Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Date June 22 1941–December 1941 Location Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Western Russia Result Strategic German failure
Belligerents
Germany, Romania, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Slovakia	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Adolf Hitler, Ion Antonescu, C.G.E. Mannerheim, Benito Mussolini, Miklós Horthy, Jozef Tiso	Joseph Stalin
Strength
~3.6 million men, 3,600 tanks, 2,700 aircraft	~2.9 million men initially, 12-15,000 tanks, 8,000 aircraft
Casualties and losses
830,903 (174,000 dead, 36,000 missing, 604,000 wounded)	Unknown, but known to be large. About 3.35 million captured.

Operation Barbarossa ([Unternehmen Barbarossa] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help)) was the codename for Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II that commenced on June 22, 1941. The operation was named after the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire, a leader of the Crusades in the 12th century; according to Nazi ideology the conquest of 'inferior races' was similarly righteous. It is not to be confused with the war on the Eastern Front in its entirety. Operation Barbarossa lasted from June 1941 to December 1941, while the war on the Eastern Front lasted from June 1941 to May 1945 when the Germans surrendered.

The original German goal was the rapid conquest of the European part of the Soviet Union, west of a line connecting the cities of Arkhangelsk and Astrakhan, often referred to as the A-A line (see the translation of Hitler's directive for details). The failure of Operation Barbarossa arguably resulted in the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany, and was a turning point for the fortunes of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Operation Barbarossa opened up the Eastern Front, which ultimately became one of the biggest theatres of war in human history alongside the Second Sino-Japanese War, with some of the largest and most brutal battles, deadliest atrocities, terrible loss of life and miserable conditions for Soviets and Germans alike.

German intentions

German propaganda made claims that the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own assault was thus presented as a pre-emptive war. Hitler's Mein Kampf ("My Struggle") makes clear his intention of an invasion of the Soviet Union. In his book, he made clear his belief that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space", i.e. land and raw materials), and that it should be found in the East. It was the stated policy of the Nazis to kill, deport, or enslave the Russian and other Slavic populations, whom they considered inferior, and to repopulate the land with Germanic peoples. This policy was called the New Order. The entire urban population was to be exterminated by starvation, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allowing their replacement by a German upper class. The German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg, who himself believed Slavs were Aryan, while preparing to implement these general ideas, suggested that conquered Soviet territory should be administered in the following Reichskommissariates:

• Ostland (The Baltic countries and Belarus)
• Ukraine (Ukraine and adjacent territories),
• Kaukasus (Southern Russia and the Caucasus area),
• Moskau (Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia)
• Turkestan (Central Asian republics and territories)

File:Wolfinsheepsclothing.PNG

A Soviet propaganda poster depicting Aesop's story The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, alluding to Operation Barbarossa. The poster captions say: "The enemy is insidious, so be alert!".

Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical Lebensraum idea ("Drang nach Osten") for the benefit of future "Aryan" generations in the centuries to come. Also the A-A Line would give Hitler's Nazi Empire reach to the Ural Mountains

The Führer anticipated additional benefits:

• When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labor shortage in the German industry could be ended by the demobilization of many soldiers.
• Ukraine would be a reliable source of agriculture.
• Having the Soviet Union as a source of slave labour would vastly improve Germany's geostrategic position.
• Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies
• The German economy needed access to oil and a push to the Soviet Baku Oilfields could achieve this objective.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had been signed shortly before the German and Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. It was ostensibly a non-aggression pact but secret protocols outlined an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the border states between them. The pact surprised the world because of their mutual hostility and their opposed ideologies. As a result of this pact, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union had reasonably strong diplomatic relations and were important trading partners. The Soviet Union supplied oil and raw materials to Germany, while Germany provided technology to the Soviet Union. Despite the pact, both sides remained strongly suspicious of each other's intentions, and as both sides began bumping up against each other in Eastern Europe it appeared that conflict was inevitable.

Hitler had long wanted to conquer western Russia in order to exploit what he saw as its untermensch (subhuman) Slavic population. He had signed the pact simply for (mutual) short-term convenience. In addition to the territorial ambitions of both Hitler and Stalin, the contrasting ideologies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union made an eventual conflict between them likely.

Stalin's reputation contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and to their faith in success. During the late 1930s, Stalin had killed and incarcerated millions of (usually innocent) citizens during the Great Purge, including large numbers of competent and experienced military officers and strategists, arguably leaving the Red Army weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often emphasized the brutality of the Soviet regime when targeting the Slavs with propaganda.

Operation Barbarossa was largely the brainchild of Hitler. Some members of his military and diplomatic staff advised finishing off Great Britain before undertaking a second front against the Soviet Union, but for the most part his General Staff agreed that an invasion would be necessary at some point. Hitler considered himself a political and military genius, and indeed at this point in the war he had achieved a series of lightning victories in the face of what appeared to be insurmountable odds, often against the advice of Germany's military leadership. His willingness to take risks, combined with the skill of the Wehrmacht, had won him first the Rhineland, Austria (Anschluss) and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia with hardly a struggle, then Poland, Denmark and Norway with only slightly more trouble. Then he had brought about the rapid collapse of France by slashing through Luxembourg north of the Maginot Line, pocketing large numbers of Allied troops, and then south to the Swiss border. The northern pocket collapsed and its troops fell back on Dunkirk. The British were driven off French soil, but Britain itself remained secure because of its naval superiority and aerial parity. Unable to force Britain's capitulation, Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the east. He was convinced that Britain would sue for peace once the Soviet Union was knocked out of the war. General Halder noted in his diaries that by destroying the Soviet Union, Germany would remove the last hope of Britain.

We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down
— Adolf Hitler

Hitler was overconfident due to his rapid success in Western Europe, as well as the Red Army's ineptitude in the Winter War against Finland 1939–40. He expected victory in a few months and did not prepare for a war lasting into the winter; his troops lacked adequate clothing and preparations for a longer campaign. The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would prove to be his undoing.

German preparations

"When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment."

Adolf Hitler [2]

In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved 3.2 million German soldiers and about 1 million Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launched many aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled material in the East. The Soviets were still taken by surprise, mostly due to Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to attack only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet leader also believed that the Nazis would likely finish their war with Britain before opening a new front. He refused to believe repeated warnings from his intelligence services on the Nazi buildup, fearing the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a war between the Nazis and the USSR. The German government also aided in this deception, telling Stalin that the troops were being moved to take them out of range of British bombers. The Germans also explained that they were trying to trick the British into thinking they were planning to attack the Soviet Union, while in fact the troops and supplies were being stockpiled for an invasion of Britain. As a result, Stalin's preparations against a possible German invasion in 1941 were half-hearted. The spy Dr. Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date; Swedish cryptanalysts led by Arne Beurling also knew the date beforehand.

The Germans set up deception operations, from April 1941, to add substance to their claims that Britain was the real target: Operations Haifisch and Harpune. These simulated preparations in Norway, the Channel coast and Britain. There were supporting activities such as ship concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises. Invasion plans were developed and some details were allowed to leak.

The Germans also closely studied Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. Napoleon had led an army of 510,000 along a central path leading to Moscow when he invaded in 1812. From the beginning, Napoleon faced stubborn resistance from Russian defenders, who burned the area before them in a scorched earth policy to deny the French food and supplies. The Grande Armée was also badly damaged by hit-and-run attack by Cossacks and conventional Russian forces operating in small units that attacked the invaders' flanks. Napoleon finally captured Moscow, only to be forced to withdraw after the burning of the city followed by a heavy winter. Only about 22,000 out of the original 510,000 survived the retreat from Moscow, and Napoleon's reputation as a military genius was shattered, paving the way to his ultimate defeat.

At Hitler's insistence, the German High Command (OKW) began to develop a strategy to avoid repeating these mistakes. The strategy Hitler and his generals agreed upon involved three separate army groups assigned to capture specific regions and large cities of the Soviet Union. The main German thrusts were conducted along historical invasion routes. Army Group North was assigned to march through the Baltics, into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg). Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk, and ultimately Moscow, marching through what is now Belarus and the west-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev, before continuing eastward over the steppes of southern Russia all the way to the Volga and the oil-rich Caucasus.

Hitler's vision was flawed from the start. In the USSR, the Wehrmacht had to conquer a vast territory quickly. The Wehrmacht was not fully motorized; it was a traditional army spearheaded by a relatively small number of highly mobile modern fighting units. The great depth and width of the front in the USSR would stretch the Wehrmacht beyond its combat power and logistic means. Hitler and the OKW relied on Blitzkrieg to solve these problems, but this method proved inadequate. The Germans underestimated Soviet military and industrial resources.

Germany had much trouble devising a strategy for Barbarossa. Hitler, the OKW and the various high commands disagreed about what the main objectives should be. In the preparation for Barbarossa, most of the OKW argued for a straight-line thrust to Moscow, whereas Hitler kept asserting his intention to seize resource-rich Ukraine and the Baltics first, before turning to Moscow. Hitler and the OKW wasted much time squabbling about strategy even as the campaign was being carried out. An initial delay, which postponed the start of Barbarossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941, may have been insignificant, especially since the Russian muddy season came late this year. However, more time was lost at various critical moments as Hitler and the OKW suspended operations in order to argue about strategic objectives.

Soviet preparations

In the 1940s, the Soviet Union was by no means a weak country. Rapid Soviet industrialization in the 1930s had resulted in industrial output second only to that of the United States, and equal to that of Nazi Germany. Production of military equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively more oriented toward military production. In the early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and promulgated in the 1936 field regulations.

Development of the armed forces of the Soviet Union from 1939 to 1941

	January 1, 1939	June 22, 1941	% increase
Divisions calculated	131.5	316.5	140.7
Personnel	2,485,000	5,774,000	132.4
Guns and mortars	55,800	117,600	110.7
Tanks	21,100	25,700	21.8
Aircraft	7,700	18,700	142.8

In 1941, the Soviet armed forces in the western districts were outnumbered by their German counterparts, 4.3 million Axis solders vs. 2.6 million Soviet soldiers.. The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July 1941, though, amounted to a little more than 5 million men 2,6 million in the west, 1,8 million in the far east with the rest being deployed or training elsewhere. Moreover, on mobilization, as the war went on the Red Army gained steadily in strength. While the strength of both sides varied, in general it is accurate to say that the 1941 campaign was fought with the Axis having numerical superiority at the front.

In some key weapons systems, however, the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable. In tanks, for example, the Red Army had a large superiority. The Red Army possessed 23,106 tanks, of which about 12,782 were in the five Western Military Districts (three of which directly faced the German invasion front). Maintenance and readiness standards were very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks needed for resupply beyond their basic fuel and ammunition loads.

Also, from 1938, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry support, but after their experiences in the Winter War and their observation of German Blitzkrieg tactics against France, had begun to emulate the Germans and organize most of their armoured assets into large, fully mechanized divisions and corps. This reorganization however was only part way through by the dawn of Barbarossa., as not enough tanks were available to bring the mechanised corps up to organic strength.

The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately-available tanks of approximately 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. The best Soviet tank, the T-34, was the most modern in the world, the KV series the best armoured. The most advanced Soviet tank models, however, the T-34 and KV-1, were not available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2% of the total Soviet tank park. But while these 1,861 modern tanks were technically superior to the 1,404 German medium Panzer III and IV tanks, the Russians in 1941 still lacked the communications, training and experience to employ such weapons effectively.

The number of aircraft and artillery pieces was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques.

The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high command had been decimated by Stalin's Great Purge (1936–1938), during which almost one-third of experienced Red Army officers and almost all of its generals were executed or shipped to Siberia, replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable." Three of the five pre-war Marshals and about two-thirds of the Corps and Division commanders were shot. This often left younger, less well-trained officers in their places; for example, in 1941, seventy-five percent of Red Army officers had held their posts for less than one year. The average Soviet Corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German Division commander. These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training necessary for their jobs.

Most Soviet units were on a peacetime footing, explaining why aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed, making easy targets for German ground-attack aircraft in the first days of the conflict. The Red air force was forbidden to shoot down German reconnaissance aircraft despite hundreds of pre-war flights into USSR airspace. The Soviet fighter force was equipped with large numbers of obsolete aircraft, such as the I-15 biplane and the I-16, and only a few of the newer MiG and LaGG fighters. Few aircraft had radios and those that were available were unencrypted and did not work reliably. Air combat tactics were primitive.

The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared, and units were often separated and without transportation to concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-designed artillery pieces, some of the guns had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely well-equipped, and also lacked training and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into combat with no arrangements for refuelling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The Army was in the midst of reorganizing the armor units into large Tank Corps, adding to the disorganization.

As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German army, the reality in the field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of equipment, insufficient motorised logistical support, and poor training placed the Red Army at a severe disadvantage. For example, throughout the early part of the campaign, the Red Army lost about six tanks for every German tank lost.

Soviet propaganda in pre-war years, of course, invariably stated that the Red Army was very strong and could easily defeat any aggressor.

File:Stalin 02.jpg

Joseph Stalin.

In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services made regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack. However, Stalin chose to ignore these warnings. Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in general and making significant preparations, he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hitler. He had fielded officers who were likely indeed to tell him only what he wanted to hear, so that he believed that the position of the Soviet Union in early 1941 was much stronger than it actually was. He also had an ill-founded confidence in the non-aggression pact, which had been signed just two years before. Last, he also suspected the British of trying to spread false rumours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR. Consequently, the Soviet border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire back without permission when attacked — though a partial alert was implemented on April 10 — they were simply not ready when the German attack came. This may be the source of the argument cited above by Viktor Suvorov.

Enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did attack. However, these forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the Red Army. In 1938 it had adopted, on the instigation of General Pavlov, a standard linear defence tactic on a line with other nations. Infantry divisions, reinforced by an organic tank component, would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones. Then came the shock of the Fall of France. The French Army, considered the strongest in the world, was defeated in a mere six weeks. Soviet analysis of events, based on incomplete information, concluded that the collapse of the French was caused by a reliance on linear defence and a lack of armoured reserves.

The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the infantry divisions would henceforth be concentrated in large formations. Most tanks would also be concentrated into 31 Mechanised Corps, each with over 1000 tanks - larger than an entire German Panzer Army (though only a few such Corps had attained their nominal strength by June 22). Should the Germans attack, their armoured spearheads would be cut off and wiped out by the mechanised corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the German infantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in Ukraine, was to be enormously reinforced to be able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German Army Group South it would swing north through Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre and North. With the complete annihilation of the encircled German Army thus made inevitable, a Red Army offensive into the rest of Europe would follow.

The Soviet offensive plans theory

Counterarguments to the usual interpretation have been advanced by former GRU defector Viktor Suvorov, author of Icebreaker. This book argues that Soviet ground forces were extremely well organized, and were mobilizing en masse all along the German-Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday July 6, 1941. The German Barbarossa, he claims, actually was a pre-emptive strike that capitalized on the massive Soviet troop concentrations immediately on Germany's borders. Suvorov argues therefore that Soviet troop concentrations on Germany's borders were offensive in nature, not defensive as usually described. His interpretation has been thoroughly rejected by various respected historians, in particular David Glantz, and has not found much serious support among Western academic historians.

However, in Eastern Europe and in Russia, the debate over the nature of the German-Soviet conflict goes on. A study by Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov (“Stalin's Missed Chance”) supports the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany. However, he rejects the statement that the German invasion was a pre-emptive strike: Meltyukhov believes both sides were preparing for the assault but neither believed in the possibility of an attack by the other side. Other Russian historians to support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov and Valeri Danilov. In key points this argumentation is similar to the interpretation of German historians Werner Maser and Joachim Hoffmann.

The now published Zhukov proposal of May 15, 1941 called for a Soviet strike against Germany. Thus the document suggested secret mobilisation and deploying Red Army troops next to the Western border, under the cover of training. Although generally believed to be a mere draft disapproved of by Stalin, the above mentioned historians have argued, that—given Stalin's concentration of power—the thesis of Soviet generals pursuing a line independent of Stalin's and composing an invasion plan must have been extremely improbable. Moreover, it is emphasised that the actual Soviet troops concentration was near the border, just like fuel depots and airfields. All of this was unsuitable for defensive operations. (Maser 1994: 376–378; Hoffmann 1999: 52–56)

Also, an indication of a planned Soviet attack were the phrasebooks and maps delivered to the troops: the maps depicted territories under German occupation and the German HQ's (whereas maps of Soviet terrain were scarce).

None of this is evidence of Soviet plans for a strategic attack on Germany. Soviet doctrine emphasised the offensive at the operational level, even if the country was strategically on the defensive.

A generally held belief is that the Wehrmacht had outnumbered the Red Army. Actually, the opposite seems to be true in many respects. According to Hoffmann, on 22 June 1941 Red Army had about 5 to 6 times as many tanks, 5 to 6 as many planes and 5 to 10 times as many artillery pieces as the German side. (Hoffmann 1999: 31)

Strength of the opposing forces on the Soviet Western border. June 22 1941

Mikhail Meltyukhov, a Russian historian, gives the following numbers in his study:

	Germany and Allies	Red Army	Ratio
Divisions	166	190	0.87 : 1
Personnel	4,306,800	3,289,851	1.3 : 1
Guns and mortars	42,601	59,787	0.7 : 1
Tanks (incl assault guns)	4,171	15,687	0.27 : 1
Aircraft	4,846	10,743	0.45 : 1

Source: Mikhail Meltyukhov “Stalin's Missed Chance” table 47,

The invasion

Opening phase (June 22, 1941 - July 3, 1941)

Main articles: Battle of Białystok-Minsk, Battle of Raseiniai, and Battle of Brody (1941)

German advances during Operation Barbarossa, 1941-06-22 to 1941-09-09.

At 3:15 am on June 22, 1941, the Axis attacked. It is difficult to precisely pinpoint the strength of the opposing sides in this initial phase, as most German figures include reserves slated for the East but not yet committed, as well as several other issues of comparability between the German and USSR's figures. A reasonable estimate is however, that roughly three million German soldiers, went into action on 22 June, and that they were facing slightly fewer Soviet troops in the border Military Districts. The contribution of the German allies would generally only begin to make itself felt somewhat further into the campaign. The surprise was complete: Stavka, alarmed by reports that German units approached the border in battle deployment, had at 00:30 AM ordered to warn the border troops that war was imminent, only a small number of units were alerted in time.

The shock of impact stemmed less from the timing of the attack however than from the sheer number of Axis troops who struck into Soviet territory all at once. Aside from the roughly 3.2 million German land forces engaged in or earmarked for the Eastern campaign, about 500,000 Romanian, Hungarian, Slovakian and Italian troops eventually accompanied the German forces, while Finland made a major contribution in the North. The Soviet forces directly facing them (not including forces in the interior and the Stavka reserve) were reinforced on such a scale that their strength had grown from roughly 2.6 million men on 22 June to more than 4 million by year's end, despite having had to make good more than 4.5 million casualties of all types.

Reconnaissance units of the Luftwaffe worked at a frantic pace to plot troop concentration, supply dumps, and airfield and marked them down for destruction. Army Group North had 18th and 16th Army and 4th Panzer Army and was deployed in East Prussia. Army Group Center had 9th and 4th Army and two Panzer Armies, the 3rd and 4th and was deployed in Poland. Army Group South was deployed in Southern Poland and Romania and it had 6th, 17th, 11th armies and 1st Panzer Army along with two Romanian Armies and several Italian, Slovakian and Hungarian Divisions.

Opposite Army Group Center were 4 Soviet Armies, 3rd, 4th, 10th and 11th. The Russians occupied a salient which jutted into German territory with its center at Bialystok. Beyond, Bialystok was Minsk which was a key railway junction. 3rd Panzer Army punched through the junction of the two Soviet fronts and crossed the River Neman and 2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Bug. While the Panzers attacked, the Infantry armies struck at the Salient and encircled Russian troops at Bialystok. The Panzer's objective was to meet at Minsk and prevent any Russian withdrawal.

Moscow failed completely to grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe that had befallen Russia. Marshall Timoshenko ordered all Soviet Forces to launch a general counter-offensive but with supply and ammunition dumps destroyed, and a complete collapse of communication, the attacks failed. Zhukov signed the infamous Directive of Peoples' Commissariat of Defence No. 3, which demanded that the Red Army start an offensive: he commanded the troops “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping near Suwalki and to seize the Suwalki region by the evening of June 26" and “to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping invading in Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction” and even “to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24.6” This manoeuver failed and unorganised Red Army units were destroyed by the Wehrmacht. Further complicating the Soviet position, on 22 June the anti-Soviet June Uprising in Lithuania began, and on the next day an independent Lithuania was proclaimed. An estimated 30,000 Lithuanian rebels engaged Soviet forces, joined by ethnic Lithuanians from the Red Army. As the Germans reached further North, armed resistance against the Soviets broke out in Estonia as well.

On June 27th, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies met up at Minsk advancing 200 miles into Soviet Territory and a third of the way to Moscow. In the vast pocket between Minsk and the Polish border, 32 Soviet Infantry and 8 Tank Divisions were encircled. Opposite Army Group North were 2 Soviet Armies. The Germans threw their 600 Tanks at the junction of the two Soviet Armies in that sector. The 4th Panzer Army's objective was to cross the River Neman and River Dvina which were the two largest obstacles en route to Leningrad. On the first day, the tanks crossed River Neman and penetrated 50 miles. Near Rasienai, the Panzers were counterattacked by 300 Soviet tanks. It took four days for the Germans to encircle and destroy the Soviet armour. The Panzers then crossed the River Dvina near Dvinsk. The Germans were now within striking distance of Leningrad, however, Hitler ordered the Panzers to hold their position while the infantry formations caught up. The orders to hold would last over a week, giving plenty of time for the Soviets to build up a defence around Leningrad.

In the south, Soviet commanders had quickly reacted to the German attack. From the start the invaders faced a determined resistance. Opposite the Germans in the South were three Soviet Armies. The German infantry armies struck at the junctions of these Armies. First Panzer Army attacked with the objective of capturing Brody. On June 26th, five Soviet Mechanized Corps with over 1,000 tanks mounted a massive counterattack on 1st Panzer Army. The battle was among the fiercest of the invasion lasting over four days; however, in the end the Germans prevailed, though the Soviets inflicted heavy losses to the First Panzer Army.

With the failure of the Soviet counteroffensive, the last substantial Soviet tank forces in the south were now used up. By the end of the first week, all three German Army groups had won major battles. But in the vast pocket in Minsk and Bialystok, the Soviets were still fighting; mopping up was causing high German casualties and many Soviets were also escaping the pocket. In the end, 290,000 Soviet soldiers were captured, 1,500 guns and 2,500 tanks were destroyed, but 250,000 Soviet troops managed to escape.

Middle phase (July 3, 1941 - October 2, 1941)

Main articles: Battle of Smolensk (1941), Battle of Uman, and Battle of Kiev (1941)

On July 3rd, Hitler finally gave the go-ahead for the Panzers to resume their drive east after the infantry divisions had caught up. However, a rainstorm typical of Russian Summers slowed down the progress and Russian defenses also stiffed. The delays gave the Soviets time to organize for a massive armour counter-attack against Army Group Center. The ultimate objective of Army Group Center was the city of Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an old Soviet defensive line held by six Armies. On July 6th, the Soviets launched an attack with 700 tanks against 3rd Panzer. The Germans defeated this counterattack using their overwhelming air superiority. The 2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dneiper and closed on Smolensk from the south while 3rd Panzer Army, after defeating the Soviet counter attack, closed in Smolensk from the north. Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet Armies. On July 26th, the Panzers closed the gap. Although 300,000 Red Army troops were captured, 200,000 managed to escape the pocket.

Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated the strength of the Soviets. Hitler had lost faith in battles of encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had continued to escape them and now believed he could defeat the Soviets by inflicting severe economic damage to them. That meant the seizure of oil fields in the South and a speedy capture of Leningrad in the North. Hitler then issued an order to send Army Group Center's tanks to the North and South, temporarily halting the drive to Moscow.

The German generals vehemently opposed the plan as the bulk of the Red Army was deployed near Moscow and an attack there would have a chance of winning the war, but Hitler was adamant and the tanks were diverted. By mid-July below the Pinsk Marshes, the Germans had come within a few miles of Kiev. The 1st Panzer Army then went South while the German 17th Army struck East and in between the Germans trapped three Soviet Armies near Uman. As the Germans eliminated the pocket, the tanks turned north and crossed the Dneiper. Meanwhile 2nd Panzer Army, diverted from Army Group Center, had crossed the River Desna with 2nd Army on its right flank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet Armies and parts of two others.

For its final attack on Leningrad, 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army Group Center. On August 8th, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses and the German 16th Army attacked to the northeast, the 18th Army cleared Estonia and advanced to Lake Pipus. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within 30 miles of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed southeast on both sides of Lake Ladoga reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.

On September 9th, Army Group North began the final push towards Leningrad and were now 7 miles from Leningrad. Hitler ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed but starved into submission. Hitler had changed his mind once again and tanks of Army Group North would be sent to Army Group Center for an all out drive to Moscow. With Army Group Center's tanks gone to reinforce Army Group North and South, it became vulnerable to increasing Soviet counter-attacks. Lacking armour, it was in no position to go on the offensive. These attacks convinced Hitler that only a drive on Moscow would defeat the Soviets. Before the attack on Moscow could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. The encirclement of Soviet Forces in Kiev was achieved on September 16th. The encircled Soviets did not give up easily, and a savage battle ensued in which the Soviets were hammered with tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment. In the end, after 10 days of vicious fighting, the Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured.

Final phase (October 2, 1941 - January 7, 1942)

Main article: Battle of Moscow

After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more reserves. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800,000 men in 83 divisions but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow, began on October 2nd. In front of Army Group Center was a series of elaborate defense lines, the first centered on Vyazma and the second on Mozhaisk.

The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise as 2nd Panzer Army returning from the south took Orel which was 75 miles behind the Soviet first defence line. Three days later the Panzers pushed on Bryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the west. Three Soviet armies were now encircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies attacked Vyazma, trapping another five Soviet armies. Moscow's first line of defence had been shattered. The pocket yielded 663,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion to three million Soviet soldiers captured. The Soviets had only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defense for Moscow.

On October 13th, 3rd Panzer Army penetrated to within 90 miles of the capital. Martial law was declared in Moscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Typhoon the weather had deteriorated steadily slowing the German advance on Moscow to as little as 2 miles a day. On October 31st, the Germany Army High Command ordered a halt to Operation Typhoon while the armies were re-organized. The pause gave the Soviets time to reinforce, and in little over a month the Soviets would organize eleven new armies which included 30 divisions of the well-trained and well-equipped Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalin there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. With the Siberian forces would come over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.

On November 15th, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once again began the attack on Moscow. Facing the Germans were six Soviet armies. The Germans intended to let 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the northeast. 2nd Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south. As the Soviets would react to the flanks, 4th Army would smash in the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting, the Germans slowly crept towards the Moscow. However, in the South, 2nd Panzer Army was being blocked. On November 22nd, Soviet Siberian units attacked the 2nd Panzer Army in the South and inflicted a defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement of Moscow.

On December 2nd, the 4th Panzer Army had penetrated to within 15 miles of Moscow, but by then the first blizzards of the winter began. The Wehrmacht was not equipped for winter warfare. Frostbite and disease caused more casualties than combat, and dead and wounded had already reached 155,000 in three weeks. Some divisions were now at fifty percent strength. The bitter cold also caused severe problems for their guns and equipment, and weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe. Newly built up Soviet units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men and on December 5th they launched a massive counter attack which pushed the Germans back over 200 miles. The invasion of the USSR had cost the Germans over 250,000 dead and 500,000 wounded.

Later events

It is sometimes argued that the fatal decision of the operation was the postponement from the original date of May 15 because Hitler wanted to intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia and Greek advances against Mussolini's occupation of Albania. However, this was just one of the reasons for the postponement — the other was the late spring of 1941 in Russia, compounded by particularly rainy weather during June 1941 which made a number of roads in western parts of the Soviet Union impassable to heavy vehicles. During the campaign, Hitler ordered the main thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward in order to help the southern army group capture Ukraine. This move delayed the assault on the Soviet capital, although it also helped to secure Army Group Center's southern flank. By the time they turned their sights on Moscow, the fierce resistance of the Red Army, assisted by the mud following the autumn rains and eventually the winter snowfall, ground their advance to a halt.

In addition, resistance by the Soviets, who proclaimed a Great Patriotic War in defence of the motherland, was much fiercer than the German command had expected. The border fortress of Brest, Belarus illustrates that tenacity: attacked on the very first day of the German invasion, the fortress was expected to be captured by surprise within hours, but held out for weeks (Soviet propaganda later asserted that it held out for six weeks). German logistics also became a major problem, as supply lines became very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the rear. The Soviets carried out a scorched earth policy on some of the land they were forced to abandon in order to deny the Germans the use of food, fuel, and buildings.

Despite the setbacks, the Germans continued to advance, often destroying or surrounding whole armies of Soviet troops and forcing them into surrender. The battle for Kiev was especially brutal. On September 19, Army Group South seized control of Kiev, and took 665,000 Soviets prisoner. Kiev was later awarded the title Hero City for its heroic defence.

Army Group North, which was to conquer the Baltic countries and eventually Leningrad, advanced as far as the southern outskirts of Leningrad by August 1941. There, fierce Soviet resistance stopped it. Since capturing the city seemed too costly, German command decided to starve the city to death by a blockade, starting the Siege of Leningrad. The city held out, despite several attempts by the Germans to break through its defenses, unrelenting air and artillery attacks, and severe shortages of food and fuel, until the Germans were driven back again from the city's approaches in early 1944. Leningrad was the first Soviet city to receive the title of 'Hero City'.

In addition to the main attacks of Barbarossa, German forces occupied Finnish Petsamo in order to secure important nickel mines. They also launched the beginning of a series of attacks against Murmansk on June 28 1941. That assault was known as Operation Silberfuchs.

Causes of initial Soviet defeats

The overall reason that the Soviet Army was so badly defeated in 1941 was that they were ill-prepared for the Axis surprise attack. The Axis armed forces were, in 1941, the most experienced and well-trained in the world. They had a doctrine of mobility and annihilation, excellent communications (c3) and the confidence that comes from repeated low-cost victories. The Soviet armed forces, in contrast, lacked leadership, training, and readiness. Much of their planning assumed that no war would take place before 1942; thus the Axis attack came at a time when new organizations and promising, but untested, weapons were just beginning to trickle into operational units. Also, a large part of the Soviet Army in Europe was concentrated along the new western Soviet border in former Polish territory, which lacked significant defences, so it was overrun and destroyed in the first weeks of war. Initially, many Soviet units were also hampered by Timoshenko and Zhukov's prewar orders (as demanded by Stalin) of non-engaging and "non-responding to provocations", followed by the first reaction "stand-and-fight-then-counterattack" order from Moscow (which left them vulnerable to German encirclements), a lack of experienced officers, and bureaucratic inertia.

The initial tactical errors of the Soviets in the first few weeks of the Axis offensive proved catastrophic. Initially, the Red Army was fooled by a complete overestimation of its own capabilities. The Mechanised Corps were ambushed and were themselves destroyed after Luftwaffe dive bombers inflicted heavy losses. Soviet tanks, poorly maintained and driven by inexperienced drivers, also suffered from an appalling breakdown rate. A lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a logistical collapse. The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous. Without tanks and lacking sufficient motorisation, Soviet troops were incapable of waging mobile maneuver warfare against the Germans and their allies.

Then Stalin issued orders to his troops not to retreat or surrender, resulting in a return to static linear positions which the German tanks still easily breached, again quickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies. Only later did Stalin allow his troops to retreat to the rear wherever possible and regroup to mount a defence in depth or to counterattack. More than 2.4 million Soviet troops had been taken prisoner by December 1941, when German and Soviet forces fought in the suburbs of Moscow.

Despite the failure of the Axis to achieve Barbarossa's initial goals, the huge Soviet losses caused a shift in Soviet propaganda. Whereas in pre-war years the government had stated that the Soviet army was very strong, by autumn it took the line that the Soviet army had been weak, that there had not been enough time to prepare for war, and that the German attack had come as a surprise.

An alternative explanation is given by Viktor Suvorov in his book Icebreaker. According to Suvorov, being larger and better equipped Soviet armed forces were getting ready for their own surprise offensive on Axis forces, especially their oil supplies in Romania. Suvorov's sources suggest that a possible date for Soviet Operation "Thunderstorm" has been set to July 6, 1941 - two weeks later than the actual German invasion. Russian historian Boris Sokolov exploring the pre-war Soviet planning has also concluded that after the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the counterblows were undertaken by the Red Army within the framework of the planned offensive operations, and the subsequent defensive operations of the Red Army, in view of the absence of pre-war defensive plans, were improvised. Hence the initial gigantic defeats.

Outcome

File:WW2 MoscowBattle russian soldiers.jpg

The Battle of Moscow.

The climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Centre, already short on supplies because of the October mud, was ordered to advance on Moscow; forward units came within sight of the spires of the Kremlin in early December 1941. This was as close as they would ever get, for Stalin's troops, well supplied and reinforced by fresh divisions from Siberia, defended Moscow ferociously in the Battle of Moscow, and drove the Germans back as the winter advanced. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the counter-offensive was directed at Army Group Center, which was closest to Moscow. Moscow later also received the distinction of Hero City.

With no shelter, few supplies, inadequate winter clothing, chronic food shortages, and nowhere to go, German troops had no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland. The Germans managed to avoid being routed by Soviet counterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and from exposure.

At the time, the seizure of Moscow was considered the key to victory for Germany. Historians currently debate whether or not loss of the Soviet capital would have caused the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve that goal. In December 1941, Germany joined Japan in declaring war against the United States. Within six months, the strategic position of Germany had become desperate, since German military industries were unprepared for a long war.

The outcome of Operation Barbarossa was at least as detrimental to the Soviets as it was to the Germans, however. Although the Germans had failed to take Moscow outright, they held huge areas of the western Soviet Union, including the entire regions of what are now Belarus, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, plus parts of Russia proper west of Moscow. The Germans held up to 500,000 sq.mi. of territory with over 75 million people at the end of 1941, and would go on to seize another 250,000 sq. mi. before being forced to retreat after military defeats such as Stalingrad and Kursk. However, the occupied areas were not always properly controlled by the Germans and underground activity rapidly escalated. Wehrmacht occupation had been brutal from the start, since it was influenced by the racist credo of Nazi leader Alfred Rosenberg, who considered Slavic peoples as an inferior race of untermenschen destined to elimination. This attitude immediately alienated much of the population from the Nazis, while in some areas at least (for example in Ukraine) it seems that some local people had been ready to consider the Germans as liberators helping them to get rid of Stalin. Anti-German partisan operations intensified when the Russian army units which had dissolved into the country's large uninhabited areas remerged as underground forces, which intensified the repressive policies of the German armies. The Germans also held on as stubbornly as possible in the face of Soviet counterattacks, resulting in huge casualties on each side in many battles.

The war on the Eastern Front went on for four bloody years. The death toll may never be established with any degree of certainty. Estimates of Soviet military deaths alone vary from roughly 8.5 million to as much as 15 million. Soviet civilian deaths remain under contention, though roughly 20 million is a frequently cited figure. German military deaths are also not clarified to a large extent. The highest and most recent estimate (Rüdiger Overmans) concluded that about 4.3 million Germans and a further 900,000 Axis forces lost their lives either in combat or in Soviet captivity.

Stalin deported to labour camps German POWs and Soviet soldiers who had previously been captured by Germans. Ethnic groups were also deported en masse to the east and to concentration camps. Examples include: in September 1941, 439,000 Volga Germans (as well as more than 300,000 other Germans from various locations) were deported mainly to Kazahkstan as their autonomous republic was abolished by Stalin's decree; in May 1944, 182,000 Crimean Tatars were deported from the Crimea to Uzbekistan; and the complete deportation of Chechens (393,000) and Ingushs (91,000) to Kazahkstan took place in 1944 (see Population transfer in the Soviet Union).

Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa

The main causes of German failure were the underestimated capabilities of the Soviet Union and the fierce resistance of the Soviet Army.

The grave situation in which the beleaguered German army found itself towards the end of 1941 was due to the increasing strength of the Red Army, compounded by a number of factors which in the short run severely restricted the effectiveness of the German forces. Chief among these were their overstretched deployment, a serious transport crisis affecting supply and movement and the eroded strength of most divisions. The infantry deficit that appeared by 1 September 1941 was never made good. For the rest of the war in the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht would be short of infantry and support services.

Parallels have been drawn with Napoleon's invasion of Russia.

Underestimated Soviet potential

German war planners grossly underestimated the mobilisation potential of the Red Army: its primary mobilisation size (i.e. the total of already trained units that could be put on a war-footing in short time) was about twice as large as they had expected. By early August, new armies had taken the place of the destroyed ones. This fact alone implied the failure of Operation Barbarossa, for the Germans now had to limit their operations for a month to bring up new supplies, leaving only six weeks to complete the battle before the start of the mud season, an impossible task. On the other hand, the Red Army proved capable of replacing its huge losses in a timely fashion, and was not destroyed as a coherent force. When the divisions consisting of conscripts trained before the war were destroyed, they were replaced by new ones, on average about half a million men being drafted each month for the duration of the war. It was this Soviet ability to mobilise vast (if often badly trained and equipped) forces within a short time and on a continual basis which allowed the Soviet Union to survive the critical first six months of the war, and the grave underestimation of this capacity which rendered German planning unrealistic.

In addition, data collected by Soviet intelligence excluded the possibility of a war with Japan, which allowed the Soviets to transfer forces from the Far East to the European theatre.

The German High Command grossly underestimated the effective control the central Soviet government exercised. The German High Command incorrectly believed the Soviet government was ineffective. The Germans based their hopes of quick victory on the belief the Soviet communist system was like a rotten structure which would collapse from a hard blow. In fact, the Soviet system proved resilient and surprisingly adaptable. In the face of early crushing defeats, the Soviets managed to dismantle entire industries threatened by the German advance. These critical factories, along with the skilled workers, were transported by rail to secure locations beyond the reach of the German army. Despite the loss of raw materials and the chaos of an invasion, the Soviets managed to build new factories in sufficient numbers to allow the mass production of needed war machines. The Soviets proved very skilled in raising and training many new armies from the different ethnic populations of the far flung republics. The Soviet government was never in danger of collapse and remained at all times in tight control of the Soviet war effort.

The Germans treated Soviet prisoners with brutality and exhibited cruelty toward overrun Soviet populations. The effect of this treatment instilled a deep hatred in the hearts and minds of the Soviet citizens. Hatred of the Germans enabled the Soviet government to extract a level of sacrifice from the Soviet population unheard of in Western nations.

The Germans underestimated the Soviet people as well. The German high command viewed the Soviet soldiers as incompetent and considered the average citizen as an inferior human being. German soldiers were stunned by the ferocity with which the Red Army fought. German planners were amazed at the level of suffering the Soviet citizens could endure and still work and fight.

Failure to correctly appraise the enemy and plan accordingly was a key reason German plans failed, but then the question arises: would Germany have attacked if it had correctly estimated Soviet potential?

And even if the Germans had fulfilled the original plan—reached the Arkhangelsk–Volga line—it probably would not have ended the war. The Soviet Union still had vast reserves in the eastern part of the country and managed to move its war industry to the Urals, Central Asia, and Siberia, so the war could have continued for a long time.

Also, Soviet technological superiority played an important role in the failure of Wehrmacht. Notable is the superiority of Soviet T-34 tanks and KV series of tanks over virtually any German tank; this technical advantage, however, had little effect on the outcome of the campaign.

Faults of logistical planning

The start of the war, in the dry summer, was the most favorable for the Germans, as they took the Soviets by surprise and destroyed a large part of the Soviet army in the first weeks. When favorable weather conditions gave way to the harsh conditions of the fall and winter and the Soviet Army recovered, the German offensive began to falter. The German army could not be sufficiently supplied for prolonged combat; indeed there was simply not enough fuel available to let the whole of the army reach its intended objectives.

This was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation, but their warnings were disregarded. The entire German plan was based on the premise that within five weeks the German troops would have attained full strategic freedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army. Only then would it have been possible to divert necessary logistic support to the fuel requirements of the few mobile units needed to occupy the defeated state.

German infantry and tanks stormed 300 miles ahead in the first week, but their supply lines struggled to keep up. Russian railroads could at first not be used due to a difference in railway gauges, until a sufficient supply of trains were seized. The railroad tracks and convoys of slow-moving vehicles were also favorite targets of Soviet partisans, although partisan activity was still low in 1941. Lack of supplies significantly slowed down the blitzkrieg.

The German logistical planning also seriously overestimated the condition of the Soviet transportation network. The road and railway network of former Eastern Poland was well known, but beyond that information was limited. Roads that looked impressive on maps turned out to be just mere dust roads or were only in the planning stages.

Weather

A paper published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hitler's plans miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather. So confident of quick victory was he, he did not prepare for even the possibility of winter warfare in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23 percent of its average strength of 3,200,000 troops) during the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 November 1941, General Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported that "We are at the end of our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of deep winter."

The German forces were not prepared to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of the USSR. In autumn, the terrain slowed the Wehrmacht’s progress. Few roads were paved. The ground in the USSR was very loose sand in the summer, sticky muck in the autumn, and heavy snow during the winter. The German tanks had narrow treads with little traction and poor flotation in mud. In contrast, the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV were far more mobile. The 600,000 large western European horses the Germans used for supply and artillery movement did not cope well with this weather. The small ponies used by the Red Army were much better adapted to this climate and could even scrape the icy ground with their hooves to dig up the weeds beneath.

German troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in the autumn and winter of 1941. Equipment had been prepared for such winter conditions, but the ability to move it up front over the severely overstrained transport network did not exist. Consequently, the troops were not equipped with adequate cold-weather gear, and some soldiers had to pack newspapers into their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to record levels of at least -30°C (-22°F). To operate furnaces and heaters, the Germans also burned precious fuel that was difficult to re-supply. Soviet soldiers often had warm, quilted uniforms, felt-lined boots, and fur hats.

Some German weapons malfunctioned in the cold. Lubricating oils were unsuitable for extreme cold, resulting in engine malfunction and misfiring weapons. To load shells into a tank’s main gun, frozen grease had to be chipped off with a knife. Soviet units faced less severe problems due to their experience with cold weather. Aircraft were supplied with insulating blankets to keep their engines warm while parked. Lighter-weight oil was used. Gasoline, which powered all German tanks and most of their trucks, was subject to freezing in the harsh winters. Most Soviet trucks and pre-war tanks also used gasoline, but diesel fuel used in the new-generation of Soviet tanks did not freeze in winter.

A common myth is that the combination of deep mud, followed by snow, stopped all military movement in the harsh Russian winter. In fact, military operations were slowed by these factors, but much more so on the German side than on the Soviet side. The Soviet December 1941 counteroffensive advanced up to 100 miles in some sectors, demonstrating that mobile warfare was still possible under winter conditions.

When the severe winter began, Hitler became fearful of a repeat of Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow, and quickly ordered the German forces to hold their ground defiantly wherever possible in the face of Soviet counterattacks. This became known as the "stand or die" order. This prevented the Germans from being routed, but resulted in heavy casualties from battle and cold.

See also

• Eastern Front (World War II)
• Continuation War, the war at Finnish front
• Operation Silberfuchs, the attack on the Soviet Arctic.
• Molotov Line, incomplete Soviet defence line at the start of Operation Barbarossa.
• Operation Nördlich, German attack against Leningrad.
• Operation Blaufuchs, German–Finnish general operational plans.
• Operation Lachsfang, the German–Finnish attack against the Murmansk–Soroka (Belomorsk) railway line.
• Jänisjärvi Offensive, Finnish strike against Russians in Ladoga Karelia, in July 10 1941.
• Captured Tanks and Armoured cars for German use in Russian Front
• Captured German equipment in Soviet use in Eastern front

References and further reading

• Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, edited by John Erickson and David Dilks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7486-0504-5); 1998 (paperback, ISBN 0-7486-1111-8).
• Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian–German Conflict, 1941–45. New York: Willam Morrow & Co., 1965.
• Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad. London: Cassell Military, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0304365416).
• Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan. "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa", War in History, Vol. 11, Issue 1. (2004), pp. 61–103.
• Farrell, Brian P. "Yes, Prime Minister: Barbarossa, Whipcord, and the Basis of British Grand Strategy, Autumn 1941", The Journal of Military History, Vol. 57, No. 4. (1993), pp. 599–625.
• From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939–1941 edited by Bernd Wegner. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997 (hardcover, ISBN 1-57181-882-0).
  • Reviewed by Peter Konecny, Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 34 Issue 2. (Aug., 1999) pp. 288–290.
• Glantz, David M. Barbarossa: Hitler's invasion of Russia, 1941. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2001 (paperback, ISBN 0-7524-1979-X).
• Glantz, David M. Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1998 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7006-0879-6).
• Glantz, David M. Colossus Reborn: the Red Army at War, 1941–1943. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7006-1353-6).
• Gorodetsky, Gabriel Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2001 (paperback, ISBN 0300084595).
• Hoffmann, Joachim. Stalin's War of Extermination. Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-9679856-8-4).
• Kershaw, Robert J. War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa, 1941/42. Shepperton: Ian Allan, 2000 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7110-2734-X).
• Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1): Army Group South. Oxford: Osprey, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 1-84176-697-6).
• Kirchubel, Robert. Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North. Oxford: Osprey, 2005 (paperback, ISBN 1-84176-857-X).
• Koch, H.W. "Hitler's 'Programme' and the Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa'", The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4. (1983), pp. 891–920.
• Latimer, Jon, Deception in War, London: John Murray, 2001
• Lubbeck, William; Hurt, David B. At Leningrad's Gates: The Story of a Soldier with Army Group North. Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1-932033-55-6).
• Macksey, Kenneth. Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority. London: Greenhill Books, 1999 (paperback, ISBN 1853673838).
• Maser, Werner. Der Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. München: Olzog, 1994 (hardcover, ISBN 3-7892-8260-X); München: Heyne, 2001 (paperback, ISBN 3453117646).
• Megargee, Geoffrey P. War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littelefield, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7425-4481-8; paperback, ISBN 0-7425-4482-6).
• Murphy, David E. What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 0-300-10780-3); 2006 (paperback, ISBN 0-300-11981-X).
  • Reviewed by Robert Conquest at The American Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 2. (2006), p. 591.
• Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (hardcover, ISBN 0-618-36701-2).
• Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945, compiled and translated by Steven H. Newton. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-306-81247-9); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-306-81409-9).
  • Reviewed by David R. Snyder in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 1. (2005), pp. 265–266.
• Rees, Laurence. War of the Century: When Hitler Fought Stalin. New York: New Press, 1999 (hardcover, ISBN 1-56584-599-4).
• Soviet casualties and combat losses in the twentieth century, edited by G.F. Krivosheev. London: Greenhill Books, 1997 (hardcover, ISBN 1-85367-280-7). Available on-line in Russian.
• Stolfi, R.H.S. German Panzers on the Offensive: Russian Front. North Africa, 1941–1942. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 0-7643-1770-9).
• Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59797-114-6).
• Weeks, Albert L. Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).
• Wieczynski, Joseph L.; Fox, J.P. "Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on The Soviet Union, June 22, 1941", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 74, No. 2. (1996), pp. 344–346.
• Ziemke, Earl F. Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987; New York: Military Heritage Press, 1988 (hardcover, ISBN 0880292946).
• Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1966; Honolulu, HA: University Press of the Pacific, 2003 (paperback, ISBN 1410204146).
• Мельтюхов, М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина. Советский Союз и борьба за Европу: 1939–1941 (Документы, факты, суждения). Москва: Вече, 2000.
• Суворов, В. Последняя республика: Почему Советский Союз проиграл Вторую Мировую войну. Москва: AST, 2003 (hardcover, ISBN 5170078765).

• lt. Kolobanov and KV-2. Notable engagements of KV series against outnumbering enemy forces: http://wio.ru/tank/ww2tank.htm

External links

• Relationship between the campaigns in the Balkans and the invasion of Russia and associated timeline on a US Army website
• Multimedia map—Covers the invasion of Russia including Operation Barbarossa
• Operation Barbarossa—Detailed analysis of the operation by author Bevin Alexander.
• Over 2,000 original German WWII soldier photographs from the Eastern Front, Part 1 and Part 2
• Lengthy narrative of the war with analysis, Operation Barbarossa Revisited