Mohammad Mosaddegh

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Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq

Mohammad Mosaddeq () (Template:PerB Moḥammad Moṣaddeq, also Mosaddegh or Mossadegh) (16 June 1882 – 5 March 1967) served as the Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953. A prominent parlimentarian when Prime Minister Ali Razmara was assassinated in 1951, he was twice appointed to that office by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, after a positive vote of inclination by the parliament. Mossadegh was a nationalist and passionately opposed foreign intervention in Iran. He was also the architect of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which had been under British control through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), today known as British Petroleum (BP).

He was eventually removed from power on August 19, 1953, in a coup d'état, supported and funded by the British and U.S. governments and led by General Fazlollah Zahedi . The American operation came to be known as Operation Ajax in America, after its CIA cryptonym, and as the "28 Mordad 1332" coup in Iran, after its date on the Iranian calendar. Dr. Mosaddeq was imprisoned for three years and subsequently put under house arrest until his death.

In Iran and many countries, Mosaddeq is widely considered a hero of anti-imperialism and victim of imperialist greed. However a number of scholars and historians believe that alongside the plotting of the UK and US, a major factor in his overthrow was Mossadeq's loss of support among Shia clerics and the traditional middle class, brought on by his increasingly radical and secular policies and by their fear of a communist takeover.

Early life

Mohammad Mossadegh was born in 1882 in Tehran to an Ashtian Bakhtiari finance minister and a Qajar princess. When his father died in 1892, he was appointed the tax collector of the Khorasan province and was bestowed with the title of "Mossadegh-os-Saltaneh" by Nasser al-Din Shah.

Education

Dr. Mossadegh received his B.A. and Masters in (International) Law from University of Paris (Sorbonne) before pursuing higher education in Switzerland. He received his Ph.D. in 1914 following a bachelor of economics in 1916. Mosaddeq also taught at the University of Tehran before entering his political career.

Early political career

Mossadegh started his career in Iranian politics with the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, when at the age of 24, he was elected from Isfahan to the newly inaugurated Persian Parliament, the Majlis of Iran. In 1920, after being self-exiled to Switzerland in protest of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, he was invited by the new Persian Prime Minister, Hassan Pirnia (Moshir-ed-Dowleh), to become his "Minister of Justice"; but while enroute to Tehran, he was asked by the people of Shiraz to become Governor of the "Fars" Province. He was later appointed Finance Minister, in the government of Ahmad Ghavam (Ghavam os-Saltaneh) in 1921, and then Foreign Minister, in the government of Moshir-ed-Dowleh in June 1923. He then became Governor of the "Azerbaijan" Province. Later, in 1923, he was re-elected to the Majlis and voted against the selection of the Prime Minister Reza Khan as the new Shah of Persia.

By 1944, Reza Shah Pahlavi had abdicated, and Mossadegh was once again elected to parliament. This time he took the lead of Jebhe Melli (National Front of Iran), an organization he had founded with nineteen others like Dr.Hossein Fatemi, Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Ali Shayegan and Karim Sanjabi, aiming to establish democracy and end the foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially by nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) operations in Iran.

Prime Minister General Haj-Ali Razmara, elected in June 1950, opposed the nationalization bill on technical grounds. Razmara was assassinated on 7 March 1951, by Khalil Tahmasebi, a member of the militant fundamentalist group Fadayan-e Islam.

Prime Minister

After negotiations for higher oil royalties failed, on 15 March and 20 March 1951, the Iranian Majlis and Senate voted to nationalize the British-owned and operated AIOC, taking control of Iran's oil industry.

On 28 April 1951, the Majlis named Mossadegh as new prime minister by a vote of 79-12. With the assassination of Prime Minister Ali Razmara in March, and aware of Mossadegh's rising popularity and political power, the young Shah appointed Mossadegh to the Premiership. Shortly after coming to office, Mossadegh enforced the Oil Nationalization Act, cancelling the AIOC’s oil concession due to expire in 1993 and expropriating the AIOC's assets.

In retaliation, the British government announced a de facto blockade. It threatened legal action against purchers of oil produced in the formerly British-controlled refineries and sent gunboats to the Persian Gulf. The AIOC withdrew its technicians so that many of the refineries lacked properly trained technicians that were needed to continue production. An economic stalemate thus ensued, with Mossadegh's government refusing to allow any British involvement in Iran's oil industry, and Britain refusing to allow any oil to leave Iran.

Since Britain had long been Iran's primary oil-consumer and producer, the stalemate was particularly hard on Iran. While the country had once boasted over a US$100 million a year in exports to Britain, after nationalization, the same oil industry began increasing Iran's debt by nearly US$120 million a year. The Abadan Crisis quickly plunged the country into economic difficulties.

Despite the economic hardships of his policy, Mossadegh remained popular, and in 1952, was approved by parliament for a second term. Sensing the difficulties of a worsening political and economic climate, he announced that he would ask the Shah to grant him emergency powers. Thus, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mossadegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the prime minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff. The Shah refused, and Mossadegh announced his resignation.

Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new prime minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute. This blatant reversal of Mossadegh's plans sparked a massive public outrage. Protesters of all stripes filled the streets, including communists and radical Muslims led by Ayatollah Kashani. Frightened by the unrest, the Shah dismissed Qavam, and re-appointed Mossadegh, granting him the full control of the military he had previously demanded.

Taking advantage of his popularity, Mossadegh convinced the parliament to grant him increased powers and appointed Ayatollah Kashani as house speaker. Kashani's Islamic scholars, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mossadegh's key political allies, although both relationships were often strained. The already precarious alliance between Mossadegh and Kashani was severed in January 1953, when Kashani opposed Mossadegh's demand that his increased powers be extended for a period of one year.

Mossadegh quickly implemented more sociopolitical changes. Iran's centuries-old feudal agriculture sector was abolished and replaced with a system of collective farming and government land ownership. Although Mossadegh had previously been opposed to these policies when implemented unilaterally by the Shah, he saw it as a means of checking the power of the Tudeh Party, which had been agitating for general land reform among the peasants.

Overthrow of Mossadegh

Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état

Plot to depose Mossadegh

Soldiers surround the Parliament building in Tehran on 19 August 1953.

The government of the United Kingdom had grown increasingly distressed over Mossadegh's policies and were especially bitter over the loss of their control of the Iranian oil industry. Repeated attempts to reach a settlement had failed.

Unable to resolve the issue singlehandedly due to its post-World War II problems, Britain looked towards the United States to settle the issue. The United States was led to believe by the British that Mossadegh was increasingly turning towards communism and was moving Iran towards the Soviet sphere at a time of high Cold War fears.

Acting on the opposition to Mossadegh by the British government and fears that he was, or would become, dependent on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party at a time of expanding Soviet influence, the United States and Britain began to publicly denounce Mossadegh's policies for Iran as harmful to the country.

Operation Ajax

In October 1952, Mossadegh declared that Britain was "an enemy", and cut all diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. In November and December 1952, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the prime minister should be ousted. The new US administration under Dwight D. Eisenhower and the British government under Winston Churchill agreed to work together toward Mossadegh's removal. In March 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was headed by his younger brother Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mossadegh.

On April 4, 1953, CIA director Dulles approved US$1 million to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh." Soon the CIA's Tehran station started to launch a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. Finally, according to The New York Times, in early June, American and British intelligence officials met again, this time in Beirut, and put the finishing touches on the strategy. Soon afterward, according to his later published accounts, the chief of the CIA's Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. the grandson of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, arrived in Tehran to direct it..In 2000, The New York Times made partial publication of a leaked CIA document titled, "Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran – November 1952-August 1953." This document describes the planning and execution conducted by the American and British governments. The New York Times published this critical document with the names censored. The New York Times also limited its publication to scanned image (bitmap) format, rather than machine-readable text. This document was eventually published properly – in text form, and fully unexpurgated. The complete CIA document is now web published. The word 'blowback' appeared for the very first time in this document.

The plot, known as Operation Ajax, centered around convincing Iran's monarch to use his constitutional authority to dismiss Mossadegh from office, as he had attempted some months earlier. But the Shah was uncooperative, and it would take much persuasion and many meetings to successfully execute the plan.

Mossadegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government. Soon Pro-Mossadegh supporters, both socialists and nationalists, threatened Muslim leaders with "savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh," with impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community. Mossadegh then moved to dissolve parliament, in spite of the Constitutional provision which gave the Shah sole authority to dissolve Parliament. After taking the additional step of abolishing the Constitutional guarantee of a “secret ballot”, Mossadegh’s victory in the national plebiscite was assured. The electorate was forced into a non-secret ballot and Mossadegh won 99.93% of the vote. The tactics employed by Mossadegh to remain in power were dictatorial in their result, playing into the hands of those who wished to see him removed. Parliament was suspended indefinitely, and Mossadegh's emergency powers were extended.

Inside Iran, Mossadegh's popularity was eroding as promised reforms failed to materialize and his crackdown engendered resentment from the people. His policy of collective farming had been a disaster , which further increased his unpopularity with the Iranian public. The Tudeh Party abandoned its alliance with Mossadegh, as did the conservative clerical factions.

Shah's exile

Shaban jafari in Tehran on 19 August 1953.

In August 1953, Mossadegh attempted to convince the Shah to leave the country and allow him control over the government. The Shah refused, and formally dismissed the Prime Minister. Mossadegh refused to leave, however, and when it became apparent that he was going to fight to overthrow the monarchy, the Shah, as a precautionary measure, flew to Baghdad and from there to Rome, Italy, after signing two decrees, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other nominating General Fazlollah Zahedi Prime Minister.

Coup d'etat

Once again, massive protests broke out across the nation. Anti- and pro-monarchy protestors violently clashed in the streets, leaving almost 300 dead. The pro-monarchy forces, led by retired army General and former Minister of Interior in Mossadegh's cabinet, Fazlollah Zahedi and street thugs like Shaban Jafari (also known as Shaban "the Brainless") , gained the upper hand on 19 August 1953 (28 Mordad). The military intervened as the pro-Shah tank regiments stormed the capital and bombarded the prime minister's official residence. Mossadegh managed to flee from the mob that set in to ransack his house, and, the following day, surrendered to General Zahedi, who had meanwhile established his makeshift headquarters at the Officers' Club. Dr. Mossadegh was arrested at the Officers' Club and transferred to a military jail shortly after.

Shah's return

Shortly after the return of the Shah, on 22 August 1953, from the brief self-imposed exile in Rome, Mossadegh was tried by a military tribunal for high treason. Zahedi and the Shah were inclined, however, to spare the man's life (the death penalty would have applied according to the laws of the day). Mossadegh received a sentence of 3 years in solitary confinement at a military jail and was exiled to his village not far from Tehran, where he remained under house arrest on his estate until his death, on 5 March 1967.

Zahedi's new government soon reached an agreement with foreign oil companies to form a "Consortium" and "restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities."

Legacy

Iran

The overthrow of Mossadeq served as a rallying point in anti-US protests during the 1979 Iranian revolution and to this day is said to be one of the most popular figures in Iranian history. Despite this he is generally ignored by the government of the Islamic Republic because of his secularism and western manners.

The withdrawal of support for Mossadeq by the powerful Shia clergy's has been regarded as having been motivated by their fear of the "chaos" of "a communist takeover." Some argue that while many elements of Mossadeq's coalition abandoned him it was the loss of support from Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani and other clergy that was fatal to his cause, reflective of the dominance of the ulama in Iranian society and a portent of the Islamic Revolution to come. "The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mossadeq's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement" in Iran.

U.S. and other countries

Prime Minister Mossadeq with President Truman

The extent of the U.S.'s role in Mossadeq's overthrow was not formally acknowledged for many years, although the Eisenhower administration was quite vocal in its opposition to the policies of the ousted Iranian Prime Minister. In his memoirs, Eisenhower writes angrily about Mossadeq, and describes him as impractical and naive, though he stops short of admitting any overt involvement in the coup.

Eventually the CIA's role became well-known, and caused controversy within the organization itself, and within the CIA congressional hearings of the 1970s. CIA supporters maintain that the plot against Mossadegh was strategically necessary, and praise the efficiency of agents in carrying out the plan. Critics say the scheme was paranoid and colonial, as well as immoral.

In March 2000, then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated her regret that Mossadegh was ousted: "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America." In the same year, the New York Times published a detailed report about the coup based on alleged CIA documents.

For his sudden rise in popularity inside and outside of Iran, and for his defiance of the British, Mossadegh was named as Time Magazine's 1951 Man of the Year. Other notables considered for the title that year included Dean Acheson, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Douglas MacArthur.

In early 2004, the Egyptian government changed a street name in Cairo from Pahlavi to Mosaddeq, to facilitate closer relations with Iran. He was good friends with Mohammad Mokri until his death.

Mosaddeq in the media

Mohammad Mosaddeq plays an important role in the 2003 TV production Soraya, which deals with the life of the Shah's second wife and former Queen of Iran, Princess Soraya Esfandiary Bakhtiari. Mosaddeq's role is played by Claude Brasseur.

See also

• List of Iranian Intellectuals

Further reading

• Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism : essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley : University of California Press, c1993. 0-520-08173-0
• Farhad Diba, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography. London: Croom Helm, 1986, ISBN 0-7099-4517-5
• Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8156-2642-8
• Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, ISBN 0-8014-2412-7
• Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954, Columbia University Press,1997, ISBN 0-231-10819-2
• Farman Farmaian, Sattareh with Dona Munker 2006. Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's Harem through the Islamic Revolution. New York: Three Rivers Press. ISBN-10: 0-307-33974-2
• Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
• Id., Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, Times Books, 2006, ISBN 0-8050-7861-4
• Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-300-09856-1
• Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, I B Tauris & Co, 1991, ISBN 1-850-43210-4
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Translated into Persian as Mosaddegh va Coup de Etat by Ali Morshedizad, Ghasidehsara Pub. Co.
• Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 261-286 (1987). JSTOR

External links

• Template:Fa icon Ardeshir Zahedi website contains number of articles related to Mossadegh
• The Mohammad Mossadegh Project - Site containing pictures, media and biography of Mossadegh
• James Risen: Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran -- A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79). The New York Times, 16 April 2000.
• New York Times Archive containing declassified US intelligence Documents on the Coup of 1953
• In Memory of August 19, 1953 by Sasan Fayazmanesh, 18 August 2003.
• Mossadegh's photo album
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran Book and declassified documents from the National Security Archive, 22 June 2004
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup - U.S. National Security Archive
• An alternative view by Ardeshir Zahedi
• 50 Years After the CIA’s First Overthrow of a Democratically Elected Foreign Government
• How to Overthrow A Government: The 1953 U.S. Coup in Iran
• A short account of 1953 Coup in Iran
• The Sunday Herald, Over A Barrel