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{{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}}
{{Campaignbox Axis-Soviet War}}
{{Campaignbox Operation Blue to 3rd Kharkov}}
{{Campaignbox Operation Blue to 3rd Kharkov}}
'''Case Blue''' ({{lang-de|'''Fall Blau'''}}) was the codename used by the German Armed Forces (''[[Wehrmacht]]'') for its 1942 strategic summer offensive in southern Russia that lasted between 28 June and November 1942.<ref>Woods, Wiest, Barbier (2002), pp. 58-59.</ref>
'''Case Blue''' ({{lang-de|'''Fall Blau'''}}) was the codename used by the German Armed Forces (''[[Wehrmacht]]'') for its 1942 strategic summer offensive in southern Soviet Union that lasted between 28 June and November 1942.<ref>Woods, Wiest, Barbier (2002), pp. 58-59.</ref>


The operation was a continuation of the previous year's [[Operation Barbarossa]], to finally finish the Soviets. The plan of the German command was a two-pronged attack, one against the rich oil-fields of [[Baku]] and one in the direction of [[Stalingrad]] and the [[Black Sea]], to cover the flanks of the advance towards Baku. The [[Oil industry in Azerbaijan#World War II|Baku oil fields]] had to be reached by crossing the [[Caucasus mountains]]. For this this, [[Army Group]] [[Army Group South|South]] (''Heeresgruppe Süd'') of the German Army (''[[Wehrmacht Heer]]'') was sub-divided into the Army Groups [[Army Group A|A]] and [[Army Group B|B]] (''Heeresgruppe A'' and ''B''), and each assigned to one direction.
The operation was a continuation of the previous year's [[Operation Barbarossa]], to finally finish the Soviets. The plan of the German command was a two-pronged attack, one against the rich oil-fields of [[Baku]] and one in the direction of [[Stalingrad]] and the [[Black Sea]], to cover the flanks of the advance towards Baku. The [[Oil industry in Azerbaijan#World War II|Baku oil fields]] had to be reached by crossing the [[Caucasus mountains]]. For this this, [[Army Group]] [[Army Group South|South]] (''Heeresgruppe Süd'') of the German Army (''[[Wehrmacht Heer]]'') was sub-divided into the Army Groups [[Army Group A|A]] and [[Army Group B|B]] (''Heeresgruppe A'' and ''B''), and each assigned to one direction.

Revision as of 22:47, 9 March 2011

Case Blue - German summer offensive in 1942
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II

German Gebirgsjäger operating a 2 cm Flugabwehrkanone (AA-gun) in the Central Caucasus near Teberda, September 1942
Date28 June 1942 until November 1942
Location
Voronezh, Rostov to Stalingrad, Kuban, Caucasus, Southern Russia, Soviet Union
Result Strategic Axis Failure
Belligerents
 Germany
 Romania
 Italy
 Hungary
 Croatia		  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Germany Maximilian von Weichs
Germany Wilhelm List
Germany Erich von Manstein
Germany Adolf Hitler[a]
Germany Paul Ludwig Ewald von Kleist
Germany Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen
Germany Friedrich Paulus		 Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky
Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov
Soviet Union Dmitri Kozlov
Soviet Union Ivan Tyulenev
Soviet Union Semyon M. Budenny
Soviet Union Filipp Golikov
Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky
Soviet Union Andrey Yeryomenko
Soviet Union Konstantin Rokossovsky
Soviet Union Semyon Timoshenko
Strength
~1 million Germans
300,000 German Allies
1,900 tanks[b][1]		 1,7 million men
~1 million reserve
3,720 tanks[2]
Casualties and losses
1,013,000 killed, wounded and missing[note][3] 1,111,681 killed or missing
1,114,735 wounded
2,226,416 overall[note][4]

Case Blue (German: Fall Blau) was the codename used by the German Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) for its 1942 strategic summer offensive in southern Soviet Union that lasted between 28 June and November 1942.[5]

The operation was a continuation of the previous year's Operation Barbarossa, to finally finish the Soviets. The plan of the German command was a two-pronged attack, one against the rich oil-fields of Baku and one in the direction of Stalingrad and the Black Sea, to cover the flanks of the advance towards Baku. The Baku oil fields had to be reached by crossing the Caucasus mountains. For this this, Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd) of the German Army (Wehrmacht Heer) was sub-divided into the Army Groups A and B (Heeresgruppe A and B), and each assigned to one direction.

Initially the German offensive met with spectacular gains. The German forces were able to make a rapid advance into the Caucasus, capturing vast areas of land and several oil fields. However, the Red Army defeated the German Army at Stalingrad following operations Uranus and Little Saturn. This defeat forced the Axis to retreat from the Caucasus for the fear of getting trapped themselves. Only Voronezh remained tentatively occupied by Axis troops.

Background

On 22 June 1941 the Germans started Operation Barbarossa to defeat the Soviets in a Blitzkrieg within months. The Germans were able to inflict heavy defeats on the Soviets, with millions of casualties and capturing of vast areas of the Soviet-Union, but were not able to knock the Soviets out of the war. In the winter of 1941/1942 the Soviets stroke back in a counteroffensive which repelled the German threat to Moscow and made it clear, that the war against the Soviets would transform into a strategic war.[6]

Planning

Case Blue

The offensive was to be conducted across the southern Russian (Kuban) steppe. The Army Group units participating in the offensive were:[7]

The German plan was composed of a three-staged attack:[8][9]

  • Fourth Panzer Army, commanded by Hermann Hoth (transferred from Army Group North) and the Second Army, supported by the Second Hungarian Army, would attack from Kursk to Voronezh and continue the advance, anchoring the northern flank of the offensive towards the Volga.
  • Sixth Army, commanded by Friedrich Paulus, would attack from Kharkov and moving in parallel with Fourth Panzer Army, to reach the Volga at Stalingrad (whose capture was not deemed necessary).
  • First Panzer Army would then strike south towards the lower Don River, with Seventeenth Army on the western flank and Fourth Romanian Army on the eastern flank.

The strategic goals of the operation would be the oild fields at Maykop, Grozny and Baku. As in Barbarossa, these movements were expected to result in a series of grand encirclements of Soviet troops.[8]

The Soviets

The Stavka (or Soviet High Command), was unable to discern the direction of the main German strategic offensive in 1942 that they were expecting. Stalin was convinced the primary German strategic goal in 1942 would be Moscow, in part due to Fall Kremel ("Case Kremlin"), a German deception plan aimed at Moscow. 57% of all Red Army troops were deployed in that region. However, the direction of the German offensive was still defended by the Bryansk, South Western and Southern Front, whose forces accounted for 25% of all troops, nearly 30% of all Soviet artillery, over 38% of all tanks and 42% of all Red Air Force aircraft of the Soviet Union.[10] Following the disastrous start of Case Blue for the Soviets, they reorganized their fronts several times. Over the course of the campaign, the Soviets also fielded the Voronezh Front, Don Front, Stalingrad Front, Transcaucasian Front, North Caucasian Front and the Caucasian Front, thus not all existed at the same time.[7]

With expecting the German thrust in the north, the Soviet command planned several local offensives of their own in the south to weaken the Germans. The most important of these was aimed toward the town Kharkov and to be conducted mainly by the Southwestern Front under Semyon Timoshenko, supported by the Southern Front under Rodion Malinovsky. The operation was scheduled for 12 May, just prior a planned German offensive in this area, which would prove fatal in the course of the operation.[11] The ensuing battle for Kharkov ended in a disaster and weakened the Soviets severely.[12] At the same time, the Axis clearing of the Kerch Peninsula together with the capture of Sevastopol, which lasted until July, weakened the Soviets further and allowed the Germans to supply Army Group A across the Kerch Peninsula through the Kuban.[12][13]

The offensive

The German advance from 7 May to 18 November 1942.
  to 7 July
  to 22 July
  to 1 August
  to 18 November

The German offensive commenced on 28 June 1942, with Fourth Panzer Army starting its drive towards Voronezh. The Soviet retreat was chaotic, enabling the Germans to make a rapid advance, restoring Wehrmacht's confidence for the upcoming major offensive.[14] By 5 July, forward elements of Fourth Panzer Army had reached the Don near Voronezh and became embroiled in the battle to capture the city. Stalin and the Soviet command still expected the main German thrust in the north against Moscow, and believed the Germans would turn north after Voronezh to threaten the capital. Therefore the Soviets rushed reinforcements into the town, to hold it at all costs. The lengthy battle, which tied town Fourth Panzer Army until 13 July, left Hitler losing his patience and dissmissing von Bock, to implement the second phase of the operation, the splitting of Army Group South.[15] On 9 July, Army Group South was splitted into Army Group A and B. Instead of von Bock, Maximilian von Weichs was appointed as commander of Army Group A.[16]

Splitting of Army Group South

Believing that the main Russian threat had been eliminated and with the desperate need for oil and to meet all the ambitious goals of Case Blue, Hitler made a series of changes to the plan in the Führer Directive No. 45:

  • reorganized Army Group South into two smaller Army Groups, A and B;
  • tasked Army Group A with advancing to the Caucasus and capturing the oil fields;
  • tasked Army Group B with the offensive towards the Volga and Stalingrad (Operation Fischreiher).[16]

The splitting of Army Group South enabled the launching of Operation Edelweiss and Operation Braunschweig which represent the two main thrusts of the army groups. Both army groups now had to strive for their goals simultaneously, instead of achieving them consecutively on a phased basis.[16]

The success of Sixth Army's initial advance was such that Hitler ordered Fourth Panzer Army south to assist First Panzer Army in forcing a crossing of the lower Don.[17]

Army Group A action - Caucasus campaign

German troops and a half-track on the Russian steppe, August 1942

Army Group A recaptured Rostov on 23 July 1942. With the Don crossing secured and Sixth Army's advance flagging, Hitler sent Fourth Panzer Army back to the Volga line, reassigning it to Army Group B.[18]

After crossing the Don on 25 July, Army Group A fanned out on a broad front with rapid advance. The German Seventeenth Army (with elements of the Eleventh Army) now manoeuvred west towards the Black Sea's eastern coast, while First Panzer Army attacked southeast. While the advance of Seventeenth Army was only steady, First Panzer Army roamed at will through the Soviet lines. On 29 July the Germans cut the last railroad between central Russia and the Caucasus region, causing considerable panic among the Soviet high command and Stalin, which was illustrated by the passing of the famous Order No. 227 - "Not a step back!".[19] Salsk was captured on 31 July and Stavropol on 5 August.[13] On 9 August, First Panzer Army reached the foothills of the Caucausus range, having advanced more than 480 kilometers (300 miles) in less than two weeks. The oil fields at Maykop were seized in a commando operation on 8-9 August. Shortly after, Pyatigorsk was taken.[13] On 12 August, Krasnodar was captured and German mountain troops hoised the Nazi flag on the highest mountain of the Caucasus, the Mount Elbrus.[20]

German Panzer III on the Russian steppe, August 1942

The German advance was highly sucessful, but with the Soviets often retreating instead of fighting, the number of captured Soviet troops fell short of expectations. Also at this time, the eyes of the German command were shifting to the struggle at Stalingrad, which was prefered with replacements and supplies.[13][21] Facing these difficulties, the Axis advance slowed from 28 August onwards.[22]

Meanwhile in the southeast, the Wehrmacht was heading in the direction of Grozny and Baku, the other important petroleum centres. More installations and industrial centres were falling into German hands, many intact or only slightly damaged during the Russian retreat from the area. In August - September the Taman Peninsula and a part of the Novorossisk naval base were taken.[23] The Germans continued their advance toward Tuapse. In the east, Elista was taken on 13 August.[24] Further south, the German advance stalled north of Grozny, after taking the town of Mozdok on 25 August.[25] German paratroopers assisted a raging insurgency in Chechnya, conducting several sabotage acts against the Grozny oil fields.

On 1 September, the Germans took Chalchuta, which lays halfway between Elista and Astrakhan.[26] Three days later, the Germans also managed to capture Kizlyar in the northeast of Grozny, marking the farthest advance of the German forces towards the Caspian Sea.[27] In the south, on 26 October 1942, Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, was taken, before the German advance toward Grozny stalled again, now from the west of the city at the town of Vladikavkaz.[28] On 5 November, Alagir was seized and the Alagir-Beslan-Malgobek line would mark the farthest German advance in the south.[23]

In November, after several unsucessful Soviet counterattacks, the Germans subsequently decided to remain defensive, waiting for the spring of 1943 to resume the offensive if the Stalingrad operations were successful.[23]

Army Group B action - Stalingrad

On 23 July the main body of Army Group B started its advance toward the Don River. The superior German forces were quickly able to break though the Soviet lines and reached the Don on 26 July which was crossed four days later.[29] By 10 August, the Red Army was largely cleared from the west bank of the Don. Soviet resistance continued in some areas, further delaying Army Group B's eastward offensive.

On 23 August, Sixth Army finally crossed the Don, allowing Army Group B to establish a defensive line on a bend in the river.[30] The Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armies used for this task were within 60 km of Stalingrad, which was also within reach of forward air bases. Consequently Luftwaffe bombers attacked the city, killing over 40,000 people and turning much of the city into rubble.[31] The ground attack on Stalingrad was two-pronged, with Sixth Army advancing from the north (Frolovo) and Fourth Panzer Army coming up from the south (Kotelnikovo). Between these armies and in the area from the Don to the Volga, a salient had been created. Two Soviet Armies (the 62nd and 64th, each roughly equal to a German corps) were in the salient. On 29 August, Fourth Panzer Army conducted a major offensive through the southern base of the salient towards Stalingrad. Sixth Army was ordered to do the same, but a strong Soviet counterattack held up its advance for three vital days, enabling Soviet forces in the salient to escape encirclement and fall back towards Stalingrad.[32]

However, despite this close escape, the rapid German advance caused a considerable morale breakdown among the Soviet troops, who retreated in chaos.[33] After neutralizing limited local Soviet counterattacks, the Sixth Army resumed its offensive on 2 September and linked up with the Fourth Panzer Army one day later. On 13 September, the Germans had reached the southern suburbs, beginning the Battle of Stalingrad one day later.[34]

The Battle of Stalingrad

Main article: Battle of Stalingrad
File:M3 Tank Stalingrad.JPG
Soviet forces attacking north of Stalingrad in late November of 1942

The Battle of Stalingrad started with initial success for the Germans. In heavy street fighting, the Wehrmacht took control of over 90% of the city on the western side of the Volga, while heavy Luftwaffe attacks hampered Soviet efforts to support the encircled defenders over the Volga.[35] Nevertheless the Wehrmacht was unable to destroy the last pockets of resistance. On 19 November, the Soviets launched Operation Uranus, which crushed the Romanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies around the city, trapping Sixth Army and parts of Fourth Panzer Army inside it.[36] Thus began a several-months-long siege in which all German efforts to relieve the pressure failed, leading to the ultimate destruction of the Sixth Army.[37]

Aftermath

Following the success of Uranus, the Red Army started Operation Little Saturn, a downscaled version of a bigger plan to cut off the entire German Army Group A from the rest of the Heer.[38] This successful operation nevertheless threatened Army Group A, which was forced into a slow retreat over the next months back to Kuban. First Panzer Army was assigned to the newly created Heeresgruppe Don under Field Marshal von Manstein, who had to help out the hard pressed Army Group A.[39]

After the disaster at Stalingrad, which marked the failure of Case Blue, all gains were lost by the end of 1943, with the Kuban bridgehead, which was established at the Taman peninsula for a possible second thrust into the Caucasus, being the last to be evacuated on 9 October 1943.[40][41]

Conclusion

The German summer offensive of 1942 was initially highly sucessful. Under this impression, the German command and especially Hitler expanded the already sophisticated plan even more, putting great strain on the German forces.[42] Hitler did not expect, that the Soviets would be able to launch a counteroffensive at the scale of Operation Uranus, and therefore deployed valuable units elsewhere on the front, while ordering the Wehrmacht to strive for numerous goals simultaneously. Any oppositions to his fluctuating plans, led simply to dismissal by Hitler, who interfered more and more into the command process.[43][44]

The vast area captured overstretched the capabilities of the Heer and its allies to defend them, and as a result enabled the Soviets to mount a decisive offensive at Stalingrad, encircling a whole German army. Soon both sides concentrated mostly on the epic struggle at the city, making the Caucasus Campaign a secondary theatre.[13] With Army Group B being unable to hold the Volga line, subsequent Soviet operations threatened to cut off Army Group A in the Caucasus, which was therefore forced to withdraw. The surrender of Sixth Army was a serious blow to German morale in general and Hitler regarded it as a personal shock. Nevertheless beside the destruction of Sixth Army, the Soviets only caused the Heer to retreat from their advance towards the Caucasus, further delaying the final decision on the Eastern Front. The now highly confident Soviet command overestimated its capabilities and pushed its forces deep into the German lines, to the limit of its supply, leading to a severe defeat at Kharkov, which gave the Germans the opportunity to mount another large strategic offensive.[45]

See also

Notes

  • a Army Group A was under direct command of the OKH from 10 September 1942 until 22 November 1942, when von Kleist took over.
  • b Not all of those tanks were serviceable at the beginning of the offensive, as tanks were in repair, already in combat engaged, refitting, or not present at the frontline.[1]
  • c Axis casualties include all casualties of Army Group A, B and Don until February 1943 (including 300,000 casualties at Stalingrad).
  • d Soviet casualties are from the Voronezh Defense, the Stalingrad Defense + Offensive and the North-Caucasus Defense + Offensive. Soviet casualties exclude all other Soviet offensives in January/February against Krasnodar, Kharkov, Voronezh etc.
  • e The Fourth Romanian Army was later assigned to Army Group B and was one of the two Romanian armies heavily engaged in Operation Uranus.
  • f After the successful completion of the battle for the Kerch Peninsula, 11th Army was split and only parts of it were assigned to Army Group A.

References

  1. ^ a b Antill (2007), pp. 24-25.
  2. ^ Antill (2007), p. 29.
  3. ^ Antill (2007), p. 87.
  4. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 295.
  5. ^ Woods, Wiest, Barbier (2002), pp. 58-59.
  6. ^ Antill (2007), pp. 7-12.
  7. ^ a b Glantz (1995), pp. 111-113.
  8. ^ a b Antill (2007), pp. 31-32.
  9. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 110.
  10. ^ Morozov, V.P, chief editor, Part 6, Volume 5, Defence of Stalingrad, table, History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in Russian)
  11. ^ Antill (2007), p. 34.
  12. ^ a b Antill (2007), p. 37.
  13. ^ a b c d e Antill (2007), p. 49.
  14. ^ Beevor (1999), p. 75.
  15. ^ Antill (2007), pp. 38-39.
  16. ^ a b c Antill (2007), p. 40.
  17. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 119.
  18. ^ Antill (2007), p. 41.
  19. ^ Glantz (1995) p. 121.
  20. ^ Antill (2007), p. 39.
  21. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 120.
  22. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 122.
  23. ^ a b c http://www.worldwar2.ro/operatii/index.php?article=11
  24. ^ Schramm (1963), p. 583.
  25. ^ Schramm (1963), p. 639.
  26. ^ Schramm (1963), p. 667.
  27. ^ Schramm (1963), p. 679.
  28. ^ Schramm (1963), p. 65.
  29. ^ Antill (2007), p. 44.
  30. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 122.
  31. ^ Beevor (1999), p. 106.
  32. ^ Antill (2007), pp. 50-51.
  33. ^ Beevor (1999), pp. 115-118.
  34. ^ Antill (2007), p. 55.
  35. ^ Antill (2007), p. 67.
  36. ^ Antill (2007), pp. 73-74.
  37. ^ Antill (2007), p. 78.
  38. ^ Glantz (1995), pp. 139-140.
  39. ^ Glantz (1995), pp. 136-137.
  40. ^ Vego, Milan N. Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas (MPG Books Ltd, London, 2003), p. 278.
  41. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 141.
  42. ^ Antill (2007), p. 39.
  43. ^ Glantz (1995), p. 132.
  44. ^ Antill (2007), p. 43.
  45. ^ Antill (2007), pp. 87-88.

Bibliography

  • Antill, Peter (2007). Stalingrad 1942. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1846030285.
  • Beevor, Antony (1999). Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943. Penguin Books. ISBN 0140284583.
  • Glantz, David M. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-70060-899-0.
  • Nipe, George M. Jr. (2000). Last Victory in Russia: The SS-Panzerkorps and Manstein's Kharkov Counteroffensive—February–March 1943. Schiffer Publishing. ISBN 0-76431-186-7.
  • Schramm, Percy Ernst (1963). Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, 1944-1945 Teilband II. Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen.
  • Manstein, Erich (2004). Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press. ISBN 0-76032-054-3.
  • Woods, Timothy; Wiest, Andrew A.; Barbier, M. K.; Strategy and Tactics Infantry Warfare, Zenith Imprint, 2002 ISBN 0760314012
  • General Editor Dr. Mann, Chris (2008). Great Battles of World War II. Parragon. ISBN 9781407525129. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)
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