Talk:Six-Day War

I edited part of the section about the events leading to war

The article was missing an important confrontation that occurred on April 7, 1967 between Israel and Syria, so I added it. -- Wiki Khalil (talk) October 13 2012

Sources for the Egyptians side:

Senior Egyptian officials:

"the testimony of Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26 May" (Gluska 2007 , p. 168)

"According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation" ( Bowen 2003, p. 57 (author interview, Cairo, 15 December 2002). I have not verified)

the testimony of Bassiouny, who recalls that when the Washington Embassy reported that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had information that Egypt was going to start the war, Amer wrote on the cable, “Shams, it seems there is a leak.” (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Egyptian military steps

on May 26, two Egyptian Air Force MiG-21s overflew the reactor (at 52,000 feet) on a photographic reconnaissance mission, and interceptors and missiles failed to bring them down. The Israelis linked the mission to a possible preemptive strike on the plant (Morris, victims, p. 308)

In the Sinai, there was deep confusion; as late as 5 June officers were still not sure whether their goal was offensive or defensive. Nasser is said by some officers to have added to the chaos by his constant interference in military plans (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p66 )

On approximately 20 May, Saad alDin Shazly, commander of a Special Forces unit in the Sinai, was given an offensive mission plan involving an advance through Israel.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

As late as 25 May, therefore, everything was set for an attack at daybreak on 27 May.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

It was only one hour before the planned strike on 27 May that Said’s army liaison officer told him the attack had been aborted after a U.S. request to the Soviets. Shazly was not informed of the shift to a defensive posture until about 1 june. Although Nasser reiterated that Egypt would not strike first, tanks and planes in the Sinai were fully fuelled and not concealed, as if they were going to attack (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Nasser intentions

On 13 May 1967 Nasser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p 7 )

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 306)

In 1966 Nasser himself had declared that if Israel developed an atomic bomb, Egypt’s response would be a “preemptive war’ directed in the first instance against the nuclear production facilities.27 On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and “to bomb the reactor in Dimona. (Morris, victims, p. 307)

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 308)

Abdel Magid Farid, however, suggests that Nasser did actually consider the first strike option until early on 27 May, when he was hauled out of bed at 3 by the ambassador from the Soviet Union (his only source of arms and spare parts) and warned not to precipitate a confrontation (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Sources for the Israeli side:

Israeli military considerations

In the first days of June ... as did the sense that the Arab states might launch an attack within days There was particular fear of a limited Jordanian or Jordanian-Egyptian offensive against Eilat. (Morris, victims, p. 310)

Israeli diplomatic and political steps

"In private, Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt. This reinforced the existing image of Egyptian military superiority — if Israel wanted to avoid war, it was presumably because Israel thought it would lose" (Shlaim, Louis, 2012,The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, p66 )

Nasser seems to have been encouraged by the fact that Israeli rhetoric condemning the Tiran blockade and subsequent developments was relatively mild. Even the fact that the United States counselled restraint was interpreted as an attempt to protect Israel from Arab wrath — and therefore as further evidence of her need for protection. (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Although Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a model of moderation (Mutawi p. 93)

the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 63 )

Nasser appeared to challenge Israel to a duel (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 7 )

1956 Suez crisis in the lead

I see that in the lead, a simple "chronological" version has been written. But why does it skip straight to 1967 after 1948, without including 1956? Kingsindian ♝ ♚ 01:21, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

Agreed. Particularly since the Israeli invasion in 1956 was the key event in the minds of the Egyptians when ordering the troop build up and the key event in the minds of the Israelis when announcing the closure of the straits to be a causus belli. I will make a proposal. Onceinawhile (talk) 09:24, 27 June 2017 (UTC)

I also agree, 1956 should definitely be included. Not to do so represents cherry-picking. I am, however, nor sure that 1956 was THE key event, but it certainly was one of the main 'push' motives for Nassar. Erictheenquirer (talk) 08:02, 28 June 2017 (UTC)

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 12 July 2017

The casualty section lists "34 US Navy sailors" killed during the U.S.S. liberty, but not all of those people were members of the U.S. Navy. 31 of the dead were members of the U.S. Navy, two of the dead were Marines, and one of the dead was actually a civilian working for the NSA named Allen Blue. The confusion with Allen Blue might come from the fact that he had served in the U.S. Navy in World War Two, meaning his grave at Arlington says he was a member of the U.S. Navy (http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/liberty.htm), but he was actually a civilian NSA worker by the time of the attack. I suggest changing it to say "31 American U.S. Navy sailors, two American Marines and one American civilian NSA employee." The U.S.S. Liberty article (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Liberty_incident) gives this source as an explanation for the casualties, but you can find a list easily online: Zwifree (talk) 14:24, 12 July 2017 (UTC)