Talk:Joseph Stalin

Semi-protected edit request on 29 May 2023

Please add the title of Dictator JitsuAttack (talk) 17:53, 29 May 2023 (UTC)

'Dictator' isn't a title, it's a description of a de facto position.Sbishop (talk) 18:10, 29 May 2023 (UTC)

Confusing wording

in August 1940, Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico, eliminating the last of Stalin's opponents among the former Party leadership. In May, this was followed by the arrest of most members of the military Supreme Command and mass arrests throughout the military, often on fabricated charges.

What is "this". Trotsky's death? May is before August. If it is May 1941, then it should say. LittleJerry (talk) 12:36, 31 May 2023 (UTC)

Battles in infobox

I have recently been checking infoboxes of various political leaders and I noticed the battles they fought only include the physically fought ones e.g. the infobox of Adolf Hitler includes World War I and not World War II, Harry S. Truman includes WWI and not WWII, Korean War etc. Thus, I will be removing the battles in which Stalin did not physically fight in. MawlidistMan (talk) 18:49, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

Heads of states don't personally participate in wars. But they cause them.--Aristophile (talk) 18:55, 16 June 2023 (UTC)

Yes but the wars which heads of states cause are not shown in the infobox. See Stalin's WWII ally Winston Churchill, see Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev, Hitler, Truman etc. They only include the wars which they personally participated in. Thus, I proposed the Russian Revolution and Russian Civil War in Stalin's infobox since Stalin's personally participated in them. MawlidistMan (talk) 8:57, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

I agree with the logic of removal in the light of the other examples. The infobox for Stalin is already long enough without being bloated by this long list.Sbishop (talk) 09:35, 17 June 2023 (UTC)

Due to the examples you provided I agree that this article should be like those other articles. Perhaps that infobox part can be divided into two separate sections, one with battles that he was more physically involved with/in like the Battle of Tsaritsyn and the other section with battles that match the description “Heads of states don't personally participate in wars. But they cause them.”

But I reckon the examples you provided would have to be changed too. Justanotherguy54 (talk) 04:39, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

Lede is pro-Stalin inclined, has to be changed (BOLD VERSION)

Unlike leads for other genocidal dictators such as Pol Pot or Adolf Hitler, Stalin's lead presents him as a normal figure all the way until the last part of the last paragraph. Even the last paragraph isn't good, because over half of it refers to how much cherished Stalin is. This is an absurd article and the lede needs to be immediately revised. Here is the edit I applied, which should stay, which improves NPOV and likens the article to others like it on Wikipedia (Pol Pot, Adolf Hitler etc.) beginning of the lede " was a Soviet politician, political theorist, revolutionary and dictator " end of first paragraph of the lede " With the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact signed shortly before the start of World War II in Europe, he is responsible for aiding Nazi Germany and co-responsible for starting the war, from joint military action to the sharing of intelligence and critical supplies. His policies, chiefly the Great Purge, the Holodomor and multiple massacres, genocides of ethnic minorities and deportations, resulted in millions of victims. " By the way, Hitler has his fans, too. Galehautt (talk) 00:37, 19 June 2023 (UTC)

By the way, referring to an earlier argument posted here above, that "dictator" isn't a title. "Leader" isn't a title either, and Stalin wasn't a president or prime minister. He was the general secretary with absolute power from 1928 until his death. Galehautt (talk) 00:57, 19 June 2023 (UTC)

And of course, "dictator" itself has a grounding in marxism/leninism/stalinism. Marx referred to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which Lenin changed into the "dictatorship of the vanguard" which Stalin changed into just a dictatorship where he dictated with decrees the course of the country. There's also Lenin's concept of "democratic centralism" which is dictatorial in its very nature, with Stalin narrowing the governing body of "democratic centralism" to himself. And let's not forget that the Soviet Union was totalitarian, especially under Stalin. Galehautt (talk) 01:07, 19 June 2023 (UTC)

The introduction already states that he was a dictator.--Jack Upland (talk) 03:41, 19 June 2023 (UTC)

Where? Galehautt (talk) 13:53, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

First paragraph. Mellk (talk) 14:00, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

Mind telling me what discussion is here? I see no discussion, so I assumed everyone agrees. There has to be a time limit. Galehautt (talk) 14:48, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

Silence is not consent. You made a bold edit, it was reverted (twice now), your obligation if you want your material included now is to gain WP:CONSENSUS, and there's no time limit for that. --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 14:56, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

Okay, how do I go about it now? Galehautt (talk) 19:20, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

You try to gain WP:consensus on this page. If you can't, you move on to something else. --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 21:00, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

How and when was consensus gained for the horrendous way the article looks now? If the community was as inactive when the current lede was forced through as it is now, I see no reason why I should not edit the lede. Why be so defensive about Stalin? Is there any way, for example, that other editors or perhaps the administration could be pinged to solve this matter? Galehautt (talk) 10:03, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

Take a look at the talk page archives, quite clearly this was not as a result of the community being "inactive". If you decide again to restore your changes, this will be considered disruptive editing. Mellk (talk) 10:24, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

Disruption is not my wish, correction is. It is sad though how active you guys are at blocking this edit and aren't so active at discussing it. That is disruptive in its own way. Galehautt (talk) 13:42, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

No, at the moment, "us guys" aren't so active at discussing something that has been argued here since at least 2004, and the consensus has been to not do what you are suggesting. Unless you have new arguments or something else has changed, it's just a rehash of an old discussion, which shows no sign of a changed consensus. --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 14:25, 23 June 2023 (UTC)

I should ping all of the administration then. And have a vote. I wonder how Jimbo sees it, too. The broad societal consensus is different, no matter whether you're on the right or the left. I would suggest you read a book or two by Anne Applebaum because you're in the wrong. We here on Wikipedia do not support genocidal tyrants here. We here on Wikipedia love democracy and rule of law here. Galehautt (talk) 08:39, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

The question of whether Stalin committed genocide is debated. Apollo1917 (talk) 09:20, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

The question whether Holodomor was a fully orchestrated genocide of Ukrainians is debated, not whether Stalin was genocidal (see: deportations of Baltic peoples, Russification/Sovietization etc.) or whether the Holodomor happened. Galehautt (talk) 09:37, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

You wrote, in WP:WIKIVOICE, that the Holodomor and other events were genocides. This is called a POV edit. Overall, your changes do not follow what the body says. Where does it say he is co-responsible? See MOS:LEAD. Mellk (talk) 09:45, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

Okay, I see where the contention is now. I will fix this. Galehautt (talk) 09:47, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

See WP:BRD. Mellk (talk) 09:50, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

You are still disruptively editing. Mellk (talk) 09:55, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I fixed the edit according to your comment. Is there anything that is still contested? I mean it's no surprise there's no discussion when I'm introducing an edit and you guys revert it and can't even point to what's contested in my edit. A bit kafkaesque Galehautt (talk) 09:59, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

You are edit warring at this point and have already violated WP:3RR. You need to self-revert and get consensus on the talk page, not continually make changes to the article. Mellk (talk) 10:07, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

You are edit-warring. I still don't know what's contested. Galehautt (talk) 10:12, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I would suggest to WP:DROPTHESTICK and move on rather than continuing to rant. Mellk (talk) 09:25, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

That's a humorous essay and you seem to have run out of arguments to clutch it. Galehautt (talk) 09:47, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

From the first paragraph: "Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to become a dictator"--C.J. Griffin (talk) 14:02, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

So he was a dictator! Galehautt (talk) 14:46, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

Should I RfC? Galehautt (talk) 08:50, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I have edited slightly my proposal. I shall implement this improved edit now and see what you guys think Galehautt (talk) 09:07, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

No, you need to get consensus on the talk page. You do not restore the same contested edit with slight changes to the wording. This is still a POV edit. Mellk (talk) 09:23, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

What is contested precisely? Galehautt (talk) 09:35, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

See above. Mellk (talk) 09:45, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

I see nothing. If you have no argument, why chip in? Galehautt (talk) 09:46, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

As another voice to indicate that you lack consensus for your desired change. We don't need to repeat all the arguments that have made for this for twenty years; "I agree with the existing consensus" suffices. --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 19:45, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

There is no proof that there is an existing consensus. It's just you and the other guy. You're both just mere users, too, not admins. You're nobodies. Before 2022, this page could've attracted mostly the attention of commies. We do not like authoritarians here on Wikipedia. I for example am a friend of one Anne Applebaum and I know what the consensus is. If you can't even point to a single thing that you contend with, you should just get out of my way. Galehautt (talk) 22:09, 24 June 2023 (UTC)

Um, I've been an admin here for almost 20 years, but that's pretty much irrelevant to this discussion; admins don't decide content, the WP:CONSENSUS of the Wikipedia community does. I'm not going to argue your points with you; I don't have to. It's quite clear from this history of this article and the history of this talk page that WP:CONSENSUS is to omit the term "dictator" from the first sentence of the article. Here is the result of a search of the talk page archives for the word "dictator". --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 00:27, 25 June 2023 (UTC)

Times change, so do articles. Discussions that were relevant to the shape of the article 10 years ago may not be relevant now. For example, the lede already in the first paragraph (though not in the first sentence, sadly) mentions that he was a dictator. That may not have been there 10 years ago. So in the current situation, I don't see why he shouldn't be described as a dictator. This is not my personal remark either, I'm merely trying to follow the standard set in other articles, which I think is far more important than any state of discussion pertaining to this sole article 10 years ago. And the standard set in other articles is such that people like Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot etc. are invariably titled "dictator" so I do not know why Stalin's article should be different. Galehautt (talk) 23:09, 25 June 2023 (UTC)

Secondly, the "dictator" thing is just one of two points I bring up. Galehautt (talk) 23:09, 25 June 2023 (UTC)

Support changing the lede in line with other 20th century dictators. This goes against the standard set by the article of every other tyrant which highlights their actions in the lede, not their cultivated appearance. DarmaniLink (talk) 21:35, 21 July 2023 (UTC)

Thanks. I also support Galehautt (talk) 19:43, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

You were recently blocked for personal attacks and edit warring, if you continue with this then it will likely lead to a longer block (though at this point I think an indefinite block is best). Mellk (talk) 19:52, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

This is also a personal attack and I see you have not learned from the previous block. Mellk (talk) 20:02, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

2 supports. Do you oppose, as a single person? Might want to reconsider who is edit warring. Galehautt (talk) 20:03, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

I am a person, not an account. I will not waver. You will not win. Sorry. You will either be blocked or not but you won't win. That's all. You can't block truth. Galehautt (talk) 20:04, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

No, but we can block you-the-person for personal attacks as I just did. --jpgordon^{𝄢𝄆𝄐𝄇} 20:16, 24 July 2023 (UTC)

Length

At over 20k words of readable prose, this article is too long to read comfortably. It would be beneficial to condense and/or migrate content to subarticles to make this one more readable. Nikkimaria (talk) 19:34, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

I added the section sizes template just above. Just going by the numbers, and starting at the top: §Early life is about half the size of its corresponding sub-article and could probably be 30-50% shorter. Joseph Stalin during the Russian Revolution, Civil War, and the Polish–Soviet War is listed as the main article §In Lenin's government, and it could definitely be expanded and possible re-titled to something like Joseph Stalin during Lenin's government. The section here is longer than that article, though it covers a few more years of history. Firefangledfeathers (talk / contribs) 20:35, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 12 July 2023

Hello! I am new here so I apologize if this is the wrong procedure for doing this. I would like to make an edit to the lead.

The sentence I would like to change is this: “Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to become a dictator.”

I would like to change it to this: "Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, and was given a leading role."

The reason for this change is to acknowledge the existence of varying interpretations regarding the extent to which Stalin consolidated his power. This proposed edit aims to present a more cautious perspective. The following is a collection of both primary and secondary source evidence that challenges the traditional notion of dictatorship. It is crucial to present a balanced view by considering diverse interpretations and engaging with counterarguments. This proposed edit aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Stalin's leadership position alongside the concept of collective leadership.

1. This report was published by the CIA in 1955. This report asserts that Stalin was a powerful leader, but doesn't actually call him a dictator. However, it's important to note that the information the CIA based this report on is not present in the report itself. The CIA could have made an error in this report and Soviet archives have since been opened since 1955, creating more available evidence to examine. The CIA said this about Stalin: "Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team..."

2. This excerpt is taken from Georgy Zhukov's Memories, published in 1969. In this source, Marshal Zhukov offers a perspective that challenges the widely held belief that Stalin single-handedly made all military and strategic decisions. Zhukov recalls how Stalin did not make decisions in isolation, but rather made decisions collectively. While this account offers an alternative viewpoint, it is essential to examine multiple sources and perspectives to gain a comprehensive understanding of Stalin's decision-making during his leadership. Marshal Zhukov states: "After J. V. Stalin's death appeared the tale about how he used to take military and strategic decisions unilaterally. This was not the case at all. I have already said above that if you reported questions to the Supreme Commander with a knowledge of your business, he took them into account. And I know of cases when he turned against his own previous opinion and changed decisions he had taken previously."

3. Vospominaniia I Razmyshleniia was published by Georgy Zhukov in 1969 in Moscow. It highlights an environment where individuals felt relatively comfortable expressing their opinions. This suggests a certain degree of openness within the leadership structure. This greatly reflects a collective leadership, not a dictatorship. However, one thing that's important to note is the broader context with democratic centralism and how it can silence people's voices. It's also important to understand that this quote doesn't discredit other evidence that exists, it merely provides nuance. Marshal Zhukov said this: "His style of work, as a rule, was businesslike. Everyone could express his own opinion without being nervous. The Supreme Commander treated everyone the same way - strict and officially. He knew how to listen attentively when you reported to him with knowledge of your topic. He himself was laconic, and did not like verbosity in others."

4. This is another quote from Zhukov's memories. It offers insight into Stalin's leadership style. Marshal Zhukov shares his observations during the war, stating that Stalin was open to discussing difficult questions and engaging in debates. Rather than imposing his own thinking on others, Stalin fostered an environment where diverse viewpoints could be defended and discussed. Marshal Zhukov said: "By the way, as I was convinced during the war, J. V. Stalin was not at all the kind of person before whom it was impossible to raise sharp questions and with whom it would be impossible to argue and even firmly defend his point of view.

If anyone claims the opposite, I will say frankly that their statements are not true."

5. Sergei Shtemenko was a general who had close contact with Stalin during the war years. He presents insights suggesting that the Soviet Union maintained a collective decision-making process rather than a dictatorship. Shtemenko writes: "I must say that Stalin did not decide and did not like to solve important issues of the war alone. He was well aware of the need for collective work in this complex area, recognized the authorities on a particular military problem, took into account their opinion and paid tribute to everyone. In December 1943, after the Tehran Conference, when it was necessary to outline action plans for the future, a report at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the State Defense Committee and the Stavka regarding the course of the struggle at the front and its prospects was made by A. M. Vasilevsky and A. I. Antonov, N. A. Voznesensky reported on the war economy, and I. V. Stalin took over the analysis of international problems "

6. This source, Tak Bylo, was published in Moscow 1999. According to the book, there are accounts suggesting that Stalin demonstrated attentiveness and an ability to change his mind when engaging in discussions with people. This perspective challenges some of the allegations against him, providing a different viewpoint on his character and decision-making process. Anastas Mikoyan writes: "He was also attentive to the proposals by the generals. Stalin listened carefully to what was said to him and to counsel, listened to disagreements with interest, extracting intelligently from them that bit of truth that helped him later to formulate his final, most appropriate decisions which were born in this way, as a result of collective discussion. More than this: it commonly happened that, convinced by our evidence, Stalin changed his own preliminary viewpoint on one or another question.”

7. This is a speech from Stalin at the plenum of the central committee on October 16, 1952. It sheds light on Stalin's leadership position and his expressed desire to be relieved of his duties. Stalin highlights the need for fresh perspectives and vigor within the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of bringing in new individuals with energy, dedication, and political leadership qualities. The sincerity of Stalin's request is a matter open to interpretation, as conclusive evidence supporting or refuting its seriousness remains elusive. Stalin says: "They say, why do we need an enlarged Central Committee. But isn’t it self-evident that we need to get new blood and new strength into the CC CPSU? We arc getting older and shall sooner or later die, but we must think into whose hands we shall give this torch of our great undertaking, who will carry it onward and reach the goal of communism? For this we need younger people with more energy, dedicated comrades and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State?... I am asking that you relieve me of the two posts! [General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.]"

8. This book was published by historian Sebag Montefiore. It presents evidence suggesting that Stalin faced open criticism. It's important to note that dictators can sometimes tolerate criticism. However, when considering the notion of collective leadership alongside this evidence, the label of "dictator" may not fully capture the complexity of the situation. It is crucial to understand the context of democratic centralism during that period and its impact on the extent of permissible criticism. Montefiore wrote: "Molotov admired Koba but did not worship him. He often disagreed with him, and criticized, Stalin right up until the end… Voroshilov, Mikoyan and a Molotov frequently disagreed with Stalin…"

9. This book was published in 1995. It contains Stalin's letters to Molotov by various scholars and provides insights into Stalin's leadership style and decision making process. The evidence suggests that Stalin adopted a collective leadership approach, as he faced challenges in achieving his desired outcomes.. They write: “In a September 1930 letter to Molotov, Stalin stated “I propose Kaganovich from the Worker-Peasant Inspection as the candidate for head of civil aviation” [Footnote] On October 15, 1930, Goltsman was confirmed by the Politburo as head of the Civil Aviation Association”

10. This quote comes from the book Stalinist Terror by Arch Getty and Roberta Manning, published in 1993. It provides nuance to how the decision making process allowed for different viewpoints. They write: "In the fall of 1938, when the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of G. M. Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But a majority of the Politburo recommended L. P. Beria for the post."

11. This quote is from Pat Sloan about his time in the Soviet Union in the 30s. He describes his experiences in the country with Soviet democracy. It's important to note that this account represents just one perspective and focuses primarily on grassroots democracy rather than higher levels of Soviet government. In his description, Sloan highlights that his participation in an election was open to all working members of the community, regardless of nationality or citizenship. He writes: "I have, while working in the Soviet Union, participated in an election. I, too, had a right to vote, as I was a working member of the community, and nationality and citizenship are no bar to electoral rights. The procedure was extremely simple. A general meeting of all the workers in our organisation was called. by the trade union committee, candidates were discussed, and a vote was taken by show of hands. Anybody present had the right to propose a candidate, and the one who was elected was not personally a member of the Party. In considering the claims of the candidates their past activities were discussed, they themselves had to answer questions as to their qualifications, anybody could express an opinion, for or against them, and the basis of all the discussion was: What justification had the candidates to represent their comrades on the local Soviet?"

12. This quote is from Sidney Webb's book: The Truth About Soviet Russia in 1942. Webb discusses how the Soviet Union allows and even encourages criticism of various aspects of the USSR: "...free criticism, however hostile it may be, is permitted, even encouraged, in the USSR, of the directors of all forms of enterprise, by the workers employed, or by the consumers of the commodities or services concerned."

13. This book was published in 1998 by Robert Thurston. Thurston provides additional information regarding the criticism of Soviet officials: "Of course, criticism had been strongly encouraged during the purges, and local records contain plenty of it.152 The press strongly endorsed criticism from below at the end of 1938. Pravda denounced "haughty answers to critical questions by the Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Party district committee. . . .Such a statement by a party leader does not facilitate healthy Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. On the contrary, it leads to stopping up, to tying up the initiative of the masses, to putting brakes on uncovering enemies."

14. Stephen Wheatcroft published this in 2007. He suggests how Yefim Georgievich Evdokimov guided Stalin and even calling him the Evdokimov "architect of the Shakhty trial": "Evdokimov had a demonstrable influence on Stalin in guiding him to adopt certain policies at certain times."

15. J. Arch Getty wrote this book in 1985 analyzing the history of power in the Soviet Union. He suggests that Soviet Russia exhibited more characteristics of a traditional society rather than a highly organized totalitarian regime. "According to most Western views, power was transmitted from the top to the bottom, from the center to the localities... Theoretically, every committee was completely subordinate to the one above it, and individual members had no power or control at all. The political reality was much different. In fact, the chain of command collapsed more often than it functioned. The Communist Party, far from having penetrated every quarter of Russian life, was more an undiciplined and disorganized force with little influence outside the cities. Soviet Russia in the '30s resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism."

16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb write in 1938 about Soviet government structure. The suggest that the Soviet Union had democratic institutions and explicitly write about Stalin's allegations of dictator: "...the Communist Party in the USSR is unlike the religious order in not being subject to any chief imposed upon it from without, and being democratically governed by its own membership, dispersed in. some 130,000 Primary Party organs, which elect a pyramid of tiers of committees, rising up to an All-Union Conference, with its central committee and sub-committees; Stalin, whom foreigners are apt to think of as a dictator, being merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee."

17. Sidney and Beatrice Webb also published a book in October of 1936 called "Soviet Communism: Dictatorship or Democracy?". They draw a comparison to other dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler, highlighting that Stalin does not possess the same level of authority over his fellow citizens or even the members of his own party: "Sometimes it is asserted that, whereas the form may be otherwise, the fact is that, whilst the Communist Party controls the whole administration, the Party itself, and thus indirectly the whole state, is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin. First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler and other modern dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens and not even over the members of the Party to which he belongs. He has not even the extensive power which the Congress of the United States has temporarily conferred upon President Roosevelt, or that which the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president... He is, in fact, only the General Secretary of the Party, receiving his salary from the Party funds and holding his office by appointment by the Party Central Committee, and, as such, also a member (one among nine) of its most important sub-committee, the Politbureau."

While the sources presented above offer evidence that challenges the theory of Stalin consolidating power and suggest a collective decision-making process, it is essential to recognize that there are alternative interpretations. Some historians argue that while collective decision-making existed, Stalin still held significant influence and authority within the Soviet system. It is important to consider a range of viewpoints to form a comprehensive understanding of Stalin's governance. Atinoua (talk) 19:57, 12 July 2023 (UTC)

There's a bunch of problems with this mass of quotations:

1. Most of them aren't relevant to the question of whether Stalin can be considered a dictator. That Stalin during the Great Patriotic War took into account the military advice of others and was willing to reverse decisions he had previously made are good traits for a leader to have, whether an elected official or an absolute monarch. That doesn't answer whether such decisions could be made and unmade against his will.

Likewise Getty writing that the 1930s USSR "resembled a backward, traditional society far more than it did the sophisticated order of totalitarianism" has nothing to do with whether Stalin was a dictator or not. After all, Russia before 1917 was surely even more of "a backward, traditional society" yet at the head stood a notorious autocracy.

Stalin desiring "fresh perspectives and vigor within the Communist Party by emphasizing the importance of bringing in new individuals" would, again, be a salutary trait. but it implies that dictators must be opposed to the replacement of subordinates and must adhere to ideological dogmatism. It's also worth noting that around the time Stalin made his speech, the Politburo was replaced by a far larger Presidium which I've seen historians generally regard as a way for Stalin to swamp earlier supporters he had now regarded as untrustworthy (Molotov, Mikoyan, etc.) with newcomers who owed their positions to him and could thus be expected to have 100% loyalty.

As for Evdokimov, leaving aside that he could only have influenced Stalin for a limited period (given he was shot during the Great Purges), I don't see how having "a demonstrable influence on Stalin in guiding him to adopt certain policies at certain times" challenges Stalin being a dictator, given that plenty of wielders of dictatorial power have had influential advisers. To give an infamous Russian example, Rasputin's influence over the Tsar.

Thurston's remarks about criticism of lower-level officials in the USSR during the Great Purges are, again, not relevant to Joseph Stalin, who was evidently exempt from any such criticism. Ditto for Webbs' remarks about the functioning of lower rungs of the state and Communist Party apparatuses and criticism of enterprise managers and the like.

2. The CIA report was addressed on this talk page less than a year ago. See Archive 23.

3. The Webbs' books on the Soviet Union aren't considered reliable sources by any historians I'm aware of. When said books are mentioned it's almost invariably either to mock or denounce them as prime examples of uncritical texts by Western "fellow travelers" of the USSR. This doesn't mean everything they write is erroneous, but what they do write should be checked against better sources (especially given that the Webbs had no special knowledge of the inner workings of the Soviet leadership whereas nowadays there's the Soviet archives and memoirs by Soviet officials.)

4. Pat Sloan was a lifelong member of the Communist Party of Great Britain, writing his book at a time when the CPGB was not known for tolerating any significant criticism of the USSR let alone Stalin. In later decades Sloan seemed to have no problem regarding Stalin as a man who had consolidated power in his own hands. Thus he complained that Soviet authors who claim the USSR is democratic were downplaying and obfuscating "the whole Stalin phenomenon, an emanation of the Soviet system" (see Labour Monthly, December 1971, p. 567) and in his last book Sloan wrote that "during the last years of Stalin, there was an internal dogmatism such that nobody apart from Stalin dared to voice a new idea, even on the basis of Marx's own original exploratory work." (Marx and the Orthodox Economists, 1973, p. 7) Sloan further states in that book, "Nobody today, for example, would dispute the fact that in the last years of Stalin centralisation was carried to fantastic extremes, supported by the illegal activities of the state security services." (p. 152)

5. The sincerity of Stalin's offers to resign, as you note, are "open to interpretation." I'm not aware of any historian who attaches much weight to them. I've already noted above the less-than-democratic context of Stalin's speech. It's also worth adding, since you've quoted the Webbs, that they themselves believed Stalin "may be thought to have become irremovable from his position of supreme leadership of the Party, and therefore of the government" given "the emotion of hero-worship, of the traditional reverence of the Russian people for a personal autocrat." In consequence, "He will therefore remain in his great position of leadership so long as he wishes to do so." (Webbs, Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation? Vol. I, 1936, pp. 438, 440) The Webbs' argument alone would be enough to indicate that Stalin could scarcely have expected his "request" to be accepted by those present, and instead that he desired merely to have his colleagues reaffirm their support for him.

Finally, it's important to note that the degree of power Stalin wielded wasn't static, so that he may very well have been faced with limitations on that power in 1930 or 1938 that were not necessarily still in place by the time of his death. Books like The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship (edited by E.A. Rees) go into this, notably Stephen Wheatcroft's contribution to that book titled "From Team-Stalin to Degenerate Tyranny" which does support the notion that Stalin "consolidated power to become a dictator." --Ismail (talk) 10:40, 13 July 2023 (UTC)

I agree.Jack Upland (talk) 01:06, 14 July 2023 (UTC)

Hello! Thank you very much for your feedback. I appreciate your thorough response regarding my proposed edit, and how quickly you responded too! You make really valid points and after reading them all, I now realize that some of the sources I provided do not directly address the central question of whether or not Stalin was actually a dictator. Accuracy and relevancy is very important and I respect your commitment to these high standards. I would like to reiterate the intention behind my proposed edit. My aim was to introduce a more cautious perspective, acknowledging the existence of varying interpretations regarding the extent to which Stalin consolidated his power. By presenting a nuanced understanding of his leadership position alongside the concept of collective leadership, I believe we can provide readers with a more balanced view and encourage critical thinking.

As you mentioned, just because Stalin took into account the military advice of others and was willing to reverse decisions he had previously made, it doesn’t automatically mean decisions could be made and unmade against his will. And I agree with that. I believe the evidence presented in sources 5 and 6 should be explored more, which highlight instances of collective work and discussions within the leadership structure. These sources provide nuance of the decision-making process of Stalin’s time, suggesting a more complex leadership dynamic than a straightforward dictatorship.

You also made a point about how Russia before the revolution was even more backward yet it was also an autocracy and you’re right that evidence 15 does not mention Stalin being a dictator. This evidence does suggest that the western understanding of Soviet history, of Stalin being a dictator, as it existed in 1985, was not entirely accurate. It provides a greater context of the extent of power consolidation. I believe a more nuanced position regarding his leadership position can be created to avoid oversimplifying it, and I would be interested in your thoughts on that.

Regarding evidence 7, you raised a point regarding Stalin's desire for fresh perspectives and new individuals within the Communist Party. It is true that this trait, in isolation, does not necessarily contradict the concept of dictatorship if the reasoning was to have an army of yes-men. When examining Stalin's actions in the broader context, it becomes essential to consider the motives and implications behind his emphasis on bringing in new members. While it is true that the replacement of the Politburo with a larger Presidium could be viewed as a means for Stalin to ensure loyalty and control, it is also important to consider the potential benefits of introducing new individuals into the decision-making process. Stalin said “We are getting older and shall sooner or later die, but we must think into whose hands we shall give this torch of our great undertaking, who will carry it onward and reach the goal of communism? For this we need younger people with more energy, dedicated comrades and political leaders.” And followed by requesting to be replaced as General Secretary. It is possible that this is not a sincere request, but if it is sincere then it suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership despite playing a bigger role. And even if it wasn’t sincere, it indicates an acknowledgement of needing a collective approach. If there is evidence that Stalin rejected the cult of personality around him, then we may be able to conclude his resignation was sincere. And if there are more instances of Stalin offering to resign that may also indicate that he was more sincere in his request.

The point you made about evidence 14 is a fair point as well. It is true that dictators can have influential advisors and this evidence alone does not change that fact. At the minimum, this evidence suggests that Stalin was receptive to input, but Stephen Wheatcroft goes further and places responsibility for the Shakhty trial on Evdokimov. This does suggest that Stalin was not alone in the decision making process.

While it is true that Thurston’s and Webbs’ remarks (evidence 13 & 12) may not be directly relevant to Stalin, they do contribute to a broader context. Thurston’s remarks are significant because it highlights a degree of openness and flexibility at least at certain levels. They indicate that the Soviet system encompassed various levels of decision-making and internal debate and supports the argument for collective leadership. Criticism also suggests a certain level of accountability that existed within the system. This kind of checks and balances is not something typically associated with dictatorships. With regards to whether Stalin himself could be criticized, evidence 8 suggests that certain members were able to criticize Stalin. Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Molotov were named. Evidence 4 also suggests that others were able to question and even argue with Stalin. This is not to say that criticism by all people, at all times, for all actions was tolerated by Stalin, but this evidence does not reflect characteristics of a dictatorship.

I wasn’t aware of the discussion regarding the CIA report (evidence 1), but I have now read it and the discussion that occurred about it. The first point I took from that conversation was that the idea of collective leadership was common at the time. If this is true then I agree that it makes sense that this report may not accurately represent history. There was also a point about how this document may not have been the consensus of the time, and even if it was, it’s an older document and there are newer perspectives, including newer perspectives from the CIA. I agree with this. Especially with Soviet archives being accessed, there is new evidence that can be examined. The final point that I saw being made was about these archives, including letters between Stalin and Molotov. Robert Conquest explains how we now know Stalin was very critical of Molotov with his lack of hostility to the west. (Feel free to add or correct me if my analysis is incomplete.) Overall this evidence is important because it shows how, at some point, at least some within the CIA believed Stalin was not a dictator.

With regards to the reliability of The Webbs’ books (Evidence 12, 16, and 17), I agree that if they are unreliable then they should not have priority over more reliable work. I haven’t looked into this yet so I appreciate you bringing it to my attention. Relying solely on their writings may not provide a comprehensive and accurate portrayal of Stalin's leadership and the nature of the Soviet system. I agree that multiple perspectives must be analyzed and considered, and I am very interested to hearing what you think!

You made a really good point about Pat Sloan (evidence 11) with his criticism of the Stalin-era. The quote you shared from Labour Monthly continues: “... is but touched upon, and that confusingly: 'The ideology of the cult of the leader is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism”. There were definitely huge problems within the Soviet system. His criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality are justified and should be taken into consideration when analyzing Stalin as a whole. As you pointed out, the CPGB did not tolerate significant criticism of the USSR which means that it's possible Pat Sloan was not telling the whole truth in this passage. The lack of criticism within his book may indicate a lack of free speech within the CPGB. This evidence cannot be taken alone and other evidence must also be analyzed before a conclusion can be made about just how accurate (or inaccurate) his claims are. You also mentioned his book Marx and the Orthodox Economists where Sloan talks about criticism within the USSR. This book was written in 1973 and could be reflecting the Soviet Union’s positions at the time (critical of Stalin). Like the original document I quoted from, this evidence could just be reflective of the time period instead. Sloan’s later works contradict some of the other evidence I have here which suggests one source isn’t telling the truth or the reality of whether Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator is complex. This is why we need to be more cautious when dealing with this question.

You also mentioned how the Webbs viewed Stalin as being irremovable against his will, but it wasn’t because he consolidated power and became a dictator. They write that it was because of the cult of personality around him, and even write it was “against his will”. On page 439: “It seems to us that a national leader so persistently boosted, and so generally admired, has, in fact, become irremovable against his will, so long as his health lasts, without a catastrophic break-up of the whole administration.” The full context of the quote you provided on page 438 reiterates this: “At this point it is necessary to observe that, although Stalin is, by the constitution, not in the least a dictator, having no power of command, and although he appears to be free from any desire to act as a dictator, and does not do so, he may be thought to have become irremovable from his position of supreme leadership of the Party, and therefore of the government.” It’s very clear that there was a strong cult of personality around Stalin which is something to be very critical of. This cult of personality does not imply in one way or the other whether Stalin was part of a collective or a dictator.

I also wanted to reiterate that evidence 9 and 10 suggest that not everything Stalin wanted, he received. Stalin wanted Kaganovich to take the position of head of civil aviation, but Goltsman ended up being picked instead. Stalin wanted Malenkov to be the new head of NKVD, but Beria ended up being picked instead. This evidence supports the idea that Stalin did not have absolute power in the government at the time.

The last thing that I wanted to say is that I agree with you that the degree of power Stalin wielded wasn't static and that we can work together to create a more cautious and more balanced perspective on this topic. If my original suggestion does not do justice for the complexities of the available evidence regarding collective decision making and dictatorship, I would be open to working together towards creating a more cautious and balanced page. You made many good points, so I am more than willing to revise the proposed edit. Thank you again for your reply! Atinoua (talk) 03:55, 14 July 2023 (UTC)

I agree it's important to remember that "not everything Stalin wanted, he received," but I don't think this is incompatible with being considered a dictator. Nicholas II evidently didn't get everything he wanted, and I'm sure even Hitler had occasions where Führerprinzip wasn't enough to get his way (in fact there was a lot of debate among German historians as to whether he was a "weak dictator" or not.) For a leader to get literally everything he or she wants would require extraordinary powers unknown to mere mortals.

As for my thoughts on whether "evidence 15" provides "a greater context of the extent of power consolidation," the answer is no, since it's talking about the efficiency of the Communist Party apparatus in regard to Soviet society rather than Stalin's role as leader of the party and country, and even here it's specifically talking about the 1930s and not covering the post-WWII period. The Kuomintang surely had an even less efficient administration of China during the years Getty covers, yet I don't think anyone would argue this means Chiang Kai-shek wasn't a dictator.

I do not see how Stalin's speech "suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership despite playing a bigger role." You haven't actually demonstrated that Stalin operated on the basis of a collective leadership during the final years of his life, whereas there are historians who argue he very much did not, such as Yoram Gorlizki (see his article "Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years.") Stalin's verbal "acknowledgement of needing a collective approach" means very little in that context.

The Shakhty Trial was held in 1928, at a time when Stalin evidently still had to reckon with Bukharin and others in the Politburo and Central Committee. If you want to argue that Stalin in the 1920s was to some extent beholden to a collective leadership, I don't think you'll find many historians disagreeing.

I don't see how "various levels of decision-making and internal debate" at different rungs of the Soviet state and party apparatus meant there must have existed collective leadership at the level of the Politburo. If collective leadership at Stalin's level existed, we can simply focus on evidence for that rather than bringing up disputes in particular regions or cities or villages.

As for disagreements and arguments by certain of Stalin's colleagues in the Politburo, during the discussion of the CIA document last year I noted that, in regard to the post-WWII period, Molotov practically begged Stalin for forgiveness over a minor political incident and decades later said that if Stalin had lived for another year or two, he (Molotov) would most likely have been killed. I also think it would be worth looking into Mikoyan's memoirs on the postwar period (rather than just his words on Stalin's handling of military affairs during the Great Patriotic War), since I suspect he concurs with other sources that in Stalin's last years any collective leadership had withered.

As for Pat Sloan, I do not think it is accurate to say that in the 1970s he was merely "reflecting the Soviet Union's positions [toward Stalin] at the time," given that as noted he explicitly criticizes Soviet authors for their insufficient treatment of what he terms the "Stalin phenomena" among other things. Furthermore the CPGB itself was among the more "liberal" (so to speak) communist parties by the early 1970s, not always being in line with the CPSU on foreign or domestic affairs. Pat Sloan seems to have supported this "liberal" attitude.

When citing the Webbs on Stalin having become irremovable, I did not claim it was because the Webbs thought he had "consolidated power and became a dictator." I brought up the Webbs' quote in the context of Stalin "requesting" to resign in 1952 to show that if the Webbs thought no one could remove Stalin, then it isn't unreasonable to assume Stalin himself must have known this when making his "request." I also brought it up because you had quoted the Webbs writing that Stalin was "merely the principal secretary to the organisation, a post from which he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee," without bringing up the important qualification that the Webbs also thought he could not, in actual practice, be dismissed.

As for the cult of personality, there are historians and recollections by Soviet officials who hold he was not so opposed to it as the Webbs would have liked to think (and again, the Webbs had no special knowledge on this subject.) Molotov for instance claimed that at first Stalin "resisted the cult of personality, but then he came to like it a bit." (Molotov Remembers, p. 220) In any case, not all dictators have had personality cults around them, and I don't think we need to discuss this subject to establish whether or not he ever held dictatorial control.

As for the appointments of A.Z. Goltsman in 1930 and Beria in 1938, two comments:

1. As I said at the start of this reply, a dictator need not always get what he wants, and two instances of a clash of opinions in an eight year period isn't exactly an impressive display of Stalin being regularly opposed, let alone having to genuinely argue for his positions to get his colleagues to vote with him as, say, Lenin often had to do.

2. I don't actually see any indication that the appointments of Goltsman or Beria were opposed by Stalin. The source for Goltsman merely indicates that in September Stalin had written to Molotov proposing Kaganovich for head of civil aviation, and that a month later the Politburo (which, after all, Stalin was part of) decided on Goltsman. Isn't it possible that Stalin had changed his mind, either on his own accord or at the suggestion of others? Likewise the source for the appointment of Beria only mentions Stalin having proposed Malenkov and a majority of other Politburo members recommending Beria instead, with seemingly no rival voting having taken place or other sign of Stalin trying to convince his colleagues and failing.

I'm sure this article can be improved upon, but I do think that the statement you took issue with (“Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to become a dictator") remains valid on the basis of what Wikipedia considers reliable sources. --Ismail (talk) 02:10, 15 July 2023 (UTC)

Hello again! Thank you for your reply.

You’re right when you say that Stalin not receiving everything he wants automatically means he isn’t a dictator. And if Stalin wanted Malenkov, but the majority of the Politburo wanted Beria, then Stalin did not have the final word, at least for this example. That is why it’s important to be more cautious, especially when it comes to the extent that Stalin consolidated power.

For your point on evidence 15, you’re right that the evidence is talking about the level of efficiency the Communist Party has to exert control over the country. And this control is very weak. The reason this provides a greater context to power consolidation is because Stalin did not (and I think your point is that maybe he was not able to) exert control over the country.

The reasoning for why various levels of decision-making and internal debate supports the argument for collective leadership is because it reflects a broader tradition within the country of a collective democracy (which I will go into more later). Having independence and debate at lower levels of state apparatus (as well as in the military) also shows that Stalin was not dictating these sections of government.

Regarding your comments about evidence 8, I do agree that it is worth considering what Stalin may have done. I also think that it's important to look at what Stalin did (or did not) do. These disagreements and arguments that continued throughout Stalin’s life do not add to the idea that Stalin was a dictator. It suggests that Stalin was not exempt from criticism and had, at least some level of a collective approach to decision making. That being said, I do agree with you that Molotov speculating he would have been killed carries significance.

Pat Sloan’s perspective and criticism of the “Stalin phenomena” (and his alignment with a more liberal position) provide an alternative viewpoint that should be weighed alongside other evidence. Here, Sloan is writing criticism of the Stalin era writers, specifically on his cult of personality. Criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality is something that reflects the Soviet Union’s perspective as they denounced this cult of personality after his death. This is what I am referring to when I say his perspective may be reflecting the Soviet Union's positions at the time. It’s important to look at all of Sloan’s analysis of the Soviet Union including both when he writes about collective democracy, and when he criticized the Stalin phenomena and his cult of personality.

I apologize for misrepresenting your view regarding the Webbs and thank you for correcting me. I agree with you that if Stalin was aware that he was so “persistently boosted” and “generally admired” that he became irremovable, then it may have influenced his attempts to resign. There may be evidence which suggests Stalin denounced this cult of personality, and if so, then it suggests Stalin not only did not have total control over this cult of personality, but also that Stalin wanted to distance himself from this cult. Resignation is one way that could be achieved. Also, you write about how the “Webbs also thought he could not, in actual practice, be dismissed.” This may suggest dictatorship, but their view is that he cannot be dismissed because of how loved he is, not because he had total control. This means it is true that “he could at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee” had he not been extremely popular and thus suggests more collective leadership instead of dictatorship.

I agree with you that 2 instances in an 8 year period does not prove that Stalin was regularly opposed. As you pointed out, this was in 1930, and 1938 and there were many more years that Stalin may have changed his mind. Evidence 9 and 10 merely suggests that different viewpoints within the country had different amounts of power. You also mentioned how it’s possible that Stalin had changed his mind and you’re right. With regards to your point on Beria being recommended, it suggests that the decision making process, at least in 1938, was not entirely Stalin being at the head and everyone else following.

I also want to clarify that my perspective is not that Stalin operated on the basis of collective leadership during the final years of his life. My perspective is that Stalin was given a leading role, and I hope that we can work together to create a cautious and more balanced view. We can add more nuance to our article and reduce the risk of oversimplification. The evidence that I have shared so far aims to question whether or not Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator.

It is important to note how Yoram Gorlizki’s perspective in Stalin's Cabinet: The Politburo and Decision Making in the Post-War Years is already one which presupposes Stalin consolidated power and became a dictator. Despite this, Gorlizki mentions: “...rather than one Politburo there were in fact a variety of distinct 'politburos' in the late Stalin period. Despite this diversity, each 'politburo' was deployed by Stalin to lock his colleagues into a system of collective responsibility; each offered a flexible yet reliable system by which the dictator could bind his peers.” Gorlizki is arguing that despite Stalin’s power consolidation, there remained a degree of independence.

He continues “Despite Stalin's importance, even at the height of his dictatorship the Soviet system never freed itself entirely from a deep-seated Bolshevik tradition of party 'democracy'.” According to Gorlizki, there were not just one, but several distinct 'politburos' in the Soviet system. Despite Stalin's centralization of power, these 'politburos' represented a degree of independence and diversity in decision-making. This suggests that the tradition of collective decision making we have been discussing continued even into the “height of Stalin’s dictatorship” although Gorlizki does say that the ultimate goal was to maintain control and loyalty to Stalin's leadership.

He also writes: “... a 'third' politburo, one without Stalin, acquired sufficient momentum and coherence to negotiate the gulf represented by Stalin's death with minimum disruption.” By expressing the cohesiveness of this politburo after Stalin’s death, it implies that the ruling group, with their shared understanding and experience gained from working together, was prepared to continue decision-making in a relatively smooth manner. This further reinforces the notion that, despite the concentration of power under Stalin, the Soviet system retained, to some degree, collective decision-making capacity that could endure beyond an individual leader's rule.

Continuing: “The Politburo thus served as an important counterweight to an energetic Council of Ministers apparatus.” This suggests how there were differing factions within the Soviet government. It suggests that the Politburo’s role wasn’t to rubber-stamp the decisions made, but to be a counterbalancing force to ensure power was not concentrated in one institution.

Continuing: “On 13 April the Politburo adopted a resolution on the Orgburo and secretariat which assigned responsibilities among the new secretaries and attempted to define the relative powers of Orgburo and secretariat, something the leadership had never found it easy to do.” The fact that the leadership found it difficult to define the powers of the Orgburo and Secretariat suggests that there were competing interests and tensions among the individuals involved which adds to the complex power dynamics at the time. This further shows why we need to approach this with more caution to maintain a high quality and accurate article.

Continuing: “By the end of Stalin's reign the discrepancy between a Politburo which, in reality, had become jaded and undisciplined, and the considerable leadership functions which this body was expected to exercise, had become accentuated. It may have been for this reason that Stalin decided to modernise the Politburo. Thus at the XIX Congress the name, membership and operations of the Politburo were all fundamentally changed. This reorganisation of the  Politburo was more than a simple 'rationalisation', however. The reforms of October 1952 underlined the cabinet's role as an agency of bolshevik leadership. In fact, the creation of the new presidium resonated closely with the calls for 'party democracy' and the demands for increased accountability and collective decision making which were raised in the run-up to the party." This increased accountability and calls for party democracy reflects tendencies associated with collective democracy, not dictatorship. It signaled a recognition of the need to avoid excessive concentration of power in a single individual, like a dictator.

Continuing: “The XIX congress stimulated efforts to 'democratise' the party at all levels. Steps to promote 'internal democracy' within the party included more frequent meetings of the party rank and file, mandatory reports of the apparatus to full party committees and a host of protest votes against sitting party officials. Such moves to reactivate party 'democracy' were twinned with steps to regularise the party's decision-making processes at all levels. At the very highest tier, the Politburo and Orgburo were merged into the Presidium, with an enlarged full membership of 25 and 11 candidate members. In contrast to its narrowly constituted predecessor, the new larger Presidium appeared to be more representative of the different sectors of the Soviet party-state and thus more open to outside influences.” This continues to add to the idea that it was not Stalin did not have absolute power. There was more diversity and more representation within the government, and therefore more power.

Continuing: “The evolution of the cabinet in Stalin's last months reflected broader developments within the Soviet party-state. Prime among these was the holding of the XIX Congress, which had direct consequences for the Politburo. Apart from its new name, the regular sessions of the Presidium Buro accorded with the new post-congress emphasis on 'collective decision making'.” This suggests that the Soviet leadership, under Stalin's last months, shifted towards a more collective decision making process rather than relying solely on the directives of a single leader.

Continuing: “At the same time the oncoming succession also left its mark on the cabinet, which became less dependent on Stalin than it had been in earlier years and which, in line with Stalin's own wishes, accommodated a new generation of younger leaders, many of whom were from the provinces.” With the cabinet becoming less dependent on Stalin, it means they were more open to embracing a new generation of leaders. This shift signaled a more collaborative leadership style.

Even in the conclusion, Gorlizki says: “The system of rule, however, never descended into a pure dictatorship where Stalin pursued policies in his own name, bypassing the Politburo altogether. In fact, Stalin approached the Politburo with a measure of caution and reserve… Despite frequently being excluded and manipulated by the leader, members of the Politburo under Stalin were treated relatively leniently…” This suggests that despite holding immense power and authority, Stalin was not inclined to govern as an outright dictator, imposing his policies without any consideration for the Politburo. Instead, he demonstrated a certain level of caution and reserve when dealing with this key decision-making body. While there were instances where he excluded and manipulated its members, they were, on the whole, treated relatively leniently.

He also mentions: “Even at its height, Stalinism had never become an unalloyed personal dictatorship, for it always contained a strong trace of Bolshevik ideology. At times, such as the XIX Congress, this ideology became more robust and the practices of internal 'party democracy' were revived. This had direct consequences for the organisation of the party and its ruling committees. It was because of its claim to be more 'democratic' than any other institution that, at the time of the XIX Congress, party committees were elevated over institutions of the state. This, however, came at a price: the rise of party institutions was conditional on the resuscitation of 'collective decision making' within the party, a commitment that reached to the nerve-centre of the party's power. To the extent that three politburos had co-existed under Stalin-the expanded sessions of the de jure Politburo, the closed meetings of the inner circle, and the Politburo without Stalin-it was to be a combination of this drive for collective decision making and the fact of Stalin's death itself that would allow the last of these politburos-the Politburo without Stalin-finally to come into its own.” He ends this article by writing Stalinims never became a personal dictatorship, and highlighted the collective decision making within the party. Although Gorlizki continues to call Stalin a dictator despite also writing about the collective decision making that remained, I believe we should continue to take a more cautious approach in our article to prevent oversimplification.

I also want to clarify that Stalin’s resignation is not simply a verbal acknowledgement of a need for collective democracy. It demonstrates, if sincere, a lack of dictatorship of Stalin through his initiative towards growing collective democracy. However there is more evidence which suggests that Stalin’s reasoning for his resignation in October 1952 was genuine. The question of how Stalin’s resignation in 1952 (evidence 7) actually suggests that Stalin continued to operate with collective leadership is a fair question. The answer is that by resigning, and by bringing in newer, younger members, Stalin would no longer be a part of the decision making process. There would be new leadership and collective decision making would continue. This evidence was taken from Leonid Nikolaevich Efremov’s notes, a young man, on the October 1952 Central Committee Plenum. It adds to the idea that Stalin was genuine when he said that older people (including himself) should be replaced with younger people. This suggests that Stalin wanted new voices and leaders within the party:

“Yes, we did hold the Congress of our party. It went very well, and many of you might think that amongst us there exists full harmony and unity. But we have not this harmony and unity of thought. Some people disagree with our decisions.

They say, why did we significantly enlarge the membership of the Central Committee? But isn't it self-evident that we need to get new forces into the CC? We old people will die out, but we must think to whom, into whose hands we shall pass the baton of our great undertaking. Who will carry it forward? For this, we need younger, dedicated people and political leaders. And what does it mean to bring up a dedicated, devoted political leader of the State? It takes ten, no, fifteen years to educate a state leader.

But just wishing for this is not enough. To educate ideologically firm state activists can only be done through practice, in the daily work of carrying out the general line of the party, of overcoming all sorts of opposition from hostile opportunist elements who are striving to slow down and interrupt the task of the building of socialism. And we must have political activists of Leninist experience, educated by our Party, in the struggle to defeat these hostile attempts and to achieve complete success in the realization of our great goals.

Is it not clear that we must lift up the role of our party and its party committees? Can we forget about improving the Party's work among the masses, as Lenin taught us? All this needs a flow of young, fresh forces into the CC, the general staff of our Party. This is what we have done, following Lenin's instructions. This is why we have expanded the membership of the CC. And the Party itself has grown a little.

The question is asked as to why we relieved some prominent Party and state figures from their important posts as ministers. What can be said on this account? We replaced comrades Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and others and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? The work of a minister - this is hard, peasant labor. It demands great strength, concrete knowledge, and good health. This is why we have relieved some deserving comrades from the posts they occupied and appointed in their places new, more qualified workers who take initiative. They are young people, full of strength and energy. We must support them in their important work.”

Additionally, it’s important to understand that there may be other perspectives of post-war Stalin. Stalin’s centralization of power does not necessarily mean consolidation into a dictatorship. By acknowledging different perspectives and interpretations, we can have a more accurate understanding of the complexities of Stalin’s role as a leader. The original suggestion of “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, and was given a leading role.” may not be the best way to ensure a cautious and balanced perspective on this. I would much prefer if the solution were a collective process but I can also add suggestions. What are your thoughts on “Stalin governed the country as part of a collective leadership, but centralized his power in later years.” This way, it acknowledges how collective leadership shifted over time and there is acknowledgement of his power centralization without the oversimplified assertion of dictator. I appreciate your feedback. Thank you! Atinoua (talk) 20:40, 18 July 2023 (UTC)

I don't hold that Stalin didn't or was not able to "exert control over the country." I hold that it makes little sense to argue that Stalin could not have been a dictator because of bureaucratic inefficiency. For example, Getty writes that the Communist Party in the 1930s had little influence outside the cities. This is true in the sense that rural membership was lower than that of urban membership. But during collectivization all sorts of personnel were sent from urban areas to the countryside to carry out the program, frequently resorting to force and violence. The fact that there were relatively few Communist Party members in rural areas in this period can help explain things about Soviet society and the countryside in particular, but I fail to see how it has any bearing on whether Stalin himself was a dictator or not.

Where do you get that "Stalin was not dictating these sections of government"? If you mean in the sense that party and state officials at lower rungs of the ladder *weren't* being tasked with implementing measures originating in the center (a center increasingly dominated by Stalin) and that they could easily risk their jobs if not their lives if they failed to carry out said tasks, then I think you'd have to find more sources than Getty for that. If you mean that Stalin wasn't an omnipresent deity who could simultaneously serve as the dictatorial head of every party and state entity in the country from Moscow to the smallest village, then sure, but by that silly criteria nobody has or ever could be a dictator.

Again, if there was indeed "a broader tradition within the country of a collective democracy," and this touched the Politburo, then you should be able to demonstrate this in regard to the Politburo.

To write that, "There may be evidence which suggests Stalin denounced this cult of personality, and if so, then it suggests Stalin not only did not have total control over this cult of personality, but also that Stalin wanted to distance himself from this cult." There is, in fact, evidence that "Stalin denounced this cult of personality." It *can* suggest that he wanted to distance himself from any responsibility for it, and of course Stalin could not have been personally responsible for every single manifestation of the cult across the entire country. But there are also authors who write that Stalin's public "denunciations" were in themselves part of his cult, reflecting a desire to glorify his "modesty."

As for the Webbs, again I've noted they aren't a reliable source and had no special insight into how the leadership of the party actually functioned, so that their mere assertion that Stalin could "at any moment be dismissed by the highest committee" carries no value. It was doubtless true in a purely "legal" sense, that Stalin could be removed in accordance with party statutes, but then he could just be another example of a dictator who ruled under a system which was democratic on paper but not in practice.

"I also want to clarify that my perspective is not that Stalin operated on the basis of collective leadership during the final years of his life. My perspective is that Stalin was given a leading role. . ." Who "gave" him this "leading role"? On what basis do you distinguish this "leading role" from that of a dictator? Why do you not accept the label of "dictator" but do accept that of "leading role"? (Besides, it would certainly be silly to argue that Stalin had no "leading role" in the 1930s or even the latter half of the 1920s, even if he could not be called a dictator at the time.)

The existence of unofficial "factions" (factions being, of course, illegal according to the party's own statutes) and "competing interests" once again have nothing to do with whether Stalin (or any other leader) could be considered a dictator or not. There have been plenty of dictators who have had to either reckon with such groups or manipulated them to keep control.

Writing that "Stalin was not inclined to govern as an outright dictator" is irrelevant. No one claimed that Stalin wanted to crown himself emperor or otherwise assume an openly dictatorial posture. Pretty much any academic work on Stalin will argue that he ruled via manipulative methods while giving the appearance of collective leadership (such as Gorlizki writing on how Stalin would circumvent the Politburo by "elevating" individuals to private meetings where Politburo-tier subjects would be discussed with certain actual Politburo members deliberately excluded.)

Again, I don't see how Stalin's own words at the 1952 plenum are "proof" that his request to resign was sincere, and I've already noted there are multiple authors who point out that the actual effect of "bringing in newer, younger members" to the leadership was to dilute the power of Molotov, Mikoyan, and other older members by bringing in personnel dependent on Stalin for their sudden promotion.

At the end of the day the overwhelming majority of reliable sources consider Stalin a dictator, including historians who (like Getty in his Practicing Stalinism and Gorlizki in his aforementioned article) note that at times Stalin was frustrated at how inept, corrupt, or otherwise inefficient the state and party organs could be. If you want to argue that the nature of Stalin's leadership was more complex than is usually presented in pop culture or whatever, I certainly won't object. But I see no reason, on the basis of Wikipedia's own standards, to adopt your suggestion of replacing the term "dictator" with "leading role." --Ismail (talk) 02:07, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

Indeed, most reliable sources agree that Stalin succesful established a dictatorship within a [party] dictatorship. And some say that he was possibly the most succesful dictator in modern history if measured by total power only. As Stephen Kotkin asked rhetorically, what other leader succesfully purged his entire army leadership and remained in power thereafter? (and this doesn't even address the purging of the secret service and communist party leadership) Machinarium (talk) 17:22, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

References

Infobox image

File:Iosif Stalin.jpg

Stalin in the 1940s

I propose the use of this official portrait of Stalin in the 1940s (File:Iosif Stalin.jpg) in the infobox over the current image, a 1937 portrait in which he holds a pipe (File:Stalin Full Image.jpg). The 1940s portrait has several advantages over the pipe portrait, consistent with the "natural and appropriate" guidance in MOS:LEADIMAGE:

• It is his most famous portrait by a wide margin (being widely issued to commemorate his 70th birthday in 1949), and is more representative of him at the peak of his international importance and recognition, in the World War II and early Cold War era. He is wearing his Marshal of the Soviet Union epaulettes and Hero of the Soviet Union badge.
• It is higher quality, and has a conventional composition typical of Wikpedia's infobox images. He is centered, with a clear view of his face, unlike in the pipe portrait.
• It is more neutral than the pipe portrait, which has too much "character" and seeks to portray him as "folksy" and "the everyday friend of the people". Both portraits are propaganda images, but the 1940s portrait is more straightforward in portraying him as a political leader and historical figure, rather than "humanizing" him.

To quote the MOS, the 1940s portrait is "the type of image used for similar purposes in high-quality reference works, and therefore what our readers will expect to see". I have read the somewhat recent discussions at Talk:Joseph Stalin/Archive 22#New infobox image and Talk:Joseph Stalin/Archive 23#New Infobox image, at which this image was not proposed but the deficiencies of the pipe portrait were pointed out by several editors. The alternatives proposed there had various problems, such as low quality or poor poses. — Goszei (talk) 16:38, 17 July 2023 (UTC)

I concur. --Ismail (talk) 17:51, 17 July 2023 (UTC)

You made some good points, and I would like to hear what other people think about this. This image you suggest does play into Stalin's cult of personality and I worry it idolizes him. Of course both images do this, but it may be better to portray him as folksy rather than godlike. What are your thoughts? Atinoua (talk) 03:49, 19 July 2023 (UTC)

That portrait is included in the article 4 times. We don't need another one. The current image is more realistic and recognisable as Stalin.--Jack Upland (talk) 04:01, 19 July 2023 (UTC)

Stalin in 1950

I have just found and uploaded a seated portrait of Stalin in 1950 to Commons. I think this cropped version is an even better candidate for the infobox than the 1940s portrait, as his appearance seems minimally retouched and closer to other photos, like those from the Yalta Conference. Overall the image strikes a more natural tone, and he lacks his ostentatious military decorations, reducing the concern about idolizing him. Thoughts? — Goszei (talk) 07:28, 19 July 2023 (UTC)

This one is much better! I am OK with this change. Atinoua (talk) 16:03, 19 July 2023 (UTC)

IMO the previous one is better. It may lack "his ostentatious military decorations," but on the other hand these hint at his role in the Great Patriotic War, which was clearly a major part of his life. --Ismail (talk) 02:07, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

I personally don't think the proposed one is perfect either since, like all other Soviet photos, it's been retouched to look as if he had perfect skin. Photos from 1941 by Margaret Bourke-White are one of the few that showed what he really looked like, see here for example: [1] but unfortunately they are not available on Wikimedia. Maybe this one from the Tehran conference is a good alternative (it's currently also used on the Russian and Georgian wikipedia pages): Machinarium (talk) 14:24, 22 July 2023 (UTC)

"...been retouched to look as if he had perfect skin." This point has been brought up multiple times and has been found to be invalid. MOS:LEADIMAGE states "Lead images should be natural and appropriate representations of the topic; they should not only illustrate the topic specifically, but also be the type of image used for similar purposes in high-quality reference works, and therefore what our readers will expect to see." It doesn't matter if the skin is cleared up. Does the image show Stalin as he would be recognized by the average reader? Would we expect the lede image for Britney Spears to show her without makeup? LittleJerry (talk) 01:17, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

But anyway, I prefer the current image or the 1950 one. Stalin is more recognizable for his tunic. After this, I think we need to stop with these image discussions (unless the lede image is deleted). They keep occurring every couple months and its giving repetitive. LittleJerry (talk) 01:21, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

I agree this is getting repetitive.--Jack Upland (talk) 03:42, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

There's a difference between make up and 'photoshopped' imagery (for lack of a better word). This article heavily favors old propaganda images that make him look prettier than he was, but I don't think an informative encyclopedia should be doing that. Neither for the lead image, with MOS:LEADIMAGE also stating that images "should be natural and appropriate representations of the topic".Machinarium (talk) 10:29, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

Make-up also makes people "prettier" than what they are. These are the same photos used in RS books about him. Hence the "type of image used for similar purposes in high-quality reference works, and therefore what our readers will expect to see" LittleJerry (talk) 12:48, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

Stalin in 1943

Again, there's a difference between a person wearing make-up, which is the way a person managed to present himself/herself in real life, versus a manipulated photo of that person which is not what the person actually looked like. Non-manipulated photos of Stalin are also used in RS books and are essentially superior to distorted ones, especially since the latter are known to have helped shape his cult of personality. Machinarium (talk) 22:21, 23 July 2023 (UTC)

Lede is pro-Stalin inclined, has to be changed (MILD VERSION) - improving the flow, calling a spade a spade

Hello. Some of you may know me and may have heard of or seen the trouble I have personally had with applying changes to this article with staunch opposition from some user. I have decided to formally disjoint my attempts and highlighted the earlier attempt as BOLD VERSION where it is currently Supported by 2 users (including me) and no further feedback. This MILD VERSION concerns the change I have most recently tried to get accepted which I consider as quite cosmetic and one which shouldn't cause any uproar at all. Alas it did. Well here goes: (1) I think it would be good to fix the flow of the first paragraph of the lede after the "He held power as ..." sentence as currently it's too lengthy in my opinion and constructed in a turgid way with redundancies. Here is my proposition for the flow of the rest of the first paragraph:

• He formalised the ideas he followed as Marxism–Leninism, while his own policies are called Stalinism. Initially governing the country as part of a collective leadership, he consolidated power to establish a dictatorship.

This at the same time improves upon the long-standing discussion whether Stalin should be given the title of "dictator" by removing the word altogether by turning away the discussion from titles to the status of the regime of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and so on.

• (2) The most egregious whitewashing in this article that I have seen so far is the euphemizing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by linking to it only as to "a non-aggression pact" (as if it was just a generic, peaceable non-aggression pact, lookie how good a man our boy Stalin was) in the rest of the lede. It's important to note that this was the style of official Soviet historiography with its historical revisionism, and later has been continued by post-Soviet Russia too and is now universally recognized as Russian propaganda. The solution required and suggested by me is only cosmetic also, just remove the euphemizing linking and input the title of the article as it is, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

What do you guys think? Galehautt (talk) 01:18, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

See WP:NOTVOTE. You also seem to have forgotten you were reverted several times already by multiple editors, therefore framing this as "staunch opposition from some user" comes across as disingenuous. Also it was a non-aggression pact. By invading the USSR, Germany broke the pact of non-aggression. The invasion of Poland is mentioned right afterwards anyway. Mellk (talk) 01:32, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

I wrote "some user" without naming names to avoid accusations of personal attacks. I'm glad you showed up but I'm concerned why you aren't alright with just linking to the article Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as it stands and are afraid of WP:SPADE. Note the secret protocol.

Galehautt (talk) 01:36, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Ummm, it is linked. Mellk (talk) 01:39, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Yeah it's linked: "his regime signed a non-aggression pact with Germany" and I propose just: his regime signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Germany

Galehautt (talk) 01:42, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

The next sentence becomes less clear. Mellk (talk) 01:44, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

How so? Galehautt (talk) 01:45, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

"Germany ended the pact" (but then it is not clear this is a non-aggression pact). Replacing this makes it unclear to the reader what "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" is. Therefore, "non-aggression pact" suffices. Mellk (talk) 01:48, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

It's pretty clear to me that you end any sort of secret pacts you have with someone when you invade them. Maybe it's not clear to you but I think to everyone else it is. If there is no further trouble with this proposed edit, I hope the positive feedback is secured and I can go through with it. Galehautt (talk) 01:50, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Your proposed change does not indicate this was a "secret pact". And the pact itself was not secret, there was a secret protocol. Mellk (talk) 01:54, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

You're pasting snippets from the paragraph to pretend there would be some inconsistency in it after applying my proposition, which is absurd. To demonstrate this, let me paste the whole thing with my clearly sensible cosmetic Wikipedianism applied:

• In 1939, his regime signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany, resulting in the Soviet invasion of Poland. Germany ended the pact by invading the Soviet Union in 1941, after which Stalin joined the Allies of World War II as one of the Big Three.

Furthermore, using your logic, as it stands right now it actually is inconsistent because it does not follow how a non-aggression pact could pave the way for the Soviet invasion of Poland while the Germans were busy invading Poland themselves. Galehautt (talk) 01:59, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

The article on the pact says it was a non-aggression pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that partitioned Eastern Europe between them. If you have a problem with it being defined as a "non-aggression pact", you should go to that talk page instead. Mellk (talk) 02:01, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

I have no problem with that article. Any further questions? Galehautt (talk) 02:02, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Then the current wording is fine, because "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" does not tell the reader what it is. Mellk (talk) 02:05, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Uh, it does. It says "resulting in the Soviet invasion of Poland." Galehautt (talk) 02:06, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

This does not mention it is a non-aggression pact. Mellk (talk) 02:07, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

It was an aggression pact truth be told. Galehautt (talk) 02:10, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

And "a non-aggression pact" does not tell the reader what the M-R Pact was at all because it's WP:SPADE Galehautt (talk) 02:08, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

This is not weasel wording. Mellk (talk) 02:09, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

My bad. It's WP:SPADE Galehautt (talk) 02:13, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

That article defines it as a "non-aggression pact". Also, you keep editing your comments after someone has replied to them. See WP:REDACT. Please self-revert. Mellk (talk) 02:18, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

Fixing typos is OK. Galehautt (talk) 02:19, 26 July 2023 (UTC)

The article doesn't even end the opening sentence on that. It continues and only then places the period. Galehautt (talk) 02:20, 26 July 2023 (UTC)