Propaganda in the Russian Federation

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The propaganda of the Russian Federation is communications that promote views, perceptions or agendas of the government of Russia. The media includes state-run outlets and online technologies,[1][2] and may involve using "Soviet-style 'active measures' as an element of modern Russian 'political warfare'".[3]

State-sponsored global PR effort[edit]

At the end of 2008, Lev Gudkov, based on the Levada Center polling data, pointed out the near-disappearance of public opinion as a socio-political institution in contemporary Russia and its replacement with the state propaganda.[4]

Shortly after the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, Putin enhanced a Kremlin-sponsored program aimed at "improving Russia's image" abroad.[5] One of the major projects of the program was the creation in 2005 of Russia Today (now known as RT) an English language TV news channel providing 24-hour news coverage. Towards its start-up budget, $30 million of public funds were allocated.[6][7] A CBS News story on the launch of Russia Today quoted Boris Kagarlitsky as saying it was "very much a continuation of the old Soviet propaganda services".[8]

Russia's deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin said in August 2008, in the context of the Russia-Georgia conflict: "Western media is a well-organized machine, which is showing only those pictures that fit in well with their thoughts. We find it very difficult to squeeze our opinion into the pages of their newspapers."[9] In June 2007, Vedomosti reported that the Kremlin had been intensifying its official lobbying activities in the United States since 2003, among other things hiring such companies as Hannaford Enterprises and Ketchum.[10]

In a 2005 interview with U.S government-owned external broadcaster Voice of America, the Russian-Israeli blogger Anton Nossik said the creation of RT "smacks of Soviet-style propaganda campaigns."[11] Pascal Bonnamour, the head of the European department of Reporters Without Borders, called the newly announced network "another step of the state to control information."[12] In 2009, Luke Harding (then the Moscow correspondent) of The Guardian described RT's advertising campaign in the United Kingdom as an "ambitious attempt to create a new post-Soviet global propaganda empire."[13] According to Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, Russia’s most well respected polling organization. Putin’s Russia’s propaganda is "aggressive and deceptive... worse than anything I witnessed in the Soviet Union"[14]

In 2014, Ivan Zassoursky, a professor of Media and Theory of Communications in the Journalism Department of Moscow State University, said that: "Today there are many complex schemes of influence in the world that can be labeled as soft power. But traditional thuggish methods of propaganda and direct control used by the Russian government cannot be considered effective from the professional standpoint and acceptable from the viewpoint of journalist morality."[15]

Following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea, a significant increase in Russian propaganda was noted by NATO.[16] In February 2017, a fabricated audio recording of NATO secretary Jens Stoltenberg supposedly interacting with Ukrainian Petro Poroshenko was published by Russian news website Life.ru. The supposed voice of Poroshenko was revealed to be Russian pranksters. Russia has been accused of comparing Ukrainian Nationalist fighters in Donbass to members of ISIS.[17] Political scholar Nikolay Kozhanov has claimed that Russia has used propaganda to convey nationalistic as well as pro-Assad messages during the Syrian Civil War. Kozhanov claims that Russia has made an effort through propaganda to paint Russia and Syria as a stable force "in the struggle against instability caused by the Americans and terrorism supported by the US regional partners."[17]

RT and Sputnik news agency are also accused of spreading false information.[18][19][19][19][20][21] In the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, the Bellingcat website of Eliot Higgins gave evidence about the manipulation of satellite images released by the Russian Ministry of Defense which was used by RT and Sputnik news agency based in Edinburgh, Scotland.[22][23]

Use of social media[edit]

Russia has been accused of using social media platforms to spread messages of propaganda to a global audience by spreading fake news as well as putting out advertisements and creating pseudo-activist movements.[24] The popularity of Sputnik on social media and its use of viral, clickbait headlines has led it to be described as "the BuzzFeed of Propaganda" by Foreign Policy magazine.[25][26]

Russia was accused by the U.S. authorities for efforts to spread fake news and propaganda in an attempt to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Election.[27][28] Russia is alleged to have used tactics such as creating fraudulent social media accounts, organization of political rallies and online political advertisements in an effort to help Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump win the election.[29] Senior executives of American social media platforms made an effort to counter alleged Russian propaganda by deleting automated accounts and alerting users of the presence of alleged misinformation on their platforms and interactions users may have had. In January 2017, Twitter estimated that approximately 677,000 users had "interacted with Russian propaganda or bots during the 2016 campaign." Three weeks later Twitter officials said that it is likely more than 1.4 million users were exposed to content stemming from these accounts.[30][31] In 2018, Twitter deleted approximately 200,000 tweets that were found to have stemmed from accounts linked to Russia.[32] On October 31, 2017, executives from Facebook, Google and Twitter testified on Russia's alleged use of social media in the 2016 election, before the House Intelligence Committee.[33] In an effort to combat fake news, Facebook announced a plan in January 2018 to attempt to highlight "reliable" sources of news.[34]

On May 17, 2017 Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed former FBI Director Robert Mueller to serve as special counsel to the US Justice Department in an investigation into alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election.[35] On February 16, 2018 The US Justice Department indicted thirteen Russian nationals and three Russian companies on charges of attempting to influence the 2016 election in support of the Trump Campaign.[36] Among the organizations indicted was the Internet Research Agency, a St. Petersburg based company that is said to use social media to spread fake news promoting Russian interests. The indictment claims that employees of the IRA were urged to "use any opportunity to criticize Hillary".[37]

Russia has been accused of engaging in propaganda campaigns in an effort to sway public opinion concerning the nation's annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian social media operations were allegedly undertaken to use misinformation to appeal to Pro-Russian forces in Crimea, while discrediting rebel and separatist groups. Notably, a false story was spread throughout social media of a young child being crucified by Ukrainian Nationalist Troops in Slovyansk.[38] The Ukrainian government also banned several Russian internet services, including the popular social media network, Vkontakte, which has been criticized as being censorship, affecting millions of Ukrainians.[39][40]

Reactions[edit]

According to Mykola Riabchuk, Ukrainian journalist and political analyst, the Russian propaganda evolved into a full-fledged information war during the Ukrainian crisis. Riabchuk writes: "Three major narratives emerged that can be summed up as 'Ukraine's borders are artificial', 'Ukraine's society is deeply divided', and 'Ukrainian institutions are irreparably dysfunctional'," thus needing "external, apparently Russian, guardianship."[41]

During a hearing in the U.S. Congress in 2015, Leon Aron, director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, described the Russian-sponsored TV network RT (formerly known as Russia Today) as not only promoting the Russian "brand", but aiming to "devalue the ideas of democratic transparency and responsibility, undermine the belief in the reliability of public information and fill the airwaves with half-truths". He described Russian state propaganda as "aggressive, often subtle, and effective in its use of the Internet".[42]

Peter Pomerantsev, a British TV producer, in his 2014 book Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible, argues that the propaganda's goals are not to convince, as in the classical propaganda, but to make an information field "dirty" so people would trust nobody,[43][44]

Discussing the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, John Kerry, United States Secretary of State, referred to RT as a state-sponsored "propaganda bullhorn" and continued, "Russia Today [sic] network has deployed to promote president Putin's fantasy about what is playing out on the ground. They almost spend full-time devoted to this effort, to propagandize, and to distort what is happening or not happening in Ukraine."[45] Cliff Kincaid, the director of Accuracy in Media's Center for Investigative Journalism, called RT "the well-known disinformation outlet for Russian propaganda".[46]

Members of European parliament have argued that Europe needs to strengthen its defense against Russian propaganda citing alleged Russian meddling in French, German and Spanish elections as well as Brexit.[47] In March 2015, The East Stratcom Task Force was created with the backing of the European Union in order to counter Russian efforts to spread misinformation and fake news.[48]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ The readers' editor on… pro-Russia trolling below the line on Ukraine stories, The Guardian, 4 May 2014
  2. ^ Максимальный ретвит: Лайки на Запад ("Maximum Retweet: 'Likes' for the West") Vedomosti, 21 May 2014
  3. ^ Abrams, Steve (2016). "Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin's Russia". Connections. 15 (1): 5–31. JSTOR 26326426. 
  4. ^ Новогодний баланс: После стабильности (in Russian). Vedomosti. December 30, 2008. Retrieved 2008-12-31. [dead link]
  5. ^ Finn, Peter (2008-03-06). "Russia Pumps Tens of Millions Into Burnishing Image Abroad". Washington Post. Retrieved 2009-01-04. 
  6. ^ «Честь России стоит дорого». Мы выяснили, сколько конкретно Novaya gazeta July 21, 2005.
  7. ^ Имидж за $30 млн Vedomosti June 6, 2005.
  8. ^ "Journalism mixes with spin on Russia Today: critics". CBC News. 2006-03-10. Archived from the original on June 11, 2007. Retrieved 2009-01-04. 
  9. ^ Russia claims media bias, by Nick Holdsworth, Variety, August 2008
  10. ^ Россия наращивает официальную лоббистскую деятельность в США NEWSru June 5, 2007.
  11. ^ "New Global TV Venture to Promote Russia". VOANews. July 6, 2005. 
  12. ^ Reporters Without Borders Don't Fancy Russia Today Kommersant October 21, 2005
  13. ^ Luke Harding (December 18, 2009). "Russia Today launches first UK ad blitz". The Guardian. London. 
  14. ^ "Russian propaganda machine 'worse than Soviet Union'". BBC News. Retrieved 22 June 2016. 
  15. ^ Darmaros, Marina (2014-12-02). ""Propaganda cannot be considered effective"". Russia Beyond The Headlines. Retrieved 2017-02-28. 
  16. ^ "NATO says it sees a sharp rise in Russian disinformation since Crimea..." Reuters. February 11, 2017. Retrieved 2018-03-05. 
  17. ^ a b Kozhanov, Nikolay (2016). Russia and the Syrian Conflict: Moscow’s Domestic, Regional and Strategic Interests. Gerlach Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctt1hj9wjf. ISBN 9783940924728. JSTOR j.ctt1hj9wjf. 
  18. ^ Logiurato (April 29, 2014), Russia's Propaganda Channel Just Got A Journalism Lesson From The US State Department, Business Insider 
  19. ^ a b c Crowley, Michael (May 1, 2014). "Putin's Russian Propaganda". TIME. 
  20. ^ Pomerantsev, Peter. "Inside Putin's Information War". politico.com. 
  21. ^ R.C. Campausen (January 10, 2011), KGB TV to Air Show Hosted by Anti-war Marine Vet, Accuracy in Media, retrieved April 5, 2011 .
  22. ^ "Forensic Analysis of Satellite Images Released by the Russian Ministry of Defense: A bell¿ngcat Investigation" (PDF). Bellingcat. 30 May 2015. Retrieved 22 June 2015. 
  23. ^ Borger, Julian (8 September 2014). "MH17: Dutch Safety Board to publish preliminary report on disaster". The Guardian. Retrieved 5 July 2015. 
  24. ^ "How Russian Propaganda Spreads On Social Media". npr.org. 
  25. ^ Feinberg, Andrew (21 August 2017). "My Life at a Russian Propaganda Network". POLITICO Magazine. Retrieved 22 June 2018. 
  26. ^ Groll, Elias (10 November 2014). "Kremlin's 'Sputnik' Newswire Is the BuzzFeed of Propaganda". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 22 June 2018. 
  27. ^ "Senator Mark Warner on Social Media and the 2016 Election". C-SPAN.org. 
  28. ^ "Graham seeks 9/11-style commission on social media vulnerabilities". politico.com. 
  29. ^ Parlapiano, Alicia. "The Propaganda Tools Used by Russians to Influence the 2016 Election". nytimes.com. 
  30. ^ "Twitter says it exposed nearly 700,000 people to Russian propaganda during US election". theverge.com. 
  31. ^ Carbone, Christopher (1 February 2018). "1.4 million Twitter users engaged with Russian propaganda during election". foxnews.com. 
  32. ^ "Twitter deleted Russian troll tweets. So we published more than 200,000 of them". nbcnews.com. 
  33. ^ "Facebook, Google, and Twitter Executives Testify on Russia's Influence on 2016 Election". C-SPAN.org. 
  34. ^ "Facebook Moves To Decide What Is Real News". npr.org. 
  35. ^ "Rod Rosenstein's Letter Appointing Mueller Special Counsel". nytimes.com. 
  36. ^ "13 Russians Indicted as Mueller Reveals Effort to Aid Trump Campaign". nytimes.com. 
  37. ^ Glaser, April. "What We Know About How Russia's Internet Research Agency Meddled in the 2016 Election". slate.com. 
  38. ^ "How Russia Weaponized Social Media in Crimea". thestrategybridge.org. 
  39. ^ "Why Ukraine Said 'Nyet' to Russian Social Networks". bloomberg.com. 
  40. ^ "Ukraine to block Russian social networks". 16 May 2017 – via www.bbc.co.uk. 
  41. ^ "Ukraine: Russian propaganda and three disaster scenarios". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 2015-11-09. 
  42. ^ "Сенат изучает роль российской пропаганды во вторжении в Украину". ГОЛОС АМЕРИКИ. Retrieved 2015-11-10. 
  43. ^ "Пітер Померанцев: Мета російської пропаганди - щоб ніхто нікому не довіряв". Українська правда. Retrieved 2015-11-10. 
  44. ^ Review: ‘Nothing Is True and Everything Is Possible,’ by Peter Pomerantsev, The New York Times, November 2014
  45. ^ "Secretary Kerry on Ukraine" (Press release). CSPAN. April 24, 2014. 
  46. ^ Kincaid, Cliff (August 22, 2014). "Why Won't Putin Help Middle East Christians?". Accuracy in Media. 
  47. ^ "EU needs to increase its resilience to Russian propaganda, say MEPs". European Parliament. Retrieved 2018-03-05. 
  48. ^ "EU Issues Call To Action To Combat Russian 'Propaganda'". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 2018-03-05. 

External links[edit]