Senkaku Islands dispute

Location of Senkaku Islands.
Blue : Uotsuri-shima (魚釣島) / Diaoyu Dao (釣魚島)
Yellow : Kuba-shima (久場島) / Huangwei Yu (黃尾嶼)
Red : Taishō-tō (大正島) / Chiwei Yu (赤尾嶼)

Uotsuri-shima, the largest of the Senkaku Islands at 4.3 km² (1.7 sq mi), in an aerial photograph taken in 1978 by the MLIT, the omnibus ministry which operates the Japan Coast Guard.

The Senkaku Islands dispute concerns a territorial dispute over a group of uninhabited islands known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, the Diaoyu in China, and Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. Aside from a 1945 to 1972 period of administration by the United States, the archipelago has been controlled by Japan since 1895. The People's Republic of China (PRC) disputed the proposed US handover of authority to Japan in 1971 and has asserted its claims to the islands since that time. Taiwan (Republic of China) also claims the islands. The territory is close to key shipping lanes and rich fishing grounds, and there may be oil reserves in the area.

Japan argues that it surveyed the islands in the late 19th century and found them to be Terra nullius (Latin: land belonging to no one); subsequently, China acquiesced to Japanese sovereignty until the 1970s. The PRC and the ROC argue that documentary evidence prior to the First Sino-Japanese War indicates Chinese possession and that the territory is accordingly a Japanese seizure that should be returned as the rest of Imperial Japan's conquests were returned in 1945.

Although the United States does not have an official position on the merits of the competing sovereignty claims, the islands are included within the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, meaning that a defense of the islands by Japan would require the United States to come to Japan's aid.

In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased three of the disputed islands from their private owner, prompting large-scale protests in China. As of early February 2013, the situation has been regarded as "the most serious for Sino-Japanese relations in the post-war period in terms of the risk of militarised conflict."

Islands

Main article: Senkaku Islands geography

The Senkaku Islands are located in the East China Sea between Japan, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China. The archipelago contains five uninhabited islands and three barren rocks, ranging in size from 800 m² to 4.32 km².

Fishing rights

The issue of sovereignty has been carefully circumvented in bilateral fishing agreements. In the 1997 fishing agreement, the Senkaku Islands were officially excluded from China's exclusive economic zone, but in a letter of intent Japan explained that Japan would not prevent Chinese boats from fishing there. Some Chinese sources have subsequently argued that this letter constitutes a waiver of Japan's claim to exclusive fishing rights.

Territorial dispute

Beginnings

Following the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government formally annexed what was known as the Ryukyu Kingdom as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. The Senkaku Islands, which lay between the Ryukyu Kingdom and the Qing empire, became the Sino-Japanese boundary for the first time.

In 1885, the Japanese Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Nishimura Sutezo, petitioned the Meiji government, asking that it take formal control of the islands. However, Inoue Kaoru, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, commented that the islands lay near to the border area with the Qing empire and that they had been given Chinese names. He also cited an article in a Chinese newspaper that had previously claimed that Japan was occupying islands off China's coast. Inoue was concerned that if Japan proceeded to erect a landmark stating its claim to the islands, it would make the Qing empire suspicious. Following Inoue's advice, Yamagata Aritomo, the Minister of the Interior, turned down the request to incorporate the islands, insisting that this matter should not be "revealed to the news media".

On 14 January 1895, during the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan incorporated the islands under the administration of Okinawa, stating that it had conducted surveys since 1884 and that the islands were terra nullius, with there being no evidence to suggest that they had been under the Qing empire's control.

After China lost the war, both countries signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 that stipulated, among other things, that China would cede to Japan "the island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa (Taiwan)". The treaty, however, was superseded in 1945 by the Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed between Japan and part of the Allied Powers in 1951 after Japan lost the Second World War. In the treaty of San Francisco, Japan explicitly relinquished the control of Taiwan/Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging to it. There is a disagreement between the Japanese, PRC and ROC governments as to whether the islands are implied to be part of the "islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa" in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. China and Taiwan both dispute the Japanese claim by citing Yamagata Aritomo's reasons and decisions to turn down the request to incorporate the islands in 1885. Both PRC and ROC asserted sovereignty over the islands. Japan points out that the islands were placed under the administration of the United States of America as part of the Ryukyu Islands, in accordance with Article III of the said treaty and China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands being under the administration of the United States under Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. In 1972, the United States ended its occupation of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Island chain, which included the Senkaku Islands.

Korean academic Lee Seokwoo notes that "The significance of subsequent acts and behaviour of the interested parties is dependent upon the determination of the applicable critical date, which is defined as 'the date by reference to which a territorial dispute must be deemed to have crystallized,' since the outcome of this dispute will be fundamentally different depending on whether the critical date is January 1895, as claimed by Chinese side, when Japan incorporated Senkaku Islands into Japanese territory, or February 1971 in the case of Taiwan, or December 1971 in the case of China, when Japan made known its official standpoint with the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, as claimed by Japan." He concluded "... Accordingly, and having regard to the various factual and legal issues explored above, one is inclined to conclude that Japan has a stronger claim to the disputed islands. In other words, the critical date in this case should be February 1971 (in the case of Taiwan) and December 1971 (in the case of China), as claimed by Japan. This is the more so that historical evidence relating to territorial disputes does not have its own value as history alone, but should be evaluated within the framework of international law on territorial acquisition and loss."

Chinese (PRC) and Taiwanese (ROC) positions

A 1785 Japanese map, the Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu (三国通覧図説) by Hayashi Shihei adopted the Chinese kanji (釣魚臺 Diaoyutai) to annotate the Senkaku Islands, which were painted in the same color as China. The primary text itself can be found here.

Although Chinese authorities did not assert claims to the islands while they were under US administration, formal claims were announced in 1971 when the US was preparing to end its administration. A 1968 academic survey undertaken by United Nations Economic Council for Asia and the Far East found possible oil reserves in the area which many consider explains the emergence of Chinese claims, a suggestion confirmed by statements made on the diplomatic records of the Japan-China Summit Meeting by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1972. However, supporters of China's claim that the sovereignty dispute is a legacy of Japanese imperialism and that China's failure to secure the territory following Japan's military defeat in 1945 was due to the complexities of the Chinese Civil War in which the Kuomintang (KMT) were forced off the mainland to Taiwan in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party. Both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) respectively separately claim sovereignty based on arguments that include the following points:

1. Discovery and early recording in maps and travelogues.
2. The islands being China's frontier off-shore defence against wokou (Japanese pirates) during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368–1911).
3. A Chinese map of Asia, as well as a map compiled by a Japanese cartographer in the 18th century, showing the islands as a part of China.
4. Japan taking control of the islands in 1895 at the same time as the First Sino-Japanese War was happening. Furthermore, correspondence between Foreign Minister Inoue and Interior Minister Yamagata in 1885, warned against the erection of national markers and developing their land to avoid Qing Dynasty suspicions.
5. The Potsdam Declaration stating that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine", and "we" referred to the victors of the Second World War who met at Potsdam and Japan's acceptance of the the terms of the Declaration when it surrendered.
6. China's formal protest the 1971 US transfer of control to Japan

According to Chinese claims, the islands were known to China since at least 1372, had been repeatedly referred to as part of Chinese territory since 1534, and were later controlled by the Qing Dynasty along with Taiwan. The earliest written record of Diaoyutai dates back to 1403 in a Chinese book Voyage with the Tail Wind (zh:順風相送), which recorded the names of the islands that voyagers had passed on a trip from Fujian to the Ryukyu Kingdom.

By 1534, all the major islets of the island group were identified and named in the book Record of the Imperial Envoy's Visit to Ryukyu (使琉球錄). and were the Ming Dynasty's (16th-century) sea-defense frontier. One of the islands, Chihweiyu, marked the boundary of the Ryukyu Islands. This is viewed by the PRC and ROC as meaning that these islands did not belong to the Ryukyu Islands.

Qing Dynasty in 1820, with provinces in yellow, military governorates and protectorates in light yellow, tributary states in orange.

The First Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894 and after the Qing dynasty of China lost the war, both countries signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 17 April 1895. In Article 2(b) the Treaty stated that "the island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa" should be ceded to Japan. Although the Treaty did not specifically name every ceded island, the PRC and ROC argue that Japan did not include the islands as part of Okinawa Prefecture prior to 1894, and that the eventual inclusion occurred only as a consequence of China's cession of Taiwan and the Pescadores to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War.

The Japanese government argues that the islands were not ceded by this treaty. In 1884, issues relating to the islands had been officially discussed by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Inoue Kaoru and the Minister of the Interior Yamagata Aritomo before incorporating them in 1895. shortly before Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War. It is also claimed that Japanese references to these islands did not appear in governmental documents before 1884.

The PRC and ROC governments claim that during negotiations with China over the Ryukyu Islands after the First Sino-Japanese War, the islands were not mentioned at all in a partition plan suggested by US ex-President Grant. The lease of the islands in 1896 and subsequent purchase in 1930 by the Koga family were merely domestic arrangements made by the Japanese government which had no bearing on the legal status of the islands."

According to PRC, Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek failed to protest American decisions with regard to the disposition of the islands because he depended on the US for support.

In April 2012, Taiwan declined an invitation from the PRC to work together to resolve the territorial dispute with Japan. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Lai Shin-yuan said, "The ROC and Mainland China will not deal with the [Tiaoyutai Islands] disputes together. Mainland China said the two sides should solve these issues together, but that is not the approach we are taking because [Taiwan and Mainland China] already have sovereignty disputes. We insist on our sovereignty."

Regarding Japan's argument about the 1953 People's Daily, Jin Canrong, a professor at Renmin University of China thinks that the article, which is anonymous, implies that Ryukyu Islands should be a sovereign state, also independent from Japan. Other Chinese commentators, including a government research institution run by a retired People's Armed Police general, extend the Chinese claim to the entire Ryukyu chain, including Okinawa.

Japanese position

The Japanese stance is that there is no territorial issue that needs to be resolved. It has stated the following points as claim for the islands and counter-argument against China's claim.

1. The islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of China prior to 1895.
2. The islands were neither part of Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty of China in Article II of the May 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, thus were not later renounced by Japan under Article II of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
3. Though the islands were controlled by the United States as an occupying power between 1945 and 1972, Japan has since 1972 exercised administration over the islands.
4. Japanese allege that Taiwan and China only started claiming ownership of the islands in 1971, following a May 1969 United Nations report that a large oil and gas reserve may exist under the seabed near the islands.

After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government surveyed the islands in 1885, which found that the islands were terra nullius and that there was no evidence to suggest that they had ever been under Chinese control. At the time of this survey, however, Yamagata Aritomo, the minister of interior of the Meji government, took a cautious approach and put off the request to incorporate the islands. The Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan through the surveys conducted by the Government of Japan, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been not only uninhabited but also showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China.

Japan claims that neither China nor Ryukyu had recognized sovereignty over the uninhabited islands. Therefore, they claim that Chinese documents only prove that Kumejima, the first inhabited island reached by the Chinese, belonged to Okinawa. Kentaro Serita (芹田 健太郎) of Kobe University points out that the official history book of the Ming Dynasty compiled during the Qing Dynasty, called the History of Ming (明史), describes Taiwan in its "Biographies of Foreign Countries" (外国列传) section. Thus, China did not control the Senkaku Islands or Taiwan during the Ming Dynasty.

A record in August 1617 of Ming Shilu, the annals of Ming dynasty emperors, shows that China did not control the Senkaku Islands. According to the record, the head of the Chinese coast guard mentioned the names of islands, including one on the eastern edge of the Dongyin, Lienchiang, about 40 kilometers off the Chinese mainland, that was controlled by the Ming and said the ocean beyond the islands was free for China and any other nation to navigate. The Senkaku Islands are about 330 kilometers from the Chinese coast. This contradicts Beijing's claim that China have controlled Senkaku Islands since the Ming dynasty about 600 years ago and underlines Japan's position that they are an inherent part of this country's territory. An expert in international law, says "We know the Ming had effective control only of the coastal area from other historical sources. What is remarkable about this finding is that a Chinese official made a clear statement along these lines to a Japanese envoy. This proves the Senkaku Islands were not controlled by the Ming."

After a number of Chinese were rescued from a shipwreck in 1920, an official letter authored by the Chinese Consul Feng Mien (冯冕/馮冕) in Nagasaki on behalf of the Republic of China (中華民國) on 20 May 1921, made reference to "Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, the Empire of Japan". The letter is on exhibition at Yaeyama museum.

The People's Daily, a daily newspaper, which is the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), referred to the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese name "Senkaku Shotō" and described the islands were a part of (then) U.S.-occupied Ryukyu Islands. The article published on January 8, 1953 titled "Battle of people in the Ryukyu Islands against the U.S. occupation" wrote "The Ryukyu Islands lie scattered on the sea between the Northeast of Taiwan of China and the Southwest of Kyushu, Japan. They consist of 7 groups of islands; the Senkaku Islands, the Sakishima Islands, the Daito Islands, the Okinawa Islands, the Oshima Islands, the Tokara Islands and the Osumi Islands."

A Chinese diplomatic draft written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC on May 15, 1950 referred to the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese name "Senkaku shotō" and "Sentō Shosho" and indicated Chinese recognition of the islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands. The 10-page document^{p. 1p. 4p. 5p. 6 (archived at p. 1p. 4p. 5p. 6)} titled "Draft outline on issues and arguments on parts concerning territories in the peace treaty with Japan" says the Ryukyus "consist of three parts--northern, central, and southern. The central part comprises the Okinawa Islands, whereas the southern part comprises the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands (Sentō Shosho)." The parentheses appear in the original. It also says "It should be studied whether the Senkaku Islands should be incorporated into Taiwan due to an extremely close distance." suggesting the Chinese government did not consider the islands part of Taiwan. The passages leave no doubt that Beijing regarded the Senkaku Islands as part of the Ryukyu Islands as of 1950.

There are many official maps published by both Chinas after 1945 that support they did not recognize their sovereignty over the islands and they recognized the islands as Japanese territory. PRC has been cracking down on erroneous maps in both print and digital forms and government agencies have handled 1,800 cases involving map irregularities and confiscated 750,000 maps since 2005. The National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation said "as China is involved in several disputes with neighboring countries, it is vital to raise public awareness of the country's due territory."

The Washington Times states that this is a classified PRC government map from 1969 and that it lists the "Senkaku islands" as Japanese territory.

• The Washington Times stated that they obtained a classified map made by the PRC's map authority in 1969 apparently listing the "Senkaku Islands" as Japanese territory.

• From 1946 to 1971, Taiwan Statistical Abstract published by the Taiwanese Provincial Government stated "the easternmost point of Taiwan is Mianhua Islet and the northernmost point is Pengjia Islet" excluding the Senkaku islands. In 1972, immediately after the Executive Yuan of the ROC announced that the islands belonged to Yilan County of Taiwan Province in December 1971, the description was revised and the points were extended to the Senkaku Islands: "the easternmost point of Taiwan is Taishō-jima and the northernmost point is Kuba-jima."

• The Grand Atlas of the World Vol. 1 published in October 1965 by the National Defense Research Academy and the China Geological Research Institute of Taiwan records the Diaoyu Islands with Japanese names: Gyochojima (Diaoyu Islands), Taishojima (Chiwei Island), and Senkaku Gunto in the "Map of the Ryukyu Islands". Taiwan and the Senkaku Gunto were clearly divided by a national border. The revised version in the early 1970s, "Senkaku Gunto" was changed to the "Tiaoyutai Islets". Furthermore, the national border was relocated to an area between the Daioyutai Islands and the Ryukyu Islands. However, in the English index, the name “Senkaku Gunto” remained unrevised.

• The National Atlas of China Vol. 1 published by the National War College of Taiwan did not include Diaoyutai Islands in the map of "Taipei and Keelung" in the first (1959), second (1963), or even third (1967) editions. However the fourth edition (1972) included an extra map of the "Taio Yu Tai Islets" as part of the ROC’s territory in the upper left corner of the map of "Taipei and Keelung".

Partial image of map showing Senkaku Islands in World Atlas published in China in 1960

• A world atlas published in November 1958, by the Map Publishing Company of Beijing, treats the Senkaku Islands as a Japanese territory and described them in Japanese name Senkaku Guntō (Senkaku Islands) and Uotsuri-Jima,

• In the 1970 junior high school geography textbook published by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation of Taiwan, the Diaoyutai Islands were named Senkaku Gunto in the "Physical Map of the Ryukyu Islands". Senkaku Gunto and the Ryukyu Islands were clearly not included in the ROC's territory by national border. However, in the 1971 edition, Senkaku Gunto was renamed Diaoyutai Islands, and the ROC national border was redrawn so that the Diaoyutai Islands were included.

During a private visit 9 years after stepping down from office, former President of Republic of China, Lee Teng-hui, once said that the islands are part of Okinawa.

United States' position

On December 25, 1953, U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 (USCAR 27) set geographical boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands that included the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, during U.S. administration of the islands, the U.S. Navy built firing ranges on them and paid annual rent of $11,000 to Jinji Koga, son of the first Japanese settler of the islands.

During the San Francisco Peace Treaty discussions, John Foster Dulles, chief U.S. delegate to the peace conference, set forth the concept that Japan had "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu Islands. According to an official analysis prepared by the U.S. Army, "residual Sovereignty" meant that "the United States will not transfer its sovereign powers over the Ryukyu Islands to any nation other than Japan." In June 1957, President Eisenhower confirmed this at the U.S.-Japan summit meeting, telling Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi that "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus meant that "the United States would exercise its rights for a period and that the sovereignty would then return to Japan." In March 1962, President Kennedy stated in an Executive Order for the Ryukyus that "I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the Free World will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty." Since there was no U.S. action to separate the Senkaku Islands from the Ryukyu, these applications of “residual sovereignty” appeared to include the Senkaku Islands.

In May 1971, A report compiled by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency said "The Japanese claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus is strong, and the burden of proof of ownership would seem to fall on the Chinese". The CIA also said in related documents that any dispute between Japan, China and Taiwan over the islands would not have arisen, had it not been for the discovery around 1968 of potential oil reserves on the nearby continental shelf.

On June 7, 1971, President Richard Nixon confirmed Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Senkaku Islands just before a deal to return Okinawa Prefecture to Japan in a conversation with his national security adviser Henry Kissinger. Kissinger also told Nixon that "these (Senkaku) islands stayed with Okinawa" when Japan returned Taiwan to China after the end of World War II in 1945.

The Nixon Administration removed the Senkakus from its inclusion in the concept of Japanese "residual sovereignty" in presenting the Okinawa Reversion Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification. On October 20, 1971, Secretary of State William Rogers sent a letter to U.S Congress. In his letter, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser Robert Starr stated "The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants... The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned." Several experts have attributed this Nixon Administration policy shift as having been influenced by White House overtures to China during 1971-1972, culminating in the Nixon visit to China.

The United States Department of State has stated that it does not take an official position on who owns the islands. Top US government officials, however, have declared in 2004, 2010, and September 2012, that as Japan maintains effective administrative control on the islands, the islands fall under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan which requires the US to assist Japan in defending the islands if anyone, including China, attacks or attempts to occupy or control them.

On November 29, 2012, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved an amendment to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 stating the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands fall under the scope of a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and Washington would defend Japan in the event of armed attacks.

In May 2013, U.S. Department of Defense criticized the Chinese territorial claim in a report called "Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013".

"In September 2012, China began using improperly drawn straight baseline claims around the Senkaku Islands, adding to its network of maritime claims inconsistent with international law."

"In December 2012, China submitted information to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding China’s extended continental shelf in the East China Sea that includes the disputed islands."

Alternative approaches

When PRC-Japan diplomatic relations were established in 1972, both nations found reasons to set aside this territorial dispute. According to negotiator Deng Xiaoping, "It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all."

In 1969, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) identified potential oil and gas reserves in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. During subsequent decades, several rounds of bilateral talks considered joint-development of sub-seabed resources in disputed territorial waters. Such efforts to develop a cooperative strategy were unsuccessful.

In 2008, a preliminary agreement on joint development of resources was reached but the agreement only includes the area far from these islands.

In 2009 a hotline was agreed to (and in 2010 a military-to-military hotline), neither of which have been implemented.

Disputes about the proximate causes

Explanations of the manifold causes of the intensified conflict involving the Senkaku Islands vary. For example, some use the term "territorial dispute"; however, the Japanese government has consistently rejected this framing since the early 1970s. An analysis of incidents and issues require distinguishing between disputes which are primarily over territory and those which merely have a territorial component.

The real importance of the islands lies in the ... implications for the wider context of the two countries’ approaches to maritime and island disputes, as well as in the way in which those issues can be used by domestic political groups to further their own objectives.] — Zhongqi Pan.

The media of various nations are closely monitoring developments and attempting to explain the causes of the crisis, e.g.,

• Senkakus described as a proxy. According to China Daily, the Senkaku Islands are a disruptive mine planted by the United States into Sino-Japanese relations.
• Senkakus characterized as a pretext. According to the New York Times, some analysts frame all discussion about the islands' status within a broader pattern of Chinese territorial assertions.
• Senkakus identified as a tactic. According to the Christian Science Monitor, the Senkakus may represent a tactical distraction from China's internal power struggle over who will replace the current leadership of the Communist Party in 2012.
• Senkakus characterized as a lack of firm foreign policy-making control and of dysfunctional decision-making. The Economist posits that "Lacking clear direction, [Chinese] bureaucracies may be trying to look tough." The Diplomat posits that the PLA may at some level be acting independently of top CPC leadership, and notes more generally that there is a lack of coordination within China’s decision-making apparatus.

The historical record is a backdrop for each new incident in the unfolding chronology of these islands.

Events

While Taiwan and China first publicly claimed the islands in 1971 (in February and December, respectively), there were no major incidents between the three states regarding the islands until the 1990s. Since 2004, however, several events, including naval encounters, scrambled fighter jets, diplomatic efforts, and massive public protests, have heightened the dispute.

Incidents at or near the islands

See also: China Marine Surveillance § Deployments around Senkaku Islands

File:China & Japan in Diaoyu Island (2012-9-24).jpg

China Marine Surveillance vessel Haijian 66 and Japan Coast Guard Hida-class patrol vessel PL53 "Kiso" (きそ) engaging with each other.

Since 2006, vessels from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have entered waters that Japan claims as part of its exclusive economic zone connected with the islands on a number of occasions. In some cases, the incursions have been carried out by Chinese and Taiwanese protesters, such as in 2006 when a group of activists from the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands approached the islands; the group was stopped by the Japanese Coast Guard prior to landing. In June 2008 activists from Taiwan, accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard vessels, approached within 0.4 nautical miles (740 m) of the main island, from which position they circumnavigated the island in an assertion of sovereignty of the islands. In 2011, a fishing boat carrying some activists navigated to within 23 nautical miles of the islands. Japan sent coast guard vessels to block the ship and a helicopter to monitor its actions, subsequent to which the Coast Guard Agency Keelung office of Taiwan sent five patrol vessels. After a short standoff between the two groups of vessels, the Taiwanese fleet returned to their own territory. In July 2012, Coastguard vessels from Taiwan and Japan collided while the Taiwanese vessel was escorting activists to the area. In August 2012, activists from Hong Kong were able to swim ashore after their boat was stopped by the Japan Coast Guard. The activists were detained and then deported two days later. In January 2013, a boat carrying activists from Taiwan was intercepted by Japanese patrols and diverted from an attempted landing on the islands through the use of water cannons.

In addition, a number of incidents have occurred due to the presence of Chinese or Taiwanese fishing vessels in sea zones claimed by Japan. In some cases, these incidents have resulted in a collision between boats. The first major event occurred in 2008, when a Taiwanese fishing boat and a Japanese patrol vessel collided. The passengers were released, but the captain was detained for three days. Later in June, after releasing video taken by the Taiwanese boat, Japan apologized for the incident and agreed to pay NT$10 million (US$311,000) as compensation to the owner of the boat. On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in disputed waters near the islands. The collisions occurred after the Japanese Coast Guard ordered the trawler to leave the area. After the collisions, Japanese sailors boarded the Chinese vessel and arrested the captain Zhan Qixiong. Japan held the captain until 24 September. Each country blamed the other for the collision.

While Japanese government vessels regularly patrol the ocean surrounding the islands, Japanese civilians have also entered the area. In July 2010, nine Japanese boats fished in the area. A spokesman from Ganbare Nippon, which owned one of the vessels, stated it was done specifically to assert Japanese sovereignty over the islands. In August 2012, Ganbare Nippon organized a group of four vessels carrying Japanese activists travelling to the islands, carrying about 150 Japanese activists. The Japanese government denied the groups the right to land, after which a number swam to shore and raised a Japanese flag.

On some occasions, ships and planes from various Chinese and Taiwanese government and military agencies have entered the disputed area. In addition to the cases where they escorted fishing and activist vessels as described above, there have been other incursions. In an eight month period in 2012, over forty maritime incursions and 160 aerial incursions occurred. For example, in July 2012, Three Chinese patrol vessels entered the disputed waters around the islands. On December 13, 2012, a Chinese government aircraft entered Japanese-controlled airspace for the first time since records began in 1958, following months of incursions by Chinese surface vessels. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambled eight F-15 fighters and an airborne early warning aircraft in response to the Chinese flight. The Japanese government made a formal diplomatic protest to China.

The most direct confrontation to date between the countries' official vessels occurred in September 2012. Seventy five Taiwanese fishing vessels were escorted by ten Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels to the area, and the Taiwanese Coast Guard ships clashed with Japanese Coast Guard ships. Both sides fired water cannons at each other and used LED lights and loudspeakers to announce their respective claims to the islands.

Military escalation continued in 2013. The two sides sent fighter airplanes to monitor ships and other planes in the area. In February, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera revealed that a Chinese frigate had locked weapons-targeting radar onto a Japanese destroyer and helicopter on two occasions in January. The Chinese Jiangwei II class frigate and the Japanese destroyer were three kilometers apart, and the crew of the latter went to battle stations. The Chinese state media responded that their frigates had been engaged in routine training at the time. In late February 2013, U.S. intelligence detected China moving road-mobile ballistic missiles closer to the coast near the disputed islands, this included DF-16s.

Diplomatic results

The various governments have lodged protests and criticisms of each other in response to the unfolding situation in and around the islands. For example, the Taiwanese government recalled its highest representative to Japan in the wake of the 2008 collision. Similarly, the Chinese government protested the 2012 Ganbare Nippon incident. The 2010 collision incident resulted in a significant increase in tensions between the two countries, both during the event as they argued over the released on the fishing boat crew, and after, as both said they would seek compensation from the other for damages.

Protests

See also: 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations

There have been a number of public protests in all three countries, often triggered by the specific incidents noted above. The first major set of protests revolved around the 2010 boat collision, with protests being held in Japan, China, and Taiwan. In 2012, major protests began in August 2012 after reports that the Japanese government was considering purchasing the islands. The protests continued after the formal purchase into the middle of September. At the height of the protests, there were demonstrations in as many as 85 Chinese cities, along with Hong Kong and the United States. In many cases, these protests included anti-Japanese violence, vandalism, and arson.

Sources

• Curtis, Gerald, Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi. (2010). Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 10-ISBN 488907080X/13-ISBN 9784889070804; OCLC 491904160
• Shaw, Han-yi. (1999). The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan. Baltimore, Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law. OCLC 608151745
• Lee, Seokwoo, Shelagh Furness and Clive Schofield. (2002). Territorial disputes among Japan, China and Taiwan concerning the Senkaku Islands. Durham: University of Durham, International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU). 10-ISBN 1897643500/13-ISBN 9781897643501; OCLC 249501645
• Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea. (2000). International Organizations and the Law of the Sea. London : Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff. OCLC 16852368
• Pan, Junwu. (2009). Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China's Territorial and Boundary Disputes. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 10-ISBN 9004174281/13-ISBN 9789004174283; OCLC 282968950
• Suganuma, Unryu. (2000). Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 10-ISBN 0824821599/13-ISBN 9780824821593; 10-ISBN 0824824938/13-ISBN 9780824824938; OCLC 170955369

External links

• Global Security, Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands
• Basic View on Senkaku (by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
• Q&A on the Senkaku Islands (by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
• Japan’s Territorial Problem: The Northern Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands, commentary by Ambassador Kazuhiko Togo (6 May 2012)
• Article by Kiyoshi Inoue Professor of History department Kyoto University, and original text and maps in Japanese
• Senkaku @BBC
• "Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands". Globalsecurity.org.
• Diaoyutai History (in Chinese)
• Satellite image of Senkaku Islands
• "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute:", Durham University, 2008. Dzurek, Daniel.
• "INTERNATIONAL LAW'S UNHELPFUL ROLE IN THE SENKAKU ISLANDS:", University of Pennsylvania, 18 October 1996. Ramos-Mrosovsky, Carlos.
• 琉球群岛人民反对美国占领的斗争 "Ryukyu Islands, the struggle of peoples against U.S. occupation," 人民日報 (People's Daily), 8 January 1953. (in Chinese)
• "China's Diaoyu Islands Sovereignty is Undeniable" at People's Daily Online, 26 May 2003.
• "Wrong to dispute Japan’s sovereignty of Senkaku" by Hiroshi Suzuki, Director, Japan Information and Cultural Centre Minister, Embassy of Japan, London., Financial Times, Letters, 28 May 2012.