User talk:Ruling party

Moves

Please stop your disruptive page moves. If you wish to move the articles, follow the WP:RM process. Thanks, Number 57 19:45, 13 January 2021 (UTC)

The standard naming format for elections is detailed at WP:NC-GAL#Elections and referendums. The Supreme People's Assembly is the parliament of North Korea. And no, moving the artilces back to their original and correctly formatted titles is not disruptive. Number 57 19:48, 13 January 2021 (UTC)

Not sure why being a communist state is relevant, but if it matters to you, see 2016 Laotian parliamentary election, 1957 Bulgarian parliamentary election, 2018 Cuban parliamentary election etc. Number 57 19:51, 13 January 2021 (UTC)

Again, the Supreme People's Assembly is a parliament, hence why it's in Category:Parliaments by country. Number 57 19:53, 13 January 2021 (UTC)

Irrelevant. Wikipedia has its own convention on how to name election articles, as I've pointed you to above. Number 57 19:58, 13 January 2021 (UTC)

Copying within Wikipedia

Hi - I noticed your discussion with Diannaa, who is amongst this project's most knowledgeable admins on the subject of copyright. Please review WP:CWW, which has a lot of information you may find helpful. Best GirthSummit _(blether) 17:26, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

@Girth Summit: Noted. I will add however that you see the same lead in the Communist Party of China and the Workers' Party of Korea. But fine - but the lead wasn't referenced in the CPV article. I'm guessing that article also referenced the lead in the body of the article. --Ruling party (talk) 17:29, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

Ruling party, I haven't reviewed every article on communism on Wikipedia - I very much doubt that Diannaa has either. It's possible that there are other problematic articles out there - we don't have a magic panopticon that allows us to see everything that happens everywhere, we can only address problems when we notice them, or when they are brought to our attention by other volunteers.

My general advice is this: Wikipedia has lots and lots of policies and guidelines, and it's not reasonable to expect someone to have read all of them before they start editing - you will make mistakes as you learn the ropes, and that's fine. However, when an administrator tells you that something you are doing is a problem, the response 'Thanks, please can you tell me why?' is good; the response 'Sorry, I won't do it again' is OK, but misses the opportunity to learn from the encounter; the response 'No it's not' is... not great. GirthSummit _(blether) 17:37, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

@Girth Summit: I accept that criticism! But I will say that removing it twice without asking me about it was also not great.

But I understand what you're saying. I accept you're point. --Ruling party (talk) 17:39, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

Ruling party, thanks for accepting it. With regards to the removal without discussion, I see why you're frustrated, but can I offer you a different perspective?

Admins have lots of demands on our editing time - vandalism, disruptive users, spam, closing and implementing deletion discussions... I could write a very long list. All of them are important to the smooth running of the project, but a few of them have serious real-world legal implications. Along with outright defamation, copyright violations are high up on that list. The backlogs are lengthy, and there aren't enough volunteers with the interest and skills to deal with them; as a result, violations of our COPYVIO policy tend to be handled without much ceremony or discussion - it's a case of whacking one mole and move on to the next. Please understand that our COPYVIO team does a huge amount of work, all of it voluntary, and it is of enormous importance to the maintenance of this project.

I am not saying that your copying content from one article to another is likely to have serious real-world implications - I recognise that it is exceedingly unlikely that anyone would make a legal case around it. That's not the point though - the people working that queue don't have time to look into each case deeply and engage in discussion, the policy is enforced rigorously and speedily because that's the only way we can hope to deal with the number of violations. Please don't interpret any brevity or lack of formalities as rudeness, it's born of necessity.

I hope that helps explain things a bit. Best wishes GirthSummit _(blether) 17:57, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

@Girth Summit: I understand! :) --Ruling party (talk) 18:33, 16 January 2021 (UTC)

On single party states

Most pages of politcal parties operate in the same format examples Sudanese Socialist Union, Chinese Communist Party, Communist Party of Cuba, Workers' Party of Korea , Communist Party of Vietnam , Arab Socialist Union (Egypt). Restore the election table no other article that i know of has the election table on the left in the middle of the article i don't care what you do with rest of article i am just the election table guy

Sourcing

Hi, I’m a New Page Reviewer and I see you get a lot of new articles sent to draft. I advise you to read our policy on notability and be sure your articles are supported by multiple reliable independent sources. If you need any help please leave a message on my talk page. All the best Mccapra (talk) 18:55, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: All of them are leading politicians of Laos, ministers, former presidents and deputy prime ministers. They are all very notable. I'm justing one source—the Historical Dictionary of Laos—to create the articles.--Ruling party (talk) 19:00, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

Yes I see but I’m afraid that isn’t sufficient. If they are genuinely notable, other sources must exist. Biographies with a single source won’t survive. Mccapra (talk) 19:03, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: You misunderstood me. I'm using one source to create these articles. There are several thousands of them. My job is to create them, and maybe expand them later. --Ruling party (talk) 19:04, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

Yes I’m afraid that approach won’t work. If a bio article has a single source it will be sent to draft. Each new article needs multiple reliable sources. Regards Mccapra (talk) 19:20, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: That's a stupid position especially considering that a quick Google search proves their notability, and a quick Google search in Lao hits the point through. --Ruling party (talk) 19:44, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

Maybe, but it’s foundationally stupid as far as Wikipedia is concerned. Our policy is it’s the job of the article creator to prove notability, not everyone else’s job to find it out. If a quick google search proves notability, put the sources in yourself. Mccapra (talk) 19:48, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: I have. I've put a historical dictionary as a source, which should say something. A Historical Dictionary only lists people who are of historical importance.... --Ruling party (talk) 19:49, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

Well it’s up to you. Every game has its rules. Wikipedia has its own. If you don’t play by the rules you’ll have a frustrating time. Mccapra (talk) 19:51, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: Read Wikipedia:Notability (people). I am following the rules."The person has an entry in the Dictionary of National Biography or similar publication." and "Politicians and judges who have held international, national, or (for countries with federal or similar systems of government) state/province-wide office, or have been members of legislative bodies at those levels.[12] This also applies to people who have been elected to such offices but have not yet assumed them." --Ruling party (talk) 19:54, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

Fine. I’ll leave you to it. Good luck. Mccapra (talk) 19:57, 19 January 2021 (UTC)

@Mccapra: Sorry if I was a bit rude! :)

It's just my belief—maybe I'm wrong—that some articles should be allowed to be stubs at creation. That an article is there in the first place might inspire someone to expand the article. I also believe a short article says more than no article and that Wikipedia is, therefore, better for it.

You were just giving me advice, and I reacted wrongly.

I've been reading the Wikipedia rulebook. Much good advice to find there. --Ruling party (talk) 21:43, 23 January 2021 (UTC)

No worries there’s a lot about Wikipedia that seems weird when it’s new, though there’s always an underlying reason fir why things are that way. You’re creating lots of articles on interesting topics that other editors aren’t covering, and I want your contributions to survive rather then getting deleted or sent to draft. All the best Mccapra (talk) 21:51, 23 January 2021 (UTC)

Copyright problem: Prime Minister of Laos

Hello, and welcome to Wikipedia! We welcome and appreciate your contributions, such as Prime Minister of Laos, but we regretfully cannot accept copyrighted text or images from either web sites or printed works. This article appears to contain work copied from https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Laos1.html, and therefore to constitute a violation of Wikipedia's copyright policies. The copyrighted text has been or will soon be deleted. While we appreciate contributions, we must require all contributors to understand and comply with our copyright policy. Wikipedia takes copyright violations very seriously, and persistent violators are liable to be blocked from editing.

If you believe that the article is not a copyright violation, or if you have permission from the copyright holder to release the content freely under license allowed by Wikipedia, then you should do one of the following:

• Have the author release the text under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License (CC BY-SA 3.0) by leaving a message explaining the details at Talk:Prime Minister of Laos and send an email with confirmation of permission to "permissions-en (at) wikimedia (dot) org". Make sure they quote the exact page name, Prime Minister of Laos, in their email. See Wikipedia:Requesting copyright permission for instructions.
• If you hold the copyright to the work: send an e-mail from an address associated with the original publication to permissions-enwikimedia.org or a postal message to the Wikimedia Foundation permitting re-use under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License and GNU Free Documentation License, and note that you have done so on Talk:Prime Minister of Laos. See Wikipedia:Donating copyrighted materials for instructions.
• If a note on the original website states that re-use is permitted "under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License (CC-BY-SA), version 3.0", or that the work is released into the public domain, or if you have strong reason to believe it is, leave a note at Talk:Prime Minister of Laos with a link to where we can find that note or your explanation of why you believe the content is free for reuse.

It may also be necessary for the text to be modified to have an encyclopedic tone and to follow Wikipedia article layout. For more information on Wikipedia's policies, see Wikipedia's policies and guidelines.

See Wikipedia:Declaration of consent for all enquiries for a template of the permissions letter the copyright holder is expected to send.

If you would like to begin working on a new version of the article you may do so at this temporary page. Leave a note at Talk:Prime Minister of Laos saying you have done so and an administrator will move the new article into place once the issue is resolved.

Thank you, and please feel welcome to continue contributing to Wikipedia. Happy editing! — Diannaa (talk) 15:14, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

@Diannaa: The law is in public domain. They cite verbatim from the law and I do the same. You should stop removing things before you actually take a proper check on what you're doing. This is the second time. --Ruling party (talk) 15:41, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

Sorry but the page you copied from is https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Laos1.html, not a copy of the actual legislation. So if you've got an online copy of the actual legislation we can use to compare with what you added, I would be happy to have a look at it. By the way, when copying from public domain sources you need to provide attribution. This can be done by adding the template {{PD-notice}} after your citation. This is done so that our readers will be aware that you copied the prose rather than wrote it yourself, and that it's okay to copy verbatim. — Diannaa (talk) 15:48, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

@Diannaa: I rewrote. I hope its better now. Is it? --Ruling party (talk) 20:39, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

There's still a lot of overlap. You can check it using Earwig's tool. Note though that things like the names of organizations do not need to be paraphrased. For that reason, there's not a specific percentage overlap you should be using as a target, but have a look at each overlapping sentence or phrase and see if you can put it into your own words or omit it. — Diannaa (talk) 21:25, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

@Diannaa: Approved boss? --Ruling party (talk) 23:18, 24 January 2021 (UTC)

I will check tomorrow, too tired now — Diannaa (talk) 01:21, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

The current version looks okay from a copyright point of view. Thanks for taking the time to do that. Some of the prose is a bit confusing though. I suggest requesting a copy edit at the GOCE requests page as part of your GA prep. Good luck,— Diannaa (talk) 11:22, 25 January 2021 (UTC)

Lovely. Thanks for telling me about the problem (and how to fix it).

@Diannaa: Yes I agree it is not written well enough at the present moment. Hopefully I'll find a way to fix it! :)

Greetings from WikiProject Korea!

Thank you for your recent contributions to one of Wikipedia's Korea-related articles. Given the interest you've expressed by your edits, have you considered joining WikiProject Korea? We are a group of editors dedicated to improving the overall quality of all Korea-related articles. If you would like to join, add your name to the list of participants. If you have any questions, don't hesitate to ask at the project talk page. We look forward to working with you in the future! – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 22:38, 29 January 2021 (UTC)

I suppose you could join WikiProject Korea and its North Korea working group as well. The projects themselves don't see much discussion, but it's a handful of prolific editors that keep the content flowing, and I haven't seen anyone contribute as much quality content as you have in years! I'm truly a fan of your work and will gladly help if you have any questions. – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 22:38, 29 January 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: That's very nice of you! :)

I'll join that project and the NK working group. Thanks for the invite!

Many things you could help! But first of all, if you look at the table at the 2nd Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea I put the word "demoted" to describe that the individuals were not reelected. But that's not the correct term is it? And of course, if you could help adding offices for the individual leaders that would be great. --Ruling party (talk) 23:26, 29 January 2021 (UTC)

Sometimes sources certainly say "demoted" to describe it. The problem is that it's a bit ambiguous because it could also mean a full member being elected only alternate member of the next CC. All in all it's not a hugely problematic word in my opinion. But I think it's a bit odd to use green for "demoted" and orange for "reelected". – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 11:10, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: Good point! Always good to have another eye on things :) I will change that.

What kind of North Korea articles do you edit? Why are you interested in North Korea? --Ruling party (talk) 16:38, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

Please see my user page for a list of articles started by me, most of them about North Korea. I'm motivated by probably two things above all. First, having encountered English-language North Korean propaganda materials for the first time, I began asking how is that society organized so that it can produce these materials which to foreign eyes look so outlandish. Secondly, I want to break the myth that "North Korea is such a closed country that almost nothing is known about it". Only people who don't know about academic research say such things and academicians themselves do not resort to such excuses. There are actually more materials and research on North Korea than, say, some small African countries that are not closed off from the rest of the world in the same sense. The general audience has all sorts of preconceptions about North Korea that are, while reaching the right conclusions, based on few and misleading facts that lack nuance and historical perspective. How about you? – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 16:56, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

Oh, and thirdly, if I might add, the propaganda, particularly written propaganda, itself. North Korea has constructed a false historical narrative about itself for 70 years now. The problem is that North Korean politics sometimes change and they have to change the story accordingly. New people and events get written in the story, old ones "forgotten", but they always have to keep in mind that what's been once written, cannot be wiped entirely clean. Hence all the strange discrepancies in Kim Il-sung's biographies from different decades, or the fact that Kim Jong-il enters the story out of nowhere and has to have a history going back to the 1940s written for him, not to mention literature on Juche that uses so many words to say very little at all so that all interpretations can be either confirmed or denied at convenience. – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 17:09, 30 January 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: We're both from the Nordics I see :)

Very interesting. I haven't really thought about it that way before. But I don't know that much about North Korea—you seem to know a lot (from the article's you've written).

I think my interest is more difficult to answer. I began being interested in North Korea after reading the books The Origin of Political Order and Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Present Day. It's about law and state construction, and he reaches some solid conclusions (and some very controversial; such as it doesn't matter if its a dictatorship or a democracy as long as it works—of course, better argued, and he himself loves democracy). Good books.

The author writes about neopatrimonialism and North Korea fits the bill perfectly. State institutions are captured by familial interests to safeguard the family first and the rest of society second. While many books are available on state capture by traditional forces and values, especially on India, I've found very little writing on the North Korean case. How (1) Kim Il-sung was able to acquire all that power, (2) why the North Korean political elite ended up supporting it and (3) how he managed to splinter the North Korean elite into so many small parts (salami tactics). That's why I'm interested in the central committees; effective control of the Central Committee equals control over society. The fact of the matter is that given all power to a family is inherently unmodern and stupid. Giving all power to one guy is ridiculous as well, but at least he can die and be succeeded by a smarter guy.

Kim Jong-un seems to be the most interesting of the Kims. He seems to be the first Kim that is institutionalising the political system. Kim Il-sung tried to dominate it, and Kim Jong-il effectively put aside the Party. Kim Jong-un is convening congresses and party meetings, delegating more powers to the elite (as the charter regulations prove). If that keeps on for another twenty years, it will be difficult to change. People are seldom willing to give away the power they have acquired. It will also be interesting to see how the North Korean elite–with time–react to the economic miracles going in China, Laos and Vietnam. If Cuba grows as well, it will be apparent that they miss out if they keep on this course. It doesn't matter if you're a good-hearted individual or a corrupt one, both seek economic growth. The first one to give to the people, while the former wants to get his hands on more money.

At last, it would be interesting to learn how the other communist states view North Korea. Only five of them left—so few that splitting destroys your own legitimacy—so it's not surprising they've only got generous words for North Korea. But I doubt the professional organisations of Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, and China approve of the family model.

It will be fun working with you on North Korea articles. The article you wrote on the Kapsan Faction Incident shows that you are more well-informed than I am. --Ruling party (talk) 07:25, 31 January 2021 (UTC)

Very interesting thoughts, Ruling party! I must say I wasn't very convinced by Fukuyama's The End of History. As a philosophy buff, I started reading it with the mindset of wanting him to be onto something, but I found the Hegelian framework to be a weakness of his arguments.

Scholars on North Korea have definitely analyzed the country as a family-state, so you might enjoy reading those works. Many say that North Korea has successfully realized male, Confucian filial piety, but B. R. Myers turns the tables on them and says the leader cult is essentially maternal even if the leaders are male! Now, entire books have been written about how Kim got into power, stabilized his rule, and managed to turn it into a multi-generational dynasty, so I'll not recount that history here. But when looking at things like CC membership, one always has to ask: Does membership actually empower these politicians? Or do appointments simply reflect political power that is fundamentally not theirs (i.e. it is the Kims who call the shots)? I think both are true. North Korea certainly appears more monolithic than it is. It's simply not possible for one guy to run the entire show, so politicians with the right credentials are given actual power through e.g. membership in the CC. But also, Kim Il-sung was a master of these "salami tactics". Who got in, and out, of the CC was largely the result of purges, both great and small. Reading on the Kapsan and August Faction Incidents is absolutely essential to understanding North Korea to this day.

Of the three Kims, I've always had a soft spot for Kim Jong-il. North Korean propaganda had to make the best out of his unflattering qualities and history: born at a Soviet military camp when officially Kim Il-sung wasn't supposed to be there, an orphan (Kim Jong-suk died in 1949), the snobbish son of the leader whose career progressed without regard to his abilities, essentially lurking in the shadows until 1980, an anti-charismatic nerd with a stutter, a dreamer obsessed with the arts and the cinema in particular, rose to leadership with particularly bad timing (collapse of the Soviet Union and the famine)... Even from North Korean propaganda you get the same impression of him as from Team America! Kim Jong-un is not as interesting propaganda-wise. They're still parsing the story together for him. His only redeeming quality seems to be that he looks, acts and talks more like Kim Il-sung than Kim Jong-il and that he is simply "modern". You might be spot on about him institutionalizing power in this new way though. I just find it confusing. It's difficult to say what matters and what does not until time has passed. That is, perhaps, why I like the more historical topics.

What about relations with the other communist states? Historically, neither the Soviet Union nor China approved either Juche or the family rule. Still, since North Korea succeeded so brilliantly in navigating the stormy waters of the Sino-Soviet split, there was no need to make this criticism public. Of the five remnants of the communist world, you are probably correct. Apart from China, these are not economically interesting relations to North Korea. As for legitimacy, North Korea has long ago figured that the present-day truncated second world offers very little. What they do, and have done since the 1970s, is offer Juche as a kind of nexus of anti-revisionism for everyone who wants to get on board. As Myers points out, that Juche has anything to do with socialism is a myth, but a myth that serves everyone: right-wingers (particularly in South Korea) can hate their countrymen in the North and seem anti-communist rather than as hating their own nation, left-wingers (particularly anti-revisionist types who are willing to put their names in things like the Pyongyang Declaration) can pretend that communism works and hasn't collapsed, and most importantly academicians can explain away their failure to predict North Korea that as a socialist state has failed to deliver a favorable economical outlook which is supposed to be the legitimacy of the entire system. I sometimes wonder why Hoxhaism became the most influential anti-revisionism and Juche did not. But the answer is obvious. To paraphrase someone; I forgot whom: Juche was designed not to establish equidistance from China and the Soviet Union, but equiproximity to both. Hoxhaism was the opposite, and probably had some genuine content too (although Hwang Jang-yop always maintained that Juche is a genuine philosophy), so Juche is merely anti-revisionist theater.

Looking forward to contributing with you! – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 23:57, 31 January 2021 (UTC)

P.S. With some breaking news coming out of Myanmar, I've always wondered why both the military-era Myanmar and also Laos have resisted the temptation of personality cult even when there is nothing to stop them. Maybe you have a guess about Laos in particular? – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 00:16, 1 February 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: I won't defend that book. But The Political Order and Political Decay books where in some ways a reversal of earlier position. As far as I know Fukuyama is the only serious political scientist in this day and age that accepts that non liberal democratic system can be (1) just as legitimate as liberal systems and (2) work just as well (or better) than liberal systems. The fact of the matter is that—the main weakness on studies of communist system—is the lack of interest. For instance, there is shockingly little interest in the rule-based order Tito established on his death bed, which literally chocked the central leadership and made them unable to stop the usurpation of power by Milosovic in Serbia and Montenegro. Or for that matter how democratic centralism is interpreted very differently in Vietnam and China.

"Does membership actually empower these politicians? Or do appointments simply reflect political power that is fundamentally not theirs (i.e. it is the Kims who call the shots)?" Good question! In North Korea it's the latter, but in Vietnam and Laos it's the first one. The sitting Vietnamese leader Nguyen Phu Trong has been voted down by his own Central Committee on several occassions, even his nominees for Politburo membership. The next question is then; why did "collective leadership" (to use the communist term) materialise in Vietnam and North Korea?

Well said, I've never really thought about it that way! But considering all the outlandish claims they made about Kim Jong-il it makes sense. His appointment as heir is, however, the biggest mistake Kim Il-sung ever made. A son needs to base his legitimacy on his father, while a non-relative needs to showcase how he's different.

It would be quite interesting to read some of Hwang Jang-yop's work published after his defection, but alas none of them are available in English. You would at least get a sense of what a high-standing North Korean official was thinking.

As for North Korea being socialist or not, I would they are socialist and at the same time an affront to socialism. I mean, they literally played "The Internationale" during the closing of the 8th WPK Congress. I honestly don't understand how the North Korean elite lacks such perspective; singing a song about freedom and abolishing the traditional way of life while being part of a system that is all about family and traditional modes of operation. But they do use Stalinist institutions and adhere to them even when they don't work. Alas, one cannot forget that communist parties abroad actively look up to North Korea as well. I ended up talking to a member of Norway's Communist Party once at an event. Nice fellow, but he talked about North Korea and had no interest in either Vietnam or China. They were invited to attend the PRC's 70th anniversary, but he was highly critical of the one-child policy and the market reforms. My point being; for many communists what constitutes socialism is working for a different society (despite them failing). A loser position I might add, but it explains why lefties are more interested in the socialist experiments that fail (Venezuela) than the one that succeeds (China and Vietnam). My point; North Korea fits the bill for many socialist and communist forces out there. This also says something about the sorry state of communism more generally.

I think I can answer that! I would add Vietnam to the equation as well.

The decision-making culture results from the Communist Party's "birthmarks", that is, how the leaders operated. For instance, let's take Ho Chi Minh. He never (at least not in important moments) breached collegial decision-making, the result being that Vietnam's party is highly collegial. The cult of personality around Ho Chi Minh was not created by himself, but by Truong Chinh, Le Duan and Le Duc Tho. The personality cult was created when Ho Chi Minh was a mere figurehead. Ho Chi Minh was turned into the father of the nation the same way George Washington is. Vietnam has never had a Stalin, Mao or Kim Il-sung. Le Duan kept power like Brezhnev did—by stopping the replenishment of party ranks and keeping people in place.

Laos is probably the communist state with the "best history". The party never killed thousands during collectivisation or other events. Kaysone Phomvihane himself became the primus inter pares but not the chief. Laos, unlike any communist state I Know, never experienced purges of it's political leadership. Some were removed during the Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Vietnamese war, but the Politburo and the Central Committee remained more or less untouched. That is, in Laos, violence against leading party officials is unheard of.

Besides, the losers stayed on in Laos. Nouhak Phoumsavanh, who was referred to as the Deputy General Secretary until Kaysone's death (despite their not existing such an office), opposed market reforms. He, however, remained as the number 2. This is in complete contrast to Kim Il-sung who sent most people who opposed him to execution or exile.

Laos actually share a lot of similarities with North Korea. Family networks and nepotism are a mainstay in Lao politics (just take a look at the LPRP 11th Central Committee), but that has also been a way to distribute power. People are appointed through democratic centralist means, nepotism and patronage and all these elements are in continual conflict. Everything is about balancing the powers of the leading networks. The fact of the matter is that, in one of the few instances in communist history (or the first?!), a party leader have served one term and willingly left office, and his successor is likely to serve one term as well. It will be interesting to see how Laos develops in the future. Khamtai Siphandon doesn't have many more years to live so how that will influence his family's position within the party will be something to follow closely.

I will also add China. The modern Chinese interpretation of democratic centralism is in complete opposition to Mao's. The Cultural Revolution, people often forget, was Mao's attempt to forestall and end the party's bureaucratisation that had occurred in the USSR and which he felt was taking place in China. In reaction to Mao's disorder and unlawfulness, the party has emphasized centralism and the law. Xi Jinping, who the media often liken to Mao, is in the opposite. The hierarchy of institutions and the regularisation of politics and bureaucracy through rules are the opposite of Mao. No other leader has issued so many intra-party regulations as Xi. For instance, he introduced new regulations in January that sought to clarify what party members could come away with or not. That is, he is clarifying how the game is played. The Maoist dictum that "Why should we proletarians be restrained by laws?!… Our law should be developed in pace with the changes in the economic base. Institutions, rules and regulations should not be fixed. We should not be afraid of changes. We have advocated uninterrupted revolutions, and the law should be in the service of the continuing revolution … It does not matter if we make a law today and change it tomorrow" has been abandoned.

The USSR is also noteworthy. The fact of the matter is that the USSR was Stalin's child and Lenin (he was semi-retired before the Civil War ended). The purges and the horrors of Stalinist modernisation literally turned the SOviet political class into a bureaucracy. Gorbachev would often complain that communist officials would seldom discuss their differences despite being given the freedom to do so. It wasn't in their DNA. It had become cultural—a good communist followed orders and did not ask too many questions.

I don't know that much about Myanmar, but the answer is both cultural and historical. The fact that the parties of Vietnam and Laos never had a dictator created a more collegial culture. It also helps that they never had purges on the same scale as the USSR and China (in Laos's case, there are no big purges to speak off) so the institution and rules were developed organically by respecting offices and institutions. North Korea lacks the latter. The office of WPK leader changes at every congress, and you know how Kim Jong-il treated the party. In general, this is another reason why North Korea is interesting; its inherently unmodern, institutions are not respected at all. It's to early to talk about the consequences of Kim Jong-un's policy of regularisation, but he can't come away with the same things Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il did. He's not them. If the WPK leaders begin seeing the regular convocations of the Congress, the Central Committee, the Politburo and the Presidium as a must for good governance than Kim Jong-un has effectively checked his powers somewhat. But, North Korea still retains the culture of killing leading state and party officials such as Jang Song-thaek. As a whole that kills regularisation of politics. So if the NK elite manages to stop that, new possibilities will be open for them.

That is, Laos and Vietnam (and Myanmar) don't need a cult of personality. They have formalised institutions. You need a cult of personality either 1) to crush institutions (Stalin or Kim Il-sung) or to 2) personify the party (Xi Jinping - the party is abstract, Xi Jinping is not).

Long answer — I hope it wasn't too long!--Ruling party (talk) 11:31, 1 February 2021 (UTC)

(talk page stalker), I saw this pop up on my watchlist and I gotta say, that is a fascinating analysis. _signed, Rosguill ^talk 16:11, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

Oh, I agree, Rosguill! Ruling party, I've read read your long (but not too long!) excellent post above. I just haven't had the time to write a reply worth for you to read! – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 16:28, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

Actually, the one part I'm not sure I followed is the claim about Xi Jinping's personification of the party. It seems like Xi's goal is to expand the bureaucracy and legal framework; while that can be counter-posed to Mao's ideas, it seems like that's still fundamentally a transformation of institutions. _signed, Rosguill ^talk 16:32, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

@Rosguill and Finnusertop: Thanks guy! I'll try to clarify below Rosguill.

Marx believed in the withering away of the state. Marx's writing on the law is one-sided (its written from the perspective of a man in opposition). He wrote that "rights of a member of civil society, i.e. the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community." That is, the law is inherently alienating, egoistic and inherently non-communist. Lenin contended that the goal was to slowly abolish the law and state: "people will gradually become accustomed to observing the elemental rules of social intercourse ... they will become accustomed to observing them without force, without compulsion, without subordination, without the specific apparatus for compulsion which is called the state." Leading Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis agreed, and summed up this general position in 1937; "If law has its real origin in commodity exchange, and if socialism is seen as the abolition of commodity exchange and the construction of production for use, then proletarian or socialist law was a conceptual, and therefore a practical, absurdity."

Stalin was the man that saved "the state" as a permanent tool. As long as the USSR was encircled, and the capitalist dominant, the communists needed to use the state machinery as a tool to defend and construct socialism. He, therefore, supported writing a new constitution and clarifying the state, however, he did not believe in laws to regulate society as such. For instance, when the Great Purge began the rationale was that the bourgeoisie enemy had infiltrated the Soviet system so as to make the current laws superfluous. Which gave the party an excuse to forget all laws and crush the enemy—which Stalin succeeded in.

While the USSR began talking about "a return to socialist legality" after Stalin, it never meant that men would be constrained by law in any sense. Considering that the Soviet state owned nearly everything the country had surprisingly few laws. Why? Because the essence of socialism is politics, that is that the people should run things. In Marxism–Leninism the people don't need to rule, they delegate it to the party. But in short, communism means politics in command (and not laws). That's what I tried to show above with the Mao quote. Mao never respected laws or institution. Laws and institutions could rise and fall as long as they were in line with the continuous revolution. Deng Xiaoping criticised this approach as the "rule of man". At the beginning the new approach, the "rule of law" as Deng called it, was mixed with more open decision-making and transparency, but after seeing Gorbachev, the most powerful man in the world, screwing everything up (he did initiate the process that killed off European communism whatever good things you can say about him). The reaction to these changes prompted the party to focus on "the centralization of the power" (the North Korean love to speak about this) and "law-based governance/socialist rule of law state" (and many more variants). To explain centralization, in communist speech total centralization means dictatorship and total democracy means anarchy. So the whole point of democratic centralism is to create a balance between the two, and since Stalin, that balance has always (with the exception of Dubcek, Gorbachev and Konia) meant an emphasis on centralisation.

Xi Jinping is continuing Deng's project. He is attacking the vestiges of "rule of man" by regularising politics. While Xi is against constitutionalism, he is for upholding the constitution. He does not seek to create a system in which the Communist Party, a force for historical change (as they see it), is limited by its own structures. But he is trying to make a system in which officialdom accept the law and rule in accordance with the law. That is, making a culture that is law-based. The fact that the anti-corruption campaign has been followed up by clearer party regulations are one of many signs of this. For instance, the new party member regulation published in January stated what members could say and where they could say it, and explicitly stating where they couldn't say it.

You're right in the sense that it is a "transformation of institutions". If Kim Jong-un began instituting law-based governance on par with China that would also, I opine, be a transformation, but how they work and how officials work within them would change dramatically. If people are unsure if they get shot if they talk against their leader they won't speak. If people are told, and showcased, formal ways of procedures (that are even anonymous in some cases) they of course will. If the rules of the game remain constant and don't change on the leader's whim (as they did during Mao and happens in North Korea) other people will again have more safety.

But "transformation of institutions" also missed the point I may add. The whole problem with the communist project pre-1978 is that they didn't believe in law as a way to regulate society or to regulate politics. Law was just a mean to enforce control and defend the state—defending the class dictatorship led by the communist party. The purpose of law has widened considerably in China. Law remains a tool to defend "the character of the state", but also to ensure regularisation and consistency. Mao or Stalin never understood this. The fact of the matter is that Mao considered laws and institutions a hindrance to construct socialism. That is why the 1975 Constitution was so short; the point of the constitution was not to be the law of the land, but rather be a document about ideological intentions and goals.

All of these become worse when we add that Marx wrote he was against the division of power (he supported unitary power), against parliamentarianism and against professional politicians. In his defence he barely wrote on the matters, but Stalin and Mao constructed a whole ideology on that premise. Xi Jinping, modern-day Laos and Vietnam and of course the Yugoslav attempt to create a communist ideology that legitimise law-based governance is both radical and a break with communist history and theory. It's a good thing and something everyone should cheer. --Ruling party (talk) 17:36, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

Some pointers from the posts above.

Hwang Jang-yop and his memoirs: Hwang Jang Yop's Memoir (2006) is available on DailyNK. They renewed their site a couple of years back so it's best to use the archived version. Hwang was also a columnist for DailyNK so you can find his commentary on topical issues as well. Hwang was an interesting person on so many levels. As Chairman of the Standing Committee of the SPA, he was a stupendously high-ranking defector. He was the political heavyweight equal to Kim Yong-nam until a few years ago or Choe Ryong-hae today, both in formal rank and actual power. The public intellectual of today of course is Thae Yong-ho, but he is not nearly as interesting. Sure, Thae knows the basic dirty secrets of the elite, but he was a deputy ambassador, a small fry. Hwang on the other hand was Kim Il-sung's right hand man, there with him in every important formal and informal meeting. The secrets he knew concerned the very key decisions of the regime. Hwang was, admittedly, something of a dreamer. He always insisted that Juche is at its core a genuine, new philosophy, that Kim Il-sung dumbed down and weaponized for his politics. B. R. Myers comments a lot on Hwang, particularly in The Juche Myth. His conclusion is more or less that perhaps Hwang was a philosopher, but not a very good one. He is also skeptical of details provided by Hwang about the government. Somewhat ironically, if Hwang wanted to gloss over some of the details about his working in the government in order to maintain his image as a misunderstood humanist, he succeeded in that. He had a few decades, and a book per year, to demonstrate his philosophical prowess in the South, but did not convince anyone.

Mao and Kim Il-sung: In many ways, Kim Il-sung was more farsighted than Mao, but he also worked in a different context. It's no secret that Kim watched the Cultural Revolution unfold with horror. The last thing he wanted was for factions within his party to levy Red Guards of their own to bring havoc to Pyongyang and the provinces. While Mao's was a desperate attempt to return to power, Kim was in power, but his power was not absolute. Now he had all the motivation he needed to not just stay on the throne but become an absolute ruler, and he could legitimize even extreme measures to do so. If there is one thing people should learn about NK, it's that the 1967 Kapsan purge really made the country what it still is to this day. This was Kim's final point of departure from conventional Stalinism toward the family rule and continued state of exception. In the aftermath of 1967, you got the theatrics of Cultural Revolution (personality cult, revolutionary opera, book worship) so you could easily mistake it for the same thing. But the transformation of the power system was the complete opposite of Red Guard anarchy. You didn't have the over-zealous students lynching factionalists. All the bad deeds were left to Kim, who did not hold back much, but the result was always contained and rational. It's a bit difficult to place NK in the context of your excellent analysis of legality from Marx through Xi. It might be a cliche, but NK closely follows Germany's Führerprinzip. Yes, Germany was more extreme (even the Reichtag and courts stopped working and there was no constitution), but NK has shown that you can run that show for decades. – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 02:36, 9 February 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: Interesting read his memoirs, but at the same time lacking! I'll study it more thoroughly in the coming days.

Interesting comments :) I am persuaded by that analysis.

What disappoints me the most when reading about internal WPK politicking is how Kim Il-sung was able to fool everyone. He got the Soviet Koreans and the Yanan to crush the indigenous North Korean communists, and then he got the same groups to crush Pak Hon-yong and the WPSK. And then the remnants of the Yanans and Soviet Koreans finally got balls and attacked Kim Il-sung in 1956 when, looking at it from retrospect, they had clearly no majority in the Central Committee. The Kapsan Faction fought, but I again they were all alone... The factionalism in the KOrean communist movement, which had always been a thing, contributed to a very very bad culture which Kim Il-sung took advantage of perfectly for his own personal ends.

But then again did they have any chance to stop him? Hwang Jang-yop notes that even Kim Il disagreed with the worst aspects of the total dictatorship, and rumours state that Choe Yong-geon probably wasn't that fond of the familial succession (but that is probably just that, a rumour).

The other thing is Kim Il-sung's luck. The Soviet picked him because all the other options failed on them. Pak Hon-yong made the stupid decision and didn't go to North Korea and lead the movement, and sent instead his deputy Hyon Chun-hyok who was, in an unlucky stroke of faith, assassinated.

But Hwang Jang-yop is right when he says the communists were plagued by excessive famialism and traditionalism (what he calls "feudalism") since it's inception. The cult of personality developed fast, and from reading that book (and other scholarly books), it always seems to have been part of the picture. Suryong began being used in 1947 — which surprised me. --Ruling party (talk) 21:33, 9 February 2021 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for February 14

An automated process has detected that when you recently edited Pak Chong-ae, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Choe Yong-gon.

(Opt-out instructions.) --DPL bot (talk) 06:19, 14 February 2021 (UTC)

GOCE copy edit of Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Further comments:

• You asked in your nomination: Would it be too much to ask for a rundown of my most common grammar mistakes?
  • I didn't find mistakes of grammar in the article so much as those of composition, which I thought due more to carelessness than incomprehension. For example:
    • sentences that could have been consolidated with those nearby (I found several sentences that I made clauses of each other, as well as those that were nearly duplicative of what was already written);
    • labels that could have been more specific (you tended to label authors as scholars, where I changed such labels to economist, political scientist, etc.)
    • lacunae where words had to be supplied, that not being evidence of persistent deficiencies of grammar as much as the article needing more checking.
  • However, I did notice—by this edit and a sentence on your talk page ("But I understand what you're saying. I accept you're point.")–that you don't always quickly spot and correct homophonic confusions, which is the only type of persistent grammatical mistake I've spotted, but did not encounter in the article.
• I note that the amount of lengthy inline quotations is unusually large and made it somewhat harder to copy edit, as I sometimes had to go back and restore text that I wasn't so free to change as I do summary text, due to the fact that it was sometimes hard to tell that I was within quoted material. I did move a few of the lengthier quotes to block-quotation form but not as many as I might have. I suggest that if you need to have lengthy quotes that you make more use of blockquotes or extended footnotes (the "efn" template). Dhtwiki (talk) 23:23, 14 February 2021 (UTC)

@Dhtwiki: Sorry late reply! Question

• • What do you mean by "clauses of each other"? Do you mean two sentences that could have been one?
  • "lacunae where words had to be supplied" — I don't understand
  • In regards to homophobic confusion you are a 100 percent correct!
  • I will make more use of blockquotes in the future.
• You obviously know you're stuff. I've started using Grammarly. Very good work tool. --Ruling party (talk) 12:04, 16 February 2021 (UTC)

You correctly interpreted what I meant by "clauses of each other".

Lacunae, in this sense, are the words that people are apt to carelessly leave out, where they're not being persistently clueless about language use.

Homophonic, not homophobic: two different words and concepts.

Are you using free Grammarly or expensive Grammarly? My advice would be along the lines of slowing down and better analyzing word usage, as well as re-reading your work after the excitement of having produced it has died down. Also, if you are copying and pasting text to the extent that copyright violations are being spotted, you need to stop that. Dhtwiki (talk) 20:22, 16 February 2021 (UTC)

@Dhtwiki: Haha yes homophonic! :P (Grammarly autocorrects it to homophobic :P ) Yes, that is proof of my laziness!

I use expensive Grammarly.

Re-reading after the excitement is good advice

Yes, I was a bit lazy on the Prime Minister of Laos, but that won't happen again (hopefully).

• Good advice. --Ruling party (talk) 21:49, 16 February 2021 (UTC)

You should get a refund from Grammarly. "Homophonic" is a student dictionary word. "Homophonic confusion" is a term I found on the internet. I've never heard of "homophobic confusion". Dhtwiki (talk) 06:11, 17 February 2021 (UTC)

Prime Minister of Laos copyedit

I've finished the copyedit. The grammar is pretty good, but there was too much capitalisation and the article relies on one vague, primary source; its sourcing would be much improved by citations to the relevant sections of the Law on Government. Good luck with GA and all the best, Miniapolis 18:00, 17 February 2021 (UTC)

@Miniapolis: Sorry for the late response and thank you for you're great work! :)

Aren't laws considered primary sources on WP? How does that work? --Ruling party (talk) 07:57, 20 February 2021 (UTC)

Yes, laws are primary sources. What makes the information in the article difficult to verify are the repeated citations to the overall Law on Government, not to the relevant section(s). All the best, Miniapolis 16:36, 20 February 2021 (UTC)

Something you might be interested in

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation lacks any kind of lists. See the Russian Wikipedia article for more and their website. – Finnusertop (talk ⋅ contribs) 10:27, 18 February 2021 (UTC)

@Finnusertop: I'm generally more interested in those of single-party states... But if you want me to fix it, I can :) It will only take an half an hour of work so it will be my pleasure to fix!--Ruling party (talk) 07:56, 20 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:2nd Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea

A tag has been placed on Category:2nd Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 17:41, 21 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:2nd Central Auditing of the Workers' Party of Korea

A tag has been placed on Category:2nd Central Auditing of the Workers' Party of Korea requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 17:42, 21 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:3rd Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea

A tag has been placed on Category:3rd Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 17:43, 21 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:4th Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea

A tag has been placed on Category:4th Central Auditing Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 17:44, 21 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:7th Secretariat of the Workers' Party of Korea

A tag has been placed on Category:7th Secretariat of the Workers' Party of Korea requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 18:58, 22 February 2021 (UTC)

Speedy deletion nomination of Category:1st Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly

A tag has been placed on Category:1st Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly requesting that it be speedily deleted from Wikipedia. This has been done under section C1 of the criteria for speedy deletion, because the category has been empty for seven days or more and is not a disambiguation category, a category redirect, a featured topics category, under discussion at Categories for discussion, or a project category that by its nature may become empty on occasion.

If you think this page should not be deleted for this reason, you may contest the nomination by visiting the page and clicking the button labelled "Contest this speedy deletion". This will give you the opportunity to explain why you believe the page should not be deleted. However, be aware that once a page is tagged for speedy deletion, it may be deleted without delay. Please do not remove the speedy deletion tag from the page yourself, but do not hesitate to add information in line with Wikipedia's policies and guidelines. Liz ^{Read! Talk!} 14:02, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

Gaming RM outcomes

Since the requested move at General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea ended without consensus, you cannot copy the material to the article title you wanted and then turn the other page into a redirect – this is WP:GAMING the system. If you want to move the article, you need to start another move request (although it is not generally considered acceptable to start a new move request to exactly the same title shortly after one closed without the desired outcome). Number 57 16:11, 23 February 2021 (UTC)

@Number 57: We have duplicated pages Number 57. General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and General Secretary and Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. I know you don't care about facts or the truth... but change you're mind and show pragmatism.

I didn't move because I didn't get my way.. I got no response... --Ruling party (talk) 16:31, 23 February 2021 (UTC)