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South Sudan People's Defence Forces

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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 24.104.116.74 (talk) at 14:56, 1 December 2016 (Fixed abbreviation/org. title (it is cited as SPLA/M most places)). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Sudan People's Liberation Army or Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M)
SPLA flag
Active1983–present
Country Sudan (1983–2011)
 South Sudan (2011–present)
BranchSudan People's Liberation Army
South Sudan Air Force
Size150,000 (2015)[1]
EngagementsMilitary history of South Sudan
Commanders
Commander-in-ChiefSalva Kiir
Chief of General StaffPaul Malong Awan [2]

The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is the army of the Republic of South Sudan. The SPLA was founded as a guerrilla movement in 1983 and was a key participant of the Second Sudanese Civil War. Throughout the war, it was led by John Garang de Mabior.

Following John Garang's death in 2005, Salva Kiir was named the new Commander-in-Chief of SPLA.[3] As of 2013, the SPLA was estimated to have 210,000 soldiers, as well as an unknown number of personnel in the small South Sudan Air Force.[4] The SPLA is divided into divisions of 10,000-14,000 soldiers.[3] Following South Sudan's independence in 2011, the SPLA became the new republic's regular army.

History

In 1983 a number of mutinies broke out in the barracks of the Sudanese army in the southern regions, most notably in Bor. These mutineers would form the nucleus of SPLA.[5] By June 1983 the majority of mutineers had moved to Ethiopia, or were on their way towards Gambella. The Ethiopian government's decision to support the nascent SPLA was a means of exacting revenge upon the Sudanese government for their support of Eritrean rebels.[6]

SPLA was led by Commander-in-Chief John Garang de Mabior.[7][8] SPLA struggled for a united and secular Sudanese state.[9] Garang stated that the struggle of the South Sudanese was the same as that of marginalized groups in the north, such as the Nuba and Fur peoples.[10] Until 1985, SPLA directed its public denouncements of the Sudanese government specifically at Nimeiri. During the years that followed, SPLA propaganda denounced the Khartoum government as a family affair that played on sectarian tensions.[10] SPLA denounced the introduction of sharia law in September 1983.[11]

War in the 1980s

High-ranking SPLA officers at the South Sudan independence celebrations, 2011

In the village of Bilpam, the first full-fledged SPLA battalion graduated in 1984. The name 'Bilpam' would carry a great symbolic importance for SPLA for years to come, as the epicentre of the uprising. After Bilpam, other SPLA training camps were established at Dimma, Bonga and Panyido.[6]

In the mid-1980s the SPLA armed struggle had blocked the development projects of the Sudanese government, such as the Jonglei Canal and the Bentiu Oil Fields.[12]

SPLA launched its first advance in Equatoria in 1985-1986. During this campaign, SPLA were confronted by a number of pro-government militias. The conduct of SPLA forces was chaotic, with many atrocities against the civilian population. The SPLA drove out around 35,000 Ugandan refugees (that had settled in Equatoria since the early 1980s) back into Uganda.[13]

SPLA had a complicated relationship with Anyanya II. Anyanya II forces blocked the expansion of SPLA between 1984 and 1987, as Anyanya II attacked SPLA recruits heading towards the SPLA based in Ethiopia. Anyanya II also attacked civilians believed to be SPLA supporters.[14] The conflict between Anyanya II and SPLA had a political dimension, as Anyanya II sought to build an independent South Sudanese state.[15] SPLA did however try to win over the leaders of Anyanya II to their fold.[16] The Anyanya II commander Gordon Kong Chuol aligned with SPLA in late 1987. Other sectors of Anyanya II would follow his example over the coming years, rendering the remainder of Anyanya II (allied with the Sudanese government) marginalized.[16][17]

Another force which confronted SPLA were the Murahaleen militias in northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Warfare between SPLA and Muraleheen began in 1987. By 1988 SPLA controlled most of the northern Bahr el-Ghazal.[13] Unlike the Anyanya II, however, the Murahaleen had no political ambitions.[15]

Political openings

SPLA boycotted the 1986 elections. In half of the constituencies of southern Sudan elections could not be held due to the SPLA boycott.[10] [18] In September 1989, the RCC invited different sectors to a 'National Dialogue Conference'. The SPLA refused to attend.[19]

On November 15, 1988 SPLA entered into an alliance with the DUP. The two parties had agreed on the lifting of the state of emergency and abolition of sharia law. The press release was made public through an announcement on Radio SPLA. After DUP rejoined the government, a ceasefire with SPLA was achieved.[10][20] After the elections, negotiations between SPLA and Sadiq al-Mahdi had been started. But the talks were aborted as SPLA shot down a civilian airplane. 60 people were killed in the attack.[10]

With the NIF coup d'état in 1989, all peace talks ended.[21] SPLA launched a major offensive between 1989 and the fall of the Ethiopian Derg government in 1991. It captured various towns, such as Bor, Waat, Yambio, Kaya, Kajo-Kaji, Nimule, Kapoeta, Torit, Akobo and Nasir. By the middle of 1991, SPLA controlled most parts of southern Sudan with the exception of the major garrison towns (Juba, Yei, Malakal and Wau)[16] Between January 21 and January 29, 1990 SPLA shelled Juba town. SPLA forces also moved into the Nuba Mountains and the southern parts of the Blue Nile State. In comparison with its 1985-1986 offensive in Equatoria, the conduct of SPLA was now more orderly.[13]

1991: Setback and split

But the downfall of the Derg government in Ethiopia in May 1991 caused a major set-back. The Ethiopian government had provided the SPLA with military supplies, training facilities and safe-haven for bases during 18 years. Soon after the change of government in Ethiopia, SPLA accompanied hundreds of thousands of refugees back into Sudan.[16]

A split in SPLA had simmered since late 1990, as Lam Akol and Riek Machar began to question Garang's leadership.[22] Lam Akol began secretly contacting SPLA officers to join his side, especially amongst the Nuer people and Shilluk people.[23] The situation deteriorated after the fall of the Derg.[22] As the Derg regime crumbled, Lam Akol published a document titled Why Garang Must Go Now.[23] The split was made public on August 28, 1991 in what became known as the Nasir Declaration. The dissidents called for democratization of SPLA and a stop to human rights abuses. Moreover, the dissidents called for an independent South Sudan (in contrast to the SPLA line of creating a united and secular Sudan). Kong Coul joined the rebellion. The 'SPLA-Nasir' was joined by the SPLA forces in Ayod, Waat, Adok, Abwong, Ler and Akobo.[9] A period of chaos reigned inside SPLA, as it was not clear which units sided with Garang and which units sided with SPLA-Nasir.[24]

Garang issued a statement through the SPLA radio communications system, denouncing the coup. Nine out of eleven (excluding himself) SPLA/M PMHC members sided with Garang.[8] The mainstream SPLA led by John Garang was based in Torit.[7] The two SPLA factions fought each other, including attacks on civilians in the home turf of their opponents.[25]

Battles of 1992

As of 1992 the Sudanese government launched a major offensive against SPLA, which was weakened by the split with SPLA-Nasir. SPLA lost control of Torit (where SPLA was headquartered), Bor, Yirol, Pibor, Pochalla and Kapoeta.[26][27]

SPLA made two attacks on Juba in June–July 1992. SPLA nearly captured the town. After the attacks, the Sudanese government forces committed harsh reprisals against the civilian population. Summary executions of suspected SPLA collaborators were carried out.[28] On September 27, 1992 the deputy commander-in-chief of SPLA, William Nyuon, defected and took a section of fighters with him.[29] SPLA re-captured Bor on November 29, 1991.[30]

Mid-1990s

SPLA officer as part of Joint Integrated Unit during the CPA era

As of the mid-1990s, the majority of the population of Southern Sudan lived in areas under the control of either the mainstream SPLA or SPLA-Nasir.[31]

2005 Peace Deal

In 2004, a year before the peace deal, the Coalition to Stop Child Soldiers, estimated that there were between 2,500 and 5,000 children serving in the SPLA.[32]

Salva Kiir Mayardit, Commander-in-Chief of SPLA

Following the signing of the CPA, a transformation process of SPLA began. This process was actively supported through funding from the United States. In 2005, John Garang restructured the top leadership of SPLA, with a Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Oyay Deng Ajak, and four Deputy Chiefs of General Staff; Maj. Gen. Salva Mathok Gengdit (Administration), Maj. Gen. Bior Ajang Aswad (Operations), Maj. Gen. James Hoth Mai (Logistics) and Maj. Gen. Obuto Mamur Mete (Political and Moral Orientation).[3]

Ministry of Defence

In 2007, the SPLA was further organised into the Ministry of Defence. Gen. Dominic Dim Deng an SPLA veteran and distinguished General, was chosen to become the first Minister for SPLA Affairs subsequently the first political officer of the SPLA. Gen. Dim died in a plane crash in 2008 alongside his wife Madam Josephine Apieu Jenaro Aken and other SPLA officers. He is buried alongside his wife at the SPLA headquarters in Bilpham, Juba.[3]

Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) James Hoth Mai replaced Oyay Deng Ajak as Chief of General Staff in May 2009.[33]

In 2010 U.S. diplomats reported that Samora "made a point to discuss how the SPLA needed to be reorganized. He stated that the SPLA was top heavy, carrying nearly 550 general officers and providing more than 200 security guards for each minister."[34]

The Government of Southern Sudan named the SPLA headquarters outside Juba 'Bilpam'.[6]

Work on a national security strategy began in late 2012.[4]

2013 political crisis

Main article: 2013 South Sudanese political crisis

On December 15, 2013, fighting broke out in Juba between different factions of the armed forces in what the South Sudanese government has described as a coup d'état. President Salva Kiir announced that the attempt was put down the next day, but fighting resumed December 16. Military spokesman Colonel Philip Aguer said that some military installations had been attacked from armed soldiers but that "the army is in full control of Juba." He added that an investigation was under way and that though the situation was tense it was also unlikely to deteriorate.[35]

Organization and equipment

Current organization

The SPLA is operationally commanded by the Chief of General Staff (COGS). The COGS oversees five directorates, each led by a deputy chief of general staff (DCOGS):

  • Administration
  • Operations
  • Logistics
  • Political and Moral Orientation
  • Training and Research

The SPLA currently has nine divisions and a small air force, all of which report to the DCOGS, Operations:

Per a 2015 security agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition, military forces currently stationed in Juba, Bor and Malakal are to be moved to bases at least 25 kilometers outside of each respective city. The Presidential Guard at Giada Barracks and SPLA's General Headquarters in Bilpam are authorized exceptions to the agreement.[41]

Equipment

As of 2013 the SLPA's land forces operated the following heavy equipment:

As of 2013 the South Sudan Air Force operated the following aircraft:

Defence expenditure

According to the 2013 edition of the International Institute for Strategic Studies' report The Military Balance, South Sudan's defence budgets since 2011 have been as follows:

Year South Sudanese pounds US dollar equivalent
2011 1.6bn 533m
2012 2.42bn 537m
2013 2.52bn

Notes

Wikimedia Commons has media related to SPLA.
  1. ^ IISS 2015.
  2. ^ "South Sudan President Salva Kiir sacks army chief". BBC. 24 April 2014. Retrieved 24 July 2014.
  3. ^ a b c d Small Arms Survey. In Need of Review: SPLA Transformation in 2006–10 and Beyond
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k IISS 2013, p. 532.
  5. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 16
  6. ^ a b c Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. pp. 252-253
  7. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. xiv
  8. ^ a b Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 210
  9. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 90
  10. ^ a b c d e Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. pp. 18-19
  11. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 23
  12. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 65
  13. ^ a b c Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. pp. 153-155
  14. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 1
  15. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 27
  16. ^ a b c d Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. pp. 21, 23
  17. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 101
  18. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 22
  19. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 25
  20. ^ Africa Watch Committee. Denying the Honor of Living: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster : an Africa Watch Report. New York, N.Y.: Africa Watch Committee, 1990. p. 53
  21. ^ Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 128
  22. ^ a b Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 25
  23. ^ a b Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 208
  24. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 91
  25. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 3
  26. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 35
  27. ^ Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo. Civil wars of the world: major conflicts since World War II. Vol. 1. ABC-CLIO. p. 748.
  28. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. pp. 56-58
  29. ^ Guarak, Mawut Achiecque Mach. Integration and Fragmentation of the Sudan: An African Renaissance. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011. p. 220
  30. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 99
  31. ^ Rone, Jemera. Civilian Devastation: Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994. p. 12
  32. ^ "SPLA to demobilize all child soldiers by end of the year - Sudan Tribune: Plural news and views on Sudan". Sudan Tribune. Retrieved 2012-06-20.
  33. ^ "Kiir appoints new army Chief of Staff, relieves deputies". Sudan Tribune. June 1, 2009. Retrieved January 7, 2014.
  34. ^ 10ADDISABABA176
  35. ^ "Heavy gunfire rocks South Sudan capital". Al Jazeera. 16 December 2013. Retrieved 17 December 2013.
  36. ^ https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/south-sudan-army-defection-wunyiik
  37. ^ https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/missing-money-spla-div-4-widows-unpaid
  38. ^ http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article58577
  39. ^ http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/armed-groups/southern-dissident-militias/ssdma-upper-nile.html
  40. ^ http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/south-sudan/conflict-of-2013-14/the-conflict-in-bahr-el-ghazal.html
  41. ^ http://www.thenationmirror.com/news/south-sudan-news/1684-spla-starts-redeploying-forces-out-of-juba

References

  • International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2013). The Military Balance 2013. London: IISS. ISSN 0459-7222. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Further reading: Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad, and Daly, M. W., Civil war in the Sudan, London ; New York : British Academic Press : Distributed by St. Martinʾs Press in the United States of America and Canada, 1993. (See Douglas and Prunier article on origins of SPLA)
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