Metaphysics: Difference between revisions
→Topics: contents of section "Topics" reorganized and rewritten; several passages were summarized and some new points were added, now with proper sourcing; for earlier drafts, see User:Phlsph7/Metaphysics - Topics; for a discussion, see Talk:Metaphysics#Changes_to_the_article Tags: harv-error Disambiguation links added |
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===Sources=== |
===Sources=== |
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* {{cite book |last1=Armstrong |first1=D. M. |title=The Mind-body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-96480-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uf7EDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA94 |language=en |date=2018 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Asay |first1=Jamin |title=A Theory of Truthmaking: Metaphysics, Ontology, and Reality |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-60404-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nRXeDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 |language=en |date=2020 }} |
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* {{cite book |author1=Ásta |title=The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-315-76857-1 |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315768571-27/social-kinds-%C3%A1sta |chapter=Social Kinds |date=2017 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |date=2006 |publisher=Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865787-5 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214235128/https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy |archive-date=14 February 2022 |chapter=Philosophy |access-date=10 November 2023 }} |
* {{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |date=2006 |publisher=Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865787-5 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214235128/https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy |archive-date=14 February 2022 |chapter=Philosophy |access-date=10 November 2023 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Bengtson |first1=Josef |title=Explorations in Post-Secular Metaphysics |date=2 November 2015 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-137-55336-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pUHvCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT35 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Bengtson |first1=Josef |title=Explorations in Post-Secular Metaphysics |date=2 November 2015 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-137-55336-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pUHvCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT35 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Benovsky |first1=Jiri |title=Meta-metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-25334-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4KHWCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 |language=en |date=2016 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Berryman |first1=Sylvia |title=Ancient Atomism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-ancient/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=25 March 2024 |date=2022 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Berto |first1=Francesco |last2=Jago |first2=Mark |title=Impossible Worlds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 February 2024 |date=2023 |archive-date=10 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210210235859/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impossible-worlds/ |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Bigelow |first1=John C. |title=Particulars |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/particulars/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=24 March 2024 |language=en |date=1998 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N040-1}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Bigelow |first1=John C. |title=Universals |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/universals/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=25 March 2024 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N065-1 |date=1998a }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Bird |first1=Alexander |last2=Tobin |first2=Emma |title=Natural Kinds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 March 2024 |date=2024 }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Brenner |first1=Andrew |title=Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question |journal=Synthese |volume=192 |issue=5 |doi=10.1007/s11229-014-0619-7 |date=2015 }} |
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* {{cite encyclopedia|last1=Brown |first1=James Robert |last2=Fehige |first2=Yiftach |title=Thought Experiments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 October 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=21 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171121022040/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/ |url-status=live }} |
* {{cite encyclopedia|last1=Brown |first1=James Robert |last2=Fehige |first2=Yiftach |title=Thought Experiments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/ |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 October 2021 |date=2019 |archive-date=21 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171121022040/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/thought-experiment/ |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Brumbaugh |first1=Robert S. |title=Applied Metaphysics: Truth and Passing Time |journal=The Review of Metaphysics |date=1966 |volume=19 |issue=4 |oclc=9970206403 |issn=0034-6632 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20124133}} |
* {{cite journal |last1=Brumbaugh |first1=Robert S. |title=Applied Metaphysics: Truth and Passing Time |journal=The Review of Metaphysics |date=1966 |volume=19 |issue=4 |oclc=9970206403 |issn=0034-6632 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20124133}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Brzović |first1=Zdenka |title=Natural Kinds |url=https://iep.utm.edu/nat-kind/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=26 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Campbell |first1=Keith |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |date=2006 |publisher=Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865787-5 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/ontology |chapter=Ontology }} |
* {{cite book |last1=Campbell |first1=Keith |editor1-last=Borchert |editor1-first=Donald M. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 7: Oakeshott - Presupposition |date=2006 |publisher=Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference |isbn=978-0-02-865787-5 |edition=2. |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/ontology |chapter=Ontology }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Carroll |first1=John W. |last2=Markosian |first2=Ned |title=An introduction to metaphysics |date=2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |isbn=978-0-521-82629-7 |edition=1}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Carroll |first1=John W. |last2=Markosian |first2=Ned |title=An introduction to metaphysics |date=2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |isbn=978-0-521-82629-7 |edition=1}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Coelho |first1=Ivo |title=Hermeneutics and Method: The 'universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan |date=1 January 2001 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |isbn=978-0-8020-4840-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=P518M0X_zakC&pg=PA128 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Coelho |first1=Ivo |title=Hermeneutics and Method: The 'universal Viewpoint' in Bernard Lonergan |date=1 January 2001 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |isbn=978-0-8020-4840-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=P518M0X_zakC&pg=PA128 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Cornell |first1=David |title=Material Composition |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mat-comp/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=25 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Costa |first1=Damiano |title=Persistence in Time |url=https://iep.utm.edu/per-time/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=26 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Cowling |first1=Sam |title=Universals |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/universals/v-2 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=25 March 2024 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N065-2 |date=2019 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Metaphysics |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/metaphysics/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=19 March 2024 |language=en |date=1998}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Metaphysics |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/overview/metaphysics/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=19 March 2024 |language=en |date=1998}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Dainton |first1=Barry |title=Time and Space |publisher=Acumen Publishing |isbn=978-1-84465-190-0 |edition=2 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/time-and-space/spatial-antirealism/CE284C8D3088AF598998951618D4867D |chapter=Spatial anti-realism |date=2010 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Christopher |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |date=2015 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-137-34455-7 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction and Historical Overview |pages=1–30 |doi=10.1057/9781137344557_1 |access-date=18 April 2022 |archive-date=1 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220501081115/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |url-status=live }} |
* {{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Christopher |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |date=2015 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-137-34455-7 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction and Historical Overview |pages=1–30 |doi=10.1057/9781137344557_1 |access-date=18 April 2022 |archive-date=1 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220501081115/https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Drummond |first1=John J. |title=Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy |date=14 March 2022 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-5381-3345-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VQ9hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Drummond |first1=John J. |title=Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy |date=14 March 2022 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-1-5381-3345-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VQ9hEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite web |title=Intuitionism (Ethics) |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuitionism-ethics |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=28 February 2022 |language=en |archive-date=7 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220307123948/https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuitionism-ethics |url-status=live |last1=Duignan |first1=Brian |date=2009a }} |
* {{cite web |title=Intuitionism (Ethics) |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuitionism-ethics |website=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=28 February 2022 |language=en |archive-date=7 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220307123948/https://www.britannica.com/topic/intuitionism-ethics |url-status=live |last1=Duignan |first1=Brian |date=2009a }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Dyke |first1=Heather |editor1-last=Callender |editor1-first=Craig |title=Time, Reality and Experience |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-52967-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IxIlqbSWg4gC&pg=PA138 |language=en |chapter=McTaggart and the Truth about Time |date=2002 }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Eder |first1=Anna-Maria A. |last2=Lawler |first2=Insa |last3=van Riel |first3=Raphael |title=Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue Philosophical Methods |journal=Synthese |date=2020 |volume=197 |issue=3 |pages=915–923 |doi=10.1007/s11229-018-02051-2 |s2cid=54631297 |language=en |issn=1573-0964 |doi-access=free}} |
* {{cite journal |last1=Eder |first1=Anna-Maria A. |last2=Lawler |first2=Insa |last3=van Riel |first3=Raphael |title=Philosophical Methods Under Scrutiny: Introduction to the Special Issue Philosophical Methods |journal=Synthese |date=2020 |volume=197 |issue=3 |pages=915–923 |doi=10.1007/s11229-018-02051-2 |s2cid=54631297 |language=en |issn=1573-0964 |doi-access=free}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Effingham |first1=Nikk |last2=Beebee |first2=Helen |last3=Goff |first3=Philip |title=Metaphysics: The Key Concepts |date=30 November 2010 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-85518-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BBKsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Effingham |first1=Nikk |last2=Beebee |first2=Helen |last3=Goff |first3=Philip |title=Metaphysics: The Key Concepts |date=30 November 2010 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-85518-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BBKsAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Erasmus |first1=Jacobus |title=The Kalām Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment |date=8 January 2018 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-73438-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ze5FDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Falguera |first1=José L. |last2=Martínez-Vidal |first2=Concha |last3=Rosen |first3=Gideon |title=Abstract Objects |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 March 2024 |date=2022}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Gallois |first1=Andre |title=Identity Over Time |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-time/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 March 2024 |date=2016 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Gibson |first1=Q. B. |title=The Existence Principle |date=31 July 1998 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-0-7923-5188-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0BvTfX-swZ0C |language=en |access-date=1 September 2023 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810225643/https://books.google.com/books?id=0BvTfX-swZ0C |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Goffi |first1=Jean-Yves |last2=Roux |first2=Sophie |author2-link=Sophie Roux |title=On the Very Idea of a Thought Experiment |journal=Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts |date=2011 |pages=165–191 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV |publisher=Brill |doi=10.1163/ej.9789004201767.i-233.35 |isbn=978-90-04-20177-4 |s2cid=260640180 |access-date=18 April 2022 |archive-date=30 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211030152653/https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV |url-status=live }} |
* {{cite journal |last1=Goffi |first1=Jean-Yves |last2=Roux |first2=Sophie |author2-link=Sophie Roux |title=On the Very Idea of a Thought Experiment |journal=Thought Experiments in Methodological and Historical Contexts |date=2011 |pages=165–191 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV |publisher=Brill |doi=10.1163/ej.9789004201767.i-233.35 |isbn=978-90-04-20177-4 |s2cid=260640180 |access-date=18 April 2022 |archive-date=30 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211030152653/https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Goldenbaum |first1=Ursula |title=Geometrical Method |url=https://iep.utm.edu/geo-meth/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=15 March 2024}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Goldenbaum |first1=Ursula |title=Geometrical Method |url=https://iep.utm.edu/geo-meth/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=15 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Goswick |first1=Dana |editor1-last=Vintiadis |editor1-first=Elly |editor2-last=Mekios |editor2-first=Constantinos |title=Brute Facts |date=25 October 2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-875860-0 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/7173/chapter-abstract/151764191 |language=en |chapter=6. Are Modal Facts Brute Facts?}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Griffin |first1=Nicholas |title=Neutral monism |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/neutral-monism/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=27 March 2024 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N035-1 |date=1998 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Grim |first1=Patrick |last2=Rescher |first2=Nicholas |title=Theory of Categories: Key Instruments of Human Understanding |date=5 September 2023 |publisher=Anthem Press |isbn=978-1-83998-815-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KgPPEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Hale |first1=Bob |title=Essence and Existence |date=26 June 2020 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-259622-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OSvsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Hanna |first1=Robert |title=Rationality and Logic |date=23 January 2009 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-26311-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ka9BhOL1ev8C&pg=PA196 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Hawley |first1=Katherine |editor1-last=Lippert-Rasmussen |editor1-first=Kasper |editor2-last=Brownlee |editor2-first=Kimberley |editor3-last=Coady |editor3-first=David |title=A Companion to Applied Philosophy |date=14 September 2016 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-86911-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IVMWDQAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=Applied Metaphysics}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Hawley |first1=Katherine |editor1-last=Lippert-Rasmussen |editor1-first=Kasper |editor2-last=Brownlee |editor2-first=Kimberley |editor3-last=Coady |editor3-first=David |title=A Companion to Applied Philosophy |date=14 September 2016 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-86911-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IVMWDQAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=Applied Metaphysics}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Hawley |first1=Katherine |title=Temporal Parts |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/temporal-parts/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 March 2024 |date=2023 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Hoefer |first1=Carl |last2=Huggett |first2=Nick |last3=Read |first3=James |title=Absolute and Relational Space and Motion: Classical Theories |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-theories-classical/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 March 2024 |date=2023 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Hofweber |first1=Thomas |title=Logic and Ontology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Hofweber |first1=Thomas |title=Logic and Ontology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Imaguire |first1=Guido |title=Priority Nominalism: Grounding Ostrich Nominalism as a Solution to the Problem of Universals |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-95004-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=X4dnDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA34 |language=en |date=2018 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis |date=1998 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-823618-2}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |title=From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis |date=1998 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-823618-2}} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Jaksland |first1=Rasmus |title=Naturalized metaphysics or displacing metaphysicians to save metaphysics |journal=Synthese |date=2 June 2023 |volume=201 |issue=6 |doi=10.1007/s11229-023-04207-1|doi-access=free }} |
* {{cite journal |last1=Jaksland |first1=Rasmus |title=Naturalized metaphysics or displacing metaphysicians to save metaphysics |journal=Synthese |date=2 June 2023 |volume=201 |issue=6 |doi=10.1007/s11229-023-04207-1|doi-access=free }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Janiak |first1=Andrew |title=Kant’s Views on Space and Time |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-spacetime/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=26 March 2024 |date=2022 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Khlentzos |first1=Drew |title=Challenges to Metaphysical Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 March 2024 |date=2021}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Khlentzos |first1=Drew |title=Challenges to Metaphysical Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 March 2024 |date=2021}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1608?rskey=jqUtkA&result=1601 |language=en |chapter=Mind, Problems of the Philosophy of |date=2005 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Kirk |first1=Robert |title=Zombies |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Kirk |first1=Robert |title=Zombies |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Körner |first1=Stephan |title=Metaphysics: Its Structure and Function |date=6 September 1984 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-26496-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eAA4AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA183 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Kuhn |first1=Thomas S. |editor1-last=Sture |editor1-first=Allén |title=Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65 |date=22 November 2010 |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-086685-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c_eYe6NVaDMC&pg=PA13 |language=en |chapter=Possible Worlds in History of Science}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Lawson |first1=Joanna |title=The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-47600-3 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-commonsense-philosophy/common-sense-in-metaphysics/BC6C0E4F101ACE777151584408E2ED39 |chapter=Common Sense in Metaphysics}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Lawson |first1=Joanna |title=The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy |date=2020 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-47600-3 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-commonsense-philosophy/common-sense-in-metaphysics/BC6C0E4F101ACE777151584408E2ED39 |chapter=Common Sense in Metaphysics}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Liston |first1=Michael |title=Scientific Realism and Antirealism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/scientific-realism-antirealism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Loux |first1=Michael J. |last2=Crisp |first2=Thomas M. |title=Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction |date=2017 |publisher=Routledge |location=New York |isbn=978-1-138-63933-1 |edition=4}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Loux |first1=Michael J. |last2=Crisp |first2=Thomas M. |title=Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction |date=2017 |publisher=Routledge |location=New York |isbn=978-1-138-63933-1 |edition=4}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Maurin |first1=Anna-Sofia |title=Particulars |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/particulars/v-2/sections/particulars-thick-or-thin |language=en |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N040-2}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=McDaniel |first1=Kris |title=This Is Metaphysics: An Introduction |date=10 June 2020 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-40077-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=McDaniel |first1=Kris |title=This Is Metaphysics: An Introduction |date=10 June 2020 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-40077-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3tDaDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA217 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=McLaughlin |first1=Brian P. |editor-last1=Audi |editor-first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-63722-0 |edition=2 |date=1999 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Menzel |first1=Christopher |title=Possible Worlds |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=24 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Kristie |title=Persistence |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/persistence/v-1/sections/1-four-accounts-of-persistence |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=26 March 2024 |language=en |doi=10.4324/0123456789-N126-1 |date=2018 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Morton |first1=Adam |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1608?rskey=jqUtkA&result=1601 |language=en |chapter=Mind |date=2005 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Mumford |first1=Stephen |title=Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction |date=2012 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford, United Kingdom |isbn=978-0-19-965712-4 |edition=1}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Mumford |first1=Stephen |title=Metaphysics: A Very Short Introduction |date=2012 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford, United Kingdom |isbn=978-0-19-965712-4 |edition=1}} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Mumford |first1=Stephen |title=Passing Powers Around |journal=Monist |volume=92 |issue=1 |doi=10.5840/monist20099215 |date=2009 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Mumford |first1=Stephen |last2=Anjum |first2=Rani Lill |title=Causation: A Very Short Introduction |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-968443-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pYszAQAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=8. Primitivism: is causation the most basic thing? |date=2013 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Ney |first1=Alyssa |title=Metaphysics: An Introduction |date=2014 |publisher=Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |location=London ; New York |isbn=978-0-415-64074-9}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Ney |first1=Alyssa |title=Metaphysics: An Introduction |date=2014 |publisher=Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group |location=London ; New York |isbn=978-0-415-64074-9}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Noonan |first1=Harold |last2=Curtis |first2=Ben |title=Identity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 March 2024 |date=2022 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Nuttall |first1=Jon |title=An Introduction to Philosophy |date=3 July 2013 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-7456-6807-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=luc-Hf_bEOIC&pg=PT135 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Olson |first1=Eric T. |editor1-last=Blakemore |editor1-first=Colin |editor2-last=Jennett |editor2-first=Sheila |title=The Oxford Companion to the Body |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-852403-8 |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/mind-body-problem |language=en |chapter=Mind–Body Problem |date=2001 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Olson |first1=Eric T. |title=Personal Identity |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 March 2024 |date=2023 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=O’Connor |first1=Timothy |last2=Franklin |first2=Christopher |title=Free Will |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 March 2024 |date=2022 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Parent |first1=Ted |title=Modal Metaphysics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/mod-meta/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Pavel |first1=Thomas G. |title=Fictional Worlds |date=1986 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=978-0-674-29966-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 |language=en |access-date=2024-02-18 |archive-date=2024-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240217215258/https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Pelczar |first1=Michael |title=Sensorama: A Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-104706-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tkjTBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA115 |language=en |date=2015 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Pihlström |first1=Sami |title=Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology |date=10 July 2009 |publisher=A&C Black |isbn=978-1-84706-593-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=srGLpb7pWdkC&pg=PA60 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Pihlström |first1=Sami |title=Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology |date=10 July 2009 |publisher=A&C Black |isbn=978-1-84706-593-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=srGLpb7pWdkC&pg=PA60 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Ramsey |first1=William |title=Eliminative Materialism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 March 2024 |date=2022 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Rea |first1=Michael C. |title=Metaphysics: The Basics |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-367-13607-9 |edition=2 |date=2021 }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Rodriguez-Pereyra |first1=Gonzalo |title=What is the problem of universals? |journal=Mind |volume=109 |issue=434 |doi=10.1093/mind/109.434.255 |date=2000 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Romero |first1=Gustavo E. |title=Scientific Philosophy |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-97631-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 |language=en |date=2018 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Ryckman |first1=Thomas |title=The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925 |date=13 January 2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-029215-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 |language=en}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Ryckman |first1=Thomas |title=The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy in Physics 1915-1925 |date=13 January 2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-029215-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FI1JCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA142 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Shaffer |first1=Michael J. |title=The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=2015 |volume=46 |issue=4/5 |pages=555–563 |doi=10.1111/meta.12158 |jstor=26602327 |s2cid=148551744 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 |issn=0026-1068 |access-date=15 February 2022 |archive-date=13 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220213133747/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 |url-status=live }} |
* {{cite journal |last1=Shaffer |first1=Michael J. |title=The Problem of Necessary and Sufficient Conditions and Conceptual Analysis |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=2015 |volume=46 |issue=4/5 |pages=555–563 |doi=10.1111/meta.12158 |jstor=26602327 |s2cid=148551744 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 |issn=0026-1068 |access-date=15 February 2022 |archive-date=13 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220213133747/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 |url-status=live }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Simons |first1=Peter |editor1-last=Kanzian |editor1-first=Christian |title=Persistence |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-032705-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 |language=en |chapter=The Thread of Persistence |date=2013 }} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Sleigh |first1=R. C. |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-926479-7 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-1174 |language=en |chapter=identity of indiscernibles |date=2005 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Stern |first1=Robert |last2=Cheng |first2=Tony |title=Transcendental Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
* {{cite web |last1=Stern |first1=Robert |last2=Cheng |first2=Tony |title=Transcendental Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/transcendental-arguments/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=17 March 2024 |date=2023}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Stubenberg |first1=Leopold |last2=Wishon |first2=Donovan |title=Neutral Monism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=27 March 2024 |date=2023 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Studtmann |first1=Paul |title=Aristotle's Categories |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 March 2024 |date=2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Tahko |first1=Tuomas E. |title=An introduction to metametaphysics |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=United Kingdom |isbn=978-1-107-07729-4}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Tahko |first1=Tuomas E. |title=An introduction to metametaphysics |date=2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=United Kingdom |isbn=978-1-107-07729-4}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Tahko |first1=Tuomas |title=Meta-metaphysics |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/meta-metaphysics/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=20 March 2024 |language=en |date=2018 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-N127-1}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Tallant |first1=Jonathan |title=Metaphysics: An Introduction |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic |isbn=978-1-3500-0671-3 |edition=Second |date=2017 }} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Thomasson |first1=Amie |title=Categories |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 March 2024 |date=2022}} |
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* {{cite web |last1=Timpe |first1=Kevin |title=Free Will |url=https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=28 March 2024}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Turner |first1=William |editor-last=Herbermann |editor-first=Charles |title=Catholic Encyclopedia |date=1913 |url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Metaphysics |language=en |chapter=Metaphysics |oclc=1293868540 |publisher=Robert Appleton Company}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Vallicella |first1=William F. |title=A Paradigm theory of existence: Onto-Theology vindicated |date=2010 |publisher=Kluwer Academic |isbn=978-90-481-6128-7}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=White |first1=Alan |title=Methods of Metaphysics |date=6 March 2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-429-51427-2 |language=en}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Williamson |first1=John |editor1-last=Beebee |editor1-first=Helen |editor2-last=Hitchcock |editor2-first=Christopher |editor3-last=Menzies |editor3-first=Peter |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-162946-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yWWEIvNgUQ4C&pg=PA186 |language=en |chapter=Probabilistic Theories |date=2012 }} |
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* {{cite journal |last1=Wilsch |first1=Tobias |title=Sophisticated Modal Primitivism |journal=Philosophical Issues |date=October 2017 |volume=27 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/phis.12100}} |
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* {{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Allen W. |editor1-last=Kim |editor1-first=Jaekwon |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |editor3-last=Rosenkrantz |editor3-first=Gary S. |title=A Companion to Metaphysics |date=12 March 2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-4443-0853-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 |language=en |chapter=Kantianism}} |
* {{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Allen W. |editor1-last=Kim |editor1-first=Jaekwon |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |editor3-last=Rosenkrantz |editor3-first=Gary S. |title=A Companion to Metaphysics |date=12 March 2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-4443-0853-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i7PG-Vk824UC&pg=PA354 |language=en |chapter=Kantianism}} |
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Revision as of 13:13, 29 March 2024
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Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental nature of reality. This includes studies of the first principles of: being or existence, identity, change, consciousness, space and time, necessity, actuality, and possibility.[1] It can also include questions about the existence of (and conceptions of) God, as well as relationships between foundational philosophical ideas such as between mind and matter, cause and effect, substance and attribute, or potentiality and actuality.[2]
Metaphysics is considered one of the four main branches of philosophy, along with epistemology, logic, and ethics.[3] Metaphysics studies what it is for something to exist (to "be") and what types of existence there are. It seeks to answer, in an abstract and fully general manner, the questions of: What is it that exists; and What it is like.[4]
Etymology
The word metaphysics derives from the Greek words μετὰ (metà, "after, behind, following" and possibly "transcending") and φυσικά (physiká, "physics").[5] It has been suggested that the term might have been coined by first century BC Aristotelian editor Andronicus of Rhodes who assembled fourteen books of Aristotle's works into the treatise we now know by the name Metaphysics (μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, metà tà physikà, lit. "after the Physics " – another of Aristotle's works), and published it.[6][7] The prefix meta- ("after") here simply indicates that these books are organized to appear after Aristotle's discussions of physics. The folk assumption that metaphysics derives from the meaning "transcending physics" is a later reinterpretation.[8] In addition to the bibliographical meaning, there is also a scientific-didactic one, relating to the content: "That which follows the explanations about nature", "What comes after physics". Which of the two points of view is considered to be more original is controversial among philosophy historians.
However, once the name was given, the commentators sought to find other reasons for its appropriateness. For instance, Thomas Aquinas understood it to refer to the chronological or pedagogical order among our philosophical studies, so that the "metaphysical sciences" would mean "those that we study after having mastered the sciences that deal with the physical world".[9]
The term was misread by other medieval commentators, who thought it meant "the science of what is beyond the physical".[10] Following this tradition, the prefix meta- has more recently been prefixed to the names of sciences to designate higher sciences dealing with ulterior and more fundamental problems: hence metamathematics, metalinguistics, metaphysiology, etc.[11]
Definition
Metaphysics is the study of the most general features of reality, including existence, objects and their properties, possibility and necessity, space and time, change, causation, and the relation between matter and mind. It is one of the oldest branches of philosophy.[12]
The precise nature of metaphysics is disputed and its characterization has changed in the course of history. Some approaches see metaphysics as a unified field and give a wide-sweeping definition by understanding it as the study of "fundamental questions about the nature of reality" or as an inquiry into the essences of things. Another approach doubts that the different areas of metaphysics share a set of underlying features and provides instead a fine-grained characterization by listing all the main topics investigated by metaphysicians.[13] Some definitions are descriptive by providing an account of what metaphysicians actually do while others are normative and prescribe what metaphysicians ought to do.[14]
Two historically influential definitions in ancient and medieval philosophy understand metaphysics as the science of the first causes and as the study of being qua being, that is, the topic of what all beings have in common and to what fundamental categories they belong. In the modern period, the scope of metaphysics was extended to cover topics such as the distinction between mind and body and free will.[15] Some philosophers follow Aristotle in describing metaphysics as first philosophy, implying that it is the most basic inquiry while all other branches of philosophy depend on it in some way.[16][a]
Metaphysics is traditionally understood as a study of mind-independent features of reality. Starting with Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, an alternative conception gained prominence that focuses on conceptual schemes rather than external reality. Kant distinguishes transcendent metaphysics, which aims to describe the objective features of reality beyond sense experience, from critical metaphysics, which outlines the aspects and principles underlying all human thought and experience.[18]
Metaphysics differs from the individual sciences by studying very general and abstract aspects of reality. The individual sciences, by contrast, examine more specific and concrete features and restrict themselves to certain classes of entities, such as the focus on physical things in physics, living entities in biology, and cultures in anthropology.[19] It is disputed to what extent this contrast is a strict dichotomy rather than a gradual continuum.[20]
Philosophers engaged in metaphysics are called metaphysicians or metaphysicists.[21] Outside the academic discourse, the term metaphysics is sometimes used in a different sense for the study of occult and paranormal phenomena, like metaphysical healing, auras, and the power of pyramids.[22]
Branches
The nature of metaphysics can also be characterized in relation to its main branches. An influential division from early modern philosophy distinguishes between general and special or specific metaphysics.[23] General metaphysics, also called ontology,[b] takes the widest perspective and studies the most fundamental aspects of being. It investigates the features that all entities have in common and how entities can be divided into different categories. Categories are the most general kinds, such as substance, property, relation, and fact.[25] Ontologists research which categories there are, how they depend on one another, and how they form a system of categories that provides an encompassing classification of all entities.[26]
Special metaphysics considers being from more narrow perspectives and is divided into subdisciplines based on the perspective they take. Metaphysical cosmology examines changeable things and investigates how they are connected to form a world as a totality of entities extending through space and time.[27] Rational psychology restricts itself to exploring metaphysical foundations and problems concerning the mind, such as its relation to matter and the freedom of the will. Natural theology studies the divine and its role as the first cause.[27] The scope of special metaphysics overlaps with other philosophical disciplines and it is often not clear whether a topic belongs to it rather than to disciplines like philosophy of mind and theology.[28]
Applied metaphysics is a young subdiscipline. It belongs to applied philosophy and studies the applications of metaphysics, both within philosophy and other fields of inquiry. In ethics and philosophy of religion, it concerns topics like the ontological foundation of moral claims and religious doctrines.[29] Applications outside philosophy include the use of ontologies in artificial intelligence, economics, and sociology to classify entities[30] as well as questions in psychiatry and medicine about the metaphysical status of diseases.[31]
Meta-metaphysics[c] is the metatheory of metaphysics and investigates the nature and methods of metaphysics. It also examines how metaphysics differs from other philosophical and scientific disciplines and how it is relevant to them. While the discussions of its topics have a long history in metaphysics, it has only recently developed into a systematic field of inquiry.[33]
Topics
Existence and categories of being
Metaphysicians often see existence or being as one of the most basic and general concepts.[34] To exist means to form part of reality and existence marks the difference between real entities and imaginary ones.[35] According to the orthodox view, existence is a second-order property or a property of properties: if an entity exists then its properties are instantiated.[36] A different position states that existence is a first-order property, meaning that it is similar to other properties of entities, such as shape or size.[37] It is controversial whether all entities have this property. According to Alexius Meinong, there are some objects that do not exist, including merely possible objects like Santa Claus and Pegasus.[38][d] A related question is whether existence is the same for all entities or whether there are different modes or degrees of existence.[40] For instance, Plato held that Platonic forms, which are perfect and immutable ideas, have a higher degree of existence than matter, which is only able to imperfectly mirror Platonic forms.[41]
Another key concern in metaphysics is the division of entities into different groups based on underlying features they have in common. Theories of categories provide a system of the most fundamental kinds or the highest genera of being by establishing a comprehensive inventory of everything.[42] One of the earliest theories of categories was provided by Aristotle, who proposed a system of 10 categories. Substances (e.g. man and horse), are the most important category since all other categories like quantity (e.g. four), quality (e.g. white), and place (e.g. in Athens) are said of substances and depend on them.[43] Kant understood categories as fundamental principles underlying human understanding and developed a system of 12 categories, which are divided into the four classes quantity, quality, relation, and modality.[44] More recent theories of categories were proposed by Edmund Husserl, Samuel Alexander, Roderick Chisholm, and E. J. Lowe.[45] Many philosophers rely on the contrast between concrete and abstract objects. According to a common view, concrete objects, like rocks, trees, and human beings, exist in space and time, undergo changes, and impact each other as cause and effect, while abstract objects, like numbers and sets, exist outside space and time, are immutable, and do not enter into causal relations.[46]
Particulars
Particulars are individual entities and include both concrete objects, like Aristotle, the Eiffel Tower, or a specific apple, and abstract objects, like the number 2 or a specific set in mathematics. Also called individuals,[e] they are unique, non-repeatable entities and contrast with universals, like the color red, which can at the same time exist in several places and characterize several particulars.[48] A widely held view is that particulars instantiate universals but are not themselves instantiated by something else, meaning that they exist in themselves while universals exist in something else. Substratum theory analyzes particulars as a substratum, also called bare particular, together with various properties. The substratum confers individuality to the particular while the properties express its qualitative features or what it is like. This approach is rejected by bundle theorists, who state that particulars are only bundles of properties without an underlying substratum. Some bundle theorists include in the bundle an individual essence, called haecceity, to ensure that each bundle is unique. Another proposal for concrete particulars is that they are individuated by their space-time location.[49]
Concrete particulars encountered in everyday life, like rocks, tables, and organisms, are complex entities composed of various parts. For example, a table is made up of a tabletop and legs, each of which is itself made up of countless particles. The relation between parts and wholes is studied by mereology.[50] The problem of the many is about which groups of entities form mereological wholes, for instance, whether a dust particle on the tabletop forms part of the table. According to mereological universalists, every collection of entities forms a whole, meaning that the parts of the table without the dust particle form one whole while they together with it form a second whole. Mereological moderatists hold that certain conditions have to be fulfilled for a group of entities to compose a whole, for example, that the entities touch one another. Mereological nihilists reject the idea that there are any wholes. They deny that, strictly speaking, there is a table and talk instead of particles that are arranged table-wise.[51] A related mereological problem is whether there are simple entities that have no parts, as atomists claim, or not, as continuum theorists contend.[52]
Universals
Universals are general entities, encompassing both properties and relations, that express what particulars are like and how they resemble one another. They are repeatable, meaning that they are not limited to a unique existent but can be instantiated by different particulars at the same time. For example, the particulars Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi instantiate the universal humanity, similar to how a strawberry and a ruby instantiate the universal red.[53]
A topic discussed since ancient philosophy, the problem of universals consists in the challenge of characterizing the ontological status of universals.[54] Realists argue that universals are real, mind-independent entities that exist in addition to particulars. According to Platonic realists, universals exist also independently of particulars, which implies that the universal red would continue to exist even if there were no red things. A more moderate form of realism, inspired by Aristotle, states that universals depend on particulars, meaning that they are only real if they are instantiated. Nominalists reject the idea that universals exist in either form. For them, the world is composed exclusively of particulars. The position of conceptualists constitutes a middle ground: they state that universals exist, but only as concepts in the mind used to order experience by classifying entities.[55]
Natural and social kinds are often understood as special types of universals. Entities belonging to the same natural kind share certain fundamental features characteristic of the structure of the natural world. In this regard, natural kinds are not an artificially made-up classification but are discovered,[f] usually by the natural sciences, and include kinds like electrons, H2O, and tigers. Scientific realists and anti-realists are in disagreement about whether natural kinds exist.[57] Social kinds are basic concepts used in the social sciences, such as race, gender, money, and disability.[58] They are studied by social metaphysics and group entities based on similarities they share from the perspective of certain practices, conventions, and institutions. They are often characterized as useful social constructions that, while not purely fictional, fail to reflect the fundamental structure of mind-independent reality.[59]
Possibility and necessity
The concepts of possibility and necessity convey what can or must be the case, expressed in statements like "it is possible to find a cure for cancer" and "it is necessary that two plus two equals four". They belong to modal metaphysics, which investigates the metaphysical principles underlying them, in particular, why it is the case that some modal statements are true while others are false.[60][g] Some metaphysicians hold that modality is a fundamental aspect of reality, meaning that besides facts about what is the case, there are additional facts about what could or must be the case.[62] A different view argues that modal truths are not about an independent aspect of reality but can be reduced to non-modal characteristics, for example, to facts about what properties or linguistic descriptions are compatible with each other or to fictional statements.[63]
Following Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, many metaphysicians use the concept of possible worlds to analyze the meaning and ontological ramifications of modal statements. A possible world is a complete and consistent way of how things could have been.[64] For example, the dinosaurs were wiped out in the actual world but there are possible worlds in which they are still alive.[65] According to possible world semantics, a statement is possibly true if it is true in at least one possible world while it is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.[66] Modal realists argue that possible worlds exist as concrete entities in the same sense as the actual world, with the main difference being that the actual world is the world we live in while other possible worlds are inhabited by counterparts. This view is controversial and various alternatives have been suggested, for example, that possible worlds only exist as abstract objects or that they are similar to stories told in works of fiction.[67]
Space, time, and change
Space and time are dimensions that entities occupy. Spacetime realists state that space and time are fundamental aspects of reality and exist independently of the human mind. This view is rejected by spacetime idealists, who hold that space and time are constructions of the human mind in its attempt to organize and make sense of reality.[68] Spacetime absolutism or substantivalism understands spacetime as a distinct object, with some metaphysicians conceptualizing it as a box that contains all other entities within it. Spacetime relationism, by contrast, sees spacetime not as an object but as relations between objects, such as the spatial relation of being next to and the temporal relation of coming before.[69]
In the metaphysics of time, an important contrast is between the A-series and the B-series. According to the A-series theory, the flow of time is real, meaning that events are categorized into the past, present, and future. The present keeps moving forward in time and events that are in the present now will change their status and lie in the past later. From the perspective of the B-series theory, time is static and events are ordered by the temporal relations earlier-than and later-than without any essential difference between past, present, and future.[70] Eternalism holds that past, present, and future are equally real while according to presentists, only entities in the present exist.[71]
Material objects persist through time and undergo changes in the process, like a tree that grows or loses leaves.[72] The main ways of conceptualizing persistence through time are endurantism and perdurantism. According to endurantism, material objects are three-dimensional entities that are wholly present at each moment. As they undergo changes, they gain or lose properties but remain the same otherwise. Perdurantists see material objects as four-dimensional entities that extend through time and are made up of different temporal parts. At each moment, only one part of the object is present but not the object as a whole. Change means that an earlier part is qualitatively different from a later part. For example, if a banana ripens then there is an unripe part followed by a ripe part.[73]
Causality
Causality is the relation between cause and effect whereby one entity produces or affects another entity.[74] For instance, if a person bumps a glass and spills its contents then the bump is the cause and the spill is the effect.[75] Besides the single-case causation between particulars in this example, there is also general-case causation expressed in general statements such as "smoking causes cancer".[76] The term agent causation is used if people and their actions cause something.[77] Causation is usually interpreted deterministically, meaning that a cause always brings about its effect. This view is rejected by probabilistic theories, which claim that the cause merely increases the probability that the effect occurs. This view can be used to explain that smoking causes cancer even though this is not true in every single case.[78]
The regularity theory of causation, inspired by David Hume's philosophy, states that causation is nothing but a constant conjunction in which the mind apprehends that one phenomenon, like putting one's hand in a fire, is always followed by another phenomenon, like a feeling of pain.[79] According to nomic regularity theories, the regularities take the forms of laws of nature studied by science.[80] Counterfactual theories focus not on regularities but on how effects depend on their causes. They state that effects owe their existence to the cause and would not be present without them.[81] According to primitivism, causation is a basic concept that cannot be analyzed in terms of non-causal concepts, such as regularities or dependence relations. One form of primitivism identifies causal powers inherent in entities as the underlying mechanism.[82] Eliminativists reject the above theories by holding that there is no causation.[83]
Mind and free will
![Diagram of approaches to the mind–body problem](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/79/Dualism-vs-Monism.png/290px-Dualism-vs-Monism.png)
Mind encompasses phenomena like thinking, perceiving, feeling, and desiring as well as the underlying faculties responsible for these phenomena.[84] The mind–body problem is the challenge of clarifying the relation between physical and mental phenomena. According to Cartesian dualism, minds and bodies are distinct substances. They causally interact with each other in various ways but can, at least in principle, exist on their own.[85] This view is rejected by monists, who argue that reality is made up of only one kind. According to idealism, everything is mental, including physical objects, which may be understood as ideas or perceptions of conscious minds. Materialists, by contrast, state that all reality is at its core material. Some deny that mind exists but the more common approach is to explain mind in terms of certain aspects of matter, such as brain states, behavioral dispositions, or functional roles.[86] Neutral monists argue that reality is fundamentally neither material nor mental and suggest that matter and mind are both derivative phenomena.[87] A key aspect of the mind–body problem is the hard problem of consciousness, which concerns the question of how physical systems like brains can produce phenomenal consciousness.[88]
The status of free will as the ability of a person to choose their actions is a central aspect of the mind–body problem.[89] Metaphysicians are interested in the relation between free will and causal determinism, the view that everything in the universe, including human behavior, is determined by preceding events and laws of nature. It is controversial whether causal determinism is true, and, if so, whether this would imply that there is no free will. According to incompatibilism, free will cannot exist in a deterministic world since there is no true choice or control if everything is determined. Hard determinists infer from this observation that there is no free will while libertarians conclude that determinism must be false. Compatibilists take a third approach by arguing that determinism and free will do not exclude each other, for instance, because a person can still act in tune with their motivation and choices even if they are determined by other forces. Free will plays a key role in ethics in regard to the moral responsibility people have for what they do.[90]
Others
Identity is a relation that every entity has to itself as a form of sameness. It refers to numerical identity when the very same entity is involved, as in "the morning star is the evening star". In a slightly different sense, it encompasses qualitative identity, also called exact similarity and indiscernibility, which is the case when two distinct entities are exactly alike, such as perfect identical twins.[91] The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals is widely accepted and holds that numerically identical entities exactly resemble one another. The converse principle, known as identity of indiscernibles, is more controversial and states that two entities are numerically identical if they exactly resemble one another.[92] Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time while diachronic identity is about the same entity at different times, as in statements like "the table I bought last year is the same as the table in my dining room now".[93] Personal identity is a related topic in metaphysics that uses the term identity in a slightly different sense and concerns questions like what personhood is or what makes someone a person.[94]
Various contemporary metaphysicians rely on the concepts of truth and truthmakers to conduct their inquiry.[95] Truth is a property of linguistic statements or mental representations that are in accord with reality. A truthmaker of a statement is the entity whose existence makes the statement true.[96] For example, the statement "a tomato is red" is true because there exists a red tomato as its truthmaker.[97] Based on this observation, it is possible to pursue metaphysical research by asking what the truthmakers of statements are, with different areas of metaphysics being dedicated to different types of statements. According to this view, modal metaphysics asks what makes statements about what is possible and necessary true while the metaphysics of time is interested in the truthmakers of temporal statements about the past, present, and future.[98]
Methodology
Metaphysicians employ a variety of methods to arrive at metaphysical theories and formulate arguments for and against them.[99] Traditionally, a priori methods are the dominant approach. They rely on rational intuition and abstract reasoning from general principles rather than sensory experience. A posteriori approaches, by contrast, ground metaphysical theories in empirical observations and scientific theories.[100] Some metaphysicians use perspectives from fields such as physics, psychology, linguistics, and history to conduct their inquiry.[101] The two approaches are not exclusive and it is possible to combine elements from both.[102] Which method a metaphysician employs often depends on their conception of the nature of metaphysics, for example, whether they see it as an inquiry into the mind-independent structure of reality, as metaphysical realists claim, or the principles underlying thought and experience, as some metaphysical anti-realists contend.[103]
A priori approaches often rely on intuitions, that is, non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles.[104] For example, arguments for the A-theory of time, which states that time flows from the past through the present and into the future, often rely on pre-theoretical intuitions associated with the sense of the passage of time.[105] Some approaches use intuitions to establish a small set of self-evident fundamental principles, known as axioms, and employ deductive reasoning to build complex metaphysical systems by drawing conclusions from these axioms.[106] Intuition-based approaches can be combined with thought experiments, which help evoke and clarify intuitions by linking them to imagined situations while using counterfactual thinking to assess the possible consequences of these situations.[107] To explore the relation between matter and consciousness, some theorists compare humans to philosophical zombies, that is, hypothetical creatures identical to humans but without conscious experience.[108] A related method relies on commonly accepted beliefs instead of intuitions to formulate arguments and theories. The common-sense approach is often used to criticize metaphysical theories that deviate a lot from how the average person thinks about an issue. For example, common-sense philosophers have argued that mereological nihilism is false since it implies that commonly accepted things, like tables, do not exist.[109]
Conceptual analysis, a method particularly prominent in analytic philosophy, aims to decompose metaphysical concepts into component parts in order to clarify their meaning and identify essential relations.[110] In phenomenology, the method of eidetic variation is used to investigate essential structures underlying phenomena. To study the essential features of any kind of object, it proceeds by imagining this object and varying its features to identify which ones are essential and cannot be changed.[111] The transcendental method is a further approach and examines the metaphysical structure of reality by observing what entities there are and studying the conditions of possibility without which these entities could not exist.[112]
Some approaches give less importance to a priori reasoning and see metaphysics instead as a practice continuous with the empirical sciences that generalizes their insights while making their underlying assumptions explicit. This approach is known as naturalized metaphysics and is closely associated with the work of Willard Van Orman Quine.[113] He relies on the idea that true sentences from the sciences and other fields have ontological commitments, that is, they imply that certain entities exist.[114] For example, if the sentence "some electrons are bonded to protons" is true then it can be used to justify that electrons and protons exist.[115] Quine used this insight to argue that one can learn about metaphysics by closely analyzing[h] scientific claims to understand what kind of metaphysical picture of the world they presuppose.[117]
In addition to methods of conducting metaphysical inquiry, there are various methodological principles used to decide between competing theories by comparing their theoretical virtues. Ockham's Razor is a well-known principle that gives preference to simple theories, in particular, to theories that assume that few entities exist. Other principles consider the explanatory power, theoretical usefulness, and proximity to established beliefs.[118]
Relation to other disciplines
Science
Prior to the modern history of science, scientific questions were addressed as a part of natural philosophy. Originally, the term "science" (Latin: scientia) simply meant "knowledge". The scientific method, however, transformed natural philosophy into an empirical activity deriving from experiment, unlike the rest of philosophy. By the end of the 18th century, it had begun to be called "science" to distinguish it from other branches of philosophy. Science and philosophy have been considered separated disciplines ever since. Thereafter, metaphysics denoted philosophical enquiry of a non-empirical character into the nature of existence.[119]
Metaphysics continues asking "why" where science leaves off. For example, any theory of fundamental physics is based on some set of axioms, which may postulate the existence of entities such as atoms, particles, forces, charges, mass, or fields. Stating such postulates is considered to be the "end" of a science theory. Metaphysics takes these postulates and explores what they mean as human concepts. For example, do all theories of physics require the existence of space and time,[120] objects, and properties? Or can they be expressed using only objects, or only properties? Do the objects have to retain their identity over time or can they change?[121] If they change, then are they still the same object? Can theories be reformulated by converting properties or predicates (such as "red") into entities (such as redness or redness fields) or processes ('there is some redding happening over there' appears in some human languages in place of the use of properties). Is the distinction between objects and properties fundamental to the physical world or to our perception of it?
Much recent work has been devoted to analyzing the role of metaphysics in scientific theorizing. Alexandre Koyré led this movement, declaring in his book Metaphysics and Measurement, "It is not by following experiment, but by outstripping experiment, that the scientific mind makes progress."[122] That metaphysical propositions can influence scientific theorizing is John Watkins' most lasting contribution to philosophy. Since 1957[123][124] "he showed the ways in which some un-testable and hence, according to Popperian ideas, non-empirical propositions can nevertheless be influential in the development of properly testable and hence scientific theories. These profound results in applied elementary logic...represented an important corrective to positivist teachings about the meaninglessness of metaphysics and of normative claims".[125] Imre Lakatos maintained that all scientific theories have a metaphysical "hard core" essential for the generation of hypotheses and theoretical assumptions.[126] Thus, according to Lakatos, "scientific changes are connected with vast cataclysmic metaphysical revolutions."[127]
An example from biology of Lakatos' thesis: David Hull has argued that changes in the ontological status of the species concept have been central in the development of biological thought from Aristotle through Cuvier, Lamarck, and Darwin. Darwin's ignorance of metaphysics made it more difficult for him to respond to his critics because he could not readily grasp the ways in which their underlying metaphysical views differed from his own.[128]
In physics, new metaphysical ideas have arisen in connection with quantum mechanics, where subatomic particles arguably do not have the same sort of individuality as the particulars with which philosophy has traditionally been concerned.[129] Also, adherence to a deterministic metaphysics in the face of the challenge posed by the quantum-mechanical uncertainty principle led physicists such as Albert Einstein to propose alternative theories that retained determinism.[130] A.N. Whitehead is famous for creating a process philosophy metaphysics inspired by electromagnetism and special relativity.[131]
In chemistry, Gilbert Newton Lewis addressed the nature of motion, arguing that an electron should not be said to move when it has none of the properties of motion.[132]
Katherine Hawley notes that the metaphysics even of a widely accepted scientific theory may be challenged if it can be argued that the metaphysical presuppositions of the theory make no contribution to its predictive success.[133]
Theology
There is a relationship between theological doctrines and philosophical reflection in the philosophy of a religion (such as Christian philosophy); philosophical reflections are strictly rational. On this way of seeing the two disciplines, if at least one of the premises of an argument is derived from revelation, the argument falls in the domain of theology; otherwise it falls into philosophy's domain.[134][135]
Logic
There are various ways in which logic and ontology are related.[136] Thus, there are various ways in which logic is related to metaphysics. To understand the variety of ways logic is related to metaphysics, one must first specify what is meant by both ‘logic’ and ‘ontology.’ Here are a few ways we might specify what we mean by logic: the study of artificial formal languages, the study of formally valid inferences and logical consequence, the study of logical truths, or the study of the general features, or form, of judgments.[136] Here are a few ways we might specify what we mean by ontology: the study of ontological commitment, the study of what there is, the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are related to each other in the metaphysically most general ways, and the study of meta-ontology.[136] For example, if we construe logic as the study of artificial formal languages and ontology as the study of ontological commitment, we might find ourselves interested in using formal logic to help us regiment our beliefs and determine our ontological commitments, as Quine suggests we should.[137]
Additionally, key concepts in metaphysics have been formalized in logical frameworks. For instance, Leibniz's law of the indiscernibility of identicals can be stated in terms of formal logic.
Rejections of metaphysics
Meta-metaphysics is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the foundations of metaphysics.[138] A number of individuals have suggested that much or all of metaphysics should be rejected, a meta-metaphysical position known as metaphysical deflationism[i][139] or ontological deflationism.[140]
In the 16th century, Francis Bacon rejected scholastic metaphysics, and argued strongly for what is now called empiricism, being seen later as the father of modern empirical science. In the 18th century, David Hume took a strong position, arguing that all genuine knowledge involves either mathematics or matters of fact and that metaphysics, which goes beyond these, is worthless. He concluded his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) with the statement:
If we take in our hand any volume [book]; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[141]
Thirty-three years after Hume's Enquiry appeared, Immanuel Kant published his Critique of Pure Reason. Although he followed Hume in rejecting much of previous metaphysics, he argued that there was still room for some synthetic a priori knowledge, concerned with matters of fact yet obtainable independent of experience.[142] These included fundamental structures of space, time, which he called "pure intuitions", and other 12 categories such as causality. Kant also argued for the existence of things in themselves, the ultimate (but unknowable) objects of experience, and the freedom of the will (in the Critique of Practical Reason).
Wittgenstein introduced the concept that metaphysics could be influenced by theories of aesthetics, via logic, vis. a world composed of "atomical facts".[143][144]
In the 1930s, A.J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap endorsed Hume's position; Carnap quoted the passage above.[145] They argued that metaphysical statements are neither true nor false but meaningless since, according to their verifiability theory of meaning, a statement is meaningful only if there can be empirical evidence for or against it. Carnap also compared metaphysical statements to music, with the difference that "metaphysicians are musicians without musical talent".[146] Thus, while Ayer rejected the monism of Spinoza, he avoided a commitment to pluralism, the contrary position, by holding both views to be without meaning.[147] Carnap took a similar line with the controversy over the reality of the external world.[148] While the logical positivism movement is now considered dead (with Ayer, a major proponent, admitting in a 1979 TV interview that "nearly all of it was false"),[149] it has continued to influence philosophy development.[150]
Arguing against such rejections, scholastic philosopher Edward Feser held that Hume's critique of metaphysics, and specifically Hume's fork, is "notoriously self-refuting".[151] Feser argues that Hume's fork itself is not a conceptual truth and is not empirically testable.
Some living philosophers, such as Amie Thomasson, have argued that many metaphysical questions can be dissolved just by looking at the way words are used; others, such as Ted Sider, have argued that metaphysical questions are substantive, and that progress can be made toward answering them by comparing theories according to a range of theoretical virtues inspired by the sciences, such as simplicity and explanatory power.[152]
History and schools of metaphysics
Pre-history
Cognitive archeology such as analysis of cave paintings and other pre-historic art and customs suggests that a form of perennial philosophy or Shamanic metaphysics may stretch back to the birth of behavioral modernity, all around the world. Similar beliefs are found in present-day "stone age" cultures such as Australian aboriginals. Perennial philosophy postulates the existence of a spirit or concept world alongside the day-to-day world, and interactions between these worlds during dreaming and ritual, or on special days or at special places. It has been argued that perennial philosophy formed the basis for Platonism, with Plato articulating, rather than creating, much older widespread beliefs.[153][154]
Bronze Age
Bronze Age cultures such as ancient Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt (along with similarly structured but chronologically later cultures such as Mayans and Aztecs) developed belief systems based on mythology, anthropomorphic gods, mind–body dualism,[citation needed] and a spirit world,[citation needed] to explain causes and cosmology. These cultures appear to have been interested in astronomy and may have associated or identified the stars with some of these entities. In ancient Egypt, the ontological distinction between order (maat) and chaos (Isfet) seems to have been important.[155]
Pre-Socratic Greece
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e3/Monad.svg/220px-Monad.svg.png)
The first named Greek philosopher, according to Aristotle, is Thales of Miletus, early 6th century BCE. He made use of purely physical explanations to explain the phenomena of the world rather than the mythological and divine explanations of tradition. He is thought to have posited water as the single underlying principle (or arche in later Aristotelian terminology) of the material world. His fellow, but younger Miletians, Anaximander and Anaximenes, also posited monistic underlying principles, namely apeiron (the indefinite or boundless) and air respectively.
Another school was the Eleatics, in southern Italy. The group was founded in the early fifth century BCE by Parmenides, and included Zeno of Elea and Melissus of Samos. Methodologically, the Eleatics were broadly rationalist, and took logical standards of clarity and necessity to be the criteria of truth. Parmenides' chief doctrine was that reality is a single unchanging and universal Being. Zeno used reductio ad absurdum, to demonstrate the illusory nature of change and time in his paradoxes.
Heraclitus of Ephesus, in contrast, made change central, teaching that "all things flow". His philosophy, expressed in brief aphorisms, is quite cryptic. For instance, he also taught the unity of opposites.
Democritus and his teacher Leucippus, are known for formulating an atomic theory for the cosmos.[156] They are considered forerunners of the scientific method.
Classical China
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/17/Yin_yang.svg/230px-Yin_yang.svg.png)
Metaphysics in Chinese philosophy can be traced back to the earliest Chinese philosophical concepts from the Zhou dynasty such as Tian (Heaven) and yin and yang. The fourth century BCE saw a turn towards cosmogony with the rise of Taoism (in the Daodejing and Zhuangzi) and sees the natural world as dynamic and constantly changing processes which spontaneously arise from a single immanent metaphysical source or principle (Tao).[157] Another philosophical school which arose around this time was the School of Naturalists which saw the ultimate metaphysical principle as the Taiji, the "supreme polarity" composed of the forces of yin and yang which were always in a state of change seeking balance. Another concern of Chinese metaphysics, especially Taoism, is the relationship and nature of being and non-being (you 有 and wu 無). The Taoists held that the ultimate, the Tao, was also non-being or no-presence.[157] Other important concepts were those of spontaneous generation or natural vitality (Ziran) and "correlative resonance" (Ganying).
After the fall of the Han dynasty (220 CE), China saw the rise of the Neo-Taoist Xuanxue school. This school was very influential in developing the concepts of later Chinese metaphysics.[157] Buddhist philosophy entered China (c. 1st century) and was influenced by the native Chinese metaphysical concepts to develop new theories. The native Tiantai and Huayen schools of philosophy maintained and reinterpreted the Indian theories of shunyata (emptiness, kong 空) and Buddha-nature (Fo xing 佛性) into the theory of interpenetration of phenomena. Neo-Confucians like Zhang Zai under the influence of other schools developed the concepts of "principle" (li) and vital energy (qi).
Classical Greece
Socrates and Plato
Plato is famous for his theory of forms (which he places in the mouth of Socrates in his dialogues). Platonic realism (also considered a form of idealism)[158] is considered to be a solution to the problem of universals; i.e., what particular objects have in common is that they share a specific Form which is universal to all others of their respective kind.
The theory has a number of other aspects:
- Epistemological: knowledge of the Forms is more certain than mere sensory data.
- Ethical: The Form of the Good sets an objective standard for morality.
- Time and Change: The world of the Forms is eternal and unchanging. Time and change belong only to the lower sensory world. "Time is a moving image of Eternity".
- Abstract objects and mathematics: Numbers, geometrical figures, etc., exist mind-independently in the World of Forms.
Platonism developed into Neoplatonism, a philosophy with a monotheistic and mystical flavour that survived well into the early Christian era.
Aristotle
Plato's pupil Aristotle wrote widely on almost every subject, including metaphysics. His solution to the problem of universals contrasts with Plato's. Whereas Platonic Forms are existentially apparent in the visible world, Aristotelian essences dwell in particulars.
Potentiality and actuality[159] are principles of a dichotomy which Aristotle used throughout his philosophical works to analyze motion, causality and other issues.
The Aristotelian theory of change and causality stretches to four causes: the material, formal, efficient and final. The efficient cause corresponds to what is now known as a cause simplicity. Final causes are explicitly teleological, a concept now regarded as controversial in science.[160] The Matter/Form dichotomy was to become highly influential in later philosophy as the substance/essence distinction.
The opening arguments in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, revolve around the senses, knowledge, experience, theory, and wisdom. The first main focus in the Metaphysics is attempting to determine how intellect "advances from sensation through memory, experience, and art, to theoretical knowledge".[161] Aristotle claims that eyesight provides the capability to recognize and remember experiences, while sound allows learning.
Classical India
More on Indian philosophy: Hindu philosophy
Sāṃkhya
Sāṃkhya is an ancient system of Indian philosophy based on a dualism involving the ultimate principles of consciousness and matter.[162] It is described as the rationalist school of Indian philosophy.[163] It is most related to the Yoga school of Hinduism, and its method was most influential on the development of Early Buddhism.[164]
The Sāmkhya is an enumerationist philosophy whose epistemology accepts three of six pramanas (proofs) as the only reliable means of gaining knowledge. These include pratyakṣa (perception), anumāṇa (inference) and śabda (āptavacana, word/testimony of reliable sources).[165][166][167]
Samkhya is strongly dualist.[168][169][170] Sāmkhya philosophy regards the universe as consisting of two realities; puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter). Jiva (a living being) is that state in which puruṣa is bonded to prakṛti in some form.[171] This fusion, state the Samkhya scholars, led to the emergence of buddhi ("spiritual awareness") and ahaṅkāra (ego consciousness). The universe is described by this school as one created by purusa-prakṛti entities infused with various permutations and combinations of variously enumerated elements, senses, feelings, activity and mind.[171] During the state of imbalance, one of more constituents overwhelm the others, creating a form of bondage, particularly of the mind. The end of this imbalance, bondage is called liberation, or moksha, by the Samkhya school.[172]
The existence of God or supreme being is not directly asserted, nor considered relevant by the Samkhya philosophers. Sāṃkhya denies the final cause of Ishvara (God).[173] While the Samkhya school considers the Vedas as a reliable source of knowledge, it is an atheistic philosophy according to Paul Deussen and other scholars.[174][175] A key difference between Samkhya and Yoga schools, state scholars,[175][176] is that Yoga school accepts a "personal, yet essentially inactive, deity" or "personal god".[177]
Samkhya is known for its theory of guṇas (qualities, innate tendencies).[178] Guṇa, it states, are of three types: sattva being good, compassionate, illuminating, positive, and constructive; rajas is one of activity, chaotic, passion, impulsive, potentially good or bad; and tamas being the quality of darkness, ignorance, destructive, lethargic, negative. Everything, all life forms and human beings, state Samkhya scholars, have these three guṇas, but in different proportions. The interplay of these guṇas defines the character of someone or something, of nature and determines the progress of life.[179][180] The Samkhya theory of guṇas was widely discussed, developed and refined by various schools of Indian philosophies, including Buddhism.[181] Samkhya's philosophical treatises also influenced the development of various theories of Hindu ethics.[164]
Vedānta
Realization of the nature of self-identity is the principal object of the Vedanta system of Indian metaphysics. In the Upanishads, self-consciousness is not the first-person indexical self-awareness or the self-awareness which is self-reference without identification,[182] and also not the self-consciousness which as a kind of desire is satisfied by another self-consciousness.[183] It is self-realisation; the realisation of the self consisting of consciousness that leads all else.[184]
The word self-consciousness in the Upanishads means the knowledge about the existence and nature of manusya, human being. It means the consciousness of our own real being, the primary reality.[185] Self-consciousness means self-knowledge, the knowledge of Prajna i.e. of Prana which is attained by a Brahman.[186] According to the Upanishads the Atman or Paramatman is phenomenally unknowable; it is the object of realisation. The Atman is unknowable in its essential nature; it is unknowable in its essential nature because it is the eternal subject who knows about everything including itself. The Atman is the knower and also the known.[187]
Metaphysicians regard the self either to be distinct from the absolute or entirely identical with the absolute. They have given form to three schools of thought – the dualistic school, the quasi-dualistic school and the monistic school, as the result of their varying mystical experiences. Prakrti and Atman, when treated as two separate and distinct aspects form the basis of the dualism of the Shvetashvatara Upanishad.[188] Quasi-dualism is reflected in the Vaishnavite-monotheism of Ramanuja and the absolute monism, in the teachings of Adi Shankara.[189]
Self-consciousness is the fourth state of consciousness or Turiya, the first three being Vaisvanara, Taijasa and Prajna. These are the four states of individual consciousness.
There are three distinct stages leading to self-realisation. The first stage is in mystically apprehending the glory of the self within one as though one were distinct from it. The second stage is in identifying the "I-within" with the self, that one is in essential nature entirely identical with the pure self. The third stage is in realising that the Atman is Brahman, that there is no difference between the self and the absolute. The fourth stage is in realising "I am the Absolute" – Aham Brahman Asmi. The fifth stage is in realising that Brahman is the "all" that exists, as also that which does not exist.[190]
Buddhist metaphysics
In Buddhist philosophy there are various metaphysical traditions that have proposed different questions about the nature of reality based on the teachings of the Buddha in the early Buddhist texts. The Buddha of the early texts does not focus on metaphysical questions but on ethical and spiritual training and in some cases, he dismisses certain metaphysical questions as unhelpful and indeterminate Avyakta, which he recommends should be set aside. The development of systematic metaphysics arose after the Buddha's death with the rise of the Abhidharma traditions.[191] The Buddhist Abhidharma schools developed their analysis of reality based on the concept of dharmas which are the ultimate physical and mental events that makeup experience and their relations to each other. Noa Ronkin has called their approach "phenomenological".[192]
Later philosophical traditions include the Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna, which further developed the theory of the emptiness (shunyata) of all phenomena or dharmas which rejects any kind of substance. This has been interpreted as a form of anti-foundationalism and anti-realism which sees reality as having no ultimate essence or ground.[193] The Yogacara school meanwhile promoted a theory called "awareness only" (vijnapti-matra) which has been interpreted as a form of Idealism or Phenomenology and denies the split between awareness itself and the objects of awareness.[194]
Islamic metaphysics
Major ideas in Islamic metaphysics (Arabic: ما وراء الطبيعة, romanized: Mawaraultabia) have surrounded the concept of weḥdah (وحدة) meaning 'unity', or in Arabic توحيد tawhid. Waḥdat al-wujūd literally means the 'unity of existence' or 'unity of being'. In modern times the phrase has been translated as "pantheism."[195] Wujud (i.e. existence or presence) here refers to Allah's wujud (compare tawhid). However, waḥdat ash-shuhūd, meaning 'apparentism' or 'monotheism of witness', holds that god and his creation are entirely separate.
Scholasticism and the Middle Ages
Between about 1100 and 1500, philosophy as a discipline took place as part of the Catholic church's teaching system, known as scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy took place within an established framework blending Christian theology with Aristotelian teachings. Although fundamental orthodoxies were not commonly challenged, there were nonetheless deep metaphysical disagreements, particularly over the problem of universals, which engaged Duns Scotus and Pierre Abelard. William of Ockham is remembered for his principle of ontological parsimony.
Continental rationalism
In the early modern period (17th and 18th centuries), the system-building scope of philosophy is often linked to the rationalist method of philosophy, that is the technique of deducing the nature of the world by pure reason. The scholastic concepts of substance and accident were employed.
- Leibniz proposed in his Monadology a plurality of non-interacting substances.
- Descartes is famous for his dualism of material and mental substances.
- Spinoza believed reality was a single substance of God-or-nature.
Christian Wolff had theoretical philosophy divided into an ontology or philosophia prima as a general metaphysics,[196] which arises as a preliminary to the distinction of the three "special metaphysics"[197] on the soul, world and God:[198][199] rational psychology,[200][201] rational cosmology[202] and rational theology.[203] The three disciplines are called empirical and rational because they are independent of revelation. This scheme, which is the counterpart of religious tripartition in creature, creation, and Creator, is best known to philosophical students by Kant's treatment of it in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the "Preface" of the 2nd edition of Kant's book, Wolff is defined "the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers."[204]
British empiricism
British empiricism marked something of a reaction to rationalist and system-building metaphysics, or speculative metaphysics as it was pejoratively termed. The skeptic David Hume famously declared that most metaphysics should be consigned to the flames (see below). Hume was notorious among his contemporaries as one of the first philosophers to openly doubt religion, but is better known now for his critique of causality. John Stuart Mill, Thomas Reid and John Locke were less skeptical, embracing a more cautious style of metaphysics based on realism, common sense and science. Other philosophers, notably George Berkeley were led from empiricism to idealistic metaphysics.
Kant
Immanuel Kant attempted a grand synthesis and revision of the trends already mentioned: scholastic philosophy, systematic metaphysics, and skeptical empiricism, not to forget the burgeoning science of his day. As did the systems builders, he had an overarching framework in which all questions were to be addressed. Like Hume, who famously woke him from his 'dogmatic slumbers', he was suspicious of metaphysical speculation, and also places much emphasis on the limitations of the human mind. Kant described his shift in metaphysics away from making claims about an objective noumenal world, towards exploring the subjective phenomenal world, as a Copernican Revolution, by analogy to (though opposite in direction to) Copernicus' shift from man (the subject) to the sun (an object) at the center of the universe.
Kant saw rationalist philosophers as aiming for a kind of metaphysical knowledge he defined as the synthetic apriori—that is knowledge that does not come from the senses (it is a priori) but is nonetheless about reality (synthetic). Inasmuch as it is about reality, it differs from abstract mathematical propositions (which he terms synthetic apriori), and being apriori it is distinct from empirical, scientific knowledge (which he terms synthetic aposteriori). The only synthetic apriori knowledge we can have is of how our minds organise the data of the senses; that organising framework is space and time, which for Kant have no mind-independent existence, but nonetheless operate uniformly in all humans. Apriori knowledge of space and time is all that remains of metaphysics as traditionally conceived. There is a reality beyond sensory data or phenomena, which he calls the realm of noumena; however, we cannot know it as it is in itself, but only as it appears to us. He allows himself to speculate that the origins of phenomenal God, morality, and free will might exist in the noumenal realm, but these possibilities have to be set against its basic unknowability for humans. Although he saw himself as having disposed of metaphysics, in a sense, he has generally been regarded in retrospect as having a metaphysics of his own, and as beginning the modern analytical conception of the subject.[citation needed]
Late modern philosophy
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e0/Metaphysics_Sullivan.jpg/220px-Metaphysics_Sullivan.jpg)
Nineteenth-century philosophy was overwhelmingly influenced by Kant and his successors. Schopenhauer, Schelling, Fichte and Hegel all purveyed their own panoramic versions of German Idealism, Kant's own caution about metaphysical speculation, and refutation of idealism, having fallen by the wayside. The idealistic impulse continued into the early twentieth century with British idealists such as F. H. Bradley and J. M. E. McTaggart. Followers of Karl Marx took Hegel's dialectic view of history and re-fashioned it as materialism.
Early analytic philosophy and positivism
During the period when idealism was dominant in philosophy, science had been making great advances. The arrival of a new generation of scientifically minded philosophers led to a sharp decline in the popularity of idealism during the 1920s.
Analytic philosophy was spearheaded by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. Russell and William James tried to compromise between idealism and materialism with the theory of neutral monism.
The early to mid-twentieth-century philosophy saw a trend to reject metaphysical questions as meaningless. The driving force behind this tendency was the philosophy of logical positivism as espoused by the Vienna Circle, which argued that the meaning of a statement was its prediction of observable results of an experiment, and thus that there is no need to postulate the existence of any objects other than these perceptual observations.
At around the same time, the American pragmatists were steering a middle course between materialism and idealism. System-building metaphysics, with a fresh inspiration from science, was revived by A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
Continental philosophy
The forces that shaped analytic philosophy—the break with idealism, and the influence of science—were much less significant outside the English speaking world, although there was a shared turn toward language. Continental philosophy continued in a trajectory from post Kantianism.
The phenomenology of Husserl and others was intended as a collaborative project for the investigation of the features and structure of consciousness common to all humans, in line with Kant's basing his synthetic apriori on the uniform operation of consciousness. It was officially neutral with regards to ontology, but was nonetheless to spawn a number of metaphysical systems. Brentano's concept of intentionality would become widely influential, including on analytic philosophy.
Heidegger, author of Being and Time, saw himself as re-focusing on Being-qua-being, introducing the novel concept of Dasein in the process. Classing himself an existentialist, Sartre wrote an extensive study of Being and Nothingness.
The speculative realism movement marks a return to full blooded realism.
Process metaphysics
There are two fundamental aspects of everyday experience: change and persistence. Until recently, the Western philosophical tradition has arguably championed substance and persistence, with some notable exceptions, however. According to process thinkers, novelty, flux and accident do matter, and sometimes they constitute the ultimate reality.
In a broad sense, process metaphysics is as old as Western philosophy, with figures such as Heraclitus, Plotinus, Duns Scotus, Leibniz, David Hume, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Gustav Theodor Fechner, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Charles Renouvier, Karl Marx, Ernst Mach, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Émile Boutroux, Henri Bergson, Samuel Alexander and Nicolas Berdyaev. It seemingly remains an open question whether major "Continental" figures such as the late Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, or Jacques Derrida should be included.[205]
In a strict sense, process metaphysics may be limited to the works of a few philosophers:
- G. W. F. Hegel,
- Charles Sanders Peirce,
- William James,
- Henri Bergson,
- A. N. Whitehead, and
- John Dewey.
From a European perspective, there was a very significant and early Whiteheadian influence on the works of outstanding scholars such as:[206]
- Émile Meyerson (1859–1933),
- Louis Couturat (1868–1914),
- Jean Wahl (1888–1974),
- Robin George Collingwood (1889–1943),
- Philippe Devaux (1902–1979),
- Hans Jonas (1903–1993),
- Dorothy M. Emmett (1904–2000),
- Maurice Merleau Ponty (1908–1961),
- Enzo Paci (1911–1976),
- Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887–1971),
- Wolfe Mays (1912–2005),
- Ilya Prigogine (1917–2003),
- Jules Vuillemin (1920–2001),
- Jean Ladrière (1921–2007),
- Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995),
- Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928–2014),
- Reiner Wiehl (1929–2010), and
- Alain Badiou (1937-).
Contemporary analytic philosophy
While early analytic philosophy tended to reject metaphysical theorizing, under the influence of logical positivism, it was revived in the second half of the twentieth century. Philosophers such as David K. Lewis and David Armstrong developed elaborate theories on a range of topics such as universals, causation, possibility and necessity and abstract objects. However, the focus of analytic philosophy generally is away from the construction of all-encompassing systems and toward close analysis of individual ideas.
Among the developments that led to the revival of metaphysical theorizing were Quine's attack on the analytic–synthetic distinction, which was generally taken to undermine Carnap's distinction between existence questions internal to a framework and those external to it.[207]
The philosophy of fiction, the problem of empty names, and the debate over existence's status as a property have all come of relative obscurity into the limelight, while perennial issues such as free will, possible worlds, and the philosophy of time have had new life breathed into them.[208][209]
The analytic view is of metaphysics as studying phenomenal human concepts rather than making claims about the noumenal world, so its style often blurs into philosophy of language and introspective psychology. Compared to system-building, it can seem very dry, stylistically similar to computer programming, mathematics or even accountancy (as a common stated goal is to "account for" entities in the world).[citation needed]
See also
- Computational metaphysics
- Doctor of Metaphysics
- Enrico Berti's classification of metaphysics
- Feminist metaphysics
- Fundamental question of metaphysics
- List of metaphysicians
- Metacognition
- Metaphilosophy
- Metaphysical fiction novels
- Metaphysical grounding
- Philosophical logic
- Philosophical realism
- Philosophy of science
- Philosophical theology
References
Notes
- ^ For example, the metaphysical problem of causation is relevant both to epistemology, as a factor involved in perceptual knowledge, and ethics, in regard to moral responsibility for the consequences caused by one's actions.[17]
- ^ The term ontology is sometimes also used as a synonym of metaphysics as a whole.[24]
- ^ Some philosophers use the term metaontology as a synonym while others characterize metaontology as a subfield of meta-metaphysics.[32]
- ^ According to Meinong, existence is not a synonym of being: all entities have being but not all entities have existence.[39]
- ^ Some philosophers use the two terms in slightly different ways.[47]
- ^ The classified entities do not have to occur naturally and can encompass man-made products, such as synthetic chemical substances.[56]
- ^ A further topic concerns different types of modality, such as the contrast between physical, metaphysical, and logical necessity based on whether the necessity has its source in the laws of nature, the essences of things, or the laws of logic.[61]
- ^ Quine's method of analysis relies on logic translation to first-order logic in order to express claims as precisely as possible while relying existential quantifiers to identify their ontological commitments.[116]
- ^ Not to be confused with semantic deflationism.
Citations
- ^ "Metaphysics". Encyclopedia.com.
- ^ "metaphysics". American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed.). 2011. Retrieved 24 November 2018.
- ^ "Epistemology". Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
- ^ What is it (that is, whatever it is that there is) like? Hall, Ned (2012). "David Lewis's Metaphysics". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 ed.). Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. Retrieved 5 October 2012.
- ^ In the English language, the word comes by way of the metaphysica from Medieval Greek metaphysika (neuter plural).[1] Archived 16 May 2006 at the Wayback Machine Various dictionaries trace its first appearance in English to the mid-sixteenth century.[2] Archived 5 February 2009 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Τὰ Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικά - Aristotle - Oxford Scholarly Editions". doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00262074. Retrieved 20 October 2023.
- ^ Cohen, S. Marc. "Aristotle's Metaphysics". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University Stanford, CA. Retrieved 14 November 2018.
- ^ "Metaphysics: Word Origin". Oxford Learner's Dictionaries. Oxford University Press, 2024.
- ^ Thomas Aquinas, Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus, V, 1
- ^ Veldsman, Daniël P. (15 November 2017). "The place of metaphysics in the science-religion debate". HTS Teologiese Studies. 73 (3): 7. doi:10.4102/hts.v73i3.4655. ISSN 2072-8050.
- ^ "meta-". The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. Vol. 1 (A–O). Oxford University Press. 1971.
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 1–3
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 1–2
- McDaniel 2020, § 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy
- Mumford 2012, § What is an Introduction?
- ^
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, pp. 1–4
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–2
- McDaniel 2020, § 0.3 An Overview of Metaphysics and Other Areas of Philosophy
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What is Metaphysics?
- Ney 2014, pp. 9–10
- van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^ Loux & Crisp 2017, p. 2
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–4
- van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, Lead Section, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 8–10
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 2–3
- ^ Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 8–10
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 1–2, 6
- Bengtson 2015, p. 35
- Wood 2009, p. 354
- ^
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What is Metaphysics?
- Ney 2014, p. xiii
- Tahko 2015, pp. 206–207
- ^ Tahko 2015, pp. 203–205
- ^
- Mumford 2012, § 10 What is Metaphysics?
- Carroll & Markosian 2010, p. 2
- ^
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 3–5, 10
- van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- Craig 1998
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 1–2
- ^ Hawley 2016, p. 166
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 10–14
- van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- Campbell 2006, The Categories Of Being
- ^
- Hofweber 2023, § 3. Ontology
- Campbell 2006, The Categories Of Being
- Thomasson 2022, Lead Section
- ^ a b
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 3–5, 10
- van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 1. The Word 'Metaphysics' and the Concept of Metaphysics
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 10–11
- Craig 1998, § 2. Specific metaphysics
- ^
- Hawley 2016, pp. 165–168
- Brumbaugh 1966, pp. 647–648
- ^ Hawley 2016, pp. 168–169, 171–172
- ^ Hawley 2016, p. 174
- ^ Tahko 2018, Lead Section
- ^
- McDaniel 2020, § 7 Meta-metaphysics
- Tahko 2018, Lead Section
- ^
- Lowe 2005, p. 277
- White 2019, pp. 135, 200
- Gibson 1998, pp. 1–2
- Shand 2004, pp. 47–48
- Vallicella 2010, p. 16
- ^
- ^
- Casati & Fujikawa, lead section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification
- Blackburn 2008, existence
- ^
- Casati & Fujikawa, lead section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification
- Blackburn 2008, existence
- ^
- Van Inwagen 2023
- Nelson 2022, lead section, §2. Meinongianism
- Shand 2004, p. 49
- ^
- Van Inwagen 2023
- Nelson 2022, lead section, §2. Meinongianism
- Shand 2004, p. 49
- ^
- Casati & Fujikawa, lead section, §3. How Many Ways of Being Existent?
- McDaniel 2017, p. 77
- ^
- Poidevin et al. 2009, pp. 227–228
- Van Inwagen 2023
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, Lead Section
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 11–12
- Wardy 1998, Lead Section
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.1 Aristotelian Realism
- Studtmann 2024, § 2. The Ten-Fold Division
- Wardy 1998, § 1. Categories in Aristotle
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.2 Kantian Conceptualism
- Wardy 1998, § 1. Categories in Kant
- ^
- Thomasson 2022, § 1.3 Husserlian Descriptivism, § 1.4 Contemporary Category Systems
- Grim & Rescher 2023, p. 39
- ^
- Falguera, Martínez-Vidal & Rosen 2022, Lead Section, § 1. Introduction, § 3.5 The Ways of Negation
- Erasmus 2018, p. 93
- Macnamara 2009, p. 94
- ^ Bigelow 1998, Lead Section
- ^
- Lowe 2005, p. 683
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section, § 1a. The Nature of Universals
- Bigelow 1998, Lead Section
- Campbell 2006, § Particularity and individuality
- Maurin 2019, Lead Section
- ^
- Maurin 2019, Lead Section
- Campbell 2006, § Particularity and individuality
- Bigelow 1998, Lead Section, § 3. Bundles of properties
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 82–83
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 250–251
- Varzi 2019, Lead Section, § 1. 'Part' and Parthood
- Cornell, Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question
- Tallant 2017, pp. 19–21
- ^
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 82–83
- Cornell, Lead Section, § 2. The Special Composition Question
- Brenner 2015, p. 1295
- Tallant 2017, pp. 19–21, 23–24, 32–33
- ^
- Berryman 2022, § 2.6 Atomism and Particle Theories in Ancient Greek Sciences
- Varzi 2019, § 3.4 Atomism, Gunk, and Other Options
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section
- Bigelow 1998a, Lead Section
- Cowling 2019, Lead Section
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section, § 1c. The Problem of Universals
- Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000, pp. 255–256
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19
- ^
- MacLeod & Rubenstein, Lead Section, § 2. Versions of Realism, § 3. Versions of Anti-Realism
- Bigelow 1998a, § 4. Nominalism and Realism
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 17–19, 45
- ^
- Brzović, Lead Section
- Bird & Tobin 2024, Lead Section
- ^
- Brzović, Lead Section, § 3. Metaphysics of Natural Kinds
- Bird & Tobin 2024, Lead Section, § 1.2 Natural Kind Realism
- Liston, Lead Section
- ^
- Ásta 2017, pp. 290–291
- Bird & Tobin 2024, § 2.4 Natural Kinds and Social Science
- ^
- ^
- Parent, Lead Section
- Loux & Crisp 2017, pp. 149–150
- Koons & Pickavance 2015, pp. 154–155
- Mumford 2012, § 8. What is possible?
- ^
- Hanna 2009, p. 196
- Hale 2020, p. 142
- ^
- Goswick 2018, pp. 97–98
- Wilsch 2017, pp. 428–429, 446
- ^
- Goswick 2018, pp. 97–98
- Parent, § 3. Ersatzism, § 4. Fictionalism
- Wilsch 2017, pp. 428–429
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Metaphysics must be distinguished from sacred or revealed theology. Theology is, by definition, the science or study of God. Theology partly overlaps metaphysics. What is common to theology and metaphysics is usually called philosophical, or natural, theology. It is the remaining part of theology that is called sacred, or revealed, theology.
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Further reading
- Assiter, Alison (2009). Kierkegaard, metaphysics and political theory: unfinished selves. London, New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-8264-9831-1.
- Benovsky, Jiri (2016), Meta-metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice. Springer.
- Bliss, Ricki and J. T. M. Miller, eds. (2021). The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Butchvarov, Panayot (1979). Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence and Predication. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press.
- Chalmers, David, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, eds. (2009). Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press.
- Crane, T and Farkas, K (2004). Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-926197-0.
- Gale, Richard M. (2002). The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gay, Peter. (1966). The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (2 vols.). New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Harris, E. E. (1965). The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Harris, E. E. (2000). The Restitution of Metaphysics. New York: Humanity Books.
- Heisenberg, Werner (1958), "Atomic Physics and Causal Law," from The Physicist's Conception of Nature.
- Kim, Jaegwon and Ernest Sosa, eds. (1999). Metaphysics: An Anthology. Blackwell Philosophy Anthologies.
- Kim, Jaegwon and Ernest Sosa, eds. (2000). A Companion to Metaphysics. Malden Massachusetts. Blackwell.
- Koons, Robert C. and Pickavance, Timothy H. (2015), Metaphysics: The Fundamentals. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Le Poidevin R. & al. eds. (2009). The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. New York: Routledge.
- Loux, M. J. (2006). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (3rd ed.). London: Routledge.
- Lowe, E. J. (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Neil A. Manson, Robert W. Barnard, eds. (2014). The Bloomsbury Companion to Metaphysics. Bloomsbury.
- Raven, Michael J. (2020). The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. Routledge.
External links
- Metaphysics at PhilPapers
- Metaphysics at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
- "Metaphysics". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Metaphysics at Encyclopædia Britannica
- The London Philosophy Study Guide Archived 23 September 2009 at the Wayback Machine offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Logic & Metaphysics Archived 12 July 2018 at the Wayback Machine.
Metaphysics public domain audiobook at LibriVox