Battle of Megiddo (1918)

For other battles fought on the vicinity of Megiddo, see Battle of Megiddo (disambiguation).

Battle of Megiddo Part of Middle Eastern theatre of World War I Turkish carts and gun carriages destroyed by British aircraft on the Nablus-Beisan road. Date 19 September – 1 October 1918 Location Megiddo, Ottoman Empire modern day Israel Result Decisive Entente victory Belligerents British Empire Great Britain British India Australia New Zealand West Indies Indian Princely states Alwar Gwalior Hyderabad Jodhpur Mysore Patiala France Arab insurgents Ottoman Empire Germany Commanders and leaders Edmund Allenby Emir Feisal Liman von Sanders Mustafa Kemal Pasha Strength Allied 12,000 mounted troops, 57,000 infantry, 540 guns Arab unknown 3,000 mounted troops, 32,000 infantry, 402 guns Casualties and losses 782 killed, 382 missing, 4,179 wounded destruction or surrender of Ottoman forces estimated to be 100,000 killed, missing and captured.

The Battle of Megiddo (Turkish: Megiddo Muharebesi) took place between 19 and 25 September 1918, in what was then the northern part of Ottoman Palestine and parts of present-day Syria and Jordan. It is less commonly known in English as the Battle of Armageddon and in Turkish as the Nablus Hezimeti ("Rout of Nablus"), the Nablus Yarması ("Breakthrough at Nablus") or the Battle of the Nablus Plain. The battle, and its subsequent exploitation, were the final engagements in the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of the First World War.

Within this battle several battles, actions and captures have been identified officially by the British including the Battle of Sharon and the Battle of Nablus both fought between 19 to 25 September. The Nablus operations included the Actions beyond Jordan between 23 and 30 September, the Capture of Amman on 25 September and the Capture of Dera'a on 27 September (by Arab forces). Following the Battle of Megiddo, the Pursuit through Syria took place between 26 September and 31 October to the north of the Haifa to Dera'a railway and included the Capture of Damascus on 1 October and the Affair of Haritan with subsequent Occupation of Aleppo on 26 October.

The Allied Egyptian Expeditionary Force, composed mainly of British, Indian, Australian and New Zealand troops, with a small French and Armenian contingent, launched an offensive against the Ottoman Yildirim Army Group (which contained a German Empire contingent) following several months of preparation. After the Ottoman forces were distracted by attacks against their lines of communication by mainly irregular forces of the Arab Revolt, the extreme right of their front was overrun by British and Indian infantry after a short but heavy artillery bombardment. Indian and Australian mounted divisions rode through the breach in the Ottoman lines and captured communication centres deep in the Ottoman rear areas, while British and Australian aircraft paralysed the Ottoman headquarters and prevented Ottoman troops rallying or escaping encirclement. Once the main Ottoman armies were destroyed, Allied mounted troops and Arab insurgents advanced to Damascus, effectively ending the campaign.

General Edmund Allenby, the British commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, took the name of this battle as his title when he was ennobled after the war, becoming the first Viscount Allenby. His operations during the Battle of Megiddo succeeded at very little cost, in contrast to many offensives during the First World War, and were widely praised in several military writings. Allenby relied on deception and surprise rather than brute force, and made significant use of both cavalry and aircraft, a historically rare combination. He also incorporated the irregular forces of the Arab Revolt into his operations, despite divergent political goals.

Background

The ancient fortress of Megiddo had stood on Tell el Mutesellim, at the mouth of the Musmus Pass near El Lajjun, controlling the routes to the north and the interior by dominating the Plain of Armageddon. Across this plain (also known as the Plain of Megiddo), Egyptians, Romans, Mongols, Arabs, Crusaders and the French led by Napoleon had marched and fought towards Nazareth in the Galilean Hills. By 1918 this plain, which had become known as the Esdraelon Plain, was still strategically important as it linked the Jordan Valley and the Plain of Sharon 40 miles (64 km) behind the Ottoman front line, and together, these three valleys formed a semicircle round the main Ottoman positions in the Judean Hills held by the Seventh and Eighth Armies.

Stalemate after the fall of Jerusalem

After capturing Jerusalem at the end of 1917 and Jericho in February 1918, Allenby's forces were greatly weakened when many of his infantry units (two complete divisions, 24 infantry battalions from other divisions and nine regiments of dismounted yeomanry) were sent to reinforce the British armies on the Western Front after the Germans launched their Spring Offensive on 21 March. Allenby's tank force was also shipped off to France, and would not return before the Armistice on the Western Front came into effect. In spite of this, Allenby tried to maintain the pressure on the Ottoman armies by twice sending mounted formations across the Jordan to capture Amman and Es Salt and to cut the Hejaz Railway. Both attacks were defeated, although Allenby retained a small bridgehead across the Jordan north of the Dead Sea.

Ottoman situation

At the same time (effectively from 8 March), the Ottoman command changed. The highest level Ottoman headquarters in Palestine was the Yıldırım Army Group. (Yıldırım translates roughly as "thunderbolt", and the name was taken from the nickname of Sultan Bayezid I.) The Army Group had originally been formed for the purpose of recapturing Baghdad which had been captured by British forces on 11 March 1917, but had been diverted to Palestine where the British threatened the front. The Army Group's first commander was the German General Erich von Falkenhayn, who wished to continue a policy of "yielding defence", being prepared to give ground while inflicting casualties and delay, rather than hold positions at all costs. He was also prepared to fall back to shorten his lines of communication and reduce the need for static garrisons. However, he was unpopular among Ottoman officers, mainly because he relied almost exclusively on German rather than Turkish staff officers, and was blamed for the defeats at Gaza and Jerusalem. He was replaced by another German General, Otto Liman von Sanders, who had commanded the successful Ottoman defence during the Gallipoli Campaign. Liman reasoned that continued retreat in Palestine would demoralise the Ottoman troops, ruin their draught animals, encourage the Arab Revolt to spread further north into the Ottoman rear areas and also lead to all the Ottoman forces to the south in the Hejaz being finally isolated. His forces halted their retreat and dug in to resist further advances by the weakened British, even regaining some ground near the Jordan as Allenby's two raids on Amman were repulsed.

Until late September 1918, the strategic situation of Ottoman Empire appeared to be better than that of the other Central Powers (Germany, Austria–Hungary, and Bulgaria). The Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia were holding their ground, while in the Caucasus, Enver Pasha had captured Armenia, Azerbaijan and much of Georgia, in an advance towards the Caspian Sea. Liman von Sanders was expected to repeat his famous defence of Gallipoli and defeat the British invasion in Palestine.

However, some Ottoman commanders were worried about an assault on their extended front in Palestine. They wished to pull their troops back several miles, so an attack would have to cross undefended ground and so lose tactical surprise. Liman would have to abandon what seemed to be good defences and decided that it was too late to pull back.

Allied reorganisation

Over the summer of 1918, Allenby's forces were built back up to full strength. Two Indian cavalry divisions, the 4th Cavalry Division and 5th Cavalry Division, were transferred to Palestine from the Western Front where there was comparatively little use for mounted troops, and were reorganised to incorporate some of Allenby's British Yeomanry units. Two British Indian Army infantry divisions, the 3rd (Lahore) Division and the 7th (Meerut) Division, were transferred from the Mesopotamian Campaign to replace two British divisions which had been sent to the Western Front. Four of Allenby's other depleted infantry divisions (the 10th, 53rd, 60th and 75th Divisions) were rebuilt with newly-raised units from India, with three Indian battalions and one retained British battalion in each of their three brigades. The remaining infantry division, the 54th (East Anglian) Division, retained all its British units but Allenby was informed by the War Office that this division was required to supply reinforcements for the Western Front and could not be allowed to incur heavy casualties. A brigade-sized detachment of French North African and Armenian troops was attached to the division. For several months, the Royal Air Force (RAF) had enjoyed superiority in the air and did not need reinforcements, but at Allenby's request more planes and men were supplied.

There was a comparative lull in activity while Allenby's divisions were reorganised and retrained, but some local attacks were made, especially in the Judean Hills. On 19 July, the Ottomans and Germans mounted a brief attack at Abu Tellul near the Jordan, but were defeated by Australian Light Horse units with heavy casualties to the German 11th Reserve Jäger battalion, which was subsequently withdrawn from Palestine.

Arab Northern Army

As Allenby's reorganisation proceeded, most of what action there was took place east of the Jordan where the Arab Northern Army (part of the Arab Revolt) was operating under the overall leadership of the Emir Feisal. Feisal's headquarters were at Aba el Lissan, about 15 miles (24 km) south-west of the Ottoman position at Ma'an. His army was supported by the British through the port of Aqaba, which had been captured by Lawrence of Arabia and bedouin in the Battle of Aqaba on 6 July 1917. The assistance to the Arab Northern Army included detachments of armoured cars and mountain artillery, 2,000 camels from disbanded battalions of the Imperial Camel Corps, weapons, ammunition and above all, money (almost always in coin). In mid-1916, this had started as a monthly subsidy of £30,000. By the time Allenby launched his Megiddo offensive, this had grown to £220,000 a month, though this sum was donated for a supreme effort by Feisal's men.

The regular soldiers of the Arab Northern Army, commanded by Jaafar Pasha, maintained a blockade of the Ottoman garrison at Ma'an after a failed attack (the Battle of Al-Samna) earlier in the year.Most of these regulars were former Arab conscripts into the Ottoman Army who had deserted or had changed sides after having been taken prisoner. Meanwhile, irregulars forayed from Aba-el-Lissan and Aqaba against the Hejaz Railway, often accompanied and inspired by Lawrence and other British liaison officers. In particular, in the weeks following the failure of Allenby's second attack across the Jordan, they carried out demolitions on a 80 miles (130 km) stretch of line around Mudawara, due east of Aqaba, effectively closing the line for a month and ending the Ottoman active operations around Medina at the end of the railway.

Prelude

Allied plans and preparations

Allenby's plan

Allenby intended to break through at the western end of his front, adjacent to the Mediterranean coast, where the terrain (the plain of Sharon) was suitable for large-scale cavalry manoeuvres and where British troops had seized crossings over a stream, the Nahr al-Auja, which was almost the only natural defensive position on this part of the front, during the last phases of the fighting in 1917 and early 1918. Once the breakthrough had been achieved, Allenby intended that the mounted troops of the Desert Mounted Corps would pass through the resulting gap in the Ottoman front lines and around the open Ottoman right flank.

On 6 September however, Allenby recast and greatly widened the plan. A short-range hook to Messudieh by the Desert Mounted Corps was dropped. Instead, once they were through the Ottoman defensive lines, Allenby intended that they march north to reach the passes through the Carmel Range before Ottoman troops could forestall them, and seize the communication centres of Al-Afuleh and Beisan. These two communication centres were within the 60 miles (97 km) radius of a strategic cavalry "bound", the distance mounted units could cover before being forced to halt for rest and to obtain water and fodder for the horses. If they were captured, the lines of communication and retreat for all Ottoman troops west of the Jordan would be cut.

The initial breakthrough was to be achieved on the coast by the five infantry divisions of XXI Corps (commanded by Lieutenant General Edward Bulfin) to create a gap 8 miles (13 km) wide. XXI Corps had concentrated a force with an advantage of 4.4 to 1 in infantry, and 3 to 1 in heavy and siege artillery. (This part of the operation would later be termed the Battle of Sharon.) The corps (with the Australian 5th Light Horse Brigade attached) would then advance to capture the headquarters of the Ottoman Eighth Army at Tulkarm and the lateral railway line by which the Ottoman Seventh and Eighth Armies were supplied, including the important railway junction at Messudieh.

The XX Corps (commanded by Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode) would attack with two division in the Judean Hills in support of the main attack on the coast, an operation later termed the Battle of Nablus. While the corps was to capture the Ottoman Seventh Army's headquarters at Nablus, its main task was to block the main escape route from Nablus to the Jordan crossing at Jisr ed Damieh, where a corps-sized detachment under Major General Edward Chaytor was to capture the bridge and fords in a pincer movement. This important line of communication between the Ottoman Armies on the west bank of the Jordan with the Ottoman Fourth Army at Es Salt, was required by Allenby before Chaytor's force could proceed to capture Es Salt and Amman.

Entente deceptions

Secrecy was an essential part of Allenby's plans, as it had been at the Battle of Beersheba the preceding year. It was feared that the Ottomans could thwart the preparations for the attack by making a withdrawal in the coastal sector. Laborious efforts were therefore made to prevent the Ottomans discerning Allenby's intentions and to persuade them that the next Entente attack would be made in the Jordan Valley. All westward movements of personnel and vehicles from the Jordan Valley towards the Mediterranean coast were made during the night while all movements eastwards were made during daytime. The detached Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (Anzac Mounted Division) in the Jordan Valley simulated the activity of the entire mounted corps. Troops marched openly down to the valley by day, and were secretly taken back by lorry at night to repeat the process the next day. Vehicles or mules dragged harrows along tracks to raise dust clouds, simulating other troop movements. Dummy camps and horse lines were constructed and a hotel in Jerusalem was ostentatiously commandeered for an Expeditionary Force headquarters.

Meanwhile, a British Yeomanry battalion of the Imperial Camel Corps joined Arab irregulars in a raid east of the Jordan. They first captured and destroyed the railway station at Mudawara, finally cutting the Hejaz Railway, and then mounted a reconnaissance near Amman, scattering corned beef tins and documents as proof of their presence. Lawrence sent agents to openly buy up huge quantities of forage in the same area. As a final touch, British newspapers and messages were filled with reports of a race meeting (one of a number which took place in the coastal plain) to take place on 19 September, the day on which the attack was to be launched.

Though Allenby's deceptions did not induce Liman to concentrate his forces against the River Jordan flank, Allenby was nevertheless able to concentrate a force superior to the Ottoman XXII Corps by five to one in infantry and even more in artillery on the Mediterranean flank, where the main attack was to be made, undetected by the Ottomans. Earlier in the year (on 9 June), units of the 7th (Meerut) Division had captured two hills just inland from the coast, depriving the Ottomans of two important observation points overlooking the Allied bridgehead north of the Nahr-el-Auja. Also, the Royal Engineers had established a bridging school on the Nahr-al-Auja much earlier in the year, so the sudden appearance of several bridges across it on the eve of the assault did not alert any other Ottoman front-line observers.

Entente air superiority

These various deceptions could not have been successful, without the Allied forces' undisputed air supremacy west of the Jordan, by this time. The squadrons of the Royal Air Force and the Australian Flying Corps outnumbered and outclassed the Ottoman and German aircraft detachments in Palestine. During the weeks before the September attack, enemy aerial activity dropped markedly; although during one week in June hostile aeroplanes crossed the British front lines 100 times, mainly on the tip–and–run principle at altitudes of 16,000–18,000 feet (4,900–5,500 m), by the last week in August this number had dropped to 18 and during the three following weeks of September it was reduced to just four enemy aircraft. During the 18 days before the start of the battle, only two or three German aircraft were seen flying. Eventually, Ottoman and German reconnaissance aircraft could not even take off without being engaged by British or Australian fighters, and could therefore not see through Allenby's deceptions, nor spot the true Allied concentration which was concealed in orange groves and plantations.

Ottoman dispositions

In August 1918, the Yildirim Army Group's front-line strength was 40,598 infantrymen armed with 19,819 rifles, 273 light and 696 heavy machine guns, and 402 guns. Although the Ottomans had fairly accurately estimated the total Allied strength, Liman lacked intelligence on the Allied plans and dispositions and was forced to dispose his forces evenly along the entire length of his front. Moreover, almost the entire Ottoman fighting strength was in the front line. As operational reserves, there were only two German regiments (one each with the Seventh Army and Eighth Army) and an understrength Ottoman cavalry division near Amman. Further back there were only some "Depot Regiments", not organised as fighting units, and scattered garrisons and line of communication units.

After four years of warfare, most of the Ottoman units were understrength and demoralised by desertions, sickness and shortage of supplies, but Liman nevertheless relied on the determination of the Turkish infantry and the strength of their front-line fortifications. Although the numbers of artillery pieces and especially of machine guns among the defenders were unusually high, the Ottoman lines had only thin belts of barbed wire compared with those on the Western Front, and Liman was unable to take into account the improved British tactical methods in set-piece offensives, involving surprise and artillery preparation based on aerial reconnaissance.

Order of battle

On 17 September 1918, the opposing armies were deployed as follows:

Ottoman Order of Battle	Allied Order of Battle
Yildirim Army Group (Otto Liman von Sanders Eighth Army (Jevad Pasha) — Plain of Sharon XXII Corps (Refet Bey) 46th Division (Shefik Avni Bey) (recently arrived at Tyre) 7th Division (Nasuhi Bey) 20th Division (Veysel Bey) Asia Korps (Oberst Gustav von Oppen) also named Left Wing Group 19th Division (Sami Sabit Bey) 16th Division (Rushdi Bey) German "Pasha II" detachment (regiment) 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division Seventh Army (Mustafa Kemal Pasha) — Judaea and Jordan Valley III Corps (Ismet Bey) 1st Division (Hans Guhr Bey) 11th Division (Kiazim Bey) XX Corps (Ali Fuad Pasha) 26th Division (Mehmed Hayri Bey) 53rd Division (Reshad Bey) German 146 Infantry Regiment Fourth Army (Mersinli Djemal Pasha, "the Lesser" VIII Corps (Jordan River) (Yasin Hilmi Bey, also known as Salman el-Hashimi) 48th Division (Âsım Bey) Composite Division (Hussein Nureddin Bey) II Corps (Galatali Shevket Bey) Jordan Group (Amman) 24th Division 3rd Cavalry Division (Esad Bey) Ma'an and Hauran detachment 62nd Division Three composite detachments 43rd Division (arrived Beirut early October)	Egyptian Expeditionary Force (Edmund Allenby) XXI Corps (Lieutenant General [Edward Bulfin) — main attack 60th Division 7th (Meerut) Division 75th Division 3rd (Lahore) Division 54th Division Detachement Francais de Palestine et Syrie (including French Armenian Legion) XX Corps (Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode) — subsidiary attack 10th Division 53rd Division Chaytor's Force (Major General Edward Chaytor) — eastern flank Anzac Mounted Division 20th Indian Brigade (Imperial Service Infantry brigade) West India Regiment (two battalions) Jewish Legion (38th & 39th Battalions Royal Fusiliers) Desert Mounted Corps (Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel) — exploitation 4th Mounted Division 11th Light Armoured Motor Battery, Machine Gun Corps (Armoured cars) 1st Light Car Patrol 5th Mounted Division 12th Light Armoured Motor Battery 2nd Light Car Patrol Australian Mounted Division 7th Light Car Patrol RAF Palestine Brigade (Brigadier-General Amyas Borton) Fifth (Corps) Wing (Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Burnett) No. 14 Squadron No. 113 Squadron No. 142 Squadron Fortieth (Army) Wing (Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Williams) No. 1 Squadron Australian Flying Corps No. 111 Squadron No. 144 Squadron No. 145 Squadron (1 flight only)
	Arab Northern Army (Emir Feisal) Regular Infantry Brigade (Jaafar Pasha) — Ma'an Sherifian and Egyptian Camel Corps — (T. E. Lawrence) Rualla and Howeitat tribesmen — (Nuri as-Said, Auda abu Tayi) Haurani insurgents

Battle

Opening attacks

On 16 September 1918, Arabs under T. E. Lawrence and Nuri as-Said began destroying railway lines around the vital rail centre of Deraa, at the junction of the Hedjaz Railway which supplied the Ottoman army at Amman and the Palestine Railway which supplied the Ottoman armies in Palestine. Lawrence's initial forces (a Camel Corps unit from Feisal's Army, an Egyptian Camel Corps unit, some Gurkha machine gunners, British and Australian armoured cars and French mountain artillery) were soon joined by up to 3,000 Ruwallah and Howeitat tribesmen, under noted fighting chiefs such as Auda abu Tayi and Nuri es-Shaalan. Although Lawrence was ordered by Allenby only to disrupt communications around Deraa for a week and Lawrence himself had not intended a major uprising to take place in the area immediately, to avoid Ottoman reprisals, a growing number of local communities spontaneously took up arms against the Turks.

As the Ottomans reacted, sending the garrison of Al-Afuleh to reinforce Deraa, the units of Chetwode's Corps made attacks in the hills above the Jordan on 17 and 18 September. The 53rd Division attempted to seize ground commanding the road system behind the Ottoman front lines. Some objectives were captured but a position known to the British as "Nairn Ridge" was defended by the Ottomans until late on 19 September. Once it was captured, roads could be constructed to link the British road systems with those newly captured. The attack was also intended to further divert the Ottomans' attention to their eastern flank, although it did not fool them.

At the last minute, an Indian deserter warned the Turks about the impending main attack. The commander of Ottoman XXII Corps wished to withdraw to forestall the attack but his superiors Jevad Pasha, commanding the Ottoman Eighth Army, and Liman (who feared that the deserter was himself an attempted intelligence bluff) forbade him to do so.

At 1:00am on 19 September, the RAF Palestine Brigade's single Handley Page O/400 heavy bomber dropped its full load of sixteen 112 pounds (51 kg) bombs on the main telephone exchange and railway station in Al-Afuleh. This cut communications between Liman's headquarters at Nazareth and Ottoman Seventh and Eighth Armies for the following vital two days, dislocating the Ottoman command. No. 144 Squadron of DH.9s also bombed El Afule telephone exchange and railway station, Messudieh railway junction and the Ottoman Seventh Army headquarters and telephone exchange at Nablus.

Battle of Sharon

At 4:30am, Allenby's main attack opened. A barrage by 385 guns (the field artillery of five divisions, five batteries of 60-pounder guns, thirteen siege batteries of medium howitzers and seven batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery) and 60 trench mortars and two destroyers off the coast, fell on the Ottoman 7th and 20th Divisions' front-line positions. As the barrage ceased at 4:50am, the British and Indian infantry advanced and quickly broke through the Turkish lines. Within hours, the three mounted divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps were moving north along the coast, with no Ottoman reserves available to check them. By the end of the day, the remnants of the Ottoman Eighth Army were in disorderly retreat under air attack by No. 1 Australian Squadron of Bristol F.2 Fighters through the defile at Messudieh and into the hills to the east, covered by a few hastily-organised rearguards. Jevad Pasha himself had fled, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was unable to re-establish control over Eighth Army's troops.^{[citation needed]}

The RAF prevented any of the German aircraft based at Jenin from taking off and interfering with the British land operations. Relays of two S.E.5s from Nos. 111 and 145 Squadrons, armed with bombs, circled over the German airfield at Jenin all day on 19 September. Whenever they spotted any movement on the ground, they bombed the airfield. Each pair of aircraft were relieved every two hours and machine-gunned the German hangars before departing.

Destruction of the Ottoman Armies

Progress of Battle, 19–24 September 1918

During the early hours of 20 September 1918, the Desert Mounted Corps secured the defiles of the Carmel Range. The 4th Mounted Division passed through these to capture Al-Afuleh and Beisan, complete with the bulk of two Depot Regiments. A brigade of the 5th Mounted Division attacked Nazareth, where Liman von Sanders's HQ was situated, although Liman himself escaped. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, also part of the 5th Mounted Division, captured the vital port of Haifa the next day. A brigade of the Australian Mounted Division occupied Jenin, threatening the rear of the Seventh Army.

Once nothing stood between Allenby's forces and Mustafa Kemal's Seventh Army in Nablus, Kemal decided that he lacked sufficient men to fight the British forces. With the railway blocked, the Seventh Army's only escape route lay to the east, along the Nablus-Beisan road that led down the Wadi Fara into the Jordan valley.

On the night of 20–21 September the Seventh Army began to evacuate Nablus. By this time the Seventh Army was the last formed Ottoman army west of the Jordan and although there was a chance that Chetwode's XX Corps might cut off their retreat, its units had been delayed by Ottoman rearguards and had made poor progress in their advance. On 21 September, the Seventh Army was spotted by aircraft in a defile west of the river. The RAF proceeded to bomb the retreating Turks and destroyed their entire column. Waves of bombing and strafing aircraft passed over the column every three minutes and although the operation had been intended to last for five hours, the Seventh Army was routed in 60 minutes. All transport, artillery and heavy equipment was abandoned or destroyed, many Turks were killed and the survivors were scattered and leaderless. The wreckage of the destroyed column stretched over 6 miles (9.7 km) and Lawrence would later write that "the RAF lost four killed. The Turks lost a corps."

Later operations

Over the next four days, the 4th Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division rounded up large numbers of demoralised and disorganised Ottoman troops in the Jezreel Valley. Many of the surviving refugees who crossed the Jordan were attacked and captured by Arabs as they approached or tried to bypass Deraa.^{[citation needed]}

Several German and Turkish aircraft had continued to operate from Deraa, harassing the Arab irregulars and insurgents still attacking railways and isolated Ottoman detachments about the town. At Lawrence's urging, British aircraft began operating from makeshift landing strips at Um el Surab nearby from 22 September. Three Bristol F.2 Fighters shot down several of the German aircraft. The Handley Page 0/400 ferried across petrol, ammunition and spares for the fighters and two Airco DH.9s, and itself bombed the airfield at Deraa early on 23 September and nearby Mafraq on the following night.

Liman had attempted to deploy a few rear-area detachments to hold the line of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers around the Sea of Galilee. A charge by an Australian Light Horse brigade at last light on 26 September captured the town of Samakh, breaking this line.

Allied Exploitation

Allenby now ordered his cavalry to cross the Jordan, to capture Amman, Deraa and Damascus. Meanwhile, the 3rd (Lahore) Division advanced north along the coast towards Beirut and the 7th (Meerut) Division advanced on Baalbek in the Beqaa Valley, where the rearmost Ottoman depots and reinforcement camps were situated.^{[citation needed]}

Transjordan theatre of operations 21 March to 2 April; 30 April to 4 May and 20 to 29 September 1918

The Ottoman Fourth Army had begun to retreat from Amman in increasing disorder on 22 September 1918, ultimately dissolving into a rabble under attack by aircraft and Arabs. A British Corps-sized detachment under Chaytor crossed the Jordan as the Turks fell back and abandoned the crossings. The Anzac Mounted Division captured Amman on 26 September. The Ottoman detachment from Ma'an found its line of retreat blocked south of Amman, and surrendered intact to the Anzac Mounted Division rather than risk slaughter by Arab irregulars.

On 27 September, the 4th Mounted Division moved to Deraa, which had already been abandoned to Arab forces, and then advanced north on Damascus in company with them. The retreating Turks committed several atrocities against hostile Arab villages; in return, the Arab forces took no prisoners. An entire Ottoman brigade (along with some German and Austrians) was massacred near the village of Tafas on 27 September, with the Ottoman commander Jemal Pasha narrowly escaping. The Arabs repeated the performance the next day, losing a few hundred casualties while wiping out nearly 5,000 Turks in these two battles.^{[citation needed]}

The 5th Mounted and Australian Mounted Divisions advanced directly across the Golan Heights towards Damascus. They fought actions at Benat Yakup, Kuneitra, Sasa and Katana, before they reached and closed the north and north-west exits from Damascus on 29 September. On 30 September, the Australians intercepted the garrison of Damascus as they tried to retreat through the Barada gorge. Damascus fell the next day, with the Allies capturing 20,000 prisoners. Jemal Pasha fled, having failed to inspire last-ditch resistance. Overall, the campaign resulted in the surrender of 75,000 Ottoman soldiers.

Aftermath

After the fall of Damascus, the 5th Mounted Division and some detachments of the Arab Northern Army advanced north through Syria, capturing Aleppo on 26 October. They subsequently advanced to Mouslimmiye, where Mustafa Kemal (now in command of the Yıldırım Army Group) had rallied some troops under XXII Corps HQ. Kemal held his positions until 31 October, when hostilities ceased following the signing of the Armistice of Mudros.^{[citation needed]}

The successful action at Megiddo resulted in the Megiddo battle honour being awarded to units of the Commonwealth forces participating in the battle. Two subsidiary battle honours, for the battles of, Sharon and Nablus were also awarded.

The Bahá'í Faith in 1918 and today has its administrative and spiritual center in the environs of Haifa. As a direct result of the events of the battle, the leader of the Bahá'í Faith at the time was rescued after death threats were made against him in case the Ottoman side was to lose. In addition, because of `Abdu'l-Bahá's preparations against famine caused by social chaos caused by war, and his generosity in sharing food stores built up, he was knighted by the British Empire, though it was a title he never used. In addition to the practical implications, the Bahá'ís believe the battle was one way the prophecies of the Battle of Armageddon were accomplished.

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• Hill, A. J. (1978). Chauvel of the Light Horse A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. OCLC 5003626. 
• Hughes, Matthew, ed (2004). Allenby in Palestine: The Middle East Correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby June 1917 – October 1919. Army Records Society. 22. Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd. ISBN 978-0-7509-3841-9. 
• Murphy, David (2008). The Arab Revolt 1916-18: Lawrence Sets Arabia Ablaze. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781846033391. 
• Lawrence, Thomas Edward (1926). Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Penguin Books. ISBN 0140015961. 
• Liddell Hart, Basil Henry. History of the First World War. London: Pan Books. ISBN 9780330233545. 
• Maude, Roderick. The Servant, the General and Armageddon. George Ronald. ISBN 0853984247. 
• Paget, G.C.H.V Marquess of Anglesey (1994). Egypt, Palestine and Syria 1914 to 1919. A History of the British Cavalry 1816–1919 Volume 5. London: Leo Cooper. ISBN 978-0-85052-395-9. 
• Perrett, Bryan (1999). Megiddo 1918 – the Last Great Cavalry Victory. Osprey Military Campaign Series. 61. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1855328275. 
• Powles, C. Guy; A. Wilkie (1922). The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. Official History New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, Volume III. Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd. OCLC 2959465. 

External links

• Cutlack, F.M. (1941). "The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War, 1914–1918" (PDF). Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 Volume VIII. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/first_world_war/volume.asp?levelID=67894. 
• Daddis, Gregory (2005). "Armageddon’s Lost Lesson's — Combined Arms Operations in Allenby's Palestine Campaign" (PDF). Air University Press. http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Wright_Flyers/Text/wf20.pdf. 

Further reading

• Stephen Lambden, "Catastrophe, Armageddon and Millennium: some aspects of the Bábí-Bahá’í exegesis of apocalyptic symbolism", Bahá'í Studies Review, Volume 9, 1999/2000.
• Cline, Eric H. (2000), The Battles of Armageddon: Megiddo and the Jezreel Valley from the Bronze Age to the Nuclear Age, University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0472097393