|1st President of the European Commission|
|Succeeded by||Jean Rey|
17 November 1901|
|Died||29 March 1982
|Resting place||Waldfriedhof Cemetery, Stuttgart|
|Political party||Christian Democratic Union|
|Alma mater||Friedrich Wilhelm University, Berlin|
Walter Hallstein (17 November 1901 – 29 March 1982) was the first president of the Commission of the European Economic Community, and one of the founding fathers of the European Union. Before becoming president of the Commission, he had a successful academic career followed by a successful diplomatic career as a leading civil servant at the German Foreign Office, where he played a key role in West Germany's integration into the West and European integration.
He began his academic career before World War II, becoming Germany's youngest law professor. During the War, he served as an officer in the military; in 1944, he was captured and spent the rest of the War in a prisoner-of-war camp in America. After the War, he returned to Germany and continued his academic career until he was recruited to a diplomatic career, becoming the leading civil servant at the German Foreign Office, where he gave his name to the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany's policy of isolating East Germany diplomatically in order to establish the West German government as the sole representative of Germany.
He was a keen advocate of a federal Europe and clashed with the Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, on the path of European integration. He was a leading architect of the European Coal and Steel Community, and became the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, which was later to become the European Union, serving from 1958 to 1967. He was the only German to serve as president of the European Commission or its predecessors.
He left this post following a clash with the French president, Charles de Gaulle and returned to German politics as a member of parliament. He is known for his speeches and writing on European integration and the European Communities.
Early life and pre-War academic career 
Walter Hallstein was born on 17 November 1901 in Mainz, Germany, the second of two sons of Jakob Hallstein, a railway planning officer (Regierungsbaurat), and Anna Hallstein (née Geibel). After attending primary school in Darmstadt, he attended the Rabanus-Maurus-Gymnasium, a classical Gymnasium school in Mainz from 1913 until his matriculation (Abitur) in 1920.
In 1920, Hallstein began his study of law in Bonn, later moving to Munich, and then Berlin, also taking courses in and economics, philosophy and the history of art. He specialized in international private law and wrote his doctoral dissertation on commercial aspects of the Treaty of Versailles. The Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin awarded him his doctorate in 1925, at the age of 23. While writing his doctorate, he also worked as a law clerk (referendary) at the Kammergericht, from 1923 to 1926, and in 1927 he passed his assessor examination, after which (following a very brief spell as a judge) he worked in an academic capacity (as a wissenschaftlicher Referent) at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Foreign Private and International Private Law in Berlin, where he specialized in comparative commercial and company law, working under Professor Martin Wolff, a leading scholar of private law. His mentors also included Heinrich Triepel and Otto von Gierke. He was to remain there until 1930. In 1929, he obtained his habilitation (a post-doctoral qualification entitling the holder to teach independently and supervise doctoral dissertations) from the University of Berlin, based on a professorial thesis on company law. In 1930, at the age of 29, he was appointed professor of private law and company law at the University of Rostock, making him Germany's youngest professor of law. He remained in Rostock until 1941.
Hallstein was a member of the National Socialist Teachers League (Nationalsozialistischer Lehrerbund), the National Socialist Association of Legal Professionals (NS-Rechtswahrerbund ), the National Socialist People's Welfare organization (Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt ), the National Socialist Association of University Lecturers (Nationalsozialistischer Dozentenbund), and the National Socialist Air Raid Protection Association (Nationalsozialistischer Luftschutzbund) but he was not a member of the Nazi Party or the SA. The background to this is that, in the early 1930s, in what was called the Gleichschaltung (synchronization), the Nazi regime took control of civil servants' associations and many other professional and civic organizations; so being a member of a professional association entailed membership in a nominally Nazi association. He is reputed to have rejected Nazi ideology and kept his distance from the Nazis. His lack of sympathy for the Nazi cause led to problems in his career, for instance in 1941, when he was being considered for a post of professor of law at the University of Frankfurt, which met with opposition from Nazi officials. In spite of the opposition, he was finally accepted by the university, and he soon advanced to become dean of the faculty.
Soldier and prisoner of war (1942–1945) 
In 1942, Hallstein was called up, and he served in an artillery regiment in Northern France as an assistant adjutant ( Ordonnanzoffizier) with the rank of first lieutenant (Oberleutnant). On 26 June 1944, during the Battle of Cherbourg, he was captured by the Americans and sent to Camp Como, a prisoner-of-war camp in Mississippi.
He remained at the prisoner-of-war camp from June 1944 to mid-1945. While there, he started a "camp university", where he held law courses for the prisoners. As part of the Sunflower Project , a project to re-educate German POWs, he attended an "administrative school" at Fort Getty, where teaching included the principles of the United States Constitution.
Post-war academic career (1945–1950) 
In November 1945, Hallstein returned to Germany, where he campaigned for Frankfurt University to be re-opened. Turning down an offer of an appointment as State Secretary and Deputy Minister of Economics at the Bavarian Ministry of Economics from Ludwig Erhard, he was appointed a lecturer at Frankfurt University on 1 February 1946, and in April he was elected its rector, a position he retained until 1948. He was president of the South German Rectors' Conference, which he founded. From 1948 to 1949, he spent a year in the United States as visiting professor at Georgetown University (Washington DC). Helmut Kohl studied international law under him at Frankfurt. Hallstein was co-founder of the German national UNESCO committee and was its president from 1949 to 1950.
Diplomatic career (1950–1957) 
Foreign affairs at the Chancellery (1950–1951) 
Against the background of the Second World War, a conflict that had caused massive destruction and left the continent split in two by the Iron Curtain, there were calls for increased co-operation in Europe and measures to prevent future wars. The French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, suggested unified control of German and French coal and steel production, and talks were started with this aim. At this time, foreign affairs were the responsibility of the Allied High Commission, so there was no German ministry of foreign affairs, and such questions were dealt with by the Chancellery. At the suggestion of Wilhelm Röpke, Konrad Adenauer, the German Chancellor, called Hallstein to Bonn and appointed him, from June 1950, to head the German delegation at the Schuman Plan negotiations in Paris, which were to lead to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Hallstein headed the German delegation, Jean Monnet led the French delegation, and together they drew up the Schuman Plan. It was on this basis that the European Coal and Steel Community was founded by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. It was to develop into the European Economic Community, and later the European Union. The person responsible for foreign affairs at the Chancellery had originally been Herbert Blankenhorn, but in August 1950, to general surprise, Hallstein was appointed to the post as head of the Office of Foreign Affairs (Dienststelle für auswärtige Angelegenheiten) at the Federal Chancellery ( Kanzleramt), with the rank of state secretary, making him the top-ranking civil servant in the Federal Chancellery. At this time, little was known about Hallstein, except that he had not been a member of the Nazi Party and he was on good terms with US officials.
State secretary at the new Foreign Office (1951–1958) 
Following a change in the Occupation Statute, the German Foreign Office was re-created on 15 March 1951, but the post of foreign minister was filled by Adenauer himself. On 2 April 1951, Hallstein was made the top civil servant (state secretary) at the newly created Foreign Office. Foreign policy continued to be managed by Adenauer himself, with his group of intimates including Hallstein, Blankenhorn, and others;, and in many respects Hallstein was the foreign minister in all but name, but there was a growing awareness that a separate foreign minister was needed. Adenauer is said to have considered Hallstein for the position, though he was not even a member of a political party.
In the early 1950s, resolution was being sought for a number of important German and European issues, and Hallstein, as the leading civil servant at the foreign office was a prime mover. The issues included the integration of Germany into the defence of Western Europe and the ending of the occupation of Germany, including resolution of the Saar question. Hallstein was heavily involved not only in the Schuman Plan but also in negotiations on the Council of Europe and discussions with the Allied High Commission on the occupation statute and Germany's defence contribution.
Hallstein was heavily involved in the attempt to restore West Germany's sovereignty and to create a European Defence Community (EDC) of which West Germany would be a member. The negotiations at first resulted in two international agreements:
- On 26 May 1952, the Treaty of Bonn was signed by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany; on ratification, it would largely restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany (de facto West Germany, not including West Berlin).
- On 27 May 1952, the Treaty of Paris was signed by the United States, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany; on ratification, it would have established the European Defence Community (EDC).
However, the Treaty of Paris failed to obtain ratification in the French Parliament. Instead, a solution with the Western European Union (WEU) was agreed, and West Germany was to become a member of NATO. The efforts to resolve the issues culminated, in 1954, in a series of conferences in London and Paris. The German side was represented by Adenauer, the German chancellor, together with the top civil servants at the German Foreign Office: Hallstein, his colleague Blankenhorn, and his deputy, Grewe. Various treaties were negotiated at the London Nine-Power Conference from 23 September to 3 October 1954, and they were finalized at the Paris conference from 20 to 23 October 1954. The conferences in Paris included a meeting of the parties to the Nine-Power Conference in London (20 October), a meeting of the seven WEU members (20 October), a meeting of the Four Powers to end the occupation of Germany (21–22 October), and a meeting of all fourteen NATO members to seal Germany's membership.
In 1954 and 1955, there were a number of Four-Power conferences with German participation that Hallstein was less involved in, the preparations being largely delegated to his deputy, Grewe. These included the Berlin Conference of foreign ministers on 25 January – 18 February 1954, which failed to reach agreement on the status of Germany and Austria; the Geneva Summit of heads of government, in July 1955, intended to address Cold War tensions; the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in October–November 1955; discussions of Eden's plan for German re-unification.
Once the major foreign policy objectives were in hand, Hallstein set about restoring Germany's diplomatic service and re-organizing the Foreign Office, based on the findings of the Maltzan Report, a report commissioned by Hallstein on 26 June 1952 and produced a month later by Vollrath Freiherr von Maltzan, a former diplomat, at that time on loan from the Ministry of Economics. The Maltzan Report had identified a lack of capacity to handle the increased workload for the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community, and other European initiatives. There was also criticism of a lack of information and consultation and an atmosphere of secrecy, possible resulting from Adenauer's distrust of the old hands at the Foreign Office, the Wilhelmstraße veterans, and the desire to fill top jobs with outsiders not tainted by having served as diplomats under the Nazis. There were suggestions of a disconnect between the leadership, consisting of Adenauer and a small group of close advisers, including Hallstein and Blankenhorn on the one hand, and the division leaders at the Foreign Office and the diplomatic missions on the other. In particular, Hallstein was also criticized in the press following the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French National Assembly, which had been predicted by the German diplomatic mission in Paris.
State secretary under foreign minister Brentano (1955–1958) 
On 6 June 1955, Adenauer, who had until then been Foreign Minister as well as Chancellor, appointed Heinrich von Brentano foreign minister, but Hallstein retained the trust of Adenauer and continued to attend cabinet meetings. Herbert Blankenhorn, who until then been the head of the Political Department of the foreign office, became the German Permanent Representative to NATO in Paris; Wilhelm Grewe took over the Political Department under Hallstein and became Hallstein's deputy.
Hallstein was involved in discussions with the French concerning the return of the coal-rich Saar, which was still under French administration, to German control. In October 1955 was the referendum for the re-integration of the Saarland, following which it was agreed with France that there would be political integration into the Federal Republic of Germany by 1 January 1957 and economic integration by 1 January 1960. In September 1956, Hallstein announced that France had agreed to hand over control of the Saar to Germany, and on 27 October 1956, the Saar Treaty was signed.
Hallstein Doctrine 
In 1955, Germany had, in large measure, regained its sovereignty and was now integrated into western defence organizations (the WEU and NATO); European integration had progressed, with the establishment of the ECSC; the Saar question was to be resolved by the referendum in October 1955. In all of these matters, Hallstein had played a major role.
Some of the main issues of German foreign policy were now German re-unification and the relations of West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) with its eastern neighbours, including East Germany (the German Democratic Republic). Being more involved in Western European integration, Hallstein delegated much of this work to his deputy, Wilhelm Grewe, but it is in this area, particularly, that German foreign policy is associated with the name Hallstein.
In 1955, Hallstein and Grewe had been members of the delegation that accompanied Adenauer to Moscow, where the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Moscow were agreed. It was on the flight back from Moscow that what was later to become known as the Hallstein Doctrine was fleshed out, though elements of the policy had already been devised and practised by the Foreign Office. The idea behind the Hallstein Doctrine came from Hallstein's deputy, Wilhelm Grewe. The Hallstein Doctrine was to become one of the major elements of West German foreign policy from September 1955 until the official recognition of the German Democratic Republic in October 1969.
Based on the (West) German Basic Law, its de facto constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany, then commonly known in the English-speaking world as West Germany, claimed an Alleinvertretungsanspruch, an exclusive mandate to represent the whole of Germany, including the Communist East Germany, which was still under Soviet control. One of the early objectives of foreign policy was the diplomatic isolation of East Germany. In 1958, journalists named this policy the Hallstein–Grewe Doctrine, and this later became shortened to the Hallstein Doctrine. Grewe himself writes that he devised the broad outlines of the policy, but mainly as one of a number of options, the decisions being made by the foreign minister, Brentano, and the chancellor, Adenauer; in any case, the name Hallstein doctrine may be something of a misnomer.
There was no public official text of the "doctrine", but it was explained publicly in a radio interview by its main architect, Wilhelm Grewe. Adenauer also explained the outlines of the policy in a statement to the German parliament on 22 September 1955. It meant that the Federal German government would regard it as an "unfriendly act" (acte peu amicable) if third countries were to recognize the "German Democratic Republic" (East Germany) or maintain diplomatic relations with it–with the exception of the Soviet Union, as one of the Four Powers responsible for Germany. The response to such an unfriendly act was often understood to mean breaking off diplomatic relations; this was not stated as an automatic response under the policy, but remained the ultima ratio.
European integration and the Rome treaties 
Differences with Erhard 
Within the German government, there were differing views on European integration. Hallstein and his team at the Foreign Office were in favour of a federal solution, with "constitutional integration", based on the European Coal and Steel Community, gradually increasing the scope to include other sectors, and with true parliamentary representation of the European populace. Hallstein was clear that his final goal was a European federal state. He was also aware of Germany's dependence on exports and believed that his institutional integration would promote German interests by opening up the rest of Europe to German exports. Ludwig Erhard and the ministry of Economics argued for a looser "functional integration" and were more in favour of intergovernmental economic co-operation. In the dispute, Adenauer finally supported Hallstein. Hallstein's conflict with Erhard was acrimonious.
The conflict between Erhard and the Ministry of Economics, on the one hand, and Hallstein and the Foreign Office, on the other, extended to the issue of which ministry was to be primarily responsible for which aspects of European Policy. The controversy became public, and a public dispute between Hallstein and Erhard ensued. Erhard was against supranational structures and accused the foreign office proponents of a federal Europe of being out of touch with economic realities.
Messina Conference 
The foreign ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community had to meet in order to nominate a member of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community and to appoint its new president and vice-presidents for the period expiring on 10 February 1957. The meeting was held from 1 June to 3 June 1955 in the Italian city of Messina, Sicily. This conference would lead to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Shortly before the conference, Adenauer had given up his double post as Foreign Minister; and since Brentano had not yet been sworn in, Hallstein lead the German delegation. The delegations of the other countries were headed by Johan Willem Beyen (Netherlands), Gaetano Martino (Italy), Joseph Bech (Luxembourg), Antoine Pinay (France), and Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium). Joseph Bech chaired the meeting. As well as appointing a new president, the agenda also included discussion of the action programme to relaunch European integration, following the collapse, in August 1954, of the plans to create a European Political Community and a European Defence Community, when France failed to ratify the treaty.
The Benelux countries had proposed a revival of European integration on the basis of a common market and integration in the transport and atomic energy sectors. The German negotiating position, represented by Hallstein, was a compromise between his own favoured position of "constitutional" integration and the "functional" integration favoured by Erhard and the Economics Ministry. One of the main German demands was liberalization of trade, with removal of trade restrictions, reduction of tariffs, and freer movement of capital and services. Unlike the Benelux countries and Italy, neither the French nor German delegations were willing to authorize the establishment of a common market or new European institutions at this time, so the final resolution spoke only of setting up an expert commission to examine the possibilities for such institutions as well as the possible creation of a common market and increased cooperation in the fields of transport, conventional energy and atomic energy. Spaak was charged with the task of producing a report evaluating the option of a sectoral integration or the step-by-step establishment of a European common market. Though the language was vague, Hallstein had succeeded in keeping the topics on the agenda, despite French reluctance. On the other hand, the apparent lack of conviction on the part of Hallstein was viewed with concern by other negotiating partners because it did not indicate a clear commitment to integration with the West.
Noordwijk Conference and Spaak Report 
On 6 September 1955, shortly before Adenauer's trip to Moscow, Hallstein, standing in for Brentano, attended the Noordwijk Conference of foreign ministers convened to evaluate progress made by the Spaak Committee, which had been set up by the Messina Conference in June to make recommendations on the creation of a common market and a European organization for the peaceful use of atomic energy. On 9 November 1955, Hallstein reported the results to the West German Cabinet, where there was opposition to the plans for a common market, as opposed to a free trade area, from the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Economics feared that a customs union meant protectionism; the Ministry of Agriculture was concerned that the interests of German farmers would be betrayed; Franz Josef Strauss opposed the perceived discrimination against German industry regarding access to uranium. Finally, the chancellor, Adenauer, settled the dispute between the ministries by a decision in favour of Hallstein and the Foreign Office. When the Spaak Report (the Brussels Report on the General Common Market) was finally presented in April 1956, it favoured a customs union. In the Cabinet meeting of 9 May 1956 there was renewed opposition to the position of the Foreign Office from other ministers, but Adenauer lent his support to Hallstein, and the Cabinet authorized intergovernmental negotiations, to be held at the conference of foreign ministers in Venice at the end of May, the German delegation again to be led by Hallstein.
Venice Conference 
The French were more interested in Euratom, but Germany made negotiations on Euratom dependent on negotiations on a common market. At the Venice Conference, the French foreign minister, Christian Pineau agreed to intergovernmental negotiations, with three provisos: the economic community was to be established in stages; customs tariffs should be reduced by only 30 percent; and national governments should not be overly constrained with regard to economic policy. Hallstein warned against accepting the French terms, which in his view meant that the French would push for a quick decision in favour of Euratom and delay the negotiations on the common market. Hallstein was supported by the foreign ministers of the Netherlands and Luxembourg, against France, in demanding a fixed deadline and timetable for the establishment of a common market. The French National Assembly approved the commencement of intergovernmental negotiations in July 1956, after the prime minister, Guy Mollet, gave an assurance that Euratom would not impose restrictions on the French nuclear weapons programme.
In July 1956, Britain had made proposals for the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to examine the possibility of a free trade area for industrial goods. The French, mainly interested in Euratom, attempted to separate the debate on the two topics and proposed a compromise treaty under which only the general principles of a common market would be agreed, leaving details to be decided later.
Other international developments 
The discussions about European integration were not taking place in a geopolitical vacuum.
On 26 July, Nasser, nationalized the Suez Canal, leading to the Suez Crisis and closed the canal and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, involving France and Britain, with Israel, in joint military operations in the Middle East. According to British Cabinet records, there was even a proposal by the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, for a union between Britain and France, or—failing that—French membership of the Commonwealth of Nations, which the British cabinet thought should, if followed up, be extended to include Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway.
French overseas territories 
Another cause of disagreement was the inclusion of French overseas territories in any common market. Erhard was strongly opposed to this, partly because he saw the danger of France involving the other member states in its colonial responsibilities. The Foreign Office shared these concerns to some extent but Hallstein and Carstens were willing to accept the French position, believing it would help gain support from the French National Assembly; Hallstein also accepted the argument of his French counterpart, Faure, that it would also benefit Germany. Hallstein helped to strike a deal by which the imports and exports of overseas territories would be treated like products of the mother country and private investment and company branches of other member states would be permitted, thus opening up the overseas territories for German exports. Hallstein played a major part in solving these problems at two conferences of foreign ministers, one from 26 to 27 January 1957 and another on 4 February.
Treaties of Rome 
On 25 March 1957, the six countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and Netherlands signed the Treaties of Rome; Adenauer and Hallstein signed for Germany. The foreign minister, Brentano had largely left the negotiations to Hallstein, and the signing of the treaty, to which he had contributed so much, represented a major success for Hallstein. It was also Hallstein who explained the treaties to the German parliament on 21 March 1957, before they were signed on 25 March 1957.
Choosing the President of the Commission 
One of the next issues was the decision on who should become president of the Commission of the European Economic Community. There had been previous suggestions of Hallstein becoming president of the European Court, but now he was put forward as the German candidate for the president of the Commission, though the Belgian Minister of Economics, Rey and the Netherlands Agriculture Minister, Mansholt were regarded as the strongest contenders for the position. The conference of foreign ministers on 20 December 1957 could not reach a decision; so when the Treaties of Rome took effect on 1 January 1958, the position had not been filled. At the conference of foreign ministers on 6 and 7 January 1958, however, Hallstein was chosen as the first president of the EEC Commission. Hallstein's selection for this position at the head of a major European organization, a decade after the end of World War II was a major achievement for Germany.
President of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1958–1967) 
Laying the foundations of the EEC 
In 1957, barely a decade after the end of the War, the German Walter Hallstein was unanimously elected the first president of the Commission of the European Economic Community (now the European Commission) in Brussels. He was elected on 7 January 1958, and he was to remain until 1967.
The Hallstein Commission held its first meeting on 16 January 1958. Hallstein's commission, which comprised nine members (two each from France, Italy and Germany, one each from Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands), was faced with a formidable array of tasks. These tasks included the implementation of a customs union and the Four Freedoms, as well as common policies on competition, trade, transport and agriculture.
Competing visions of Europe 
Though Hallstein's own vision of a federal Europe was clear, the EEC treaty left many questions open, and opinions were divided, for instance, on whether a common market could succeed without a common economic policy, enlargement of the European Union, in particular whether Britain, should join, and whether the final goal should be a political union in the sense of a United States of Europe.
The differing interests and traditions of the member states and differing opinions among the politicians meant that consensus was difficult. The disagreements that had preceded the creation of the EEC continued after it was established, and these were reflected within the Commission. For instance, the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the responsibility of Sicco Mansholt, the Commissioner for Agriculture, was at odds with the liberal foreign trade policy of the Commissioner for External relations, Jean Rey.
EEC and EFTA 
Britain had at first been against the formation of the EEC, preferring a looser free trade area, and later proposed a larger free trade area that would include the EEC and other European countries. The German government, German industry, and especially the Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, wanted Britain to be part of an integrated Europe. Hallstein was also in favour of Britain's inclusion in the long term but was against the idea of a wider free trade area at this time, hoping to first achieve a greater degree of integration among a smaller number of countries. However, discussions on the possibility of a wider trade area, avoiding the tariff wall between the EEC and the EFTA countries, continued; but in the middle of preparations for negotiations on the possibility of a wider trade area, the French government, on instructions from de Gaulle, refused further participation. This unilateral action by the French in November 1958 displeased the other EEC members but effectively put an end to the negotiations. German politicians like Erhard felt that Hallstein and his commission had not done enough to promote the wider free trade area.
The six countries of the EEC had decided on a customs union: they agreed to remove tariffs between one another within a period of twelve years, and also agreed to erect a common tariff barrier between themselves and other countries. Seven of the excluded European countries (England, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal) responded with an alternative free trade area, EFTA, which also removed tariff barriers between each other, but did not insist on a tariff barrier with other countries. The EFTA convention was signed in January 1960 and was to come into force in May 1960.
On 3 March 1960, Hallstein announced a plan for accelerating the implementation of the common market, which commentators regarded as sabotaging hopes of a joint free trade area that included the EEC and EFTA. The plan was to reduce internal tariffs within the EEC by twenty per cent on 1 July 1960 (instead of the envisaged ten per cent) and by a further twenty percent on 1 January 1962 (instead of the envisaged ten per cent); and the external tariffs were to start, not on 1 January 1962, as originally planned but on 1 July 1960 (that is in three months time). This invoked the displeasure, not only of the EFTA countries, but also of the Economics Ministry under Erhard. Commentators talked of Hallstein's "religious zeal".
In 1961 Harold Macmillan, the British prime minister, finally gave up the idea of the larger free trade area and the United Kingdom applied to join the EEC. Edward Heath, as Lord Privy Seal in the Macmillan government led the negotiations in Britain's first attempt to join the EEC. Hallstein, as president of the EEC Commission, was cautious, considering the British application premature. Of British politicians, only Heath (who shared some of his personality traits and his interest in music) was able to establish a rapport with Hallstein  The Financial Times (of 2 August 1961) wrote that Hallstein was one of the least enthusiastic about British membership of the EEC. In British government circles he was at first seen as siding with the French and de Gaulle, against Britain and the other five members of the EEC, who were more welcoming to Britain, and as favouring the French Protectionist position. Elements of the British Press, notably the Daily Express, were critical of Hallstein, or what he represented
Fouchet Plan 
It was in 1961 that de Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan, a plan for an intergovernmental "union of states", as an alternative to the European Communities. There was little support from the other European countries, and negotiations were abandoned on 17 April 1962.
While Hallstein had a decidedly federal vision for Europe, and regarded the Commission as a quasi-federal organ, de Gaulle's vision was of a confederation.  From the beginning, Hallstein did not believe that de Gaulle's approach of cooperation between sovereign nation states would be able to realize his vision of a powerful Europe that could play its proper part on the world stage.
De Gaulle also envisaged a pooling of sovereignty in certain areas, such as external defence, harmonization of industrial production and foreign trade, currency, exploitation of resources in overseas territories, and cultural and scientific development,  but, at the same time, he was developing the French nuclear deterrent capability, the Force de Frappe, which he envisaged as part of a European defence capability independent of the United States. This independence from the United States was one of de Gaulle's main objectives; he was against the increased integration of Europe under the umbrella of transatlantic integration as provided for in the Rome treaties.
In 1962, when the United Kingdom and Ireland were applying to join the European Economic Community, Hallstein startled an Irish journalist by saying that he had not thought it necessary even to open, let alone read Ireland's application. He then summed up Ireland's dilemma "If the UK goes in, you go also; if not you too will stay out. Britain can possibly come in without Ireland but Ireland cannot come in without Britain." The French veto on the United Kingdom indeed made it effectively impossible for Ireland to join until the removal of the French veto made it possible for both to join in 1972.
Élysée Treaty 
A second attempt by de Gaulle to establish a closer political union in Europe that would be independent of the United States was the Franco-German bilateral treaty on political cooperation. This treaty between France and Germany, which was signed on 22 January 1963, was criticized by other countries as being incompatible with the EEC and NATO treaties. Hallstein and other members of the Commission also criticized the treaty, which angered de Gaulle. When the treaty was ratified by Germany, the German Bundestag unilaterally added a preamble that re-affirmed the commitment to close transatlantic ties, the enlargement of the existing European Communities and attempts to secure Britain's accession. Since Britain had firmly expressed its unwillingness to support an autonomous European defence independent of America, de Gaulle regarded the treaty as a failure.
Further attempts by de Gaulle for military cooperation with Germany to the exclusion of America were rebuffed by Erhard (now Federal Chancellor) and his foreign minister Gerhard Schröder. Britain's application for membership of the EEC was vetoed by de Gaulle in 1963, which also further antagonized the other participants.
Confrontation with de Gaulle 
On the matter of the Common Agricultural Policy, de Gaulle took a confrontational course. On 21 October 1964, the French minister of information, Alain Peyrefitte announced that France would leave the EEC if the European Agricultural market were not implemented in the agreed form by 15 December 1964. On 1 December 1964, Erhard, now head of government (Federal Chancellor) in Germany, announced that Germany would accede to French demands for a common wheat price, and on 15 December, the Council of Ministers laid down common grain prices from 1 July 1967 and instructed the Commission to submit proposals for financing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by 1 July 1965. These proposals were also to specify from what date these costs in the agricultural sector would be paid for out levies by the EEC rather than out of national budgets, as had been agreed in principle on 14 January 1962.
The differences between France and the Commission, and especially between de Gaulle and Hallstein, were exacerbated when France took on the rotating six-month Presidency of the Council in January 1965.
The Council of Ministers instructed the Commission to submit plans by 1 April 1965 on how to finance the Common Agricultural Policy from July 1965, including its financing from direct levies rather than national contributions, as had been agreed on 14 January 1962. This would entail a transfer of revenues to the Community. The ministers representing other countries, in particular the Netherlands, indicated that their national parliaments would not approve transfer of revenues to the Community unless the rights of the European Parliament were strengthened. On 20 January 1965, the European Parliament passed a resolution appealing to the governments to take this step toward strengthening a democratic and federal Europe. Hallstein supported this. He saw de Gaulle as a narrow-minded defender of national interests and did not support de Gaulle's idea of a Europe independent of the United States. Hallstein had received indications that other countries shared his own point of view and decided to risk the confrontation with de Gaulle, interpreting the instructions from the Council broadly, with the support of Dutch Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt. The majority of the commission backed Hallstein.
On 24 March 1965, Hallstein presented the Commission's proposals for financing the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to the European Parliament. It was proposed that customs duties collected at EEC borders would go to the community budget and that the Common Agricultural Market would be implemented as scheduled on 1 July 1967—but the customs union for industrial products would also be implemented at the same time, two and a half years earlier than provided for in the Rome Treaty. The increased revenue was to be distributed in a way that strengthened the European Parliament—and the Commission. The proposals would have allowed the Community to develop its own financial resources, independently of the member states and given more budgetary powers to Parliament. From 1 January 1966, voting in the Council was to be by simple majority, removing the implicit veto power of individual countries, which the French government stated it could not agree to.
The proposals were supposedly about the common agricultural policy, so they would normally have been drafted by the Agriculture Commissioner, but Hallstein knew of their risky nature, comparing the dangerous ground to a minefield, and was himself active in drafting them. The tone of internal deliberations at the time also show that the institution was aware of their likely effect and some Commissioners—notably both the French commissioners—opposed the plans. However, they were supported by some members of the Commission, including Mansholt and Rey, and by the European Parliament. Hallstein saw them as vital to the Commission's long-term goals. Since the legislation would increase not only the Commission's powers, but also the Parliament's, Hallstein had the support of the Parliament, which had long been campaigning for more powers. Before the proposals were presented to the Council, they became public, and Hallstein then presented them to the European Parliament on 24 March, a week before presenting them to the Council. When Hallstein put forward his proposals, the Council was already troubled. De Gaulle was incensed by what he saw as a usurpation of governmental authority. France rejected the idea of the increased powers of Parliament and of the Community having its own independent revenues, insisting on what had been agreed by the Council regarding the financing of the common agricultural policy being implemented by 30 June 1965. He accused Hallstein of acting as if he were a head of state. France was particularly concerned about protecting the CAP, because under a majority system it could be challenged by the other members.
After discussions between France and Germany, a compromise was at first reached, postponing implementation of the agricultural levies until 1970. However, at the Council meeting of 28 June, the Netherlands foreign minister, Josef Luns, and his Italian counterpart, Amintore Fanfani, insisted that all of the Commission's proposals should be discussed as a whole. German diplomats supported this position, and the German Bundestag passed a resolution stating that the Commission's proposals did not go far enough. Germany did not want to agree to the plans for agricultural financing without being assured of France not hindering a general reduction in tariffs in the Kennedy Round.
The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the foreign ministers produced a report recommending a compromise by making both the agricultural levies and the customs duties available for Community purposes but not centralizing the process; however, Hallstein refused to broker this deal, and was in favour of invoking the common practice of stopping the clock until the issue could be resolved.
Under pressure from Couve de Murville, who was the President of the Council at the time, Hallstein agreed, on 30 June 1965, to work out a compromise, but after consulting with de Gaulle, the same day, Couve de Murville announced that no agreement had been reached by the agreed deadline and that the negotiations had failed. France's presidency of the Council, which rotated every six months, terminated on 30 June 1965.
Empty chair crisis 
Five days later, de Gaulle instructed France's permanent representative to the Council to stop participation in all meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Council of Permanent Representatives that dealt with any new decisions. The French Permanent Representative to the EU, Jean-Marc Boegner was recalled, together with 18 high-ranking civil servants and diplomats, and French participation in numerous working groups ceased.
In an attempt to resolve the situation, Hallstein, together with Marjolin, the (French) vice-president of the Commission, drew up a new plan, continuing the provisional arrangement for agricultural finances until 1 January 1970, and delaying the provision of the Community with its own sources of revenue and the strengthening of parliament until that time. This proposal was presented to the Council on 22 June 1965.
De Gaulle, however, remained confrontational toward Hallstein and the Brussels "technocrats". In September 1965, he publicly declared his opposition to majority voting and the political role of the Commission. Since a decision required unanimity, there was stalemate, and there was no provision in the treaties to cover such a boycott of the normal running of the Community. At least in Hallstein's eyes, this boycott of the Council was a breach of treaty obligations, and he was unprepared for such a scenario. He had the Commission's legal team examine whether France had already violated the terms of the Treaty by breaking off negotiations and recalling its permanent representative. De Gaulle claimed that Hallstein had exceeded his authority and started a conspiracy with his proposals for strengthening the power of Parliament.
On 20 October 1965, Couve de Murville, in the National Assembly, pushed for a general revision of the treaties, which was opposed by the other five member states. At the Council meeting of 25 to 26 October, they passed a resolution stating that a solution must be found within the provisions of the existing treaties. As a compromise, however, they offered the possibility of an extraordinary meeting of the Council to discuss "the general situation of the Community"— without the Commission being invited.
The resolution of the crisis 
Following the French presidential elections on 5 November and 19 December 1965, de Gaulle accepted this offer. In the negotiations on 17/18 January 1966, the French foreign minister, Couve de Murville, dropped the more extreme demands.
In January 1966, the six foreign ministers agreed to suggest to the Commission that the Permanent Representatives of the ministers should be consulted before making any major proposals and not to publish such proposals before they had been dealt with by the Council of Ministers. The other five registered—but did not formally accept—the opinion of the French delegation that for matters of very important national interest, the discussion should continue until a unanimous agreement was reached.
This became known as the Luxembourg Compromise. It was not specified what could be invoked as a national interest and how to resolve disputes, so majority decisions were avoided and—until it was abolished by the Single European Act — it became a de facto veto requiring unanimity for Council decisions. Some concessions were made to French sensibilities; for instance, diplomats no longer presented their credentials to Hallstein alone but jointly to the presidents of the Commission and the Council. When the "empty chair crisis" was finally resolved, it had lasted from 30 June 1965 to 29 January 1966.
When the French foreign minister Couve de Murville returned to the negotiating table after Hallstein's official term of office in January 1966, he insisted on Hallstein's departure and the nomination of someone else to be the head of the new commission, which would in future be the commission shared by all three communities when the EEC, the ECSC, and Euratom were merged. Since there was no agreement on a replacement for Hallstein when his term ended on 8 January 1966, he remained in office as a caretaker (based on Article 159 of the EEC Treaty). This also meant that the planned merger of the three communities, which was to have taken place on 1 January 1966, was postponed.
In view of the confrontation with de Gaulle, there was a proposal that Hallstein should be nominated for a further term but that he should serve for only six months. The German Chancellor, Georg Kiesinger agreed to this compromise, but Hallstein considered this was a breach of the Treaty, and on 5 May 1967 he asked not to be re-nominated at all.
In this way, the national governments had refused to accept the commission becoming a European executive, blocking Hallstein's vision of a United States of Europe.
Issues behind the confrontation with de Gaulle 
De Gaulle recognized Hallstein's service to the European idea, but attributed it to German patriotism, serving the interests of Germany, enabling Germany to re-attain a respect and status in Europe that it had lost because of Hitler.
De Gaulle disliked the status that Hallstein (for him a mere civil servant, a technocrat) was accorded by foreign states. Hallstein, for his part, mindful of his vision of Europe as a federal state, was watchful that he, as representative of the Commission was accorded the status normally accorded to a head of state, including red carpets. Hallstein regarded the Commission as having a political role. He is quoted as saying
"In principle, we have no [political] competences ... because there is nothing of that nature in the Rome Treaty. But we have political responsibility because we are a political—not an economic—enterprise. The Common Market has the goal of unifying Europe politically."[Der Spiegel]
The issue that triggered the empty chair crisis was the financing of the common agricultural policy, which was of critical interest to France: from 1962 to 1964, France had received 46 million US dollars from the agricultural fund, 85 per cent of all revenue. However, Hallstein, together with German and Dutch parliamentarians, was accused of using the changes to increase the political power of EEC institutions in ways not envisaged by the EEC Treaty. The French objected to this transfer of political power. De Gaulle complained of the Commission usurping a political role reserved for governments and of Hallstein usurping a role reserved for heads of government or heads of state; he attacked Hallstein personally saying that Hallstein was trying to turn the EEC into a superstate, with Brussels as its capital, acting like a sovereign; he talked (in 1965) of defending French democracy against the supranational demands of the Brussels commission and of a largely foreign technocracy. These complaints included Hallstein's being frequently received by US presidents, although the Commission had no foreign relations mandate; Hallstein's claim to be a sort of European prime minister; the rank of ambassador held by the representatives of the 65 states accredited with the European Commission; foreign ambassadors' presentation of their credentials to Hallstein (ambassadors normally present their credentials, signed by the countries head of state to the head of state of the host country); the participation of Commission staff in the Kennedy Round negotiations in Geneva, in negotiations with EFTA, and in negotiations with non-European states, in particular South American states. The clash between Hallstein and de Gaulle was really a clash between two opposing visions of Europe, both of which were intended as a radical change from the past. The differences included:
- the debate on inclusion of the United Kingdom
- the financing of the common agricultural policy
- the rights of the European Parliament, especially with respect to the budget
- majority voting in the Council of Ministers.
On most of these issues, de Gaulle regarded Hallstein as an opponent. Hallstein's response to de Gaulle's attacks was also somewhat confrontational, indirectly comparing de Gaulle to Hitler.
Later life (1967–1982) 
When Hallstein left the Commission at the end of 1967, he was 68 years old. Though well respected in German government circles, there was, somewhat surprisingly, no offer of a suitable position in German government.
On 28 January 1968, at an election in Rome, Hallstein was elected president of the European Movement, a private organization founded in 1948 as the umbrella organization of various organizations in favour of European integration. He continued to promote his vision of a "United States of Europe". Hallstein was re-elected president of the organization in 1970, and again in 1972. In 1974, he did not stand for re-election, and on 31 May 1974, Jean Rey, who had succeeded him as President of the Commission, was elected as his successor.
In the run-up to the federal elections in 1969, Helmut Kohl, then minister-president and head of the CDU in the state of Rhineland Palatinate offered Hallstein the opportunity of standing as a direct candidate in a constituency in the Westerwald area and heading up the CDU party list in the state of Rhineland Palatinate. At the time, the CDU under Kurt Georg Kiesinger was the governing party, and at the CDU "Euroforum 68" congress in Saarbrücken in January 1968, Hallstein was celebrated as the future foreign minister, should the CDU win the 1969 federal election. He proposed to confront de Gaulle and counter his attempts to "devalue" and "weaken" the European Community. However, the party lost the election, leaving Hallstein as a member of the Bundestag, but with no government office.
Hallstein was later approached by Kohl as a possible candidate to replace Heinrich Lübke as Federal President, but this did not come to fruition. From 1969 to 1972, he was a member of the German Federal Parliament for the Christian Democratic Union. As a member of parliament, he was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and was one of the party's spokesmen for European affairs, along with Erik Blumenfeld and Carl-Ludwig Wagner. In the party, he supported the Junge Union, the CDU youth organization. Hallstein had little personal contact with his constituency, the work being done mainly by his assistant Christian Franck. At the next elections in 1972, he was not re-nominated. In his speeches in the Bundestag, he continued to express his vision of European union. He also spoke out in favour of direct election of the European Parliament. At that time, the members of the European Parliament were delegated by the Bundestag, and direct election was not introduced until 1979.
Having left the Bundestag in 1972 and the presidency of the European Movement in 1974, Hallstein retired from active political life but continued to write and give talks. He moved from his country house in the Westerwald to Stuttgart, and continued his work as an author.
Hallstein fell ill in early 1980 and died in Stuttgart on 29 March 1982, at the age of 80. He was buried, following a state funeral, on 2 April 1982 at the Waldfriedhof Cemetery in Stuttgart.
Personal qualities and vision of Europe 
Hallstein was described as quiet, introverted, sober, and rational; strict and hard-working; respected rather than liked, but honest, straightforward, and dependable; disciplined, with a keen intellect, excellent command of language, and formidable debating skills. People who knew him praised his ability to explain things lucidly, in speech and writing. He was sometimes perceived as cold and excessively intellectual. He was also characterized as having a keen sense of duty. Franz Josef Strauss called him one of the last Prussians (referring to his "Prussian virtues"). He lived frugally.
Hallstein set out his ideas on European integration in his main work Der unvollendete Bundesstaat [literally, The Unfinished Federal State]. Later editions were renamed Die europäische Gemeinchaft [The European Community]; a translated and revised edition was published in English as Europe in the Making. But long before he became president of the Commission, he also expressed his vision in a number of speeches.
Hallstein's driving force was the vision of a federal Europe. He called European integration a "revolutionary endeavour". However, he realized that its creation would be a long process. He saw a number of factors favouring European integration, not least the Soviet threat, the danger of conflict between the states of central and western Europe, and the political and economic fragility of some European democracies. Integration was meant not only as a defence against the East but also as a way of preventing conflict between the countries of the West. Hallstein and his staff at the Foreign Office aimed for a constitutional framework to guarantee and consolidate European integration, in the federalist sense. This supranational idea was opposed by the school centred around Ludwig Erhard and the Ministry of Economics, who preferred the concept of intergovernmental, economic cooperation, founded on free trade.
He also spoke in favour of the proposed European Defence Community, which never came to fruition, and of West German's integration in the West, which he saw as necessary for the solution of other problems, including German reunification.
Hallstein spoke of three "dimensions" of European integration:
- Intensity expressed the degree to which member states give up individual sovereignty to create a supranational community.
- Extensity expressed the size, the number of member states.
- Time expressed the order and speed of steps toward complete integration.
He saw a trade-off between the different dimensions: the larger the number of members, the less integration would be possible in a given time. His model included the coexistence of different European organizations of differing size and with differing degrees of integration. Such considerations were particularly relevant to the United Kingdom, which had been more in favour of intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe and had shown less interest in supranational organizations like the European Coal and Steel Community and the proposed European Defence Community.
Without losing sight of his final goal of "total political cooperation", Hallstein realized that it was expedient to first pursue the goal of economic integration. He saw the Schuman Plan as a way for Europe to become an equal partner of the United States—and as a way for Germany to "rejoin the organized community of free peoples".
Seeing that there was no possibility of complete integration in one step, he envisaged a planned, gradual evolution involving a number of projects, coming together to produce a coherent whole. At first he talked of the "dynamic aspect of the constituent plans" (dynamischer Aspekt der Teilpläne), but later of what he called an "inherent logic" (Sachlogik). This meant setting up a situation in such a way that the desired goal would be achieved because people faced with future problems and choices would naturally choose the desired path—not automatically, but because the inherent logic would favour the desired choice. For instance, installing common tariffs would naturally lead to the need for a common trade policy; prescribing free movement for people, services, and capital would tend to lead to a common infrastructure, including a common tax policy, a common budgetary policy, and a common currency.
The Schuman Plan was the first step, applying to the field of economics; the next step was to be defence; these would then necessarily lead to integration in the related fields of industrial relations and social policy, energy policy and foreign policy.
Hallstein strove for a Europe built on "law in place of force", or Right, not Might. He recognized the problems of creating a constitutional system that reconciled the requirements of different countries with widely varying constitutional structures, and called the attempted solution "revolutionary", predicting that future generations might regard the "philosophical and legal concept underlying Europe's constitution as the most creative achievement in the evolution of jurisprudence in our age". His concept of European union was that of a "community", not (yet) a federation (because it is not a state), nor a confederation ("because it is endowed with the power of exercising authority directly over every citizen in each of its member states"), based on democracy and the rule of law.
A lawyer and expert in international law, Hallstein saw a strong legal foundation as essential. His model of a federal Europe borrowed from the federal structures of Germany, the United States and Switzerland. Hallstein later wrote that the experience of Nazi Germany led him to distrust not only the idea of absolute and inalienable national sovereignty, but also the British idea of a European balance of power. Partly as a result of the American's re-education programme, Hallstein developed an interest in the United States Constitution and American history between independence, in 1776, and the ratification of the Constitution, in 1788, when the United States was a confederation of states. The problems that the United States experienced were, in his view, due partly to the states defending their sovereignty. He rejected the concept of the unitary nation state favoured by the French, in favour of a federal solution, and concluded that Europe should follow the American path towards a federal solution. However, he wished to retain Europe's diversity and opposed the idea of Europe becoming a "melting pot". The model on which the ECSC was based reflected important elements of a possible federal constitution. There was
- an executive independent of the individual member states: the High Authority
- a federal body operating (at least to some extent) on majority principles: the Special Council of Ministers
- a European parliament: the Common Assembly
- a European court: the Court of Justice
with separation of powers and checks and balances.
Hallstein's major work on the European Community, Der unvollendeter Bundesstaat [The Unfinished Federal State] was published in 1969. He was helped in the writing by his former chief of staff Karl-Heinz Narjes and the Brussels correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Hans-Herbert Götz. This book can be seen as Hallstein's political testament. There were several editions of the book and it was translated into several languages. The second German edition was titled simply Die Europäische Gemeinschaft [The European Community]. A later version was published in English with the title Europe in the Making.
During his lifetime, Walter Hallstein received honorary doctorates from nine European and nine American universities, including Georgetown, Padua, Harvard, John Hopkins, Sussex, Liège, Nancy, Leuven, Oviedo, and Tübingen.
He was also awarded numerous other honours and prizes:
- 1953: Knight Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Italian Republic.
- 1953/54: Grand Cross (Grand Merit Cross with Star and Sash) of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.
- 1955: Grand Decoration of Honour in Gold with Sash for Services to the Republic of Austria..
- 1955: Grand Cross of the Order of the Falcon.
- 1961 Charlemagne prize (Karlspreis) by the City of Aachen for his efforts in the cause of European federation.
- 1964: honorary member of the American Society of International Law.
- 1968: Order of Merit of the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre.
- 1968: Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold.
- 1968: Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Netherlands Lion.
- 1969: Robert Schuman Prize 
- 1969: Grand Cross of the Order of St. Sylvester Pope and Martyr(GCSS)
- 1969: Grand Cross of the Brazilian Order of the Southern Cross
- 1969: Grand Cross of the Greek Order of George I
- 1969: Grand Cross of the Argentinian order of merit
- 1971: honorary citizen of Brussels, the first German since the War to receive such an honour. 
- The 1995–1996 academic year at the College of Europe was named in his honour.
- In 1997, the Walter Hallstein Institute for European Constitutional Law at the Humboldt University in Berlin was named in his honour.
- From 2002 to 2008, the Walter Hallstein Prize was awarded annually in November by the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main, the town of Frankfurt am Main and the Dresdner Bank for special services to European integration.
Hallstein's major popular work was Der unvollendete Bundesstaat, including later revised editions under the name Die europäische Gemeinschaft and the English translation Europe in the Making.
- Hallstein, Walter (1969). Der unvollendete Bundesstaat. Europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse. Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ. ISBN 3-4301-3897-3.
- Hallstein, Walter (1973). Die europäische Gemeinschaft. Düsseldorf, Vienna: Econ. ISBN 3-4301-3898-1.
- Hallstein, Walter (1979). Europäische Reden. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. ISBN 3-4210-1894-4.
- Hallstein, Walter (1972). Europe in the Making. Translated by Charles Roetter. George Allen & Unwin. ISBN 0-04-330215-7.
He also wrote a number of academic books and numerous articles, and he gave innumerable speeches, the documented total number of publications exceeding 365.
See also 
Notes and references 
- According to his birth certificate "Walther Peter Hallstein",Piela 2012, p. 27
- Küsters 2011.
- or Jacob
- Piela 2012, p. 27.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 208.
- KilianM 2005, p. 371.
- Piela 2012, p. 28.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 210.
- The topic of Hallstein's doctoral dissertation was The Life Insurance Policy under the Treaty of Versailles.KilianM 2005, p. 371GermanHistoricalMuseum
- Piela 2012, p. 29.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 211.
- Elvert 2011.
- The thesis was entitled Die Aktienrechte der Gegenwart [Contemporary Company Law Sytstems] and was published in 1931
- Piela 2012, p. 31.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 213.
- Kitchen 2011, p. 239.
- Gerstenmaier 1981, p. 66.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 214.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 225.
- KilianM 2005, p. 372.
- Piela 2012, p. 32.
- Piela 2012, p. 33.
- Kohl, p. 33.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 216.
- Piela 2010, pp. 2–3.
- Gerstenmaier 1981, pp. 307–308.
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- Maulucci 2012, pp. 205–206.
- A state secretary (Staatssekretär) in the German civil service is the top ranking civil servant, usually directly under the minister (or other parliamentary appointee), similar to a permanent under-secretary in Britain, for instance.
- Lahn 1998, p. 17.
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- German: Im Prinzip haben wir keine (politischen) Kompetenzen ... weil davon nichts im Römischen Vertrag steht. Dennoch tragen wir eine politische Verantwortung, weil wir selbst ein politisches Unternehmen sind und kein wirtschaftliches. Der Gemeinsame Markt hat das Ziel, Europa politisch zu einigen.
- Groeb en, pp. 171–171.
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- Hallstein called de Gaulle's attempts to dismantle the progress achieved on the path to a supranational Europe "the greatest act of destruction in the history of Europe, even of the free world, since Hitler der größte Zerstörungsakt in der Geschichte Europas, ja der freien Welt, seit den Tagen Hitlers.
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- Piela 2010, p. 12.
- Hallstein 1972, pp. 30–55.
- Piela 2010, pp. 12–13.
- Hallstein 1972, p. 37.
- Hallstein 1972, p. 40.
- Bärenbrinker 1998, pp. 87–88.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 215.
- Freiberger 2010, p. 227.
- Hallstein 1972, pp. 15–16.
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Further reading 
- Loth, Wilfried; Wallace, William; Wessels, Wolfgang (1998). Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European?. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 978-031221293-3.
- Müller, Kay; Walter, Franz (2004). "Der Mann für Verträge: Walter Hallstein" [The Man for Treaties: Walter Hallstein]. Graue Eminenzen der Macht: Küchenkabinette in der deutschen Kanzlerdemokratie von Adenauer bis Schröder [Éminences grises: Kitchen Cabinets in Germany's Chancellor Democracy from Adenauer to Schröder] (in German). Wiesbaden: Springer. pp. 31–34. ISBN 9783531143484.
- Grewe, W.G. (1960). Deutsche Außenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit. Stuttgart: DVA.
|Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Walter Hallstein|
- The History of the European Union: The founding fathers of the EU
- Biography of Walter Hallstein at a semi-official French web site(French)
- Biography of Walter Hallstein at the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation(German)
- Brief portrait of Walter Hallstein at the official web site for Charlemagne Prize awards(German)
- Walter Hallstein Institute(German)
- Charlemagne Prize Foundation; includes a list of recipients(German)
- Walter Hallstein (speaker). Founding fathers of the European Union: Walter Hallstein (in German). European Commission. I-072675. Retrieved 18 February 2013.
- Address given by Walter Hallstein: the revival of European integration (Bonn, 14 May 1956)
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