Bolivarian Revolution

The "Bolivarian Revolution" refers to a mass social movement and political process in Venezuela. Its most prominent leader is Hugo Chávez, the founder of the Fifth Republic Movement and the current President of Venezuela. The "Bolivarian Revolution" seeks the implementation of Bolivarianism in Venezuela. Proponents of Bolivarianism trace its roots to an avowedly democratic socialist interpretation of some ideals of Simón Bolívar, an early 19th century Venezuelan and Latin American revolutionary leader, prominent in the South American Wars of Independence. Other historical figures often invoked by Chávez as emblematic of the "Bolivarian Revolution" are Simón Rodríguez (Bolivar's lifelong mentor) and Ezequiel Zamora.

Ideology

Chávez is the most prominent exponent of Bolivarianism, which functions as the root ideology of the "Bolivarian Revolution". Chávez has listed a number of ideological streams that he sees as having contributed significantly to Bolivarianism.

Chávez asserted in his September 2005 speech at the Bronx's Latino Pastoral Action Center that Jesus of Nazareth was a radical activist who purportedly emphasized and sought redistributive social justice and democratic socialism--Chávez has stated that such emphases also characterize Bolivarianism. Chávez has repeatedly claimed that Jesus was a social, as well as an individual, savior and liberator who was active in class struggle, social justice, and human rights both individual and collective.

This contrasts greatly with the ideals of the revolution's namesake, making this revolution and the ideology a misnomer. Simón Bolívar was a great admirer of the American Revolution (and a great critic of the French Revolution), Bolívar described himself in his many letters as a classical "liberal" and defender of the free market economic system. Among the books he traveled with when he wrote the Bolivian Constitution were Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws and Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.

Bolívar's many speeches and writings reveal him to be an adherent of limited government, the separation of powers, freedom of religion, property rights, and the rule of law. Critics say Chávez has used the Bolivarian Revolution to consolidate his power, nationalize industries, and use the government to change vast aspects of everyday life for Venezuelans.

Chávez' statements on Bolivarian ideology have attracted the ire of some evangelical and conservative groups, who traditionally place almost exclusive emphasis on Jesus as a personal, as opposed to a social, savior. Such groups promote the idea that Jesus's teachings did not address issues such as class conflict and exploitation. Margaret Thatcher's so-called Sermon on the Mound in Scotland expressly articulated these anti-liberation theology sentiments by attempting to offer theological justification for capitalism. In it, she claimed "Christianity is about spiritual redemption, not social reform".[1] Thatcher's speech, however, was widely interpreted as being politely rebuked by the Church of Scotland, being described as 'a disgraceful travesty of the gospel' by one clergyman present.

Chávez's administration has sought to strengthen the Venezuelan government's control over the nation's vital oil industry while seeking to better redistribute the revenues earned from petroleum exports. Bolivarianism has continually evolved as a coherent ideology since Hugo Chávez was elected president in late 1998.

Components of Chávez's Bolivarianism

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Chávez has used his charismatic aura and skills as an orator to invigorate supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution during both electoral campaigns and rallies. Here Chávez addresses a fiery lecture to red-shirted chavistas at the Worker's Day march on January 05, 2005 in downtown Caracas.

In recent years, its most significant political manifestation is in the government of Venezuela's president Hugo Chávez, including changing the 1999 Constitution and Venezuela's name to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and other ideas such as the Bolivarian Schools, Bolivarian Circles, and the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela. Often, the term Bolivarianism is used specifically to refer to Chávez's rule. The central points of Bolivarianism, as extolled by Chávez, are:

1.	Venezuelan economic and political sovereignty (anti-imperialism).
2.	Grassroots political participation of the population via popular votes, referendums and Communal Councils (participatory democracy).
3.	Economic self-sufficiency (in food, consumer durables, et cetera).
4.	Instilling in people a national ethic of patriotic service.
5.	Equitable distribution of Venezuela's vast oil revenues.
6.	Eliminating corruption.

Historical development into a democratic socialist movement

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Chávez extols the anti-imperialist aspects of Bolivarianism, which were first kindled during his college years, in an address to hundreds of thousands of chavistas along Caracas's Avenida Bolívar on May 16, 2004.

Subsequent to the 2002 coup attempt, the attempted lockout and work stoppage by Venezuela's oil industry, and an unsuccessful and internationally verified 2004 Venezuelan recall referendum on Chávez's presidency, political and social policies and development popularly associated with the "Bolivarian Revolution" began to accelerate, and involved increased participation by the Venezuelan poor. Following the example of the Cuban Revolution, Chávez began to organize Bolivarian Circles in Venezuelan communities with the purpose of promoting the Revolution. After the coup, many in the movement, including Chávez himself, began advocating socialism as being the correct direction in which the "Bolivarian Revolution" should move. This has historical significance, being the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall that such a statement of intention has come from a popular leader. Chávez has also stated that we must forget the "ghosts" with which socialism has been associated in the 20th century, developing a new "Socialism of the 21st Century".

The recent political history of Venezuela has been marked by clashes - often violent - between supporters of Mr. Chávez and his opponents. The proclamation of 49 laws by Chávez in late 2001 under powers granted to him by the country's National Assembly, the supreme legislative power, led to opposition. At the same time, the price of oil, Venezuela's principal export and the main source of government funds, fell, forcing the government to sharply curtail spending, which led to a decline in support for the government amongst Venezuela's poor, who make up the majority of voters. The resulting political tension led to an increasingly tense political situation in the country, which culminated in the violent attempted coup of 11 April 2002.

Chávez returned to the presidency on 13 April 2002 and promised national reconciliation, but the president ultimately refused to make concessions on his economic plans. The breakdown in dialogue between the government and the opposition eventually led to the calling of a "national strike" in December 2002, designed to force early presidential elections. As part of the strike, thousands of employees of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company, walked off the job, shutting down oil production in the world's fifth largest oil exporter. The strike was eventually broken by the government in January 2003. As a result of the strike, some 19,000 PDVSA employees were fired. Critics have consistently claimed that PDVSA has failed to return oil production to pre-strike levels. A delayed audited financial statement submitted by PDVSA in October 2005 showed this claim to be false, with oil production returning to pre-strike levels during April 2003, three months after the 2003 opposition strike ended.

Following his 2004 referendum victory, Chávez embraced a more concretely leftist social, economic and foreign policy. Chávez now advocates "socialism of the 21st century" although there is debate among both supporters and critics as to the meaning of such a term.

Authoritarian versus Democratic

There is an ongoing debate about whether Hugo Chávez rescued Venezuela from the corruption of the Pacto de Punto Fijo or damaged the very foundations of the nation’s democracy.

The Authoritarian Position

Main article: Criticism of Hugo Chávez

Some critics believe that there is too much power in Chávez's hands. Some scholars perceive Chávez’s new constitution as contradictory and authoritarian. Although it is comprehensive in it sections concerning human rights, some argue that the strength and power that is given to the highest branch of the government could violate human rights anyhow. Chávez’s new Constitution allows the president to be in office considerably longer than in the previous constitution, which some argue supports authoritarianism. The most disturbing element of the Constitution to some is that it only expects that the military be nonpartisan and compliant. This is interpreted by some to mean that the army could have major role in society and the state. Scholars also criticize the manner in which Chávez gained power and his conduct just after his election. When Chávez organized a new constituent assembly, some thought his real motivation was not to create a more democratic nation, but merely to settle the score with Venezuela’s traditional political parties and to remove them from all positions of influence. These scholars view Chávez’s attempt to overthrow the government in 1992 as equal to the corruption of the traditional parties, which seized power by military intervention in 1945 and disbanded Venezuela’s Congress and Supreme Court.

Furthermore, Chávez’s use of inflammatory and exclusionary language against his opponents mimics the more authoritarian qualities of the traditional Venezuelan political leaders.

The Democratic Stance

On the other hand, some argue that Chávez is the protector of democracy. In their view, although Chávez's government does emphasize the mobilization of the masses and confrontational speeches, Chávez cannot be equated to fascism since his ideology is left wing and egalitarian. Others are more pronounced in their views that Chávez is a benefit to democracy. These people believe that Chávez liberated Venezuela from the corruption of the Pacto de Punto Fijo and that he stands for a much needed deep transformation in Venezuelan society. They think that since Chávez does not belong to any particular political body, he is better able to meet the interests of Venezuelans.

While some label Chávez as an “authoritarian nationalist” similar to Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, others compare him to a “neopopulist” similar to Alberto Fujimori. However, some believe Chávez’s democratic rise to power and the new constitution, which outlines new democratic procedures, as invalidating comparisons with Nasser, Fidel Castro and other leaders of neo-liberal states. Some critics of Chávez compare him to Fujimori but this comparison is also incorrect, because unlike Fujimori, Chávez has an independent foreign policy, a radical discourse, and he did not endorse massive privatization. While those who argue that Chávez is too authoritarian in his policies, others praise him for his abstinence from using force against demonstrations that demanded his removal from presidency.

Women in the "Bolivarian Revolution"

Chávez sought the opinions of women in the drafting of the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution. Women of various socio-economic backgrounds were involved in the drafting of portions of the Constitution including former guerilla fighters, professionals, housewives and members from Women’s organizations such as Women for Venezuela and United Women Leaders. It discusses sexual discrimination, sexual harassment and domestic violence. It recognizes domestic housework ‘as an economically productive activity’ thus entitling housewives to social benefits (Article 88). In most countries, domestic work does not have economic value (with exceptions such as Germany). Furthermore, the Constitution explicitly states women’s position in society as well as removes class distinctions.

Aside from drafting the Constitution, women have also lent their hand in formulating legislation about health care, education, the environment and indigenous and reproductive rights.

The Women's Development Bank, also referred to as Banmujer, attempts to empower women politically, economically and socially.

Women’s organizations such as INAMUJER, have also played a role in the "Bolivarian Revolution". It performs functions such as educating women about what their political rights are and how to defend them. It also informs women about their sexual reproductive rights and how to prevent abuse against women. It provides telephone hotlines for victims of abuse to report crimes as well as shelters, such as Casa de Abrigo for victims of spousal abuse. INAJUMER also attempts to mobilize marginalized women into their organizations and involve them in the political discourse.

Racism in Venezuela

Racism in Venezuela During the Colonial Period

Over a period of three centuries, about 100,000 slaves aged 15-20 were brought to Venezuela. These slaves were treated inhumanely. They were rubbed with coconut oil to give them a black shine so as to attract slave buyers and their mouths were forced open to inspect their teeth before purchase, a demeaning practice usually reserved for horses.

The theologians of the Spanish empire legitimized the slave trade using the Bible, suggesting that blacks have their origins in Ham, who came from a light skinned ancestry but was born dark skinned. Ham symbolized the impression the Spaniards had of the slaves: drunk and ignoble. Therefore, it was easy to blame them for society’s troubles. This prejudice and culpability came to be associated with indigenous peoples as well.

The Royal Certificate of Special Dispensation of 1795 allowed those of mixed race to purchase the classification of being “white.” However, there was strong opposition by the white criollos. The whites feared social and economic equality among the races. The large cacao plantations they had come to own represented a large source of their wealth. These plantations had been developed through slave labour and indigenous servitude. Therefore equality among the races would mean the abolishment of slave labour, and indigenous servitude and thus the abolishment of plantations.

The African slave trade ended in 1797 however, it did not abolish servitude among the Afro-Venezuelans and the indigenous.

In later years, a national identity of a “mixed” race known as mestizo was formed. The mestizo identity was a way to marginalize the Afro-Venezuelans and the indigenous because now their race was no longer recognized. Simply, it was a way to exclude an entire social class of Afro-Venezuelans and indigenous people. The result for the indigenous was that they lost their rights to their land.

Marginalization of Afro-Venezuelans

Under the new Bolivarian constitution, drafted in 1999, indigenous Venezuelans’ rights were recognized. For example, Article 121 of the constitution states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their ethnic and cultural entity, worldview, values, spirituality, and sacred places of worship. The state shall promote the appreciation and dissemination of the cultural manifestations of the indigenous peoples, who have the right to their own education and an education system of an intercultural and bilingual nature, taking into account their special social and cultural characteristics, values, and traditions.”

Although Hugo Chávez is considered to be partly of African descent, Afro-Venezuelans continue to be marginalized and have yet to be recognized or mentioned in anyway under the Bolivarian constitution.

Role of Social Groups in the Bolivarian Movement

Afro-Venezuelan social groups such as La Red Afro-Venezolana advocate a change of legislation so that Afro-Venezuelans’ rights are legally recognized under the constitution. Groups such as La Red Afro-Venezolana are working toward implementing Afro-Venezuelan education into the educational system, for example. In addition, these grassroots groups state that democracy in Venezuela cannot exist if Afro-Venezuelans are not included in the constitution. Afro-Venezuelans are working toward obtaining their rights through the Bolivarian movement’s concept of participatory democracy. Through participatory democracy, they are able to have a say in policies that affect them. Many Afro-Venezuelans are optimistic about their future under the Bolivarian movement.

Other positive steps toward recognition of Afro-Venezuelan rights are conferences that have been held in Venezuela to eradicate racism. For instance, the International Afro-Descendent Conference took place in Caracas, May 6-8, 2005. The conference focused on Latin American unity on this sensitive subject, as well as ways to promote inclusion and visibility of Afro-Venezuelans.

Policies and aspects

Military’s Role in Social Missions

Origins

“Go house to house combing the terrain. The enemy. Who is the enemy? Hunger!” (Hugo Chávez, 2005). As a youth, Hugo Chávez only dreamed of becoming a pitcher in the Major Leagues. At the age of seventeen, he became a soldier in order to leave his poverty stricken life behind, and get to Caracas to attend high school and educate himself. It was his drive to learn and study the history of his people that often brought him to conflict with the life he was leading as a soldier. Accordingly in October 1977, as a twenty-three year old Lieutenant, Chávez secretly formed “The Bolivarian Army of the Liberation of the Venezuelan People”, which consisted of just five members. In 1982, as Captain of the paratroopers, he and his growing army swore an oath under the “saman”, which is a tree that Bolívar once camped under. This oath accelerated the movement of a Bolivarian army within the Venezuelan army. Here Chávez stated, “If I am here, this is where I will engage in struggle”, speaking of Caracas. Chávez was elected 1998 on three main promises: (i) to break the old political system of "puntofijismo"; (ii) to end corruption; and (iii) to alleviate poverty in Venezuela. Once Chávez gained power he began to replace institutionalized civilian control of armed forces with direct presidential control. In 1999 the new constitution expanded military judicial boundaries, and Chávez took ultimate control of the military including promotions of personnel. He quickly appointed officers who supported him in the 1992 coup to prominent positions and the military became a vital force in the government’s social policy.

Theoretical Framework and Social Crisis

Civil relations theorists have long cautioned of the armed forces partaking in domestic missions in democratic societies. They warn that this participation can politically bolster the military and lead to the overthrow of the government. However, history has shown that military involvement can be conducted without risk to democracy if elected officials who will limit their missions properly supervise it. Such increased military involvement in social missions will occur to compensate for the states inability to provide public services and goods demanded by the people. In addition, it is argued that political intervention by the military is just one outcome of internal conflict induced by crisis. This can be seen in 1999, when Venezuela fell under severe economic crisis. At this time oil prices fell to $7.00 per barrel, even though the budget planned for $14.00. This led to the immediate cut back of oil production, massive external debt, low wages, inflation of over 35% and 20% unemployment. The state weakness induced military immersion in the many domestic affairs and social missions. These missions were a product of the long-term deterioration of institutions of civilian control and short-term upsurges of political crisis involving citizens, and not the armed forces. Another period of crisis hit in 2002. There was a coup attempt; three general strikes, led by emplyers; and the sabotage and shut-down of the oil industry. This limited the resources available for many of the ongoing missions, but also increased military involvement throughout the country.

Chávez believes that the perfect government is one that strives to guarantee the greatest degree of happiness for it people. As a reaction to state weakness, Plan Bolivar 2000 was devised to empower the poor, end poverty, and solidify political support. Consequently, Plan Bolivar 2000 began to use the armed forces as servants of the people on February 27, 1999. The military of Venezuela, with civilian volunteers flooded the streets and began to work, repair schools, build markets, provide food, and educate the people. Chávez said, “We are going to fill them with bursts of life instead of gunshots of death.”

Social justice aspects

Venezuela under the Chávez administration has deployed numerous national social welfare programs (Misiónes or "Missions") of massive scale:

• Air Force Plan of social routes - The air force transports people for free, who cannot afford to travel but desperately need to.
• Mission Barrio Adentro ("Mission Inside the Neighborhood") - a series of initiatives (deployed in three distinct stages: I, II, and III) to provide free, comprehensive, and high-quality community health care (at both the primary (Consultorios y Clínicas Populares or clinics) and secondary (hospital) levels in addition to preventative medical counsel to the twenty million people that live in Venezuela's medically underserved and impoverished barrios.
• Mission Guaicaipuro (launched 12 October 2003) - carried out by the Venezuelan Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, this program seeks to restore communal land titles and human rights to Venezuela's numerous indigenous communities, in addition to defending their rights against resource and financial speculation by the dominant culture.
• Mission Hábitat ("Mission Habitat") - has as its goal to build thousands of new and free housing units for the poor. Also seeks to develop agreeable and integrated housing zones that make available all social services from education to healthcare. Vision is similar to that of New Urbanism.
• Mission Identidad - This program mainly seeks to ease the process of obtaining an ID card which are used to facilitate access to the social services provided by the other Missions.
• Mission Mercal - seeks to provide access to high-quality produce, grains, dairy, and meat at discounted prices. Seeks to provide Venezuela's poor increased access to nutritious, safe, and organic locally- and nationally-grown foodstuffs. Seeks also to increase Venezuela's food sovereignty.
• Mission Miranda - establishes a Venezuelan military reserve and provides needed social benefits to unemployed Venezeulan veterans from poor socioeconomic backgrounds.
• Mission Robinson (launched in July 2003) - uses volunteers to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic to the more than 1.5 million Venezuelan adults who were at that time illiterate.
• Mission Ribas (launched November 2003) - provides remedial high school level classes to the five million Venezeulan high school dropouts; named after independence hero José Felix Ribas.
• Mission Sucre (launched in late 2003) - provides free and ongoing basic education courses to the two million adult Venezuelans who had not completed their elementary-level education.
• Mission Vuelta al Campo ("Return to the Countryside"; announced in mid 2005) - seeks to encourage impoverished and unemployed urban Venezuelans to willingly return to the countryside
• Mission Vuelvan Caras ("Mission Turn Faces") - is one of the more vague and less concrete Missions; seeks to "realize a quality of dignified life for all Venezuelans via popular participation in conjunction with the Revolutionary Government in the social and economic transformation of the country, via education and labor."
• Plan Pescar 2000 - The military works with fishermen, organizing co-operatives, repairing iceboxes and refrigerators, and offering training.
• Plan Casiquiare 2000 - Casiquiare is a river in the jungle inhabited by indigenous people. The military assists in the distribution of medicine to the people; and doctors are sent to give vaccination and examine the children. The armed forces also help to build homes for the inhabitants based on what the inhabitants want, not the government.
• Plan WASP - this plan was created by General Garcia Carneiro, where the communities work together to build their own homes. This results in increased employment, increased social cohesion, and the building of new homes. The soldiers make the building blocks, and give courses, as well as, making the wooden doors for the homes.
• Highway at a lower cost - in this mission, soldiers finished highway lanes that have been in stagnation for over twenty years. The estimated cost to complete these highways was 5 billion bolivars. The use of the military’s machinery and military engineers allowed this major job to be completed with only 1.5 billion bolivars.

In particular, the literacy programs that Misión Sucre comprises are centered on encouraging and facilitating ordinary Venezuelans' literacy and comprehension of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution and their inherent human rights as Venezuelan citizens therein. These programs have been criticized as inefficient and incomplete by opposition figures, but are widely heralded and appreciated by Chávez backers and by many international observers.

These are just a few of the many missions taking place in Venezuela today. These missions help promote social justice and social welfare. They are anti-poverty and work effectively to promote education and empower the large poor population of Venezuela. They work to refurbish infrastructure and provide health care for the poor. Moreover, they combat illiteracy and unemployment. With regards to the oil price crisis discussed above, by the end of 1999, Chávez was able to raise prices up to $16.00 per barrel, after meeting with OPEC leaders. The military has played a vital role in the building of over 600,000 schools. Also, by the end of 1999 the government more than doubled the health and education budgets. Over 60% of the population is now studying and there are now doctors in villages with medicine, which is free for the people. A scholarship fund has been created where 400,000 people receive $100.00 per month to study. The military’s increased role in domestic social policy has played a large role in the improvement of many of Venezuela’s problems. Chávez sums this up in an interview he gave in January 2003: “All this…would not have happened without the profound contact between the army and the people. That is Mao. The water and the fish. The people are to the army what the water is to the fish. In Venezuela today we have fishes in the water…”

Many of these programs involve importing expertise from abroad; Venezuela is providing Cuba with 53,000 barrels of below-market-rate oil a day in exchange for the service of thousands of physicians, teachers, sports trainers, and other skilled professionals.

Oil profits -- about 25 billion dollars in 2004 -- allowed the Chávez administration to carry out what he calls a "new socialist revolution." The leftist platform involves a remarkable increase in spending on social programs. The Chávez administration has thus built free health care clinics, subsidized food and created small manufacturing cooperatives. Political scientist Michael Shifter says these projects have galvanized his core supporters -- the poor -- who make up around 60 percent of the country's population.

Venezuela has been involved in the purchase of a large number, 300,000, Russian assault rifles as well as military helicopters. As well, "neighborhood defense units" has been established to protect the nation against a purported American invasion.

Market socialist aspects

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Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frías addressing Venepal workers during a ceremony celebrating the expropriation decree.

In 2004, a group of trade unionists occupied the Venepal paper mill, the largest supplier of paper products in Venezuela, and called for its nationalization under workers' control. The company that oversaw the factory had previously been forced to declare bankruptcy as a result of financial losses stemming from its participation in the general lockout in 2003. Workers occupied the factory and restarted production, placing the factory under democratic worker management. Following a failed deal with the prior corporate management and amidst the company's threats to sell off equipment, the Chávez administration expropriated and nationalized the Venepal mill and extended a government line of credit to the factory for use in making repairs and installing upgrades.

The example of Venepal has inspired many of Chávez's supporters to call for the transformation of the Venezuelan economy to a fully market socialist model. However, other Chávez supporters fear that such expropriations would incur retaliation from the United States. Nonetheless the "Bolivarian Revolution" is quickly developing into a socialist movement.

A free software law was implemented in January 2006. Directive 3.390 mandated all government agencies to migrate to free software over a two year period.

Results

Domestic

The changes brought about by the "Bolivarian Revolution" have altered the economic and cultural landscape of Venezuela. Most notably, recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust, supported mainly by crude oil high prices; per-capita GDP in 2004 rose over 25% from 1998 levels. According to Chávez's administration sources, there have also been significant drops since 1999 in both unemployment and government-defined poverty, and marked improvements in infant mortality between 1998 and 2005. Domestically, the Chávez administration has launched anti-poverty initiatives, constructed thousands of free medical posts near shanty towns, instituted educational campaigns that have allegedly taught more than one million adult Venezuelans to read, enacted deep food and housing subsidies, and promulgated the new progressive 1999 Bolivarian constitution. Chávez has also overseen state-supported experimentation in participatory economics as well as the granting of thousands of free land titles to formerly landless poor and indigenous communities; in contrast, several large landed estates and factories have been — or are in the process of being — nationalized.

According to The Boston Globe, the head of Mission Sucre, a program to provide free and ongoing education, says that “investments in education, health, and infrastructure will have a lasting effect on standard of living”. Data from a private Venezuelan research firm shows the incomes of the “poorest Venezuelans have risen because of subsidies and grants”. The Globe reports that the government has “subsidized markets in poor neighborhoods that sell staple foods up to 40 percent cheaper than elsewhere.” Low income residents are reportedly living better because of subsidies that boost household income, decrease food costs, and provide access to free schooling and basic medical care. Chavez’s “missions” offer education, aid to the needy, soup kitchens, and medical care.

Criticism of domestic effects

Main article: Criticism of Hugo Chávez

Chávez was first elected on an anti-corruption platform and on promises of redistributing wealth to the poor, but Michael Shifter of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service says that "despite record oil profits that are funding social spending, his initiatives have yielded only very modest gains", and The Economist reports that his policies are most vulnerable in the areas of corruption, jobs and crime.

During Chávez's presidency from 1999 to 2004, per-capita GDP dropped 1–2%, but with the help of rising oil prices, the end of the oil strike, and strong consumption growth, recent economic activity under Chávez has been robust. GDP growth rates were 18% in 2004, 9% in 2005, and 9.6% in the first half of 2006, with the private sector growing at a 10.3% clip. From 2004 to the first half of 2006, non-petroleum sectors of the economy showed growth rates greater than 10%. Some economists argue that this subsidized growth could stop if oil prices decline, and some social scientists and economists claim that the government's reported poverty figures have not fallen in proportion to the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years. The president of a private Venezuelan research firm which documented 55% real income growth among the poorest sectors of society said that, although his surveys showed rising incomes because of subsidies and grants, the number of people in the worst living conditions has grown. "The poor of Venezuela are living much better lately and have increased their purchasing power . . . [but] without being able to improve their housing, education level, and social mobility," he said. "Rather than help [the poor] become stakeholders in the economic system, what [the government has] done is distribute as much oil wealth as possible in missions and social programs."

According to government figures, unemployment has dropped by 6.9% since the start of Chávez's presidency. Despite high oil revenues, Venezuela's rate of unemployment remains at 10% in February 2006 from the 2003 high of 20%, which occurred during a two-month strike and business lockout that shut down the country's oil industry. However, some economists argue that recent job creation may not be permanent, for it relies on an expanded public payroll that will become unaffordable if oil prices fall. With the help of an expanded public payroll, unemployment has been reduced from the 2003 high under Chávez of 20%, but some economists argue that the jobs may not be permanent, and critics question the government's reported poverty figures, based on contradictory statistics and definitions, which they say have not fallen enough considering the country's vast oil revenues in the last two years. The Economist reports that both poverty and unemployment figures under Chávez have not seen significant improvement and that official corruption under his government continues to be rampant, and point to the 1-2% drop in Venezuela's per-capita GDP early in Chávez's term, before the 2004 surge in oil prices. According to The Boston Globe, critics say the government defines "informal workers, such as street vendors, as employed, and exclud[es] adults who are studying in missions from unemployment numbers." When the president of the Venezuelan National Statistics Institute released numbers in 2005 which showed that poverty had actually risen by more than 10 points under Chávez (to 53% in 2004), Chávez called for a new measure of poverty, defining a "social well-being index". Under this new definition, poverty registers at 40 percent. The minimum wage in Venezuela in July 2006 covered only 65 percent of the cost of the basic food basket.

The government and independent observers refute the charges of economic decline by pointing out that the renewed economic growth of the last two years has brought rapid reductions in poverty, especially when one considers the vast expansion of non-cash income represented by subsidized food distribution and other social programs.

At the same time, The Economist opines that the administration's unwillingness to utilize private sector resources has resulted in a crumbling public infrastructure and a deficit in housing. Critics cite the many public hospitals that lack basic medicine and hygienic supplies. They also question the motives behind the Bolivarian Missions' regular cash and in-kind payments to the millions of poor Venezuelans enrolling in their social programs. With many enrollees participating in more than one Mission simultaneously, receiving a steady and unearned income, critics worry that work ethic will be corrupted and enrollees will be predisposed to support and vote for Chávez. Supporters would respond that the opposition was not similarly worried about economic policy influencing political allegiances in the years when the current Venezuelan opposition promoted policies that re-distributed income upward. There have been marked improvements in the infant mortality rate between 1998 and 2005.

According to Venezuela's El Universal, one of the Chávez administration's outstanding weaknesses is the failure to meet its goals of construction of housing. Chávez promised to build 150,000 houses in 2006, but in the first half of the year, completed only 24 percent of that target, with 35,000 houses.

Venezuela's non-traditional exports decreased by 20 percent in the first quarter of 2006. The drop was attributed to uncertain regulations on exports, markets lost because of politics, restrictions on purchasing US dollars, and bureaucratic delays affecting exporters, according to Francisco Mendoza, president of the Venezuelan Exporter's Association (AVEX). Mendoza said Venezuela is losing five large trade partners by withdrawing from the Group of Three (G-3) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), exchanging them for less valuable markets in the Common Market of the South (Mercosur). He says that only 10 percent of AVEX members have been granted certificates to purchase USD dollars needed for exports, and that overvaluation of the Venezuelan bolivar undermines the competitiveness of Venezuelan products abroad.

ISN Security Watch says that, as long Venezuela's military leaders remain loyal to Chávez, they will "receive no oversight from Caracas", resulting in impunity and corruption. Gustavo Coronel, a former member of PDVSA's board of directors, claimed that social programs are "run by military officers who have little to no oversight". Members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces are alleged to be involved in supplying arms to Colombia's FARC, and U.S. anti-drug officials allege that corruption within the Chávez administration is converting Venezuela into a trafficking route for Colombian drugs. Critics also allege widespread corruption in the police force.

The Economist reports that "Mr Chávez has grasped all the powers of state into his own hands, and eliminated all independent oversight of his government. The opposition argues that the inevitable result of this is graft on an increased scale." Berlin-based Transparency International, in its annual survey Corruption Perceptions Index, ranked Venezuela as one of only a dozen countries where perceived corruption had "greatly increased", resulting in a ranking of 130 out of the 150 countries surveyed, to become the nation perceived as the third most corrupt in Latin America, above Paraguay and Haiti. Critics claim that rampant corruption reaches the highest levels of Venezuelan airport and security officials, that billions of dollars have been siphoned away from social programs by corrupt officials, and that leaders of the military have limited oversight, creating an environment in which impunity and corruption develop.

Since he took office, The Economist reports that the murder rate has almost tripled, and that Venezuela's capital – Caracas – has become South America's most violent, with police implicated in some of the crimes. The United Nations reported in 2005 that Venezuela had the highest number of deaths by gunfire per capita in the world, garnering for Venezuela claim to the title of the world's most violent crime capital.

Critics claim that Chávez's policies are responsible for some of these declines. and the U.S. State Department says there is unchecked concentration of power in the executive.

Critics accuse the Bolivarian Circles Chávez founded of furthering violence, and say Chávez's new civil reserve defense force is intended to intimidate domestic opponents and repress internal dissent. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States. According to a study by Brigham Young University scholars, the "Bolivarian circles" also help the government identify opponents, who are then denied services.

According to an article in Foreign Policy Magazine, "On average, Chávez shuffles more than half of his cabinet every year." During his presidency, Chávez has had six Ministers of Interior and Justice. In August 2006, following assaults on a squatter and a National Assembly member, El Universal says that Chávez called on the latest Minister, Jesse Chacón to quit if he could not do the job, demanding more rigor in the fight against corruption, and affirming the need to clean up and transform the local police forces. He questioned the impunity that exists in the country, and challenged authorities, like Chacón, to resign if they couldn't make progress against crime. He also called for greater protection of squatters settling on landed estates.

Some criticism has come from Chávez's supporters. Chávez's own political party, Fifth Republic Movement (MVR), has been criticized as being riddled with the same cronyism, political patronage, and corruption that Chávez alleged were characteristic of the old "Fourth Republic" political parties. Venezuela's trade unionists and indigenous communities have participated in peaceful demonstrations intended to impel the government to speed up labor and land reforms. These communities, while largely expressing their sympathy and support for Chávez, criticize what they see as Chávez's slow progress in protecting their interests against managers and mining concerns, respectively.

Farmers have protested about the lack of a consistent policy addressing prices, smuggling, insecurity and crime.

Left wing parties have also been very critical of Chavez as the main left wing parties do not support Chavez, and never did. MAS (Movement towards Socialism) MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement), CR (Radical Cause) have been very critical towards Chavez.

Foreign affairs

Further information: Foreign policy of Hugo Chávez

The "Bolivarian Revolution" under Chávez has also refocused Venezuelan foreign policy on Latin American economic and social integration by enacting bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements, including his so-called "oil diplomacy". Chávez regularly portrays his movement's objectives as being in intractable conflict with neocolonialism and neoliberalism. As a result of his anti-capitalist and redistributive domestic policies combined with his strong relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro and other controversial figures, Venezuela-U.S. relations have deteriorated in recent years.

Chávez has also made a policy of spreading his ideas around the world and funding groups such as the International Bolivarian Circles and reaching out to Iran, Syria and Zimbabwe in the form of visits, symbolic acts and numerous trade agreements. Perhaps he is best known on the diplomatic scene for systematically opposing the United States numerous times.

Criticism of foreign policy

Main article: Criticism of Hugo Chávez

The New York Times has represented Chàvez as "thriving on the atmosphere of confrontation" between Venezuela and the U.S. The Washington Post has described him as an "ideologue". A PBS discussion panel has said that Chávez's actions are "hurtful to Venezuela's democracy" and that he is "making all types of unfounded allegations about what the U.S. is up to in Venezuela."

Chávez's trips abroad have also caused some criticism within his own coalition. For example, in July 2006 the National Assembly refused to ratify a trip to North Korea. The BBC reports that Chávez has spent 365 days abroad since taking office.

U.S. News & World Report and U.S. government officials say that the Chávez administration allows alleged terrorist organizations to operate within Venezuela's borders, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamiyya al Gammat. U.S. officials also allege that the Venezuelan government is knowingly providing identity documents to these organizations. The Venezuelan government flatly denies all of these claims. The U.S. government criticizes Venezuela's cooperation in the "War on Terrorism" as negligible or purposely indifferent, particularly with regards to FARC and ELN in neighboring Colombia, which the U.S. government considers to be terrorist organizations, while Venezuela accuses the U.S. government of having a double standard for giving safe haven to Luis Posada Carriles. However, U.S. officials acknowledge that there is no evidence of Chavez engaging directly in terrorism.

Critics say that Chávez's large purchases of military hardware are for reasons other than the defence of his country in the event of the "imminent US invasion", which he has repeatedly claimed will take place and which has used as a reason to justify these large transactions. Colombian military analyst Alfredo Rangel says that Chávez's new civil reserve defense force, claimed to consist of approximately two million members, may be intended to intimidate domestic opponents and suppress internal dissent, dismissing the possibility of a U.S. invasion. Chávez government officials respond that the reserve is similar to civilian reserves and forces in many nations, including the United States.

On August 3, 2006 Chávez ordered the Venezuelan charge d'affaires to Israel, to return from Tel Aviv to Caracas, protesting the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict. The Israeli government responded by recalling the Israeli ambassador to Venezuela.

Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Mark Regev responded, "As an act of protest against the one-sided policy of the president of Venezuela and in light of his wild slurs against the state of Israel and in response to the recall of the Venezuelan charge d'affaires to his country, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni decided to bring our ambassador in Venezuala back temporarily for consultations."

CNSNews says that critics of Israel, many of them in the Arab world, hailed Chávez in his dealings with Israel. Al-Ahram Weekly commented, "it was somehow ironic that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, following his attack on Israel and the recalling of his ambassador to Tel Aviv, emerged as the most popular leader within the Arab world." The Syrian communist party urged Arab governments to "follow the example of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez”.

President Chávez's has made a number of trips to Libya in his role as OPEC representative to discuss the international situation, declining oil prices, and OPEC production. The first occurred in 2001 after a personal invitation he received in 1999 by Muammar al-Gaddafi. Some members of the National Assembly of Venezuela accused Chávez of not reporting his trip to Libya and hiding it under a tour of Europe and Africa. Venezuela's former ambassador to Libya Julio César Pineda said in 2003 that Chávez was coordinating an anti-American strategy with terrorist states following his visit to Libya, but today, Libya is moving closer to alignment with the United States at a time that Chávez is setting himself up as South America's leading anti-American.

President Chávez has developed strong ties with the government of Iran, in particular in the area of energy production, economic, and industrial cooperation. He has visited Iran on several occasions, the first time in 2001, when he declared that he came to Iran to "prepare the road for peace, justice, stability and progress for the 21st century". Mohamed Khatami also has visited Venezuela on three occasions. During his 2005 visit, Chávez awarded him the Orden del Libertador and called him a "tireless fighter for all the right causes in the world". In May of 2006, Chávez expressed his favorable view of the production of nuclear energy in Iran announced by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and denied that they had plans to develop atomic weapons. His relationship with the government of Iran and his support for their nuclear program has elicited the concern of the U.S. government. Condoleezza Rice commented that, given the political strategy of President Chávez in relation to Iran, "Venezuela has become a negative force in the region".

See also

• CIA involvement in 2007 Venezuelan Referendum
• Heinz Dieterich
• Socialism of the 21st century

Notes

• Venezuelanalysis.com, Rafael Ramirez A National, Popular, and Revolutionary Oil Policy for Venezuela, June 9, 2005 [2]
• Venezuelanalysis.com, Gregory Wilpert The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela, August 30, 2003

[3]

• Venezuelanalysis.com, Oil Wars How much money does Venezuela Really get from Oil?, January 17, 2006

[4]

References

• Venezuelanalysis. (Venezuelanalysis, 20 Jul 2005). "Unemployment Drops 3.7% in Venezuela". Retrieved 15 Oct 2005.
• Wilpert, Gregory. (Venezuelanalysis, 12 Sep 2005). "Venezuela’s Quiet Housing Revolution: Urban Land Reform". Retrieved 18 Oct 2005.
• Schuyler, George W. (The Policy Studies Organization) Health and Neoliberalism: Venezuela and Cuba. Retrieved 18 Oct 2005.

• Template:Es icon Gobierno en Línea: Misiones — Official government website detailing the Bolivarian Missions.
• Richard Gott, The Guardian, May 30 2005, Chávez leads the way
• Christian Parenti, The Nation, 11 April 2005, "Hugo Chávez and Petro Populism"

External links

• Template:Es icon Gobierno en Línea: Misiones — Official government website detailing the Bolivarian Missions.
• Template:Es icon Misión Barrio Adentro — Official government Mission Barrio Adentro web portal.
• Template:Es icon Instituto Nacional de Estadística — Venezuela's National Institute of Statistics; has web several portals for accessing demographic and economic data related to the impact of Bolivarian Missions.
• Template:Es icon Barrio Adentro — Official government dossier on Barrio Adentro (in Spanish)
• Template:Es icon Aló Presidente 225 — Video of a July 2005 episode of Hugo Chávez's talkshow Aló Presidente that features an eight hour tour of a new Barrio Adentro II CDI (Centros de Diagnóstico Integral) in Maturín, Monagas state, Venezuela.
• Template:Es icon Programa Nro. 225 - Aló Presidente — Transcript of Aló Presidente 225.
• Venezuela's Cooperative Revolution from Dollars & Sense magazine
• Venezuela's Path by Michael Albert
• Venezuelanalysis.com