Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

The mushroom cloud over Hiroshima after the dropping of Little Boy

The Fat Man mushroom cloud resulting from the nuclear explosion over Nagasaki rises 18 km (11 mi, 60,000 ft) into the air from the hypocenter.

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were nuclear attacks at the end of World War II against the Empire of Japan by the United States at the order of U.S. President Harry S. Truman on August 6 and 9, 1945. After six months of intense firebombing of 67 other Japanese cities, the nuclear weapon "Little Boy" was dropped on the city of Hiroshima on Monday, August 6 1945, followed on August 9 by the detonation of the "Fat Man" nuclear bomb over Nagasaki. These are to date the only attacks with nuclear weapons in the history of warfare.

The bombs killed as many as 140,000 people in Hiroshima and 80,000 in Nagasaki by the end of 1945, roughly half on the days of the bombings. Since then, thousands more have died from injuries or illness attributed to exposure to radiation released by the bombs. In both cities, the overwhelming majority of the dead were civilians.

Six days after the detonation over Nagasaki, on August 15, Japan announced its surrender to the Allied Powers, signing the Instrument of Surrender on September 2, officially ending the Pacific War and therefore World War II. (Germany had signed its Instrument of Surrender on May 7, ending the war in Europe.) The bombings led, in part, to post-war Japan adopting Three Non-Nuclear Principles, forbidding that nation from nuclear armament.

The Manhattan Project

Main article: Manhattan Project

The United States, with assistance from the United Kingdom and Canada, designed and built the first atomic bombs under what was called the Manhattan Project. The scientific research was directed by American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer. The Hiroshima bomb, a gun-type bomb called "Little Boy", was made with uranium-235, a rare isotope of uranium. The atomic bomb was first tested at Trinity Site, on July 16, 1945, near Alamogordo, New Mexico. The test weapon, "the gadget," and the Nagasaki bomb, "Fat Man", were both implosion-type devices made primarily of plutonium-239, a synthetic element.

Choice of targets

Although many political and military leaders, including General Eisenhower, argued against dropping the bombs on civilian targets, the Target Committee had few qualms about using them on civilian targets. Professor Mark Selden writes, "A few U.S. military men raised questions ...but no significant discussion of the ethics or the political ramifications of civilian bombing took place either in policy councils or in the public domain...Despite fleeting discussions about demonstrating the power of the bomb at an uninhabited test site, discussions which took place largely outside the corridors of power, the road to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was essentially devoid of consideration of the ethical implications of its use."

Map showing the locations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan where the two atomic weapons were employed

The Target Committee at Los Alamos on May 10–11, 1945, recommended Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and the arsenal at Kokura as possible targets. Hiroshima was described as "This is an important army depot and port of embarkation in the middle of an urban industrial area. It is a good radar target and it is such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged. There are adjacent hills which are likely to produce a focussing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage. Due to rivers it is not a good incendiary target." The Target Committee stated that "It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size and with possible focussing from nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic value."

During World War II, Edwin O. Reischauer was the Japan expert for the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, where he is said to have prevented the bombing of Kyoto during the war, as explained by Robert Jungk in Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A personal history of the atomic scientists:

"On the short list of targets for the atom bomb, in addition to Hiroshima, Kokura and Niigata, was the Japanese city of temples, Kyoto. When the expert on Japan, Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, heard this terrible news, he rushed into the office of his chief, Major Alfred MacCormack, in a department of the Army Intelligence Service. The shock caused him to burst into tears. MacCormack, a cultivated and humane New York lawyer, thereupon managed to persuade Secretary of War Stimson to reprieve Kyoto and have it crossed off the black list."

In his autobiography, Reischauer specifically refuted the validity of this broadly-accepted version:

"I probably would have done this if I had ever had the opportunity, but there is not a word of truth to it. As has been amply proved by my friend Otis Cary of Doshisha in Kyoto, the only person deserving credit for saving Kyoto from destruction is Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, who had known and admired Kyoto ever since his honeymoon there several decades earlier."

The Potsdam ultimatum

On July 26, Truman and other allied leaders issued The Potsdam Declaration outlining terms of surrender for Japan. It was presented as an ultimatum and stated that without a surrender, the Allies would attack Japan, resulting in "the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland" but the atomic bomb was not mentioned. On July 28, Japanese papers reported that the declaration had been rejected by the Japanese government. That afternoon, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki declared at a press conference that the Potsdam Declaration was no more than a rehash (yakinaoshi) of the Cairo Declaration and that the government intended to ignore it (mokusatsu). The statement was taken by both Japanese and foreign papers as a clear rejection of the declaration. Emperor Hirohito, who was waiting for a Soviet reply to noncommittal Japanese peace feelers made no move to change the government position. On July 31, he made clear to Kido that the Imperial Regalia of Japan had to be defended at all costs.

In early July, on his way to Potsdam, Truman had re-examined the decision to use the bomb. In the end, Truman made the decision to drop the atomic bombs on Japan. His stated intention in ordering the bombings was to bring about a quick resolution of the war by inflicting destruction, and instilling fear of further destruction, that was sufficient to cause Japan to surrender.

Hiroshima

Hiroshima during World War II

At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of some industrial and military significance. A number of military camps were located nearby, including the headquarters of the Fifth Division and Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's 2nd General Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan. Hiroshima was a minor supply and logistics base for the Japanese military. The city was a communications center, a storage point, and an assembly area for troops. It was one of several Japanese cities left deliberately untouched by American bombing, allowing a pristine environment to measure the damage caused by the atomic bomb. Another account stresses that after General Spaatz reported that Hiroshima was the only targeted city without prisoner of war (POW) camps, Washington decided to assign it highest priority .

A postwar "Little Boy" casing mockup

The center of the city contained several reinforced concrete buildings and lighter structures. Outside the center, the area was congested by a dense collection of small wooden workshops set among Japanese houses. A few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the city. The houses were of wooden construction with tile roofs, and many of the industrial buildings also were of wood frame construction. The city as a whole was highly susceptible to fire damage.

In front of the harbor of the city, on the island of Okunoshima, was a toxic gas factory linked to Unit 731. Different types of chemical weapons were produced there during the first part of the Shōwa era like mustard gas, yperite, lewisite and cyanide.

The population of Hiroshima had reached a peak of over 381,000 earlier in the war, but prior to the atomic bombing the population had steadily decreased because of a systematic evacuation ordered by the Japanese government. At the time of the attack the population was approximately 255,000. This figure is based on the registered population used by the Japanese in computing ration quantities, and the estimates of additional workers and troops who were brought into the city may be inaccurate.

File:Hirgrnd1.jpg

Seizo Yamada's ground level photo taken from approximately 7 km northeast of Hiroshima.

The bombing

For the composition of the USAAF mission see 509th Composite Group.

Hiroshima was the primary target of the first nuclear bombing mission on August 6, with Kokura and Nagasaki being alternative targets. August 6 was chosen because there had previously been cloud cover over the target. The 393d Bombardment Squadron B-29 Enola Gay, piloted and commanded by 509th Composite Group commander Colonel Paul Tibbets, was launched from North Field airbase on Tinian in the West Pacific, about six hours flight time from Japan. The Enola Gay (named after Colonel Tibbets' mother) was accompanied by two other B29s, The Great Artiste which carried instrumentation, commanded by Major Charles W. Sweeney, and a then-nameless aircraft later called Necessary Evil (the photography aircraft) commanded by Captain George Marquardt.

After leaving Tinian the aircraft made their way separately to Iwo Jima where they rendezvoused at 2440 m (8000 ft) and set course for Japan. The aircraft arrived over the target in clear visibility at 9855 m (32,000 ft). On the journey, Navy Captain William Parsons had armed the bomb, which had been left unarmed to minimize the risks during takeoff. His assistant, 2nd Lt. Morris Jeppson, removed the safety devices 30 minutes before reaching the target area.

Hiroshima, in the aftermath of the bombing

The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) was uneventful, and the gravity bomb known as "Little Boy", a gun-type fission weapon with 60 kg (130 pounds) of uranium-235, took 57 seconds to fall from the aircraft to the predetermined detonation height about 600 meters (1,900 ft) above the city. Due to crosswind, it missed the aiming point, the Aioi Bridge, by almost 800 feet and detonated directly over Shima Surgical Clinic. It created a blast equivalent to about 13 kilotons of TNT. (The U-235 weapon was considered very inefficient, with only 1.38% of its material fissioning.) The radius of total destruction was about 1.6 km (1 mile), with resulting fires across 11.4 km² (4.4 square miles). Infrastructure damage was estimated at 90 percent of Hiroshima's buildings being either damaged or completely destroyed.

About an hour before the bombing, Japanese early warning radar detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. An alert was given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima. At nearly 08:00, the radar operator in Hiroshima determined that the number of planes coming in was very small—probably not more than three—and the air raid alert was lifted. To conserve fuel and aircraft, the Japanese had decided not to intercept small formations. The normal radio broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to air-raid shelters if B-29s were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance.

Japanese realization of the bombing

The energy released by the bomb was powerful enough to burn through clothing. The dark portions of the garments this victim wore at the time of the blast were emblazoned on to the flesh as scars, while skin underneath the lighter parts (which absorb less energy) was not damaged as badly.

The Tokyo control operator of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to re-establish his program by using another telephone line, but it too had failed. About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within 16 kilometers (10 mi) of the city came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima. All these reports were transmitted to the headquarters of the Japanese General Staff.

Military bases repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima. The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at headquarters; they knew that no large enemy raid had occurred and that no sizable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time. A young officer of the Japanese General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt at headquarters that nothing serious had taken place and that it was all a rumor.

The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles (160 km) from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the land still burning and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke was all that was left. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer, after reporting to Tokyo, immediately began to organize relief measures.

Tokyo's first knowledge of what had really caused the disaster came from the White House public announcement in Washington, D.C., sixteen hours after the nuclear attack on Hiroshima.

By August 8, 1945, newspapers in the US were reporting that broadcasts from Radio Tokyo had described the destruction observed in Hiroshima. "Practically all living things, human and animal, were literally seared to death," Japanese radio announcers said in a broadcast captured by Allied sources.

Post-attack casualties

According to most estimates, the immediate effects of the blast of the bombing of Hiroshima killed approximately 70,000 people. Estimates of total deaths by the end of 1945 from burns, radiation and related disease, the effects of which were aggravated by lack of medical resources, range from 90,000 to 140,000. Some estimates state up to 200,000 had died by 1950, due to cancer and other long-term effects. From 1950 to 1990, roughly 9% of the cancer and leukemia deaths among bomb survivors was due to radiation from the bombs. At least eleven known prisoners of war died from the bombing.

Survival of some structures

Above shows a small-scale recreation of the Nakajima area around ground zero. There remains modern "Rest House" (right) and a few structures.

Some of the reinforced concrete buildings in Hiroshima were very strongly constructed because of the earthquake danger in Japan, and their framework did not collapse even though they were fairly close to the center of damage in the city. Eizo Nomura (野村 英三, Nomura Eizō) was the closest known survivor, who was in a basement of modern "Rest House" only 100 m from ground-zero at the time of the attack. Akiko Takakura (高蔵 信子, Takakura Akiko) was among the closest survivors to the hypocenter of the blast. She had been in the strongly built Bank of Hiroshima only 300 m from ground-zero at the time of the attack. Since the bomb detonated in the air, the blast was more downward than sideways, which was largely responsible for the survival of the Prefectural Industrial Promotional Hall, now commonly known as the Genbaku, or A-bomb Dome designed and built by the Czech architect Jan Letzel, which was only 150 meters (490 ft) from ground zero (the hypocenter). The ruin was named Hiroshima Peace Memorial and made a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1996 over the objections of the U.S. and China.

Events of August 7-9

After the Hiroshima bombing, President Truman announced, "If they do not accept our terms, they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the likes of which has never been seen on this earth." On August 8 1945, leaflets were dropped and warnings were given to Japan by Radio Saipan. (The area of Nagasaki did not receive warning leaflets until August 10, though the leaflet campaign covering the whole country was over a month into its operations.)

The Japanese government still did not react to the Potsdam Declaration. Emperor Hirohito, the government and the War council were considering four conditions for surrender: the preservation of the kokutai (Imperial institution and national polity), assumption by the Imperial Headquarters of responsibility for disarmament and demobilization, no occupation, and delegation to the Japanese government of the punishment of war criminals.

The Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov informed Tokyo of the Soviet Union's unilateral abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 5. At two minutes past midnight on August 9, Tokyo time, Soviet infantry, armor, and air forces launched an invasion of Manchuria. Four hours later, word reached Tokyo that the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. The senior leadership of the Japanese Army began preparations to impose martial law on the nation, with the support of Minister of War Korechika Anami, in order to stop anyone attempting to make peace.

Responsibility for the timing of the second bombing was delegated to Colonel Tibbets as commander of the 509th Composite Group on Tinian. Scheduled for August 11 against Kokura, the raid was moved forward to avoid a five day period of bad weather forecast to begin on August 10. Three bomb pre-assemblies had been transported to Tinian, labeled F-31, F-32, and F-33 on their exteriors. On August 8 a dress rehearsal was conducted off Tinian by Maj. Charles Sweeney using Bockscar as the drop airplane. Assembly F-33 was expended testing the components and F-31 was designated for the mission August 9.

Nagasaki

Nagasaki during World War II

Urakami Tenshudo (Catholic Church in Nagasaki) in January 1946, destroyed by the atomic bomb, the dome of the church having toppled off.

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern Japan and was of great wartime importance because of its wide-ranging industrial activity, including the production of ordnance, ships, military equipment, and other war materials.

In contrast to many modern aspects of Hiroshima, the bulk of the residences were of old-fashioned Japanese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame buildings, with wood walls (with or without plaster), and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also housed in buildings of wood or other materials not designed to withstand explosions. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan; residences were erected adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as closely as possible throughout the entire industrial valley.

Nagasaki had never been subjected to large-scale bombing prior to the explosion of a nuclear weapon there. On August 1, 1945, however, a number of conventional high-explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few hit in the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city, several hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there. While the damage from these bombs was relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki and many people—principally school children—were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the nuclear attack.

To the north of Nagasaki there was a camp holding British Commonwealth prisoners of war, some of whom were working in the coal mines and only found out about the bombing when they came to the surface. At least eight known POWs died from the bombing.

The bombing

A post-war "Fat Man" model

For the composition of the USAAF mission see 509th Composite Group.

On the morning of August 9, 1945, the U.S. B-29 Superfortress Bockscar, flown by the crew of 393rd Squadron commander Major Charles W. Sweeney, carried the nuclear bomb code-named "Fat Man", with Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29's flying an hour ahead as weather scouts and two additional B-29's in Sweeney's flight for instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged.

Illustration of the implosion concept employed in "Fat Man".

Observers aboard the weather planes reported both targets clear. When Sweeney's aircraft arrived at the assembly point for his flight off the coast of Japan, the third plane, Big Stink, flown by the group's Operations Officer, Lt. Col. James I. Hopkins, Jr. failed to make the rendezvous. Bockscar and the instrumentation plane circled for forty minutes without locating Hopkins. Already thirty minutes behind schedule, Sweeney decided to fly on without Hopkins.

Nagasaki before and after bombing

By the time they reached Kokura a half hour later, a 7/10 cloud cover had obscured the city, prohibiting the visual attack required by orders. After three runs over the city, and with fuel running low because a transfer pump on a reserve tank had failed before take-off, they headed for their secondary target, Nagasaki. Fuel consumption calculations made en route indicated that Bockscar had insufficient fuel to reach Iwo Jima and they would be forced to divert to Okinawa. After initially deciding that if Nagasaki were obscured on their arrival they would carry the bomb to Okinawa and dispose of it in the ocean if necessary, the weaponeer Navy Commander Frederick Ashworth decided that a radar approach would be used if the target was obscured.

At about 07:50 Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53, the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given.

A few minutes later, at 11:00, The Great Artiste, the support B-29 flown by Captain Frederick C. Bock dropped instruments attached to three parachutes. These instruments also contained an unsigned letter to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a nuclear physicist at the University of Tokyo who studied with three of the scientists responsible for the atomic bomb at the University of California, Berkeley, urging him to tell the public about the danger involved with these weapons of mass destruction. The messages were found by military authorities but not turned over to Sagane until a month later. In 1949 one of the authors of the letter, Luis Alvarez, met with Sagane and signed the document.

A Japanese report on the bombing characterized Nagasaki as "like a graveyard with not a tombstone standing".

At 11:01, a last minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed Bockscar's bombardier, Captain Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The "Fat Man" weapon, containing a core of ~6.4 kg (14.1 lbs.) of plutonium-239, was dropped over the city's industrial valley. Forty-three seconds later it exploded 469 meters (1,540 ft) above the ground exactly halfway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works) in the north. This was nearly 3 kilometers (2 mi) northwest of the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the Urakami Valley and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills. The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT. The explosion generated heat estimated at 3900 degrees Celsius (7000 degrees Fahrenheit) and winds that were estimated at 1005 km/h (624 mph).

Casualty estimates for immediate deaths range from 40,000 to 75,000. Total deaths by the end of 1945 may have reached 80,000. The radius of total destruction was about 1.6 km (1 mile), followed by fires across the northern portion of the city to 3.2 km (2 miles) south of the bomb.

An unknown number of survivors from the Hiroshima bombing had made their way to Nagasaki, where they were bombed again.

Plans for more atomic attacks on Japan

The United States expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August, with three more in September and a further three in October. On August 10, Major General Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum to General of the Army George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, in which he wrote that "the next bomb . . should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or 18 August." On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President." There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in production until Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. "The problem now [August 13th] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use."

The surrender of Japan and subsequent occupation

Main articles: Surrender of Japan and Occupation of Japan

Up to August 9, the war council was still insisting on its four conditions for surrender. On that day Hirohito ordered Kido to "quickly control the situation" "because Soviet Union has declared war against us". He then held an Imperial conference during which he authorized minister Togo to notify the Allies that Japan would accept their terms on one condition, that the declaration "does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler".

On August 12, the Emperor informed the imperial family of his decision to surrender. One of his uncles, Prince Asaka, then asked whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito simply replied "of course". As the Allied terms seemed to leave intact the principle of the preservation of the Throne, Hirohito recorded on August 14 his capitulation announcement which was broadcast to the Japanese nation the next day despite a short rebellion by militarists opposed to the surrender.

In his declaration, Hirohito referred to the atomic bombings :

Moreover, the enemy now possesses a new and terrible weapon with the power to destroy many innocent lives and do incalculable damage. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.

In his "Rescript to the soldiers and sailors" delivered on 17 August, he stressed the impact of the Soviet invasion and his decision to surrender, omitting any mention of the bombs.

During the year after the bombing, approximately 40,000 U.S. occupation troops were in Hiroshima. Nagasaki was occupied by 27,000 troops.

Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission

In the spring of 1948, the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) was established in accordance with a presidential directive from Harry S. Truman to the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council to conduct investigations of the late effects of radiation among the survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Among the casualties were found many unintended victims including:

• Allied POWs.
• Korean and Chinese labourers.
• Students from Malaya on scholarships.
• Some 3,200 Japanese American citizens.

One of the early studies conducted by the ABCC was on the outcome of pregnancies occurring in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in a control city, Kure located 18 miles (29 km) south from Hiroshima, to discern the conditions and outcomes related to radiation exposure. Some would say ABCC was not in a position to offer medical treatment to the survivors except in a research capacity. One author has claimed that the ABCC refused to provide medical treatment to the survivors for better research results. In 1975, the Radiation Effects Research Foundation was created to assume the responsibilities of ABCC.

The Hibakusha

Panoramic view of the monument marking the hypocentre, or ground zero, of the atomic bomb explosion over Nagasaki.

Citizens of Hiroshima walk by the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, the closest building to have survived the city's atomic bombing.

The surviving victims of the bombings are called Hibakusha (被爆者), a Japanese word that literally translates to "explosion-affected people". The suffering of the bombing has led Japan to seek the abolition of nuclear weapons from the world ever since, exhibiting one of the world's most firm non-nuclear policies. As of 31 March 2007, there were 251,834 hibakusha recognized by the Japanese government; most live in Japan. The government of Japan recognizes about 1% of these as having illnesses caused by radiation. The memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki contain lists of the names of the hibakusha who are known to have died since the bombings. Updated annually on the anniversaries of the bombings, as of August 2007 the memorials record the names of almost 400,000 hibakusha — 253,008 in Hiroshima, and 143,124 in Nagasaki. News accounts often use these figures as a source for the numbers of people who have died because of the bombings.

Korean survivors

During the war Japan brought many Korean conscripts to both Hiroshima and Nagasaki to work as forced labor. According to recent estimates, about 20,000 Koreans were killed in Hiroshima and about 2,000 died in Nagasaki. It is estimated that one in seven of the Hiroshima victims was of Korean ancestry. For many years, Koreans had a difficult time fighting for recognition as atomic bomb victims and were denied health benefits. However, most issues have been addressed in recent years through lawsuits.

Debate over bombings

Main article: Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Those who argue in favor of the decision to drop the bombs generally assert that they caused the Japanese surrender, preventing massive casualties on both sides in the planned invasion of Japan.

Those who argue against the decision to drop the bombs characterize them as inherently immoral, war crimes or, crimes against humanity and/or state terrorism. They may also argue that they were militarily unnecessary.

See also

• Hiroshima Maidens
• Hiroshima National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims
• Hiroshima Peace Memorial
• Japanese atomic program
• Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum
• Nagasaki Peace Park
• Pumpkin bomb dummy atomic bomb
• Strategic bombing during World War II
• The United States and nuclear weapons

Further reading

The black marker indicates "ground zero" of the Nagasaki atomic bomb explosion.

There is an extensive body of literature concerning the bombings, the decision to use the bombs, and the surrender of Japan. The following sources provide a sampling of prominent works on this subject matter.

• Hein, Laura and Selden, Mark (Editors) (1997). Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. M. E. Sharpe. ISBN 1-56324-967-9. {{cite book}}: |author= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Sherwin, Martin J. (2003). A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies. Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-3957-9.
• Sodei, Rinjiro (1998). Were We the Enemy? American Survivors of Hiroshima. Westview Press. ISBN 081333750X.
• Ogura, Toyofumi (1948). Letters from the End of the World: A Firsthand Account of the Bombing of Hiroshima. Kodansha International Ltd. ISBN 4-7700-2776-1.
• Sekimori, Gaynor (1986). Hibakusha: Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kosei Publishing Company. ISBN 4-333-01204-X.
• The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1981). Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings. Basic Books. ISBN 046502985X.
• Hogan, Michael J. (1996). Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521562066.
• Knebel, Fletcher and Bailey, Charles W. (1960). No High Ground. Harper and Row. ISBN 0313242216.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) A history of the bombings, and the decision-making to use them.
• Sweeney, Charles; et al. (1999). War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission. Quill Publishing. ISBN 0380788748. {{cite book}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |author= (help)
• Rhodes, Richard (1977). Enola Gay: The Bombing of Hiroshima. Konecky & Konecky. ISBN 1568525974. {{cite book}}: More than one of |author= and |last= specified (help)
• Richard H. Campbell (2005). "Chapter 2: Development and Production". The Silverplate Bombers: A History and Registry of the Enola Gay and Other B-29s Configured to Carry Atomic Bombs. McFarland & Company, Inc. ISBN 0-7864-2139-8.
• Goldstein, Donald M; Dillon, Katherine V. & Wenger, J. Michael Rain of Ruin: A Photographic History of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1995, Brasseys, Washington & London) ISBN 1-57488-033-0
• Murakami, Chikayasu (2007). Hiroshima no shiroi sora ~The white sky in Hiroshima~. Bungeisha. ISBN 4286037088.

External links

• "The Effects of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. 1946.
• "Scientific Data of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Disaster". Atomic Bomb Disease Institute, Nagasaki University. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Correspondence Regarding Decision to Drop the Bomb". NuclearFiles.org.
• "The Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb; Gar Alperovitz And The H-Net Debate".
• Dietrich, Bill (1995). "Pro and Con on Dropping the Bomb". The Seattle Times.
• "Tale of Two Cities: The Story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". Retrieved 2007-07-09.
• "Documents on the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb". The Harry S. Truman Library.
• "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki". Manhattan Project, U.S. Army. 1946.
• Burr, William (Editor) (2005). "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II: A Collection of Primary Sources". National Security Archive. {{cite web}}: |first= has generic name (help)
• Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, official homepage.
• Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, official homepage.
• The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, A Collection of Primary Sources, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 162.
• Above and Beyond a 1952 MGM feature film with the love story behind the billion dollar secret, about Paul & Lucey Tibbets
• Enola Gay: The Men, the Mission, the Atomic Bomb a 1980 film for TV
• Tale of Two Cities, 1946 Documentary (videostream)