Talk:Douglas MacArthur

"win" the Medal of Honor

According to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medal_of_honor the CMH is award to those who "…conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States…"

My questions are:

1) At which part of the Battle for the Philippines did Dugout Doug ever risk his life?

2) At which point was he personally engaged in action against the Japanese?

Seems to me that his award of the CMH in 1942 was a complete travesty and totally at odds with the requirements of the award.

SDJ 2/28/08

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—Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.142.211.19 (talk) 07:18, 29 February 2008 (UTC)

You do not "win" the Medal of Honor. You receive it. ( not even that, you are awarded the Medal of Honor.) Some would say that you are invested with the Medal.

68.100.161.83 15:29, 7 March 2006 (UTC)

He was "awarded" the medal for his defense during the Battle for the Philippines. Dragonrider27 (talk) 20:11, 26 May 2008 (UTC)

I find it interesting in this context that almost alone of Wikipedia articles on Medal of Honor winners, MacArthur's article does not contain the citation. Is that because the citation, when compared against available documentation, wouldn't pass the giggle test? Peter.zimmerman (talk) 17:09, 28 June 2008 (UTC)

I have inlined the citation to bring the article into line with that of other Medal of Honor recipients. The text of the citation was written by General Marshall himself based upon a draft by General Sutherland. It contains one glaring historical error: the notion that the defence of the Philippines was conducted in the face of overwhelming enemy superiority. That this was untrue would not emerge until after the war. James E. Van Zandt had introduced a bill authorising award of the medal to MacArthur. Marshall felt that it would be more proper if the award came from the President and the War Department rather than from Congress. That the citation was not for valour in combat was not overlooked, but the case of Charles Lindbergh was cited as a precedent. Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:54, 28 June 2008 (UTC)

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What no mention of his firing on the WWI Veterans?—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 210.49.193.178 (talk • contribs) 22:27, 7 July 2002.

Because that is Communist crap from the "bonus march" of 1932. In fact the only serious combat took place BEFORE the military took over. Some policemen and some bonus marchers had a fight (with casualties on both sides).

When MacArthur took over he managed to defeat the bonus marchers (some of whom were not WWI Veterans) without killing anyone. The Communists never forgave him for denying them their "martyrs" so they invented some.

Paul Marks.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 193.63.48.48 (talk • contribs) 17:30, 31 May 2006.

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I question the changing of the spelling to "modern" Korean terms. If someone is going to want to know what MacArthur did at Inchon, they're not going to know to look at Incheon. Should we rename the movie "Fifty-five Days at Beijing"? -- Zoe

I agree and I changed all the history-related links back. I see no harm in having the newer spellings at South Korea/Cities or in any other contemporary context. --mav

mav, see your talk page for a link and the reasons of the changes. I think for terms like these, we should handle them like you would handle misspellings. That is, someone looking for Inchon should be redirected to Incheon. Or would you create an encyclopedia entry for Inchon covering the time it was romantized this way, and another entry for Incheon since the new rules? And one for Inch'on which was the correct spelling according to the old romantication?—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 210.180.96.41 (talk • contribs) 19:08, 5 August 2002.

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Is the general's name spelled Matthew B. Ridgway or Matthew B. Ridgeway? I've seen Ridgway used more often, although Ridgeway is how it is spelled on the NATO website.—The preceding unsigned comment was added by Ugen64 (talk • contribs) 23:49, 10 October 2003.

Ridgway is correct. Pmeisel 01:36, 8 Jan 2005 (UTC)

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I question the writing ability of the author of this article. "He was busying praying" while the invasion was occurring? ugen64 01:44, Nov 13, 2003 (UTC)

Why not cover other people's mistakes when possible to do so without dishonor? 金 15:25, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC)

Technically not correct. He was reading his Bible. He wasn't, for instance, odering Brereton's B-17s to bomb socked in Japanese airbases on Formosa, or convoys still formed up in Formosan harbors. Neither was he arranging movement of food & medical supplies in case of emergency. Neither was he arranging with Hart to provide air reconaissance for Hart's submarines. One may ask what, exactly, he was doing, beyond disobeying a direct order from DC. Trekphiler 13:58, 29 December 2006 (UTC)

MacArthur's handling of Kokoda

Paul Ham, an Aussie journalist, has written a book called "Kokoda". He has been incredibly critical of both Blamey and MacArthur. MacArthur because he was an armchair commander, issuing ridiculous, unreasonable and, quite frankly criminal orders to Australian troops. Not only this, but he was dismissive of the Australian army in general, he only went over to PNG once - and even then never saw the conditions the men were fighting in - he insisted on advancing when it was not possible, from what I understand he was one of the reasons why they never employed planes to fly out dreadfully wounded men, and he manipulated the media in Australia and in America to make out it was he who was commanding the fighters on the front line.

If it wasn't for Austraila's gallant few (the Australian militia and the 2nd AIF) who held back the advancing enemy time and time again sometimes outnumbered by a much as 6 to 1 and never giving an inch, Macarthur's true incompetence all throughout the Kokoda campaign would've been very evident, most likely resulting in the invasion of Australia. Instead Macarthur's good understanding of how to handle (some would argue manipulate)the media and make himself look very responsible for the victory of the Battle of Kokoda overshone the selfless acts of the diggers and the Fuzzy Wuzzy angles once again denying them of their rightful title as competent soldiers good men and victors.

Some time earlier in the Kokoda campaign, Macarthur added to this saying that the (australians) were an inferior fighting force and were not equal to their enemies. when in fact the opposite was true.

All in all, not a nice individual and I'm amazed that PNG wasn't successfully invaded by the Japanese (though they had their own incompetent leadership). - Ta bu shi da yu 08:09, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

Far from "never giving an inch", the diggers retreated all the way from Buna back to Imita Ridge. They were defeated by the Japanese at every turn. Kokoda was a Australian defeat, not a victory. MacArthur was right to be concerned about the Australian performance, especially after Malaya. For a number of reasons, the Australian Army did not fight as well at Kokoda as it did in Malaya and West Timor.

The charge that MacArthur visited PNG only once is completely untrue. He was there for months on end in 1943 and 1944. His strategy was sound and subsequent events vindicated it. Higher leadership of the Australian Army was very good. The problem was that Australia had not built a balanced Army with the logistical wherewithal to fight a campaign.

Wounded men were flown out but they had to be taken to an airstrip. The loss of Kokoda meant that there was no airstrips on the track until you got back to Port Moresby. Hawkeye7 10:40, 26 April 2007 (UTC)

Not sure what your references are Hawkeye, but all the ones I have, do not seem to mention that Kokoda was "a[n] Australian defeat" Fortunately for you and I, we still speak English due to their efforts. They obviously won at Kokoda, but it was slow due to the sheer numerical force presented by the Japanese. The Australian plan was to delay to a point where the Japanese could no longer sustain themselves and culminated. This occured and was followed by a swift counter-attack all the way to Buna. Could I recommend Peter Fitzsimons book "Kokoda" and "The Odd Couple - Blamey and MacArthur at War" by Jack Galaway.

You are right about MacArthurs presence in PNG although 'months' is also a little generous. Gallaway produces MacArthurs movements by day and states "MacArthur spent 60 days in New Guinea in 1942, but never went further north than Port Moresby. In 1943 he spent 65 days in New Guinea...[and] in 1944 ...28 days in the north..." What is true from a wide variety of reputable sources, MacArthur was not a great strategist, he instead was driven by his own ego. He lacked the integrity to speak the truth during a significant number of his communiques and was only ever interested in himself and his own development. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.183.168.254 (talk) 03:46, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

I have reviewed Galaway elsewhere and pronounced it garbage. Avoid it at all costs. Stick to the books written by historians (ie not Fitzsimmons). The best source on Australia's part in WWII is Gavin Long's "The Six Year's War", followed by Robertson's "Australia at War". For the campaigns in New Guinea, McCarthy's "South West Pacific", Dexter's "New Guinea Offensives" and Long's "Final Campaigns". For Blamey, read Horner; for MacArthur, read Clayton James. And yes, the battle of Kokoda was indeed a defeat. Hawkeye7 (talk) 10:06, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

Youngest General

MacArthur was certainly the youngest general at the time of his promotion to brigadier general. But I was under the impression that the youngest army general in US history would have been 19 year old Gilbert Lafayette in 1778, or does the Continental Army not count? -- Bucky (unregistered user) 10:55 16 December 2005 (UTC)

The page says he made Brigadier General in 1918. If he was born in 1880, then he would have been 38, not 28 as the text states. Therefore will delete the statement that he was 28 when he made general. 144.139.175.228 02:29, 25 June 2006 (UTC)

There were several generals that were younger during the Civil War. Among those that come to mind are George Custer (mid-20s?) and Wesley Merritt (again mid-20s). Reportedly the youngest of all was the wonderfully named Galusha Pennypacker, who was (depending on who you talk to, either 19 or 20 when he was promoted to Brig. Gen. just after Fort Fisher in 1865. The youngest general of the World War II era (supposedly) was James Gavin, who was in his mid-30s when promoted to Brig. Gen.68.190.212.114 02:30, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Custer held a brevet General rank in the Civil War, after the war he went back to his permanent rank of Captain.Awotter (talk) 17:36, 7 January 2008 (UTC)

A Nit

MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would invade, but if they did he said our airpower would make the invasion expensive.

And he would have been right had Truman not kept him from using the full power of the U.S. military to stop the Communist Chinese army. A number of years ago it was revealed that the communists knew that Truman wouldn't stop a Chinese invasion of Korea and based on that info, the Chinese attacked.[1] Jtpaladin 23:43, 16 May 2007 (UTC)

And aren't we all disappointed that we missed out on World War 3?Theamazingzeno (talk) 01:58, 3 February 2008 (UTC)

So - Were you in Truman's Cabinet? Jokem (talk) 19:08, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

MacArthur failed to understand conditions on the ground in Korea, and failed to anticipate that his rush to the Yalu River would put American divisions at risk in areas where airpower was tactically less useful. A more prudent general would not have split his command into such disparate pieces, spread them out, and failed to have adequate reconnaissance, communication, and military intelligence. MacArthur's incompetence was singularly responsible for the disastrous loss of life in that campaign.

IMHO PedEye1 (talk) 00:20, 14 May 2008 (UTC)

One-sided and POV

This article is ridiculously one-side and reads almost like something from the general's press agent. His very clear failures are passed over. For example, there's no mention that

1. many military historians consider him one of the most over-rated generals in history (he's actually listed as such in Robert Cowley's and Geoffrey Parker's "Reader's Companion to Military History"),

2. he's widely viewed as having badly misjudged Japanese capabilities and intentions leading up to the Japanese attack

3. his decision to meet the Japanese amphibious assaults at the beaches was a fiasco, particularly given the qualitative differences between his forces and the Japanese and the fact that his air force had been destroyed

4. his micro-management of logistical supplies undercut his fallback to Bataan

5. his later decision to retake the Philippines was strongly opposed by other war planners, who saw the Philippines as a secondary objective compared taking islands closer to Japan (and thereby cutting off the Japanese in the Philippines)

6. rather than simply contain the strongholds of Japanese resistance on Luzon (following the strategy taken in the rest of the Pacific by Nimitz), MacArthur insisted on a bloody reconquest of the whole archipelago, possibly for ego reasons (i.e., so he could live up to his vow to "return")

7. despite having been taken by surprise by the Japanese in 1941, he repeats the mistake in 1950 by underestimating the threat of a North Korean invasion of South Korea

In addition, the article barely mentions how badly MacArthur misjudged the possibilty of Chinese intervention on behalf of North Korea, or how many consider the Chinese intervention to be the "worst debacle in American military history" (to quote Bradford A. Lee). And while the article goes into extensive depth about how MacArthur "made his greatest contribution to history in the next five and a half years" as leader of the American occupation of Japan, it doesn't mention that a great many of his most significant reforms (industrial deconcentration and dismantling the zaibatsus, developing a Japanese labor movement) were almost completely reversed following 1948, when George C. Marshall sent George Kennan to Japan to take over what was widely perceived (by the U.S. government, at least) to be MacArthur's ineffectual and counter-productive reconstruction efforts. (See Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (Oxford, 1985).)

Instead, this article reads like a partisan of MacArthur's abortive 1950s-era presidential campaign. Puleeze. He wasn't all that and a bag of potato chips. Epstein's Mother 23:16, 2 January 2007 (UTC)

Schaller is a polemicist who is great at digging up facts to support biased half-truths and venomous lies, like David Irving only left-wing and apparently not against the law these days. Anything by him including on this page must be balanced by someone without an anti-MacArthur agenda.Shield2 03:46, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

Perhaps the balance might be achieved with a link to Logical_fallacy/Ad_Hominem. And my point was that there was no balance at all. The article mostly reads like something written by MacArthur's press agent. Epstein's Mother 06:55, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

The article seems like a fair rundown of his life, and in some parts it is actually a bit more negative than positive. Nothing as biased against him as Schaller, but nothing particularly laudatory either. It mentions the major controversies without offering an opinion on them. It doesn't say anything such as "others commend his actions during the Korean War, believing them to have prevented a complete loss," but instead comes close to suggesting that it is a hard fact that his actions were wrong rather than noble. As if "everyone knows" that. Was there a poll taken recently? It also leaves out important things he did, for better or worse, on his own accord during that war. Other than that, the article looks fine.

As for MacArthur's abilities as a commander, the brilliance with which he planned and commanded invasions and major offensive operations was unrivaled by any military leader of the 20th Century with the possible exception of Erwin Rommel. In that category he is actually the most underrated general in history . However, his skills as a defensive strategist were faulty and compared to his awe-inspiring offensive strategies, often abysmal. His management of logistics usually wasn't the best either, but it wasn't as responsible for the Philippines fiasco as as it is often claimed to be. MacArthur's weaknesses were only part of the problem, FDR was the main one to blame for that. His "Europe First" policy made no sense from an American standpoint, and even before America was officially drawn into the war he was paying more attention to helping Britain than defending the Pacific. The only wise policy relating to military logistics ever enacted by FDR was his refusal to bomb the concentration camp traintracks. As a tactician MacArthur was always excellent even during his worst moments, because he still managed to inflict more casualties than the enemy expected. He lost fewer men during his entire World War II career than Eisenhower did in the Battle of Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge (seperately, not put together), but critcs always seem to single him out for accusations of losing too many men. As far as casualties ratios, his record is again one of the greatest in history. The so-called historians who attack his military abilities are politically motivated. They dislike him because he was politically controversial and took political matters into his own hands in ways that determined the course of the 20th Century. Whether he was a dangerous arch-criminal on par with Hitler or the only truly courageous American patriot of the 20th Century to hold such a high position of world-altering power, MacArthur siezed and impacted the course of history in a way that few other post-Napoleanic Western leaders did. It's understandably difficult to get an honest and fair evaluation of such a man's strengths and shortcomings as a military leader. George Marshall, someone who really was "not all that and a bag of potato chips" in the grand scheme of things was nowhere near as historically significant as MacArthur, a lobster criticizing a shark because the scraps taste a bit too fishy.Shield2 10:19, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

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Not really McArthur relevant, but I'd like to argue that FDR's policy made perfect sense from an American standpoint, both in the short term and longer term...

FDR was the main one to blame for that. His "Europe First" policy made no sense from an American standpoint

Actually, "Europe First" made perfect sense from a U.S. grand strategy standpoint. At first, the USSR, bearing the brunt of the land war in Europe against Nazi Germany, were intensely suspicious of the U.S./U.K. cutting a deal with Germany for peace on the European theater's Western Front; this indeed was the sentiment of much of the Nazi leadership, who after the fall of France and the Low Countries in 1940 repeatedly expressed a willingness to allow the U.K. to retain her Empire in exchange for a free hand on the Continent, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. Rudolf Hess's Quixotic flight to England, deranged though it was, was with the intention of negotiating peace with Britain, an idea that was quite popular in Nazi circles at the time.

Stain frequently and bitterly complained to the West regarding the lack of a "second front". If the U.S.S.R. had collapsed in the early years after Barbarossa (1941 or 1942), which didn't seem at all impossible with the tremendous German gains in the first two years of that front, Germany would have gained almost unfettered, blockade-proof access to the oil fields of the Caucasus, the wheat fields of the Ukraine, and the other vast natural treasures of European Russia. Germany could have then relegated nearly all of their military resources to defense in the West, and through access to the sea through Scandinavia and the Baltic ports, they might have eventually developed a naval force sufficient to challenge the U.S. and the U.K. in the Atlantic. An Allied invasion of Europe would have been several orders of magnitude more costly and difficult with no Eastern front to divide the German land army.

Finally, they might have closed the Mediterranean and Suez, which Churchill later admitted would have made continuing U.K. prosecution of the war doubtful.

It was therefore critical to insure there was no Soviet collapse.

Later in the war, once it became clear that Nazi Germany would never conquer the U.S.S.R., and indeed the reverse was more likely, there was all the more pressure on the U.S./U.K. to get their land armies afoot on the continent, before much of Western Europe was overrun by the Red Army as they rolled back the Germans. It was absolutely critical to have Allied shoeleather on significant amounts of German soid, in order to participate in the shaping of the postwar continent. The Normandy invasions were barely in time to avoid total postwar Soviet control East of the Rhine.

Japan's war goals were far different than Germany's, although rooted in a similar quest for access to resources and empire. Japan did not pose a near-term threat to the continental U.S. Their conquest of Pacific islands was in order to make the Pacific, and in particular the Western Pacific, a Japanese lake, and to remove the ability of the U.S. and European empires the ability to project power to the Asian mainland. The Pacific islands themselves are of negligible value in terms of natural resources.

Japan already had conquered large areas of the Asian mainland, however their land army in Asia was heavily committed, and their conquests in Asia up until Pearl Harbor were not fully developed, requiring more infrastructure such as railways, in order to increase their striking distance further West into the Indian subcontinent.

Embeddedcynic (talk) 08:51, 26 January 2008 (UTC)

Use of air power

In the article, we have the following statement:

MacArthur's use of air power during the New Guinea campaign is considered by many historians as the first harnessing of air power to influence land warfare

This appears to be something of an over exaggeration as it makes it sound like MacArthur was the first person to think of using aricraft in a battlefield! Presumably Macarthur used planes in some novel way in this campaign but I have no idea as to what this might be. I'd suggest that we either find out what this is (with a reference) or simply remove the statement alltogether.

I didn't write that, but it would make much more sense if we added "strategically" or "from a strategic standpoint."Shield2 06:01, 29 June 2007 (UTC)

Re his use of airpower in New Guinea, I'd call it a pioneer use of tactical airlift; "strategic" isn't the word I'd use. Trekphiler 02:29, 30 June 2007 (UTC)

It was hardly the first major airlift. German Ju-52s carried Franco's army across the strait of Gibraltar, and the Germans had kept 80,000 troops in the Demyansk Pocket supplied by air in the winter of 41-42. Aircraft were certainly relevant to the New Guinea campaign, but I was under the impression that airpower in the South Pacific was most useful against the Japanese Navy.(TariqAlSuave 02:13, 5 October 2007 (UTC))

I removed the sentence as it's completely ridiculous on all levels. Billy Mitchell has long been considered a pioneer in the use of air power in coordination with land forces for martialing over 1,500 aircraft in the Battle of Saint-Mihiel; and as TariqAlSuave points out above MacArthur's command was hardly the first to use it as a tactical airlift instrument.Awotter (talk) 17:55, 7 January 2008 (UTC)

Dismissal section

The section "Dismissal" contains a strong POV. From a "Search Inside" at Amazon, it seems that this POV is indeed adopted in the cited book by Halberstam (The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War), but I couldn't find any appropriate quotes. The way it's currently phrased the POV is presented as fact. I suggest that this part should either be quoted as one view from Halberstam, or deleted. Perhaps someone who has access to the book could take this up? Joriki (talk) 17:00, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

I'm not going to get involved in the POV issue. I'd like to point out that this section starts off "In April 1952..." but that MacArthur was removed in 1951. Could we agree to change this reference to "In April 1951..." without issues? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.231.197.225 (talk) 03:49, 21 March 2008 (UTC)

Article split

Because of the size of the article I created Places named for Douglas MacArthur and Service summary of Douglas MacArthur. Places remains a section with a template direction to new article, most of the material moved was schools roads etc.. Service summary I added to the See Also section since it was a recapitulation of the sections of the main article.Awotter (talk) 00:01, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

p.s. Dates of rank and awards could (and probably should I think) be moved as well).Awotter (talk) 00:04, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

You're not The Bomb

I changed it to the Sov declaration; despite common U.S. opinion today, in Japan at the time, it seems, the Sov declaration was the bigger influence (since Japanese cities were being burned on a routine basis by then...). Anybody that wants to mention both, feel free; I'd very strongly discourage the (previous) emphasis on it being the Bomb alone. Trekphiler (talk) 09:58, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

The Soviets had declared war some considerable time previously. It was the "shock" factor of the bomb more than the destruction itself which "did the trick". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.148.1.17 (talk) 20:00, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

The Soviets declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945, effective 9 August - after the nuclear strike on Hiroshima on 6 August but before that on Nagasaki on 9 August. Japan offered to surrender on 10 August. Japanese historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa has written a whole book about this, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Belknap Press, 2005)), an hour-by-hour examination of how and why the Japanese leadership decided to surrender, compiled from the Japanese documents. His conclusion is that it was the Soviet declaration of war and not the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombings that led to the Japanese surrender. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:17, 20 January 2008 (UTC)

The defense rests. Perry Mason (talk) 07:21, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

References Screwed Up

Somebody apparently Rhinocerous Ranger has made hash of most of the references list. Someone who knows how, please fix. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Alrees (talk • contribs) 22:40, 25 January 2008 (UTC)

I see this has been fixed by Eupator, Thanks Alrees (talk) 20:12, 31 January 2008 (UTC)

Rather funny phrasing

From the "Dismissal" section:

MacArthur by this time had not been back to the United States for more than twenty years and suffered from paranoia, self-destructive impulses, and political aspirations, and he had visions of running against Truman in the 1952 elections.

The construction "... suffered from paranoia, self-destructive impulses, and political aspirations" suggests that we think political aspirations are something one "suffers from", like the aforementioned mental conditions. Also, in the context of this sentence, it is not clear whether the word "visions" refers to a visionary state (which would go with the context of mental conditions) or just reinforcing the "political aspirations". --FOo (talk) 10:46, 31 January 2008 (UTC)

SCAP

Surely his role as military governor of Japan (Supereme Commander of the Allied Powers) should be included in the info box? Cripipper (talk) 08:33, 15 February 2008 (UTC)

Dec 7 vs Dec 8

Those who insist upon giving the date of the attack on Pearl Harbor as Dec 8 based on Philippine local time should insert this technicality as a footnote. One of the objectives of these articles should be clarity. Remember that this article will be read by school children for whom WW2 is ancient history. —Preceding unsigned comment added by RandomTool2 (talk • contribs) 18:10, 27 February 2008 (UTC)

So why didn't you? Noted, however. Trekphiler (talk) 03:09, 2 March 2008 (UTC)

I find this:

"On the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 8, 1941, in Manila), MacArthur was Allied commander in the Philippines."

to be confusing. The way it is worded might make people a) think the article is incorrect or b) actually believe the Pearl Harbor attack occurred on 8 December 1941 in Manila. Yes, I understand there was an attack on the Philippines hours later, and that local time would mean it was December 8, not 7. Can that be restated for clarity? I was going to but then found I wanted to rewrite that paragraph completely.

MicheleFloyd (talk) 18:16, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

• Look under subject "Dec 7 vs Dec 8" for similar thoughts on this question. Editors are continually changing the 8 to 7, and it's getting very tiresome correcting this.RandomTool2 (talk) 19:39, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

MicheleFloyd, if you can find a way that's clear & doesn't invite constant reversion, I'll give you your own personal Barnstar, free gratis & for nothing, autographed by Elvis. Trekphiler (talk) 01:40, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

High School

Does anyone know what high school General MacArthur was an alumnus of? GO-PCHS-NJROTC (talk) 01:39, 1 March 2008 (UTC)

That's nothing worth adding to this article. Dragonrider27 (talk) 19:18, 13 May 2008 (UTC)

Heavily POV

This page is heavily pov- see for example

"The speech was recorded, and even in MacArthur's old and faltering voice, it is still possible to hear the mesmerizing presence and towering ego which drove him throughout his career. His stirring final passage sounds like a voice from another age[...]"

213.246.191.57 (talk) 09:14, 25 July 2008 (UTC)

I took a stab at correcting the peacock prose. Binksternet (talk) 23:22, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

POV

Somebody has removed both the POV dispute tag I placed on the main page and the rationale for it that I placed here on the talk page. As I said previously, (and was supported in this view by many other editors) the article has no balance and appears to have been hijacked by Macarthur hagiographers. I and others have tried to redress the imbalance before. However, the numerous referenced criticisms from reputable sources which several editors have posted have been repeatedly and systematically removed.

Life is too short to get into edit wars with those who appear to have infinite persistence, but it is reasonable to at least warn article readers that there is a significant difference of opinion on the veracity of this article. RichardH (talk) 04:33, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

what exactly is pov? 67.173.1.71 (talk) 22:36, 26 November 2008 (UTC)

All along the Watchtower

"largely responsible for the increased diversion of resources to the Pacific"? I wouldn't disagree, but it wasn't that simple (& I'd fix it if I had sources to hand...). There were two campaigns in PTO, his & Nimitz's, & FDR's inability to choose between them (or unwillingness, 'cause choosing Nimitz was liable to mean Dougie would be Stateside running for President before the ink was dry on the orders) put a strain on logistics & increased the number of LCs in-theatre. (It wasn't helped by slow unloading of shipping...) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 19:58, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Yeah, I don't have access to a source that confirms or denies MacArthur's responsibility for diversion of funds away from the ETO. I am, however, holding on to a diamond of a book that is filled with synthesis and analysis of the Pacific War: Retribution by Max Hastings. This guy has a boatload of sources laid out in front of him, some newly dug up, some historic. He deflates and skewers a couple of sacred American beliefs, such as the wisdom of a two-front war in the Pacific. He argues that MacArthur's presence alone was the reason for such a division of resources and that a unified command under Joint Chiefs control would have decided in favor of a strategy of island-hopping including the bypassing of the Philippines. Binksternet (talk) 21:24, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Hastings puts the importance of the Battle for the Philippines as equivalent to that for Burma. The Philippines didn't decide anything regarding the war's outcome. Binksternet (talk) 21:26, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Hastings was writing a popular work for British consumption. So he did not want to say controversial things about the war in Burma. (Whereas saying outrageous things about the Americans and Australians is okay.) But of course the war in Burma ultimately was not nearly as important as the campaign in the Philippines. Had there existed a Joint Chiefs organisation without inter-service rivalry, it would no doubt have decided on a single approach strategy. It would then have realised that the South West Pacific route was by far the better choice, as it would have allowed greater land and land-based air forces to be brought to bear on the enemy, and reduced casualties by allowing for manoeuvre at the operational level. In real life though, the JCS could not make such a decision, and indeed did not formulate a strategy for the war against Japan until 1943, by which time operations had long been under way in SWPA and SOPAC and the war had acquired a momentum of its own. MacArthur did cause the division of some forces from ETO to PTO in 1942; but in 1943 the JCS denied him the additional resources he asked for, thereby delaying his campaign into 1944. Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:10, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Yes, Retribution is meant to be a popular work. That's why I'm liking Hastings a lot after years of healthy but heavy fiber in my reading diet. Hastings is willing to say the unsayable and back it up based on new interviews and re-fittings of available data into the bigger picture. I'm finding him very quotable here as he's got the knack for bringing the dry facts together in a colorful and brief summation. We're all about brief summation.

In the spirit of "what if" conjecture, I don't think the Philippines or Taiwan were the only good choices open to the JCS for a base of operations nearer to Japan. A too-great amount of facility infrastructure had been put together in Australia -- that could have been used as a jumping off point along with the Marianas for the attack on Okinawa, thence from Okinawa to Japan. I just don't see the need for either Taiwan or the Philippines to be in the picture at all. I think MacArthur's presence in the mix is what made major land campaigns even a remote possibility after New Guinea and before Okinawa. See where I'm going? MacArthur was a big factor in the delays in getting close to Japan. It's not that JCS denied him resources, it's not that he got bogged down by surprisingly resilient defenses under Yamashita, it's the fact that he picked the battle at all. Binksternet (talk) 01:07, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

Ah, it was in front of me all along. here's the source for the phrase you quoted. At the very end of the text (before the footnotes) there's a synthesis that states MacArthur's and King's roles in pulling resources away from a Europe First goal. The reference system here works. ;^) Binksternet (talk) 21:55, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Whether the Philippines rises above Burma in importance is less relevant than its effect on diversion of resources from a more direct approach & a shorter war, & there's no question of that. Even sensible people have said the invasion was necessary as a base of ops for blockade, forgetting English & Lockwood had been laying on a blockade from Pearl (& later Guam) since around 24/12, when Joe Enright Grenfell (oops...) reached Empire waters.

MacArthur was so obsessed, he failed to see the main objective was defeating Japan, not liberating the Philippines; the same argument applied to adding force in CBI, which is 1 reason the major effort planned (name I don't recall) got cancelled. His very presence did divert resources, by his ability to get what he wanted; if I understand your argument (or Hastings') correctly, Bink, I'd agree with that.

IMO, any effort but a holding action by 14h Army was a needless diversion; the short route to Japan was through Saipan, Iwo, & Okinawa. (Let's not even mention MATTERHORN, or the diversion of fully half the funding for it to ROC graft...)

Hawk, I think you misread the situation in SWPA. Clearing New Guinea or DEI did not bring the Allies (I'd say U.S. & forget the Oz & NZ forces, their contribution was small, but it's not trivial) nearer Japan. Nor was land based airpower dominant. CVs were. You make the same mistake Fire in the Sky does (I can never spell his name correctly... ;) ), & the same mistake the Japanese did. Without seapower, the islands weren't strongholds, they were traps. Barrier & the Javelin describes the use of CVs as judo blitzkrieg, pointing out the need. (I can never spell his name properly, either. =]) I'd only add it wasn't CVs that were ultimately essential, it was subs; cutting off fuel would turn IJN CVs into floating a/c parks without the need to engage (which was more/less the situation by 10/44, but could've been a great deal sooner). Nimitz failed to see it, too (probably his one big mistake of the war), & Uncle Charlie (rightly, IMO) criticizes him for it in (thank Fabartus for reminding me).

We're agreed on the Philippines & Taiwan; I think JCS hadn't fully grasped the potentials of subs & B-29s to hammer the Japanese. As to why, that's a great question. Lack of vision? Distraction by ETO? Blinded by vengeance? I tend to discount, as Racing the Enemy proposes (tho limiting to Truman & the Bomb, but it's been suggested as a broader U.S. motivation elsewhere), there was an innate desire for revenge. Americans were dying, too, in rather large numbers. I do think there was a disbelief Japan would surrender, & by 7-8/45, a desire to test the Bomb & overawe the Soviets with it (certainly that was high in Byrnes' mind); at the time of the decision to invade the Philippines, I have to think FDR was more concerned with Doug being overseas & occupied, rather than in DC (which has been credited as why he wasn't court-martialed for the 12/41 debâcle).

In case I'm not clear (a perennial problem... =]), let me state it simply: Nimitz should have pulled his subs back to Hawaii, put as much manpower on breaking the maru code as he could beg, borrow, or steal (the bandsmen from all the BBs sunk 7/12 would have been a good beginning) & on fixing the godawful Mk XIV (transferrring Jimmy Fife to England, where he couldn't do any harm, & firing Ralph Waldo Christie, in lieu of shooting the SOB, for a start), then turned his S-boats over to training & set a handful of older boats (Bass, Bonita, & 'cuda, if they weren't already retired, & Narwhal, Nautilus, & especially Argonaut) on minelaying duty, & put the rest of his force in the Luzon Strait, Yellow Sea, Tsushima Strait, & off the Bungo & Kii Suido, & strangle Japan. With good intel & working torpedoes, the war ends by 12/43. MacArthur explodes from frustration sometime in 1942. Moutbatten is named Viceroy of Japan. (I do think the odds of it going to Crerar are mighty low, much as I might wish. =] OK, the odds of Dougie actually exploding are low, too, much as I might wish, absent the plot against him mooted in MacArthur Must Die...)

Ultimately, the "two roads" was FDR's choice, not JCS's. Recall, it came to him, & he OKd it, rather than choose, & I think the reason is clear. It isn't good, but I do think it's clear.

Do me 1 favor, tho. Don't ask me for sources... ;D I'm working from memory. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 08:34 & 08:35, 15 August & 23:26, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

I'd take the word of a Section 8 anyday

"Interestingly, the official record of the day's events by the Army Air Corps' command has been clearly altered, with numerous erasures and type-overs." Is that sourced? And is it more than a reflection of bad typing by an incompetent clerk? TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:51, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

That's funny... I was wondering that, too. The questionable import of messy paperwork is why I didn't protest that sentence's deletion. Binksternet (talk) 13:46, 28 August 2008 (UTC)

Questionable language

This language may be questionable... "As an anticipatory gesture in 1945, MacArthur had given his treasured Gold Castles engineers' insignia, a personal possession, to his chief engineer, Jack Sverdrup; and while MacArthur himself may have just faded away, these insignia continue to be worn by the Army's Chief of Engineers as a tradition." Anyone else have an opinion? 68.230.99.224 (talk) 16:27, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

"Anticipatory" and "personal possession" are completely unnecessary. We ought to document the gift neutrally without trying to guess motivation. The whole "while MacArthur himself may have just faded away" should go. Binksternet (talk) 17:17, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

Language changed. The IP post above was made by myself when I was not logged in. Thanks for your review, Bink. Tan | 39 17:23, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

I believe the line while MacArthur himself may have just faded away was merely a reference to this quote "Old soldiers never die; they just fade away... And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away — an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty. Good-bye." and was not making a judgment of McArthur or his influence. I believe it was an acceptable if unnecessary stylistic decision (that was probably missed by most people) on the original authors part. Zamp m (talk) 02:44, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Important Issues

There are several important issues on this article that you all should discuss further, especially as regards strategic disobedience and counteraction of brinkmanship; and a good start would be learning all the names of the letters, memorizing multiplication tables, and the primary colors for fingerpainting.

98.230.27.142 (talk) 13:08, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

Bonus Army

User:Trekphiler, be serious. I have no admiration for Douglas MacArthur, much less his contemptible and paranoia-fueled assault on the Bonus Army. This is a simple matter of policy and good writing. The sentence in question is:"It should be noted, however, that no supporting evidence for MacArthur's charges have ever surfaced." First, it is a clear example of words to avoid. Second, it is unverified and unsourced. Third, the next sentence cites a reliable source to prove the same point neutrally and effectively. When I said "unnecessary," I meant "unnecessary." A little good faith next time? Deltabeignet (talk) 22:40, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

Words to avoid? May introduce bias? MacArthur's making baseless charges & taking this out looked (& does look) like a defense (which also looks like introduced bias). I'm not privy to your thinking. On "unnecessary", I'd disagree, but not strongly. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 23:20, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

I'm with Deltabeignet in that the phrase "no supporting evidence for MacArthur's charges have ever surfaced" is impossible to prove and wouldn't be able to support itself unless modified by directly quoting an author or expert who said that exact thing. It's also bad grammar; it should have been "no... evidence... has ever surfaced". ;^) Binksternet (talk) 00:03, 31 October 2008 (UTC)

Decorations

This is a question from a German Wikipedia-user. In the Geman Wikipedia Douglas MacArthur is referred to as the "most decorated soldier in the history of the US armed forces". Can we really use that description?

Douglas MacArthur got the highest Decoration (MoH) once, other Soldiers got it twice. And as far as I know, other soldiers got more Decorations (in numbers).

Is it appropriate to use this kind of description?

PS German Wikipedia does not make a difference between Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force and it does not refer to a specific period of time. It just says "most decorated soldier in the history of the US armed forces".--84.173.135.206 (talk) 01:48, 1 November 2008 (UTC)