Talk:Six-Day War

Pre-emptive attack

It appears that someone inserted a sentence reading something like: "Israel claims that it was a pre-emptive strike, but the Arab states argue that it was an act of aggression". What? Where does it say that these two things are mutually exclusive? This sentence makes zero sense. I have reworded it. —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 23:36, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

That was me. I take the point about how a preemptive strike is an act of aggression and so I'll reword this. But pre-emptive strike violates NPOV. It assumes something that, at the very least, can be disputed. Hence it is better to use neutral terminology - that Israel attacked Egypt (which nobody denies) followed by Israel's view of why and then the Arab disputing of that. To do otherwise is to give undue weight to the Israeli explanation, to assume that it is the truth and only argued against by a few crackpots and Arabs. That may be what you think. But it's not NPOV. To be NPOV, the evidence of an actual, impending Egyptian attack (as opposed to a tense diplomatic situation) would have to be indisputable, and it isn't.Steve3742 (talk) 21:36, 20 October 2009 (UTC)

What are you talking about? It was a preemptive strike. Do you actually have sources disputing that it was a preemptive strike, or is this your own research? We have about 30 sources already in the article that say it's a preemptive strike, and 0 disputing this. Your statement about having to have "the evidence of an actual, impending Egyptian attack" is irrelevant and against the Wikipedia policy of no original research. —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 01:15, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

It is fair to turn the tables and ask what exactly are you talking about? Even the accounts published by the Israeli decision makers, Israeli historians, and Israeli political scientists agree that the decision to go to war was made on the basis of the IDF's Doctrine of Deterrence, not because they seriously thought that they were preempting an impending Arab attack.

• Greg Cashman said that in late May 1967, Egypt had complained that the false Soviet report caused them to send troops into the Sinai. see An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq, page 185

• The Egyptians had already provided categorical assurances to Israel through the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General that they did not intend to initiate hostilities, and that they were willing to make concessions to avoid a war. see Cashman; Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, document 132; and paragragh 9 of the report to the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/7906, 26 May 1967.

• Christopher Gelpi says that the government of Egypt had let it be known that their tough statements were "mere words designed for public consumption." see The power of legitimacy: assessing the role of norms in crisis bargaining, page 141

• David Rodman said that since the early days of the State, Israeli military doctrine placed a premium on offensive, rather than defensive warfare. Military leaders felt that there was a better prospect of deterring the outbreak of hostilities if the IDF transferred fighting to enemy territory as soon as possible. That strategy also compensated for limited finances and the absence of alliance partners. see Between war and peace, editor Efraim Karsh, page 153

• Dan Kurzman said Rabin was not concerned with the Sinai build-up. see Soldier of peace, page 202

• Rabin said the IDF GHQ Intelligence assessment was that Israel was facing a repetition of Operation Rotem (see the talk page discussion above), and that Egypt would eventually withdraw. He characterized the Sinai troop build-up and the closure of the Straits as "humiliating pinpricks" that would render the IDF's long term deterrent capacity worthless. During the meeting in "the Pit", he and the other military leaders said they were afraid that it would appear that the government had lost confidence in the IDF, and that the significance of the closure of the Straits lay in the effect on Israel's deterrent capability. see The Rabin Memoirs, page 80-81; Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present, edited by Itamar Rabinovich, Jehuda Reinharz, pages 212-213; and Israel's Decision To Go To War, June 2, 1967, by Col. Ami Gluska

• Avner Yaniv said that IDF doctrine was based on the assumption of the inherent disability of Israel to win a decisive strategic battle and impose peace on the Arabs. The leadership felt that Israel could not subdue the Arabs. It could defend itself, cause the Arabs pain, and destroy their armies for a while, but they felt that solving the problem once and for all was beyond Israel's capacity. The IDF relied on a strategy of active conventional deterrence that emphasized punitive and demonstrative use of force and the accumulation of dissuasive power not through one military victory, but through a succession of quick decisive blows to Arab military power. see National security and democracy in Israel, page 90.

• Avi Shlaim said there is general agreement among commentators that Nasser neither wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. He said the Israeli economy would survive the closure of the Straits, but the deterrent image of the IDF could not. see The Iron Wall, pages 236-237.

• Yagil Levy says that the tendency to use force and generate escalation in order to bring about counter-reaction by the Arabs, ruled out possible options to settle the crisis other than by war. Israel's doctrine of deterrence called for "flexible retaliation" designed to deter the Syrians or provoke them so that Israel could launch a full scale response. He said that Israel became trapped in its own formula of deterrence. see Trial and error: Israel's route from war to de-escalation, page 107

• Re'uven Pedatzur said that any erosion of Israeli deterrent power is an impediment to peace in the region. He said that Israeli deterrence is greatly dependent on the IDF's capability to inflict great and painful damage to the enemy -- "deterrence through punishment." and that in the absence of comprehensive peace in the Middle East, deterrence will remain the chief component in Israel's national defense doctrine. see Limits of Deterrence, Ha'aretz, 28 March 1995 p B1

• Uzi Benziman described Israel's doctrine of strategic deterrence and Ariel Sharon's role in launching cross-border attacks into Jordan or Egypt where his forces would strike targets and disappear. see for example Sharon: An Israeli Caesar, pages 42-44

There are many popular and quite different histories of the war, e.g. 1967: Israel, The War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East, by Tom Segev; Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, by Michael Oren; and Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East, by Donald Neff. The article quotes Rabin, Begin, Dayan and many other leaders who said they didn't think that Nasser was going to attack; that he didn't want a war; or that the war had been avoidable. Why do we have to include the theory about a "preemptive attack" in the lede? It isn't very well supported by the contents of the article or the various accounts. harlan (talk) 07:20, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

I ask again, what are you talking about? None of the things you said are in any way relevant. Where does it say that a preemptive strike cannot also be a deterrent? The original editor who inserted the controversial information (Steve3742) disputed that it was a preemptive strike. I have 30 sources saying that it was a preemptive strike. Do you have any sources that contradict this? —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 10:14, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

You could try reading the footnotes. There are a number of references in footnote 14 that dispute the idea that Egypt was about to attack or that this impending attack was the reason for Israel's attack on Egypt. To quote just one: "Nasser had no intention of striking first and the Israeli generals were confident of victory... For the Israeli hawks, the crisis was less a threat than an opportunity - to smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement while Israel still had military superiority."

Here it clearly says that a) Egypt was not about to attack and b) The motive for the Israeli attack wasn't to prevent an attack but to "smash Nasserish Egypt and the Pan-Arab movement". Hence not a pre-emptive attack.

Of course, I imagine you disagree with this, but that's not the point. There is a dispute about whether or not the attack was preemptive. Hence it would violate NPOV to say "preemptive attack" when talking about Israel's attack on Egypt. So, call it a "surprise attack" - nobody disputes that - and then say that Israel considers it a pre-emptive strike but the Arabs assert otherwise.

Regarding the meaning of preemptive attack, it has to include the idea that Israel was just about to be attacked. The source above and others dispute that this was the case and also dispute that Israel was motivated by this fear to attack Egypt. Of course, you could try stretching the definition to say that Israel was trying to smash pan Arab unity before it grew strong enough to challenge Israel or something like that. This is actually closer to the truth, IMHO. But that's not a preemptive attack. Attacking somebody to prevent what they may do in a few years time cannot be called a preemptive attack by any stretch of the definition. Apart from anything else, it's impossible to prove what people are going to do in a few years time. Or should we call the Arab attack on Israel in 1948 a pre-emptive attack?

Answering your criticism of harlan, he is not saying that a pre-emptive strike cannot ALSO be a deterrent, he is saying (and the sources show) that it was a deterrent INSTEAD of a preemptive strike. The phrase "preemptive strike" has a meaning - look it up on Wikipedia. Deterring people from possibly attacking at some unspecified time in the future is not a pre-emptive attack. It is not original research to not use the phrase "pre-emptive attack" when a considerable number of sources - the ones in note 14 and the ones quoted by harlan above (which I invite him to add to note 14, if he's reading this) - dispute this. In fact, as I've said before, it would violate NPOV to do so. Using an unqualified adjective in the lead implies that it's fact, that it's not in dispute. This is untrue. Steve3742 (talk) 12:20, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

Most of the points you mentioned above are irrelevant, and the few that aren't - are just in hindsight. That some people thought Nasser wasn't planning to attack, and maybe he really wasn't, doesn't change what he actually said and did. He declared the coming destruction of Israel; he closed off the straits, an act of war; he expelled the peace keeping force, and moved large forces into the Sinai, both in contradiction to the agreements ending the 1956 war. In that time, there was a very real fear in Israel of a massive attack from several fronts. Due to Israel's very small size, and small population, it was always clear that it cannot withstand a massive invasion, as the supply bases and civilian population would quickly be overrun - it didn't have a huge desert as a buffer, like Egypt. Thus the need to fight the battles in the enemy's territory. Because of this, thinking Egypt (and friends) were about to attack, Israel decided a preemptive strike would be best.

Saying, in hindsight, that Nasser wasn't serious, that he was just flexing his muscles, that he was lying to his people - that might be of academic interest, but it doesn't change the character of the initial strike, and that entire war. okedem (talk) 17:14, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

OK, firstly, all of what you have written above is your own opinion and uses your own reasoning. It's also using hindsight.

As far as I know, there's no Wikipedia policy against using hindsight, especially with historical articles, where it's often all you have. That being said, it's untrue - a number of the sources cast doubt on the idea that Israeli policymakers believed that Egypt was just about to attack.

If you're trying to say that the decision makers in Israel made a decision to attack Egypt because they believed, rightly or wrongly, that Egypt was just about to attack Israel, then you can say that Israel considers it a pre-emptive attack (which is, of course, what I have said in my edits.) But you're basing this on someone else's judgement of another country's intentions. Hence "Israel considers it a pre-emptive attack" To present it without this is to present it as fact, and, at the very least, it's disputed, both that Egypt was going to attack AND that Israeli decision makers believed that Egypt was going to attack. To say "it was a pre-emptive attack" violates NPOV because it assumes as fact things which are in dispute.

In my opinion, this applies to pretty much all uses of the phrase. All countries that attack anothe claim pre-emption. It was mentioned above that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour could be considered a pre-emptive attack (wrongly IMHO). They certainly claimed that at the time. And other countries that invaded other countries in WWII (I'll not mention them by name for fear of running afoul of Godwin's Law) also claimed pre-emption.

That Israel (and a number of historians) consider it a pre-emptive attack is not in doubt. Equally, there is no doubt that the Arab states (and a number of historians) consider that it was not a pre-emptive attack. In such circumstances we cannot say "it was a pre-emptive attack" without violating NPOV. Instead, it was a surprise attack that Israel claims was pre-emptive and the Arab states claim was not. Which is more or less what I have written.Steve3742 (talk) 17:55, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

(edit conflict)Well first let me say, I also agree that Israel's action was a preemptive strike. However, opinions that Egypt wasn't going to attack can be found in reliable sources, as well as the majority opinion that it was. Unless the sources can all be discounted (a look at them suggests that might be possible with a couple of them), it seems that this minority opinion should be at least mentioned in a balanced article. I would, however, add that it was regarded as a preemptive strike by most western countries' governments and population, as well as Israel's. TastyCakes (talk) 18:00, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

Most countries didn't know what to think, because Israel initially claimed that it had been attacked by the Egyptians. According to William Quandt, Secretary of State Rusk had warned the Israeli's that there would be consequences for the side that initiated hostilities. President Johnson told Foreign Minister Eban that he thought Israel had been unwise when it went to war and that he still thought they were unwise in October 1968. see Peace process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli conflict since 1967, page 443

In his letter to David Ben-Gurion dated 9 January 1968, President De Gaulle said that he was convinced that Israel had ignored his warnings and overstepped the bounds of moderation by taking possession of Jerusalem, and so much Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory by force of arms.[1] France stopped selling arms to Israel. harlan (talk) 20:57, 22 October 2009 (UTC)

TastyCakes, to say that Israel and most western countries' governments and population is a majority opinion is untrue and very western-centric (something Wikipedia is often accused of.) It's also inaccurate - in Europe at least I don't think you can say that it's the majority opinion of the population, though perhaps it is of the governments.

But even assuming it was the majority opinion of most western countries' governments and population, this wouldn't make it a majority opinion. Most of the rest of the world would disagree. And that would make the pre-emptive strike version a minority opinion.

Of course, you cannot say what is true or otherwise by popularity contests. But I mention this because you seem to be saying that the idea that it was not a pre-emptive strike is a minority opinion. It isn't.

To repeat: We have two versions of events. We should not give either undue prominence. Hence we explain what happened neutrally - Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt - then give both versions. Anything else would violate NPOVSteve3742 (talk) 00:14, 23 October 2009 (UTC)

Well it seems most of the voices I've seen saying that Egypt wasn't going to attack and that it was therefore not a preemptive strike have been Arab sources. Growing up, it was always presented as a preemptive strike in my education and in documentaries and the like that I've watched on it. Perhaps my Western upbringing was unusually biased and this really is less of a majority opinion than I believe, but I wouldn't bet on it without seeing some data one way or another. Also, it's not really "Western-centric" to say what the western's world opinion on the matter was, I'm not quite sure what logic you're using to say it is. Perhaps you mean it's unfair to mention the West's prevailing opinion without mentioning everyone else's, but I don't really know what the rest of the world's opinions are/were. Do you? If so, by all means I think they should be mentioned as well. As for your statement about not being able to say if it were true or not based on a popularity contest, I of course agree and believe that was the thrust of my last post. What I consider the minority opinion and you, apparently, consider the majority opinion should also be mentioned since it cannot be factually disproved. TastyCakes (talk) 21:12, 26 October 2009 (UTC)

(outdent)TastyCakes the Israeli leaders quoted in the article were not Arabs. They said that they didn't believe that Nasser or the Egyptian Army was really ready to attack. They certainly were worried that time was running out for their side, but that was due to the impact on the Israeli economy of a prolonged mobilization of so many reserve forces. The doctrine of deterrence was adopted in order to avoid prolonged standoffs and stalemates. harlan (talk) 12:08, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

I still don't understand how this is relevant. It is your original research. Thirty sources say it was a preemptive strike. What sources do you have that say it was not a preemptive strike? —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 13:57, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Essentially I guess my argument boils down to something similar (to Ynhockey). I think there are many more reliable sources that say it was a preemptive strike than those that say Egypt wasn't planning on attacking. That would seem to make it the majority opinion. But again, that doesn't mean the other opinion shouldn't be mentioned. TastyCakes (talk) 14:02, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Ynhockey, regarding original research, note that "Carefully summarizing or rephrasing source material without changing its meaning is not synthesis—it is good editing." If a number of sources claim that Israel did not consider that Egypt was about to attack, then it is good editing to say that a number of sources say that it was not a pre-emptive attack - that's what pre-emptive means, after all.

I'm also pretty sure that some of them at least (Avi Shlaim and Finkelstein that I know of) do come out and say that it was not a pre-emptive attack. I'll have a look.

Tastycakes, both opinions are mentioned in the lead. Neither is given prominence. Ynhockey seems to be arguing that the pre-emption version should be given prominence with the other version tagged on with some weasel words ("The Arab States claim...") I'm arguing that a neutral version should be presented ("Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt...") followed by both versions as to motive. Doing otherwise violates NPOV Steve3742 (talk) 16:25, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Abba Eban said, "From May the 24th onward, the question who started the war or who fired the first shot became momentously irrelevant." Nonetheless, I'd like to see actual quotes from Israeli officials who said that it was a preemptive attack if the article is going to make that claim.

The article does cite Israeli officials, including several men that served as IDF Chief of Staff and as Prime Ministers of Israel, who said that Nasser wasn't ready to attack and that the war was avoidable. Those aren't just "some people" engaged in "idle talk'. The lede also makes it appear as though only Arab countries thought that Israel's attack was unwarranted. Wikipedia policy says that published sources should speak for themselves and that the lede should summarize the contents of the article. Right now the lede doesn't even reflect the published views expressed by the Israeli Cabinet Ministers and Generals who made the decision to go to war.

The neutral voice of the article is making an unsupportable claim that "Israel" always claimed that the attack was preemptive. Many of the sources cited to support that statement say no such thing. Most do not include any official Israeli statements on the subject, and some note that Israel originally claimed it was a counterattack. There are only two or three Israeli authors in the entire list. You can characterize what the authors have to say however you like, but the article really shouldn't attribute the remarks of this group to "Israel": Antonio Cassese, Erik Goldstein, David Roberston, Martin S. Alexander, Soren Von Dosenrode, Anders Stubkjaer, Avner Cohen, BBC, CNN, NPR, Funk & Wagnalls, The Economist, Michael Elliott, Marguerite Johnson, Encarta Answers, Microsoft Encarta, Shlomo Aronson, Warren I. Cohen, Richard K. Betts, Dan Reiter, Isabella Ginor, Seymon Brown, and Alan Dershowitz).

John Quigley said that Israel's representative told the Security Council that Egypt had attacked first and that the claim was untrue. He said that Israel never produced evidence of the Egyptian attacks and soon stopped making that claim. see Justice in the Palestine-Israel Conflict, page 11 [2] The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides a selection of key documents on Israel's foreign relations during the Six Day War: [3] There isn't any mention of a "preemptive attack" in any of them. They either say, or imply, that the Egyptian Army and Air Forces attacked Israel first and that Israel went into action to contain them. Here are some examples: [4] [5]

General Peled is quoted in the article as saying that the Egyptian forces were not in a position to threaten Israel, and that the survival argument was an excuse that was made up after the war. A similar statement was made by Mordechai Bentov, a Cabinet Minister and one of the signatories of the Israeli Declaration of Independence. On June 3, 1972 the Le Monde reported that he said "This story about the danger of extermination has been a complete invention and has been blown up a posteriori to justify the annexation of new Arab territories." see 'Perspectives on Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews', by James J. Zogby, Medina Press, 1977, 0914456172, Page 83. The published claims and evidence of "changing stories" deserves its own subsection and should be mentioned in the lede.

Col. Ami Gluska's article [6] details the discussion in the Pit on 2 June and General Peled actually did say that the Egyptian Army was not ready for war; the Straits of Tiran were irrelevant; and that Egypt's entry into Sinai had been anticipated:

"We have heard something regarding Tiran, which lost its significance long ago. It was not important to start with and is even less important now." The entry of an Egyptian force into Sinai was nothing new for the IDF, having been anticipated and planned for in various exercises and war games. The only surprise, he stressed, was Nasser's audacity, since it was well known that his army was not ready for war. Peled had an explanation to offer for Nasser's moves:
In my opinion he was relying on the hesitation of the Israeli government. He acted in confidence that we would not dare to hit at him.... Nasser moved an army which was not ready to the border and he derived full advantage from the move. One thing is acting in his favor and that is the fact that the Israeli government is not ready to act against him.

In their post-war interviews the Israeli decision makers dismissed the idea that Nasser was ready to attack. Rabin's memoirs and the interview that he gave Le Monde stated that he didn't think that Nasser was about to attack, and that neither did GHQ intelligence. Menachim Begin said Israel had decided to attack Egypt, and that the troop concentrations didn't prove that Nasser was ready to attack. Gen Bar Lev said 'the entrance of the Egyptians into Sinai was not a casus belli.' Defense Minister Dayan's remarks to the Ma'ariv interviewer and General Peled's remarks in the Gluska article make it clear that the closure of the Straits of Tiran did not make a war unavoidable. harlan (talk) 14:50, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

Harlan, do you think you could insert some of the sources you've mentioned above into footnote 14?

I already knew that Israel had claimed (in 1967) that Egypt had attacked them but, as far as I know, they've not claimed it since 1967. I'm not aware of any historian, even the most pro-Israeli ones, who take it seriously. I don't know whether it should be put in the lead (which is meant to be a brief summary.) Perhaps it should be in the body of the article, along with the fact that no historian takes it seriously and Israel hasn't claimed it since 1967. In fact, a separate subsection could be created about the decision to go to war, it seems to be lacking at the moment.

I take the point that all the notes in footnote 13, the thirty sources that Ynhockey keeps talking about, are from historians and so are secondary sources. Perhaps Ynhockey could find a quote from an Israeli decision maker of the time? If not, I take the point that "Israel claims that..." hasn't been sourced. Perhaps something along the lines of "Many historians claim that..." What does everyone think? Steve3742 (talk) 18:23, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

(outdent) I think that the idea of collecting a long list of references to justify the choice of verbs in a sentence detracts from the article just to prove a point. It doesn't change the fact that other significant published viewpoints are supposed to be fairly represented, which is exactly how they were employed in this case. It is okay to provide a list when someone demands sources on the talk page, but they don't necessarily need to added to the article footnotes if they already contain other examples. There are external links and further reading sections for any members of the list that deserve special attention. harlan (talk) 23:01, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

I also don't think there should be 30 references for the same fact in the article, and maybe it's true that it was originally done to prove a point. However, the reason it's there now is that some people just insist on arguing against well-known facts. You need to understand something: if someone says "we are not sure that Egypt is going to attack", it doesn't mean the strike can't be preemptive. That conclusion is your and Steve's original research. I am asking that you provide reliable mainstream sources saying not that "Egypt probably wasn't going to attack", but that "The Israeli attack was not a preemptive strike, because ...". If what you are saying is true, why is it so hard to provide such sources? —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 23:53, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

Ynhockey, there isn't a single person that I've cited who said "we are not sure that Egypt is going to attack". They said the Egyptian army wasn't ready to go to war and that both sides knew that. I don't deny that Israel's assertion that the attack was preemptive is widely accepted. That doesn't make it the only significant published viewpoint, or a fact. Israel didn't even make that claim until the 7th of July, when it abandoned its earlier story that Egypt had attacked first.

John Quigley, Micheal Akehurst, and a host of others have written about that. Quigley said:

'Israel's change of argument created skepticism about both its versions of the facts. "At first Israel claimed that the Arab armies had attacked her first," wrote Michael Akehurst. "If this Israeli claim is false, why did Israel tell a lie?"... ...Various Israeli officials said later, however, that Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt when it struck on June 5th.' [7]

Quigley goes on to cite the Rabin quote from the Le Monde interview. I provided that citation to Quigley in one of my posts above, and it remains valid. I don't intend to supply a list of thirty more references just to make the point that I was NOT supplying my own WP:OR conclusion, or that the connection of the Rabin quote with that conclusion is NOT WP:Synth. harlan (talk) 02:24, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Hold on. You said: "They said the Egyptian army wasn't ready to go to war and that both sides knew that.". Does that mean that it was not a preemptive strike? Again, your original research. In 1948 for example, Egypt wasn't "ready" to go to war and "both sides knew that", yet they invaded Israel anyway (see Morris 2008). Therefore, it has nothing to do with the strike being preemptive. The Quigley quote is mostly irrelevant, and only briefly mentions that "Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt". Again, this does not necessarily mean that it was not a preemptive strike. We need a source that actually disputes the preemptive strike assertion, otherwise even if you use your logic to derive from the above that it was not a preemptive strike (OR), it would clearly fit under WP:FRINGE and WP:UNDUE. —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 03:39, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Ynhockey,

"Israel had not in fact anticipated an imminent attack by Egypt". Again, this does not necessarily mean that it was not a preemptive strike.

Actually, it sort of does. Pre-emption applies to imminent attacks, hence if Israel hadn't anticipated an imminent attack, Israel's attack was not pre-emptive. At any rate, I've found at least one quote that actually disputes the pre-emption theory specifically. I've put it into note 14. Regarding your accusations of WP:OR, see above.Steve3742 (talk) 18:37, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Ynhockey, your case would be easier to understand if you explained what "preemptive" means to you. Of course anyone can attack someone and claim that it was to prevent something happening at some time in the future, but that seems too general a meaning to me. With that definition a large fraction of the conflict articles in Wikipedia would need changing. Zero^talk 22:38, 31 October 2009 (UTC)

Zero, the case for including the fact that it was a preemptive strike is based on its overwhelming prevalence in reliable sources, not my own opinion.

Having said that, I believe that the opponents of the term "preemptive strike" on Wikipedia take the meaning of the word as purely tactical, i.e. an offensive just before the opponent's offensive, and the time frame is hours–days. However, this is not necessarily the only meaning in the strategic sense, in a weeks–months time frame. It is well-known that before the war, both sides had significant forces ready at the borders to attack, i.e. each side had the assumed capability to launch a full-scale assault. Israel might not have been expecting to be hit that day because of the political atmosphere, but for example, it is logical to assume that calling off the reserves to prevent the economy from collapsing may have led to an Arab attack; therefore, attacking just before most of the reserves had to be called off (=likely Arab attack) would in effect be a preemptive strike.

Again though, that's my personal interpretation, and what Harlan and Steve said are their personal interpretations. They have so far failed to provide a single source that disputes that it was a preemptive strike. If this is such a widely-held viewpoint in some parts of the world, why aren't there dozens of sources on the subject, like there are dozens of sources calling it a preemptive strike? Just for comparison, for the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the major historiographical questions have all been discussed in published sources: for example, there are dozens of academic articles and at least one book on the question of whether Israeli forces were the David and the Arab forces were the Goliath, or vice versa; there are a number of academic articles asking whether Operation Pleshet was a decisive battle in the war, or whether Nitzanim's surrender was justified. Where are the sources questioning Operation Focus as a preemptive strike? Maybe I'm not reading enough? —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 01:12, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Ynhockey, I've never said the word preemptive strike can't be used, on the contrary I've said that all significant views must be included. You started this thread complaining about the inclusion of the viewpoints of the states that were attacked. There is no support in WP:UNDUE policy for advancing a single viewpoint. The guidelines given at Wikipedia:Fringe theories state that they are theories outside the mainstream that have not been discussed at all by the mainstream.

You are describing a preemptive war, not a preemptive strike. To the legal community those are two different situations. There is no basis for claiming that Antonio Cassese would support your viewpoint. In footnote 13 he was specifically discussing the doctrine of anticipatory self defense in which an attack is imminent.

Legal experts have a variety of opinions, and not everyone agrees that it was a preemptive strike. Yoram Dinstein (War Aggression, and Self-Defense, 3d ed. 2001) and Christine Gray (International Law and the Use of Force 2004) are two very mainstream legal scholars who have said that Egypt initiated hostilities. As a consequence, they say the air strikes on 5 June 1967 were not legally a preemptive situation at all. They consider them an intercept or counterattack and avoid the "doctrine of necessity" altogether.

In Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Preemptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources, James Thuo Gathii says that many scholars and state officials do not support the notion that customary law permits the unilateral use of preemptive force without UN approval. He notes that State practice, opinio juris, and some legal scholars do distinguish between preemptive wars (which are illegal) and preemptive strikes under certain rare circumstances, i.e. anticipatory self-defense when a threat is imminent. He says 'there has yet to be a good case in which the very limited and contested notion of anticipatory self-defence met the Caroline test. The closest case that might have, but is now regarded as not having met the Caroline test, was Israel’s first strike against Egypt in the 1967. Few regarded it as a good example of a permissible anticipatory attack under the Caroline test, especially after it became clear following the attack that there was no overwhelming threat that justified the attack to ensure Israel’s survival. Many States criticized the attack, which made it clear that the attack would not serve as a precedent to legitimize “a general right of anticipatory self defense.”' see Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1-34, 2005

The Antonio Cassese quote that appears in footnote 13 is an extract from his 1987 discussion regarding the two different situations. The Quigley material that I quoted above, and the passage from Quigley that appears in footnote 14 is extracted from a more recent, but similar, discussion. Quigley like the majority of legal commentators does deny that the 5 June air strikes were an act of anticipatory self-defense in the cited passage.

The President of the American Society of International Law created a Task Force on Terrorism in 2002. It published The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense, by Mary Ellen O’Connell. The report said that preemptive war must be distinguished from anticipatory self defense, and that any use of force in self-defense must respect the principles of necessity, proportionality, and cannot violate the jus cogens norm against unilateral use of force. O'Connell said that commentators have defended Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1967 on the grounds that it was anticipatory self-defense. She cited Rabin's remarks in the Le Monde interview and said: "Israel stated that it had convincing intelligence that Egypt would attack and that Egyptian preparations were underway. We now know that the Israel acted on less than convincing evidence. Thus, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war does not provide an actual example of lawful anticipatory self-defense." [8]

In The Use of Force and (the State of) Necessity, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, 2004, Andreas Laursen discusses "the necessity excuse" in international law. He says that necessity may constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness under certain very limited circumstances. He notes that Article 25 of the UN Declaration on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [9] bars a defense of necessity if the State making the claim has contributed to the situation of necessity.

Tom Segev, Avi Shlaim, Yigal Levy and others have written that the premeditated raid on Samu, the downing of the Syrian aircraft over Damascus, and Rabin's threat to topple the regime in Syria led Israel down the path to war. The article notes that Moshe Shemesh, a historian and former senior intelligence officer in the IDF, said that Jordan's military and civilian leaders estimated that Israel's main objective was conquest of the West Bank. They felt that Israel was striving to drag all of the Arab countries into a war. After the Samu offensive, those apprehensions became the deciding factor in Jordan's decision to participate in the war. King Hussein was convinced Israel would try to occupy the West Bank whether Jordan went to war, or not. The publication of detailed accounts by the Israeli officials and public statements like those made by Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Mordechai Bentov, Menachim Begin, and etc. have cast doubts on Israel's motivations. "Anticipatory Self-Defense" and Other Stories by Jeanne Woods and James Donovan, 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 487 (2005) [10] discussed the Six Day War and said that "The on-going occupation of the territory set aside for a Palestinian State suggests the motive was a quest for land and resources." [11] harlan (talk) 09:20, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

Most of the stuff you provided discusses the strike from a legal, not a military point of view. Feel free to add the material in the article body as an alternative legal theory, with specific citations of course. Not all of this material should be included though, as there are other relevant articles, including Operation Focus. —Ynhockey ^(Talk) 11:53, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

I'm going to be busy in real life for a couple of weeks, but plan to incorporate the information on Operation Rotem, the doctrine of deterrence, "necessity", and "anticipatory self-defense". harlan (talk) 13:45, 5 November 2009 (UTC)

Made threats, disputed preemption?

(unindent) I don't get it. If the Arabs say that they were about to attack, then how can they dispute that the strike was preemptive? -- Heptor _talk 10:13, 15 December 2009 (UTC)

Article 25 of the UN Declaration on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts bars a defense of necessity if the State making the claim has contributed to the situation of necessity. A number of published sources explain that Israel had already invaded the territories and airspace of the other states without permission from the UN Security Council. The UN Yearbook and other sources, including Dayan, Rabin, Segev, and Shlaim mention that Israel had kept Arab cultivators away from their lands in the DMZs, while sending in armored tractors and the air force to deliberately provoke Syrian responses. Israel launched a massive raid on es-Samu that was condemned by the Security Council. President Johnson's personal assistant, R. W. Komer, sent word to Prime Minister Eshkol 'that Israel was "going too far" in striking Jordan and had better lay off'. Eshkol authorized the use IAF fighters to conduct combat operations in the airspace over Damascus in peacetime and said afterward that Israel would have to teach Syria a sharper lesson than that of 7 April. Those were not "border skirmishes". Israeli historians, like Oren and Segev, and Israeli military leaders including Dayan and Lior viewed them as the actual starting point of the war. harlan (talk) 11:27, 19 December 2009 (UTC)

If I understand you correctly, you are disputing the starting point of the war? -- Heptor _talk 00:04, 22 December 2009 (UTC)

Six Days?

I see June 5 to June 10, and, correct me if I'm wrong, but that looks an awful lot like five days. Anyone know where the discrepancy came from? 66.19.99.59 (talk) 17:55, 14 December 2009 (UTC)

June 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Count them. Hertz1888 (talk) 18:10, 14 December 2009 (UTC)

Weird wording

I think this paragraph sounds weird:

The Israeli decision [to offer back taken land in exchange for peace] was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the United States. The US was informed of the decision, but not that it was to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria, and some historians claim that they may have never received the offer.

It kind of makes it sound like Israel managed to keep their decision to return land a secret from the Arab nations. Does anyone have access to newspaper clips from about June 19, 1967? -- Heptor _talk 00:55, 18 December 2009 (UTC)

This was a decision made in a secret cabinet meeting, not a publicly made "offer". The text of the cabinet decision was ultimately released decades later, and you can find it in the opening pages of Dennis Ross's book (The Missing Peace). This was an internal discussion among Israeli leaders about what they would be prepared to give up in any future negotiations. It is normal for countries keep their negotiating positions secret before a deal is struck, so the fact that the decision was not made public at the time is not unusual. By the way, the land they were prepared to return in this hypothetical situation did not include Gaza or the West Bank. Sanguinalis (talk) 18:29, 17 January 2010 (UTC)

change losses

according to this israeli site http://he.shvoong.com/internet-and-technologies/1737250-%D7%9E%D7%9C%D7%97%D7%9E%D7%AA-%D7%A9%D7%A9%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%99%D7%9D/ israel lost 800 soldiers egypt 10,000-15,000 jorden 6,000 syria 1,000-2,5000 Please check it and change --Yaniv1234 (talk) 16:58, 6 January 2010 (UTC)

Hey Yaniv, Thanks for the research. Two points in response

1) There is already a reliable source cited that puts the number of Israeli soldiers killed at 983. If you find a second source that you believe is reliable stating that Israeli causulities numbered 800, you should add the reference, and change the number to 800 - 983 to indicate that there is some disagreement between sources regarding the exact number.

2) Also, read Wikipedia:Verifiability#Non-English_sources regarding citing references that are not in english.

Thanks NickCT (talk) 19:52, 6 January 2010 (UTC)

Arab casualties seem to be grossly understated while Israeli casualties seem to be somewhat inflated. Currently, as far as I can tell, the article uses only one source for casualties. Additional reliable sources on casualty figures should be added and I will provide them in due course.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 18:57, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

I have added alternate, sourced figures for Arab casualties, per Churchill and Herzog.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 05:33, 15 February 2010 (UTC)

"preemptive attack" needs to be qualified

In the third paragraph of this article, it states "On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt." There is a reference to a footnote that contains many quotes from a wide variety of sources characterizing the Israeli attack by the adjective "preemptive". This is a subjective use of the adjective, and a qualification of it as such should be inserted into the article, particularly given that the following sentence states that "The Arab countries denied planning to attack Israel and asserted that Israel's strike was not preemptive but an unwarranted and illegal act of aggression" (emphasis added).

A reasonable alteration of the text of this article would read:

"On June 5, 1967 Israel launched an attack on Egypt it claims was an act of preemption against an imminent military threat from Egypt."

JRHammond (talk) 07:57, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

I agree, this would be better wording. Go ahead and change.BorisG (talk) 08:13, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements. It is a fact that Egypt closed the Tiran Straits, thus closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. It is a fact that Egypt massed 100,000 or more soldiers on Israel's border. It is a fact that Egypt expelled U.N. Peacekeepers from Sinai thus depriving Israel of an important buffer. It is a fact that Syria and Jordan mobilized their respective armies and were joined by contingents from Iraq, among other Arab countries. It is a fact that anti-Israeli war rhetoric reached a fever pitch in Arab capitals just prior to commencement of hostilities. Judging by objective facts and not by revisionist post-war interviews, it is clear that the Arabs were bent on war. Therefore, the term pre-emption or "pre-emptive attack" is not only more appropriate, it is more accurate. Respectfully,--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 19:11, 5 February 2010 (UTC)

I have no doubts Arabs prepared for war. However I disagree with the statement "Pre-emption should be judged on the objective facts not subjective statements". In my dictionary, pre-emption is about motivation for the attack, and therefore is inherently subjective. Alas, maybe the very fact that it is inherently subjective means that the wording 'launched a pre-emptive attack' is ok, because all it means is that Israelis meant it as pre-emptive.BorisG (talk) 07:35, 7 February 2010 (UTC)

For an attack to be "preemptive", there must have been an imminent threat of attack from Egypt. But no imminent attack is evidenced, as acknowledged by two former Israeli prime ministers, Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, both of whom acknowledged that Nasser had not intended to actually initiate a first strike against Israel.

To say Israel's attack was "preemptive" is itself subjective. And I agree 100%, as I already indicated, that the use of this adjective to describe Israel's attack should therefore, for that very reason, be eliminated.

To address each evidence given that the attack was "preemptive":

1) Israel's closing of the straits was not a military attack. Israel's attack did not "preempt" the closing of the straits. So this example is totally irrelevant. Whether or not this action justified Israel's attack is also an irrelevant question for our purposes here. Even if we assume this justified Israel's attack, it doesn't make Israel's attack "preemptive".

2) Egyptian troop movements don't prove intent. A very persuasive argument can be made that Egypt's positioning was defensive, an argument supported by Rabin and Begin (as noted above), who both acknowledge that Nasser never intended a first strike. Both U.S. and Israeli intelligence prior to the war also assessed that it was unlikely Nasser would actually strike first. Israel had already attacked Samu. Israel was planning an attack on Syria and had already attempted to provoke Syrian belligerency in the Golan Heights, and Israeli leaders were making similarly belligerent remarks as Nasser had. Israel also moved troops to the border.

So by this same reasoning, had Egypt actually launched the first military attack, it was have been an act of "preemption". Unless we can accept that this was the case, the logic must be rejected.

3) There are numerous alternative explanations for the belligerent nature of Egyptian officals' statements, including attempting to deter an Israeli attack through rhetorical exaggeration of the Egyptian force of arms. As both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed prior to the war, Nasser wasn't going to attack -- but even if he did, Israel would win the war in two weeks. If Israel attacked first, it could win in one week, such was the great superiority of its arms.

Judging by the objective facts can only lead to the conclusion that the use of the adjective "preemptive" to describe the Israeli attack is a subjective one, and therefore inappropriate for a Wikipedia entry.--JRHammond (talk) 10:24, 10 February 2010 (UTC)

As for alternative explanations for Egypt's bellicose talk, it doesn't negate the fact that such talk reached a crescendo and as Michael Oren points out, carried with it a momentum from which there was no return. In addition, your analyses curiously omits the expulsion of U.N. peacekeepers from Sinai. What was Israel to discern from that move? Also, your claim that Israel was massing forces along the Syrian border is false. As Zeev Schiff and others well-regarded in the field note, this was a false Soviet claim designed to further ignite Arab (particularly Egyptian) passions and put them into a frenzy.--Jiujitsuguy (talk) 17:51, 12 February 2010 (UTC)

Belligerents

Sending some aircraft to the war does not warrant the inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Sudan, etc... The infobox should not include providers of token forces. --Sherif9282 (talk) 13:06, 17 February 2010 (UTC)

Why not? If a token show of solidarity deserves to be mentioned anywhere it's in a historical summary. --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

no citation

"U.S ambassador to Israel, Walworth Barbour, did not deliver it in a timely manner.." can anyone find a source for this or should it be removed? --68.41.80.161 (talk) 01:06, 20 February 2010 (UTC)