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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Factpineapple (talk | contribs) at 16:09, 8 February 2024 (→‎Article violates Neutral point of view: new section). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Bibliography

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Fowler&fowler's third-party scholarly sources on descriptors commonly used for the "exodus" of Pandits

Please do not add sources to this section. I will add a discussion section below once I have added the sources.

"migration"

"migration
  1. Evans, Alexander (2002), "A departure from history: Kashmiri Pandits, 1990–2001", Contemporary South Asia, 11 (1): 19–37, doi:10.1080/0958493022000000341, ISSN 0958-4935, S2CID 145573161,  (p. 19) The present article is structured as follows. First, it tries to explain what happened to KPs in 1990 and beyond. (p. 20) Examining the fall-out of the mass migration, it then looks at the extremist politics that followed, before concluding with an assessment of the contemporary situation. (p. 22) There is a third possible explanation for what happened in 1990; one that acknowledges the enormity of what took place, but that examines carefully what triggered KP migration: KPs migrated en masse through legitimate fear. (p. 24) While decennial growth rates rose between 1961 and 2001, the same period saw a degree of migration of KPs from Jammu & Kashmir.
  2. Zia, Ather (2020), Resisting Disappearnce: Military Occupation and Women's Activism in Kashmir, University of Washington Press, p. 60,  In the early 1990s the Kashmiri Hindus, known as the Pandits (a 100,000 to 140,000 strong community), migrated en masse from Kashmir to Jammu, Delhi, and other places.
  3. Bhatia, Mohita (2020), Rethinking Conflict at the Margins: Dalits and Borderland Hindus in Jammu and Kashmir, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9,  Despite witnessing a prolonged spell of insurgency including a few incidents of selective killings, Jammu was still considered to be a relatively safe refuge by the Hindu community of Kashmir, the Pandits. As a minuscule Hindu minority community in the Muslim-majority Kashmir (around 3 per cent of Kashmir's population), they felt more vulnerable and noticeable as insurgency peaked in Kashmir. Lawlessness, uncertainty, political turmoil along with a few target killings of Pandits led to the migration of almost the entire community from the Valley to other parts of the country
  4. Bhan, Mona; Misri, Deepti; Zia, Ather (2020), "Relating Otherwise: Forging Critical Solidarities Across the Kashmiri Pandit-Muslim Divide.", Biography, 43 (2): 285–305, doi:10.1353/bio.2020.0030,  ...the everyday modes of relating that existed between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the period leading up to the "Migration," as the Pandit departures have come to be called among Kashmiris, both Pandit and Muslim.
  5. Duschinski, Haley (2018), "'Survial Is Now Our Politics': Kashmiri Pandit Community Identiy and the Politics of Homeland", Kashmir: History, Politics, Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 172–198, 178–179,  The Kashmiri Pandit migration: (p. 178) The onset of the armed phase of the freedom struggle in 1989 was a chaotic and turbulent time in Kashmir (Bose, 2003). Kashmiri Pandits felt an increasing sense of vulnerability
  6. Zutshi, Chitralekha (2004), Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 318, ISBN 978-1-85065-700-2,  Since a majority of the landlords were Hindu, the (land) reforms (of 1950) led to a mass exodus of Hindus from the state. ... The unsettled nature of Kashmir's accession to India, coupled with the threat of economic and social decline in the face of the land reforms, led to increasing insecurity among the Hindus in Jammu, and among Kashmiri Pandits, 20 per cent of whom had emigrated from the Valley by 1950.
  7. Sarkaria, Mallika Kaur (2009), "Powerful Pawns of the Kashmir Conflict: Kashmiri Pandit Migrants", Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 18 (2): 197–230,   (p. 197) Tens of thousands Kashmiri Pandits (the Hindus of Kashmir) left the Kashmir Valley during the Kashmiri Independence movement of 1989-1990. This migration has been fervently debated by all sides ever since. The voices of Pandit advocacy organizations have gained prominence and often serve to create a narrative that forwards the Indian government's interests: painting the conflict in Kashmir as one of Muslim desire for communal hegemony versus the Indian state's secularism and democracy. This paper focuses specifically on the claims for reparations for Pandit-owned properties that remain in the Valley. (p. 199) It is widely held that the majority of Kashmiri Muslims supported the Kashmiri Independence movement; that the government machinery of Kashmir was initially ineffective in the face of this uprising; and that tens of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits (the Hindus from Kashmir, who constitute a unique religious and cultural minority) migrated from the Valley. The statements of the facts that surround this Kashmiri Pandit migration do not converge on much else. Since 1990, Pandit migration has been a fervently debated and deeply sensitive issue on all sides. Pandits have been more vocal and organized than other internally displaced populations in India. Yet, as this paper illustrates, the prominent Pandit advocacy organizations and activists might not in fact represent those most affected or those who continue to desire to return to the Kashmir Valley. Note this also has "internally displaced."
  8. Duschinski, Haley (2014), "Community Identity of Kashmiri Hindus in the United States", Emerging Voices: Experiences of Underrepresented Asian Americans, Rutgers University Press, The mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus from Kashmir Valley began in November 1989 and accelerated in the following months. Every family has its departure story. Many families simply packed their belongings into thier cars and left under cover of night, without words of farewell to friends and neighbors. In some cases, wives and children left first, while husbands stayed behind to watch for the situation to improve; in other cases, parents sent their teenage sons away after hearing threats against them, and followed them days or weeks later. Many migrants report that they entrusted their house keys and belongings to the Muslim neighbors or servants and expected to return to their homes after a few weeks. Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Hindus left Kashmir Valley in the span of several months. There are also competing perspectives on the factors that led to the mass migration of Kashmiri Hindus during this period. Kashmiri Hindus describe migration as a forced exodus diven by Islamic fundamendalist elements in Pakistan that spilled across the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley. They think that Kashmiri Muslims had acted as bystanders to violence by not protecting lives and properties fo the vulnerable Hindu community from the militant ... The mass migration, however, was understood differently by the Muslim religious majority in Kashmir. These Kashmiri Muslims, many of whom were committed to the cause of regional independence, believed that Kashmiri Hindus betrayed them by withdrawning their support from the Kashmiri nationalist movement and turning to the government of India for protection at the moment of ... This perspective is supported by claims, articulated by some prominent separatist political leaders, that the Indian government orchestrated the mass migration of the Kashmiri Hindu community in order to have a free hand to crack down on the popular uprising. These competing perspectives gave rise to mutual feelings of suspicion and betrayal—feelings that lingered between Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus and became more entrenched as time continued.

"flight"

"flight"
  • Bose, Sumantra (2021), Kashmir at the Crossroads, Inside a 21st-Century Conflict, Yale University Press, pp. 119–120,  As insurrection gripped the Kashmir Valley in early 1990, the bulk – about 100,000 people – of the Pandit population fled the Valley over a few weeks in February–March 1990 to the southern Indian J&K city of Jammu and further afield to cities such as Delhi. ... The large-scale flight of Kashmiri Pandits during the first months of the insurrection is a controversial episode of the post-1989 Kashmir conflict.
  • Talbot, Ian; Singh, Gurharpal (2009), The Partition of India, New Approaches to Asian History, Cambridge University Press, pp. 136–137, ISBN 9780521672566,  Between 1990 and 1995, 25,000 people were killed in Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed forces. Kashmiris put the figure at 50,000. In addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the valley to settle in the Hindu-majority region of Jammu.
  • Metcalf & Metcalf 2006, p. 274The Hindu Pandits, a small but influential elite community who had secured a favourable position, first under the maharajas, and then under the successive Congress regimes, and proponents of a distinctive Kashmiri culture that linked them to India, felt under siege as the uprising gathered force. Of a population of some 140,000, perhaps 100,000 Pandits fled the state after 1990

"departure," "leaving"

"departure"
  • Rai, Mridu (2021), "Narratives from exile: Kashmiri Pandits and their construction of the past", in Bose, Sugata; Jalal, Ayesha (eds.), Kashmir and the Future of South Asia, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, Routledge, pp. 91–115, 106, Beginning in January 1990, such large numbers of Kashmiri Pandits – the com munity of Hindus native to the valley of Kashmir – left their homeland and so precipitously that some have termed their departure an exodus. Indeed, within a few months, nearly 100,000 of the 140,000- strong community had left for neighbouring Jammu, Delhi, and other parts of India and the world. One immediate impetus for this departure in such dramatically large numbers was the inauguration in 1989 of a popularly backed armed Kashmiri insurgency against Indian rule. This insurrection drew support mostly from the Valley's Muslim population. By 2011, the numbers of Pandits remaining in the Valley had dwindled to between 2,700 and 3,400, according to different estimates. An insignificant number have returned.

Content dispute

  • The content being disputed, removed here, is this:[1]

    What added to their perceptions was the presence of various newly founded militant organisations with their fundamentalist agenda. Apart from seeking to apply Islamic codes on Kashmiri society and imposing moral codes on Kashmiri Muslims, these organisations also sought to pressurise the Kashmiri Pundits into using symbols to identify them-selves as ‘Hindus’. Some of these organisations also started a campaign using mosques and street posters to ask Kashmiri Pundits to leave Kashmir. Irrespective of the fact that mass of Kashmiri Muslims were not influenced by these fringe organisations and empathised with the Pundits and even offered to protect them in case of any untoward incident, at least in the initial phase, the factor of ‘fear’ was very strong.

    UnpetitproleX (talk) 13:04, 27 September 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    See also Behera (2006):[2]

    One such alignment has developed among the Kashmiri Pandits, a target of militant Islamists in the early 1990s, when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) imposed an Islamic code of conduct on the Valley. Cinemas, beauty salons, and shops selling liquor and videocassettes were closed, and Hindi movies banned. Muslim women were ordered to wear burkas and Hindu women to stop wearing a bindi. People in the transport business were no longer allowed to carry unveiled women in their vehicles, while tailors in Srinagar were warned against stitching any Western-style garments that departed from the traditional attire of Kashmiri women and were kept busy making burkas. The Jamaat-i-Islami, in particular, targeted the Pandits as “Kafirs—the Batta, (Infidels—the Pandit) the first symbol of India in Kashmir.”

    UnpetitproleX (talk) 13:08, 27 September 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    @TrangaBellam: and @Kautilya3: regards the actual content being disputed. UnpetitproleX (talk) 07:31, 29 September 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Another thing that was removed was the mention of threats carried in letters, posters etc. for which Chowdhary was added as a reference.[3] Chowdhary, again, is not the only one to mention these threats. See, for instance, Hussain (2021):[4]

    Stories of Kashmiri Pandits, branded as “informers,” and killed in their own homes or in their alleys, and survived by grieving wives and children, had a tremendous impact on the psyche of the minority community. Their fears were heightened as religious slogans merged with the cry for independence emerging from the mosques of Kashmir. Certain militant groups even wrote threatening letters to the Kashmiri Hindu community, asking them to leave the Valley.

    UnpetitproleX (talk) 13:22, 27 September 2023 (UTC) Copied and pasted from above section per this comment. --UnpetitproleX (talk) 08:14, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    The problem is not removed content, but added content. It doesn't help to parade sources. The lead of the article had been stable for quite some time. You added something. I reverted it because the reliable content relating to the topic was already in the lead. Per WP:BRD and particularly WP:ONUS (which is Wikipedia policy), you need to tell us what exactly were the sentences you had added in the lead and why there are WP:DUE.
    Again, please don't parade sources. Tell us what the text was you had added, i.e. don't hide it in links. And tell us why what was there was not enough and why what you had added has due weight in the scholarly literature. 13:55, 2 October 2023 (UTC) Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:55, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    PS And tell us where in the lead you had added it, include both the sentence before and that after. It is not our job to decipher mysterious links. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 13:57, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    PS I have changed the section title "Removed content" which is not accurate to "Content dispute." Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:07, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Please note that your quote cited to Shahla Hussain [4] (Hussain) above is a small part of the much longer quote already appearing in citation [41] (in the stable version of the lead). Please tell us what special meaning or emphasis can be extracted from the reduced quote that requires a second sentence. Please also note that the lead is written in Summary style. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:17, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Please also *do not* add new sources. We need to first discuss your text addition in light of the attribution you had originally supplied and whether that attribution made the text due. Only then can we discuss new sources. The academics of this world were not twiddling their thumbs during the pandemic. Quite a few new ones have appeared. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 14:46, 2 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Summing up the above: please note that the stable lead alone has 58 citations to major scholars of Kashmir and the first two paragraphs of the Background section have another 20. (The lead has citations, moreover, because it was written with a lot of care and consideration to be the WP:NPOV and WP:DUE template for the rewriting of the article. The lead is not the summary of the article. There were quite a few editors watching me do it. The lead was in turn used in discussions and editing of Kashmir Files. I have done this sort of writing of lead-as-template in many WP articles, such as: Sanskrit, Mughal Empire, Brahmi script, 2020 Delhi riots (at the request of Kautilya3), Varanasi, Indus Valley Civilisation, Subhas Chandra Bose, Bhagat Singh, Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, … to name a few. It is that sort of lead. Sometimes people request my help for such lead writing in controversial articles.) Most citations have extensive quotes. Please make sure you have read them all before you attempt the defense of an addition. We can then consider that addition of text (in a specific place in the lead) to be a proposal and decide whether it fits coherently and cohesively with the prose organization of the lead and more importantly whether it carries due weight in the scholarly literature. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 16:31, 2 October 2023 (UTC) Clarifed with emphasis, explanation, and corrections. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 08:30, 3 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    I will add something here soon. UnpetitproleX (talk) 06:49, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Please be aware that I might also take five days to acknowledge it and longer to respond. Fowler&fowler«Talk» 10:55, 9 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Noting that neither user:Kautilya3 nor user:TrangaBellam have responded to user:UnpetitproleX's ping of ten days ago (29 September 2023). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:38, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Actually, K3 has responded on UnpetitproleX's user talk page and essentially asked them to refrain from editing the lead, to preferring editing the main body (which is what I had written the lead for anyway). Fowler&fowler«Talk» 02:44, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Loss and erasure

In this edit, I've added a sentence that makes the sentence about the KP's in exile writing memoirs more comprehensible. It is cited to Ankur Datta's chapter in the very recent (June 2023) Palgrave Handbook of New Directions in Kashmir Studies. It has a quote for aiding in the main body expansion.

  • Datta, Ankur (2023), "The Blank Space Between Nationalisms: Locating the Kashmiri Pandits in Liberal and Hindu Nationalist Politics in Relation to Kashmir and India", in Duschinski, Haley; Bhan, Mona; Robinson, Cabeiri deBergh (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of New Directions in Kashmir Studies, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 365–380, ISBN 978-3-031-28519-6

Fowler&fowler«Talk» 01:38, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Article violates Neutral point of view

"Many Kashmiri Muslims did not support violence against religious minorities; the departure of the Kashmiri Pandits offered an excuse for casting Kashmiri Muslims as Islamic radicals, thereby contaminating their more genuine political grievances, and offering a rationale for their surveillance and violent treatment by the Indian state"


Such apologetic tone is not present in articles on Anti Muslim riots in India, for example. Many Hindus don't support riots against muslims as well but these things are not mentioned when victims are Muslims


Besides, read the article on 2002 riots and then this, and you would realise how crimes are described in graphic details in that article Factpineapple (talk) 16:09, 8 February 2024 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ Chowdhary 2016, p. 125
  2. ^ Behera, Navnita Chadha (2006), Demystifying Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, pp. 124–125, ISBN 978-0-8157-0860-5
  3. ^ Chowdhary 2016, p.127: (in footnote) "Apart from the imposition of code of conduct by some militant organisations, some of these launched a terror campaign through letters, posters, pamphlets and newspapers asking them to leave in specified time. Some Srinagar-based newspapers also carried threats from militant organisations asking the minorities to leave. Many Pundits received threatening letters and phone calls. The religious slogans like ‘Nara-I- Taqbir Allah - o-Akbar’; ‘Yahan Kya Chalegea? Nizam-e-Mustafea’ [What will happen here? System of the prophet] certainly affected the morale of the minority community. Further, there were slogans that were specifically targeting the Pundits. Some of these slogans (e.g. ‘Zalimo, Kaffiro, Hamara Kashmir Choor Do’ [Tyrants, infidels, leave our Kashmir], ‘Musslamano Jago, Kaffiro Bhago, Jihad Aa Raha He’ [Muslims wake up, infidels run away, jihad is coming], ‘Agar Kasmir Me Rehna Hoga, Allah Allah Kehna Hoga’ [If you want to live in Kashmir, you have to chant Allah]) made the Pundits quite insecure."
  4. ^ Hussain, Shahla (2021), Kashmir in the Aftermath of Partition, Cambridge University Press, p. 320, ISBN 978-1-108-49046-7