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169th Rifle Division (Soviet Union)

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169th Rifle Division
Active1939–1946
Country Soviet Union
Branch Red Army
TypeInfantry
SizeDivision
EngagementsSoviet occupation of Western Ukraine
Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
Operation Barbarossa
Battle of Uman
Battle of Kiev (1941)
Second Battle of Kharkov
Operation Wilhelm
Case Blue
Battle of Stalingrad
Operation Uranus
Operation Ring
Operation Kutuzov
Battle of the Dniepr
Rogachyov-Zhlobin Operation
Operation Bagration
Vistula-Oder Offensive
East Prussian Offensive
DecorationsOrder of the Red Banner Order of the Red Banner
Order of Suvorov 2nd Class Order of Suvorov
Order of Kutuzov 2nd Class Order of Kutuzov
Battle honoursRogachyov
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Maj. Gen. Ivan Evdokimovich Turunov
Maj. Gen. Samuil Mironovich Rogachevskii
Maj. Gen. Yakov Filatovich Yeryomenko
Maj. Gen. Fyodor Andreevich Veryovkin

The 169th Rifle Division began forming as an infantry division of the Red Army in the Ukraine Military District in August 1939, based on the shtat (table of organization and equipment) of the following month. It nominally saw service in the occupation force in western Ukraine in September, but was not in any state to see combat. It played a more active role in the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in June/July 1940. The German invasion in June 1941 found it still in Ukraine, as part of 55th Rifle Corps fighting back to the Dniepr until it was nearly destroyed. It joined the reformed 28th Army after that Army was assigned to Southwestern Front. In May it formed part of the Front's northern shock group for the offensive intended to liberate Kharkiv. While initially hampered by the failure to take the German strongpoint at Ternovaya it gradually developed momentum in cooperation with 175th Rifle Division and ended up deep into the German positions before being struck by an armored counterattack on May 20 and being driven back to near its starting line, at considerable cost. In June it was nearly encircled during Operation Wilhelm, but managed to escape, again with serious losses. At the end of July it was removed to the Stalingrad Military District for rebuilding, joining the reformed 28th Army in the Kalmyk Steppe, but was then moved north in October to 64th Army south of Stalingrad and played a minor role in an offensive to break into the city. At the start of Operation Uranus it was in 57th Army south of the city and quickly penetrated the Romanian positions and exploited westward until coming up against German positions on the southern edge of what was now the Stalingrad Kessel (Pocket). During the operation that eliminated the pocket in January 1943 it was again under 64th Army, now in Don Front. Following the German surrender the 169th was removed to the Reserve of the Supreme High Command and sent north to join 11th Guards Army in Western Front, and under these command it took part in the offensive against the Oryol salient in July and August.

Formation

The 169th was based on a cadre from the 45th Rifle Regiment of the 15th Rifle Division as it was converting to a motorized division, and began forming on August 25 and into September 1939 at Kherson and Mykolaiv in the Ukrainian Military District (later, the Odessa Military District).[1] While still forming up it was officially in the third echelon of the Soviet forces as part of 6th Rifle Corps taking part in the Soviet invasion of Poland. It also participated in the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in June/July 1940,[2] under command of 37th Rifle Corps. In early 1941 it was assigned to 55th Rifle Corps in the Kiev Special Military District, along with the 130th and 189th Rifle Divisions.[3]

Operation Barbarossa

Kombrig Ivan Evdokimovich Turunov had been appointed to command of the division on January 10, 1940. He had previously led the 99th Rifle Division through all of 1939. His rank was modernized to that of major general on June 5, 1940. On June 22, 1941, the order of battle of the 169th was as follows:

  • 434th Rifle Regiment
  • 556th Rifle Regiment
  • 680th Rifle Regiment
  • 307th Artillery Regiment
  • 342nd Howitzer Regiment (until November 19, 1941)
  • 160th Antitank Battalion
  • 152nd Reconnaissance Company (later 152nd Reconnaissance Battalion)
  • 171st Sapper Battalion
  • 159th Signal Battalion[4]
  • 258th Medical/Sanitation Battalion
  • 83rd Chemical Defense (Anti-gas) Platoon
  • 100th Motor Transport Company (later 100th Motor Transport Battalion)
  • 350th Field Bakery (later 94th Motor Field Bakery)
  • 171st Divisional Veterinary Hospital
  • 75th Divisional Artillery Workshop
  • 459th Field Postal Station
  • 355th Field Office of the State Bank

As the German offensive began the division was headquartered northwest of Zhmerynka ,[5] but its subunits were spread over 65km in peacetime garrisons around Lipkany, Mohyliv-Podilskyi, and Grushka along the Dniestr River.[6] On June 25 it was assigned to Southern Front, and within days the 55th Corps, minus the 189th Division, came under command of 18th Army.[7]

Battle of Uman

By July 13 the 169th was holding a front along the Dniestr northwest of Mohyliv-Podilskyi. The 680th Rifle Regiment came under attack from a Romanian force in the area of Nova Ushytsia. The regiment's battery of four 45mm antitank guns was led by Sen. Lt. Labius, and one of his gun layers was Krasnoarmeets Yakov Kharitonovich Kolchak. Allowing a column of Romanian tanks to come as close as 150m before opening fire, in an hour of fighting he destroyed four of them, including two when he had only one other member of his crew remaining. His gun was then crushed by a tank that managed to break into his position. On August 2, on the recommendation of 18th Army's commander, Lt. Gen. A. K. Smirnov, Kolchak was made a Hero of the Soviet Union, while Labius received the Order of Lenin. However, Kolchak had been wounded and left on the battlefield on July 23 and fell into enemy hands before he had been informed of his award. Eventually listed as missing in action he was liberated in Moldova in August 1944 and mobilized again into the Red Army on September 9, being sent to serve in the 168th Penal Company in 57th Army for the duration of the war. He continued to serve with distinction, winning the Order of the Red Banner and Order of the Red Star and rising to the rank of starshina, but he was only informed that he had been awarded the Gold Star when he returned to the USSR. He was presented with this, and its accompanying Order of Lenin, at the Kremlin on March 25, 1947. He went to work in agriculture and as a political representative following this, but died on March 7, 1955 at the age of 36 and was buried near Mykolaiv.[8]

The 169th remained under attack from the Romanian 3rd Army and was soon forced to fall back to the southeast; it was located roughly halfway between its former location and the city of Kodyma by July 23 and then beyond that place by the end of the month.[9] This retreat placed it south of the Axis forces that were proceeding to envelop the 6th and 12th Armies to the north in the Uman area. This was completed on August 1, and over the following days the 169th attempted to aid the breakout of the encircled Soviet forces. While directing his troops from his command post in the Pervomaisk area General Turunov was severely wounded by a shell fragment. He was evacuated by air to Kharkiv, but died in hospital on August 3.[10] He was replaced the next day by Lt. Col. Nikolai Nikolaevich Zelinskii.

Retreat through south Ukraine

Retreating under pressure through the southern Ukraine, by August 12 the division was reduced to two groups, one with a strength of 808 men, and one of just 603 men. The former group was destroyed on August 14, and two days later the latter group was evacuated over the Dniepr River to serve as a cadre for the rebuilding division. By September 1 it was back in the line under command of the reconstructed 6th Army near Dnipro. The order of battle had changed; the 135th Antiaircraft Battalion had been removed to become a separate unit. Lt. Colonel Zelinskii was replaced on October 1 by Col. Samuil Mironovich Rogachevskii. On October 30 the 169th was in 38th Army of Southwestern Front with 4,787 officers and men in the ranks.During October and November it took part in 38th Army's delaying action west and later east of Kharkiv.[11] The city fell to German 6th Army on October 25 after five days of heavy fighting.[12]

On December 26 the 342nd Howitzer Regiment was disbanded and the 307th Light Artillery Regiment became a standard divisional artillery regiment, while the reconnaissance battalion was reorganized as a company, with the same number. As of January 1, 1942, the divisional strength was 5,536 officers and men, half of what was authorized for a rifle division at that time, but about average compared to other such divisions.[13] By this time it had been transferred to 21st Army, still in Southwestern Front.[14] On January 20 Colonel Rogachevskii left the division for the 8th Motor Rifle Division NKVD, which he had been concurrently leading since January 11, and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Mikhail Ivanovich Goryunov until February 27, when Rogachevskii returned while still leading 8th NKVD into April. He was promoted to the rank of major general on May 30. In March the 169th returned to 38th Army, before being moved to the rebuilt 28th Army the next month.[15]

Second Battle of Kharkiv

28th Army, under command of Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev, also contained the 13th Guards, 38th, 162nd, 175th, and 244th Rifle Divisions, plus a cavalry corps and four tank brigades.[16]

Second Battle of Kharkiv. Note position of 28th Army.

Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, who now commanded Southwestern Front, planned a new offensive to liberate Kharkiv with two shock groups. 28th Army formed the center of the northern group, with 21st Army to its north and 38th Army to its south. Ryabyshev's Army, located northeast of the city and with the bulk of the armor support, was expected to lead the advance. The 169th's initial objective was the village of Ternovaya in cooperation with the 175th; this was held by elements of the 429th Regiment of the 294th Infantry Division. Rogachevskii's reconnaissance thoroughly surveyed the defenses and passed on 43 specific targets to the supporting artillery. These included three artillery and two mortar batteries plus a pair of antitank guns; altogether the 169th outgunned the defenders 54 to 26.[17]

The offensive opened at 0630 hours on May 12 with a 60-minute artillery preparation led by Lt. Col. S. M. Bichek's 307th Artillery and backed by almost 100 reserve guns and mortars, followed by a 15-20 minute air attack against front line strongpoints and artillery positions. The infantry and tanks went over to the attack at 0730. Elements of the 556th Rifle Regiment quickly overcame the flattened advance positions and occupied the dominant height 203.4. However, the regimental commander was careless and failed to order his troops to dig in or to bring forward his regimental guns, giving the 429th Regiment the opportunity to counterattack and drive the 556th back to its start line. This uncovered the right flank of the 680th Rifle Regiment and put the entire Army offensive in jeopardy. Rogachevskii and Ryabyshev both reacted with alacrity to rally the 556th in person. After the latter arranged for renewed artillery and air strikes on the high point he led a combined infantry and tank attack which returned the regiment to the objective, whereupon it resumed its advance. Another strong German counterattack was defeated largely by regimental gun direct fire and the regiment now dug in to prepare to resume the attack in the morning. The 680th launched a coordinated attack by all three battalions against the fortified village of Bairak. The 3rd Battalion forced its way in during heavy house-to-house fighting, followed by the 1st and 2nd. With its retreat routes threatened the garrison withdrew to new positions along a north-south road just west of the village, and the tired 680th followed up before also digging in for the night. In the event, 28th Army had gained only 2–4km in heavy fighting through the day and German forces continued to hold Varvarovka and Ternovaya, hindering the development of the offensive, even though the former had been encircled.[18]

Overnight, the commander of Army Group South released the 23rd Panzer Division plus two infantry divisions to its 6th Army to join the depleted 3rd Panzer Division as a counterattack force. When combat resumed on the morning of May 13 Ryabyshev decided to develop the offensive on his left flank, taking advantage of the gains made by 38th Army the day before. During the day the garrison of Varvarovka was liquidated but Ternovaya continued to hold out, despite itself being encircled. The 680th and 556th Regiments advanced into the woods south of the strongpoint, cut the road leading north into it, and seized height 226. But the 556th and the left flank regiment of the 175th were unable to force their way into the village proper. Late in the day the 38th Division was ordered forward to maintain the encirclement while the 175th and 169th continued to advance to the west. By the middle of the day disconcerting intelligence reports were reaching Ryabyshev about large concentrations of German armor and infantry massing east of the city. Early in the afternoon the German grouping struck 38th Army, and 13th Guards was ordered to form a defense facing south.[19]

Despite the growing crisis on his left flank, Ryabyshev urged his divisions onward on May 14. While Ternovaya continued to hold out to the 38th, the 175th and 169th advanced 6-8km, defeating several small units formed from rear-area support troops. The 680th Regiment, assisted by tanks of the 84th Tank Brigade, fought a stiff battle to drive German troops from Veseloe; by the end of the day it had been reinforced by the 556th and after completing its capture prepared for a morning advance on Lyptsi. The two divisions were now reaching the German rear defense line running along the west bank of the Kharkiv River, but they had taken significant losses. At the same time Ternovaya remained in German hands for several more days, requiring air supply and even reinforcements in the form of paratroops. Meanwhile, the armored attacks against 28th Army's left flank, in which the 13th Guards still held most of their positions, but at the cost of as much as a third of their strength, rendered that wing of the Army incapable of further offensive action.[20]

After some hesitation overnight in the German command, its counterattack proceeded on May 15. A grouping consisting of an infantry regiment and 40 tanks struck from the Nepokrytaia region against the boundary of the 28th and 38th Armies and advanced northeastward toward Peremoga and Ternovaya. One regiment of the 244th Division was driven back 10km in what can only be termed a rout, finally taking up new positions 2–3km southwest of Ternovaya. Meanwhile, the 175th and 169th had received orders from Timoshenko to continue their advance alongside 21st Army. In the event, the two divisions scrambled throughout the day to contain the German breakthrough. Early in the morning the 680th and 556th swept across the valley of the Murom River and by noon reached the outskirts of Lyptsi, with the 434th Regiment (Col. I. P. Mishin) closely following. The 1st Battalion of the 556th (Sen. Lt. I. G. Shchegrenev) pushed into the town and drove the defenders to the western edge of town along the Kharkiv. A following counterattack struck the strung-out battalion and killed or wounded nearly half of its fighters before the 2nd Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 680th could come to assist. A foothold in Lyptsi was held, but the 169th now came under heavy attack from fighter-bombers which were assisting the attack of 3rd Panzer against the 244th. The rout of part of this division uncovered the left flank of the 169th so it was forced to abandon Lyptsi and withdraw eastward, in good order, to a new line based on height 203, while at the same time helping to scrape up units to fill the gap left by the 244th.[21]

On May 16, 3rd Panzer, having eliminated the regiment of the 244th encircled at Ternovaya, struck north along the Murom valley toward Neskuchnoe. After a short artillery preparation at first light a force of as many as 100 armored vehicles struck the 434th Regiment and most of the 307th Artillery Regiment. The latter's 2nd Battalion (Sen. Lt. Vladimir Kamsagovich Kharazia) struck the armor with direct fire. In the subsequent fighting the senior lieutenant, his chief of staff, and dozens of soldiers fell killed or wounded, but the attack was halted, with an estimated 30 vehicles knocked out. Kharazia was personally credited with eight of them while acting as a gun layer before he was killed, and he would be posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union.[22][23]

Over the following days efforts were made to revive the offensive of the northern group, including an order from Timoshenko on May 17 that the 169th was to attack westward to join the 175th. In the event, this was forestalled when the 3rd and 23rd Panzers, with the 71st Infantry Division, renewed their drive toward Ternovaya. The remnants of 244th Division were taken by surprise and driven off to the northeast, uncovering the Murom axis. The German garrison was relieved and 38th Division was forced to withdraw 2-3km to the east. The 169th was also forced to pull back 5-8km northward, finally taking up positions with second echelon units of 5th Guards Cavalry Division and occupied defenses in the height 207–Kozlov–Bezbozhnye sector. The 169th, along with the regiment of the 175th that had been detached against paratroops, put up a strong defense in the Arapovka–Ploskoe area and halted any further advance on Murom. By this time the southern shock group, and indeed all the Soviet forces in the Izium salient, were in danger of encirclement and destruction due to the counteroffensive launched the same day by 1st Panzer Army in the area of Barvinkove.[24]

Overnight the 244th was sent to the rear; it would be disbanded within a few months. Captured documents now convinced Timoshenko that the two panzer divisions would change their attack axis to the southeast in an effort to link up with 1st Panzer Army. In order to prevent this he ordered the 28th and 38th Armies to continue offensive operations on May 18 with all available forces. The 169th and 162nd Divisions were to make a concentrated attack to reach Veseloe, height 205, and Petrovskoe. Despite the danger to the forces of Southwestern and Southern Fronts in the Barvinkove salient, Stalin refused to abandon the offensive on Kharkiv. 38th Army began its attack at 0700 hours, but due to organizational difficulties 28th Army did not get underway until 1130. The 169th Division was nailed down by air attacks and while the 162nd made some initial gains it was soon forced back to its start line. Meanwhile, the shift of German forces allowed 38th Division to again encircle Ternovaya.[25]

On May 19, 28th Army again went over to the attack at 0930 hours, as did the 38th Army, but with no greater success than the day before. In the afternoon in the 21st Army's sector the 168th Infantry Division struck the 293rd Rifle Division and drove it back from Murom. This forced General Ryabyshev to commit scant reserves to cover his flank and rear. Meanwhile, 3rd Panzer was indeed on the move, but contrary to Timoshenko's understanding it had moved through Lyptsi and was concentrating, along with the 57th Infantry Division, to the northwest of the main body of the 175th Division. Unaware of this, Ryabyshev ordered all his forces, except the 175th, to go over to the attack again at first light on May 20. The advance was initially successful until it ran into the positions of 23rd Panzer near Vesele. At noon a German counterattack was launched against the 175th and 169th. Under pressure of armor, and almost continuous air attacks, the two divisions began to withdraw to the east, uncovering the flank of 21st Army's 227th Division to the north. By the end of the day all the units along the boundary flanks of the two Armies had been forced back 10-15km with heavy losses. The northern shock group was now along a line from Murom to Ternovaya and then south along the west bank of the Bolshaya Babka River.[26]

Having attained this success, 6th Army did not press the offensive on this sector, but instead began to withdraw the two panzer divisions back to Lyptsi as a preliminary to redeployment toward the Barvinkove salient, where the Soviet situation was going from bad to worse. During the following days the 21st, 28th, and 38th Armies were limited to local attacks to improve positions. Timoshenko soon ordered the 169th, 175th and 227th withdrawn from the front for rebuilding, along with all the tank brigades that had supported the northern shock group. On the afternoon of May 22 the encirclement of the southern shock group and two armies of Southern Front was completed, and these forces were reduced and largely destroyed by the end of the month.[27]

Operation Wilhelm

In early June the 169th was in much the same place as it had been at the start of the Kharkiv offensive, southwest of Vovchansk in a bridgehead over the Northern Donets centered on Staryi Saltiv. As a preliminary to the main German summer offensive Gen. F. Paulus, commander of 6th Army, intended to eliminate the bridgehead in a pincer attack in order to gain crossing points over the Donets. Altogether the bridgehead contained seven rifle divisions, five from 28th Army, including the 169th, plus two of 21st Army. All of these were under strength, backed by four weak tank brigades, three more rifle divisions and three cavalry divisions. The assault began early on June 10 and took the defenders by surprise. The four infantry divisions of VIII Army Corps took only two days to clear the bridgehead and capture Vovchansk. Meanwhile, the III Motorized Corps broke through the defenses of 38th Army to the south. Under the circumstances the 28th Army began retreating almost as soon as the German attack was underway. Rainy weather began on June 11 and this slowed the advance, along with defensive actions and counterattacks by the tank brigades. By the time the pincers closed on June 15 most of the Soviet forces had escaped, losing 24,800 men taken prisoner, largely from the now-shattered 28th Army; the 169th was reported by Timoshenko on June 13 as "seriously battered".[28]

Operation Blue and Stalingrad

By the start of the main German summer offensive in late June, 28th Army had five rifle divisions in various states of repair (13th and 15th Guards Rifle, 38th, 169th, and 175th), plus three battered tank brigades, numbering in total about 90 tanks. The Army's defenses along the Oskil River were in a single echelon, with the 169th on the right flank. were penetrated by XXXX Panzer Corps, supported by three Army Corps, on June 30, but the resistance of the 169th, along with the two Guards divisions and 13th Tank Corps, limited the advance. By July 10, 28th Army reported the division "was fighting in the Zhuravka region with 100 fighters", and these remnants made their way north of the Don in the following days.[29]

On July 31 the remnants of the division were withdrawn into the Stalingrad Military District, along with the 13th Guards.[30] On August 31 Stalin ordered that this District become a new 28th Army, effective September 5. It was to operate on the left flank of the new Southeastern Front after forming up at Astrakhan. Meanwhile the STAVKA organized a new 7th Rifle Corps, consisting of the 169th, the 141st Rifle Brigade, plus three other rifle brigades, in order to cover the gap between the Front and the Army in the area of Verkhny Baskunchak.[31] After over a month of rest and refitting, by September 11 the division was back up to a strength of 8,028 officers and men; 6,679 new men arrived from hospitals, the Tashkent Machinegun-Mortar School, the Astrakhan Infantry School, and reserve regiments. General Rogachevskii left the division on September 25 to take up the post of chief of staff of 28th Army, which he would hold for the duration of the war. He was replaced by now-Colonel Zelinskii, but he in turn handed the command on October 7 to Col. Yakov Filippovich Yeryomenko. This officer had led the 116th Rifle Division in 1941 before being wounded and hospitalized and had been chief of staff of 28th Army in September; he would be promoted to major general on March 1, 1943. On October 29 the 169th had reached nearly-full strength of 9,424 and was assigned to 57th Army on the west bank of the Volga, south of Stalingrad.[32]

Beketovka Bridgehead

On October 17 the commander of Stalingrad Front, Col. Gen. A. I. Yeryomenko, submitted a plan to the STAVKA for a further effort to break through to the encircled 62nd Army in the city, or at least to divert German forces from the battle there. The so-called Beketovka bridgehead on the west bank of the Volga south of the city was held by 64th Army and faced the German 71st Infantry and 29th Motorized Divisions, plus part of the 371st Infantry Division, along a 9km-wide front from south of Kuporosnoe to roughly 5km west of Gornaya Polyana. According to the plan the Army's shock group was to penetrate the 371st and advance to the Tsaritsa River to link up with 13th Guards in the city center. While this was exceptionally ambitious, Yeryomenko more realistically expected to draw one infantry and one panzer division from the battle in the city.[33]

The plan called for the shock group to be formed from the relatively fresh 93rd, 96th and 97th Rifle Brigades of 7th Corps and the 169th, all of which had been transferred to the Army, plus the 422nd and 126th Rifle Divisions, for a total of some 30,000 troops, backed by 80 tanks from four depleted brigades. 92 Guards mortars, and 243 guns. The force was deployed in two echelons, with the 93rd and 97th Brigades and 422nd Division, and two tank brigades in first, the 126th Division, 96th Brigade, and two tank brigades in second, and the 169th in general reserve to reinforce where and as needed. The first phase of the attack was to begin at dawn on October 23 and Yeryomenko estimated it would take 10 days to complete. In the event, due to difficulties in organization it did not kick off until 0900 hours on October 25; the 371st lost several hundred metres of ground in Kuporosnoe to the 422nd, plus as much as 2km west of the town, but soon stabilized the situation, although fighting continued until November 1.[34]

Operation Uranus

Preparations for Operation Uranus. Note positions of 169th and 422nd Divisions south of Stalingrad.

In preparation for the strategic counteroffensive to encircle 6th Army in and west of Stalingrad, the 169th was transferred to 57th Army in early November and moved southwards, to the vicinity of Tundutovo and Ivanovka, and reinforced. This Army was under command of Lt. Gen. F. I. Tolbukhin. According to the operational plan he was to attack at the junction of Romanian 20th and 2nd Infantry Divisions, which also formed the boundary between 4th Panzer Army and Romanian 4th Army. Once a penetration was made the 13th Tank Corps would be introduced into the gap. For the offensive the 169th was to be supported by 90th Tank Brigade, and would advance west to take up a line from Andreevka and Koshary Station. The other half of 57th Army's shock group, 422nd Division with 143rd Rifle and 235th Tank Brigades, was to move southward with the intention of encircling 2nd Infantry in cooperation with 15th Guards Division of 51st Army.[35]

After a 75-minute artillery preparation, which ended with five minutes of massed Guards mortar fire, the shock group stepped off at 1115 hours on November 20 and easily penetrated the defenses of the under-strength 2nd Infantry, which had only four battalions and a company under command; it suffered "tank fright" and was virtually routed in the first hour. By mid-afternoon the shock group had advanced 6-8km and the 169th had captured Khara-Uson, Erdeshkin, Nariman, and the eastern approaches to the Shosha Balka (ravine). Under Tolbukhin's plan the 13th Tank Corps was to enter the penetration and exploit northwestward, but this was delayed until 1620 due to difficulties in crossing the Volga. In the evening the 169th came under attack by the 29th Motorized, which drove it back from Nariman; quick action by the 90th Tank Brigade saved the day by engaging the German armor and destroying several tanks. The division lost 93 men killed and 257 wounded in this action. 13th Tanks' 163rd Tank Regiment next came under attack and suffered heavy losses, as did accompanying riflemen of the 169th and 422nd. The battle seesawed through the night and next day, until the German division was ordered northward towards Stalingrad, after which the 169th and its supporting tanks continued to exploit their penetration westwards.[36]

Throughout November 21 the combined forces of the shock group, the 163rd Tanks, and 62nd Mechanized Brigade struggled to retake Nariman from rearguards of 29th Motorized. At midnight the German division was ordered to begin withdrawing to more secure defenses south of Karpovka. During November 23 Tolbukhin's Army resumed its advance to the northwest, moving past German defenses on the west bank of the Chervlenaya River toward Karpovka, spearheaded by 13th Tanks with its remaining 120 tanks. On the same day elements of the Army linked up with units of 21st Army at Sovetskii and the encirclement of 6th Army was completed. The next day the Army's advance on its right flank faltered soon after it began against due to the strong defenses and incessant counterattacks. This was the 169th's flank and it was now cooperating with the 36th Guards Rifle Division of 64th Army in repeated attacks on the 297th Infantry Division, defending the strongpoints of Tsybenko and Kravtsov. Elements of the division managed to penetrate into Tsybenko several times during the day before being finally expelled by nightfall. By November 25 the situation along the south face of the pocket had essentially become a siege operation. 36th Guards and its sector east of the Chervlenaya was transferred to 57th Army as the 169th was moved eastward to take over the sector, allowing the guardsmen to rest and refit.[37]

During November 25-27 the 169th and 422nd made repeated assaults along both banks of the Chervlenaya in an effort to envelop Tsybenko from west and east. The 169th had taken a small bridgehead north of the Karavatka Balka, which served as the base of its attacks. The village, as well as its southeastern and eastern approaches, were held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of 371st Infantry's 670th Regiment. The 169th's divisional history describes the frustrating battle as follows:

The division fought to capture Tsybenko from 25 through 29 November, but failed. There were three large enemy minefields in that region. Sappers neutralized them [and] quite often attacked and destroyed the enemy along with the riflemen... 680th, 434th, and 556th Rifle Regiments advanced forward a bit and occupied defenses in the vicinity of the heights on front of Tsybenko.

By now it was clear that 57th Army had failed to reach its objective of clearing the road and rail line from Marinovka to Karpovka, and operations over the following weeks would resemble a prolonged siege.[38] The counteroffensive had taken its toll, and by December 4 the strength of the division was back down to a total of 5,574 personnel.[39]

Operation Ring

Operation Ring. Note positions of 64th Army.

During December the 169th returned to 64th Army, which was in Don Front as of December 30.[40] 4th Panzer Army launched Operation Winter Storm, the effort to relieve 6th Army, on December 12, and two days later the STAVKA halted active operations against the pocket until this crisis was averted. Winter Storm was halted by December 23, and Operation Koltso (Ring) began on January 10, 1943. According to the final plan the 64th Army would initially mount supporting attacks, once again along the Chervlenaya. As the offensive developed the main shock groups were to compress 6th Army eastward into the city, and 64th Army would eventually exploit north and northeast to add weight to the push. At this time most of the Front's rifle divisions had 4,500 to 5,500 personnel each but the German force was severely weakened by previous fighting and lack of supplies to the failed airlift.[41]

64th Army organized its main thrust in the 6km-wide sector from south of height 111.6 east to Elkhi. The shock group consisted of 36th Guards and 204th Rifle Divisions, 143rd Rifle Brigade, and 157th Rifle Division, and was supported by 51 tanks. 29th Rifle Division and 154th Naval Rifle Brigade were in second echelon while a motorized rifle brigade served as a mobile reserve. The remainder of the Army, including the 169th, was deployed in defensive positions from Elkhi to the Volga south of Kuporosnoe, with the division on the left flank. The Front commander, Lt. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskii, issued an ultimatum on January 8 to Gen. F. Paulus of 6th Army offering terms for surrender, but this was turned down.[42]

By the end of the first day the defenses of German IV Army Corps had been pierced on a broad sector west and east of the Chervlenaya and the strongpoint at Tsybenko was in the process of being encircled. In addition to heavy casualties the 297th and 371st Infantry Divisions had lost 26 of their combined 54 antitank guns. On January 11, 64th Army was to continue its advance both to gain territory and prevent German forces from shifting to the west side of the pocket, which was beginning to collapse; in fact, IV Corps had no reserves to spare. The Corps reported a large breach that it could neither repair nor retake, it continued to hold a containment line from Tsybenko to height 119.7 which held 64th Army back from its immediate objective, the rail line at Basargino and Voroponovo Station. In order to accelerate the capture of Tsybenko the 29th Division and 154th Naval Brigade were released from second echelon.[43]

Tsybenko finally fell to the 422nd Division on January 12. The next day the continued advance of 64th Army enveloped height 119.7 and Elkhi from the west and northwest, demolishing the right wing and center of the 297th Infantry. During January 14 the Army's forces were reshuffled, but continued resistance at Elkhi prevented any advance by the 169th. Over the next two days the pace of the offensive slowed and Rokossovskii, who was promoted to colonel general on the 15th, paused operations from January 18-21. 64th Army spent these four days preparing for the final drive; on the 22km-wide attack sector of 21st, 57th and 64th Armies 4,100 guns (76mm calibre or larger) and 75 tanks (mostly KV models) were concentrated.[44]

Ring resumed on January 22, when 64th Army took the Staro-Dubovka region. The advance resumed the next day; 36th Guards and 29th Divisions captured Peschanka from the 297th Infantry and then pushed eastward toward Verkhnaya Elshanka, which provided the 169th and 157th a gap to exploit toward the northeast. Together they seized Zelenaya Polyana, just 4km from the outskirts of Stalingrad's southern suburbs. During January 24 the size of the pocket was reduced by about 33 percent as the German forces outside the city fell back toward the ruins. The following day 64th Army began a general advance through the suburbs, with the division assisting in the liberation of Elshanka and Minina. On January 27 the STAVKA issued orders for the 169th and 157th, plus two rifle brigades, to be withdrawn from the Army into the Reserve of the Supreme High Command,[45] although in the case of the 169th this was not completed until February 5.

Operation Kutuzov

Map of Operation Kutuzov. Note position of 11th Guards Army.

The division's time in the Reserve was about five weeks, during which it was moved northward by rail. On March 13 it was assigned to Western Front, where it initially came under direct Front command. 16th Army was redesignated as 11th Guards Army on May 1, and by the beginning of June the 169th had joined that Army as part of the 16th Guards Rifle Corps, along with the 1st, 16th, and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions.[46]

In the planning for the operation against German 9th Army in the Oryol salient the 11th Guards Army, under command of Lt. Gen. I. Kh. Bagramyan, was to launch the Front's main attack. It was to defend along a front of 22km on its right flank with the 217th Rifle Division while concentrating 11 rifle divisions, including the 169th, as a shock group on the left flank. This was backed by two tank corps, four tank brigades, two Guards heavy tank regiments (KV tanks), five artillery brigades, 38 artillery regiments, plus other artillery and air assets. The attack sector was 14km wide from Glinnaya to Ozhigovo, where the German 211th and 293rd Infantry Divisions shared a boundary. After penetrating the defense the attackers were to advance in the direction of Belyi Verkh, Ulyanovo and Krapvina, and by the end of the second day the line of the Resseta River was to be reached. From here the Army was to move toward Bolkhov in an effort to encircling the German forces there in cooperation with 61st Army of Bryansk Front. The 169th was one of six divisions in the Army's first echelon. 16th Guards Corps had the 4th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, 29th Guards Tank Brigade, and a self-propelled artillery regiment in direct support of the first echelon.[47]

Preparations for the attack were effectively complete by July 10, while the fighting for the Kursk salient to the south was ongoing. The main offensive was preceded on July 11 by a reconnaissance-in-force to uncover the German fire plan and ascertain the forward edge of the defense. Each of the Army's first echelon divisions created a reinforced battalion for this purpose, and these attacked at 0300 hours following a 10-minute artillery bombardment. The battalions were also supported by reserve artillery fire. This fighting continued through the day and the first trench line, thinly held as expected, was taken, and the attackers continued to the second line, where the main German forces were located. On this basis many adjustments to the artillery and air preparation plan were made, while the false impression of having defeated the opening of a main offensive was left with many of the defenders.[48]

The next morning at 0300 hours the reconnaissance battalions handed their positions over to fresh forces. The artillery preparation began at 0320 and proved effective in part due to the good target intelligence. The complex bombardment lasted a total of two hours and 40 minutes and disrupted the defense to a depth of as much as 6km. A rolling barrage began at 0600 and the infantry went over to the attack at 0605, accompanied by the heavy tanks. The forward edge of the defense was penetrated by 0700 against minimal resistance, at which point the tank brigades were committed through the first echelon rifle divisions. The main resistance zone, with its many strongpoints, was soon seized while the tanks broke through to the intermediate zone. The two German divisions, supported by reserves from LIII Army Corps, began to recover and attempt to consolidate on a line from Zhelyabova to Rechitsa while also launching counterattacks, which were driven off with heavy casualties. German air attacks increased and units of 5th Panzer Division began to appear in the breakthrough zone. By the end of the day 16th Guards Corps, developing its attack to the southwest, had reached a line from 3km northeast of Ozerny to Krasnyi Oktyabr. Overall, the Army had gained up to 12km and partly broken the second German defense line.[49]

During July 13 the 16th Guards Corps, less 1st Guards Division which was fighting near Staritsa, continued to widen the breach to the southwest and by day's end had reached a line from Chernyshino to Dudorovo, which completed the breach of the third defense line. Bagramyan's Army had now penetrated to a depth of 12-25km on a 23km-wide front, had routed the two German infantry divisions and elements of 5th Panzer, and favorable conditions had been created for a further attack toward Bolkhov or to cut the Oryol–Bryansk railroad and paved road. The German command was reacting by rushing reserves from the rear and other sectors of the front. The next day units of 20th Panzer Division and three infantry divisions arrived on the breakthrough sector, with more following during July 15-19. These were intended not only to stop the breakthrough but to counterattack the base of the penetration and restore the original line.[50]

Fighting on the Resseta

50th Army to the north had attacked unsuccessfully on July 13, and as 11th Guards continued to advance, albeit at a slower pace, 16th Guards Corps was forced to extend its sector in order retain contact. It was now fighting along the Resseta River with its right flank units, attempting to take crossings and bridgeheads on the left bank against the influx of German reserves, including 5th Panzer and 183rd Infantry Divisions. The heaviest resistance was in the Kholmishchi–Khatkovo–Moilovo–Ktsyn area, where the Corps faced continual counterattacks from infantry and tanks. In a few placed the Soviet forces were pushed back from recent gains. Despite this, after two days of fighting, on July 17 the 169th cleared Khatkovo and, developing its success, also took Suseya in a turning movement. On July 19 it cooperated with 31st Guards Division, with some support from 1st Guards, to capture the village of Brusny. By the end of this day the Corps had reached a line from the woods 2km southeast of Chishche to Brusny to the northern outskirts of Moilovo, but German forces had managed to retain Moilovo and Ktsyn, from where they continued to threaten the right side of the base of the penetration, which was now more than 70km deep.[51]

50th Army had regrouped and attacked again on July 14, this time breaking through on a narrow frontage before going over to a general offensive on July 17. This had assisted the success of 16th Guards Corps by reducing the length of its sector.[52]

Advance

In late 1943 the 169th was assigned to 40th Rifle Corps in 3rd Army, where it would remain, almost continuously, until the end of the war.[53] In late February 1944, 3rd Army was in 1st Belorussian Front during the Rogachyov-Zhlobin Operation, with the goal of seizing bridgeheads over the Dniepr River. During this fighting, the division distinguished itself in the liberation of Rogachyov, and received that town's name as an honorific.

At the outset of Operation Bagration, on June 23, 40th Rifle Corps began with a shattering artillery barrage of 45 minutes against the sector held by German XII Corps near Rogachyov, followed by regimental-sized attacks against the 267th Infantry and 18th Panzergrenadier Divisions.[54] As the offensive unfolded, the 9th Tank Corps made a 200 km deep "raid" into the Minsk area, and the 169th organized a forward detachment in support, composed of the 434th Rifle Regiment loaded onto every truck available, plus the 160th Antitank Battalion, with extra troops from the "Burevestnik" Partisan Brigade picked up along the way. This successful exploitation earned the division the Order of the Red Banner, awarded on July 25 for the liberation of Volkovisk.[55]

On January 2, 1945, just before the Vistula-Oder Offensive, the division had a strength of 6,712 troops, including 770 officers, 1,685 NCOs, and 4,257 enlisted; 42% of the division's personnel were either Communist Party members or Komsomols. After driving into East Prussia as part of 2nd Belorussian Front, the division was awarded the Order of Suvorov and later the Order of Kutuzov. When the war ended the 169th was on the Elbe River, 120 km west of Berlin. The men and women of the division had earned its full title: 169-я стрелковая Рогачевская Краснознамённая орденов Суворова и Кутузова дивизия (English: 169th Rifle, Rogachyov, Order of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Kutuzov Division), and six men had become Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Postwar

According to STAVKA Order No. 11095 of May 29, 1945, part 6, the 169th is listed as one of the rifle divisions to be "disbanded in place".[56] However, this was not carried out, and by the end of August the division had been relocated to Vitebsk.[57]

According to Vitaly Feskov and his research team, even further after the war it was moved to Lepiel, still with the 40th Rifle Corps.[58] The division was disbanded there in June 1946.[59]

References

Citations

  1. ^ Charles C. Sharp, "Red Legions", Soviet Rifle Divisions Formed Before June 1941, Soviet Order of Battle World War II, vol. VIII, Nafziger, 1996, p. 83
  2. ^ David M. Glantz, Kharkov 1942, Ian Allan Publishing, Hersham, UK, 2010, p. 113
  3. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 10
  4. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 83
  5. ^ Artyom Drabkin and Alexei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes, trans. C. Summerville, Pen & Sword Books Ltd., Barnsley, UK, 2012, p. xiii
  6. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 83
  7. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1941, p. 17
  8. ^ https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=7250. In Russian, English translation available. Retrieved July 15, 2024.
  9. ^ David Stahel, Kiev 1941, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2012, pp. 78, 85
  10. ^ Aleksander A. Maslov, Fallen Soviet Generals, trans. & ed. by D. M. Glantz, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1998, p. 44
  11. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 83
  12. ^ David M. Glantz, Before Stalingrad, Tempus Publishing Ltd., Stroud, UK, 2003, p. 152
  13. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", p. 83
  14. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 11
  15. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, pp. 66, 85
  16. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 112-14
  17. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 163-67
  18. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 167-68, 173
  19. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 176-81
  20. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 184-88
  21. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 203-07, 211, 214-16
  22. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 219-21
  23. ^ https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=4818. In Russian, English translation available. Retrieved July 15, 2024.
  24. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 246-48
  25. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 248, 250-52, 254, 261-63
  26. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 269-73
  27. ^ Glantz, Kharkov 1942, pp. 273-74, 281, 297-98
  28. ^ Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, pp. 90-91, 96-97
  29. ^ Glantz, To the Gates of Stalingrad, pp. 111, 127-30, 134, 180-81
  30. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1942, p. 159
  31. ^ Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2009, p. 36
  32. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions", pp. 83-84
  33. ^ Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, p. 524
  34. ^ Glantz, Armageddon in Stalingrad, pp. 525-56, 537
  35. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014, pp. 66, 106-08
  36. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One, pp. 253-58
  37. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One, pp. 291, 363, 405-06, 453
  38. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book One, pp. 453-54
  39. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions" p. 84
  40. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, pp. 17-18
  41. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014, pp. 342, 403, 419, 422
  42. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 423, 430, 433-35
  43. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 439-40, 444, 449, 452, 459
  44. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 465, 474, 480-81, 495, 510
  45. ^ Glantz, Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two, pp. 513, 519, 522, 526, 540
  46. ^ Combat Composition of the Soviet Army, 1943, pp. 85, 133
  47. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, ed. & trans. R. W. Harrison, Helion & Co., Ltd., Solihull, UK, 2016, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, chs. 1, 2
  48. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, ch. 2
  49. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, ch. 2
  50. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, ch. 2
  51. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, ch. 2
  52. ^ Soviet General Staff, The Battle of Kursk, Kindle ed., Book Two, Part One, ch. 2
  53. ^ Sharp, "Red Legions" p. 84
  54. ^ Walter S. Dunn Jr., Soviet Blitzkrieg, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2008, p. 183
  55. ^ Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union 1967a, p. 408.
  56. ^ Stavka Order No. 11095
  57. ^ Combat Journal of the 169th Rifle Division, p. 379
  58. ^ Feskov et al 2013, p. 450
  59. ^ Lukyanov & Kostrov 1946, p. 6.

Bibliography

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