1993 Russian constitutional crisis
This article needs additional citations for verification. (August 2008) |
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1993 Russian constitutional crisis | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() File:Vympel.jpgVympel |
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||
![]() ![]() Pavel Grachev Viktor Yerin Anatoly Kulikov |
![]() ![]() Ruslan Khasbulatov Albert Makashov | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
12[citation needed] killed (of which at least 9 were by friendly fire) |
187 killed, 437 wounded (official government estimate) Up to 2,000 killed (claims by the Soviets) |
The Russian constitutional crisis of 1993 was a political stand-off between Russian president and Russian parliament that was resolved by using military force. The relations between the president and the parliament had been deteriorating for a while. They reached a tipping point on 21 September, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin dissolved the country's legislature (Congress of People's Deputies and its Supreme Soviet). The president did not have the power to dissolve the parliament according to the current constitution. Yeltsin used the results of the referendum of April 1993 to justify his actions. In response, the parliament impeached Yeltsin and proclaimed vice president Aleksandr Rutskoy as an acting president.
The situation deteriorated at the beginning of October. On Sunday, 3 October, demonstrators removed police cordons around the parliament and urged by their leaders, took over Mayor's offices and tried to storm Ostankino television centre. The army that had initially declared its neutrality by Yeltsin's orders stormed the Supreme Soviet building in the early morning hours of 4 October and arrested the leaders of the resistence.
The ten-day conflict had seen the deadliest street fighting in Moscow since the revolution of 1905. According to government estimates 187 people had been killed and 437 wounded, while sources close to Russian communists put the death toll to as high as 2,000.[2].
Origins of the crisis
Intensifying executive-legislative power struggle
As part of Russian economic reform during the 1990s, Yeltsin's program took effect on 2 January 1992.[3] Soon afterward prices skyrocketed, government spending was slashed, and heavy new taxes went into effect. A deep credit crunch shut down many industries and brought about a protracted depression. Certain politicians began quickly to distance themselves from the program; and increasingly the ensuing political confrontation between Yeltsin on the one side, and the opposition to radical economic reform on the other, became centered in the two branches of government.
Real GDP percentage change in Russia, 1990-1994[4].
1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 |
---|---|---|---|---|
-3.0% | -13.0% | -19.0% | -12.0% | -15.0% |
Throughout 1992, opposition to Yeltsin's reform policies grew stronger and more intractable among regional leaders who wanted more independence from Moscow. Russia's vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoy, denounced the Yeltsin program as "economic genocide."[5] Leaders of oil-rich republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan called for full independence from Russia.
Also throughout 1992, Yeltsin wrestled with the Supreme Soviet (the standing legislature) and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies (the country's highest legislative body, from which the Supreme Soviet members were drawn) for control over government and government policy. In 1992 the speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, came out in opposition to the reforms, despite claiming to support Yeltsin's overall goals.
The president was concerned about the terms of the constitutional amendments passed in late 1991, which meant that his special powers of decree were set to expire by the end of 1992 (Yeltsin expanded the powers of the presidency beyond normal constitutional limits in carrying out the reform program). Yeltsin, awaiting implementation of his privatization program, demanded that parliament reinstate his decree powers (only parliament had the authority to replace or amend the constitution). But in the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and in the Supreme Soviet, the deputies refused to adopt a new constitution that would enshrine the scope of presidential powers demanded by Yeltsin into law.
Seventh session of the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD)
During its December 1992 session, the parliament clashed with Yeltsin on a number of issues, and the conflict came to a head on 9 December when the parliament refused to confirm Yegor Gaidar, the widely unpopular architect of Russia's market liberalizations, as prime minister. The parliament refused to nominate Gaidar, demanding modifications of the economic program and directed the Central Bank, which was under the parliament's control, to continue issuing credits to enterprises to keep them from shutting down.[6]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/9c/Russian_Congressional_Fractions_1992.png/200px-Russian_Congressional_Fractions_1992.png)
In a speech the next day on 10 December, Yeltsin deemed the congress as a "fortress of conservative and reactionary forces." Parliament responded by voting to take control of the parliamentary army.
On 12 December, Yeltsin and parliament speaker Khasbulatov agreed on a compromise that included the following provisions: (1) a national referendum on framing a new Russian constitution to be held in April 1993; (2) most of Yeltsin's emergency powers were extended until the referendum; (3) the parliament asserted its right to nominate and vote on its own choices for prime minister; and (4) the parliament asserted its right to reject the president's choices to head the Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Security ministries. Yeltsin nominated Viktor Chernomyrdin to be prime minister on 14 December, and the parliament confirmed him.
Yeltsin's December 1992 compromise with the seventh Congress of the People's Deputies temporarily backfired. Early 1993 saw increasing tension between Yeltsin and the parliament over the language of the referendum and power sharing. In a series of collisions over policy, the congress whittled away the president's extraordinary powers, which it had granted him in late 1991. The legislature, marshaled by Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, began to sense that it could block and even defeat the president. The tactic that it adopted was gradually to erode presidential control over the government. In response, the president called a referendum on a constitution for 11 April.
Eighth session of the CPD
The eighth Congress of People's Deputies opened on 10 March 1993 with an attack on the president by Khasbulatov, who accused Yeltsin of acting unconstitutionally. In mid-March, an emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies voted to amend the constitution, strip Yeltsin of many of his powers, and cancel the scheduled April referendum, again opening the door to legislation that would shift the balance of power away from the president. The president walked out of the congress. Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy prime minister, declared that the referendum would go ahead, but on 25 April.
The parliament was gradually expanding its influence over the government. On 16 March the president signed a decree that conferred Cabinet rank on Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the central bank, and three other officials; this was in accordance with the decision of the eighth congress that these officials should be members of the government. The congress' ruling, however, had made it clear that as ministers they would continue to be subordinate to parliament.
"Special regime"
On 20 March Yeltsin addressed the nation directly to declare that he has just signed the decree introducing a "special regime", under which he would assume extraordinary executive power pending the results of a referendum on the timing of new legislative elections, on a new constitution, and on public confidence in the president and vice president. Yeltsin also strongly opposed the parliament, accusing the deputies of trying to restore the Soviet-era order.
Vice President Rutskoy, a key Yeltsin opponent, condemned Yeltsin's declaration as a grab for special powers. After the Constitutional Court ruled on March 23, 1993 that Yeltsin had acted unconstitutionally[7], it turned out that another decree was signed instead, which did not violate the constitution.
Ninth session of the CPD
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/78/Russian_Congressional_Fractions_1993.png/200px-Russian_Congressional_Fractions_1993.png)
The ninth congress, which opened on 26 March, began with an extraordinary session of the Congress of People's Deputies taking up discussions of emergency measures to defend the constitution, including impeachment of President Yeltsin. Yeltsin conceded that he had made mistakes and reached out to swing voters in parliament. Yeltsin publicly swore he would not obey a congressional decision against him during impeachment. On 28 March the vote to impeach him failed; votes for impeachment falling 72 short of the 689 votes needed for a 2/3 majority.
National referendum
The referendum would go ahead, but since the impeachment vote failed, the Congress of People's Deputies sought to set new terms for a popular referendum. The legislature's version of the referendum asked whether citizens had confidence in Yeltsin, approved of his reforms, and supported early presidential and legislative elections. The parliament voted that in order to win, the president would need to obtain 50% of the whole electorate, rather than 50% of those actually voting, to avoid an early presidential election.
This time, the Constitutional Court supported Yeltsin and ruled that the president required only a simple majority on two issues: confidence in him, and economic and social policy; he would need the support of half the electorate in order to call new parliamentary and presidential elections.
On 25 April a majority of voters expressed confidence in the president and called for new legislative elections. Yeltsin termed the results a mandate for him to continue in power (before the referendum, he had promised to resign, if the electorate expressed no confidence in his policies[8]). Although this permitted the president to declare that the population supported him, not the parliament, he lacked a constitutional mechanism to implement his victory.
Constitutional convention
Yeltsin decreed the creation of a special constitutional convention to meet in to examine the draft constitution that he had presented in April. The convention was to consist of political leaders from a wide range of government institutions, regions, public organizations, and political parties. The Constitutional Committee of the Congress of People's Deputies decided to participate and present its own draft constitution. Of course, the two main drafts contained contrary views of legislative-executive relations.
Some 200 representatives at the conference ultimately adopted a draft constitution on 12 July that envisaged a bicameral legislature and the dissolution of the congress. But because the convention's draft of the constitution would dissolve the congress, there was little likelihood that the congress would vote itself into oblivion. The Supreme Soviet immediately rejected the draft and declared that the Congress of People's Deputies was the supreme lawmaking body and hence would decide on the new constitution.
The Supreme Soviet was active in July, while president Yeltsin was on vacation, and passed a number of decrees that revised economic policy in order to "end the division of society." It also launched investigations of key advisers of the president, accusing them of corruption.
In July, the Constitutional Court confirmed the election of Pyotr Sumin to the position of the head of administration of the Chelyabinsk oblast, something that Yeltsin refused to accept. As a result, a situation of dual power existed in the oblast from July to October 1993, with two administrations acting side by side[9]. Also, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation delegated to the Constitutional Court of Mordovia the question of the legality of abolishing the post of the President of the republic. As a result, popularly elected President Vasily Guslyannikov (member of the pro-Yeltsin 'Democratic Russia' movement) lost his position. After that, the state media (ITAR-TASS) stopped reporting on numerous Constitutional Court decisions[10].
The president returned to Moscow in August and declared that he would deploy all means, including circumventing the constitution, to achieve new parliamentary elections.
Clashes of power in September
In August 1993, commentator reflected on the situation as follows: “The President issues decrees as if there were no Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviet suspends decrees as if there were no President.” (Izvestiya, 13 August 1993)[11]. The Supreme soviet, in the meantime, was preparing for a session of the Congress of People's Deputies scheduled to take place in November. It was likely that Yeltsin would have been stripped of most of his powers, transforming him into a ceremonial head of state[12]. The president launched his offensive on 1 September when he attempted to suspend Vice President Rutskoy, a key adversary. Rutskoy, elected on the same ticket as Yeltsin in 1991, was the president's automatic successor. A presidential spokesman said that he had been suspended because of "accusations of corruption." On 3 September, the Supreme Soviet rejected Yeltsin's suspension of Rutskoy and referred the question to the Constitutional Court.
Two weeks later he declared that he would agree to call early presidential elections provided that the parliament also called elections. The parliament ignored him. On 18 September, Yeltsin then named Yegor Gaidar, who had been forced out of office by parliamentary opposition in 1992, a deputy prime minister and a deputy premier for economic affairs. This appointment was rejected by the Supreme Soviet.
Siege and assault
On 21 September 1993, President Boris Yeltsin dissolved the Supreme Soviet, which was in direct contradiction with the articles of Russian Constitution, e.g.:
Article 121-6. The powers of the President of Russian Federation cannot be used to change national and state organization of Russian Federation, to dissolve or to interfere with the functioning of any elected organs of state power. In this case, his powers cease immediately.
He also scrapped the constitution, replacing it with one that gave the president extraordinary executive powers. (According to the new plan, the lower house would have 450 deputies and be called the State Duma, the name of the Russian legislature before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The Federation Council, which would bring together representatives from the 89 subdivisions of the Russian Federation, would play the role of an upper house.)
Yeltsin claimed that by dissolving the Russian parliament in September 1993 he was clearing the tracks for a rapid transition to a functioning market economy. With this pledge, he received strong backing from the leading capitalist powers of the West and the other former Soviet republics. In Russia, the Yeltsin side had control over television, where hardly any pro-parliament views were expressed during the September-October crisis[13] A notable exception to the rule was the scandalous '600 Seconds' broadcast of Alexander Nevzorov, aired by the Saint Petersburg TV.
Parliament invalidates Yeltsin's presidency
Rutskoy called Yeltsin's move a coup d'état. The next day, the Constitutional Court held that Yeltsin had violated the constitution and could be impeached. During an all-night session, chaired by Khasbulatov, parliament declared the president's decree null and void. Rutskoy was proclaimed president and took the oath on the constitution. He dismissed Yeltsin and the key ministers Pavel Grachev (defense), Nikolai Golushko (security), and Viktor Yerin (interior). Russia now had two presidents and two ministers of defense, security, and interior. It was dual power in earnest.
On 23 September, the Congress of People's deputies convened. Though only 638 deputies were present (the quorum was 689), Yeltsin was impeached by the Congress[14]. On 24 September, an undaunted Yeltsin announced presidential elections for June 1994. The same day, the Congress of People's Deputies voted to hold simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections by March 1994.[15] Yeltsin scoffed at the parliament backed-proposal for simultaneous elections, and responded the next day by cutting off electricity, phone service, and hot water in the parliament building.
Protests in Moscow
Yeltsin also sparked popular unrest with his dissolution of a parliament increasingly opposed to his economic reforms.
At the night of 23/24 September, a group of pro-parliament militants stormed the headquarters of the CIS military forces[16], resulting in a number of casualties. Pavel Grachev, minister of defense in Chernomyrdin's cabinet, blamed the Union of Officers , led by Stanislav Terekhov, for the assault[17]. Around the sieged White House, the Rutskoy-Khasbulatov had organized their own rag-tag army, which included elements from former Riga OMON units[18], militants from the Transnistria area and Abkhazia.
On 28 September, Moscow saw the first bloody clashes between the OMON riot police and demonstrators. The Interior Ministry moved to seal off the parliament building. Barricades and wire were put around the building. On 1 October, the Interior Ministry estimated that 600 fighting men with a large cache of arms had joined Yeltsin's political opponents in the parliament building. On 30 September, the first barricades were built.
The leaders of parliament were still not discounting the prospects of a compromise with Yeltsin. The Russian Orthodox Church acted as a host to desultory discussions between representatives of the parliament and the president. The negotiations with Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow as mediator continued until 2 October. On the afternoon of 3 October, however, Moscow police failed to control a demonstration near the White House, and the political impasse developed into armed conflict.
Storming of the television premises
2 October and 3 October were the culmination of violent clashes with the police. On 2 October, supporters of parliament constructed barricades and blocked traffic on Moscow's main streets. On the afternoon of 3 October, armed opponents of Yeltsin successfully stormed the police cordon around the White House territory, where the Russian parliament was barricaded[19]. Paramilitaries from the Russian Neo-nazi party RNU and the Stalinist Labour Russia movement, as well as a few units of the internal military (armed forces normally reporting to the Ministry of Interior), supported the Supreme Soviet.
Rutskoy greeted the crowds from the White House balcony, and urged them to form battalions and to go on to seize the Mayor's office and the national television center at Ostankino. Khasbulatov also called for the storming of the Kremlin and imprisoning “the criminal and usurper Yeltsin” in Matrosskaya Tishina. With some people already dead on the streets, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Moscow.
On the evening of 3 October, after taking the mayor's office, pro-parliament demonstrators marched toward Ostankino, the television center. But the pro-parliament crowds were met at the television complex by Interior Ministry units. A pitched battle followed. Part of the TV center was significantly damaged. Television stations went off the air and 62 people were killed. Before midnight, the Interior Ministry's units had turned back the parliament loyalists.
When broadcasting resumed late in the evening, Yegor Gaidar called on television for a meeting in support of President Yeltsin. A number of people with different political convictions and interpretations over the causes of the crisis (Mikhail Gorbachev, Grigory Yavlinsky, Alexander Yakovlev, Yuri Luzhkov, Ales Adamovich, Bulat Okudzhava etc) also appealed to support the government[20]. Similarly, the Civic Union bloc of 'constructive opposition' issued a statement accusing the Supreme Soviet of having crossed the border separating political struggle from criminality[21]. Several hundred of Yeltsin's supporters spent the night in the square in front of the Moscow City Hall preparing for further clashes, only to learn in the morning of 4 October that the army was on their side.
Storming of the White House
Between 2 October-4, the position of the army was the deciding factor. The military debated for several hours whether or not respond to Yeltsin's call for action. By this time dozens of people had been killed and hundreds had been wounded.
Rutskoy, as a former general, appealed to some of his ex-colleagues. After all, many officers and especially rank-and-file soldiers had little sympathy for Yeltsin. But the supporters of the parliament did not send any emissaries to the barracks to recruit lower-ranking officer corps, making the fatal mistake of attempting to deliberate only among high-ranking military officials who already had close ties to parliamentary leaders. In the end, a prevailing bulk of the generals did not want to take their chances with a Rutskoy-Khasbulatov regime. Some generals had stated their intention to back the parliament, but at the last moment moved over to Yeltsin's side.
The plan of action was actually proposed by captain Gennady Zakharov. Ten tanks were to fire at the upper floors of the White House, with the aim of minimizing casualties but creating confusion and panic amongst the defenders. Then, special troops of the Vympel and Alpha units would storm the building[22]. According to Yeltsin's bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov, firing the upper floors was also necessary to scare off the snipers.
By sunrise, 4 October, the Russian army encircled the parliament building, and a few hours later army tanks began to shell the White House. At 8 o'clock Moscow time, Boris Yeltsin's declaration was announced by his press service. Yeltsin accused the parliamentary opposition:
Those, who went against the peaceful city and unleashed bloody slaughter, are criminals. But this is not only a crime of individual bandits and pogromshschiki. Everything that took place and is still taking place in Moscow is a pre-planned armed rebellion. It has been organized by Communist revanchists, Fascist leaders, a part of former deputies, the representatives of the Soviets.
Under the cover of negotiations they gathered forces, recruited bandit troops of mercenaries, who were accustomed to murders and violence. A petty gang of politicians attempted by armed force to impose their will on the entire country. The means by which they wanted to govern Russia have been shown to the entire world. These are the cynical lie, bribery. These are cobblestones, sharpened iron rods, automatic weapons and machine guns.
Those, who are waving red flags, again stained Russia with blood. They hoped for the unexpectedness, for the fact that their impudence and unprecedented cruelty will sow fear and confusion.
and assured the listeners that the
Fascist-communist armed rebellion in Moscow shall be suppressed within the shortest period. The Russian state has necessary forces for this
[23].
By noon, troops entered the White House and began to occupy it, floor by floor. Hostilities were stopped several times to allow some in the White House to leave. By mid-afternoon, popular resistance in the streets was completely suppressed, barring an occasional sniper's fire.
Crushing the "second October Revolution," which, as mentioned, saw the deadliest street fighting in Moscow since 1917, cost hundreds of lives. Police said, on 8 October, that 187 had died in the conflict and 437 had been wounded. Unofficial sources named much higher numbers: up to 2,000 dead. In any event, nearly all the victims were killed by troops loyal to Yeltsin. Russian Army and Interior Ministry lost 12 soldiers, at least 9 of which were accidentally killed by their own men. It had been a close call; Yeltsin owed his victory to the military, the former KGB, and the Ministry of Interior, not to support from the regions or a popular base of support.
The crisis was a strong example of the problems of executive-legislative balance in Russia's presidential system, and, moreover, the likelihood of conflict of a zero-sum character and the absence of obvious mechanisms to resolve it.[24] In the end, this was a battle of competing legitimacy of the executive and the legislature, won by the side that could muster the support of the ultimate instruments of coercion.[25]
Who supported whom in the crisis
During the conflict president Yeltsin enjoyed the support of Russian liberal reformers, military, U.S. president Bill Clinton and other western leaders. Supreme Soviet supporters included Communist Party veterans and radical nationalists. For that reason the liberal press dubbed the supporters of the Supreme Soviet "Red-Brown coalition" (Russian: Красно-коричневые).
Yeltsin's consolidation of power
Immediate aftermath
In the weeks following the storming of the White House, Yeltsin issued a barrage of presidential decrees intended to consolidate his position. On 5 October, Yeltsin banned some of the political leftist and nationalist organisations and newspapers that had supported the parliament, among those the National Salvation Front, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, the Union of Officers[26]. In an address to the nation on 6 October, Yeltsin also called on those regional councils that had opposed him—by far the majority—to disband. Valery Zorkin, chairman of the Constitutional Court, was forced to resign. The chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions was also sacked, and the president took the opportunity to deprive trade unions of many of their administrative functions so as to whittle away their direct working ties to their rank-and-file membership.
On 6 October, forty-two notable writers and other literati published a letter, demanding decisive steps against communist and nationalist forces that had taken part or supported the rebellion.
Yeltsin decreed, on 12 October, that both houses of parliament would be elected in December. On 15 October, he ordered that a popular referendum be held in December on a new constitution. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov were charged on 15 October with "organizing mass disorders" and imprisoned. They were later released in 1994 after an amnesty was passed in the newly elected parliament.
"Russia needs order," Yeltsin told the Russian people in a television broadcast in November in introducing his new draft of the constitution, which was to be put to a referendum on 12 December. The new basic law would concentrate sweeping powers in the hands of the president. The bicameral legislature, to sit for only two years, was restricted in crucial areas. The president could choose the prime minister even if the parliament objected and could appoint the military leadership without parliamentary approval. He would head and appoint the members of a new, more powerful security council. If a vote of no confidence in the government was passed, the president would be enabled to keep it in office for three months and could dissolve the parliament if it repeated the vote. The president could veto any bill passed by a simple majority in the lower house, after which a two-thirds majority would be required for the legislation to be passed. The president could not be impeached for contravening the constitution. The central bank would become independent, but the president would need the approval of the State Duma to appoint the bank's governor, who would thereafter be independent of the parliament. At the time, most political observers regarded the draft constitution as shaped by and for Yeltsin and perhaps unlikely to survive him.
End of the first constitutional period
On 12 December, Yeltsin managed to push through his new constitution, creating a strong presidency and giving the president sweeping powers to issue decrees. (For details on the constitution passed in 1993 see the Constitution and government structure of Russia.)
In the parliament election on the same day the pro-Yeltsin party Democratic Choice of Russia became the second largest party, and unexpectedly, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) became the largest, alarming many observers abroad with his neo-fascist, chauvinist declarations.
Nevertheless, the referendum marked the end of the constitutional period defined by the constitution adopted by the Russian SFSR in 1978, which was amended many times while Russia was a part of Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union. (For further details on the democratization of the former Soviet Union, see History of the Soviet Union (1985–1991).) Although Russia would emerge as a dual presidential-parliamentary system in theory, substantial power would rest in the president's hands. Russia now has a prime minister who heads a cabinet and directs the administration, but the system is an example of presidentialism with the cover of a presidential prime minister, not an effective semipresidential constitutional model. (The premier, for example, is appointed, and in effect freely dismissed, by the president.)
Notes and references
- ^ Supporters of Alexander Rutskoy, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies frequently used those flags. The Russian tricolor itself only remained hoisted at the White House building.
- ^ "On 7 October, even the pro-American “Radio Liberty” reported that about 1012 people had been killed and many more had died later in the hospitals. The “Voice of America” claimed that many bodies of those who had been defending the Parliament building had been cremated during the night without any registration." (A. Kramer). "The role of the masses during the October 1993 Moscow rebellion".
- ^ Urmanov, Alexandr (1992-02-06). "The Creeping Counterrevolution in Russia: Local Resistance to Privitization". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 2007-09-04.
- ^ http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/3459873_050.pdf p. 38.
- ^ Celestine Bohlen, "Yeltsin Deputy Calls Reforms 'Economic Genocide,'" New York Times, 9 February 1992.
- ^ See, e.g., Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2002), p. 50.
- ^ Template:Ru iconText of the ruling (Russian). Accessed 2009-04-12. Archived 2009-05-11.
- ^ Российская газета. 1993. 1 апр. Cited in: Белкин А.А.. Дело о референдуме 25 апреля 1993 года. - "Правоведение"/1994/№ 5-6 . Accessed 2009-04-12. Archived 2009-05-11.
- ^ "Lenta.ru: : Зорькин, Валерий". Archived from the original on 2009-05-11. Retrieved 2009-04-12.
{{cite web}}
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{{cite web}}
: Unknown parameter|deadurl=
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suggested) (help) - ^ Executive decree authority By John M. Carey, Matthew Soberg. p. 76
- ^ Executive decree authority By John M. Carey, Matthew Soberg. p. 77
- ^ Changing channels By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz p. 126.
- ^ A Guide to the Economies in Transition By Ian Jeffries p. 113
- ^ For further details see Margaret Shapiro, "Yeltsin Dissolves Parliament, Orders New Vote," Washington Post, 22 September 1993.
- ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=oanB4q0o2vsC&pg=PA290&dq=1993+october+moscow+rutskoy+mayor%27s
- ^ "Октябрь 1993. Хроника переворота. 24 сентября. Четвертый день противостояния". Archived from the original on 2009-05-11. Retrieved 2009-04-12.
{{cite web}}
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suggested) (help) - ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=rsB-5-e0RwgC&pg=PA78&dq=yeltsin+decree+1400+1993+television+broadcast&lr=&ei=_pi3SZ_JMJLGywT5nN3gBw#PPA81,M1
- ^ http://books.google.com/books?id=oanB4q0o2vsC&pg=PA290&dq=1993+october+moscow+rutskoy+mayor%27s
- ^ http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/2003_10/031007_ng_sheynis.html
- ^ http://www.yabloko.ru/Publ/2003/2003_10/031007_ng_sheynis.html
- ^ Yeltsin's Russia and the West By Andrew Felkay. p. 79
- ^ The whole text of the declaration in Russian, part of the video broadcast
- ^ Since the release of Argentine political scientist Juan Linz's 1985 influential essay "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" the argument that presidentialism is less likely to sustain stable democratic regimes has gained widespread currency in Western comparative politics literature. According to Linz, conflict is always latent between the president and the legislature due to competing claims to legitimacy derived from the same source: electoral mandates from the very same body of citizens. Thus, a conflict can escalate dramatically since it cannot be resolved through rules, procedures, negotiations, or compromise.
- ^ See, e.g., Stephen White, "Russia: Presidential Leadership under Yeltsin," in Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidents (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 57–61.
- ^ Russia's Stillborn Democracy? By Graeme J. Gill, Roger D. p. 164
External links and further reading
- "A Specter’s Shadow Returns to Haunt Moscow" article by Ellen Barry in The New York Times October 11, 2008 (15th anniversary demonstration)
- Template:Ru iconA collection of materials on the topic; pro-parliament