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Caste in Indian society refers to a social group where membership is largely decided by birth. Members of such local group avoid entering into marital relationships with outsiders. Originally, these groups were associated with specific professions. The mutual relationship of one caste with the other is established on the principle of lineage and the resultant purity of blood, making the relationship between one and another caste distant.

The definition of caste is, however, incomplete; usually a caste is fragmented into several sub-castes whose members are more unified, and each group maintains its identity and establishes relationships with similar groups spread over a large geographical area. Caste, through the united efforts of its members to assert themselves, has today intruded in both politics and administration in India mainly through franchise and institutions like Panchayati Raj. Whether it is the factionalism of Indian political parties or the nomination of candidates and the mode of election campaign – many variables can be explained through caste interests and caste balance.

Caste, politically speaking, has played such a basic role in the decision making process that even the reorganization of states in India had to grapple with it so that no caste group dominates a particular territory. Although untouchability has been prohibited under the Constitution, Harijan and Adivasi people have also been given legal protection as a positive measure. Thus an attempt has been made to create economic and social equality but these reservations have affected Indian politics in an unwholesome manner. Groups declared "backward" are not prepared to forego the concessions that accrue to them by the label of "backwardness." Caste has thus become a major obstacle in the establishment of a casteless society and has cemented communal connections. Politicians are also caught in a difficult situation. On the one hand, they would like the differences and preferences based on caste to be abolished and on the other, they are well aware that these are helpful in securing the vote. Therefore, they allow the caste organizations while simultaneously trying to determine their limitations and containing their influence. This paradoxical situation can be overcome only if the caste entity and the impact it makes on politics is fully recognized.

Caste becomes important in politics because politics is highly competitive. Its purpose is to gain power for certain ends. It exploits all kinds of loyalties in the society to gain and consolidate certain political positions; organization and articulation of support are important in the above process of politics in our country. Caste is one such organization with which the people are associated. The linkage between politics and caste is thus important and in the process both interact so closely that they are transformed. Party programmes also cut across caste loyalties and members of one caste may be divided on the basis of ideological affiliations. India became a nation under the British Raj after 400 years of Mughal rule. Despite many changes during this long period, one unchanging phenomenon was caste discrimination.

Before British rule, a stream of Sufi saints had rejected the Brahmanism and injustice to Dalit people, but their main focus was on encouraging self-awareness and trust in a seemingly egalitarian religion with a non-discriminating, omnipresent and omnipotent god.

Real changes came in the 19th century, when the leaders of deprived castes espoused both revolt against the ideas of high-caste Hindus led by the Brahmins and belief in the modernity which had led to democratization in Europe and the United States.

Jyoti Ba Phule forged an alliance of farmers and marginalized and deprived communities. He considered that India was being led by minority high-caste Hindus. Dr Ambedkar, who had educated in the United States, the UK and Germany, was more concerned about the constitutional provisions for Dalits. Institutions should be strong enough to protect the constitutional provisions made for the most marginalized communities. The community that he was leading was thoroughly unempowered. They couldn’t understand what their rights were because ideologies that kept them in enslavement and poverty had been inculcated into them since birth. They accepted the theory of karma, that misfortunes were due to bad behavior in a previous existence, and believed that all they could do was to hold to their duties. In Ambedkar’s opinion, the greatest damage to Dalits was caused by theory of karma.

Ambedkar thought that the Dalit minority needed constitutional protection from the tyranny of the majority. In the 1930s, he fought for them to have a separate electoral identity and the British made what was known at the time as a communal award.

After India’s independence, Ambedkar led the drafting of the Indian Constitution. Dalits were reserved 17.5 per cent of seats in Parliament and state assemblies. However, when he stood in an election in Mumbai, Ambedkar was defeated by a coalition of high-caste Hindus.

In subsequent years, many Dalit leaders were elected and even achieved high office, but this did little to improve the overall condition of the Dalits as a whole.

In 1956 Ambedkar questioned whether India was a genuine democracy, beset as it was by innumerable caste divisions. He pointed out that “An Indian cannot eat or marry with an Indian simply because he or she does not belong to his or her caste. An Indian simply can not touch an Indian because he or she does not belong to his or her caste.” He described the caste system as “an ascending scale of hatred and descending scale of contempt” where castes were jealous of one another. The Congress party chose candidates carefully on the basis of their caste, and voters supported candidates from their own caste.

Ambedkar formed the Indian Labour Party. He formed the Depressed Classes League and he formed the Republican Party of India, all in an attempt to fight discrimination. To eradicate the caste identity of different Dalit communities (or Scheduled Castes, as they are called constitutionally), Ambedkar redefined Buddhism in a radical Humanist way and termed it Navayana. But Ambedkar’s quest for a progressive Dalit identity beyond caste has not been properly followed up by those who claim his legacy.

For the parties claiming his legacy he was “their” leader only. For the Hindu upper-caste parties, he became a “Dalit leader”, therefore relegating him to significance only in urban slums and the Dalitwadas of the villages. The irony was that a modern man like Ambedkar, whose democratic spirit could have been the meeting ground for the forces of change, became a victim of caste identities in India.

The first-past-the-post electoral system, which Ambedkar himself actually felt inadequate to protect the interest of the Dalits, is fast turning into a game of identities. The more numbers a group has, the bigger its share in the power structure. Nowhere is there any insurance for minorities.

The reservation of seats has fragmented Dalit politics further. Dalits do not constitute a single caste. More and more Dalit leaders focus on their primary caste identities to gain power. Political power is in the hands of those who are fundamentally anti-democratic. The token presence of Dalits in power is used to tell the world that Dalits as a whole have been empowered in India, but it is time to look into the ugly realities of the process.

We can see the process of political changes in the two most populous states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. They were the first where the national parties were thoroughly marginalized while a large number of Other Backward Classes (OBC) leaders dominated the political process since 1990.

In addition, there was a tendency to categorize any non-Dalit-OBC politician as “Brahmanical”. Nevertheless, Dali-OBC political leaders were happy to cooperate with the right-wing Hindu Nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Power was maintained by abusing high-caste Hindus during the day and dining and plotting with them at night.

Anti-Brahmanism and anti-ritualism is a quintessential theme for Dalit-OBC leaders, but instead of applying this to high-caste Hindus only, they apply it within the Dalit community as well and manage to marginalize members of minority Dalit and backward castes.

In Bihar a backward-caste leader made an alliance with Muslims that ruled the state for nearly 20 years but without any developmental work. Eventually, disillusioned Dalits withdrew support and the Government fell. Similarly, in Uttar Pradesh the Chief Minister, Mayawati, combined her caste strength (Chamar) with the Brahmins, much to resentment of the other Dalit communities. There again the Government forgot the basic Dalit agenda of measures like land reform, education and health care or any new scheme for the poor. The result was that the Chamars themselves became disillusioned with the Government, feeling that they were just fodder to give the Brahmins power.

The assertion of rights and the democratization of India will continue. Marginalized communities will not be satisfied by token representation in the political process and will reject those who seek power for their own ends. Caste identity is not enough; people want development; they want their voices to be heard. India has a good Constitution, but it is not fully implemented. The rich legacy of Ambedkar, Phule and Periyar, each of them possessed of high integrity and deeply committed to the cause of oppressed communities, must be carried forward by the current leadership. The Dalit movement cannot be a movement of caste identities but should provide an alternative political theory in India. Dalit-OBC politics cannot be exclusive in nature, but more broad, open-minded and inclusive, and should promote a culture of freedom and Humanism.

Fortunately, the recent election sent a stern message to the political parties that they cannot take people for granted in the name of identity. What are needed are good education and economic conditions and a social change towards equality. Unfortunately, those who harp on caste have no idea of how to annihilate it. Caste must not be exploited for the glorification of a few individuals and their megalomaniac visions. The issue of caste and Dalits needs to be addressed in a similar way to the Civil Rights movement in the United States. It must be about much more than a few seats in Parliament and the empowerment of elite leaders in the name of communities. It must be a broad movement for human rights and human dignity and against the religious rituals and holy texts that have subjugated and enslaved millions for centuries.

Caste-based identities must not be allowed to threaten basic Dalit unity. Humanists have that capacity to lead such a movement towards a modern, democratic state as envisaged by Dr Ambedkar.

Political connection is a reflection of the social reality and politics is one instrument which a particular class or group exploits to strengthen itself. It is, however, certain that the caste institutions are influenced in a dynamic and developing society, by urbanization, industrialization and modernization. No political party can function with a style of caste group and thus it has to look beyond the caste structure and appeal to all castes through its program. This is bound to weaken the caste structure.The politics of India, in various levels, has been influenced by the prevailing caste system in the country. The caste system is essentially a five-tier social standing apparatus that comes from Hindu culture. At the top of the social hierarchy are the Brahmins, who are typically priests. At the bottom of the caste system are the untouchables who are usually latrine cleaners or street sweepers. Even though there have been recent attempts by the government to implement systems that give lower caste people more opportunities, the social stigma of their heritage still hinders their upward mobility.

Though Caste has always been a part of Hindu social society in India, it did not become institutionalized into government organizations until the arrival of British Colonizers. The removal of the boundaries between "civil society" and "political society" meant that caste now played a huge role in the political arena and also influenced other government run institutions such as police and the judicial system. Though caste seemed to dictate ones access to such institutions, the location of that caste also played a pivotal role. If a lower caste were concentrated enough in one area, it could then translate that pocket of concentration of its caste members into political power that could then challenge the locally dominate upper caste. Location is not the only other contributor to the power dynamic of caste in politics, gender also plays a significant role. Women's representation within the political system seems to also be tied to which caste they happen to belong. Lower, more conservative castes, have less female participation in politics than upper, more socially liberal, caste. This has caused a disproportionately large number of upper caste women to occupy political office when compared to their lower caste counterparts. The hierarchy of caste and its role in politics and access to power and resources has created a society of patron-client relationships along caste lines. This staunchly clientelistic structure was most prevalent during the Congress-dominating period. This eventually led to the practice of vote banking, where voters back only candidates that are in their cast, or officials from which they expect to receive some kind of benefits.

Historically it has been very hard to change the structure of caste politics. More recently however, there has been a flux in caste politics, mainly caused by economic liberalization in India. This upsurge in lower cast empowerment was accompanied in some regions by a spike in the level of corruption. This was partly due to lower caste perceiving development programs and rule of law as tools used by the upper caste to subjugate lower castes. This resulted in a movement in the lower caste to seek Social Justice through corruption. More contemporary India, however, has seen the influence of caste start to decline. This is partly to due to the spread of education to all castes which has had a democratizing effect on the political system. However, this "equalizing" of the playing field has not been without controversy. The Mandal Commission and its quotas system has been a particularly sensitive issue.


Colonial History

See also: British India

The British institutionalized caste into the workings of the major government institutions within India . The main benefactors of this indirect rule were the upper castes or forward castes, which maintained their monopoly of control and influence over government institutes long after independence from the British. The state of post-colonial India promised development, rule of law, and nation building, but in reality, was a complex network of patronage systems, which solidified the upper-caste position of dominance and subjugated the lower castes. This network undermined the very promises of ‘nation building’ that post-colonial India had made and ushered in an area of upper-caste dominance that lasted for the next four decades.

Caste and Political Power

See also: Caste system in India, List of Indian castes

The caste system has traditionally had significant influence over people’s access to power. The privileged upper caste groups benefit more by gaining substantially more economic and political power, while the lower caste groups have limited access to those powers. The caste system distributes to different castes different economic strength. The upper caste groups can then manipulate the economic and political system to transfer economic strength into political power. [1]

Access to power

In rural North India, upper and middle-ranking castes dominate the ownership of land. They were able to transfer this control over wealth into political dominance over the Panchayat decision. The Panchayat is a local government unit that is in-charge of resources disbursement. The upper caste groups monopolized leadership positions in the Panchayat, thus gaining more opportunities to government contracts, employment and funding.

Access to police and judicial assistance also depends on which caste one belongs to. By bribing, influencing and intimidating the police and judicial officials, the rural north Indian middle to upper castes tend to manipulate the local police and judicial power more successfully. These types of political rent-seeking's have also helped secure the supply of rents to elites through other channels such as ‘rigging Panchayat elections, capturing electoral booths, and using pre-election intimidatory tactics in elections for the state assembly.’ [2] Whether an individual or a group can raise enough money for constant bribes depends on the caste-based socioeconomic status. Hence, the advantage in accessing economic resources not only transfers into but also reinforces the political domination of the upper caste groups.

Caste, ascribed at birth, is also influenced by where one is born. Political lines in India have often been drawn along caste lines; however, this is only part of the story. Caste is often specific to a particular area. These caste pockets create a locally dominant caste. Because of the political structure in India, local dominance can translate into regional dominance. This concentration of caste population has meant that smaller, less influential castes have the opportunity stake there claims in the political power arena. However, if a non-dominant cast is not concentrated in a particular area, then they are not likely to get any representation without teaming up with another caste to increase their influence. This means, “localized concentration facilitates a space for contesting the domination of State-level dominant caste”.[3] For instance, the Maratha-Kunbi caste has concentrations of populations all over the Indian states. They thus managed to receive maximum representation at the state legislature.(ibid)

Though the caste system factors greatly in determining who makes up the local elites, it also plays a huge role in determining women’s influence and representation in the political system. In India’s bicameral parliamentary system, women represent a meniscal amount of each house. Of the people's assembly, made up of 545 members, women represent a mere 5.2 percent; and in the State assembly, with 259 members, women make up only 8.8 percent. Both houses have seen an alarming decline in female representatives in the most recent decades. Of the 39 women representatives in the Indian Parliament most were members of higher castes. Caste, which eventually effects class, is one of the most important factors in determining a woman’s successful inclusion into the political system. This may be due to the fact that higher castes challenge the role of the traditional Indian woman and so their caste position gives them a greater range of options that are not available to lower more traditional castes. This inflated representation of elite caste in public offices has meant that the impact they have on public policy is disproportionately large in comparison to their actual numbers.[4]

Clientelism

Politics in India highly depended on patron-client ties along the caste lines during the Congress-dominating period. The caste that one belongs to serves as a strong determinant of his or her voting pattern.[5] In India, different political parties represent the interests of different caste groups. The upper and merchant castes such as Brahmin, Rajput and Kayasth and the rich Muslim groups tend to express their interests through the Congress Party. The agrarian middle class such as the Jats tend to vote for the competing parties. Numerically minor parties, represented by the Jan Shangh, receive votes almost exclusively from the upper and trading castes (ibid). However, caste does not solely determine voting behaviors. Discrepancies occur especially for the upper caste groups. (ibid) This means that not everyone from the same caste would vote for only one particular party. The upper caste people have more freedom to vote by political beliefs. The List of Indian castes provides many different caste groups. The Mandal Commission also covered more than 3000 Other Backward Castes. It is thus not clear which parties are associated with each castes.

Loyal groups of voters usually back a certain candidate or party during elections with the expectation of receiving benefits once their candidate is in office. This practice, called vote bank, is prolific throughout most regions of the country[6]. Many political parties in India have openly indulged in caste-based votebank politics. The Congress party used votebank to maintain power; the competing parties constructed votebanks to challenge the Congress dominance of politics.

Caste Politics in Flux

For more about Political Parties in India and Caste see: Politics of India

By the early 1990s there began a shift in caste politics. The continuation of a one party system, which was the Congress party, composed mostly of upper-caste leadership, came to an end. This was partly due to economic liberalization in India which reduced the control the state had on the economy and thus the lower casts, and partly due to an upsurge in caste based parties that made the politics of lower caste empowerment a central part of there political agenda. It should be pointed out that these new political parties emerged not on a national level but on a village and regional level, and were most dominant in North India.

These parties view development programs and rule of law as institutions used by upper caste to control and subjugate lower castes. As a result, these new political parties sought to weaken these institutions and in turn weaken the upper caste domination in the political arena in India. Since ‘rule of law’ was seen as controlled by upper-caste, these new parties adopted a strategy that had to operate outside of this rule in order to gain political influence and lower-caste empowerment.

Political competition

Corruption thus translated into power and a means to enter the political arena, once only open to upper caste members. Corruption in India became a way to level the playing field. This struggle for empowerment that was forced to operate outside of the rule of law produced case-based mafia networks. These mafia-networks began to chip away at upper caste control over state institutions.[7]

However, unlike their predecessor, these caste mafias groups were not concerned with ‘development’, but mainly viewed elections and democracy as a way of gaining control of the state, which would enable them to level social inequalities. This new state envisioned a government of “Social Justice” through caste empowerment. Within the context of “social justice" corruption pontificated by the caste mafias became tolerated, and in some cases, as in the town of Bihar, even celebrated.

The very nature of caste politics inherently means that there are no boundaries between “civil society” and “political society”, as demonstrated by the proliferation caste mafia. The mafia dons were the mayors, ministers, and even members of Parliament. Therefore, there was no alternative to fight against these mafia figures and political brokers. Because rule of law was perceived to be a mechanism of upper caste control, corruption used by caste mafia became popularly accepted, as it was perceived to be a means to achieve lower caste empowerment. The corruption elevated to such a level that nearly all elected officials in some towns and regions were also criminals. The upper caste who had used their control over the state to discretely plunder its institutions for their own gain, were now replaced by the mafia dons who now openly pillaged the state institutions. Many of these elected ministers/mafia dons were jailed for the illegal practices they employed; however, this was widely touted as the upper castes trying to regain dominance by eliminating “social justice” supporters. One of the more famous of these mafia dons was Lalu Yadav, who became the first elected chief minister in India to be sent to jail. Lalu, convicted of embezzling 9.5 billion rupees from the Animal Husbandry Department, still continued to run the government from his prison cell in Bihar, which was later coined as the “cell-phone raj”. Corruption and politics became so common that at a time it was not uncommon for election results to be contested from a prison cell.

Corruption therefore translated into power and a means to enter the political arena, once only open to upper caste members. In this way corruption was seen as a way to level the playing field, and as a result was tolerated and in some villages championed under the banner of “social justice”.[8]

In the 1951 election, three ethnic parties challenged the Congress party: the Ram Rajya Parishad, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. These three sought to gain support from the Hindu majority. The All India Scheduled Caste Federation bid for support from the ex-untouchable castes. Three of the four ethnic parties gradually disappeared because they were not able to obtain enough votes. In the late 1980s, the Congress began to decline. More non-congress parties started to challenge the Congress dominance. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) descended from the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It attempted to pit Hindus against Muslims. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Janata Dal ( JD) tried to seek support from the Scheduled Castes, and Muslims against the upper castes.[9]

The intense party competitions that started in the late 1970s have also weakened the influence of caste in Indian politics. Traditionally, Indian political parties have been constructed from top-down. Party leaders relied on preexisted patron-client networks to collect votes. Hence, no parties established fixed organizations to keep constant contacts with the village-level. Since 1977, the number of youth participating in politics has significantly increased. Due to the lack of fixed organizations, political parties had to rely on the young village members for political mobilization [10] . Often, these young villagers exerted more political influence than the upper caste leaders and patrons. The status of these young people in the village depended on how much he could contribute to the economic development of the village. It is easier for the youth to maintain their status by rallying rather than remain loyal to a specific party. This also weakened the influence of caste and clientelism on Indian politics.

In the 1990s, many parties Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Samajwadi Party and the Janata Dal started claiming that they were representing the backward castes. Many such parties, relying primarily on Backward Classes' support, often in alliance with Dalits and Muslims, rose to power in Indian states.[11] At the same time, many Dalit leaders and intellectuals started realizing that the main Dalit oppressors were the so-called Other Backward Classes, and formed their own parties, such as the Indian Justice Party. The Congress (I) in Maharashtra long relied on OBCs' backing for its political success.[11] Bharatiya Janata Party has also showcased its Dalit and OBC leaders to prove that it is not an upper-caste party. Bangaru Laxman, the former BJP president (2001–2002) was a former Dalit. Sanyasin Uma Bharati, former CM of Madhya Pradesh , who belongs to OBC caste, was a former BJP leader. In 2006 Arjun Singh cabinet minister for MHRD of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was accused of playing caste politics when he introduced reservations for OBCs in educational institutions all around.

In Tamil Nadu, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party rose to power under the canard of "Brahmin oppression". Many upper-caste Brahmins have complained of reverse discrimination, alleging that Tamil Brahmins (Iyers, Iyengars, etc.) have left the state, due to a "hostile atmosphere" prevalent against upper castes in the region.[12][13]

Caste-based mobilization

Recent evidence suggests that the influence of caste has been declining. Rather than a long-established, unchanging institution, caste is subject to political influence. Changes in political leadership throughout the history of India have led to changes in the structure of the caste system. India’s colonial past has shaped caste into a flexible institution, generating a new system that has crucial influences on political mobilization.[14] In some regions of India, strategic reconstructions of the caste system have taken place. For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party in the state of Punjab was first initiated by urban political entrepreneurs who belonged to the former lower caste groups [15]. The pliable caste system in the post-independence era acts as a tool for identifying marginal groups and political mobilization . Various political leaderships can alter and influence the caste system to give different groups of people unequal rights in accessing public services and political competition.


Education

See also: Education in India

Education spread to the lower castes after India gained independence. The younger generations of all castes have had access to educational resources since the 1980s. The number of the Scheduled and Backward Castes people receiving education increased at a faster rate than that of the upper caste groups. ‘Not a single SC or ST person aged over sixty-five years had five or more years of school education, but 72 percent of the members of SCs between eighteen and twenty-five years of age and 53 percent of the members of STs of the same age group are educated to this level.’[16] The spread of education to all castes generated democratizing effects. Some representatives of the SC and ST groups obtained access to Congress in the 1950s~1960s (1179). Due to their higher education levels, they are less likely to respond to the upper-caste patrons, but to the needs and interests of the lower castes.

Controversial Issues

Reservation System

The Mandal Commission was established in 1979 by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai with a mandate to "identify the socially or educationally backward".[17] The Commission was set up to consider the question of seat reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination, and used eleven social, economic, and educational indicators to determine "backwardness." In 1980, the commission's report affirmed the affirmative action practice under Indian law whereby members of lower castes (known as Other Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes and Tribes) were given exclusive access to a certain portion of government jobs and slots in public universities, and recommended changes to these quotas, increasing them by 27% to 49.5%. L R Naik, the only Dalit member in the Mandal Commission refused to sign the Mandal recommendations,[18] as he feared that well-to-do OBCs would corner all the benefits of reservation.

A decade after the commission gave its report, V. P. Singh, the Prime Minister at the time, tried to implement its recommendations in 1989. The criticism was sharp and colleges across the country held massive protests against it. Many alleged that the politicians were trying to cash on caste-based reservations for purely pragmatic electoral purposes. Rajiv Goswami, student of Delhi University, threatened self-immolation in protest of the government's actions. His act further sparked a series of self-immolations by other college students and led to a formidable movement against job reservations for Backward Castes in India.

References

  1. ^ Craig, Jeffrey. "Caste, Class, and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday Corruption in Rural North India". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  2. ^ Jeffrey, Craig. "Caste, Class, and Clientelism: A Political Economy of Everyday Corruption in Rural North India". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. ^ Suhas, Pahlshikar. "Caste Politics Through the Prism of Region". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  4. ^ Rai, Shirin. "Class, Caste and Gender- Women in Parliament in India". IDEA'S Handbook: Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers: 1–8.
  5. ^ Kela, Shashank. "Caste, Class and Politics in Contemporary North India". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  6. ^ "Vote Bank".
  7. ^ Witsoe, Jeffrey. "Corruption as Power: Caste and the Political Imagination of the Postcolonial State". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  8. ^ Witsoe, Jeffrey (2011). "Corruption as A Power: Caste and the Political Imagination of the Postcolonial State". Journal of the American Ethnological Society. 38 (1): 73–85.
  9. ^ Chandra, Kanchan (2005). "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability". Perspectives on Politics. 3: 235–252. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  10. ^ Krishna, Anirudh (2003). "What is happening to Caste? A View from Some North Indian Villages". The Journal of Asian Studies. 62 (4): 1171–1193. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  11. ^ a b "Caste-Based Parties". Country Studies US. Retrieved 2006-12-12.
  12. ^ Are Brahmins the Dalits of today?
  13. ^ 'We Are Like The Jews: Politics apart, Brahmin-bashing is rampant in literary and cultural worlds too'
  14. ^ Rao and Ban. "The Political Construction of Caste in South India". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  15. ^ Krishna, Anirudh (2003). "What is happening to Caste? A View from Some North Indian Villages". The Journal of Asian Studies. 62 (4): 1171–1193. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  16. ^ Krishna, Anirudh (2003). "What is happening to Caste? A View from Some North Indian Villages". The Journal of Asian Studies. 62 (4): 1171–1193. {{cite journal}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  17. ^ Bhattacharya, Amit. "Who are the OBCs?". Archived from the original on 2006-06-27. Retrieved 2006-04-19. Times of India, April 8, 2006.
  18. ^ "Mandal's True Inheritors". The Times of India. 2006-12-12. Retrieved 2006-12-12.

Further reading