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2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism

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The Moscow–Constantinople schism,[a] also known as the Orthodox Church schism of 2018,[b][1] is a schism which began on 15 October 2018 when the Russian Orthodox Church unilaterally severed full communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.[2] This was done in response to a decision of the synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 11 October 2018 which confirmed the intention of moving towards granting autocephaly (independence) to the orthodox Church of Ukraine, to reestablish a stauropegion[3] of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Kiev, to revoke the legal binding of the letter of 1686[4] which led to the Russian Orthodox Church establishing jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Church, and to lift the excommunications which affected clergy and faithful of two unrecognized Orthodox churches in Ukraine.[5][6] Those two churches, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), were competing with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) and were, and still are, considered schismatics by the Patriarchate of Moscow.[7]

In its synod on 14 September 2018, the Moscow Patriarchate had broken off participation in any episcopal assemblies, theological discussions, multilateral commissions, and any other structures that are chaired or co-chaired by representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[8] In its statement of 15 October, the Russian Orthodox Church barred all members of the Moscow Patriarchate from taking part in communion, baptism, and marriage at any church controlled by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[2]

The schism forms part of a wider political conflict involving Russia's 2014 annexation of the Crimea and its military intervention in Ukraine, as well as Ukraine's desire to join the European Union and NATO.[9][10] On 28 November 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko declared the Kerch Strait incident was provoked by Russia in order to force Ukraine to declare martial law and therefore to prevent Ukraine from receiving its tomos (formal decree) of autocephaly.[11][12]

This schism is reminiscent of the Moscow–Constantinople schism of 1996 over canonical jurisdiction over Estonia, which was however resolved after less than three months.[13]

Background

Further information: History of Christianity in Ukraine and History of the Russian Orthodox Church

After the baptism of Rus', its lands were under the control of the Metropolitan of Kiev. Among the 24 metropolitans who held the throne before the Mongol invasion, only two were of local origin and the rest were Greek. Usually, they were appointed by Constantinople and were not chosen by the bishops of their dioceses, as it should be done according to the Canon.[14] After the Mongol invasion, the southern part of Rus' was heavily devastated and the disintegration of Kievan Rus' accelerated. Metropolitan Kirill III, who occupied the throne for 30 years, spent almost all of his time in the lands of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus' and visited Kiev only twice, although earlier he had come from Galicia and had been nominated for the post of Metropolitan by the prince Daniel of Galicia.[15] After the new Mongol raid in 1299, Metropolitan Maksim finally moved to Vladimir in the north, and did not even leave a bishop behind. In 1303 a new cathedra was created for south-west Rus' in Galicia and the new Metropolitan was consecrated by Constantinople,[16] but its existence ended in 1355 after the Galicia–Volhynia Wars. In 1325, Metropolitan Peter moved to Moscow, thus greatly contributing to the rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which gradually conquered other Russian principalities in the northeast of the former Kievan Rus'. Another part of Kievan Rus' gradually came under the rule of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, which entered into rivalry with Moscow. In particular, the Grand Dukes of Lithuania sought from Constantinople a separate Metropolitan for the Orthodox who lived in their lands. Although the Metropolitan in Moscow continued to retain the title of "Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus'", he could not rule the Orthodox outside the borders of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. Constantinople twice agreed to create a separate Metropolitan for Lithuania, but these decisions were not permanent, Constantinople being inclined to maintain a single church government on the lands of the former Kievan Rus'.[17][18]

In 1439, Constantinople entered into union with the Roman Catholic Church. In Moscow, this decision was rejected outright, and Metropolitan Isidor, consecrated by Constantinople, was accused in heresy, imprisoned, and later expelled.[19] In 1448, the council of north-eastern Russian clergy in Moscow, at the behest of prince Vasily II of Moscow, elected Jonah the Metropolitan of Kiev and All Rus' without the consent of the Patriarch of Constantinople. In 1469 Patriarch Dionysius I stated that Constantinople would not recognize any metropolitan ordained without its blessing.[20] Meanwhile, the metropolis of Kiev (de facto in Novogrudok) stayed under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, and in 1458, bishop Gregory became the Uniate Metropolitan in Kiev with the title of the "Metropolitan of Kiev, Galich and All Rus'". Moscow's de facto independence from Constantinople remained unrecognized until 1589 when Patriarch of Constantinople Jeremiah II approved the creation of a new, fifth Orthodox Patriarchate in Moscow. This decision was finally confirmed by the four older Patriarchs in 1593.[21]

The Patriarch of Moscow became the head of "all Russia and Northern countries",[22][23] and Chernihiv (now in Ukraine) was one of his dioceses.[24] However, he had no power among the Orthodox bishops of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, who remained under the rule of Constantinople. At the same time, the Orthodox hierarchs of those lands were inclined to the Union with Rome, despite the resistance of their parishes, who formed the Orthodox brotherhoods (or fraternities) to keep their identity. On the way from Moscow, Jeremiah II visited the lands of present-day Ukraine and committed an unprecedented act, granting Stauropegia (direct subordination to Patriarch) to many Orthodox brotherhoods. This provoked the anger of the local bishops and soon the Union of Brest was proclaimed, which was supported by the majority of the Orthodox bishops of the Commonwealth, including Metropolitan Michail Rogoza. Officially, the Orthodox (but not the Uniate) Metropolis of Kiev in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was eliminated and re-established only in 1620, in subsequent co-existence with Uniate Metropolis. That led to sharp conflict and numerous revolts culminating in the Khmelnytsky Uprising.

In 1654, Russia entered the war with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; it quickly occupied, for a while, the lands of present Belarus, and gained some power over the Hetmanate pursuant to the Pereyaslav Agreement (1654). The official title of Patriarch Nikon of Moscow was "Patriarch of Moscow and all Great, Lesser, and White Russia". However, the Metropolitan of Kiev Sylvester Kossov had managed to defend his independence from the Moscow Patriarchate. The Moscow government, which needed the support of the Orthodox clergy, postponed the resolution of this issue.

In 1686, Ecumenical Patriarch Dionysius IV approved the new Metropolitan of Kiev, Gedeon Chetvertinsky, who would be ordained by the Moscow Patriarchate and thus transferred, albeit with certain qualifications, a part of the Kiev ecclesiastical province to the jurisdiction of Patriarchate of Moscow (the Russian Orthodox Church).[25]

In 1924 Tome (Tomos) of Ecumenical Patriarchate to Polish Orthodox Church, the previous transfer of the Kyivan Church to the jurisdiction of Moscow (in 1685-1686) was declared uncanonical.[26] In addition, the Tome pointed out that the conditions of the “Act” of 1686 were never adhered to by the Patriarchate of Moscow.[27]

1996 schism over Estonia

Main article: 1996 Moscow–Constantinople schism

The Moscow–Constantinople schism of 1996 began on 23 February 1996, when the Russian Orthodox Church severed full communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,[28] and ended on 16 May 1996 when the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate reached an agreement establishing parallel jurisdictions.[29][30] The excommunication was in response to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's decision on 20 February 1996 to reestablish an autonomous Orthodox church in Estonia under the Ecumenical Patriarchate's canonical jurisdiction.[31][32][33] The 1996 schism has similarities with the schism of October 2018. Both schisms were caused by a dispute between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate concerning the canonical jurisdiction over a territory in Eastern Europe upon which the Russian Orthodox Church claimed to have the exclusive canonical jurisdiction, territory which after the collapse of the Soviet Union had become an independent state (Ukraine, Estonia). The break of communion in 1996 was made by Moscow unilaterally, as in 2018.[13]

September 2018: Russian Orthodox synod's "retaliatory measures" and the aftermath

Further information: Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine § Ecumenical Patriarch's legates in Ukraine and reactions of the Russian Orthodox Church

On 14 September 2018, in response to the appointment of two exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine, the Russian Orthodox Church decided to hold an extraordinary session to take "retaliatory measures after the appointment by the Patriarchate of Constantinople of its “exarchs” to Kiev following up the decision of this Church's Synod “to grant autocephalous status to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.”" The synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decided:[34][35]

1. To suspend the liturgical prayerful commemoration of Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople.

2. To suspend concelebration with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

3. To suspend the participation of the Russian Orthodox Church in all Episcopal Assemblies, theological dialogues, multilateral commissions and other structures chaired or co-chaired by representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

4. To adopt a statement of the Holy Synod concerning the uncanonical actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Ukraine.

A statement was released the same day explaining the situation and the sanctions taken to protest against the Ecumenical Patriarch's behavior.[8][36] On the same day, Metropolitan Hilarion clarified the situation in an interview published on the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations. In the interview, Hilarion stated:[37]

"[S]uspended will be the [...] participation in all the structures chaired or co-chaired by representatives of Constantinople. [...] The suspension includes bishop’s assemblies in the countries of the so-called diaspora and the theological dialogue[.] [...] The decision of the Holy Synod to suspend the liturgical mention of the Patriarch of Constantinople’s name during the liturgy and the fact that we suspend con-celebration with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of Constantinople does not imply a full breaking-off of the Eucharistic communion. The lay people who come to Mount Athos or find themselves in churches of the Patriarchate of Constantinople can take communion in them. But we refuse to concelebrate with hierarchs of the Patriarchate of Constantinople since every time they mention the name of their Patriarch during the liturgy while we have suspended it. [...] We do not think, of course, that all this will finally shut the door for dialogue, but our today’s decision is a signal to the Patriarchate of Constantinople that if the actions of this kind continue, we will have to break the Eucharistic communion entirely. [...] [A]fter the breaking-off of the Eucharistic communion, at least a half of this 300-million-strong population will no longer recognize him as even the first among equals."

On 23 September 2018 Patriarch Bartholomew, during a mass he was celebrating in the Saint Fokas Orthodox Church declared that he "had sent a message that Ukraine would receive autocephaly as soon as possible, since it is entitled to it"[38][39]

On 30 September 2018, in an interview to Izvestia daily published on the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations, Metropolitan Hilarion commented: "The Russian Church does not need to fear isolation. If Constantinople continues its anti-canonical actions, it will place itself outside the canonical space, outside the understanding of church order that distinguishes the Orthodox Church."[40]

On 2 October, Patriarch Kirill of the ROC sent a letter to all the autocephalous Orthodox churches to ask them to hold a "Pan-Orthodox discussion" concerning the question of Ukraine's autocephaly.[41][42][43][44]

On 5 October, the Metropolitan Pavel, head of the Belarusian Orthodox Church (exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church), announced the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church on 15 October in Minsk. He said that "The situation with the Orthodox Church in Ukraine will be on the agenda of the meeting".[45] This meeting had been announced previously on 7 January 2018 and was at the time "most likely to take place in mid October."[46]

On 9 October, Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church warned that "if the project for Ukrainian autocephaly is carried through, it will mean a tragic and possibly irretrievable schism of the whole Orthodoxy." He added that "ignoring sacred canons shakes up the whole system of the church organism. Schismatics in other Local Churches are well aware that if autocephaly is given to the Ukrainian schismatics, it will be possible to repeat the same scenario anywhere. That is why we state that autocephaly in Ukraine will not be ‘the healing of the schism’ but its legalization and encouragement."[47]

The question of Ukraine's autocephaly

Main article: Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine

On 11 October 2018 the synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced that it would grant autocephaly to the "Church of Ukraine".[48] This decision led the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church to break communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 15 October 2018, which marked the beginning of the 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism. On 15 December 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was formed after a unification council between the the UAOC, the UOC-KP, and two bishops of the UOC-MP, the elected primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is Metropolitan Epiphanius. On 5 January 2019, Bartholomew I, the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, signed the tomos that granted autocephaly (self-governorship) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and officially established the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

Break of communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate by the Russian Orthodox Church

On 15 October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, meeting in Minsk, decided to cut all ties with the Constantinople Patriarchate. This decision forbade joint participation in all sacraments, including communion, baptism, and marriage, at any church worldwide controlled by Constantinople.[2] At the time of the schism, the Russian Orthodox Church had over 150 million followers, more than half of all Eastern Orthodox Christians.[49] The same day, after the synod, a briefing for journalists was given by Metropolitan Hilarion, chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, in which he declared that "[t]he decision on complete cessation of the Eucharistic communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople was taken today."[50]

Events in Ukraine

Transfer of St Andrew's church

On 18 October 2018, the Ukrainian parliament gave approval to give permanent use of the St Andrew's Church in Kiev to the Patriarch of Constantinople for him to hold "worships, religious ceremonies and processions"[51] in the said church, provided that St Andrew's church is also used as a museum and still belongs to the Ukrainian state.[52][53][54][55] St Andrew's church will also serve, according to an official, as the Ecumenical Patriarchate's embassy in Ukraine.[56] St Andrew's church previous owner was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church which accepted the transfer.[57] The parliament had to vote on this decision because the church is part of a national heritage site owned by the state.[58][59] The goal of this vote was, according to the KyivPost, to "speed up the receipt of a tomos (ordinance) – [the] recognition of a local Orthodox church in Ukraine by the global Orthodoxy"[53] Iryna Lutsenko, the representative of the Ukrainian president in parliament, declared the goal of this action was to make a "sign of solidarity with this process [of Ukraine receiving a tomos]" as well as "a symbolic gesture of unity with the Mother-Church [Constantinople]".[51] However, on the same day the Opposition Bloc introduced a motion to repeal the transfer, which meant that the Ukrainian President would not be able to sign the motion to transfer the St Andrew's church until the motion of repeal is reviewed by the Ukrainian parliament.[60] Finally, President Poroshenko signed the law of transfer on 7 November 2018[61][52][62][63][64] and the law took effect on 10 November 2018.[61][52][65][66] On 28 November 2018, in conformity with the law on religious organizations, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the transfer of the St Andrew's church to the Ecumenical Patriarchate's permanent use.[67]

On the morning of November 15, four unknown persons threw Molotov cocktails at the St Andrew's church (but they didn't explode) and attacked the priest with a spray.[68][69][70] On 27 November one of the suspects was arrested.[71]

The first liturgy presided by the members of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in this church took place on 13 December 2018.[72][73] This liturgy chaired by hierarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was condemned by the UOC-MP.[74][75]

Cancellation of the transfer of the Pochayiv Lavra

On 16 November 2018 Ukrinform reported that the Ukrainian Culture Ministry had challenged the legality of the transfer of the Pochayiv Lavra, located in the Ternopil Oblast, to the UOC-MP. The Pochayiv Lavra is a historic site of Ukraine.[76] It is only in 2018 that a local deputy of Pochayevsky city council found out that Yanukovych’s 2003 order on the transfer of the Lavra until 2052 to the UOC-MP (№ 438)[77] was carried out in an unknown way. The police of the Ternopil region opened proceedings in this case.[78] Should the illegality of the transfer be established, the transfer would be cancelled.[79] On 23 November 2018, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice cancelled the transfer of the Pochayiv Lavra to the UOC-MP.[80][81][82] On the next day, the UOC-MP monks of the Pochayiv Lavra clarified that "the commission of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, in response to the complaint from the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, has cancelled the registration of the contract for the right to use the Assumption Cathedral, the Trinity Cathedral, monastic cells, the bell tower, the bishop's house and the Holy Gates."[83][84] On 28 November, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the return of the Pochayiv Lavra to the Kremenets-Pochaev State Historical and Architectural Reserve by cancelling the 2003 transfer law which gave the use of the lavra to the UOC-MP and excluded the lavra from the Pochayiv Lavra to the Kremenets-Pochaev State Historical and Architectural Reserve.[85][86][87][88]

Law on the churches' names

On 15 December, Filaret requested parliament speaker Andriy Parubiy that the laws 5309 and 4128 be voted in parliament.[89]

It was expected that on 20 December 2018, the Ukrainian Parliament was going vote a law to force the UOC-MP to change its name (law n. 5309[90]).[91][92] This law concerns the name of religious organizations (associations) that are part of a religious organization (association) whose governing center is outside the borders of Ukraine, in a state which, according to the Law of Ukraine, is recognized as carrying out military aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupying part of the territory of Ukraine.[90] In October 2018, the press secretary of the UOC-KP had already called the Ukrainian Parliament to pass this law.[93] On 19 December 2018, Filaret declared himself in favor of this law.[94] On 20 December, the law was successfully voted,[95] while members of the UOC-MP were holding a protest outside the parliament.[96] Soon after the law was passed, a brawl erupted in the parliament between the deputies.[97][98][99] On 20 December, the UOC-MP called the Ukrainian President to veto the law.[100] The next day, Epiphany, primate of the OCU, declared his support for this law.[101] On 22 December, President Poroshenko signed the law and said that those changes in the law created "better conditions" for the exercise of freedom of choice of religion "for those who decide which Orthodox jurisdiction to belong to ... Either to the newly created autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine, or to the church that insists on maintaining its connection and dependence on ROC"[102] On 25 December, the UOC-MP said it would appeal to Constitutional Court to invalidate the law 5309.[103][104][105]

The law 5309 became effective on 27 December 2018. "From now on, the state body for religious affairs – the Department of Religions and Nationalities – must conduct a religious expert examination that determines which religious organizations are subject to this provision. The results of the examination will be published in the official publication Uriadovy Kuryer. Communities have 9 months to change their name and submit relevant documents to public authorities. Otherwise, the statute of the respective religious organization will cease to be in force in the part which defines its full official name."[106]

The law 4128, which concerns churches communities who want to be put under another jurisdiction, was momentarily postponed.[89] On 5 January 2019, parliament speaker Andriy Parubiy declared a session to adopt the law 4128 would take place "in the coming week".[107]

Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) raids

Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) carries out raids across the country targeting the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) churches and priests.[when?] According to Metropolitan Pavel, "There is a pressure on me personally, threats are being heard, all sorts of attacks not only on me, but also on other bishops and priests. For what reason I do not know."[108][109][110]

Kerch Strait incident

Further information: Kerch Strait incident

On 27 November, parliament speaker Andriy Parubiy announced that the martial law declared in some regions of Ukraine would not delay the receiving of the tomos of autocephaly (independence) and that, if anything, the martial law was going to speed up the process of Ukraine receiving its tomos.[111][112][113][114] On 28 November 2018, Ukrainian President Poroshenko declared the Kerch Strait incident was provoked by Russia in order to force Ukraine to declare martial law and therefore to prevent Ukraine from receiving its tomos of autocephaly.[11][12]

Reactions

International community

Reactions of the Orthodox churches

Main article: Reactions of the Orthodox churches to the 2018 Moscow–Constantinople schism

Numerous Orthodox churches took position concerning the question of the canonical jurisdiction over Ukraine, whether before or after this schism.

Canonical issues

The schism has its root in a dispute over who between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Patriarchate of Constantinople has canonical jurisdiction over the See of Kyiv (Kiev) and, therefore, which patriarchate has canonical jurisdiction over the territory of Ukraine. "[T]he principal argument proposed [concerning the granting of the ecclesiastical status of autocephaly to Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchate] is that Ukraine "constitutes the canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Moscow” and that, consequently, such an act on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate would comprise an "intervention" into a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction."[27] The Patriarchate of Moscow's claim of canonical jurisdiction is based mostly on two documents: the Patriarchal and Synodal “Act” or “Letter of Issue” of 1686, and a 1686 Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia. Both those documents are reproduced in the "Appendix" section of a study published by the Ecumenical Patriarch called The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church – The Documents Speak.[27] The Church of Constantinople claims the Church of Constantinople has canonical jurisdiction over the See of Kyiv and that the documents upon which the Russian Orthodox Church bases its claim of jurisdiction over said See of Kyiv do not support the ROC's claim.

On 1 July 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarch said that Constantinople was the Mother Church of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and declared that "Constantinople never ceded the territory of Ukraine to anyone by means of some ecclesiastical Act, but only granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right of ordination or transfer of the Metropolitan of Kiev on the condition that the Metropolitan of Kiev should be elected by a Clergy-Laity Congress and commemorate the Ecumenical Patriarch. [It is written] in the Tome of autocephaly, which was granted by the Mother Church [Constantinople] to the Church of Poland: “[...] original separation from our Throne of the Metropolis of Kiev and of the two Orthodox churches of Lithuania and Poland, which depend on it, and their annexation to the Holy Church of Moscow, in no way occurred according to the binding canonical regulations, nor was the agreement respected concerning the full ecclesial independence of the Metropolitan of Kiev, who bears the title of Exarch of the Ecumenical Throne...”[131]"[132] The ROC considers this argument "groundles[s]".[8]

Ecumenical Patriarchate's claims

The Ecumenical Patriarchate issued a document authored by various clerics and theologians called The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church – The Documents Speak.[27] This document analyzes canonical historic documents (namely the Patriarchal and Synodal "Act" or "Letter of Issue" of 1686 and the 1686 Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia) to see if the claim over the See of Kyiv by the Patriarch of Moscow is canonical or not. The date of publication of this document is unknown, but the earliest online version can be found on 28 September 2018 on the website of the Greek Orthodox Archidiocese of America[133] in PDF in English[134] as well as in Greek.[135] In September 2018, the Holy Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy and Malta issued a translation[136][137] which was on 17 October published on the official Italian website of the Archdiocese of Russian Orthodox Churches in Western Europe.[138] The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church was translated in Ukrainian as of 6 October 2018.[139]

The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church concludes that:

"[T]hrough the autocratic abolition of the commemoration of the Ecumenical Patriarch by each Metropolitan of Kyiv, the de jure dependence of the Metropolis of Kyiv (and the Church of Ukraine) on the Ecumenical Patriarchate was arbitrarily rendered an annexation and amalgamation of Ukraine to the Patriarchate of Moscow. [...] All these events took place in a period when the Ecumenical Throne was in deep turmoil and incapable “on account of the circumstances of the time to raise its voice against such capricious actions[.]” [...] The Church of Ukraine never ceased to constitute de jure canonical territory of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. [...] The Ecumenical Patriarchate was always aware of this despite the fact that, “on account of the circumstances of the time”, it tolerated the arbitrary actions by the Patriarchate of Moscow. [...] [T]he Ecumenical Patriarchate is entitled and obliged to assume the appropriate maternal care for the Church of Ukraine in every situation where this is deemed necessary."

Constantin Vetochnikov, two PhD in theology, PhD in history and member of the Collège de France,[140] who participated in Augustus 2016 to the 23rd International Congress of Byzantine Studies in Belgrade where he made a report on the subject of the transfer of the See of Kyiv,[141] and who helped the Ecumenical Patriarchate on The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church,[142] declared on 27 December 2016 that the transfer of the See of Kyiv from the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church "never took place".[143]

Later, Vetoshnikov made an analysis of the arguments of the Russian Orthodox Church. He pointed out that, according to the strict dogmatic approach (akribeia, ἀκρίβεια), the whole territory of Russia was originally subjected to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. After the Muscovy had gone into the schism in the XV century, it received autocephaly according to a more flexible approach (oikonomia, οἰκονομία) to heal this schism. The Metropolitan of Kiev at the same time remained within the jurisdiction of Constantinople. Then, also according to the oikonomia approach, the right to ordain Metropolitans of Kiev was transferred to the Patriarch of Moscow. This was not a change in the boundaries of the Moscow Patriarchate eparchy, as it was issued by a document of a lower level (ekdosis, ἐκδόσεως), which was used for various temporary solutions. For pastoral reasons, the Ecumenical Patriarchate subsequently did not assert its rights to this territory. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a split among the Orthodox of Ukraine and the Russian Church for 30 years failed to overcome this split. And now, also for pastoral reasons, the Ecumenical Patriarchate was forced to act in accordance with the principle of akribeia, and so it decided to abolish the right to ordain Metropolitans of Kiev which had been earlier transferred to the Moscow Patriarchate in accordance with oikonomia.[144][145]

Arguments against the Ecumenical Patriarchate's claims

On 20 August 2018, the pro-Moscow anonymous site Union of Orthodox Journalists[146] analysed the Ecumenical Patriarchate's claim of jurisdiction over Ukraine and concluded the See of Kyiv had been transferred to the Patriarchate of Moscow. They added that even if the Ecumenical Patriarchate decided to abrogate the 1686 transfer, the territory covered in 1686 by the See of Kyiv's territory was "a far cry from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of today" and covered less than half of Ukraine's current territory.[147]

In its 15 October 2018 official statement, the Russian Orthodox Church gave counterarguments to the Ecumenical Patriarch's arguments.[2]

Metropilitan Hilarion, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations, declared in an interview that Constantinople's plan to "grant Autocephaly to a part of the Russian Orthodox Church [...] that once was subordinate to Constantinople [...] runs counter to historic truth". His argumument is that the entire territory of Ukraine has not been under Constantinople's jurisdiction for 300 because the Kiev metropolis that was incorporated into the Moscow Patriarchate in 1686 was much smaller (it did not include Donbass, Odessa and some other regions) and therefore does not coincide with the present-day territory of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.[148] A smiliar argument was given on 13 November in a live phone interview to Radio Liberty by the Head of the Information and Education Department of the UOC-MP, Archbishop Clement.[149][150]

Archbishop Clement of the UOC-MP considers that "to revoke the letter on the transfer of the Kiev Metropolis in 1686 is the same as to cancel the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils of the 4th or 7th centuries."[151][152]

On 8 November the pro-Moscow anonymous website Union of Orthodox Journalists[146] analyzed the same documents as The Ecumenical Throne and the Ukrainian Church (the Patriarchal and Synodal "Act" or "Letter of Issue" of 1686 and the 1686 Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia) and concluded that the See of Kyiv had been "completely transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Church in 1686".[153]

Possibility of a pan-Orthodox synaxis on the question of Ukraine

The possibility of a pan-Orthodox synaxis has been raised before and after the official break of communion.

On 29 September 2018, the Reverend Alexander Volkov, the press secretary of the Patriarch of Moscow, declared the "[l]ocal [national [- TASS]] Orthodox Churches may initiate a pan-Orthodox Synaxis – consultative assembly or conference – on the problem of the Ecumenical Patriarch’s decision to grant autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine", however the problem was that conveneing such a synaxis is "a prerogative of the First among the Equals, that is, the Ecumenical Patriarch". Volkov noted there was "[o]thers forms [of pan-Orthodox synaxis]. There are the elders of the Church who can take this task upon themselves. [...] If you look at the Diptychs [the table specifying the order of commemorating the Primates of Orthodox Churches – TASS], the next in line [after the Ecumenical Patriarch – TASS] is the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria. Or else, there is the so-called synaxis of the eldest Patriarchs – of Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch[.]"[154]

Thus far, Patriarch John X of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch,[155][156] Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church,[156] Archbishop Chrysostomos II of the Church of Cyprus,[157] the Polish Orthodox Church primate Metropolitan Sawa (Hrycuniak),[158] the Orthodox Church in America primate Metropolitan Tikhon,[c][159] Archbishop Anastasios, primate of the Albanian Orthodox Church,[160][161][162][163] and three hierarchs of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitans Gabriel of Lovech, John of Varna and Veliki Preslav, and Daniel of Vedin)[164] have expressed their desire for a pan-Orthodox synaxis or pan-Orthodox council over the question of Ukraine in various statements. On 12 November 2018, the synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church published a communiqué in which they requested the convocation of a Pan-Orthodox Synod.[165][166]

On 7 November, answering the question "Who could, for instance, convene a Pan-Orthodox Council and chair it?", Metropolitan Hilarion declared in an interview, which was published on the official website of the ROC Department for External Church Relations, that it was "obvious" that the Ecumenical Patriarch could not chair a Pan-Orthodox Council since "the most important problems in the Orthodox world are linked with precisely his [Ecumenical Patriarch] anti-canonical activity".[167]

On 4 December, in an interview, when asked about the fact that convoking a pan-Orthodox council was "according to the canons" a prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarch, Metropolitan Hilarion replied: "which canons ? [...] I believe those canons do not exist, the Ecumenical councils were not convoked by the Ecumenical Patriarch, they were convoked by the emperor. The fact the Patriarch of Constantinople has been given the right to convey councils in the 20th century is the result of a consensus reached by all the local churches. It is not at a personnal initiative that the council is convoked, but only with the consent of all the local churches. We had, until recently, the first among equals, that is the Patriarch of Constantinople, who convoked the councils [...] in the name of the local Orthodox churches. Now, the unifiying element is no more the Patriarchate of Constantinople which, so to speak, autodestroyed itself. It is its decision. [...] We have to think about the future: who will convoke the councils, will it be the Patriarch of Alexandria, or another Patriarch, or else we will generally not have a council? Whatever. The Patriarch of Constantinople, as long as he stays in schism, even if he convokes a council the Russian Orthodox Church will not take part in it."[168]

See also

Information directly related to the subject of the article:

Background information:

References

Notes

  1. ^ Russian: Раскол между РПЦ и Константинопольским; Ukrainian: Розкол між РПЦ і Константинопольським, lit. 'ROC–Constantinople split'
  2. ^ Russian: Раскол Православной церкви; Ukrainian: Розкол Православної церкви, lit. 'split of the Orthodox Church'
  3. ^ Autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in America was granted by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1970 and is not yet fully recognized by all the other Orthodox Churches (including the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople).

References

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  3. ^ Zhukovsky, Arkadii. "Stauropegion". Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 1 December 2018.
  4. ^ "Patriarchal Letter to the Kings of Russia", THE ECUMENICAL THRONE AND THE CHURCH OF UKRAINE –The Documents Speak (September 2018), pp. 35–39 (English translation based on the text published in: Собрание государственных грамот и договоров, хранящихся в государственной коллегии иностранных дел [Collection of state documents and treaties kept in the Collegium of Foreign Affairs], Part Four, Moscow, 1826, 514–517).
  5. ^ "Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the encroachment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the canonical territory of the Russian Church | The Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. 15 October 2018. Retrieved 26 October 2018. "the report of the Patriarchate of Constantinople published on October 11, 2018, about the following decisions of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople: confirming the intention ‘to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church; opening a ‘stauropegion’ of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Kiev; ‘restoring in the rank of bishop or priest’ the leaders of the Ukrainian schism and their followers and ‘returning their faithful to church communion’; ‘recalling the 1686 patent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the transfer of the Metropolis of Kiev to the Moscow Patriarchate as its part."
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  7. ^ "Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the encroachment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the canonical territory of the Russian Church | The Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 31 October 2018. To admit into communion schismatics and a person anathematized in other Local Church [Filared, head of the UOC-KP] with all the 'bishops' and 'clergy' consecrated by him, the encroachment on somebody else's canonical regions, the attempt to abandon its own historical decisions and commitments – all this leads the Patriarchate of Constantinople beyond the canonical space and, to our great grief, makes it impossible for us to continue the Eucharistic community with its hierarch, clergy and laity. From now on until the Patriarchate of Constantinople's rejection of its anti-canonical decisions, it is impossible for all the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church to concelebrate with the clergy of the Church of Constantinople and for the laity to participate in sacraments administered in its churches.See also: "The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognises the independence of the Orthodox metropolis of Kiev". OSW. 12 October 2018. Retrieved 31 October 2018. The recognition of the canonical legitimacy of the two church structures (the KP UOC and the UAOC), which had hitherto been regarded as schismatic, may be assumed to be just a temporary step, aimed at facilitating the reunification of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into a single organisation. See also :"Metropolitan Hilarion: Filaret Denisenko was and remains a schismatic | The Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 29 October 2018. See also : "Russian Orthodox Church Breaks Ties With Constantinople Patriarchate". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 29 October 2018.
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  9. ^ a b Max Seddon; Roman Olearchyk (14 October 2018). "Putin suffers Crimea blowback with Orthodox Church schism". Financial Times. Retrieved 20 October 2018. But both sides acknowledge the canonical dispute is a proxy for a wider battle over Kiev's independence from Moscow. ... Speaking in front of Kiev's oldest church on Sunday, Mr Poroshenko cast "autocephaly", or autonomy for the Ukrainian church, as part of Kiev's broader push for integration with the west through EU and Nato membership while withdrawing from agreements with Russia
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  15. ^ Shubin 2004, p. 87-88.
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  19. ^ Shubin 2004, p. 124-129.
  20. ^ Shubin 2004, p. 130-132.
  21. ^ Shubin 2005, p. 17,35.
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  23. ^ In Russian translation Патриарх Московский и всея России и северных стран
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  28. ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 8 November 2000 : Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 1 November 2018. Patriarch Bartholomew issued an 'Act' on 20 February 1996 on the renewal of the 1923 Tomos of Patriarch Meletius IV and on the establishment of the 'Autonomous Orthodox Estonian Metropolia' on the territory of Estonia. Temporal administration was entrusted to Archbishop John of Karelia and All Finland. A schismatic group headed by the suspended clergymen was accepted into canonical communion. Thus the schism in Estonia became a reality.
    On 23 February 1996, in response to the one-sided and illegal actions of Patriarch Bartholomew the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church resolved to recognize them 'as schismatic and compelling our Church to suspend canonical and Eucharistic communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople… and to omit the name of the Patriarch of Constantinople in the diptych of the Primates of the Local Orthodox Churches'.
  29. ^ "Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church 8 November 2000 : Russian Orthodox Church". mospat.ru. Retrieved 28 October 2018. The text of the memorandum was agreed upon and included into the decisions taken by the Synods of the Orthodox Churches of Constantinople and Moscow on 16 May 1996. The document restored the interrupted communion between the two Patriarchates.
  30. ^ "CNEWA – The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church". www.cnewa.org. Retrieved 1 November 2018. On May 16 both Holy Synods formally adopted the recommendations made at the Zurich meeting. The agreement provided for parallel jurisdictions in Estonia, and allowed individual parishes and clergy to join either the Estonian autonomous church under Constantinople or the diocese that would remain dependent on Moscow. For its part, Constantinople agreed to a four-month suspension of its February 20th decision to re-establish the Estonian autonomous church. Moscow agreed to lift the penalties that had been imposed on clergy who had joined the autonomous church. Both Patriarchates agreed to work together with the Estonian government, so that all Estonian Orthodox might enjoy the same rights, including rights to property. As a result of this agreement, full communion was restored between Moscow and Constantinople, and the name of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was again included in the diptychs in Moscow.
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    1) To renew the decision already made that the Ecumenical Patriarchate proceed to the granting of Autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine. [...]
    4) To revoke the legal binding of the Synodal Letter of the year 1686 [...]
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    "I replied that I personally agreed, but I will gather the bishops, because it's not solely I who makes decisions," explained the "metropolitan". "We give it away, but you have to give us something in return.<...> There is a church of St. Cyril, there is a reserve, there is a church of the Savior on Berestov – here we go. And in the ZIK program, the president said he'd promised to make it up for both Filaret and Makariy, but it will be one church to get by. So, one has to be consistent. I can be deceived once, twice, but it will not work anymore."
    "Moscow (temples – Ed.) won't be transferred, whereas the only cathedral of the UAOC can be. Such justice we have, complained Makariy. " Filaret also has monasteries, churches, serves in Little Sofia. So the president is not acting in good faith, even though I praised him."
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  121. ^ Tomos ante portas: a short guide to Ukrainian church independence. Euromaidan Press. 14 October 2018. Retrieved 16 October 2018. the Synod ... of the Ecumenical Patriarchate ... gave further confirmation that Ukraine is on the path to receiving church independence from Moscow. ... Although President Poroshenko triumphantly announced that in result of the meeting Ukraine had received the long-awaited Tomos, or decree of Church independence – a claim circulated in Ukraine with great enthusiasm, this is not true. ... Constantinople's decision will benefit other jurisdictions in Ukraine – the UOC KP and UAOC, which will have to effectively dismantle their own administrative structures and set up a new Church, which will receive the Tomos of autocephaly. ... Right now it's unclear which part of the UOC MP will join the new Church. 10 out of 90 UOC MP bishops signed the appeal for autocephaly to the Ecumenical Patriarch – only 11%. But separate priests could join even if their bishops don't, says Zuiev.
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Literature

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