Argument from inconsistent revelations: Difference between revisions

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== Appearances ==
== Appearances ==
The argument appears, among other places, in [[Voltaire|Voltaire's]] ''[[Candide]]'' and ''[[Philosophical Dictionary]]''. It is also manifested in [[Denis Diderot|Denis Diderot's]] statement that, whatever proofs are offered for the existence of God in Christianity or any other religion, "an [[Imam]] can reason the same way".<ref name="Diderot">{{Cite book |last=Diderot |first=Denis |title=Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1 |year=1875–77 |editor-last=J. Assézar |pages=167 |language=fr |author-link=Denis Diderot |orig-year=1746}}</ref>
The argument appears, among other places, in [[Voltaire|Voltaire's]] ''[[Candide]]'' and ''[[Philosophical Dictionary]]''. It is also manifested in [[Denis Diderot|Denis Diderot's]] statement in response to [[Pascal's wager|Pascal's Wager]] that, whatever proofs are offered for the existence of God in Christianity or any other religion, "an [[Imam]] can reason the same way".<ref name="Diderot">{{Cite book |last=Diderot |first=Denis |title=Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1 |year=1875–77 |editor-last=J. Assézar |pages=167 |language=fr |author-link=Denis Diderot |orig-year=1746}}</ref><ref>https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/#ObjePascWage</ref>



== See also ==
== See also ==

Revision as of 20:47, 1 April 2022

The argument from inconsistent revelations is an argument that aims to show that one cannot choose one religion over another since their revelations are inconsistent with each other and that any two religions cannot be true.[1]

The philosopher David Basinger, writing for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, treats this problem as one aspect of the philosophical problems caused by religious diversity. More specifically, it proceeds from an exclusivist conception of the different faiths, where one faith is considered to be true or closer to the truth than the others. Exclusivism is opposed to non-exclusivism - the idea that no religious perspective is closer to the truth than the others.[2]

When placed in front of the diversity of faiths, exclusivists are forced to ask what, if anything, justifies their preference for their own religions. Many different responses can be formulated. For example, fideists hold that religious faith is not subjected to the standards of reason and can therefore disregard the apparent contradictions. Another response, discussed by philosopher Alvin Plantinga is to deny that members of other religions are epistemic peers who have reasons as good as one's own for believing in their faiths.[3].

According to J.L. Schellenberg, since mutually incompatible claims cannot be true, people who disagree about such claims can only maintain their own claim in a justified way if they possess a justification based on the assumptions and principles acceptable to both parties. Since such a justification cannot be found in religious debates, disputants cannot be justified to hold their own claims as the truth.[4]

Appearances

The argument appears, among other places, in Voltaire's Candide and Philosophical Dictionary. It is also manifested in Denis Diderot's statement in response to Pascal's Wager that, whatever proofs are offered for the existence of God in Christianity or any other religion, "an Imam can reason the same way".[5][6]

See also

References

  1. ^ Dawkins, Richard (16 January 2008). The God Delusion. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 25. ISBN 978-0-547-34866-7. Retrieved 28 March 2021.
  2. ^ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-pluralism/
  3. ^ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-pluralism/
  4. ^ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religious-pluralism/
  5. ^ Diderot, Denis (1875–77) [1746]. J. Assézar (ed.). Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1 (in French). p. 167.
  6. ^ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/#ObjePascWage