Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow: Difference between revisions
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===Background=== |
===Background=== |
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In the post-[[World War II|Second World War]] period, the [[Soviet Union]] began developing a fleet of long-range [[bombers]] capable of delivering [[nuclear weapons]] to North America and Europe. This threat was thought by air power theorists in the US and Canadian Air Forces to be a long term one. It was believed to consist principally of high speed/high altitude bombardment aircraft which would enter North American airspace undetected from the Arctic seas and North Pole (where there was as yet no radar coverage) and fly either direct or circuitous routes over the vast and unpopulated Northwest Territories. |
In the post-[[World War II|Second World War]] period, the [[Soviet Union]] began developing a fleet of long-range [[bombers]] capable of delivering [[nuclear weapons]] to North America and Europe. This threat was thought by air power theorists in the US and Canadian Air Forces to be a long term one. It was believed to consist principally of high speed/high altitude bombardment aircraft which would enter North American airspace undetected from the Arctic seas and North Pole (where there was as yet no radar coverage) and fly either direct or circuitous routes over the vast and unpopulated Northwest Territories. |
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The bombers would then conduct high altitude/high speed bombing runs against military bases, built-up and industrial centers in Canada and the United States. At the time the technical ability to build high speed large aircraft was superior to the ability to build smaller, fighter/pursuit/interceptor aircraft. To counter this threat, Western countries planned the development of interceptor aircraft that could engage and destroy these bombers before they reached their targets.<ref name= "Gunston p. 18">Gunston 1981, p. 18.</ref> |
The bombers would then conduct high altitude/high speed bombing runs against military bases, built-up and industrial centers in Canada and the United States. At the time the technical ability to build high speed large aircraft was superior to the ability to build smaller, fighter/pursuit/interceptor aircraft. To counter this threat, Western countries planned the development of interceptor aircraft that could engage and destroy these bombers before they reached their targets.<ref name= "Gunston p. 18">Gunston 1981, p. 18.</ref> |
Revision as of 16:02, 15 June 2010
CF-105 Arrow | |
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File:AvroArrow1.jpg | |
Photo from the Canadian Department of National Defence | |
Role | Interceptor |
Manufacturer | Avro Aircraft Limited (Canada) |
First flight | 25 March 1958 |
Status | Cancelled 20 February 1959 |
Primary user | Royal Canadian Air Force |
Produced | 1957 (project design initiated: 1953) |
Number built | 5 |
The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow was a delta-winged interceptor aircraft, designed and built by Avro Aircraft Limited (Canada) in Malton, Ontario, Canada, as the culmination of a design study that began in 1953. Considered to be both an advanced technical and aerodynamic achievement for the Canadian aviation industry, the CF-105 held the promise of Mach 2 speeds at altitudes exceeding 50,000 ft (15,000 m), and was intended to serve as the Royal Canadian Air Force's primary interceptor in the 1960s and beyond.
Not long after the 1958 start of its flight test program, the development of the Arrow (including its Orenda Iroquois jet engines) was abruptly and controversially halted,[1][2] sparking a long and bitter political debate.
Design and development
Background
In the post-Second World War period, the Soviet Union began developing a fleet of long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons to North America and Europe. This threat was thought by air power theorists in the US and Canadian Air Forces to be a long term one. It was believed to consist principally of high speed/high altitude bombardment aircraft which would enter North American airspace undetected from the Arctic seas and North Pole (where there was as yet no radar coverage) and fly either direct or circuitous routes over the vast and unpopulated Northwest Territories.
The bombers would then conduct high altitude/high speed bombing runs against military bases, built-up and industrial centers in Canada and the United States. At the time the technical ability to build high speed large aircraft was superior to the ability to build smaller, fighter/pursuit/interceptor aircraft. To counter this threat, Western countries planned the development of interceptor aircraft that could engage and destroy these bombers before they reached their targets.[3]
A. V. Roe Canada Limited had been set up as a subsidiary of the Hawker Siddeley Group in 1945, initially handling repair and maintenance work for aircraft at Malton, Ontario Airport (today known as Pearson International Airport, Toronto's main airport). The next year the company began the design of Canada's first jet fighter for the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Avro CF-100 Canuck all-weather interceptor. The Canuck underwent a lengthy prototype period before entering service seven years later in 1953. It would nevertheless go on to become one of the most enduring aircraft of its class, serving until 1981 in a variety of roles.
Recognizing that the delays that impacted the development and deployment of the CF-100 could also impact its successor, and the fact that the Soviets were working on newer jet-powered bombers that would render the CF-100 ineffective, the RCAF began looking for a supersonic, missile-armed replacement for the Canuck even before it had entered service. In March 1952, the RCAF's Final Report of the All-Weather Interceptor Requirements Team was submitted to Avro Canada.
Higher speeds
Avro engineering had been considering supersonic issues for some time at this point. Supersonic flight works in a very different fashion and presents a number of new problems. One of the most critical, and surprising, was the sudden onset of a new form of drag, known in the West as wave drag. Wave drag was so powerful that engines of the era could not provide enough power to overcome it, leading to the concept of a "sound barrier".
German research during the Second World War had shown that the onset of wave drag was greatly reduced by using airfoils that varied in curvature as slowly as possible. This suggested the use of thinner airfoils with much longer chord than what designers would have used on subsonic aircraft. These designs were impractical because they left little internal room in the wing for armament or fuel. However, they also discovered that one could "trick" the airflow into the same behavior if you used a conventional thicker airfoil and swept it rearward at a sharp angle, creating a swept-wing. This provided many of the advantages of a thinner airfoil while also retaining the internal space needed for strength and fuel storage. Another advantage was that the wings were clear of the supersonic shock wave generated by the nose of the aircraft.
Almost every fighter project in the postwar era immediately applied the concept, which started appearing on production fighters in the late 1940s. Avro engineers had previously explored swept-wing and tail modifications to the CF-100 known as the C103, which had proceeded to wooden mock-up stage, and offered improved transonic performance with supersonic abilities in a dive. However, the basic CF-100 continued to improve through this period, and the advantages were eroded.[4]
Delta wings
"At the time we laid down the design of the CF-105, there was a somewhat emotional controversy going on in the United States on the relative merits of the delta plan form versus the straight wing for supersonic aircraft… our choice of a tailless delta was based mainly on the compromise of attempting to achieve structural and aeroelastic efficiency, with a very thin wing, and yet, at the same time, achieving the large internal fuel capacity required for the specified range."
Designer James C. Floyd.[5]
Another solution, picked up by the Avro engineers, was the delta-wing design. The delta-wing had many of the same advantages of the swept wing in terms of transonic and supersonic performance, but offered much more internal room and overall surface area. This provided more room for fuel, an important consideration given the thirsty engines of the era, and the large wing area provided ample lift at high altitudes. Another "trick" the deltas offered was slower landings than swept wings in certain conditions, as discovered by Chuck Yeager in the Convair XF-92. This was a major advantage for high-speed aircraft, which often had unforgiving landing characteristics and led to the dreaded "Sabre Dance".
The disadvantages of the design were increased drag at lower speeds and altitudes, and especially higher drag while maneuvering. For the interceptor role these were minor concerns, as the aircraft would be spending most of its time flying in straight lines at high altitudes and speeds, mitigating these disadvantages.
Further proposals based on the delta wing resulted in two versions of the design known as C104: the single engine C104/1, and twin-engined C104/2. The designs were otherwise similar, using a low-mounted delta-wing and powered by the new Orenda TR.9 engines. Armament featured a battery of Velvet Glove missiles, (a Canadair product based on CARDE design work), stored in an internal bay. It would be crewed by a single pilot guided by a completely automatic weapons control system to track and attack the target, similar to the system utilized in the F-86D Sabre. The primary advantages of the twin-engine C104/2 version was that it was larger overall, with a much larger weapons bay, and that it provided twin-engine reliability. The proposals were submitted to the RCAF in June 1952.
AIR 7-3 and C105
Intensive discussions between Avro and the RCAF examined a wide range of alternative sizes and configurations for a supersonic interceptor, culminating in RCAF Specification AIR 7-3 in April 1953.
AIR 7-3 called specifically for:
- Crew of two (It was considered unlikely even a fully automated system would reduce workload enough to allow a lone crewman).
- Twin engines (no single engine then available could lift the fuel load needed for the long-range missions the RCAF demanded).
- Range of 300 NM (556 km) for a normal low-speed mission, and 200 NM (370 km) for a high-speed interception mission.
- Operation from a 6 000 ft (1 830 m) runway.
- Mach 1.5 cruising speed at an altitude of 50 000 ft (15 000 m).
- Manoeuvrability (2 g turns with no loss of speed or altitude at Mach 1.5 and 50 000 ft).
- The time from a signal to start the engines to the aircraft's reaching 50 000 ft and Mach 1.5 to be less than 5 min.
- Turn-around time on the ground was to be less than 10 min.
An RCAF team led by Ray Foottit visited U.S. aircraft producers and surveyed British and French manufacturers before concluding that no existing or planned aircraft could fulfill these requirements.
Avro submitted their modified C105 design in May 1953, essentially a two-man version of the C104/2. A change to a "shoulder-mounted" wing allowed rapid access to the aircraft's internals, weapons bay, and engines. The new design also allowed the wing to be built as a single structure sitting on the upper fuselage, simplifying construction and improving strength. The wing design required a long main landing gear that still had to fit within the thin delta wing, presenting an engineering challenge. Five different wing sizes were outlined in the report, ranging between 1 000 ft2 and 1 400 ft2 (93 m2 to 130 m2). The 1 200 ft2 (111 m2) version was eventually selected. Three engines were considered as well: the Rolls-Royce RB106, the Bristol B.0L.4 Olympus, and the Curtiss-Wright J67 (a license-built version of the Olympus). The RB106 was selected, with the J67 as backup.
The weapons bay design was larger than the original C104/2 design, situated in a large thin box on the bottom fuselage, running from a point adjacent to the front of the wing to the middle of the fuselage. The weapon system originally selected was the Hughes MX-1179, which was a pairing of the existing MA-1 fire-control system with the AIM-4 Falcon missile of both semi-active radar homing and infrared homing variants. This system was already under development for proposed use in the USAF's WS-201 1954 interceptor (dating from 1949, which would lead to the F-102 Delta Dagger). The Velvet Glove radar-guided missile had been under development with the RCAF for some time, but was considered unsuitable for supersonic launch, and further work on that project was eventually cancelled in 1956.
In July 1953, the proposal was accepted and Avro was given the go-ahead to start a full design study. In December, CA$27 million was provided to start flight modeling. At first, the project was limited in scope, but the introduction of the Soviet Myasishchev M-4 Bison jet bomber and the Soviet Union's testing of a hydrogen bomb dramatically changed Cold War priorities. In March 1955, the contract was upgraded to CA$260 million for five Arrow Mk.1 flight-test aircraft, to be followed by 35 Arrow Mk.2s with production engines and fire-control systems.
Production
Most aircraft designs start with the construction of a small number of hand-built prototypes that are test flown and modified, if required, before being committed to a set of jigs for production. This requires extra time to move from testing to manufacturing. The Arrow program instead adopted the Cook-Craigie plan. Developed in the 1940s, Cook-Craigie eliminated the prototype phase, with the first test airframes constructed on production jigs. Any changes would be incorporated into the jigs while testing continued, with full production starting when the test program was complete. As Jim Floyd noted at the time, this was a risky approach, but together with the RCAF, "...it was decided to take the technical risks involved to save time on the programme… I will not pretend that this philosophy of production type build from the outset did not cause us a lot of problems in Engineering. However, it did achieve its objective."[5]
In order to mitigate risks, a massive testing program was started. By mid-1954, the first production drawings were issued and wind tunnel work began. In a related program, nine instrumented free-flight models were mounted on solid fuel Nike rocket boosters and launched over Lake Ontario while two additional models were launched from Wallops Island, USA, over the Atlantic Ocean. These models were for aerodynamic drag and stability testing, flown to a maximum speed of Mach 1.7+ before intentionally crashing into the water. Ongoing efforts have been made to search for the models in Lake Ontario; as of 2009[update], two have been found,[citation needed] along with one Nike booster and another for a Velvet Glove.
Experiments showed the need for only a small number of design changes, mainly involving the wing profile and positioning. To improve high-alpha performance, the leading edge of the wing was drooped, especially on outer sections, a dog-tooth was introduced to control spanwise flow, and the entire wing given a slight negative camber which helped control trim drag and pitch-up.
The area rule principle, made public in 1952, was also applied to the design. This resulted in several changes including the addition of a tailcone, sharpening the radar nose profile, thinning the intake lips, and reducing the cross-sectional area of the fuselage below the canopy.[5]
The aircraft used a measure of magnesium and titanium in the fuselage, the latter limited largely to the area around the engines and to fasteners. Titanium was still expensive and not widely used because it was difficult to machine. The construction of the airframe itself was fairly conventional, however, with a semi-monocoque frame and multi-spar wing.
The Arrow's thin wing required aviation's first 4 000 lb/in2 (28 MPa) hydraulic system to supply enough force to the control surfaces, while using small actuators and piping. A rudimentary fly-by-wire system was employed, in which the pilot's input was detected by a series of pressure-sensitive transducers in the stick, and their signal was sent to an electronic control servo that operated the valves in the hydraulic system to move the various flight controls. This resulted in a lack of control feel; because the control stick input was not mechanically connected to the hydraulic system, the variations in back-pressure from the flight control surfaces that would normally be felt by the pilot could no longer be transmitted back into the stick. To re-create a sense of feel, the same electronic control box rapidly responded to the hydraulic back-pressure fluctuations and triggered actuators in the stick, making it move slightly; this system, called "artificial feel", was also a first. An advanced stability augmentation system was added as well, recognizing that long, "thin" aircraft have a number of coupling modes that can lead to departure from controlled flight if not damped out quickly. Since the center of lift moved aft with speed, the flight control system also assisted stability and manoeuvre.
In 1954, the RB.106 program was cancelled, necessitating the use of the backup J67 engine instead. In 1955, this engine was also cancelled, leaving the design with no engine. At this point, the Pratt & Whitney J75 was selected for the initial test-flight models, while the new TR 13 (soon PS-13 Iroquois) engine was developed at Orenda for the production Mk 2s. Ultimately, only the rejected Bristol Olympus engine would actually go into production.
In 1956, the RCAF demanded additional changes, selecting the advanced RCA-Victor Astra fire-control system firing the equally advanced United States Navy Sparrow II in place of the MX-1179 and Falcon combination. Avro objected on the grounds that neither of these were even in testing at that point, whereas both the MX-1179 and Falcon were almost ready for production. RCAF planners felt the greatly improved performance of the Sparrow was worth the gamble.
The Astra proved to be problematic as the system ran into a lengthy period of delays, and when the USN cancelled the Sparrow II in 1956, Canadair was quickly brought in to continue the Sparrow program in Canada, although they expressed grave concerns about the project as well.
Political issues
In June 1957, the governing Liberals lost the federal election, and a Progressive Conservative government under John Diefenbaker took power. Diefenbaker, from the Canadian west, had campaigned on a platform of reining in what the Conservatives claimed was "rampant Liberal spending". The debate was politically presented as an east versus west divide, with the Conservatives campaigning on a platform of eastern Canada using money from across the country to fund their "industrial welfare" projects. The Arrow was not the only major industrial project targeted during the campaign, others such as the "million dollar monster" postal sorting computer from Ferranti Canada were singled out for additional political scorn.
In August 1957, the Diefenbaker government signed the NORAD (North American Air Defense[6]) Agreement with the United States, making Canada a partner with American command and control. The USAF was in the process of completely automating their air defense system with the SAGE project, and offered Canada the opportunity to share this sensitive information for the air defence of North America. One aspect of the SAGE system was the BOMARC nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missile, which when intercepting bombers over Ontario and Quebec would be exploding over major Canadian cities. This led to studies on basing BOMARCs in Canada in order to push the line further north, away from the cities.
Storms of Controversy revealed a top secret brief prepared for George Pearkes, then Minister of National Defence, for his July 1958 meeting with U.S. officials. The brief states,
The introduction of SAGE in Canada will cost in the neighborhood of $107 million. Further improvements are required in the radar… NORAD has also recommended the introduction of the BOMARC missile… will be a further commitment of $164 million… All these commitments coming at this particular time… will tend to increase our defence budget by as much as 25 to 30%.
Pearkes was also concerned about funding defence against ballistic missiles. The existence of Sputnik had also raised the spectre of attack from space, and, as the year progressed, word of a "missile gap" began spreading. An American brief of the meeting with Pearkes reported Pearkes "stated that the problem of developing a defence against missiles while at the same time completing and rounding out defence measures against manned bombers posed a serious problem for Canada from the point of view of expense".[7] In a document written after the cancellation, Pearkes noted, "We did not cancel the CF-105 because there was no bomber threat, but because there was a lesser threat and we got the Bomarc in lieu of more airplanes to look after this".[8] It is also said Canada could afford the Arrow or Bomarc/SAGE, but not both.[9] Arguably however, the SAGE program contributed to the policy of Deterrence, which was the foundation of the Canadian, US and NATO robust stance against potential Soviet aggression.
By 11 August 1958, Pearkes requested cancellation of the Arrow, but the Cabinet Defence Committee refused. He tabled it again in September, and recommended installation of the Bomarc missile system. The latter was accepted but, again, the CDC refused to cancel the entire Arrow program. The CDC wanted to wait until a major review in 31 March 1959, to better examine world conditions. They did, however, cancel the Sparrow/Astra system in September 1958. Efforts to continue the program through cost-sharing with other countries were then explored.
Worldwide, the Arrow was not the only heavy high-speed interceptor design cancelled at that time; the Republic Aircraft XF-103 and the North American Aviation XF-108 Rapier, designed to have higher performance specifications than the Arrow, were cancelled in the mock-up stage of development at approximately the same time.[10][11] Even the Convair F-106 Delta Dart was very nearly terminated. In the UK, the ramifications of the 1957 Defence White Paper led to the cancellation of almost all British manned fighter aircraft then in development.
Operational history
Foreign interest
Canada tried to sell the Arrow aircraft to the U.S. and Britain, but had no takers. The aircraft industry in both countries was considered a national interest and the purchase of foreign designs was rare.[12]
From 1955 onwards, the UK had shown considerable interest in the Arrow; in April 1956, the UK's Air Council[13] recommended a purchase of 144 Arrows for the RAF to serve alongside the Saunders-Roe SR.177 mixed power interceptor, instead of the "thin-wing" Gloster Javelin then under study. The CF-105 would serve as a stopgap until the UK's F.155 project came to fruition. However with the F.155 due in 1963 and the Arrow not likely to reach the RAF before 1962, there was little point in proceeding, even if the costs of acquisition had not been so high. The infamous 1957 Defence White Paper, prompted by a general lack of funds, foretold an end to manned fighters and completely curtailed any likelihood of a purchase. In January 1959, the UK's final answer was no—with an offer to sell Canada the English Electric P.1 (the aircraft that would become the English Electric Lightning) instead. The French government was prepared to buy some 200 Iroquois engines, but cancelled their order in 1958, being advised by persons unknown that the Arrow was going to be cancelled.[citation needed]
The US Air Force had already developed three aircraft with performance intended to be broadly similar to the Arrow, originally as part of their "1954 Interceptor" project—the McDonnell F-101B Voodoo, Convair F-102 Delta Dagger and Convair F-102B (later Convair F-106 Delta Dart). Additionally, two more advanced interceptors (the Republic XF-103 and North American XF-108) were under development, although both would ultimately be cancelled in the early design and mock-up phases.[14] Nevertheless it appears the USAF was concerned about the effect the cancellation would have on Canada's defence industry. In 1958, Avro Aircraft Limited President and General Manager Fred Smye elicited a promise from the USAF to "supply, free, the fire control system and missiles and if they would allow the free use of their flight test center at... Edwards AFB".[15]
Cancellation
The cancellation on 20 February 1959 known as "Black Friday"[16] immediately put 14,528 Avro employees [17] out of work as well as nearly 15,000 other employees in the Avro "supply chain" of outside suppliers.[18][19] Declassified records show Avro management was caught unprepared by the suddenness of the announcement by the government. While executives were aware that the program was in jeopardy, they expected it to continue at least until the March review. It was widely believed that during this lead-up to the review, the first Arrow Mk 2, RL-206, would be prepared for an attempt at both world speed and altitude records.
An attempt was made to provide the completed Arrows to the National Research Council of Canada as high-speed test aircraft. The NRC refused, noting that without sufficient spare parts and maintenance, as well as qualified pilots, the NRC could make no use of them. A similar project initiated by the Royal Aircraft Establishment (Boscombe Down) had resulted in Avro Vice-President (Engineering) Jim Floyd's preparing a transatlantic ferry operation. This proposal, like others from the United States, was never realized.
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/ad/AvroCF105ArrowRL206Serial25206.jpg/220px-AvroCF105ArrowRL206Serial25206.jpg)
Aftermath
Within two months of the project cancellation, all aircraft, engines, production tooling and technical data were ordered scrapped. Officially, the reason given for the destruction order from Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff was to destroy classified and "secret" materials utilized in the Arrow/Iroquois programs.[20] The action has been attributed to Royal Canadian Mounted Police fears that a Soviet "mole" had infiltrated Avro, later confirmed to some degree in the Mitrokhin archives[21].
Along with the five flying test models and production aircraft, blueprints and other materials were destroyed, leading to the creation of a piece of Canadian mythology. The rushed destruction incited a number of conspiracy theories alleging American culpability for the Arrow's demise.
Rumors had circulated that Air Marshal W.A. Curtis, a World War I ace who headed Avro, had ignored Diefenbaker and spirited one of the planes away to be saved for posterity. These rumors were given life in a 1968 interview, when Curtis was asked point-blank if the rumor was true. He replied: "I don't want to answer that." He proceeded to question the wisdom of printing the story of a missing Arrow, and wondered whether it would be safe to reveal the existence of a surviving airframe only nine years later. "If it is in existence it may have to wait another 10 years. Politically it may cause a lot of trouble."[22]
The fanciful legend endures that one of the prototypes remains intact somewhere.[23]
Following the Canadian government's cancellation of the Avro Arrow project in 1959, CF-105 Chief Aerodynamicist Jim Chamberlin led a team of 25 engineers to NASA's Space Task Group to become lead engineers, program managers, and heads of engineering in NASA's manned space programs—Projects Mercury, Gemini and Apollo. This team would eventually grow to 32 Avro engineers and technicians, and become emblematic of what many Canadians viewed as a "brain drain" to the U.S. Many other engineers, including Jim Floyd (whose design studies at Hawker Siddeley (Avro Aircraft's UK parent) on the HSA.1000 supersonic transport design studies were ultimately influential in the design of the Concorde[24]) found work abroad in either the UK or the United States.
In 1961, the RCAF obtained 66 CF-101 Voodoo aircraft, one of the American designs the RCAF originally rejected,[25] to serve in the role originally intended for the Avro Arrow. The controversy surrounding this acquisition, and Canada's acquiring nuclear weapons for the Voodoos and Bomarcs eventually contributed to the collapse of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.[26]
Although nearly everything connected to the CF-105 and Orenda Iroquois programs was destroyed, the cockpit and nose gear of RL-206, the first Mk 2 Arrow, and two outer panels of RL-203's wings were saved and are on display at the Canada Aviation Museum in Ottawa, alongside an Iroquois engine.
With specifications comparable to then-current offerings from American and Soviet design bureaus, at the time of its cancellation, the Arrow was considered by one aviation industry observer to be one of the most advanced aircraft in the world.[3]
In its planning, design and flight-test programme, this fighter, in almost every way the most advanced of all the fighters of the 1950s, was as impressive, and successful as any aircraft in history.
— Bill Gunston, 1981, [3]
Variants
Mark 1
Go-ahead on the production was given in 1955, with series production taking place in Assembly Bay One. The rollout of the first CF-105, marked as RL-201, took place 4 October 1957. The company had planned to capitalize on the event, inviting more than 13 000 guests to the occasion.[27] Unfortunately for Avro, the media and public attention for the Arrow rollout was dwarfed by the launch of Sputnik the same day.[28]
The J75 engine was slightly heavier than the PS-13, and therefore required ballast to be placed in the nose to return the center of gravity to the correct position. In addition, the Astra fire-control system was not ready, and it too, was replaced by ballast. The otherwise unused weapons bay was loaded with test equipment.
RL-201 first flew on 25 March 1958 with Chief Development Test Pilot S/L Janusz Żurakowski at the controls. Four more J75-powered Mk 1s were delivered in the next 18 months. The test flights went surprisingly well; the aircraft demonstrated excellent handling throughout the flight envelope. Much of this was due to the natural qualities of the delta-wing, but an equal amount can be attributed to the Arrow's stability augmentation system. The aircraft went supersonic on only its third flight and, on the seventh, broke 1 000 mi/h (1 600 km/h) at 50 000 ft (15 000 m), while climbing and still accelerating. A top speed of Mach 1.98 was eventually reached at three-quarters throttle, even with these lower-powered engines.
No major problems were encountered during the testing phase, though some minor issues found with the landing gear and flight control system. The former problem was partly due to the tandem main landing gear (two wheels and tires: one in front of and one behind the gear leg) being very narrow, in order to fit into the wings. The leg shortened in length and rotated as it was stowed. During one landing incident, the chain mechanism (used to shorten the gear) in the Mark 1 gear jammed, resulting in incomplete rotation. In a second incident with Arrow 202 on 11 November 1958, the flight control system commanded elevons full down at landing. The resulting reduction in weight on the gears reduced the effective tire friction, ultimately resulting in brake lockup and subsequent gear collapse. A photograph taken of the incident proved inadvertent flight control activation had caused the accident.[29]
The stability augmentation system also required much fine-tuning. Although the CF-105 was not the first aircraft to use such a system (the Arrow used this system for all three axes, other aircraft did not[clarification needed]) it was one of the first of its kind, and was consequently problematic. By February 1959, the five aircraft had completed the majority of the company test program and were progressing to the RCAF acceptance trials.
Mark 2
The Mk 2 version was to be fitted with the Iroquois engine. The Astra/Sparrow fire control system had been terminated by the government in September 1958 with all aircraft to employ the Hughes/Falcon combination. At the time of cancellation of the entire program, the first Arrow Mk 2, RL-206, was nearly complete. AVRO engineers and designers expected it to break the world speed record, but it never had the chance.
Top speed would have been limited by atmospheric frictional heating, but according to project engineer James Floyd, “[t]he aluminum alloy structure which we favoured was good for speeds greater than a Mach number of 2."[30]
Other designs
Avro Canada had a wide range of Arrow derivatives under development at the time of project cancellation. Frequent mention is made of an Arrow that could have been capable of Mach 3, similar to the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25. This was not the production version, but one of the design studies, and would have been a greatly modified version of the Arrow Mk 2, featuring revised engine inlets and extensive use of stainless steel or titanium to withstand airframe heating.
Avro Arrow replicas
Allan Jackson of Wetaskiwin, Alberta was the original designer of the replica used in the CBC docu-drama. As a hobby, he began building a full-scale replica of the Arrow in 1989. Years later, in 1996, when the producers of the Arrow miniseries learned of Jackson's replica, then about 70% complete, an offer was made to complete the construction if the replica could be used for the production. After use on the mini-series, and several public appearances at air shows, the Jackson replica was donated to the Reynolds-Alberta Museum in Wetaskiwin. While in a temporary outdoor collection, the replica was damaged in a wind storm. As of January 2010, it remained on display outdoors at the museum.
The Avro Museum of Calgary, Canada, completed a 0.6-scale remote controlled replica aircraft built for public flight demonstration. Construction started in September 2000 following eight years of research. Built of modern-day composite materials under Canadian Recreational Aircraft Legislation, construction involved five years of volunteer labour and cost a half-million dollars in materials and parts. The scale model has been successfully flown on a number of occasions.[31]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a2/Avro_Arrow_replica.jpg/220px-Avro_Arrow_replica.jpg)
The Canadian Air and Space Museum, located at the former CFB Downsview features a full-size replica Arrow built by volunteers with assistance from local aerospace firms. With a metal structure, the replica features many authentic-looking components including landing gear constructed by Messier-Dowty (the original Arrow main landing gear sub-contractor). Painted in the colours of Arrow 25203, the Arrow replica was rolled out for a media event on 28 September 2006 and was on public display on 8–9 October 2006 to commemorate the original aircraft's rollout in 1957. It will be permanently displayed beside an Avro Lancaster bomber (currently under restoration) built at the same Malton plant that produced the Arrow. The museum ultimately hopes to acquire an Avro CF-100 and the first Avro VZ-9-AV Avrocar (the company's last aviation project) on a long-term loan from the National Air and Space Museum, in Washington, D.C., to be exhibited alongside the Arrow replica and the Lancaster.
Operators
- Royal Canadian Air Force (Upon cancellation, undergoing acceptance trials but never entered squadron service)[32]
Specifications (Arrow Mk 1)
Data from The Great Book of Fighters[33]
General characteristics
- Crew: 2
- Airfoil: NACA 0003.5 mod root, NACA 0003.8 tip
Performance
- Thrust/weight: 0.825 loaded weight
Armament
- Rockets: 1-4× AIR-2 Genie unguided nuclear rockets
- Missiles: 8× AIM-4 Falcon, Canadair Velvet Glove (cancelled 1956), 2 AIM-7 Sparrow II 2D active guidance missiles (cancelled)
Avionics
- Hughes MX-1179 fire control system
Notable appearances in media
In 1997, the CBC broadcast the two-part mini-series, The Arrow about the Arrow program. The film, having been made in "docu-drama" style, departed from strict factuality. The production used a combination of archival film, remote-control flying models and computer animation for the flying and sequences. The flying models were built by Doug Hyslip of Calgary, but a full-scale replica of the Arrow built by Allan Jackson of Wetaskiwin was used in ground scenes. [35]
See also
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era
- English Electric Lightning
- F-101 Voodoo
- F-106 Delta Dart
- Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25
- F.155 Project (UK)
- Saab 35 Draken
- Saunders-Roe SR.177
- XF-108 Rapier
- Lockheed YF-12A
Related lists
References
- Notes
- ^ Dow 1979, p. 127. Quote: "In February, Diefenbaker was urged by members of his cabinet to make an early decision on the Arrow." The actual project review was not due until 31 March 1959.
- ^ "Orenda History". Magellan Aerospace Corporation, 2005. Retrieved: 12 March 2009.
- ^ a b c Gunston 1981, p. 18.
- ^ Milberry 1984, p. 317.
- ^ a b c Floyd, James. “The Canadian Approach to All-Weather Interceptor Development. The Fourteenth British Commonwealth Lecture.” Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, December 1958.
- ^ NORAD at 40 Historical Overview The designation was changed in 1981 to North American Aerospace Defense.
- ^ Eisenhower Library, File: DDE Trip to Canada, Memcons, 8-11, July 1958, Canada-U.S. Defence Problems.
- ^ Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, File 79/469 Folder 19.
- ^ Campagna 1988, p. 88. Quote: "Could Canada afford both SAGE and the Arrow? Was the system even needed for defence? As it turned out, the answer to both questions was no."
- ^ North American XF-108 Rapier
- ^ Republic XF-103
- ^ Peden 1987, p. 72.
- ^ The senior body for the organization of the RAF
- ^ Whitcomb 2002, pp. 80, 181–182.
- ^ Smye 1985, p. 87.
- ^ Zuuring 1999, p. 112.
- ^ Stewart 1998, p. 269.
- ^ Peden 1978, p. 157.
- ^ Harrison, Mark. "Diefenbaker surrenders our sovereignty?" Toronto Daily Star, 23 February 1959, p. 1.
- ^ Stewart 1998, pp. 274–276.
- ^ The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, p. 219. "The Intelligence provided by LIND [A Communist A.V.Roe Employee] included plans for the CF-105 Avro Arrow..."
- ^ McNenly, Pat. Toronto Star, Saturday 30 November 1968, p. 1.
- ^ Bliss, Michael. "Arrow That Doesn't Fly." Time Magazine (Canada edition), 20 January 1997.
- ^ Whitcomb 1999, pp. 251–259. Note: An entire chapter, The SST Saga: Canadian Contributions Exposed is devoted to the work of Floyd in the UK. His role in SST development is fully detailed.
- ^ Page et al. 1980, p. 13. Note: Although the source indicates it was the F-101 that was evaluated, it was the XF-88 Voodoo that was flying at the time while the F-101 was a revised and upgraded variant that was only in the development stage in 1953.
- ^ Stursberg 1975, p. 122.
- ^ Gainor 2001, p. 15.
- ^ Gainor 2001, p. 18.
- ^ Avro Museum
- ^ a b Floyd 1958
- ^ Replica Arrow Project
- ^ Page 1979, p. 117.
- ^ Green, William and Gordon Swanborough. The Great Book of Fighters. St. Paul, Minnesota: MBI Publishing, 2001. ISBN 0-7603-1194-3.
- ^ Page 1979, p. 116.
- ^ Bliss. Michael. "Arrow That Doesn't Fly: The CBC's mini-series about the interceptor that wasn't, is good to look at but ungrounded in facts." Time Magazine, 27 January 1997. Retrieved: 28 March 2010.
- Bibliography
- Campagna, Palmiro. Storms of Controversy: The Secret Avro Arrow Files Revealed. Toronto: Stoddart, third paperback edition, 1998. ISBN 0-7737-5990-5.
- Campagna, Palmiro. Requiem for a Giant: A.V. Roe Canada and the Avro Arrow. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2003. ISBN 1-55002-438-8.
- Dow, James. The Arrow. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company Publishers, 1979. ISBN 0-88862-282-1.
- Floyd, James. "The Canadian Approach to All-Weather Interceptor Development. The Fourteenth British Commonwealth Lecture." The Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, Volume 62, no. 576, December 1958.
- Gainor, Chris. Arrows to the Moon: Avro's Engineers and the Space Race. Burlington, Ontario: Apogee, 2001. ISBN 1-896522-83-1.
- Gainor, Chris. Who Killed the Avro Arrow? Edmonton: Folklore Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-894864-68-8.
- Gunston, Bill. Fighters of the Fifties. Oscela, Wisconsin: Specialty Press, 1981. ISBN 0-93342-432-9.
- Isinger, Russell. "Flying Blind: The Politics Of The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow Programme." The Evolution of Air Power in Canada 1919 to the Present Day and Beyond. Winnipeg: Department of National Defence, Papers presented at the 2nd Air Force Historical Conference, volume II, 1997.
- Isinger, Russell. "The Avro Arrow." Canada: Confederation to Present. CD-ROM. Edmonton: Chinook Multimedia Inc., 2001. ISBN 1-894785-00-2.
- Isinger, Russell. "The Avro Arrow." The Oxford Companion to Canadian History. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-19-541559-0.
- Isinger, Russell. The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow Programme: Decisions and Determinants. MA Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1997.
- Isinger, Russell and D.C. Story. "The Origins of the Cancellation of Canada's Avro CF-105 Arrow Fighter Program." Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, No. 6, December 2007.
- Isinger, Russell and D.C. Story. "The Plane Truth: The Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow Programme." In The Diefenbaker Legacy: Politics, Law, and Society Since 1957. Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1980. ISBN 0-88977-091-3.
- Lukasiewicz, Julius. "Canada's Encounter with High-Speed Aeronautics." Technology and Culture. The International Quarterly Journal of the Society for the History of Technology, Volume 27, No. 2, April 1986.
- Milberry, Larry, ed. Sixty Years - The RCAF and CF Air Command 1924 - 1984. Toronto: Canav Books, 1984. ISBN 0-9690703-4-9.
- Page, Ron, Richard Organ, Don Watson and Les Wilkinson. Avro Arrow: The Story of the Avro Arrow from its Evolution to its Extinction. Erin, Ontario: Boston Mills Press, 1979, reprinted Stoddart, 2004. ISBN 1-55046-047-1.
- Peden, Murray. Fall of an Arrow. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1987. ISBN 0-7737-5105-X.
- Shaw, E.K. There Never was an Arrow. Toronto: Steel Rail Educational Publishing, 1979. ISBN 0-88791-025-4.
- Smye, Fred. Canadian Aviation and the Avro Arrow. Oakville, Ontario: Randy Smye (self-published), 1985.
- Stewart, Greig. Arrow Through the Heart: The Life and Times of Crawford Gordon and the Avro Arrow. Toronto: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, 1998. ISBN 0-07-560102-8.
- Stewart, Greig. Shutting Down the National Dream: A.V. Roe and the Tragedy of the Avro Arrow. Toronto: McGraw-Hill-Ryerson, 1991. ISBN 0-07-551119-3.
- Stursberg, Peter. Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained: 1956-62. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975. ISBN 0-8020-2130-1.
- Supersonic Sentinel. Rare Avro Arrow film footage. Available from Arrow Digital Archives (ARC); also includes extra footage of the Arrow in flight and some footage of the Avro Jetliner (1950).
- Valiquette, Marc-Andre. Destruction of a Dream: The Tragedy of Avro Canada and the CF-105 Arrow, Volume 1. Montreal: Marc-Andre Valiquette (self-published), 2009. ISBN 978-2-9811239-0-9.
- Valiquette, Marc-Andre. Supersonic Dreams: At the Dawn of a New Era, Volume 2. Montreal: Marc-Andre Valiquette (self-published), 2010. ISBN 978-2-9811021-3-3.
- Whitcomb, Randall. Avro Aircraft and Cold War Aviation. St. Catharine's, Ontario: Vanwell, 2002. ISBN 1-55125-082-9.
- Whitcomb, Randall. Cold War Tech War. The Politics Of America's Air Defense. Burlington, Ontario: Apogee Books, 2008. ISBN 1-894959-77-9.
- Zuk, Bill. The Avro Arrow Story: The Impossible Dream. Calgary: Altitude Publishing, 2006. ISBN 1-55439-703-0.
- Zuk, Bill. The Avro Arrow Story: The Revolutionary Airplane and its Courageous Test Pilots. Calgary: Altitude Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1-55153-978-0.
- Zuk, Bill. Janusz Zurakowski: Legends in the Sky. St. Catharine's, Ontario: Vanwell, 2004. ISBN 1-55125-083-7.
- Zuuring, Peter. Arrow Countdown. Kingston, Ontario: Arrow Alliance Press, 2001. ISBN 1-55056-866-3.
- Zuuring, Peter. Arrow First Flight. Kingston, Ontario: Arrow Alliance Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55056-903-1.
- Zuuring, Peter. Arrow Rollout. Kingston, Ontario: Arrow Alliance Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55056-902-3.
- Zuuring, Peter. The Arrow Scrapbook. Kingston, Ontario: Arrow Alliance Press, 1999. ISBN 1-55056-690-3.
- Zuuring, Peter. Iroquois Rollout. Kingston, Ontario: Arrow Alliance Press, 2002. ISBN 1-55056-906-6.
- Additional resources
- Library and Archives Canada is the official repository of most government documents relating to the Avro CF-105 Arrow project, though there are many documents at the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History and Heritage as well. Almost all Avro Arrow documents have now been declassified.
- There Never Was an Arrow was broadcast on the CBC in March 1980 (available as an extra on the Arrow Docu-Drama DVD). Clips from the program can be seen at CBC.
External links
- Aerospace Heritage Foundation of Canada
- Arrow Digital Archives
- Avro Arrow Historica Minute
- Avro Arrow Home Page, the longest running Avro Arrow page
- Canada Aviation Museum, home of the remaining pieces of the Avro Arrow
- Canadian Air and Space Museum, home of an Avro Arrow replica
- CBC Digital Archives - The Avro Arrow: Canada's Broken Dream