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Hamas are Palestinian and terrorists! 

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Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.


That should be its primary descriptor as such is with Al-Qaeda and ISIS 23.93.17.238 (talk) 06:12, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Hi IP editor. You are absolutely right but English Wikipedia is widely known to have a liberal bias. And, unlike other sources, Wikipedia does not officially acknowledge it.
What's happening right now is that Wikipedia's administrators take over pet articles, like this one, and protect by claiming everything needs to come from a "reliable source", as defined by themselves! They get to be the gatekeepers of it all and through a very convoluted process where you must register, become a known editor and already conform to their methods, you can then "vote" once every few years on what is and is not a "reliable source".
For the purposes of this article, they will skim over the largest countries in the world designating Hamas as a pure terrorist organization, since China doesn't consider it. And give it unequal weight since Reuters or AP, already biased sources, try to state Hamas is a "militant group" instead of purely a terrorist one. On this end, Wikipedia Administrators that have been editing and protecting this article for years, will unilaterally ignore the WSJ, NY Times, Globe and Mail, and BBC and go with AP's preferred term to "protect the integrity" of this article.
That is why, they will only allow the adjective "Terrorist" to be referred to in this article as a specific country's designation for Hamas is. Notwithstanding Hamas' allies are also other terrorist organizations, like Hezbollah.
All of this, dear IP editor, is to let you know that Wikipedia has not been and is not interested in being a neutral purveyor of news. Articles like this only show a very biased and globally liberal viewpoint.
2601:18B:8180:D810:91B:681B:EE69:D4AD (talk) 17:57, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I understand it's easy to get emotional given the events, but it is important that Wikipedia stays objective. The term "terrorism" is controversial. Many would argue the IDF's actions are also terrorism, for instance. The plain reality is that some countries think Hamas is terrorist; others do not. So we need to stay balanced. 2001:569:57B2:4D00:C9A0:AE48:F495:2536 (talk) 18:36, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think terrorism is purposely targeting civilians, whereas targeting militants with accidental civilian casualties wouldn't be terrorism. If Hamas is raiding shelters specifically meant for civilians and gunning down children with assault rifles, that is a terrorist act. 23.93.17.238 (talk) 19:52, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The IDF’s actions are in response to an initial attack. Terrorism is the use of violence against civilians for political purposes, like Hamas slaughtering concert goers. The plain fact is Hamas is a terrorist organization whereas the IDF is a nation’s army. Also the fact that the US lists Hamas as a terrorist organization is proof enough, unless you’re basing this off the opinions of Russian, China, North Korea and Iran. 2600:4041:78DE:3C00:B9B5:DAF7:5165:2743 (talk) 01:11, 9 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
What I know about leftism is that it revolves around workers' rights and social welfare. I do not understand why or how a leftist website would sympathize with a fundamentalist and violent movement similar to right-wing western parties. Is this truly leftist or is Wikipedia under the influence of terror sympathizers? 23.93.17.238 (talk) 19:54, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Please see MOS:TERRORIST. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:04, 8 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The pro-Hamas editor does everything possible to make Hamas look good, lol. Shocker. LVMH11 (talk) 07:54, 9 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It’s because leftists see everything as the oppressors vs the oppressed. In this case, Israel is the oppressor, or “occupier,” and Hamas is acting on behalf of poor, oppressed Palestine. 2600:4041:78DE:3C00:B9B5:DAF7:5165:2743 (talk) 01:08, 9 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Watch this reply get deleted. This perfectly sums up the problem with Wikipedia. Wonder why they have beg for donations every few weeks? The US has Hamas listed as a terrorist organization that should be enough. The AP, which gave us such racist gems as capitalizing the “b” in “black” but not the “w” in “white,” is a very biased source. However, the editors here don’t accept allsides.com as reliable, of course, because they don’t like that it shows how the majority of their “reliable sources” are left wing.
Source: https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/ 2600:4041:78DE:3C00:B9B5:DAF7:5165:2743 (talk) 01:06, 9 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why on Earth would the use of the term by the US, a close ally of one of the countries involved in the conflict, be sufficient as reason it should be used here? You seem to be very confused about Wikipedia's neutrality stance as well as what constitutes a reliable source. 136.54.91.222 (talk) 01:46, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Because Wikipedia is American and the US government is a reliable source. You need the New York Times to say it too? 2600:4041:78DE:3C00:3C1D:E840:4A26:D700 (talk) 02:12, 10 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Wiki Education assignment: Media and Culture Theory - MDC 254

This article was the subject of a Wiki Education Foundation-supported course assignment, between 29 August 2023 and 11 December 2023. Further details are available on the course page. Student editor(s): Curry7524 (article contribs).

— Assignment last updated by Curry7524 (talk) 14:17, 11 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Was Hamas originally tacitly supported by Israeli intelligence?

So, on page 121 of Good Muslim, Bad Muslim Mahmood Mamdani wrote, "until events proved the foolhardiness of the project, Israel hoped to encourage an Islamist political movement in the Occupied Territories and play it off against the secular nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Israeli intelligence allowed Hamas to operate unhindered during the first intifada - letting it open a university and bank accounts and even possibly helping it with funding - only to confront Hamas in the second intifada." It is sometimes alleged that Israeli intelligence propped up Hamas to more or less avoid having to follow through with the peace process. I don't know that I would go so far, but I am curious if there isn't more information about this. I know that Mamdani also alleges for Abdullah Yusuf Azzam to have been supported by the Central Intelligence Agency back in those days. Daydreamdays2 (talk) 22:24, 12 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead?

Editors have recently gone back and forth in describing the ideology of Hamas in the lead. This is likely due to the fact that academic sources, popular media, and statements on/from Hamas have widely varied over the decades. Early Hamas statements explicitly called for the destruction of (at least the current conception) Israel. While statements past-2017 have been more ambiguous. While some academic sources take them on their word, others express doubts on whether the 2017 statement actually changed anything.

  • Option #1: Hamas is predominately described as supporting the end of Israel within the article. Statements post-2017 are treated with significant skepticism.
  • Option #2: Both the 1988 and 2017 statements are left outside of the lead; lead doesn't state either. The article gives relatively equal weight to those who believe there has been a changed in the goals of Hamas and those who do not.
  • Option #3: Hamas is predominately described as accepting the 1967 Israeli-Palestinian borders, post 2017. Early viewpoints are significantly trimmed from the article.
  • Option #4: Another option not listed.

I'm personally in favor of #2. What do people here believe is the best solution in resolving this?

#2. (Note: Creator of RFC) Since there hasn't been a clear consensus in the academic literature, news media sources, among other things, we shouldn't definitely state one or the other. KlayCax (talk) 04:54, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
KlayCax, an RFC question should be simple and neutral. I suggest you change it to something simple like "Should the lead include Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders?"VR talk 05:23, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
There's multiple wways that we can phrase it within the article. The RFC is about whether it should be stated in Wikivoice.
In my opinion, saying that they "accepted the 1967 borders" is disputable and thus shouldn't be in the lead, as multiple reliable sources have directly contradicted the interpretation that they did. KlayCax (talk) 05:28, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • There are a lot of WP:RS and WP:SCHOLARSHIP who believe that Hamas' 2017 constituted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, I put these sources in the section below for analysis. If there are dissenting voices they should be examined and we should give WP:BALANCE accordingly.VR talk 05:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    @Vice regent It would be very helpful if you yourself could compile a similar number of scholarly and other RS on the opposing side of this discussion.
    RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 06:43, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Bruce Hoffman isn't a random OP-ed writer. He's a well-known expert in the field.
    Even many of the sources listed by vice regent give significant doubt to their claims, @RadioactiveBoulevardier:.
    Others have also expressed doubt about what the wording of the 2017 statement actually meant. (e.g. You could interpret it to mean.)
    It's generally interpreted as saying that:
    • Palestine includes Gaza and the West Bank
    • It is left unspecified rather the rest is Israeli or Palestinian
    Many have argued that this is just a form of word games. A fact that even many of the sources below state. NBC says "appeared", Rand Corporation says "at least in principle", and Wall Street Journal seems entirely doubtful, saying that it was "an attempt to moderate its image" while "still [refusing] to recognize Israel". The academic sources itself are almost always prefaced with a notion of skepticism to whether their position has changed. Just that you could interpret the statement that way.
    Michael Milshtein also expresses skepticism of whether there has actually been any moderation in their position:

    Although, Ben, you need to remember this offensive was planned a year ago. All talks about negotiations between us and the Saudis began only two, three months ago. It’s absolutely clear that the basic reasons for this brutal attack was not the Al-Aqsa Mosque, or the war in the West Bank, or the economic situation in Gaza, or the Saudi-Israeli negotiations. It was much deeper. It was a part of the long-term vision of Hamas to eradicate Israel...Absolutely. In order to understand Hamas, you have to know Arabic, and you have to read things in Arabic and listen to Hamas preachers and Hamas leaders when they speak to their own people. It’s absolutely different from the things that are translated to us in Hebrew or English. For two years, I read all those books, and articles, and interviews, and it was absolutely clear for me that Hamas is not ready at all to give up on the jihad for permits, for workers, or for any other economic gesture from Israel.

    Simply prefacing it uncritically in the lead without any context is a giant issue of WP: Weight. Especially considering how the ambiguous statement is.
    The action that most fits WP: NPOV is #2. Explaining how each side interprets the 2017 statement while not promoting one opinion in the lead. KlayCax (talk) 17:23, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Option 2 goes against policy for two reasons. The more sources we quote here, whether for or against, the more clear it becomes this is a major that RS cover. Which means that we must give it prominence in lead, whatever the wording might be.
    Second thus far, the overwhelming majority of sources presented in this RFC seem to favor that Hamas did accept the 1967 borders in 2017. The idea that it didn't seems to be the minority view based (unless more sources to the contrary are provided). VR talk 17:25, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Also Michael Milshtein is a former member of the Israeli military, which is not an wp:independent source on Hamas given their state of war (just Hamas is not a reliable source on Israel). VR talk 20:01, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    I just wish to point that Al Jazeera, used widely in this article, is also not a NPOV. They are a media outlet of the Qatari government, a financial backer and heavy supporter of Hamas. Bar Harel (talk) 23:25, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    For the purposes of this RfC you can see that I have used 9 other news sources that are not Al-Jazeera and also used 6 academic sources. VR talk 01:31, 15 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Furthermore, there are sources that point out Hamas tacitly accepted the 1967 borders before 2017. For example, in 2009 a Hamas leader told the UN he accepts the 1967 borders[1]. Similarly, Leila Seurat, a researcher at School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences who wrote a whole book on Hamas' foreign policy points out that Hamas tacitly accepted this position when it signed various agreements with Fatah from 2005 to 2012 (including Palestinian Cairo Declaration, Palestinian Prisoners' Document and Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement). I have not seen any sources cast skepticism on this position.VR talk 05:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option #3: The source analyses below make plain that the position of Hamas has shifted/gained nuance in the last decade. The article should reflect the organisation's current positions, while of course noting its past positions. However, Wikipedia pages should be up-to-date and not simply mausoleums of undue history. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:52, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
That's true. But the present wording strongly implies that there has a definite, irrefutable change within the organization's foreign policy and agenda. That's heavily disputed among reliable source.
Many have argued that their true position hasn't changed at all. Even the ones being used to "support" the notion express significant skepticism of their position. KlayCax (talk) 17:28, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Comment: Many sources below have mentioned their changed position. But is it accepting the state of Israel as-is, implicitly or explicitly, or accepting only the 1967 boundary without mentioning Israel? Senorangel (talk) 02:45, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Senorangel: just to clarify no one tried to insert in the article that "Hamas recognizes Israel", that's not what this RFC is about.
But to answer your question, Hamas definitely doesn't explicitly recognize Israel. They explicitly only recognized the 1967 borders. However, in the section below you can see some scholars who believe that this implied recognition. For example, Brenner says "While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of [1967] borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there." Likewise Zartman says "Hamas updated its charter in early 2017, accepting the idea of a negotiated two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist." VR talk 20:10, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option 4 Past and recent positions should both be described in the lead. Senorangel (talk) 01:59, 15 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option #3: The number and quality of sources accepting the 1967 borders in 2017 far outweighs the number and quality of sources expressing skepticism. Cjhard (talk) 08:17, 16 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option 3, considering the WP Policy WP:AGE MATTERS and the number of reliable sources provided. As a reminder, WP:AGE MATTERS states, "In areas like politics or fashion, laws or trends may make older claims incorrect. Be sure to check that older sources have not been superseded, especially if it is likely that new discoveries or developments have occurred in the last few years." Penguino35 (talk) 16:55, 16 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option 2. There are multiple post-2017 sources which state that the ultimate goal of Hamas is establishing a Palestinian state in the whole territory of the former Mandatory Palestine (see Source analysis 3). Also, even the scholars that think that Hamas recognises the 1967 borders (see Source analysis 1) make it clear that Hamas does not recognise Israel. Therefore the wording proposed in the RfC "accepting the 1967 *Israeli* borders" is not supported by them and cannot be used. Alaexis¿question? 09:08, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Right, if they don't accept the existence of Israel, then they don't accept the 1967 borders. It's misleading to claim otherwise. KlayCax (talk) 01:24, 19 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Actually, 7 out of the 11 scholars in "Source analysis 1" (Zartman, Brenner, Seurat, Baconi, Lansford, Ismael and Ezbidi) say that Hamas' acceptance of the 1967 borders implies an implicit recognition of Israel, but I never proposed putting that in the lead. I'm ok with writing "1967 borders" as opposed to "the 1967 *Israeli* borders". VR talk 04:30, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option #3 (Summoned by bot) per WP:AGE MATTERS and WP:RS. TarnishedPathtalk 09:32, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 3: There are a wide variety of reliable sources, both scholarly and journalistic, provided in the source analysis sections which back this option. The group has explicitly recognized the 1967 borders. --Mhhossein talk 19:20, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 3; oppose 2 in strongest possible terms. We should state that they currently accept the 1967 borders in the article voice, unattributed (or, more properly, attributed directly to Hamas, not with the "scholars" WP:WEASEL wording used currently.) Nothing in the text should suggest that there is any doubt that Hamas has stated that, since nobody has presented any sources that would support this. Contrary to the current wording and the RFC statement, based on the sources presented here, even skeptics do not largely dispute that that is their currently stated position. What people have presented instead is sources that generally distrust that position or do not give it much credence; we can certainly include that position in the lead, but it doesn't seem to be the majority view, and in any case there's sufficient coverage to include their currently stated policy in the lead as fact. Also, the note from the RFC creator about option 2 clearly violates WP:RFCNEUTRAL (as does the description of Hamas' statements as "ambiguous"); that's the sort of thing the RFC exists to determine. It's also wrong - per the below, there isn't actually much disagreement among the sources as to the fact that Hamas currently says that it accepts the 1967 borders. There are some observers who distrust that statement, or who give it little weight, or who believe that that policy is a temporary recognition of the current situation and that they'll therefore move the goalposts down the line; but that's a separate question and we can note and attribute the existence of people who express that belief while still being clear about what Hamas has at least stated. Oppose 2 in strongest possible terms; complete omission from the lead would be absurd. While I prefer option 3, even option 1 would be preferable - we cannot simply have the lead act as though Hamas has said nothing about this when coverage is so sustained, overwhelming, and clear; the question is instead how we want to weigh the amount of focus on Hamas' currently stated position vs. the voices of skeptics who distrust that position. People who give heavy weight to that skepticism should be pushing for 1 instead (or for a hypothetical version that balances the two evenly.) But option 2 would be an embarrassment that would leave out a key point about the topic. --Aquillion (talk) 05:42, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option #2:, otherwise Option #1. Hamas has allegedly killed the entire opposition in the government, because they were too "open" to the possibility of making peace and legitimizing the existence of Israel. Moreover, "trimming" the early viewpoint is extremely problematic as it right now calls for the destruction of Israel, coinciding with its early viewpoints. Bar Harel (talk) 05:55, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    How can one link the so-called killings with the fact brought up by the sources. Does it change the source analysis showing Hamas did accept the 1967 borders? --Mhhossein talk 18:41, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Source analysis 1

Here are 6 scholarly sources that say Hamas accepted the 1967 borders in 2017. WP:SCHOLARSHIP indicates that scholarly sources are preferred:

Khaled Mesh’al describes the Document of General Principles and Policies published on 1 May 2017 as a new political benchmark for Hamas. Although the recognition of 1967 borders goes back to the Cairo Agreement and the Prisoners Document, respectively, signed in 2005 and 2006 and is an integral part of all intra-Palestinian agreements signed since then (2007, 2011, 2012, 2014), this document introduces for the first time the recognition as an integral part of the Islamic resistance’s programme, and not simply as a programme shared by the set of Palestinian political players. page 61-62

Indeed, since 2006, Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders, as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel. This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005: the Cairo Agreement in 2005, the Prisoners’ Document in 2006, the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012. Yet these compromises linked to the strict framework of reconciliation agreements between Palestinians had never been displayed as an integral part of Hamas strategy. From 2017 on, Hamas would endorse them as its own political stands and not as simple concessions to Fatah. page 18-19

  • 2. Maria Koinova. Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States. Oxford University Press. p. 150.. Author is Professor of International Relations, University of Warwick.

The 2017 Hamas charter accepted a Palestinian state with 1967 borders, but still without recognizing Israel.

In its May 2017 charter, Hamas expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders of Israel and Palestine. The statement, however, done not include recognition of Israel or acceptance of the solution proposed by the Oslo Accords. Nevertheless, acceptance of the 1967 borders can be interpreted as a de facto acceptable of the preconditions for a two-state solution.

The new document still referred to Palestine as territory 'from the river to the sea'. However, it also added that it accepted the pre-1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of these borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there.

  • 5. Asaf Siniver (ed.). Routledge Companion to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

The year 2017 saw another significant development inside Hamas...the accept of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, which Hamas hoped would improve its relations with the West.

  • 6. Jonathan Zartman. "Conflict in the Modern Middle East:An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change". ABC-CLIO. p. 230. Zartman is associate professor at Air Command and Staff College.

Hamas updated its charter in early 2017, accepting the idea of a negotiated two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist.

VR talk 05:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

In addition to the 6 sources above, here are 5 more sources:

  • 7. Tareq Baconi. Hamas contained: The rise and pacification of Palestinian resistance. Stanford University Press. p. 230,245.:

[The Hamas 2017 charter] demonstrated that on the most official level, Hamas accepted the creation of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, UN Resolution 194 for the right of return, and the notion of restricting armed struggle to operate within the limits of international law. Although not breaking any new ground in terms of political concessions, the document was a powerful intervention that restated more forcefully than before the position Hamas has adopted since at least 2007, if not since the 1990s. page 245

Hamas said “Why should we be forced to explicitly recognize Israel if we’ve already indicated we have a de facto acceptance of its presence?” Hamas’s implicit acceptance of Israel has gone far beyond what many Israeli political parties, including the dominant ruling Likud party, have offered Palestinians within their charters. page 230

  • 8. Tom Lansford (2019). Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019. SAGE Publications. p. 1815.

In May 2017 Hamas announced a major policy reversal and declared that it was willing to accept the creation of an independent, though interim, Palestinian state, alongside Israel, if that state existed along the pre-1967 borders. Hamas had previously been unwilling to compromise on territorial issues. The organization emphasized that its statement did not imply a recognition of Israel.

  • 9. Jacqueline S. Ismael, Tareq Y. Ismael, Glenn Perry. Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East Continuity and Change. Taylor & Francis. p. 106?.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Hamas on multiple occasions has accepted, in principle, the existence of Israel, as delineated by its 1967 borders and dropped the call for destruction of Israel from its manifesto. When asked whether Hamas would abandon the destruction of Israel as part of its platform, Mahmoud Zahar, a Hamas leader and a 'hard-liner', answered 'If Israel is ready to tell the people what is the official border, after that we are going to answer this question'. Khaled Meshal, Hamas' political bureau chief then based in Damascus admitted in 2008 that Hamas' leadership are 'realists' who recognize the existence of an 'entity named Israel'. Pushed further, Meshal continued that Hamas accepts 'the national accord for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders'. More specifically, another Hamas leader, Ghazi Hamad went even further in January 2009 (in spite of the sustained Israeli attack Gaza had just suffered), admitting that Hamas would be satisfied with the minimalist goals of reclaiming the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem (i.e. territories lost in 1967), implicitly accepting Israel's pre-1967 borders.

The 2017 update of its charter that obliterates the movement's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, indicates Hamas's acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders — with the implication of recognising Israel—and the willingness to negotiate and accept a renewable hudna (armistice) with Israel.

VR talk 04:14, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Source analysis 2

Here are 10 news sources that indicate Hamas accepted the 1967 borders.

  • NBC News[3]: "For decades, Hamas called for the destruction of Israel. In 2017, 30 years after its founding, the group issued a new charter that appeared to stop short of that goal. The document, known as the Hamas 2017 charter, was the first time the group had shown a willingness to accept a Palestinian state that would fall within the borders that existed in 1967, consisting of the West Bank, Gaza and all of Jerusalem."
  • Al-Jazeera[4]: "Hamas has presented a new political document that accepts the formation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, without recognising the statehood of Israel".
  • The Independent[5]: "However, since 2017, Hamas has said it accepts a Palestinian state shaped around the borders of 1967, which existed prior to the war in which Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip..."
  • The Guardian [6]: "n the biggest concession, the new document states that Hamas “considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of 4 June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus”. By implication, the document accepts that there will be another state entity outside these borders, even if it does not mention Israel."
  • Reuters[7] "Palestinian Islamist group Hamas supports the establishment of a transitional Palestinian state along the borders from 1967, its leader Khaled Meshaal said on Monday."
  • RAND corporation[8]: "The major takeaway is that Hamas is open, at least in principle, to accepting the 1967 borders of a Palestinian state..."
  • Wall Street Journal[9]: "Hamas is dedicated to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. It has signaled it is willing to accept a two-state solution based on borders that existed before 1967, but in recent years friction with Israel has steadily grown."
  • PBS[10]: In what observers called an attempt to moderate its image, Hamas presented a new document [PDF] in 2017 that accepted an interim Palestinian state along the “Green Line” border established before the Six-Day War but that still refused to recognize Israel.
  • India Today[11]: "The organization's 1988 charter called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, covering the entirety of what is now Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. However, a 2017 policy document suggests a more nuanced stance, acknowledging the possibility of an interim Palestinian state based on 1967 borders."
  • Deutsche Welle[12]:"In a new charter announced earlier this year, Hamas dropped its wording of "destroying" Israel and said it would recognize a Palestinian state within the borders created by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war."

VR talk 05:39, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Source analysis 3 - sources that dispute the acceptance

Alaexis¿question? 09:02, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Every single one of the above sources says that Hamas recognizes the 1967 borders in anything less than the "long-term" or "ultimate goal". But do the sources give any indication on what Hamas considers the "long-term"? For example, their 1988 charter seems to reference "Day of Judgement". This is analogous to how Orthodox Jews believe that, at some point in the distant future, the Third Temple should be built at the location of the Al-Aqsa mosque.VR talk 23:02, 18 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think we should second-guess them. If they say that this is the long-term goal then this is what we should write in the article. If some day they clarify their position we will add it too. Alaexis¿question? 10:22, 19 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Based on my research, the length of period for which Hamas would accept the 1967 borders is often described as "indefinite".[1] Halim Rane, professor at Griffith University, says many Hamas officials accepted the Geneva Initiative (based on the 1967 borders), but wanted to express the wording as "indefinite ceasefire" as opposed to a formal peace agreement, and compared it to Ariel Sharon's "long-term interim agreement".[2] Likewise, a paper in Negotiation Journal points that Hamas "offered a ten-year hudna in return for complete withdrawal from all territories captured in the Six Day War and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza" but later extended it to "thirty, forty, or one hundred years, although it would never signal recognition of Israel...[Hamas claims that] an indefinite hudna in no way contradicts Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel." Likewise other papers also argue that Hamas would agree to peace, in exchange for Israel withdrawing to the 1967 borders, for now and leave future peace "up to the next generation" of Palestinians to decide.[3][4] Another source says Hamas accepts the 1967 borders "for the forseeable future".[5]VR talk 03:56, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
These articles are from 2008-2009, so they cannot tell us anything about the changes associated with the 2017 charter. You cannot simultaneously believe that Hamas have always been ready to accept the 1967 borders and that they changed their position in 2017 and are ready to accept these borders since then.
Also, this interpretation did not and does not represent the consensus. Atram says a few sentences after the passage that you quoted that many Israelis believe that Hamas’s refusal of recognition and permanent peace indicate that any hudna will just be a smoke screen to allow military preparation for an eventual attack on Israel.
Dag Tuastad wrote explicitly in 2010 that there are two interpretations

Alaexis¿question? 14:34, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Alaexis: How is it deduced from the sources that the Hamas did not accept the 1967 borders? Would you please elaborate on that? --Mhhossein talk 19:24, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Multiple sources published after 2017 make a distinction between the short-term acceptance of the 1967 borders and the long-term goal of establishing an Islamic state between the river and the sea. Only mentioning the former and not the latter is a clear violation of WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 20:47, 20 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
But as pointed above, the terms "short-term" and "long-term" are incredibly vague, and without definition they shouldn't be included. One of the sources above points out that Hamas itself has proposed a "thirty, forty, or one hundred years" ceasefire to Israel based on the 1967 borders. 30-100 years is hardly "short-term"!VR talk 04:44, 22 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I am understanding from Alaexis's comment that he accepts the Hamas acceptance of 1967 borders but still think their previous thoughts should be mentioned. --Mhhossein talk 19:03, 23 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Being WP:BOLD, I've made changes to the lede, I believe that now it covers all the key points (the initial maximalist position, acceptance of the 1967 borders but not of Israel in the compromises of the 2000's and the 2017 charter, the long-term goal). Alaexis¿question? 13:31, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I think what you added is one-sided, as sources point out this debate is two-sided as to whether Hamas intends upon long-term peace, or a short-term tactic. We've already discussed sources above who point out this two sided debate, but here's another source:[6]

There are two competing interpretations over the purpose of Hamas’s Hudna. While some consider Hamas’s offer as a tactic to get time for a future military attack and conquer all the land of Palestine, others see it as an Islamic way of conflict resolution to achieve permanent/long-term peace in the future (Tuastad 2010b: 5)...On the one side...the Islamist movement will never give up the dream of establishing a Palestinians state and wiping out Israel...On the other ...the demand for Hudna seems to be a genuine demand for peace... "In Arab and Islamic tradition, a Hudna constitute a phase: first the ceasefire, Hudna, then the sulh, reconciliation. The most common outcome of the Hudna phase is a final peace agreement”.

The second view is also supported by the following sources. Baconi, who wrote one of the more comprehensive books on Hamas, writes:[7]

[Khaled Meshal] stressed that the constant offering of ceasefires on land occupied in 1967 was another indication that Hamas implicitly recognized Israel. Meshal’s views were mirrored by others; Hamas’s finance minister in Gaza stated that “a long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same. It’s just a question of vocabulary.”

Tristan Dunning writes:[8]

[Hamas minister says] "A hudna extends beyond the Western concept of a ceasefire and obliges the parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences." Hamas has also repeatedly and publicly committed itself to accepting a popular referendum on any peace agreement reached by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Instances of this may be found in... Hamas’ acceptance of the Arab League initiative, entailing full normalisation with Israel in return for a withdrawal from Arab territories captured in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Loren Lybarger writes:[9]

Hamas too would signal a willingness to accept a long-term "hudna" (cessation of hostilities, truce) along the armistice lines of 1948 (an effective acceptance of the two-state formula).

Krista Weigand writes:[10]

Hamas's offers of long term cease-fires and acceptance of a two-state solution with pre-I967 borders...Hamas leaders continue to suggest that they are willing to compromise on their claim for all of historic Palestine, yet their claims are mostly ignored...Though Hamas has not stated it explicitly, the conditions under which it proposed the truce would in fact provide recognition of the existence of the state of Israel with its pre-1967 boundaries. Because of Hamas's unwillingness to explicitly recognize the state of Israel...

Finally Ayoob (2009, page 126) writes:

The Hamas leadership has increasingly begun to emphasize the importance of Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders as the precondition for a long-term truce (hudna). Hamas's leaders have also accepted the idea that the future of Palestine ought to be determined either on the basis of a popular referendum or by freely elected representatives of the Palestinian people and that Hamas will abide by such a decision. Such statements have often implied that the long-term truce as conceived by Hamas leaves open the possibilities of mutual recognition by Palestine and Israel and of a settlement based on the borders of 1967, if the Palestinian people accept it of their own volition. Hamas's decision to participate in the 2006 elections to the Palestine National Council after having boycotted the 1996 elections because they were held within the Oslo framework is probably the best indication that it has decided to work within the two-state framework, without explicitly admitting that fact.

VR talk 20:50, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Ok, so I WP:BOLDly made an edit that does two things. First, I wrote "[Hamas 2017 charter] supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel" because at this point the overwhelming majority of sources say that, and even Alaexis' sources say Hamas accepts the 1967 borders in the interim. Secondly, I added "Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10—100 years) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution", given the sources I provided above.VR talk 21:18, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

RFC: Should Hamas' ideology be described as anti-imperialist in the infobox?

Should Hamas be described as anti-imperialist in the infobox?

  • Option #1: Ideology: Anti-imperialism shouldn't be mentioned in the infobox
  • Option #2: Ideology: Anti-imperialism
  • Option #3: Ideology: Anti-imperialism (disputed)

The options are the above. There has been significant edit warring within the article over the past week related to this. KlayCax (talk) 05:35, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Option 1: Such a statement would equate Zionism with imperialism, which is, to say the least, an extremely contentious matter and utterly inappropriate for Wikivoice. Infoboxes should generally err on the side of caution regarding potentially controversial, let alone inflammatory, claims.
RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 06:40, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Whether Zionism is imperialist or not is unrelated to whether Hamas ideologically believes itself to be anti-imperialist. Who said the internal ideologies of organizations are academically accurate? Iskandar323 (talk) 06:48, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Zionist state is undoubtedly a settler-colonial, imperialist and irredentist entity; which was founded after the ethnic cleansing of native Palestinians. It currently occupies territories of the State of Palestine and Syria. During 1980s, it invaded Lebanon and occupied southern Lebanon for nearly 15 years. (until it got defeated and expelled militarily) It has also been aggressively annexing more and more Palestinian lands.
Many Jewish dissidents criticize or oppose such imperialist, irredentist and expansionist policies; but its a fact that the Zionist state itself is a settler-colonial and imperial entity. Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 13:33, 16 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
WP:NOTAFORUM Drsmoo (talk) 03:25, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 1 Most of the sources dont describe it in such way so it will be wp:undue to do so
Shrike (talk) 19:16, 13 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option 2: In addition to news reports, there are plenty of academic sources discussing the anti-imperialism of Hamas. I dont know why an academic source which cited the anti-imperialist character of Hamas movement was erased repeatedly from this page.
Publisher: Haymarket Books

"Nowhere did the Zionist left bother to respond to analysts like Azmi Bishara, who time and again emphasized that in supporting Hamas, the Palestinian people were declaring that they opposed the former PA policies, which had succumbed to Israeli dictates. Nor did their general political view allow them to relate to the anti-imperialist essence inherent in Hamas's resistance.."[12]

  • From "The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion" (2010) edited by John Hinnells. Publisher: Routledge

    There is also a nationalist and anti-imperial dimension to most Islamic militancy. Hamas is a fundamentalist movement in the sense that it advocates a state based on strict conformity to Islamic law, and the followers of Hamas are expected to follow a strictly Islamic code of conduct. At the same time, however, Hamas is clearly a Palestinian nationalist movement that echoes most of the traditional demands of the Palestinian Liberation Organization before it accepted the idea of the partition of pre-1948 Palestine into a Jewish state on 78 percent of the land and a Palestinian state on the remaining 22 percent[13]

  • From "A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad" (2021) authored by Erik Skare. Publisher: Cambridge University Press

    These qualifications, however, do not necessarily weaken my claim that the thought and practice of PIJ and Hamas derive from two different political traditions. First, both movements opposed Western colonialism and its complicity in the crimes of the Israeli occupation. Yet, Hamas's theorization about the instrumental Zionist-Western relationship made it explore the division of responsibilities in the liberation struggle. That is, the movement explored the issue of who had to bear the greatest costs of "Zionists and imperialist projects." Hamas concluded that liberation could not be borne by the Palestinian resistance alone. Hroub thus argues that "one finds evidence of the line of thinking [in Hamas] that originated in the 1970s... that is, an Islamic state [should first] be established outside (Palestine), and such a state should take a lion's share of the responsibility for liberation." Accordingly, Hamas never expected the First Intifada to lead to the liberation of Palestine. This conclusion would necessarily distinguish Hamas from PIJ, with the confidence of the latter in the Palestinian masses and their armed struggle. As Hatina notes: "A general enlistment of the Muslim world to join the struggle in Palestine [was] acknowledged as impractical [by PIJ]. The main burden, in consequence, at least in the initial phase, [had to] fall on the Muslims of Palestine.
    Second, these differing views on the division of responsibilities, and the realism of the Palestinian struggle, would necessarily affect their approach to the West and the application of their anti-colonial analysis in daily and diplomatic practices.[14]

  • "Conversations with Terrorists: Middle East Leaders on Politics, Violence, and Empire" (2016) authored by Reese Erlich & Baer Robert. Publisher: Routledge

    Hamas was founded in December 1987 by Sheik Ahmed Yassin and his followers as a branch of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had a long history in the Middle East as an anti-imperialist organization seeking to establish Arab governments ruled by a strict interpretation of Islam....
    From the beginning Hamas saw itself as a distinct, religious trend and refused to join the PLO. Hamas sought to merge a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam with anti-imperialism.[15]

As everyone can see, numerous academic sources have clearly described Hamas as an anti-imperialist movement. Outside the academia, it is well-known that various media outlets, political and civilian activists across the world, describe Hamas movement as anti-imperialist.
Due to the settler-colonial nature of Zionist nationalism, Zionists of all political persuasions attempt to deny the anti-imperialist character of Hamas insurgents. (as mentioned in the above listed academic sources)
I view these ongoing, repeated attempts to remove and censor the well-sourced content regarding anti-imperialism of Hamas insurgents as part of the Western-centric systemic bias prevelant in this "online encyclopaedia". Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 12:25, 16 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 2 for now, in light of sources presented by Shadowwarrior8. I'm open to seeing contrarian sources too.VR talk 02:59, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 2 (Summoned by bot) there are serious academic sources in which it is clear that Hamas consider themselves to be anti-imperialist. For example, Meir Litvak who is the Chair of the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University writes in two places of an article[16] that "More important, Hamas regards the struggle against Israel and the Jews as part of a broader religious war waged between the Islamic and Western civilizations. It is the latest and most fateful phase of the relentless onslaught waged by Western imperialism and culture against Islam since the time of the Crusades. Both the capitalist West and the Communist East are regarded as one entity in this context because of their support for Zionism. Thus Hamas depicted the 1991 Gulf War as a war of the 'crusaders [Western] coalition' against Islam in order to complete what Zionism had been unable to do. In addition, the Jews were sometimes portrayed as instruments of the West, or alternatively as the power which controls and manipulates the West. The US, for instance, was described as a servant of Israel and as seeking to subjugate the Arabs according to the Jewish plan" and "The ramifications of the Palestinian jihad, according to Hamas, go far beyond Palestine. History from the times of the Crusades has shown that the Islamic nation unites only around Palestine , writes Abd al-Hafiz 'Alawi, a frequent contributor to Filastin al-Muslima. The Palestinian cause is the common denominator of all popular movements in the Muslim world. The loss of Palestine was the beginning of the nation's collapse and disintegration, and the liberation of Palestine is a necessary precondition for the nation's cultural revival and progress. Moreover, humanity everywhere, which is oppressed by American imperialism and Zionism, looks forward to the defeat of these forces as the first step towards its liberation. There is no future for this nation and this region, he concluded, except by liberating Palestine and by removing the Zionist state which constitutes the obstacle to Arab and Islamic revival". TarnishedPathtalk 10:16, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option #2: There appears to be plenty of evidence that Hamas views its own activities through an anti-imperialist lense, and by contrast, no evidence contradicting this and asserting that it does not. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:50, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option #3: Ideology: Anti-imperialism (disputed) They may view themselves as anti-imperialist, but they also say they are committed to the destruction of Israel, which goes beyond simply being anti-imperialist. Elmmapleoakpine (talk) 16:57, 19 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Option 2, with the assumption that the rest of the section is staying rather than being replaced (that is Anti-imperialism in addition to Palestinian nationalism, Islamism, etc rather than instead of). Horse Eye's Back (talk) 17:08, 19 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Option #2, although it would would benefit from the addition of ideaologies such as nationalism, Palestinian self-determinaton, etc. Estep00 (talk) 21:35, 19 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ SCOTT ATRAN. "Hamas May Give Peace a Chance". New York Times. Most significant, the top Hamas leader on the West Bank, Sheik Hassan Yussef, declared that the group should consider an indefinite "hudna" - or pause in armed conflict - if Israel were to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, approve a right of return for Palestinian refugees, release long-term prisoners and raze the wall being built in the West Bank.
  2. ^ Halim Rane (2009). Reconstructing Jihad Amid Competing International Norms. p. 34. ...many Israelis expressed concern over the term "hudna" (variously translated as "ceasefire," "settlement," or "treaty") as it conveyed to them only a temporary suspension of attacks that would be resumed at a later, more opportunistic time. Other Israelis, however, have a deeper understanding and are less concerned. Asher Susser, director of the Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University, conveyed to me in an interview that "Hamas' 'hudna' is not significantly different from Sharon's 'long-tcrm interim agreement." Similarly, Daniel Levy, a senior Israeli official for the Geneva Initiative (GI), informed me that certain Hamas officials find the GI acceptable, but due to the concerns about their Islamically oriented constituency and their own Islamic identity, they would "have to express the final result in terms ofa "hudna," or "indefinite" ceasefire," rather than a formal peace agreement." These statements are consistent with the opinion of a senior Western diplomat that the Palestinians need more. organized public relations and media campaigns and that Hamas, in particular, needs to "express itself in terms that are better understood by the West, rather than in Islamic terms that are misunderstood in the West."
  3. ^ Dag Tuastad. ""Hamas's Concept of a Long-term Ceasefire: A Viable Alternative to Full Peace?"". Peace Research Institute Oslo. Hamas wants "a Palestinian state in exchange for an extended ceasefire. After the ceasefire, if there is trust and people are happy, then there will be peace. If not, there will not be peace. According to Hamas, this would be up to the next generation to decide." {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  4. ^ Dag Tuastad. "The Hudna: Hamas's Concept of a Long-Term Ceasefire". Peace Research Institute Oslo. It should be up to the next generation of the Palestinians to decide whether the hudna should be extended, suspended or developed into a permanent agreement {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  5. ^ Martin Kear. "The Dilemmas of Dual Resistance: Hamas and Political Learning in Gaza". The Politics of Islamism. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 243. The most astounding aspect of the document was Hamas's acceptance that in the foreseeable future any Palestinian state would exist along the 1967 ceasefire lines
  6. ^ Shameer Modongal (2023). Islamic Perspectives on International Conflict Resolution. Routledge. p. 121.
  7. ^ Baconi (2018), page 108
  8. ^ Tristan Dunning (2016). Hamas, Jihad and Popular Legitimacy. Routledge. p. 179-180.
  9. ^ Loren D. Lybarger (2020). Palestinian Chicago. University of California Press. p. 199.
  10. ^ Krista E. Wiegand (2016). Bombs and Ballots: Governance by Islamist Terrorist and Guerrilla Groups. Taylor & Francis. p. 165.
  11. ^ Honig-Parnass, Haddad, Tikva, Toufic (2007). "10: Expanding Regionally, Resisting Locally". Between the Lines. Haymarket Books. p. 297. ISBN 978-1931859-44-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  12. ^ Honig-Parnass, Haddad, Tikva, Toufic (2007). "10: Expanding Regionally, Resisting Locally". Between the Lines. Haymarket Books. p. 297. ISBN 978-1931859-44-8.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  13. ^ Hinnells, John; Munson, Henry (2010). "21: Fundamentalism". The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-86876-8.
  14. ^ Skare, Erik (2021). A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. New York, NY 10006, USA: Cambridge University Press. p. 367. ISBN 978-1-108-84506-9.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link)
  15. ^ Erlich, Robert, Reese, Baer (2016). Conversations with Terrorists: Middle East Leaders on Politics, Violence, and Empire. 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10007, USA: Routledge. p. 367. ISBN 978-1-1384-6788-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  16. ^ Litvak, Meir (Jan 1998). "The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas". Middle Eastern Studies. 34 (1): 148–163. Retrieved 2023-10-17.

Radical Sunni Islamist

The lead currently says that Hamas is a "Sunni Islamist" militant group, but someone added "radical Sunni Islamist" militant group. Firstly, what's the difference and what's the definition of "radical" in this context?

Secondly are there a lot of sources that say Hamas meets that particular definition?VR talk 19:45, 14 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Qatar funding of Hamas with support of Netanyahu governments

Former PM Ehud Olmert reports that "Hamas was financed with the assistance of Israel - for years - by hundreds of millions of Dollars that came from Qatar, with the assistance of the state of Israel, with the full knowledge and support of the Israeli government led by Netanyahu. Netanyahu when he took over in 2009, said that his primary responsibility and priority is to destroy Hamas. And throughout the period he was prime minister, he made every possible effort, in order to build Hamas rather than to destroy it. And in a certain way the expansion of Hamas and the strengthening of Hamas is largely also a result of this policy of Netanyahu." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uar3I_LUSyM&t=671s I think this, or at least parts of it, should be shown as a quote in the "Finances and funding" section, as it is crucial information brought by a former PM of Israel. Haxtibel (talk) 20:27, 15 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I certainly think it deserves some mention somewhere. Funding is fine. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:40, 15 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 October 2023

Re-adding anti-communism back to infobox ideologies https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hamas&diff=prev&oldid=1180045138 Scendgo (talk) 07:03, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done Edit requests aren't a means to give old content disputes another shot through the wringer. * Pppery * it has begun... 00:39, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 17 October 2023

Change this line in the opening paragraph: "is a Sunni Islamist political and military organization governing the Gaza Strip"

by adding the following word "de-facto":

"is a Sunni Islamist political and military organization de-facto governing the Gaza Strip"

This is because legally (de jure), the governing party is the Palestinian Authority

Xland44 (talk) 07:15, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done The currently wording is fine - it says Hamas does the governing and (the wording) doesn't make any claims about de-jure statue. This seems controversial enough it would need consensus to implement. * Pppery * it has begun... 00:39, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Removal of sourced material

"campaigning on using armed resistance against the Israeli occupation,[1]"

Why has this been removed from the lede?

Makeandtoss (talk) 11:09, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

It might help if you could establish when it was removed/the summary. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:18, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I have no idea where specifically but seems last mention of the occupation, the elephant in the article's lede, was removed by @KlayCax:, with no edit summary [14]. Makeandtoss (talk) 11:40, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Since it's basically Hamas's main policy, and definitely for its continuous clashes with the PA, which has disavowed the use of armed resistance, it's pretty obviously relevant in the context. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:40, 17 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Cite error: The named reference SMF was invoked but never defined (see the help page).

Hamas comparison to ISIS

Hamas has been compared to the Islamic State, known as ISIS or Daesh. This comparison has been done following recent massacres in southern Israel (2023). The comparison has been done not only by Israel but also by US and European leadership. Therefore, since it seems that this comparison has been repeatedly deleted on this page, I'm raising this issue. One must assume that at least 1 sentence in the Lead on this topic is obliged considering the scope of Hamas actions and the severity of the actions and comparison.

I suggest the following sentence: "Following its actions in 2023, Hamas has been compared to ISIS by multiple world leaders and experts."

Sources:

Experts, Leading News on foreign policy...

Foreign Affairs:How Israel Can Win,Washington Post: Only the U.S. can be an effective broker in the Gaza conflict:, Begin-Sadat Institute of Strategic Studies: The Islamic State of Hamas, Haaretz: Is Hamas Really Like ISIS? Experts Explain

World Leaders

Barron's: In Israel, Italy FM Compares Hamas To ISIS, Nazis, US Secretary of Defence, US President


Homerethegreat (talk) 15:23, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Politicians views are worthless for things like this (actually most things). Experts can be cited with attribution, note that there are two sides to that in the Haaretz article. I seriously doubt that this is leadworthy, in the article body maybe. Selfstudier (talk) 15:36, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I still think the large "Comparison to ISIS" section added to the criticism section was undue given the removal of the rest of the section, which is why I removed it. I agree that there is no need to include the comparison in the lead. Like the insistent request that we describe Hamas as "terrorist" , the only reason to include the comparison in the lead is to tell the reader Hamas is bad/evil, which is not particularly encyclopedic. Hemiauchenia (talk) 16:35, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Those comparisons certainly justify a mention in the article. If not in the lead, then in the body of the article for sure. Though, given the broad comparisons by worldwide leaders, I'd suggest it is leadworthy. Tomer T (talk) 18:20, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think that maybe one or several sentences in the body somewhere would suffice (but not under its own heading or in the "criticism" section), but I don't think we really need to make detailed comparisons to ISIS specifically, because otherwise why not make comparisons to other Islamist jihadist group like Al-Qaeda? I don't disagree with the assertion that Hamas is a jihadist group, this is extensively covered by RS [15], but I think we should let Hamas actions, like their historic suicide bombings and recent massacres of civillians during the current conflict, speak for themselves. Hemiauchenia (talk) 19:06, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's not jihadist; it's nationalist Islamist, which is what quite a few of those RS blurbs will tell you. Iskandar323 (talk) 20:28, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Opinions of politicians are not worthless as you say, since the purposed change directly says that this is the opinion of world leaders. World leaders (usually politicians) did made those claims- therefore it is reasonable to add such a sentence to the article.
Omri2424 (talk) 20:02, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I would also like to add, that I support adding a sentence or a paragraph to the article, about the above comparisons between ISIS and Hamas by world leaders and experts. About the location for this information, I currently don't have a strong opinion where it should be presented.
Omri2424 (talk) 20:08, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The Zionist state has been widely compared to Nazi Germany and apartheid-era South Africa by various political activists and academics as well. See the pages "Israel and apartheid" and "Comparisons between Israel and Nazi Germany". Yet none of these comparisons are currently mentioned in the body or lede of the page "Israel".
The recent attempts made by Zionists to compare Hamas to ISIS are part of their war-propaganda. Majority of the world disagree with the Israeli claims and the hysterical opinions of overtly biased pro-Zionist politicians in the West are worthless. Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 05:21, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Your cynic words hysterical and worthless prove you are deeply biased against Israel and your allegations are false. TaBaZzz (talk) 19:23, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Let's keep personal commentary out of this. Selfstudier (talk) 20:22, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
NPOV please. TaBaZzz (talk) 06:06, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Israel says Hamas ‘is ISIS.’ But it’s not. Selfstudier (talk) 10:33, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 21 October 2023 (2)

In the column on the right of the page, please change the chairman of Hamas into Yahya Sinwar (and hyperlink it to the wikipedia page with the same name.) Thank you! BIGRATHER (talk) 22:34, 21 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

 Question: :@BIGRATHER, could you assist with a source for the change? I’m looking at the current chairman’s page and it shows he is the current chairman still.

Likewise, Yahya Sinwar also does not show as the current chairperson, rather the current “Hamas Chief in the Gaza Strip”
Thanks,
Pedantical (talk) 20:43, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Deactivating request pending response to the above comments. * Pppery * it has begun... 00:39, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Re: Hamas’ “perceived anti-Israeli stance”

Hi,

I’m not extended autoconfirmed, or I would otherwise have made this edit request myself, but I have a small suggestion for improvement to this article.

In the third paragraph of the lead, the following sentence appears:

Hamas has gained widespread popularity within Palestinian society for its perceived anti-Israeli stance. (emphasis added)

It feels like “perceived anti-Israeli stance” is a bit disingenuous. There is nothing purely “perceptual” about Hamas’ stance towards Israel—it is quite real, and quite obvious. Whatever lens through which one views the current escalation in violence, this sentence nearly reads like a joke in light thereof. Hamas’ charter literally calls for the annihilation of the State of Israel through jihad. In fact, just two sentences before this, the lead states:

[…] it has pursued a policy of jihad (armed struggle) against Israel.

I would suggest changing the sentence in question to something like “Hamas has gained widespread popularity within Palestinian society for its anti-Israeli stance.” or “Hamas has gained widespread popularity within Palestinian society for its active anti-Israeli stance.”

Thanks for your work and consideration,

Hermes Thrice Great (talk) 07:34, 22 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

An editor has started an RfC asking "Should Operation Al-Aqsa Flood by Hamas be included in the List of Islamist terrorist attacks?" at Talk:List of Islamist terrorist attacks#Should Operation Al-Aqsa Flood by Hamas included in the list of Islamist Terrorist attacks?. Interested editors are invited to participate. TarnishedPathtalk 09:23, 22 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Citation for most recent Hamas attack

The source cited for the most recent Hamas attack (an AP news article) makes no mention of a massacre, only the kidnapping of hostages. If whoever wrote this wants to include evidence of a massacre of innocent civilians, they will need to add new reliable sources please. There needs to be rigour on this given that Israel’s govt has retracted certain claims about the violence (e.g. beheaded babies). 184.64.192.108 (talk) 06:58, 23 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Mainstream sources do not doubt that Hamas massacred civilians, including children during the initial offensive, there are plenty of sources at Kfar Aza massacre that could probably be used, among others. Hemiauchenia (talk) 07:01, 23 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Talk page too long

This talk page is really too long, making saving edits very slow, please archive some discussion with consensus, thanks. -Lemonaka‎ 12:01, 23 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I’ve gone ahead and archived mostly all of the “answered” requests here, and also archived a handful of stale posts that didn’t seem relevant anymore.
It’s not perfect but hopefully it helps trim it down a bit! Pedantical (talk) 03:07, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Adding Moldova as state that designated Hamas as a terrorist org

Here is the source - terrorist orgs list of Moldova national antiterrorist committee 2019. https://antiteror.sis.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/osis_14_2019.pdf Zaygle (talk) 07:54, 24 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Saudi Arabia

JohnnyPedro1998 you added Saudi Arabia as an opponent to Hamas. But I notice that your sources are a couple of years old. A few months ago, the leader of Hamas visited Saudi Arabia.[16] The article also says that Saudis did indeed arrest people for Hamas links, but "in recent months" they were released. So maybe Saudi Arabia is no longer an opponent? VR talk 21:25, 25 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 26 October 2023

Add Sudan and Tunisia to the allies box (probably allegedly), and in the case of Sudan, who ceased its support for Hamas since 2019, Sudan should probably be listed as "X Year" (the year Sudan was an ally of Hamas)"-2019, present, allegedly" Source TheLibyanGuy (talk) 15:12, 26 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 26 October 2023

Mistake
The following discussion has been closed. Please do not modify it.

Add Sudan and Tunisia to the allies box (probably allegedly), and in the case of Sudan, who ceased its support for Hamas since 2019, Sudan should probably be listed as "X Year" (the year Sudan was an ally of Hamas)"-2019, present, allegedly" Source TheLibyanGuy (talk) 20:39, 26 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done Duplicate request. * Pppery * it has begun... 00:39, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Oh sorry, my bad, my internet disconnected for a second, but initially I thought the replied was submitted. Either way can you complete the request?Probably respond to the one up above. TheLibyanGuy (talk) 01:43, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

RfC #3

Should editors collaborate to maximize the number of active RfCs on this page, in the aim of creating a record number? 21:20, 26 October 2023 (UTC) Edward-Woodrowtalk 21:20, 26 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

well, the RfC titled "Should Hamas' ideology be described as anti-imperialist in the infobox?" has been present for 2 weeks now. Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 05:58, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Dubious sourcing for allied to Al Qaeda claim

The sources for claiming Al Qaeda is an ally of Hamas, never say anything about Al Qaeda being allied to Hamas. It should be removed unless someone can provide actual sourcing IdkIdc12345 (talk) 22:01, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Only allegedly, the sources never explicitly state that Al Qaeda and Hamas are allies, just that Al Qaeda allegedly voices support for Hamas TheLibyanGuy (talk) 22:58, 27 October 2023 (UTC)[reply]