Talk:Six-Day War

GA Review

Unfortunately, I am going to have to fail this article, as it does not meet the GA Criteria at this time. More specifically, some of my concerns are as follows:

• Inline citations are missing from quite a few paragraphs and, in some cases, entire sections. This includes, but is not limited to:
  • The first two paragraphs of "Suez Crisis Aftermath"
  • Much of the first paragraph of "The Straits of Tiran"
  • The final paragraph of "The Straits of Tiran"
  • The final sentence of "Egypt and Jordan"
  • The end of "The drift to war" (which currently reads as original research)
  • The final paragraph of "Preliminary air attack"
  • Almost everything in "Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula"
  • Four paragraphs in "West Bank"
  • Almost everything in "Golan Heights"
  • The entire "War in the air" and "War at sea" sections
  • The first, fourth, seventh and eighth paragraphs in "Conclusion of conflict and post-war situation"
  • Much of "Allegations of U.S. and British combat support", including quotations
  • The second paragraph of "U.S. and British non-combat support"
• The article contains four "citation needed" tags and a "specify" tag *--Datapolitical (talk) 00:33, 29 March 2008 (UTC)
• The article is not stable, as there are multiple edits every day.
• The copyright of some images is questionable:
  • Image:FCO17473 10Apr67.gif uses a deprecated tag *removed--Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
  • The tag on Image:Arab israeli memo.jpg says that an additional copyright tag is needed *--Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
  • I don't know that a case for Fair Use can be made for Image:Life67.jpg, as magazines should not be used to illustrate text unless the text relates to the magazine itself. *--Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
• The article lacks consistency in some areas:
  • Not all abbreviations are spelled out the first time they are used (eg. UNTSO) *--Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
  • It needs to be either "U.S." or "US" throughout the article; likewise, "U.N." or "UN" *(partly) --Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
  • Most people's names are given in full the first time, but President Johnson's first name is not mentioned in the text of the article at all.
• The article contains several "It should be noted" statements, which are discouraged as per Wikipedia:Words to avoid#Words that editorialize *--Datapolitical (talk) 09:09, 20 March 2008 (UTC)
• Several external links do not work:
  • The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court of Justice, ICJ Reports, 1949, pp. 28-29 [icj-cij.org]
  • A Campaign for the Books [time.com]
  • Bamford Bashes Israel: Conspiracy Theorist Claims Attack on USS Liberty Intentional [std.com]
  • UN Resolutions on Palestine [palestine-un.org]
  • Israel Defense Forces' History [www1.idf.il]
• The article would benefit greatly from copyediting. There are writing errors that distract from the text. For the most part, it is okay. I found that punctuation errors made quite a few sentences confusing. After a prepositional phrase (eg. "In 1967", "At this time", "After receiving this message", etc.), a comma is needed. Having large amounts of the text in parentheses also makes the article choppy and hard to follow.
• More consistency is needed in the Footnotes section. All online references should have a publisher and access date.

I hope these comments are helfpul. I don't want to be discouraging, as the article is very interesting and I have no doubt that it can become a Good Article. I don't feel it is ready yet, though. I wanted to give detailed feedback with specific items to address, as I saw that people were upset by the comments left during the previous GA review. Best wishes, GaryColemanFan (talk) 14:57, 12 March 2008 (UTC)

Moving to Good Article Status

So thanks to GaryColemanFan we've got a task list to work off of. I'm going to start going through and starring everything I've finished doing, and anyone else who's working on improving the article can feel free to do the same. My goal is to have this done by the end of the semester. --Datapolitical (talk) 09:06, 20 March 2008 (UTC)

Recent additions

An unregistered user has made several contributions to the article yesterday. They are unreferenced, and are placed next to existing references, which might be misleading. Can anyone verify them? -- Nudve (talk) 05:36, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Yea, there are more than a couple. They seem to have been reverted by another unregistered user (or someone who just didn't log in). If the person who made them thinks they're correct, they should list the proposed changes on the talk page or give specific references.

I know it'll be a hideous pain to list all content changes on the talk page, but considering that this is a politically charged event, an edit war would not surprise me if changes were made without discussion.

Also, references to the US and the Soviet Union seem to have been changed to Nato and the Warsaw pact respectively. I'm not sure who made those changes, but are we sure those are correct? (If it's a registered user, can they explain them on here?) --Datapolitical (talk) 23:09, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Right. We could give it a few more days, but otherwise, if nobody here can verify them and the contributor cannot be contacted, there might be no choice but to revert. -- Nudve (talk) 05:27, 24 March 2008 (UTC)

The book I've been reading about the Six Day War references the US and the Soviet Union directly, and doesn't talk about pressure coming from the Warsaw Pact at all. I personally think the changes are incorrect, but lets wait until Wednesday before we revert.

Also, someone changed these numbers:

On the eve of the war, Egypt massed around 160,000 of its 300,000 troops in the Sinai. Many Egyptans were witheld from action in the Sinai because Egypt feared another attack by foreign powers like in 1956. No less than a third of them were veterans of Egypt's intervention into the Yemen Civil War and another third were reservists. These forces had 1,792 tanks, 2,109 APCs and more than 4,500 artillery pieces.

Since the citation didn't change but the numbers did, i'm tempted to revert, but I'll hold off till Wednesday when we can fix everything from the last week as well if it can't be verified.--Datapolitical (talk) 23:45, 24 March 2008 (UTC)

I don't recall any references to the Warsaw Pact either -- Nudve (talk) 06:18, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

I just pulled out a book from my school's library on the war, Six Days, by Jeremy Bowen, so I'll be checking the stuff we need sourced against that.--Datapolitical (talk) 06:46, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Semi-protection

So I've gotten the article semi-protected for a month so we can fix this thing up without vandalism. I'm confident the edits over the past few days are bogus, so i'm gonna do a revert now. If someone feels that this is in error, please feel free to undo that, but also provide your reasoning here. Specifically in relation to the changes from US to Nato and Soviet Union to Warsaw Pact, those need clarification as there is a material difference between the two.--Datapolitical (talk) 05:13, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

As far as I can see, the changes were wrong or meaningless. "Nato" in the 56 war is ridiculous - it would amount to Britain and France pressuring themselves; India and Yugoslavia is correct, India and South Africa isn't, Egypt wasn't worried about anyone but Israel attacking, etc.John Z (talk) 07:37, 25 March 2008 (UTC)

Info on a copy-protected image

Since we can't use the Life Magazine image (of the soldier in the Suez Canal) found in this article: http://www.azure.org.il/magazine/magazine.asp?id=387, which was removed for copyright issues, I put a link to that site in our external links section. I'd like to reference the photograph in the article itself and talk about its relevance, so any thoughts on how to do that properly (i'm thinking something on "Images of the Six-Day War" to talk about the significance of the image that headlines the article (of the three soldiers entering the Old City) and of the Life magazine cover.--Datapolitical (talk) 08:13, 28 March 2008 (UTC)

Sources for apocryphal quote on British tanks

This paragraph was in the article and had no source, and clearly needs one. I've been unable in about 20 minutes of searching the web and in searching the four reference books on the war I checked out from the library to find any reference to the story. I've moved the section here, so if anyone can find a source on this, put it back, but I figure it should stay on the talk page until we've got some reference to it.

A possibly apocryphal story was going the rounds that the UK had supplied some Chieftain tanks to the IDF for evaluation. When hostilities broke out, the UK Ministry of Defense, in a panic, called Israel for assurances that the tanks would not approach the border combat zones. Back came the Israeli response, "Don't worry, we've moved the borders!"

(there were a few spelling errors as well which I've cleaned up, and which make me just a bit more unsure about this section)--Datapolitical (talk) 00:24, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

editorializing removed

The political importance of the 1967 War was immense; Israel demonstrated that it was not only able, but also willing to initiate strategic strikes that could change the regional balance. Egypt and Syria learned tactical lessons, but perhaps not the strategic ones,[specify] and would launch an attack in 1973 in an attempt to reclaim their lost territory. [110]

The phrase "but perhaps not the strategic ones" can be considered editorializing, and since the source cited makes no reference to the claim, I removed that clause from the sentence. If anyone can find a reference directly supporting it, please add it back in. --Datapolitical (talk) 00:31, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Gulf of Aqaba as an act War

Concerning the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba by the UAR as an act of war, the viewpoint of the UAR has to be considered[1]

The Gulf of Aqaba, the representative of the United Arab Republic stated, had always been a national inland waterway subject to Arab sovereignty. Since the Gulf's only three legitimate littoral States - Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic - were all in a state of war with Israel, their right to bar enemy vessels was recognized under international law. The claim that Israel had a port on the Gulf had no validity, as Israel had illegally occupied several miles of coastline on the Gulf, including Om Rashrash, in violation of Security Council resolutions of 1948 and the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement. The Armistice Agreements did not vitiate his Government's rights to impose restrictions on navigation in the Strait; nor had the 1956 aggression changed the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba or the United Arab Republic's rights over its territorial waters.

It was further pointed out that the claim that the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba itself constituted an act of war and justified the Israel aggression as an act of self-defence provided no excuse for the massive assault. The Strait of Tiran had never been opened to Israel until the aggression of 1956. No vital interests had suffered; not an Israel ship had passed through the Strait in the last two and a half years. The action of Israel was not legitimate self-defence within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter because no armed attack on its territory had in fact occurred. On 5 June 1967, the United Arab Republic had not yet even completed its defensive precautions in Sinai, and a similar condition had prevailed in Syria and Jordan.

Arab Belligerents

I notice that the list of combatants in the info box keeps changing and I think there must be some confusion about countries and flags, etc. The United Arab Republic split in 1961, however Egypt continued to be known by that name until 1971. Its flag was the flag now associated with Syria. Following the rise of the Ba'ath party in Syria, in 1963, they adopted the flag used by Iraq at the time. So, the Arab belligerents in the 6 Six Days war are: the United Arab Republic, Syria (with the flag of Iraq), and Jordan (with the flag of Jordan). I don't know why other involved countries were removed (e.g. Iraq and Libya), but I just wanted to raise the issue of naming. JEB90 (talk) 07:57, 25 April 2008 (UTC)

What does Libya have to do with the war? They weren't belligerents. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.173.165.226 (talk) 07:15, 9 May 2008 (UTC)

I was pretty sure only Egypt (or the United Arab Republic), Jordan and Syria fought against Israel. What did the rest have to do with it? 87.127.157.166 (talk) 20:25, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

Waiting period (Six-Day War)

I stumbled across that article. It has many problems, and it doesn't appear in the main article. What do you suggest be done about it? Should it be merged? -- Nudve (talk) 15:08, 4 May 2008 (UTC)

How many Syrians fled the Golan heights

Recently, an anon has been an edit warring, claiming that "100 000 Syrians fled the Golan, not 1000" (as it is currently written). He was thrice reverted, once with the "rv uncited change", which I assume means "change to sourced statements" (otherwise this is not a legitimate reason to revert).

My question is, whether the number is really sourced. The ref is "International Committee of the Red Cross, 1998, p. 454.". (possibly dumb question ahead, please correct if so) What is this referring to? The ICRC's 1998 international review? Or possibly the annual report? If the international review, then page 454 does not appear to have contained any meaningful information (pages 445-453, pages 455-462), and adjacent pages don't appear to contain directly relevant information either. The 1998 annual report didn't appear to contain the needed information either. Also, it is important to note that the article's text originally read "about 100,000", but was changed mid-February by an anon, without anyone taking notice.[2]

Wikipedia's article about the Golan heights states "Between 80,000 and 109,000 of the Golan's inhabitants [...] fled or were driven out during the Six-Day War", citing Benny Morris(2001) and Report of the UN Secretary-General.

So, given all this, I believe a slight rewrite is in order. If no one opposes, I will modify the sentence to incorporate the above sources. Rami R 19:33, 20 May 2008 (UTC)

I support -- Nudve (talk) 04:30, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

The vast majority of the Syrians who fled the Golan Heights were residents of Quneitra, a city which was handed back to Syria in 1974. DrorK (talk) 07:28, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

The wiki (currently) uses the number of 80,000, using the website http://i-cias.com/e.o/golan_h.htm as a citation. I must protest; the website is clearly non-scholorly and biased. It should also be noted that Syrian settlement of the Golan was limited; following it's acquisition in 1948 of the Golan, Syria contented itself with building military facilities to defend the strategic highlands. 71.139.195.17 (talk) 02:54, 12 August 2008 (UTC)

The article on Quneitra suggests that there were about 20,000 before 1967. This Syrian site[3] says 60,000; while this one[4] says 153,000. Does anyone here have an RS on exactly how many of the refugees were from Quneitra? -- Nudve (talk) 08:35, 21 May 2008 (UTC)

The 20,000 is apparently from britannica. Anyway, I have updated the article based with the current available reliable sources. The article can be further updated, if any new reliable sources are found. Rami R 17:02, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

[Addendum] I was able to find a JSTOR article, from the Journal of Palestinian Studies ("Voices from the Golan", 2000), which put the population of the Golan at 130,000. The article then claims that only 6,000 stayed. Despite the intense bias displayed [towards the plight of the Palestinians in the face of the brutal, puppy-murdering Israelis], facts and sources relating to different numbers would be nominal. Sadly, the truth is that however many Arab dwelled in the Golan, most probably fled in a combination of fear and hate. 71.139.195.17 (talk) 03:08, 12 August 2008 (UTC)

Before / After Map?

I think this article would benefit from a before/after map showing the territorial changes as outlined in the info box. Currently:

Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt,
the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan,
and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Paulshannon (talk) 15:21, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

United Arab Emirates

I dont see how the UAE was part of the war as the country was formed in 1971. Before that it was a number of Emirates all being British protectorates with no military force other than the trucial scouts that were under British command.--81.156.165.31 (talk) 22:17, 29 May 2008 (UTC)

That's true. Plus, since the articles itself has no mention of it, it should be removed. Any objections? -- Nudve (talk) 05:18, 30 May 2008 (UTC)

Pre-Emptive Strike

The sources cited to support the idea that Israel engaged in a pre-emptive strike are dubious. The likes of "The Economist", CNN, are not the proper sources to cite because they do not specialize in the analysis of history. A draft resolution which would "vigorously condemn Israel's aggression"[5] was rejected by 57 votes against to 36 in favor with 23 abstentions. Considering that a large part of the world in 1967 condemned Israel for committing aggression, the "pre-emptive" position in no way represents a consensus; Nierva (talk) 20:30, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Not only are they reliable sources, but they also reflect the modern consensus of opinion on the subject. The proposal by the U.S.S.R. you refer to was rejected. And Egypt didn't "request" that the U.N. force leave, it ordered them out. Please don't remove properly sourced information again, thanks. Jayjg ^(talk) 01:27, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

The BBC is not an outlet that engages in the scholarly analysis of history but is merely a news outlet that reports current events. "The Economist" does not analyze history but only promotes a particular set of foreign and economic policies. None of these sources are reliable for the subject at hand. The resolution you refer to, despite being rejected, still had substantial support. The results contradict the misleading suggestion in this article that Israel engaged in a pre-emptive attack is supported by a consensus.

Concerning the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force, it was terminated by a decision of the Government of the UAR. The UNEF had entered Egyptian territory with the consent of the UAR Government and in fact could remain there only as long as that consent continued.

Your indiscriminate deletion of sourced material is provocative and at the least shows an absence of good faith.

Nierva (talk) 02:12, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

My "indiscriminate deletion of sourced material"? It was you who deleted seven reliable sources, in some bizarre attempt to suppress the majority view on this. I've restored them, of course, and added six more sources. I'll quote from one of them:

"...Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Egyptian planes as they stood on the airfields. These events triggered the so-called June war of 1967, but the pre-emptive action of Israel was not condemned by the S.C. - or indeed by the G.A. There appeared to be a general feeling, certainly shared by the Western states, that taken in the context this was a lawful use of anticipatory self-defence, and that for Israel to have waited any longer could well have been fatal to her survival." Antonio Cassese. The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force: Current Legal Regulation Vol10, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, p. 443. ISBN 9024732476

This is the view of international law on the matter by Antonio Cassese, the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia. You, by contrast, have provided this as a source [6], a Table of Contents, and this: [7] a speech by Egypt's ambassador to the U.N. And this from someone who is claiming that the BBC and The Economist are not reliable sources. If you imagine that The Economist "does not analyze history but only promotes a particular set of foreign and economic policies", what on earth do you imagine the Egyptian ambassador to the U.N. does? Please review WP:V and WP:NPOV, and do not remove the reliable sources again, nor insert the unreliable ones. Thank you. Jayjg ^(talk) 03:14, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

Even if one discounts CNN, The Economist, and the BBC (and no reasonable person will discount those three as reliable sources), the fact that the 6 Day War began with a preemptive strike is sourced to no less than 19 other sources, many of which satisfy Nierva's criteria of being "scholarly." For good measure, I'm about to add one more. --GHcool (talk) 03:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

There’s no doubt that the term “pre-emptive” is precise, appropriate and well sourced. -- Olve Utne (talk) 14:48, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

No one has disputed the reliability of the BBC and CNN. What is in dispute is the competence of these popular media organs in the analysis of history and international law. You will not find a citation of CNN in the work of a scholar in order to prove his argument that Israel launched a "pre-emptive" strike. These organs do not specialize in the analysis of history but merely report on current events in a manner that is often biased. While it's reasonable to cite these sources on current events, it is fallacious to consult them on matters of history.

Nor is anyone actually disputing belief that Israel engaged in a pre-emptive strike. This article makes a misleading attempt to show that this opinion represents a consensus when I have demonstrated the contrary. That there were 36 votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly condemning Israel for having committed aggression means that this viewpoint has to be considered. Whereas I am trying to show the perspective from the other side, many of you stubbornly insist that only one biased view has to be entertained.

A demonstration of an oppposing point of view is found in the work of the international jurist Henry Cattan who wrote:

...After the discovery of the true facts about Israel's aggression, Israel invoked two arguments to justify its launching the war. Its first argument was that it acted by way of a preventative strike which, in its view, is equivalent to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Such argument has no basis in fact or in law. In fact, Israel, as we have seen, created the crisis and attacked its neighbors. In law, the Charter recognizes the right of self-defence against an armed attack, but not a pre-emptive strike in advance of any attack. None of the Arab States had attacked or threatened to attack Israel and as D.P. O'Connell observes, the invasion of a neibhoring country's territory is not an exercise of the right of self-defence.

Nierva (talk) 20:50, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

Aside from the fact that Cattan must have a very selective reading of history (Egypt didn't threaten Israel? Really?) I think criticism and condemnation of Israel's actions have been fairly covered in the article. We can never know what Egypt, Syria, etc., would have done if Israel had not attacked first. But the term "pre-emptive" must by necessity deal with the motivation of the attack, and you don't seem to be disputing this. --Leifern (talk) 20:59, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

That is your opinion. There are other opinions that conflict with that view and they should be fairly represented. Nierva (talk) 21:06, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

But it is you who are deleting information, not me. I have not tried to omit objections of any kind to Israel's actions. Besides, it is not a matter of opinion whether Nasser threatened Israel. Here's one well-documented quote from the article itself: 'President Nasser, who had called King Hussein an "imperialist lackey" just days earlier, declared: "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."' You are also mixing up your arguments. In the introductory paragraph, the attack is merely characterized as pre-emptive and does not state whether it was "legal" or not. --Leifern (talk) 00:56, 5 June 2008 (UTC)

Other observations found in the work of the United States scholar John Quigley:

"Even if Israel had expected Egypt to attack, it is not clear a preemptive strike is lawful. The UN Charter, Article 51, characterizes armed force as defensive only if it is used in response to an "armed attack." Most states consider this language to mean that a preemptive strike is unlawful. India, for one, asserted in General Assembly discussion of the June 1967 hostilities that preemptive self-defense is not permitted under international law. Most authorities agree with that view, though some say force may be used in anticipation of an attack that has not yet occurred but is reasonably expected to occur imminently Israel did not face such a situation.

Nierva (talk) 21:32, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

Nierva commits the red herring fallacy with his/her argument above. Preemptive strikes are a complex issue in terms of legality, and perhaps an argument could be made that Israel's preemptive attack was illegal. I am not educated well enough in international law to know whether Israel's attack of Egypt was legal or not, but my guess is that it was legal since Egypt violated international law by closing the Straits of Tiran, and which any nation would interpret as a casus belli. The point is that Israel attacked preemptively regardless of whether or not it was legal to, and describing the attack as something other than a preemptive one is uncalled for. --GHcool (talk) 22:29, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

(Reset indent) Not that we should determine matters of international law here, but there is no question that a naval blockade is an act of war.--Leifern (talk) 00:58, 5 June 2008 (UTC)

The arguments raised here have not sought to dispute historical facts. Rather, they have sought to dispute the suggestion that an overwhelming consensus of scholars believe that Israel launched a pre-emptive invasion when that is clearly not the case as has been thoroughly demonstrated above. In the historiography present in many predominantly Muslim countries the view that Israel engaged in aggression is unequivocal. At best, there is a divide between those that view Israel's attack as illegal aggression and those that saw it as a pre-emptive attack.Nierva (talk) 21:59, 10 June 2008 (UTC)

No, actually, there is a strong consensus that it was a pre-emptive attack, despite the protestations of opinion pieces by Galal Nassar in Al-Ahram Weekly. Your argument assumes that the phrase "pre-emptive attack" is completely incompatible with "illegal aggression". In fact, "pre-emptive attack" is a military strategy, "illegal aggression" is a political (and sometimes legal) opinion. Jayjg ^(talk) 00:49, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

IMHO, that is exactly right. Hi again Jay, and thanks for the kind words. When one is speaking about legality, "pre-emptive" is inconsistently used with two opposite meanings. (More popularly and more recently in my OR opinion.) "preemptive" (legal) is opposed to "preventative" (illegal) , while international law literature often opposes "anticipatory self-defense" (legal) to "preemptive" (illegal). Cf the relevant pages here and their talk pages - there's a paper cited there with a helpful footnote on this point. Reading legal or older articles can be very confusing until you understand this point, and of course people aren't always talking about legality. So using the word doesn't say anything really about legality, which should be debated elsewhere. Perhaps we should be clearer that we're using it as Jayjg explains.John Z (talk) 06:13, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

Source material clearly substantiates the postulate that Israel engauged in a first strike provoked by Egyptian actions. Source: Levi Eshkol's June 4th '67 correspondence with president Johnson[8] Other Referances - Memoirs from: Avihu Bindun, Dassault Super Mystère pilot and first strike leader, 1967 U.S. Secretary of state Dean Rusk, Avey Fienberg to President Johnson at a New York Reception 24 hours before war, Memoir of Primminister Yitzhak Rabin, Journal entry by Moshe Dayan, many others.

--A. Renner (talk) 03:56, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Egypt's forces?

So what was the makeup of Egypt's forces in the Sinai? From the article, there were seven divisions. One of them was mechanized. But the article contradicts itself on the other six. Either it was four armored and two infantry, or vice versa... I don't have any references, or I'd fix it myself. 70.168.46.226 (talk) 12:20, 5 June 2008 (UTC)

Lebanon?

In my opinion, as the article and others refer to Lebanon as being neutral, showing it in the list of oponents of Israel makes no sense. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Lususromulus (talk • contribs) 16:48, 5 June 2008 (UTC)

Yes, its inclusion is just plain silly. The other combatants listed in addition to Egypt, Jordan and Syria are presently Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya and Algeria. Iraq is the only one which is at all reasonable to include. The others are about as silly as Lebanon. For the real but relatively minor Iraqi involvement, see Oren or Trevor Dupuy's Elusive Victory. Iraqi planes made a raid into Israel, and Israel bombed an Iraqi airfield. So, I changed it, with Iraq listed last and least.John Z (talk) 05:33, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

I've actually found a source that specifically states that Lebanon was not one of the countries to send troops into Israel. (Syria & Lebanon by Carter, Dunston, and Humphreys, p. 31: "Lebanon may have not sent troops to fight in the 1967 but, along with the rest of the Middle East, was profoundly affected by the conflict.") I'm going to remove them from the infobox. ← George ^[talk] 08:35, 14 July 2008 (UTC)

I don't think this is a big deal worth edit warring over, but it is certainly not "plain silly" to include Lebanon - it sent aircraft into battle, one of which (a Hunter) was shot down over Rayak. Not major involvement, to be sure, but clearly a participant in combat action. Canadian Monkey (talk) 22:33, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

I agree, it's definitely not a "plain silly" issue. Do you have any sources regarding Lebanon sending aircraft into Israel? Was it just a single aircraft? Do sources state that it was actually a "participant in combat action," or would it have just been used for reconnaissance? The article currently states "In addition, one out of 12 of Lebanon's Hunter fighters was shot down after entering Israeli airspace," but it's (a) unsourced, and (b) unclear if this is one of twelve total fighters that Lebanon had, or one of twelve fighters that entered Israeli airspace. ← George ^[talk] 22:43, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

After a little digging, I found this source, which seems to pretty much agree with any other sources I could find. It states: "On the morning of June 6th 1967 a Lebanese hunter was shot down by an Israeli Mirage IIICJ flown by Uri Even-Nir, near the Lebanon/Israel border." Unfortunately, none of the sources are specific about whether or not it was over Israeli or Lebanese airspace, and whether it was aggressive, or engaged in any "combat action" at the time, so we may never know the details for sure. ← George ^[talk] 22:52, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

here is another source for you: "During the first day of the Six Day War, a force of four Lebanese Hawker Hunter fighters ambushed 4 Israeli Mystere jets that were returning from the Golan Heights and one of the Mystere jets was brought down near the town of Nabatiye and its pilot was captured. Israel retaliated by sending four Mirage III jets and shot down a Lebanese Air Force Hunter." [9]. Canadian Monkey (talk) 23:29, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

Hmm, this sounds like quite an interesting story. Can you find anything to confirm this from a reliable source? Or even to confirm that one of the pilots was captured - that should have made some headlines for sure. Unfortunately http://www.lebaneseairforce.info/ this website] is just one person's personal account of the history of the Lebanese army, and it's not clear that that person is an expert on the subject. When they're basically saying that a published book on the subject is wrong (in the paragraph precedeing the one you quoted), we definitely need some independent confirmation. ← George ^[talk] 23:52, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

I am the owner of www.lebaneseairforce.info and I can clarify a few points regarding the Israeli Mystere story. It is not clear how the Mystere was brought down. The Lebanese Air Force says that they have not opened fire on Israeli jets but they did scramble with them a few times. The Mystere could have been downed due to damages sustained over Golan or even by Lebanese ground fire. The Israeli air force operations over Golan was probably causing annoyance for the Lebanese. The Mystere story can be found on the front pages of Lebanese dailies that day and if anyone has access, can read about it and a photo of Lebanese soldiers by the jet is also included. I have seen and read An-Nahar but I don't have it. Also, I can't tell the mystery surrounding this subject and I think a lot more research is needed. Lebanon didn't go into war after the cabinet voted against it the very day the war started and I doubt that any Lebanese jets violated Israeli airspace. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Vatche (talk • contribs) 06:29, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Quigly

Recent edits by Nierva have introduced a number of POV changes to the article, most of them cited to Quigly. The link provided does not work, and in any case, no page number is given. I am therefor removing these POV edits, and restoring previous consensus version. Please discuss any changes here, giving the exact page number in Quigly. Canadian Monkey (talk) 01:19, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

You have provided no evidence or argument to explain why the edits are POV. Page numbers should have been given; the information is not difficult to find with the aid of Google Books. The given information is drawn from pages 158-164, as far as I can tell. Some of the language is problematic; "After threatening to invade Syria" in particular does not seem to be supported by the book. The closest I can find is a public declaration by then-IDF Chief of Staff Rabin that Israel could not be secure until the Syrian government was overthrown. Much of the language was not problematic, and seems to me to be a valuable counterbalance to the sort of Abba Eban-Michael Oren melodramatic nonsense about Israel being "strangled" by the Straits closure. <eleland/talkedits> 02:03, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

Here are a few reasons why the changes were POV. The original text had given the time-line, correctly, as Egypt mobilizing and expelling the UNEF on May 16, as a reaction to already existing Israeli-Syrian tension, followed by Israeli mobilization on the 19th. The change "cites" an alleged Israeli threat to occupy Syria on the 19th (which you acknowledge is not supported by the reference) as the first action. Then come numerous "rationalizations" for why the Egyptian blockade of Tiran wasn't "that bad", complete with editorializing on why this was fair and reasonable. You are welcome to your opinion that a respected historian such as Oren is engaged in "melodramatic nonsense", but just like the article does not include claims that Israel was being "strangled" by the Straits closure, it will not include the equally nonsensical language of apologists such as Quigley who are eager to defend violations of international law. Canadian Monkey (talk) 02:21, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

A sufficient justification for the deletions made by the user above have not been provided. To describe in detail the decisions taken by the UAR Government concerning its territorial waters in Tiran hardly qualifies as a biased addition. What is biased is to omit important pieces of information concerning the measures taken by the UAR Government and the effects it could have had towards Israel. You are entitled to your opinion of John Quigley as an "apologist", but this should not dictate the content in this article. The motive of these deletions seem to be less concerned with abiding by Wikipedia guidelines than pushing an unattractive agenda.Nierva (talk) 00:04, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

You are incorrect. I have described exactly why your edits were POV, and eleland agreed that your claim that Israel was threatening to occupy Syria was unsupported by your reference. The material about the utilization of the Eilat port is already in the article, there's a limit to how much space should be given to this type of apologia. Canadian Monkey (talk) 01:53, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

List of sources

FYI, a list of sources on this subject can be found here: [10]. Cla68 (talk) 03:37, 14 August 2008 (UTC)

Photograph

Hi. I've not read the article yet, so I'm not going to comment on the neutrality of the text.

However, having glanced at the article it seems somewhat strange to me that the only photograph of combatants is quite an "artistic" one of noble-looking IDF troops. Not only that, but it is sourced from the Israeli government's website and the description notes that its use has been widespread in Israeli media and culture: clearly it has significant sentimental/symbolic/propagandic value for the Israeli side of the conflict.

Now, I'm not saying that this means it should be removed from the article - on the contrary, it seems like a very appropriate image to include. What I find peturbing is that in the rest of the article there is not a single image of Arab troops, even though it seems from the troop numbers cited in the article that there were twice as many Arabs as Israelis involved in the conflict. To a casual observer such as myself, who knows nothing about the conflict, this gives the impression of bias to the article before I've even started reading it, though it might turn out to be completely objective military history.

Perhaps somebody with better knowledge of the subject than me (and indeed more wikipedia experience!) could find an appropriate photograph to balance this one? Davidkleinfeld (talk) 15:07, 29 September 2008 (UTC)

I have not contributed to this article, nor edited it. However, in reviewing the article history, it appears that other picture(s) were removed because of copyright concerns. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.23.182.212 (talk) 06:25, 30 December 2008 (UTC)

"Disputed", Israel's refusal to host UNEF

It is a fact that UNEF was tasked, in part, with supervising the withdrawal of Israeli, British, and French forces that had invaded Egyptian territory. The General Assembly plan called for UNEF to deploy on both sides of the armistice line, but Israel refused to allow UNEF to deploy on their side. The Secretary General offered to redeploy UNEF to Israel's side of the border ten years later, after Israel's ambassador objected to the withdrawal of the force from Egyptian territory.

Some of the editors object to adding that information to the introduction without a full explanation as to why Nasser asked UNEF to go home after 10 years, or why Israel refused to host UNEF. So, the current introduction to the article expresses a commonly-held POV that the withdrawal of UNEF and/or the deployment of Egyptian forces to positions in their own territory somehow threatened Israel and triggered a crisis that served as a casus belli.

That particular theory has been publicly discredited by many observers, including Yitzhak Rabin, who served as the Chief of the General Staff for Israel during the war. In an interview published in Le Monde, on February 28 1968, he explained:

"I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it." cited in One Land, Two Peoples, by Deborah J. Gerner, Page 112

The same page explains that (a) President Johnson told Abba Eban that the CIA, the National Security Council, and the State Department had each investigated and concluded that no Egyptian attack was imminent; and (b)that Menachem Begin admitted "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."

Wikiquotes carries a variation of the Rabin quote under 'Sourced'. The only minor difference being 'We did not...' vs. 'I do not'...and etc. and a verbatim copy of the Begin quote under 'Sourced', Begin Speech at National Defense College, The New York Times, August 11, 1982, p. A6

The Terrorist Conjunction: The United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, and Al-Qā'ida, By Alfred G. Gerteiny, and Jean Ziegler, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, ISBN 0275996433, page 142, quotes General Matityahu Peled: "The thesis that the danger of genocide was hanging over us in June 1967 and that Israel was fighting for its physical existence is only bluff, which was born and developed after the war. ... ...To pretend that the Egyptian forces massed on our frontiers were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this sort of situation, but above all an insult to the Zahal (Israeli military), from Ha’aretz, March 19, 1972.

The Making of Resolution 242, by Sydney Dawson Bailey, page 21-22, says: "Thant (UN Secretary General U Thant) raised with Gideon Raphael the possibility of deploying UNEF on the Israeli side of the armistice demarcation line, but this was rejected by Israel as 'entirely unacceptable".... The author observes that alone wouldn't have opened the Suez Canal or Straits of Tiran, but explains: ..."it would have interposed a symbolic barrier to Egyptian military threats from Sinai"... and that ..."Thant believed that if only Israel had decided otherwise, 'the course of history would have been different.'"

An unclassified report to the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations, S/7906, 26 May 1967, explained:

6. It may be relevant to note here that UNEF functioned exclusively on the United Arab Republic side of the Line in a zone from which the armed forces of the United Arab Republic had voluntarily stayed away for over ten years. It was this arrangement which allowed UNEF to function as a buffer and as a restraint on infiltration. When this arrangement lapsed United Arab Republic troops moved up to the Line as they had every right to do.

7. If UNEF had been deployed on both sides of the Line as originally envisaged in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, its buffer function would not necessarily have ended. However, its presence on the Israel side of the Line has never been permitted. The fact that UNEF was not stationed on the Israel side of the Line was a recognition of the unquestioned sovereign right of Israel to withhold its consent for the stationing of the Force. The acquiescence in the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the Force after ten and a half years on United Arab Republic soil was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of the United Arab Republic. In no official document relating to UNEF has there been any suggestion of a limitation of this sovereign authority'.... ...'President Nasser and Foreign Minister Riad assured me that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. Their general aim, as stated to me, was for a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.'

These are significant facts and viewpoints that have been published in reliable sources. harlan (talk) 10:02, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

Regarding your points:

1) You have not given any credible explanation as to why "Nasser asked UNEF to go home after 10 years" - in reality, Nasser unilaterally pushing UNEF out on short notice.

2) By the time war broke out the Egyptians had 7 divisions, not 2, massed on the border, and the revisionist political view that Nasser was merely posturing, along with cherry-picked out-of-context quotes from Israeli leaders, can certainly be discussed in the article, but the overwhelming view at the time, and since, was that Nasser's re-militarization of the Sinai, massing troops, concluding pacts with Jordan and Syria, etc., combined with his belligerent rhetoric indicating Israel's imminent destruction, indicated a credible threat to Israel. The CIA's and NSA's assessments have been discussed elsewhere on this page, please review those discussions.

3) Wikiquotes is the weakest English language Wiki we have; please don't bother referring to it again.

4) Your inclusion did not, for example, give Israel's reasons for not wanting UNEF troops on its own territories; the article does give the detail.

5) The detail in general, including the revisionist apologia for Nasser's actions, can certainly go in the body of the article, but it has no place in the lede, which is a summary of uncontested facts. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:13, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

In no particular order:

Nasser couldn't 'unilaterally' decide to force UNEF out of the region. He needed Israel to serve as a willing partner in the accomplishment of that task. The introduction fails to make any mention of the Israeli decisions in the matter. In other words, the introduction isn't a summary of uncontested facts. You appear to be working quite assiduously to prevent the mere mention in the lead that Israel might have shunned its responsibility under the original General Assembly plan to host half of the UNEF forces on their side of the armistice line, and of their subsequent refusal to permit any portion of the force to redeploy there. After discovering those details a reasonable reader might agree with U Thant that if Israel had only decided otherwise, the course of history would have been different.

Israel asserted its 'sovereign right' as the justification for its original decision not to host peacekeepers from any country. That objection was raised before UNEF forces (as such) from any friendly or 'unfriendly nations' ever arrived. It is self-serving to suggest that Israel had to attack because the UNEF was withdrawn, or that Israel suddenly had concerns about the composition of the peacekeeping force that had been employed on the Egyptian side all along. Israeli intransigence helped create those supposedly dire circumstances.

U Thant's unclassified report supplies a credible explanation of Nasser's request for UNEF's withdrawal, the desire to return to the status quo ante with both sides observing the terms of the armistice. Egypt had already hosted a force of unwelcome foreigners, on a 'temporary mission', for ten and a half years after it had been invaded. Israel, given the same choice, had refused to tolerate those same peacekeepers for so much as one minute. If you want to start a wild goose chase for a more 'credible explanation' than that, the burden of conducting it is yours.

The 'Diplomacy and intelligence assessments section' of the article already reports (with admirable NPOV equivocation) that Nasser may have wanted a negotiated settlement: "U Thant, visited Cairo for mediation and recommended moratorium in the Straits of Tiran and a renewed diplomatic effort to solve the crisis. Egypt agreed and Israel rejected these proposals. Nasser's concessions do not necessarily suggest that he was making a concerted effort to avoid war." and: "The U.S. also tried to mediate and Nasser agreed to send his vice-president to Washington to explore a diplomatic settlement. The meeting did not happen because Israel launched its offensive."

I supplied more than one reliable published source for each of the quotations in order to dispell any misgivings about the use Wikiquotes. You are free to supply some cherry-picked quotations of your own regarding the importance these same men attached to the Egyptian troop build-up, or the withdrawal of UNEF.

U Thant's report and President Johnson's assessment of the situation can hardly be labeled 'revisionist'. They were submitted on the same day - just prior to the war. The article states that Abba Eban felt the Israeli government assessment delivered during his visit to Washington was 'An act of momentous irresponsibility... eccentric... ...lacked wisdom, veracity and tactical understanding. Nothing was right about it.' Characterizing Menachem Began, and General Peled as historical revisionists doesn't really change the fact that both men were talking about all of the Egyptian forces you have mentioned, and that neither seriously believed that Nasser was going to launch an offensive against Israel. Your claim that the overwhelming view at the time, and since, was that Nasser's re-militarization posed a grave threat amounts to the use of weasel words or concensus in an apparent attempt to forestall the inclusion of a substantial and well published point of view. In light of the fact that the statements I quoted were made by the leaders themselves, including: U Thant, Nasser, Johnson, Rabin, Begin, Peled, et al the possibility exists that the overwhelming majority of us were misled or kept in the dark. harlan (talk) 02:42, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Regarding Nasser not being able to unilaterally force the U.N. "out of the region", that's nonsense, of course. Using the weasel term "the region", you attempt to draw Israel into the issue. However, the fact remains, the UNEF had been in the demilitarized zone, manning its posts, until the Egyptian army swept in and occupied them, so they certainly were forced to withdraw from posts they were manning. Also nonsense is the claim "that Israel had to attack because the UNEF was withdrawn, or that Israel suddenly had concerns about the composition of the peacekeeping force that had been employed on the Egyptian side all along." No-one is claiming that except, perhaps, you. Israel attacked because Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran, filled the airwaves with belligerent rhetoric stating he was going to destroy Israel, and massed 7 divisions comprising almost 100,000 troops and 1000 tanks on the border. Regarding Johnson's view, again, please review previous discussions on the page; just because the CIA didn't think an attack was imminent, it doesn't mean that an attack wasn't imminent. The CIA and NSA have gotten things wrong before, and they hardly had the same amount at stake as Israel if they got it wrong. And finally, Israeli officials have said all sorts of things, some of which were meant to serve internal political interests, and some of which have been taken out of context. They have been used to create a revisionist view of the war which was not held by at the time, nor is it commonly held today, except among the revisionist "Israel is the root of all evil in the Middle East" crowd. Their view should and does get an airing, but the conspiracy theories don't belong in the lead alongside actual facts. Jayjg ^(talk) 03:42, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Despite all of those equivocations, the quotes are genuine and belong in any NPOV article about the war. The fact that the General Assembly plan called for UNEF to be deployed on both sides of the border makes it regional deployment and the details of Israeli refusal to cooperate with the plan belong in the article for the same reason. harlan (talk) 04:10, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

If you want to talk about exactly how the G.A. plan was originally implemented 10 years before the Six-Day War, the place for that is in an article on the plan, or perhaps in Suez Crisis#Introduction of UN peacekeepers. As for the quotes may be genuine, but they're primary sources being used to advance an . If you want to build a case that Egypt had no intention of attacking, then please find some reliable historians who hold this POV/make this argument, and include that POV/argument in the body of the text, where it belongs. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:17, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

The Secretary General's conclusions about the consequences of the failure to implement the original General Assembly UNEF deployment plan are contained in his own words in a report submitted to the Security Counsel just days before the war. He brought the issue up because it was still relevant. The Israeli and Egyptian sovereign right of consent was not dispositive. The Security Council is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter to enforce peace when faced with threats or breaches of peace or with acts of aggression. They could have authorized the use of force to impose a deployment of UN forces on both sides of the armistice line, so it wasn't a 10 year old issue at all.

In the field of international law, articles such as United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent and The Withdrawal of UNEF And a New Notion of Consent recognize the fact that UNEF could not legally stay and operate once Egypt's consent was withdrawn. They suggest that "consent" and the Good Faith Accords of 1956 between Egypt and the United Nations should have been ignored and a new definition of consent be developed in the future. That rationale applies with equal force to the Israeli right of consent. The Six Day War article contains many footnotes to editorials, books, magazines, and online resources like the Jewish Virtual Library Fact sheet #52 which make similar suggestions or claim that agreements to consult the General Assembly prior to any withdrawal may have been violated. The Secretary General's report addresses all of those issues.

As a result, clarifications seem to be in order for the "Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force" section of the article. UNEF operated under a Chapter VI mandate. In describing the principles of the UNEF Model, Frederick H. Fleitz explained that the most important principle was obtaining consent, and that Israel had refused to permit UNEF troops on its territory or behind its armistice lines. After Egypt voiced concerns over consent, UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld had agreed it was an absolute condition (under Chapter VI), and entered into several bilateral agreements which were endorsed by the General Assembly November 7, 1956 (The Good Faith Accord of 1956). Under the terms of those agreements, UNEF could not stay or operate in Egypt if Egypt's consent was withdrawn; Acceptance of UNEF would not submit Egypt to any external control or infringe on its sovereignty; and UNEF was to be a temporary operation. see Principles of UNEF Model, Consent, page 39

The UN did not carry out those principles. For example, Dr. Anthony Best explains that when Nasser sent troops into the Sinai on 14 May, he asked for a partial withdrawal of UNEF forces. The UN did nothing, and responded by insisting he choose between no withdrawal or complete withdrawal. see International History of the Twentieth Century, page 409. Fleitz explains that unlike Hammarskjöld, U Thant did not think consent was absolutely necessary. He points out that despite Cairo's request for complete withdrawal on 16 May 1967, Thant resisted withdrawing UNEF even after Egyptian forces had overrun their positions. see Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s, page 41

The quotations for the Israeli politicians and generals were all taken from published secondary sources. The authors of those works include visiting scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior lecturers on history at major universities, a UN Special Rapporteur, and a university Middle Eastern Affairs department head. The responsible Israeli leaders and generals were stating their own conclusions after the fact, so no one is drawing inferences, or employing some sort of synthesis in violation of a Wikipedia guideline to substitute their own opinions.

The thesis that the Egyptian deployment in the Sinai threatened Israel's survival has been a dead duck for a long time. In 1972, Time magazine reported that former chief of staff of the armed forces, Haim Bar-Lev (a deputy chief during the war) had stated: "the entrance of the Egyptians into Sinai was not a casus belli." In the same article General Peled, the chief of logistics for the Army during the war, claimed the survival argument was "a bluff which was born and developed only after the war... ..."When we spoke of the war in the General Staff, we talked of the political ramifications if we didn't go to war —what would happen to Israel in the next 25 years. Never of survival today." see: Was the War Necessary? harlan (talk) 18:33, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

I'm not sure how your points in any way even respond to mine, much less contradict them. Whether or not Egypt really meant its threats to destroy Israel, or whether or not Israeli leaders really believed them, is a point for discussion in the article. By the way, in 1973 Israel thought its Bar Lev line was impregnable; within 6 hours of attacking Egypt had 5 divisions and 400 tanks through the line, with almost no losses. So much for military assurances. Jayjg ^(talk) 02:54, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

You keep restoring an argumentative intro which claims that UNEF was expelled. The facts are that Nasser only requested a partial withdrawal of UNEF, and that the UN Secretary General gave him the choice of either no withdrawal, or a complete withdrawal. In any event, UNEF was still in-country on their main operating bases when the war started. They were planning on a phased redeployment with an estimated completion date of 30 June 1967. William Dutch noted that in 1967 the IDF drove through the remnants of UNEF at the start of the third Israeli-Arab war (see The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, page 17). The UN Yearbook also notes that the UNEF commander had reported a strafing incident on 5 June 1967 in which Israeli aircraft killed three Indian soldiers and wounded several others. Those peacekeepers weren't 'expelled', they were either overrun or mistakenly attacked by the IDF. harlan (talk) 01:50, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

Actually, you keep inserting the whitewashed intro that Nasser "requested" the UNEF withdraw, when in reality he demanded they withdraw, and militarily re-occupied their posts, so that when they showed up to man them, the found Egyptian troops had taken charge. As the U.N. itself reports, while U Thant was attempting to negotiate with the Egyptians, "the Egyptian Foreign Minister in Cairo summoned representatives of nations with troops in UNEF to inform them that UNEF had terminated its tasks in Egypt and the Gaza Strip and must depart forthwith... The same day, 18 May, Egyptian soldiers prevented UNEF troops from entering their posts." Also, note these sources in the article:

• "In 1967, Egypt ordered the UN troops out and blocked Israeli shipping routes - adding to already high levels of tension between Israel and its neighbours." Israel and the Palestinians in depth, 1967: Six Day War, BBC website. URL accessed May 14, 2006.
• "Buoyed by the almost universal Arab acclaim he received for his actions, Nasser expelled the UNEF forces and announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran" Robert Owen Freedman. World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Pergamon Press, 1979, p. 79.
• "The Israeli attack ended a nerve-wracking three weeks of waiting... begun when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser expelled the United Nations peacekeepers from the Gaza Strip and the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula, blockaded the nearby Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships, and deployed his massive army along the Israeli border." Dan Perry, Alfred Ironside. Israel and the Quest for Permanence, McFarland, 1999, p. 18.
• "Soon after Nasser expelled UN forces from the Sinai, Secretary of State Dean Rusk directed State Department officials in Washington, New York, and Moscow to urge the Soviets to restrain their Arab friends." Nigel John Ashton. Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p. 18.
• "Nasser... closed the Gulf of Aqaba to shipping, cutting off Israel from its primary oil supplies. He told U.N. peacekeepers in the Sinai Peninsula to leave. He then sent scores of tanks and hundreds of troops into the Sinai closer to Israel. The Arab world was delirious with support," The Mideast: A Century of Conflict Part 4: The 1967 Six Day War, NPR morning edition, October 3, 2002. URL accessed May 14, 2006.
• "...a Middle East crisis erupted on May 16, 1967, when Nasser expelled the UN troops that had policed the Sinai since the end of the Suez-Sinai War in 1957." Peter L. Hahn. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945, Potomac Books, 2005 , p.50.
• "In May, 1967 President Nasser expelled UNEF from Egypt and set in train the events that precipitated Israel's blitzkrieg invasion and conquest of the Sinai." J. L. Granatstein. Canadian Foreign Policy: Historical Readings, Copp Clark Pitman, 1986, p. 236.

Please stop changing wording to suit your views, rather than what reliable sources say. Jayjg ^(talk) 02:27, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

I've done nothing to prevent you or anyone else from including material you consider relevant. I do happen to consider the fact that the IDF drove through the remnants of the UNEF force at the start of the war quite relevant. I've been trying to add material, not delete it. You on the other hand have taken on the role of a self-appointed gatekeeper bent on deleting kilobytes of very well sourced material, while accusing everyone (but yourself) of perpetrating 'a whitewash'.

As for changing the wording. I did change the word "expelled" to "requested withdrawal". According to U Thant's official report and the other letter cited in the article, those were the actual words used by the Egyptian government. You initially asked me to supply material on Nasser's motive, and then deleted it when I complied with your request. Nasser wanted the withdrawal of UNEF, a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956, and full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 between Egypt and Israel. That was all contained in U Thant's report which I cited. It was also contained in the reliable sources like Frederick H. Fleitz who explained the legal situation and the stages in the negotiations. In any event many of the 3,378 military personnel assigned to UNEF were unable to leave on short notice and were still in Egypt when the war actually started. The complete withdrawal wasn't scheduled for completion until 30 June 1967. Most readers would understand "expelled" to mean the UNEF were no longer present.

There had been no peace treaty after 1949 war or the Suez Crisis. It was not an irrelevant fact under international law that Israel had stopped observing the terms of the armistice agreements, or that it had been conducting covert military operations targeting the canal zone, while issuing public denials. You also took it upon yourself to delete the quoted post-war threat assessments of Rabin, Begin, Bar-Lev, and Peled in what appears to be an act of outright censorship. I believe it is time to tag this article as POV. harlan (talk) 04:05, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Here from Wikipedia:Third opinion. seems that there are multiple reliable sources stating that Nasser "expelled" or "order out" the UN troops, so per, WP:V, that is the term that should be used in the article. NoCal100 (talk) 05:05, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

With all due respect, the term "ordered out" has never been used, as yet, in the article. In any event, the dispute here is over the massive deletion of well-sourced verifiable material on numerous occasions. harlan (talk) 06:29, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

This appears to be a fourth opinion by this point, but I agree as well. Very strong and reliable sourcing has been presented supporting that Nasser did in fact expel the peacekeepers. The sources presented to refute this are largely primary and therefore not nearly so reliable, and I also don't think they're unambiguous enough to fit our normal requirements for the use of primary sources. I therefore see no problem with the lead section stating that there was an expulsion, as that position appears to be well supported. Seraphimblade ^{Talk to me} 07:52, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Begging your pardon, but the original dispute was, and still is, over a series of arbitrary deletions of material from scholarly WP:V secondary sources, i.e. The Making of Resolution 242, by Sydney Dawson Bailey; International History of the Twentieth Century, by Anthony Best; Peacekeeping Fiascoes, by Frederick H. Fleitz; The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, By William Durch; and etc. The UN Yearbook is a reference work published by the United Nations Information Service. Those secondary sources also happen to be supported by the primary source document - U Thant's report. Picking a WP:V source while excluding all others in order to craft a "master narrative" is a violation of the more fundamental WP:NPOV policy. harlan (talk) 16:18, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Section Break This Dispute is over Censorship

After a lengthy discussion here, I added these well-sourced quotations from WP:V secondary sources only to have them deleted:

After the war Yitzhak Rabin, who had served as the Chief of the General Staff for Israel during the war stated: "I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it." Menachem Begin stated that "The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him." [61] both men quoted in One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict Over Palestine, By Deborah J. Gerner PhD, Westview Press, 1994, ISBN 0813321808, Page 112

Former Chief of Staff of the armed forces, Haim Bar-Lev (a deputy chief during the war) had stated: "the entrance of the Egyptians into Sinai was not a casus belli." Major General Mattityahu Peled, the Chief of Logistics for the Armed Forces during the war, claimed the survival argument was "a bluff which was born and developed only after the war... ..."When we spoke of the war in the General Staff, we talked of the political ramifications if we didn't go to war —what would happen to Israel in the next 25 years. Never of survival today." [62] both men were quoted in "Was the War Necessary?", Time Magazine. Peled also stated that "To pretend that the Egyptian forces massed on our frontiers were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this sort of situation, but above all an insult to the Zahal (Israeli military)[63] quoted from 'The Terrorist Conjunction: The United States, the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, by Alfred G. Gerteiny, and Jean Ziegler, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, ISBN 0275996433, page 142 harlan (talk) 15:22, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

If Harlan were really interested in neutrality, rather than just finding secondary sources that included the specific quotes you were so keen on inserting into the article, you would instead have actually reproduced the thrust of the arguments the sources were using. Deborah J. Gerner, for example, suggests that it is unlikely that Nasser was actually going to attack Israel. However, she also points out that Nasser was engaged in brinkmanship in an "attempt to improve its standing in the Arab world and to humiliate Israel by forcing it to accept what it said it would not accept—the renewed closure of the Strait of Tiran". Someone interested in NPOV would have edited to include that view. By the way, Alfred G. Gerteiny reproduces a WP:FRINGE theory that "the Zionist lobby" and Israel are responsible for just about all Arab terrorism, among other things; certainly a view that's widely held among a certain segment of the world's population, but not nearly as widely held among respected historians of the topic. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:09, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Looks to me as if Harlan has excellent material that belongs in the article. As it currently reads, it is absurdly POV, giving the impression that it was Egypt's belligerence that caused the war, which I'm fairly certain is outrageously ridiculous. Dayan and Ben-Gurion were itching for this war and committed constant provocations. Nasser was no more than foolishly provocative in return. PR^talk 19:05, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

I've tried to include quotations from very well known news accounts which first appeared in Ha'aretz, Time Magazine, and Le Monde. Employing ad hominem fallacies in an attempt to discredit me, Gerteiny, Wikiquote, and etc. which merely cite those interviews is illogical. I'm taking a break, but will return to this matter in a few weeks. harlan (talk) 22:50, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Straits of Tiran

I have shortened this section because it is too long and incoherent. Information about when Egypt signed a treaty is irrelevant to the discussion. The section needs to get to the point.

The statements: "However, it has long been a part of state practice and customary international law that ships of all states have a right of innocent passage through territorial seas." and "This is however, contentious..." amount to original research that seek to prove a point instead of citing the views of scholars.Nierva (talk) 19:38, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

While some of your points may be valid, even your most recent edit removed one side of the argument while maintaining the other, and removed the straightforward fact that Israel cited international law in its 1957 statements. I've cleaned that up for you, and as a bonus, cleaned up some copyright violations - a direct copy of entire sentences from a source, for example. Jayjg ^(talk) 20:10, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Nierva is a sock of Jacob Peters (talk · contribs). YellowMonkey (click here to chose Australia's next top model!) 00:41, 14 October 2008 (UTC)

Regarding bias

"The aftermath of the war is also of religious significance. Under Jordanian rule, Jews and many Christians[136] were forbidden from entering the Old City of Jerusalem, which included the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest site. Jewish sites were not maintained, and their cemeteries had been desecrated. After the annexation to Israel, each religious group was granted administration over their holy sites. Despite the Temple Mount's importance in Jewish tradition, the al-Aqsa Mosque is under sole administration of a Muslim Waqf, and Jews are barred from conducting services there.[137]"

Overall, I found the article to be not overly slanted toward Israel, but this paragraph seemed to overstate the religious importance of these places for Jews ("Judaism's holiest site", "importance in Jewish tradition" ") while not once mentioning Islamic tradition or the importance of the Temple Mount for them. I think a more balanced article would include a statement of that nature, and possibly a mention of the Western Wall incident. Untwirl (talk) 04:56, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

Suez Crisis

The article implies that Egypt violated international law or the applicable treaties without mentioning their repeated requests for adjudication and requests that Israel stop acting as a belligerent and readopt the terms of the 1949 armistice agreement.

Israel had not been complying with the terms of the applicable UN resolutions or the 1949 Armistice agreements before the Suez Crisis or the 1967 war. It had stopped participating in the Mixed Armistice Commission meetings in 1951, and had been carrying out belligerent acts inside Egypt. When Israeli military intelligence agents were captured, Israel issued public denials of any wrongdoing. On the basis of those allegations, Egypt had requested a world court opinion on the legality of its refusal to permit Israeli shipping to pass through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The covert operations were subsequently confirmed during the Lavon Affair. The doctrine of servitude that developed in the colonial era depends on friendly relations. In practice, it has never been extended to belligerent parties. For example Great Britain violated the neutrality and militarized the Suez Canal zone during both world wars. The Panama Canal treaty adopts the terms of passage from the Treaty of Constantinople by reference. Nonetheless, the U.S. had closed the Panama Canal to belligerents during World War II, and went so far as impounding an Italian cruise ship and placing the crew in an internment camp. harlan (talk) 18:18, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

If anything was violated, it was the resolution to place the United Nations Emergency Force in 1957. Everybody knew that the 1949 Armistice agreements were dead long before 1967. So why is it relevant? -- Nudve (talk) 18:43, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

The article has to present Egyptian and Israeli points of view, it does not have to adjudicate them. Egypt did complain about Israeli espionage and it did request a world court opinion according to several published accounts. harlan (talk) 20:04, 15 November 2008 (UTC)

No, actually, the article has to present what reliable sources say on the matter, not your personal views. You've been told before that your sources have to refer to the Six-Day War to be relevant, you can't invent your own timeline of what you consider to be relevant events. Jayjg ^(talk) 02:18, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Jayjg, alleged violations of the terms of the 1949 armistice agreements were part Egypt's justification for closing the canal and the straits prior to both the Suez crisis, and the 1967 war. The article already has a section on the Suez Crisis, because Israel invaded Egypt, not because I invented some timeline. I suspect that you would like it even less if I followed the ones provided in the UN yearbooks.

In this instance I cited material regarding the UN peace efforts from 'The Elusive Peace in the Middle East', Malcolm H. Kerr, SUNY Press, 1975, ISBN 0873953053, page 97. They were not my personal views. It seems that he also happened to believe that if peacekeepers could be placed on both sides of the borders they would be better able to prevent incidents, as well as wars. See page 92 of his book. I presume he qualifies as a reliable source. He was the president of the American University in Beirut, and had studied there and at Harvard, Cambridge, Oxford, and Johns Hopkins - where he earned his PhD. He had also served as the chair of the Political Science Department at UCLA. His biography is available online here http://www.mesa.arizona.edu/excellence/kerrbio.htm harlan (talk) 05:43, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

If Egypt cited the 1949 armistice agreements as its reason, then this is relevant, but not stories about the Lavon affair and the 1951 Mixed Armistice Commission meetings. Malcolm H. Kerr's views may be correct, but are speculative. According to Michael Oren (I believe in the English edition it should be around pages 69-70), Ralph Bunche denied that a request for replacement in Gaza or Sharm a-Sheikh was made, and that for U Thant, any request for a change in UNEF's deployment was tantamount to a demand for its complete removal. -- Nudve (talk) 06:11, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

I mentioned the fact that Israel stopped attending the Mixed Armistice meetings in 1951. They didn't participate after the Suez Crisis either. Both Egypt and the UN mentioned the need for compliance in that area during the security council hearings. In the absence of an armistice or a peace treaty, the question before the Security Council boiled-down to a dispute over Egypt's right to secure the canal and their territory. I didn't include any "stories" about the Lavon Affair. I mentioned that an Israeli Committee tasked with investigating it had found that in 1954 cables had been sent to Israeli military intelligence teams operating in Egypt requesting that they report on the possibility of operations in the canal zone. Egypt had captured the teams and turned their trials into a public spectacle. harlan (talk) 14:45, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

The article is about the Six-Day War, not a reprise of every twist and turn of Arab-Israeli politics from 1949 onwards. The Suez Crisis is quite relevant, because that's what led to the UNEF being in the Sinai, and also has implications regarding the closing of the Straits of Tiran. The rest is just POV-bloat. Jayjg ^(talk) 18:05, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

The intro starts with UNEF, while the UN Yearbook, Dr Anthony's International History of the Twentieth Century (page 409), and Tom Segev's "1967" start with the downing of the Syrian MIGs, i.e. Eshkol's Aide-de-Camp, General Yisrael Lior, wrote that "From my point of view, the Six Day War had begun. see 1967, page 212.

I see. The downing of the MIGs was in 1967, though, not 1956. I'm not sure what you are suggesting for the article. Jayjg ^(talk) 23:20, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

On 30 May 1967, Prime Minister Eshkol promised President Johnson that he would wait two weeks to see if negotiations could resolve the crisis with Egypt. That was after the Egyptian troop build-up. see For the President's Eyes Only, Christopher Andrew, HarperCollins, 1996, ISBN 0060921781, page 333. The article should supply some information on the reasons the General Staff ordered the pre-emptive strike after those assurances were given, since afterward none of them attributed their motivation to concern over the Egyptian troop build-up. According several published reports, after the overflight of Dimona, they were worried about their hands being tied by a world ultimatum. One of those reports contains extensive quotes on the subject from Rabin, and et. al.. It also mentions that in the year and a half prior to the Six-Day War, Mossad Chief General Meir Amit promoted the establishment of a direct, secret channel with Egypt that had started in an effort to release the imprisoned Israeli spies, but that Amit was pushing to turn it into a regular channel for diplomacy between the two states. see Crossing the Threshold: The Untold Nuclear Dimension of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and Its Contemporary Lessons, by Avner Cohen harlan (talk) 18:52, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

O.K. What about the costs to the Israeli economy on maintaining all the reserves on alert? Israel has a fairly small standing army. Jayjg ^(talk) 23:20, 16 November 2008 (UTC)

Lead image

I added a new section about the paratrooper photo in the infobox in order to satisfy WP:NFCC, specifically point 8 which states that non-free images can only be used when they are essential to the reader's understanding. In fact, it had been already been nominated for deletion once on those grounds. Since that time, no additional commentary on the photo has ever been added to this article. I think my addition should satisfy our policy. However, User:Jheald makes the point on my talk page that it's customary for non-free media to be used right at the point in the text where it's mentioned, and he's correct -- that's where it should be. So the question becomes, what can we put in the infobox (if anything) to replace it? howcheng {chat} 19:40, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

What if we put this in an endnote in the caption? -- Nudve (talk) 19:57, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

Sounds reasonable. Canadian Monkey (talk) 00:16, 4 December 2008 (UTC)

Done. I figured that since the article already has a few very long footnotes, there's no need for a more compliacted endnote. -- Nudve (talk) 07:27, 4 December 2008 (UTC)

Casualty totals

The Israeli casualties don't add up. Under "Preliminary air attack" it says 26 of theirs were downed, but the itemisation totals 27; and under "Casualties", it says 800 soldiers were killed, with the itemisation totalling 1,029. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mathemancer (talk • contribs) 03:24, 5 January 2009 (UTC)

I was just about to make a comment on that. The line currently reads "The following casualties are as confirmed by Israel: 800 Israeli soldiers were killed, 338 on the Egyptian front, 550 on the Jordanian front, and 141 on the Syrian front;" which simply is an illogical statement. Does anyone know the actual amount killed? 98.230.33.45 (talk) 13:43, 22 January 2009 (UTC)

"Defensible borders"

This article states that the concept of "defensible borders" was not mentioned or known in 1967, without any further explanation. This suggests (to me) that the goal of "having defensible borders" was later used by Israel as justification for the 1967 war, is this true? At any rate, this quote in the article needs to be explained to uninformed readers like me, because it looks like one half of the story to me.

(Yes,I am that badly informed.)

Also, it seems to me that the section "Egypt and Jordan" should be clarified, in particular the text "At the end of May". Was this before or after the Soviets told Nasser not to start a war on May 27? Moreover, the section on Egypt and Jordan does not mention at all that the Soviets 'cancelled' the war (please excuse my frivolous wording), and instead only talks about increasing war preparations and the (implied or stated) increasing threat to Israel. Given the later text, this appears to be rather misleading, in that it suggests that Israel had to do something.--KarlFrei (talk) 14:59, 16 January 2009 (UTC)

Casualties

There seems to be a serious mistake in the casualties section. The Revision as of 17:32, 22 December 2008, put the casualties as:

Egypt- 11,500 killed and 20,000 wounded, Jordan- 700 killed and 2,500 wounded, Syria- 2,500 killed and 5,000 wounded, Iraq- 10 killed and 30 wounded

Total number- 21,000 killed, 45,000 wounded, 6,000 prisoners, over 400 aircraft destroyed
(estimates)

The current revision only includes the total number. I don't understand how the total number adds up since Egypt, Syria and Jordan add up to 14,500 killed, 27,500 wounded.

Also, Mohamed Abdel-Ghani El Gammasy, Egyptian Chief of Operations during the 1973 war who also served with the Egyptian army at General Headquarters in 1967 puts the number of Egyptian losses to be around 10,000 dead, wounded and missing in action in his book The October War, 1973, and mentions that Egypt lost around 85% of its airforce and 4% of its pilots, so it is unlikely that 100 Egyptian pilots were killed. He constitutes a reliable source. Sherif9282 (talk) 15:40, 17 January 2009 (UTC)

According to Colonel Mustapha a former syrian intelligence officer in his book " secrets of the fall of the Golan" described the syrian casualities as only hundreds using this figure to claim that the Syrian army did not fight and was ordered by the Baath party leaders to withdraw unconditionally.Colonel Mustapha accuses Hafez al-assad of selling the Golan heights to the Israelis and in return he secured ruling Syria for 30 years. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 87.101.128.110 (talk) 21:21, 29 January 2009 (UTC)

The Big Lie

This is well know tactic used in some parts of the world where it is important to "Move the street" into reacting (or being manipulated) in a way state propagandists would like.
This concept of "The Big Lie" is something that has had a great influence on the aftermath of this war and indeed subsequent relations with the West.
Before I put down my comments, I would be very interested to know what others thought of this section and it's inclusion as a topic in the main article.
--A. Renner (talk) 04:05, 1 February 2009 (UTC)