Argument from inconsistent revelations
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The argument from inconsistent revelations, also known as the avoiding the wrong hell problem, is an argument against the existence of God. It asserts that it is unlikely that God exists because many theologians and faithful adherents have produced conflicting and mutually exclusive revelations. The argument states that since a person not privy to revelation must either accept it or reject it based solely upon the authority of its proponent, and there is no way for a mere mortal to resolve these conflicting claims by investigation, it is prudent to reserve one's judgment.
It is also argued that it is difficult to accept the existence of any one God without personal revelation. Most arguments for the existence of God are not specific to any one religion and could be applied to many religions with near equal validity. Acceptance of any one religion thus requires a rejection of the others, and when faced with these competing claims in the absence of a personal revelation, it is argued that it is difficult to decide amongst them. Were a personal revelation to be granted to a nonbeliever, the same problem of confusion would develop in each new person the believer shares the revelation with.
Particular examples
Christians believe that Jesus is the savior of the world and the son of God; Jews do not. Similarly, Muslims believe that the Qur'an was divinely authored, while Jews and Christians do not. There are many examples of such contrasting views, indeed, opposing fundamental beliefs (schisms) exist even within each major religion. Christianity, for example, has many subsets, not all of which are mutually compatible. Hinduism, with it's conception of multiple deities being expressions of one Supreme God, is more open to the possibility that other religions might be 'correct' for their followers, but this same principle requires the rejection of the exclusivity demanded by each of the Abrahamic faiths.
Additionally, Faith-confirming events such as visions and miracles are reported within all faiths with regularity. A single deity associated with a single exclusive existing faith or sect would either have to have caused adherents to other faiths to have visionary or miraculous experiences which lead the to continue to reject the 'true' faith, or at least allowed some other agency to cause these same effects.
The problem does not arise in some theological models. In Deism, it is believed that there is a God, but presumed that there are no divinely caused revelations or miracles at all, leaving reports of such to have natural explanations. In some forms of Pantheism (where God is the Universe) and in Pandeism (where God has become the Universe), the appearance of many inconsistent divine revelations or miracles might simply result unintentionally from the divine nature of the Universe itself.[citation needed]
Systematic description
If it were to be assumed that:
- The existence of some god is certain,
- There is some number (n) of distinct, mutually exclusive interpretations of that god one could believe in,
- There is no way to tell which one, if any, were true a priori
then the probability of having chosen to practice the correct religion (through upbringing or by making Pascal's Wager) cannot be greater than 1⁄n. Therefore, if there are only two distinct faiths, the probability that a person who chooses to believe in either faith has chosen the correct one is 1 in 2 (50% or 1⁄2). Four distinct faiths would result in the probability dropping to 1 in 4 (25% or 1⁄4), and so on.
Since there are hundreds of religions in existence, the probability of any one of them being true to the exclusion of all others is diminishingly small.
Appearances
The argument appears, among other places, in Voltaire's Candide and Philosophical Dictionary. It is also manifested in Denis Diderot's statement that, whatever proofs are offered for the existence of God in Christianity or any other religion, "an Imam can reason the same way".[1]
See also
References
- ^ Diderot, Denis (1875–77) [1746]. J. Assézar (ed.). Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1 (in French). p. 167.