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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 64.229.137.141 (talk) at 01:09, 2 August 2014 (→‎bias?). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Former good article nomineeSix-Day War was a good articles nominee, but did not meet the good article criteria at the time. There may be suggestions below for improving the article. Once these issues have been addressed, the article can be renominated. Editors may also seek a reassessment of the decision if they believe there was a mistake.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
September 28, 2006Good article nomineeNot listed
March 12, 2008Good article nomineeNot listed
Current status: Former good article nominee

I edited part of the section about the events leading to war

The article was missing an important confrontation that occurred on April 7, 1967 between Israel and Syria, so I added it. -- Wiki Khalil (talk) October 13 2012

Unwanted war?

This article statement:"Most scholarly accounts of the crisis attribute the drift to war to an escalation that was unwanted" is problematic.

  • Egypt planned to attack Israel at 27 May 1967. This plan was canceled between the 25 May to the last minute 27 May. Hence, at least until the 25 May, the war was wanted.
  • The view of current historians is important, but each side perceptions of the other side are important too. The Israeli discovered the 27 May Egyptian attack plan and asked the Americans to deal with. The U.S told the soviets, and the Soviet ambassador waked up Nasser in the middle of the night and asked him not to attack. During the days after the 27 May, with Nasser repeating severe threats, could Israel be sure that the Egyptian will not attack eventually ?

I propose to add this text:

"Egypt planned to attack Israel at 27 May 1967. This plan was canceled at the last minute. Later, Nasser threatened that the Arab people want to fight, and the objective is the destruction of Israel. Israel decided to strike preemptively."

You are engaged in WP:OR, synthesizing choice statements from a vast record in order to rewrite your version of the war on wikipedia, for which reason, unless you learn to edit correctly, the only alternative is to revert you, as I just did on the absurd snippet abouty Palestinian frenzy. That is in the source, but the whole section deals with complex details about Jordanian dissent, disagreement with Nasser by Tal, total lack of Jordanian capabilities, certainty of losing in any war, also the West Bank. All you saw was the word 'Palestinian frenzy'. Nothing of the tactical need for noise-making, nothing of the belief in the Jordanian elite that as in 1956 if war broke out international powers would step in and stop it before damage took place. That edit is one more proof of why you should not be editing wikipedia. Nishidani (talk) 13:56, 23 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Sources for the Egyptians side:

Senior Egyptian officials:

"the testimony of Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi to the effect that an Egyptian air attack was scheduled for 27 May, and that the relevant orders had already been signed by Abdel Hakim Amer when Nasser ordered its cancellation on 26 May" (Gluska 2007 , p. 168)

"According to then Egyptian Vice-President Hussein el-Shafei, as soon as Nasser knew what Amer planned, he cancelled the operation" ( Bowen 2003, p. 57 (author interview, Cairo, 15 December 2002). I have not verified)

the testimony of Bassiouny, who recalls that when the Washington Embassy reported that Secretary of State Dean Rusk had information that Egypt was going to start the war, Amer wrote on the cable, “Shams, it seems there is a leak.” (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Egyptian military steps

on May 26, two Egyptian Air Force MiG-21s overflew the reactor (at 52,000 feet) on a photographic reconnaissance mission, and interceptors and missiles failed to bring them down. The Israelis linked the mission to a possible preemptive strike on the plant (Morris, victims, p. 308)

In the Sinai, there was deep confusion; as late as 5 June officers were still not sure whether their goal was offensive or defensive. Nasser is said by some officers to have added to the chaos by his constant interference in military plans (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p66 )

On approximately 20 May, Saad alDin Shazly, commander of a Special Forces unit in the Sinai, was given an offensive mission plan involving an advance through Israel.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

As late as 25 May, therefore, everything was set for an attack at daybreak on 27 May.(Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p67 )

It was only one hour before the planned strike on 27 May that Said’s army liaison officer told him the attack had been aborted after a U.S. request to the Soviets. Shazly was not informed of the shift to a defensive posture until about 1 june. Although Nasser reiterated that Egypt would not strike first, tanks and planes in the Sinai were fully fuelled and not concealed, as if they were going to attack (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Nasser intentions

On 13 May 1967 Nasser received a Soviet intelligence report which claimed that Israel was massing troops on Syria's border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps which made war virtually inevitable (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p 7 )

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 306)

In 1966 Nasser himself had declared that if Israel developed an atomic bomb, Egypt’s response would be a “preemptive war’ directed in the first instance against the nuclear production facilities.27 On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and “to bomb the reactor in Dimona. (Morris, victims, p. 307)

He was subsequently to imply- as during his speech of May 26 to Arab trade union leaders-that the whole sequence of moves, culminating in the closure of the straits, had been planned to trigger war with Israel, with the ultimate aim of “liberating Palestine." (Morris, victims, p. 308)

Abdel Magid Farid, however, suggests that Nasser did actually consider the first strike option until early on 27 May, when he was hauled out of bed at 3 by the ambassador from the Soviet Union (his only source of arms and spare parts) and warned not to precipitate a confrontation (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )


Sources for the Israeli side:

Israeli military considerations

In the first days of June ... as did the sense that the Arab states might launch an attack within days There was particular fear of a limited Jordanian or Jordanian-Egyptian offensive against Eilat. (Morris, victims, p. 310)

Israeli diplomatic and political steps

"In private, Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt. This reinforced the existing image of Egyptian military superiority — if Israel wanted to avoid war, it was presumably because Israel thought it would lose" (Shlaim, Louis, 2012,The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences, p66 )

Nasser seems to have been encouraged by the fact that Israeli rhetoric condemning the Tiran blockade and subsequent developments was relatively mild. Even the fact that the United States counselled restraint was interpreted as an attempt to protect Israel from Arab wrath — and therefore as further evidence of her need for protection. (Shlaim, Louis, 2012, p68 )

Although Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a model of moderation (Mutawi p. 93)

the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 63 )

Nasser appeared to challenge Israel to a duel (Shlaim; Louis2012, p. 7 )

Ykantor contributions

I compiled this list in order to discuss the POV mess claim and identify the POV contributions. It is based on all my contributions in the history page, and does not include small / unrelated contributions. some edits may have been deleted already . I apologize if have missed some. If required, I can add a similar list sorted by the contribution size.

Please reply in the section "suggestion to revert" or open here a "discussion" sub-section and discuss there.

1 734 bytes added; 28/05/2014 12:00

-- ‎The aftermath of the war: Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel were tantamount to surrender

2 1,042 bytes added; 26/05/2014 13:19

-- ‎Events during the weeks before the war: The U.S. forces planned not to allow the Arab states, to destroy Israel, but also not to allow Israel to expand. On May 20, 1967, a cable of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff was sent to EUCOM and STRICOM. STRICOM

3 1,092 bytes added; 26/05/2014 12:00

-- ‎Israel: On May 22, Nasser declared the Straits closed to Israeli shipping, blocking 90% of Israeli oil that passed through the Straits of Tiran.[9] Oil tankers that were due to pass through the straights have been delayed

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-- ‎Israel: on 25 May Israel mobilized the whole army reserves, which caused the economy to come to a standstill.[

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-- ‎Israel: During May- June 1967, Eshkol's government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front

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-- ‎Israel: During 22 to 24 May, General Rabin was incapacitated for 2 days because of a nervous breakdown. The collapse may have been triggered by Ben Gurion, who blamed Rabin for his mistaken mobilization of reserves that made the crisis acute and that

6 248 bytes added; 24/05/2014 1:30

-- ‎Golan Heights: n May–June 1967 The Israeli government did everything in its power to confine the confrontation to the Egyptian front. Eshkol and his colleagues took into account the possibility of some fighting on the Syrian front

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-- ‎Israel: Egypt planned to Attack Israel at 27 May. A couple of days before the attack date, Israel discovered it, and asked the Americans to deal with it. The American president called the Soviet leadership, and the Soviet ambassador, in the middle of

7b 278 bytes added; 23/05/2014 23:08

-- ‎Israel: During May 1967 the Israel wanted Jordan to keep out of any war with Egypt, and it had no plans for the conquest of the West Bank or East Jerusalem. The Israelis sent Hussein three messages saying they had no hostile intent towards Jordan

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-- ‎Israel: Israeli military officers had occasionally made reckless and belligerent public statements, but Eshkol had no intention of provoking a war with the Arabs and still less of expanding Israel. Territorial aims developed during the war. The Israel

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-- ‎Israel: add

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-- ‎Israel: Israel and the UN protested that the Russian were falsely reporting on 13 May of Israeli forces concentrations near the border with Syria.

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-- ‎Israel: On May 21, Eshkol had told the cabinet Defense Committee that Egypt wanted to close the straits and to bomb the reactor in Dimona

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-- ‎Israel: Eshkol had sent Nasser secret messages urging deescalation. In public, he continued to assert Israel’s peaceful intentions, call for international mediation, and avoid criticism of Egypt.

7h 388 bytes added; 23/05/2014 22:07

-- ‎Israel: the leaders of the confrontational states were caught by complete surprise when Israel took their threats at face value

7a 987 bytes added; 23/05/2014 18:06

-- ‎Events: Israel–Jordan I am blamed for too long edits to an already long article. So I summarize and then accused for too short writings.

7b 271 bytes added; 23/05/2014 16:20

-- ‎Events: Israel–Jordan According to Mutawi, all levels of Jordanian society (with some exceptions) were in favour of going to war. The Ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians, had been whipped up into a state of frenzy against Israel and in

8 892 bytes added; 13/05/2014 17:21

-- It is a pity to fight against facts. Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight. It is a different issue wether he planned to initiate the war

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-- ‎Events: Israel–Egypt On 26 May Nasser declared, "The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel

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-- ‎Events: Israel–Syria add a source

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-- ‎Events: Israel–Egypt Eshkol denounced the Egyptians in his speech on 21 May, but his response to this development was a model of moderation. He demanded that Nasser withdraw his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the

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-- ‎Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Many of these allegations and conspiracy theories[1] have been disputed and it has been claimed

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-- ‎Allegations of military support from the U.S., U.K. and Soviet Union: Anwar Sadat implied that Nasser used this deliberate conspiracy in order to accuse the United States as a political cover-up for domestic consumption

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-- ‎Events: Israel–Egypt fix my mistake- p. 63 and not p. 199 , According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications

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-- ‎Events: Israel–Egypt According to Shlaim & Louis, in the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications

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-- According to the prominent historian Abd aI-’Azim Ramadan, Nasser mistaken decisions to expel the international peacekeeping force from the Sinai Peninsula and close the Straits of Tiran in 1967, led to a state of war with Israel, despite the lack of mi

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-- According to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, [Gamal Abdel Nasser| Nasser]] had admitted his responsibility for the military defeat in the June 1967

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Egypt Still, Nasser declared full mobilisation in Egypt as of 14 May 1967, citing the joint defence agreement with Syria.

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-- ‎The Egyptian army: President Nasser , having learned of the results of the air strike, decided together with Field Marshal Amer to pull out the troops from Sinai within 24 hours. No detailed instructions were given concerning the manner and sequence

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Egypt Fawzi (general)]] left for Syria for one day tour, verified that the Soviet report is false and reported that there are no Israeli armed forces near the Syrian border

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Egypt the Straits of Tiran were opened to Israeli traffic and The Sinai peninsula was demilitarized

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria Before 1967, Syria exacerbated the confrontation with Israel, in order to divert attention from its internal economic and political instability.

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria use a quote

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria Israel tapped the Jordan River (and the Sea of Galilee) by canal for irrigation of the Southern Negev desert

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria War over Water was a major factor for the six days war

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria Syria started the Headwater Diversion Plan (Jordan River) in order to thwart Israel's plans to use the water

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-- ‎Events: Israel - Syria Israeli armoured tractors, often guarded by police, would start to plow in a disputed area of the DMZ. From its high ground positions, Syria would fire at those advancing

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-- ‎Background and summary of events leading to war: Syria planned to reduce Israeli water consumption well under the allocated Johnston plan quota

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-- ‎Background and summary of events leading to war

Ykantor (talk) 14:35, 2 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

— Preceding unsigned comment added by Ykantor (talk • contribs) 15:12, 29 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]

tldr. Ykantor, you're missing the point in two ways. As far as POV is concerned look at Nishidani's posts above. But the main point is you've made the article unreadable. DeCausa (talk) 19:07, 29 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Nasser steps made war inevitable

Nisidani undid my editing with the note:" summary contains Ykantor's personal view of the war, as does the added content. POV pushing".

- Those words are Shlaim's text: "Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May".[2]. Shlaim is not known as a pro Israeli.

- If this is a POV, it is a POV of Nasser's side. In the end of May 1967, Nasser claimed in a public speech to have been aware of the Straits of Tiran closure implications: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation" [3]

- It is suggested to continue with the edit: "Nasser took 3 successive steps that made the war virtually ineviteable: On 14 May he deployed his troops in Sinai near the border with Israel, On 19 May expelled the UN peacekeepers stationed in the Sinai Peninsula border with Israel, and on 23 May closed The Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.".

notes:

  1. ^ Shlaim#=# Louis (2012) p. 8,53,60,75,193,199,297
  2. ^ Shlaim, Avi (2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge University Press. p. 106. ISBN 9781107002364. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in Sinai near Israel's border on 14 May; expelled the UNEF from the Gaza Strip and Sinai on 19 May; and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping on 22 May.
  3. ^ Shlaim, Avi (2012). The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. Cambridge University Press. p. 63. ISBN 9781107002364. "he claimed in a public speech to have been aware of all the implications: "Taking over Sharm El Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. It also means that we ready to enter a general war with Israel. It was not a separate operation"..

Ykantor (talk) 18:06, 6 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Hi, since we're planning to revert the whole Background section to way back, why bother to edit it now? Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:57, 6 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]
After the planned revert, shouldn't the appropriate and well supported text added again to the article? Ykantor (talk) 04:43, 7 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Hi, well supported and neutral text may be added later on, in a conservative and restrained way, to the background section but the main point in the revert is to remove excessive verbiage, not pave the way for its re-addition. Cheers, --Dailycare (talk) 18:52, 7 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Your definition of "Neutral" is not accepted by me, and vice versa. Why shouldn't we stick to Wikipedia rule that if there is a dispute, both (well supported) views should be shown? Ykantor (talk) 07:30, 8 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

What exactly is this note trying to say?

I am referring to

4. ^ Lenczowski 1990, p. 105–115, Citing Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, and Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Arab–Israeli Confrontation, 1948–1967, p. 375

Israel clearly did not want the US government to know too much about its dispositions for attacking Syria, initially planned for June 8, but postponed for 24 hours. It should be pointed out that the attack on the Liberty occurred on June 8, whereas on June 9 at 3 am, Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire. Despite this, at 7 am, that is, four hours later, Israel's minister of defense, Moshe Dayan, "gave the order to go into action against Syria."

What text is being supported by the bit which says Israel didn't want the US to know its plans? What is the relevance to Liberty? Did the Liberty incident influence Syria in accepting the ceasefire? Does this note exist to push a POV? It even has the phrase "It should be pointed out". Really. If our writing is not adequate to make the point obvious to readers then it shouldn't be in Wikipedia. Moriori (talk) 04:07, 15 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

You are definitely right. Moreover, the text omit to mention that this Israeli action against Syria was taken after the Syrian attack against Israel. Ykantor (talk) 19:23, 15 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Nasser's stationing of troops in Yemen Needs to Explained

He had been too preoccupied with the North Yemen Civil War and that has been largely regarded as the reason why the Egyptian military was too ill-prepared to maintain the Sinai Peninsula. He still had ambitions of creating a nation among the Arab states and saw North Yemen as a way to enhance this goal. He planned to rebuild the United Arab Republic union which he had previously had with Syria between 1958 and 1961 and focused greatly on including North Yemen-which had been part of the United Arab States union with Egypt and Syria during that time- as one of the first members of the proposed Arab union.JoetheMoe25 (talk) 14:25, 21 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Liberty casualties in infobox?

Should the USS Liberty casualties (34 dead) be listed in the infobox beneath "20 Israeli civilians killed"? Something on the lines of "34 US Navy sailors killed". best, 188.220.81.192 (talk) 19:43, 27 July 2014 (UTC)[reply]

bias?

The commanders of these batteries were instructed to lay a two-hour barrage against military and civilian settlements in central Israel. Some shells hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv.[77]

like the above statement. made by Michael_Oren, israeli embassador to the US. in fact, the whole section is littered with statement from what was at the time, an enemy head of state? this seems puzzling at the very least. 64.229.137.141 (talk) 01:08, 2 August 2014 (UTC)[reply]

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