Talk:Scientific method

Thought experiments

"the truth consists of hard-to-vary assertions about reality is the most important fact about the physical world" --David Deutsch#Invariants is already cited in the article.

If a thought experiment were to become the basis of a science, it would need to be invariant. That's a high barrier, compared to a real experiment. -- Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 15:57, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

Thought experiments are important, especially in physics. I don't say they all what's required to pass as a theory, but they are the beginning of a theory. E.g. Newton knew the speed required to bring an artificial satellite in orbit. tgeorgescu (talk) 16:15, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

Tricky thing is that just as there's no science as to what counts as science (see the Demarcation problem), there's no science as to what counts as the scientific method — which is really just so much more of an attitude of rationality and openness to evidence that we just "know it when we see it". Otherwise the articles on science and its "method" would be easy to hammer out — things would either be correct or incorrect, not debatable. The consensus for school children does not mention mind experiments explicitly as valid. But the consensus among science philosophers and historians is obvious: Einstein isn't the only one who figured out quite a bit in his head long before anything was proven on paper (let alone in the physical world). For example I think it wasn't until the 1960s or 70s that we could finally do our first experiments to validate relativistic time by flying some atomic clocks around for a few hours and then comparing them. Clearly, the work was already considered real science long before the experiment was conducted. Destrylevigriffith (talk) 16:44, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

The scientific method is for establishing new knowledge (to the extent that predictions are possible in the new, unknown domain). In a nutshell, that's the demarcation problem. If the prediction/explanation has to change to match observation, the explanation fails (is shown to be in error), as stated in the article. Conjecture/ hypothesis is welcome, of course, but has to be tagged as such. When a scientist changes his explanation to match the observation, this is tampering. The article explains this point (e.g. researchers are to sign and date their contribution as part of their protocol; have separate teams for explanation versus experimentation, etc.). We don't yet know how to do this for an experiment conducted entirely in one's mind. There is room for physical, communicable experiments, not involving neologisms. Digital twinning is far from thought experiment, as yet.

One thousand years ago, Alhacen (Ibn al-Haytham) made your point, that scientists are not free from error, and proved several points (in optics and in space science) to be in error, using experiment (it's in the article). So an open question in science has to be recognized as such; the science at that point remains a model, only a concept. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 18:49, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

My point: thought experiments are a tool in the scientific method. They are of course not the only tool. Evidence is needed to test their assumptions. tgeorgescu (talk) 22:05, 14 October 2023 (UTC)

Stemwedel quote

for editor convenience, I have retrospectively prefixed here the quotation whose addition is being challenged under WP:BRD:

The big difference Popper identifies between science and pseudo-science is a difference in attitude. While a pseudo-science is set up to look for evidence that supports its claims, Popper says, science is set up to challenge its claims and look for evidence that might prove it false. In other words, pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications.

— Janet D. Stemwedel, Scientific American

Discussion

Binksternet left a message on my talk page that said: Please do not add commentary, your own point of view, or your own personal analysis to Wikipedia articles, as you did to Scientific method. Doing so violates Wikipedia's neutral point of view policy and breaches the formal tone expected in an encyclopedia. Binksternet's response is puzzling, as it refers to this edit in which I did not add anything to the article—there is no "commentary" or "personal analysis" to be found!

As for my justification of the removal of the Stemwedel quote from the beginning of the "Overview" section: I said in the edit summary: science may also seek confirmations—see, e.g., the footnotes in Critical rationalism#Variations, such as "Producing evidence" (Bunge 1983). I will quote the footnote on Mario Bunge to which I referred:

• Bunge, Mario (1983). "Producing evidence". Epistemology & methodology II: understanding the world. Treatise on basic philosophy. Vol. 6. Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 59–113 (70). doi:10.1007/978-94-015-6921-7_2. ISBN 902771634X. OCLC 9759870. Critical rationalism (e.g. Popper, 1959) agrees that experience is a test of theories (its only concern) but claims that only negative evidence counts (against), for positive evidence is too easy to come by. True, unsuccessful attempts to refute a theory (or discredit a proposal or an artifact) are more valuable than mere empirical confirmation. However, (a) the most general theories are not refutable, although they are indirectly confirmable by turning them into specific theories upon adjoining them specific hypotheses (Bunge, 1973b); (b) true (or approximately true) predictions are not that cheap, as shown by the predictive barrenness of pseudoscience; (c) positive evidence for the truth of an idea or the efficiency of a proposal, procedure, or artifact, does count: thus the US Food and Drug Administration will rightly demand positive evidence for the efficiency [efficacy] of a drug before permitting its marketing.

Earlier Bunge had argued:

• Bunge, Mario (1973). "Testability today". Method, model, and matter. Synthese library. Vol. 44. Dordrecht; Boston: Reidel. pp. 27–43. doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2519-5_2. ISBN 9027702527. OCLC 613670. Quite apart from their historical merits, is either of the two criteria [of science—confirmability versus falsifiability] actually satisfied by today's science? Have they withstood four decades of momentous advances in pure and applied science? This is the problem of the present investigation. The outcome of it will be negative: neither confirmability nor refutability is either necessary or sufficient for every single component of science. Nor will any other single trait do: science is too complex an object to be characterizable by a single property.

These quotes from Bunge refute the claim in the Stemwedel quote that "pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications", which is a far too simplistic characterization of science, as the quotes from Bunge indicate. As I said in another edit summary reverting the addition of the same quote to another article, the Stemwedel quote seems to conflate falsifiability as a demarcation criterion with falsifications—a hypothesis can be falsifiable and yet still be confirmed/corroborated, and it's fine for scientists to seek confirmations/corroborations as long as they use sufficiently severe tests.

Even critical rationalist philosopher John W. N. Watkins emphasized that science involves confirmations/corroborations:

• Watkins, John W. N. (December 1995). "Book review of: Critical rationalism: a restatement and defence, by David Miller". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 46 (4): 610–616. doi:10.1093/bjps/46.4.610. JSTOR 687902. (2) A main component of Popper's methodology was his theory of corroboration (see the concluding chapter and appendix *ix of his [1959]); corroborations are what ultimately govern the rational acceptance of theories. This disappears without trace in Miller's 'restatement'. In his index there are six entries against 'corroboration', five of which refer to places where an author is being quoted or reported. The sixth comes in the course of an examination of my [1984]. I had tried to give a fresh answer to the question, 'Why do corroborations matter?' Miller writes: 'The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter' (p. 120). (3) Popper had a horror of anything like rationality-scepticism. He insisted that a theory's being currently the best corroborated, while not justifying the theory, does justify a preference for it over its rivals. He may not have kept these two kinds of justification as separate as he should have done, but his philosophy allows there to be sufficient reasons for accepting one theory as better than its rivals at the present time.

Or if those quotes aren't sufficient, take Graham Oddie's summary of why falsification without confirmation/corroboration is insufficient:

• Oddie, Graham (2001). "Truth, verification, verisimilitude, and evidence: philosophical aspects". In Smelser, Neil J.; Baltes, Paul B. (eds.). International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences. Vol. 23. Amsterdam; New York: Elsevier. pp. 15932–15937. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/01014-7. ISBN 9780080430768. OCLC 47869490. Pseudoscientific theories (Popper's examples were psychoanalysis and astrology) are replete with 'confirming instances.' Everything that happens appears to confirm them only because they rule nothing out. Popper argued that genuine theories must forever remain conjectures. But science is still rational, because we can submit falsifiable theories to severe tests. If they fail, we weed them out. If they survive? Then we submit them to more tests, until they too fail, as they almost assuredly will. There are three serious problems with falsificationism. First, it does not account for the apparent epistemic value of confirmations. The hardline falsificationist must maintain that the appearance is an illusion. Second, it cannot explain why it is rational to act on the unrefuted theories. Confidence born of experimental success reeks of inductivism. Third, pessimism about the enterprise of science seems obligatory. Although truth is the goal of inquiry, the best we can manage is to pronounce a refuted theory false.

In summary, the Stemwedel quote is not a good summary of scientific method or of demarcation of science from pseudoscience. That is why I removed the quote. Biogeographist (talk) 23:25, 2 February 2024 (UTC)

"Simplistic" material has its purpose. Popper made his simplistic pronouncement for a purpose. Why can we not keep the Popper quote followed by defining context from Oddie and Watkins? We can excite the black-or-white reader and the shades-of-grey reader at the same time. Binksternet (talk) 23:34, 2 February 2024 (UTC)

It is a good quote taken from a well known scientific journal. However, it gives the impression that there is no debate about what distinguishes science from non science. Clearly, our personal perspective is irrelevant, but since Biogeographist gave his view, I will add mine: Popper found a good criterion when taken in its proper context, but clearly one cannot reduce science to falsifiability and I don't think Popper could have reasonably claimed that out of a proper context. This is in fact a key point. Every thing we say, always depends on a context. Nothing is universally true. This is something known since the ancient Greece: every truth depends on a previous truth. This also applies to the falsifiability criterion. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:46, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

The reason that I added that quote is because the article as it stands is very dense and almost legalistic. The quotation is clear, concise and accessible to non-specialists. It is entirely opposite. Biogeographist's response merely confirms my view of the need for such a clear statement because it is written in the same legalistic tone as the article: it is not wrong but it is not helpful. --𝕁𝕄𝔽 (talk) 01:04, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

I agree 100% with Dominic Mayers about the importance of context and about the high value of falsifiability within a proper context, and I'm certainly not opposed to JMF's goal of making the article more readable, but I don't think the Stemwedel quotation helps, for the reasons already stated. Perhaps you can take inspiration from Stemwedel's article and from this discussion to craft a new edit that meets your goals while avoiding these objections. Biogeographist (talk) 02:08, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

By the way, it is mistaken that Stemwedel's article is from a "scientific journal" as Dominic said; it is really a blog post. The blogs at https://blogs.scientificamerican.com are mostly not published in the magazine. I don't see anything wrong with the blog post as far as it goes, but as Stemwedel said, she's just explaining Popper's demarcation criterion, not claiming that it's the only criterion or that there is no debate about demarcation. In fact, she wrote: "before we get into how real science (and real non-science) might depart from Sir Karl's image of things, I think it's important to look more closely at the distinction he's trying to draw." But she never comes back to "how real science (and real non-science) might depart from Sir Karl's image of things". An interesting article that was published ten years after Stemwedel's blog post and that you may want to read for more recent views on the demarcation problem is: Hirvonen, Ilmari; Karisto, Janne (June 2022). "Demarcation without dogmas". Theoria. 88 (3): 701–720. doi:10.1111/theo.12395. Biogeographist (talk) 03:38, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

This last paper only confirms that there are still debates about what distinguishes science from non science. Also, any review paper in philosophy is still only representing a point of view, not the truth about the current state of the art in philosophy, and must be treated as such in Wikipedia. Dominic Mayers (talk) 13:19, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

That supports my view that Biogeographist is being excessively purist about this. Here, and especially in the pseudo-science article, we need a clear, concise and accessible statement of what makes real science different from nonsense. If a reader follows a link in a general article, they should not be confronted with a philosophical treatise. The advantage of using the Stemwedel quote is that it provides just such a statement but because it is a quote, we don't have to qualify it extensively as we would if it were in Wikivoice. In all honesty, I can't help feeling that Biogeographist's concerns, while valid, are about edge cases. When the topic is something clear-cut like crackpot cures for CV19, then Popper's exposition is very broadly representative of mainstream scientific consensus going back to Bacon. WP:Think of the reader who is likely to be someone who has little or no scientific education. We don't have to impress professional scientists who won't be reading this article in any search for knowledge. --𝕁𝕄𝔽 (talk) 13:53, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

I just want to insist that Popper always spoke in a context. He often criticized people, because they took his statements out of context. In particular, even the falsifiability criterion have to be understood within science as a problem solving activity. When Popper says that falsifiability is sufficient and necessary, it is within that context. In other words, Popper has never claimed that science does not have the positive goal of solving problems. The idea that Popper would have claimed that the goal of science is not to solve problems, but only to make falsifiable statements, is ridiculous. Yet, there are some to criticize Popper as if he had made that claim. I say that because the quote could lead to such a misunderstanding when it concludes "pseudo-science seeks confirmations and science seeks falsifications" out of context. Dominic Mayers (talk) 14:49, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

I agree with everything Dominic Mayers has said so far.

In the introduction of the article by Hirvonen & Karisto that I mentioned above, there is a helpful distinction between two types of demarcation, general and specific: "General demarcation is about providing blunt instruments for laypersons." But specific demarcation is also necessary, they said, because: "Explaining in detail why some instance of pseudoscience is pseudoscience may demand in-depth knowledge about the field of inquiry that it deals with. This could require one to answer such questions as: What kind of methods qualified scientists use in the field? Why and how do these practices differ from the pseudoscientific ones? What scientific claims do pseudoscientific theses contradict?"

I would say that JMF's example above of "crackpot cures for CV19" is a case where science communicators would need to apply what Hirvonen & Karisto call specific demarcation. The general confirmation/falsification heuristic wouldn't be specific enough; to refute CV19 pseudoscience you would need to discuss some of the in-depth background knowledge about the field that a particular CV19 pseudotheory ignores.

So, I expect there is a way to insert Stemwedel's point into the article while emphasizing that it is a general demarcation heuristic that will not be sufficient for all contexts. Biogeographist (talk) 15:57, 3 February 2024 (UTC)

Just to add that my contribution here is not at all an endorsement of the article in its current state. I had a quick look at the article and this quote was the least of its issues. It's full of naive personal opinions that reflect what the average scientists with no formation on philosophy would think. There is a difference between presenting well thought philosophical content in a way that the average people can understand and presenting what average people think. Having to do the former should not be an excuse to do the latter. Dominic Mayers (talk) 18:16, 4 February 2024 (UTC)

References

State and scope of the article March 2024

I iterated this post several times now as I worked through the article (and hopefully managed to make useful changes).

The only question I have remaining is on the general scope of the article. Several sections (Scientific inquiry, Philosophy, and Relationship with mathematics) seem they are very much their own thing and, to me, well-outside the scope of the article.

Are they here simply because of the high article traffic and to give people jumping off points to further reading? And have they been justified previously?

JackTheSecond (talk) 22:42, 8 March 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for your updates. The sections you mention used to have extensive coverage in this article. They relied on the thinking of Charles Sanders Peirce, based on the thousands of posts to his papers. User:The Tetrast was called to lead a Peirce website, and stepped away from this article a dozen years ago. User:Jon Awbrey (see Template talk:Infobox philosopher/Archive 1) and User:Prof. Carl Hewitt also contributed to the scope of this article, and to the encyclopedia.

In the last decade, the rise of proof assistants is directly traceable to Peirce, Wittgenstein, Emil Post, Alonzo Church, etc. These influences (as documented in the arXiv.org and Internet Archive) show that mathematical method and scientific method have intertwined since the 1870s. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 09:28, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Well, those are literal lifetimes of history... I think the most actual contribution beyond a copy edit I could give the article would be to introduce an {Empty section} on 'Modern methodology and the scientific method', as the article seems to be quite light on things past the 1960s.

Another suggestion I have is to write a 'DNA Experiment' header for the 'Confirmation' header, that gets into how DNA research moved on since. JackTheSecond (talk) 11:00, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

Direction of the 'History' section.

This 2018 diff shows that the vision for the 'History' section of the article had been to give a brief overview with a link to the article 'History of scientific method'. It has now grown and there should probably be a conversation about what to do with it and the 'Theory' section.

• Should the section keep growing? In my opinion the main article should have a complete (even if brief) History section and that means expansion at the moment. (Which is why I introduced sectioning, to encourage and organise; even if I don't know if the focus is entirely correct.)
• Is the heavy use of notes justified? And is it implemented in the best way... is perhaps the better question.
• The 'Theory' section I introduced should probably be moved or even merged elsewhere. I just didn't know what to do with one particular paragraph formerly in the 'History' section and wrote an introduction to a fitting section. ~

JackTheSecond (talk) 19:42, 10 March 2024 (UTC)

I added an anchor to characterization; credit for this term is due to user:Banno back in 2004. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 11:24, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

Lead sentence

The further I get into the topic of the article, the more I come around to the idea that the first sentence of the lead section should not read 'empirical' and even more so not 'empirical method'. My arguments are:

• The empirical method is its own, much more limited, concept.
• Empirical implies empiricism, which is what the scientific method is built on, but far, far from being descriptive of it.
• Most openly available sources do not actually use 'empirical'. Source 2 and Britannica both do not; The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's entry on "Scientific Method" does not. (Source 3 does).
• And, above all, that Thomas Kuhn was right when he wrote about the scientific method being a 'social framework', as written about in the article already here (second paragraph).

The previous (quite high-quality) discussion that added the term was started by User:Markworthen and is archived here: 2018.

What I would change the opening line to (without the brackets):

1. The scientific method is the sociological framework that has characterized the sciences since the 17th century. (Thomas Kuhn)

2. The scientific method is a framework for procedure that has characterized the sciences since the scientific revolution of the 17th century.(Thomas Kuhn + source 2)

3. The scientific method is the sociology of science. It is not a sequence of steps, or elements – even if this article, as many educators do, will section itself such in order to give structure to explanation. (the flippant version)

4. The scientific method is a method of procedure that characterized the sciences since the scientific revolution of the 17th century. (source 2, verbatim)

I like 1 most, because the way Kuhn's definition works allows for other interpretations of it as well—no matter if one's views on it are informed by Dewey, Feyerabend or anyone in between. JackTheSecond (talk) 23:58, 19 March 2024 (UTC)

You have a point. I think the scientific method is generally a method of induction and is metaphysical. I am thinking of Francis Bacon and going back to medievals like Roger Bacon. Ramos1990 (talk) 00:39, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

I don't see any way to avoid the empirical aspect of what this article is talking about: the article is not talking about purely formal a priori knowledge. There is an empirical aspect.

I don't think it's true that Empirical implies empiricism (where empiricism refers to a particular epistemological view opposed to, e.g., rationalism) as JackTheSecond said above. Empirical can refer to the experiential or experimental aspect of a procedure, as opposed to, e.g., guessing or looking up data in an actuarial table. And, again, that empirical aspect is central to what this article is talking about.

Saying that the scientific method is sociology or sociological seems badly misleading in at least one respect: physicists, for example, are not doing sociology when they use scientific method. You seem to mean that it is social, but that property does not differentiate it from most other human activities.

For all the stated reasons, I don't see any one of the proposed sentences as an improvement over the status quo (which is not to say that that the current lead sentence could not be improved). Biogeographist (talk) 15:42, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

The scientific method is a set of principles and procedures to acquire knowledge by careful observation; inducing from those observations falsifiable hypotheses; and in most, but not all disciplines, designing experiments to test those hypotheses; refining hypotheses based on experimental findings; and inferring tentative truths from the observations and experiments. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:19, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

Good point - empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. How about replacing it with scholarly method? Scholarly method is not controversial (I don't think) and is consistent with the article as a whole. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:37, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

A couple of suggestions to play with:

• The scientific method is a scholarly method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized scientific inquiry since the 17th century, albeit with much debate regarding how scientific discovery actually occurs.
• The scientific method, a systematic approach to acquiring knowledge, has been a hallmark of scientific inquiry since the 17th century. However, there is considerable debate about the actual process of scientific discovery.

Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:53, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

I think while scholarly method does a good job of putting the method into context, it doesn't do a good job actually saying what the 'scientific' method is. JackTheSecond (talk) 19:00, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

@Markworthen: If you are responding to me, as your indentation implies, then I have to clarify that I did not say that empirical method is imprecise and not consistent with the article as a whole. I was defending the use of the word "empirical", which I consider to be an essential differentiator of science as factual knowledge from purely formal a priori knowledge, on the one hand, and wildly imaginative guessing on the other hand: this article is not primarily about either of the latter two cognitive modes. Scientific method for factual knowledge is more than only empirical, but the empirical is an essential aspect.

Scholarly method isn't quite right because scholars of the the arts, for example, are scholars but do not necessarily use scientific method. Furthermore, dictionaries often indicate, and rightly in my view, that the term "scholar" is especially associated with the humanities (which, of course, is not to say that there is no scholarship in science).

Something like your second proposed sentence would be better if it retained the word "empirical", for the reasons I mentioned above, e.g.: "The scientific method is an empirical and systematic approach to acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century." Biogeographist (talk) 18:30, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

Biogeographist - Sorry, I got the indention wrong. I meant to reply to JackTheSecond. I fixed the indention just now. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 16:54, 22 March 2024 (UTC)

You may be right about Kuhn and sociology not being a better solution. It is confusing, even if the point I was trying to make still stands (to me) that 'empirical' does not do enough. The only other leads I was able to come up with were the historical approach:

The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that emphasises rational thought. It first gained prominence during the scientific revolution as an expansion on early empiricism, and has characterized the development of the sciences since. It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, reasoned thought, and the formation and testing of hypotheses.

and the perhaps more radical idea of replacing everything with what's currently called 'Overview'... the section has both the cohesion as well as the nuance required. (And we may just have to embrace its length...) JackTheSecond (talk) 19:37, 20 March 2024 (UTC) edit:@Biogeographist JackTheSecond (talk) 19:42, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

This proposal for the lead sentences looks fine to me in general. Biogeographist (talk) 19:54, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

JackTheSecond - Looks good to me too. Thanks for working hard on this. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 16:57, 22 March 2024 (UTC)

Another comment about one of JackTheSecond's initial claims above: Most openly available sources do not actually use 'empirical'. But all of the cited sources use one or more of the terms 'empirical', 'observing', 'observation', 'measurement', 'experiment', which are variations on the same empirical aspect. Biogeographist (talk) 19:33, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

Hmm. That I feel is an unfair characterization of what I was saying. Calling it 'empirical method' is saying that the method is and empirical one. The other sources all say that the 'empirical aspect' as you called it is 'one of' the aspects. JackTheSecond (talk) 19:47, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

If there is an empirical aspect, and there is, then I think it's justifiable to characterize it as an empirical method, but there may be other ways to say it. In any case, I think your latest proposal looks good. Biogeographist (talk) 19:54, 20 March 2024 (UTC)

---

I've gotten around to User:Markworthen's idea of icluding 'scholarly method'. It's a neat way of putting things into context and avoids stating a definitive definition (that doesn't seem to have a scientific consensus anyway). New stab at a complete lead section (kind of deleting Popper; the inclusion seemed unduly selective // potential issue is that the second sentence of the first paragraph might count as copyvio from the (referenced) Stanford Encyclopedia; to me, it seems generic enough not to~):

The scientific method is a scholarly method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of the sciences since at least the 17th century. It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories.

Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, the underlying process is frequently the same. The process in the scientific method involves making hypothetical explanations, deriving predictions from the hypotheses as logical consequences, and then carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those predictions.

Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.

JackTheSecond (talk) 17:55, 4 April 2024 (UTC)

I guess I mostly just didn't understand why falsificationism and scepticism were given preference. JackTheSecond (talk) 18:08, 4 April 2024 (UTC)

FWIW some notes on the above conversation:

• I do not like the word scholarly being given such prominence. Apart from being too original I think it implies that science is academic, and that what is academic is scientific. Scientific method is not a professional qualification.
• Scientific method is clearly not something which applies to all science, for example classical science, or any modern science which still works like classical science. It is mordern, and it is methodical/systematic.
• If you ask what it is systematic a long discussion is possible, but since the beginning of modern science all versions have been cautious of human bias, including most types of metaphysical explanations. So it is sceptical, and it involves as little as possible meaphysics. So I support the mention of scepticism and I would question any proposal to call it metaphysical in any simple sense.
• FWIW the minimalistic metaphysics which modern science can not avoid is the idea that there are laws of nature. But these only imply consistent underlying patterns of causation, which do not change from one day to the next. By definition this patterns which describe nature are not elements of nature and so they are metaphysical instead of physical. This type of thing is not what most people think of when they think of metaphysics.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 11:30, 5 April 2024 (UTC)
• Although induction and metaphysics can't be avoided modern scientific method tries to take it cues from empircal evidences, observations. So I don't really see a problem with saying it is empirical. Someone like Aristotle could do science without being empirical but he was not using scientific method.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 12:04, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

• I fully agree not to call it anything akin to 'metaphysical' or any version of the arguments on 'social constructs'. They are not useful; and they tend to be unhelpful, especially stated outright.
• On the issue over 'scepticism': I question mentioning scepticism specifically when rationalism isn't. And I felt like removing 'empirical' in order to replace it with some form of link to empiricism. The term currently links to 'empirical evidence' - which is valid, but also not at all philosophically valuable enough, in my view. And if we can't in the first sentence make clear what method is (and that seems quite the challenge to me) we can at least frame in a useful context.
• I think setting as equal a 'scholar' of something as an 'academic' is presumptuous. Being a scholar is more about the attitude with which you work, being an academic is about the system in which you work. An if we can't in the first sentence make clear what method is (and that seems quite the challenge to me) we can at least frame in a useful context.
• And, I'd like to read more on 'method clearly not being something which applies to all science', that statement seems like a quite broad rejection of any kind of unificationism.

JackTheSecond (talk) 12:10, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

Aristotle did his marine biology at the Pyrrha lagoon, now called the Gulf of Kalloni, a specific situation from which he could make his many observations and conjectures. --Ancheta Wis   (talk | contribs) 12:33, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

One should note, that the lead paragraph as it currently appears on Google reads:

The scientific method is an empirical method for acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century. The scientific method involves careful observation coupled with rigorous scepticism, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of the observation.

... which doesn't mention experiments at all; 'the scientific method' as well as 'observation' twice; and is just generally useless. JackTheSecond (talk) 13:38, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

@JackTheSecond: Perhaps the first question is whether this article is about all science or just modern science, which insists on being "methodical", which was clearly a new demand made at the start of modern science. I think the answer is absolutely clear, and so if anyone disagrees they should explain why. Responses:

• Scepticism is something the empiricists and rationalists, or perhaps more usefully both Decartes and Bacon, agreed on. The whole idea of their being a need for method was connected with the idea that there is no force of nature which guides people to be unbiased. Therefore we have to be systematically cautious of being misled. That is what the term scepticism is referring to. Also, I don't think empiricism or rationalism are part of any serious definition of modern science. I think these categories can be seen as a questionable way of teaching people about the history of modern science, using an arguably unrealistic simplification. In any case, just taking them seriously, they contrast with each other by definition, and do not claim to cover all possible forms modern science.
• Scholarly implies academic. This is just how the English language works. Our readers will read things into our text.
• I don't know what you are referring to as unificationism. To me it is just a fact that not all science is "modern science", and modern science is a specific style of doing science in a systematically sceptical (critical, cautious) way. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:44, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

• I feel it needs to be pointed out that your arguments against 'scholarly' are just as valid as an argument against 'empirical'. The implication of the word is wrong. Also, 'empirical' is not used anywhere in the article, in a sourced manner as to state 'this is method'.
• Thank you for your point on scepticism, the argument makes its inclusion much more apparent.
• Ah, you mean 'not all science' in a historical context. In that case, and you probably already agree anyway: Someone decided that the scientific discussion preceding the Age of Enlightenment was so fundamental as to be called some version of 'the first prominent one' and I am not here to question that. (WP:NOTTRUTH)
• Also, the second sentence that reads "It is often characterized by systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories." is sourced to a relatively authoritative enyclopedia, not just to a dictionary definition. (Currently there are two sources that are dictionaries in the lead.)
• Also, peripherally, the article is structured more like how science is taught in education than being about how science is done. Which is okay in my view, it's what most people will expect--but should be expanded upon.

I wrote another version; you are invited to comment on or even edit it: User:JackTheSecond/A new lead 'scientific method' Keep comments here, for centralised discussion. JackTheSecond (talk) 20:12, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

ping @Andrew Lancaster JackTheSecond (talk) 20:35, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

@JackTheSecond: I am not sure where to find the other version you mention.

• "The implication of the word is wrong." Sorry, it is how modern English works. We are meant to take that into account. I am a native speaker of English. If I am seeing that implication others will, and so we need another solution.
• "you mean 'not all science' in a historical context" Your third bullet is impossible to parse. Can you explain your point please?
• The second sentence you cite seems fine to me, and is consistent with what I am saying, but it only says "often characterized by", so it does not define what unites all forms of scientific method, which is something we need in the opening lines. What unites all forms of scientific method is that they aim to be systematically careful to avoid bias (ie they are systematically sceptical), and an important aspect of this is that modern scientific method always avoids explanations which rely on unobservable things (i.e. metaphysical explanations). In other words, scientific method uses observations. In other words scientific method is empirical, not metaphysical. (Empirical science is not the same as empiricism, just to be clear. Empiricism is a supposed position about empirical science.) Notice that there are various ways to word these things. As editors our job is to pick clear wording. In these notes I am just trying to note the elements I think are required.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:18, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

There is a link included above. ~ JackTheSecond (talk) 22:21, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

Thanks. I think one concern is already clear, which is the word "scholarly". Personally I think one aspect of modern science, in contrast to previous science, is that it is less clearly distinct from practical technology (or artifice, to use the classical term). Shoe makers were different from classical philosophers/scientists, because they admitted their ignorance about what caused things. Shoemakers, like many engineers, rely on whatever they have seen works. Modern science no longer draws a big red line between these people and science. It no longer claims deeper understanding to be necessary. It is also just trying to work out what works. It is in other words less scholarly, and more practical. I also worry that you are pushing the text into a direction where modern science becomes Popperian, and all about testing hypotheses. It can be like this, but as far as defining modern science I think Popper and his ilk created no long lasting consensus, because their vision of science never matched how real scientists work. Anyway, for now I hope others will also consider and comment before we go further.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:31, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

@Andrew Lancaster I agree with retiring the discussion for the moment.

• On the question of the third point: You wrote that not all science is "modern science" and I was clarifying that I had not understood that previous. Doesn't matter, though, since I chose to retire the argument.
• You wrote: it does not define what unites all forms of scientific method. An issue with that is that there is significant disagreement with there being such a thing. But I recognise that you mean that we should write a Wikipedia lead a certain way, and agree with the assessment.

JackTheSecond (talk) 22:35, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

I did not say anything about retiring any arguments. I am calling for more people to give their feedback, in the hope my feedback is now clear enough to help point to some potential concerns. As you say, this is a topic where it is difficult to define the consensus about what unifies the topic itself. I guess I am suggesting that rather than using controversial ideas like those of Popper, scientific method can be uncontroversially be identified as something which defines modern science. Just to reflect on your third bullet, what makes modern science special is connected on the one hand to the split between science and philosophy, and on the other hand to the blurring of lines between science and technology. We've mentioned the question of what non-modern science is and I've suggested that one aspect of non-modern science is that it sees itself as different in kind from practical arts and technical methods. In contrast, some of the precedents for modern science are to be found in the arts and crafts, which are also in a sense methodical, and reliant upon physical observations. The avoidance of metaphysics and reliance upon observation are a big deal which seem to me to more or less enter into every discussion about what unifies modern science and makes it seek "method".--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:17, 6 April 2024 (UTC)

I agree with Andrew Lancaster that calling it a "scholarly method" is not quite right, as I said above at 18:30, 20 March 2024 before Andrew joined the discussion. Why not just cut the adjective altogether: "The scientific method is a method for..." Biogeographist (talk) 21:55, 6 April 2024 (UTC)

Yes maybe, but how to continue that sentence? What unites different ideas about scientific method might perhaps be something about the aim, but then again I suppose we can't just continue that sentence by using the word truth or certainty, can we, because that is also not something everyone would agree upon. But maybe we can use a negative wording. For example such method always aims to avoid or ameliorate the effects of bias, or other sources of error, by working in a careful and systematic way. Also, given the lack of consensus about the details of one ultimate scientific method, should there really be a "the"?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 22:18, 6 April 2024 (UTC)

should there really be a "the"? That basically seems to be a lie to children, perhaps harmless if the lack of consensus can be clarified later? Or do a more complicated lead that doesn't try to start with a (too simple) definition, as in the SEP article, which starts by talking about "The study of scientific method...". Biogeographist (talk) 22:24, 6 April 2024 (UTC)

Yeah, the SEP article works quite hard at not actually defining what 'scientific method' is exactly. It's an Encyclopedia on philosophy written by philosophers though, unspecific statements that encourage thought are kind of their thing... JackTheSecond (talk) 23:10, 6 April 2024 (UTC)

Yes, after I posted that sentence about the SEP, I was reviewing in my mind all the ways that the SEP article is different from this one. The SEP article is not such a good point of comparison, although it does what it does well. The lead section of this article needs to reflect what this article actually says. Biogeographist (talk) 00:26, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

I think the SEP approach or something similar might be necessary. In any case, scientific method is not in fact a single method and so we should not imply that it is. It is instead an unclear goal, which has varied over time, and between different proponents and practitioners. It is in a sense a vision (or group of similar visions) concerning how science should be done in order to avoid biased interpretations of observations.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:11, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

A possible first sentence for consideration, attempting to avoid jargon or specific controversial positions, at least for the first sentence: Scientific method is any sceptical systematic approach used by scientists, especially modern scientists, when they interpret physical evidence.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:50, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

You will not be surprised to learn that this psychologist objects to "physical evidence."  ;^) Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 16:18, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

Here is my attempt: The scientific method is a set of principles and procedures for acquiring knowledge through careful observation, inducing falsifiable hypotheses from those observations, and, in most disciplines, designing experiments to test the hypotheses, refining hypotheses based on experimental findings, and inferring tentative truths from the observations and experiments. Mark D Worthen PsyD (talk) [he/him] 17:25, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

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