Talk:Dieppe Raid

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Untitled[edit]

27 Oct 2005 - not only should the "R" in "raid" be capitalized, but it in military usage, the names of operations always appear in all-caps, ie Operation JUBILEE, etc. - Michael Dorosh



Maybe I linkified it a little too much? Opinions?


Looks fine to me. Adam Bishop 06:22, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
I agree. It's defnitely not too much. Angela 06:32, Nov 8, 2003 (UTC)

Ok, thanks! :)

Why is the "R" in Raid capitalized? RickK 08:06, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)

That seems to be common usage, judging from what Google turns up. Major battles usually seem to be capitalized: Normandy Invasion, Battle of the Bulge (hard to find examples that aren't just "Battle of <place name>"!)

Changed CEF to a generic "Canadian forces". As far as I can tell, the CEF (Canadian Expeditionary Force) served in WWI, not WWII.

"Casualty figures vary, but of the 6,090 men, according to one source..." - which should be cited IMHO. TwoOneTwo, I choose you! ;)


I have added some figures specifically about Canadians from a very good source, i can be more specific if anyone would like, i can not find out if it was 2211 (stated on pg 385 of the official hist of can in ww2) or 2210 (pg 389 in a chart), if anyone can figure this out feel free to revise my figures, i also stated the specific numbers of Fusiliers (584 not 600, not a big deal) - Neil McKay

Why bother with the +/- 1 clutter? Let's say "about". Beanbatch 08:02, 8 September 2005 (UTC)

What does LCT stand for "L...? Tank Carrier"? Mintguy 17:33, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)

Don't worry I've worked it out... Landing Craft Tank.

Wouldn't it be better to have the Commando links go directly to British Commandos instead of adding one-shot redirects?

I see we also now have links for several other units. Do we really want to have an article for every unit that participated, either in this battle, or all of WWII? Maybe in a military history wiki, but in a general-purpose encyclopedia? I think it's too fine a level of detail.

Er.. what is wrong with having an aritcle for every unit that took part in WWII? we have individual articles about individual Disney characters for chrissake! Mintguy 18:15, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)
Well, there must be hundreds if not thousands. And why just WWII? How about every unit that participated in WWI, and the Franco-Prussian War, and the American Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War, and... you see my point. There have been thousands of wars in human history, most with a great many divisions, platoons, or whatever. I think it would be going into too much detail to have an article about every one, even just for WWII. My rule of thumb is, if there is no website anywhere on the web dedicated to a particular subject, there shouldn't be an article either.
Now, celebrated units are another matter. Certainly we should have articles about particularly distinguished, famous units, just as we do for particularly distinguished, famous people and places. But we don't have articles about everybody who ever ran for the Senate, or who ever ran a large corporation, and we shouldn't have them about every group of soldiers who fought in a war.
I didn't suggest that we have pages about indivudual platoons, but Regiments are significant sized unites many of whom have historical significance. take a look at http://www.regiments.org/milhist/na-canada/lists/cargxref.htm I don't see why we should have a similar level of detail. Mintguy 03:20, 9 Nov 2003 (UTC)


we don't have articles about everybody who ever ran for the Senate - well, not yet, anyway. Have you seen Historic Members of the United States Senate? RickK 19:43, 8 Nov 2003 (UTC)

would somebody please take a look at the first section of the article. reference is made the the 'joint chiefs of staff' this should read the 'combined chiefs of staff'. the joint chiefs were essentially american and the 'combined chiefs' consisted of the british imperial general staff together with the joint chiefs. both staffs were based in washington D.C.. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bruce Condell (talkcontribs) 07:20, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

Calgary Highlander involvement[edit]

Please do not delete references to the Calgary Highlanders who were at the Dieppe Raid. Someone keeps deleting it. They were in LCT 6. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.70.160.153 (talk) 20:21, 21 July 2010 (UTC)


Footnotes?[edit]

I deleted this:

(R.Nisbet "Roosevelt and Stalin: The Failed Courtship" 1989)
(D.Reynolds)

And rewrote this:

"One example of this retrospective justification and M.I.6 "spin" was the undeniable fact that "By the end of 1942, Hitler had at least thirty-three German divisions along the Atlantic wall ... in the belief that ... the British intended to strike again." (W. Stevenson "A Man Called Intrepid" 1976)."

I have a problem with the notes showing no page number, and the elliptical quote is inappropriate. Moreover, if it is "spin", what is "undeniable" about it? Also, "spin" is inappropriate usage for an encyclopedia. Anyone who wants to restore the notes with specific citation, & preferably a superscript number, go ahead. Trekphiler 09:18, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

VC[edit]

If 3 were awarded, who were the recipients? Surely this is worth mentioning, for the UK's highest award for bravery... Trekphiler 09:32, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Done

The Three V.C. recipients were: Cec Merritt from Vancouver C.O. of the SSR. Rev. J.W. Foote attached to the RHLI & Pat Porteous of No.4 Commando — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.67.235.114 (talk) 00:25, 21 January 2014 (UTC)

Leadership[edit]

I added critcism of Roberts' based on Hughes-Wilson's Military Intelligence Blunders & Cover-Ups, & of small units based on a TV documentary I've seen (the title of which escapes me...) claiming many were "led from behind", while those who were "led from the front" succeeded in comparable conditions. Trekphiler 09:41, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Small unit leadership will need a better source than that - cowardice is a strong accusation to make. I'd recommend pulling the reference to this until you find a decent source. I do know that at it is claimed that at least one boatload of Royals refused to disembark until a naval officer pulled a revolver on them - I'd have to find the source before using it on the page though; an issue of the Canadian Infantry Journal discusses it in detail.

Mike Myers thinking of a film about Dieppe[edit]

Ive heard that Mike Myers would like to make a movie about the Dieppe Raid, which war is his life-long passion. Would it be to add this into this page? paat 23:10, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

If it's made then I don't see why not.

POW policies; killing shackled prisoners[edit]

Why is there no mention of the second reason that Hitler issued the shackle order, i.e. Dead German POWs found with their hands tied behind their back?

http://uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=47

After the raid there were reports of German POWs’ bodies washing ashore with their hands tied and of captured documents stating that German prisoners were to have their hands tied behind their back.


http://www.oliverchronicle.com/1996_19.htm

The second page in Ross's prison camp album reveals a simple line drawing he created to depict the shackles that bound him and thousands of other prisoners; underneath the picture are two dates - Dec. 2, 1942 and Nov. 22, 1943 - which mark the time they spent in chains.
"This was a reprisal, a payback" Ross explains. "When the bodies of German prisoners washed up on the beaches they were found in handcuffs, so the Germans took this as a license to shackle us."


By the way; here one can follow the discussions in the British government in the following months on how to resolve the prisoner shackling issue. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_1_transcript.pdf

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/cab_195_2_transcript.pdf

W.M.(42)137th Meeting 9th October 1942.
  • M/L.

Don’t go in for any further reprisal yet.

  • L.P.

Distinction betwn. manacling men in custody and tying up men not yet in custody.

  • S/Doms.

Canadians think we have put ourselves in a false posn. by concealing the truth.

  • Adam.

What we thght wrong was the advance instrn. to tie hands in every case to prevent destruction of documents wthr. or not any need to do so to prevent escape.

  • S/Doms.

Before any other action taken, we shd. invite views of Dom. Govts.

  • L.P.

We shd. now give more informn. for our own people, about what happened at Dieppe.

Stor stark7 13:53, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

According to the personal accounts of L/Cpl Gene LaBonte of the Essex Scottish on October the 8th 1942 until sometime in November the men of his unit were bound with “Red Cross ropes” the chains replaced the ropes at that time an remain on these men until November 22nd 0f 1944 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.216.186.138 (talk) 06:29, 9 July 2008 (UTC)

Hardly a major victory over Canada[edit]

Not sure this latest edit "was a major victory over Canada" reflects that it was a joint arms operation with the infantry mainly supplied by Canada and the marine and air elements mainly by UK. I think it should be referred to as Allied. Also I don't think the repulse of an attack of only Divisional size which was non-strategic can be described as a 'major victory' although possibly the attack could be described as a total failure (barring the lessons learned) Stephen Kirrage 11:53, 3 September 2006 (UTC)

Map needed[edit]

The description of the battle is quite good an interesting, however a map would be wonderful.

References[edit]

"While dozens of books have been written on the subject, the three titles above are generally considered the best. The first contains a great deal of first person detail; the second is a detailed and very scholarly look at high level planning almost exclusively, and the last is a mixture of both first person account (Whitaker was the only officer of his brigade to return from the main beach unwounded and later commanded the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry in Northwest Europe) and scholarly history. Villa's book offers up tantalizing theories on deliberate leaks of information to the Germans, and attempts to prove the thesis that Admiral Mountbatten mounted the raid without approval from above. Whitaker's book attempts to prove that valuable lessons were learned at Dieppe and may be forgiven for some measure of bias due to his personal involvement in the historical action. Robertson's book is the most even-handed but suffers from being written before many files were available to researchers, especially those relating to Ultra."

I've moved this here because it seems like a personal opinion being inserted. However, I don't know much about historical sources, so I didn't outright delete it. --Wafulz 01:38, 1 February 2007 (UTC)

Decisive German Victory?[edit]

This is begining to annoy me. Stop writing "Decisive German Victory" for every battle the Germans won...THEY DIDN'T WIN THE WAR, stop using the word "Decisive". Decsive would means: putting an end to controversy; crucial or most important. This victory would have been decisive if the Germans would have as a result of it (for example) ended up conquering Britain. This battle was a "Strategic" German victory. Bogdan 03:28, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

I agree; in terms of the war as a whole it decided nothing, so cannot be described as 'decisive'. Perhaps the original contributor was trying to say 'comprehensive' or perhaps 'complete' victory, meaning that in no aspect of the engagement did the Allies gain an advantage? Stephen Kirrage talk - contribs 13:50, 24 March 2007 (UTC)
I agree, it was a loss for the Allies, but it had no consequences whatsoever for the remainder of the war, hence decisive does not apply. Arnoutf 20:08, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Thank you. Bogdan 02:26, 6 April 2007 (UTC)

The article is about the battle, not the war as the whole. The operation was a miserable failure for the Allies. It may have delayed D-Day for 12 months. That is a decisive German victory, in the battle. Grant | Talk 03:12, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
We're now arguing about the use of English. Decisive implies important consequences beyond the battle itself - Stalingrad was decisive, 2nd Alamein was decisive, Dieppe was not. Often a decisive victory is also a comprehensive one and so the two words are sometimes (incorrectly) used interchangeably. Dieppe was comprehensive, not decisive because it did not in any meaningful way decide the course of subsequent events Stephen Kirrage talk - contribs 17:26, 6 April 2007 (UTC)
Name a single major Commando operation after Dieppe. Umm...isn't the fact that you can't a decisive victory in itelf?139.48.25.61 (talk) 18:47, 5 August 2008 (UTC)

naval action[edit]

The naval action where the invasion forces stumbled across a german coastal convoi did not involve S-Boats, but rather converted trawlers and whalers. Nothing was torpedoed anywhere, but it was rather a very confused gun action fought with automatic Flak guns at close ranges. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by JCRitter (talkcontribs) 16:33:02, August 19, 2007 (UTC).

No Maps[edit]

Makes no sense to have a military article without maps or air photos of the battlefield.68.5.64.178 19:41, 20 August 2007 (UTC)

Assessment[edit]

I have assessed this as B Class, as it contains a large amount of detail and organization, although it requires more in-line citations. I have assessed this as mid importance as I do feel that the subject of this article plays a strong role in understanding Canada. Cheers, CP 22:10, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

I, I, I. Who else did you consult? -- quota (talk)
He doesn't need to, and B-Class is the correct categorization. If detailed in-line citations can be provided, this article would be A-Class pending GA or FA nomination, as it is, it can't be better than B-Class. "Mid" importance is also pretty standard, if it was Vimy Ridge then "High" or "Top", but this is ultimately just one battle in our history. <eleland/talkedits> 02:02, 17 November 2007 (UTC)

Scandal?[edit]

I thought about adding this to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Military_scandals

Do it if you want. --84.234.60.154 (talk) 17:01, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

contributions by military historians/et al[edit]

The Dieppe raid was a tragedy and a disaster for the allied forces who took part in this operation, which consisted, mainly, of Canadian forces. However, this does not excuse the poor standards of reporting in the Wiki-article on Dieppe and the biased vocabulary. Would somebody please instill standards which are normally associated with a basic university degree (mod-history 101) and, at least, tighten up the text. Note: for whoever is interested: editing does not consist only of removing tracts of text which you disagree with. It also includes revisions of policy, grammar, punctuation, vocabulary, content, voice and substance; as it would be the case if any of you had found work on a newspaper as a Sub-Editor. I assume that we are all using the same University of Chicago Style Book (the standard work). If not, please get a copy before meddling with text. I also assume that 'wiki-editors' are experts in the fields of the articles which they are editing and will, at least, be able to show past higher studies work in the area which they are working on. This is not a collection of blogs for the inexpert, or the poorly literate!! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.194.53.104 (talk) 21:52, 5 April 2008 (UTC) bruce (talk) 13:00, 7 April 2008 (UTC)

Bruce, thanks for your concern for the quality article. Probably the best place to start to understand why the article has these problems is the ["About Wikipedia"] page. To address one of the issues you raise, editors do not need to be experts, or even knowledgeable about the subject at all -- a grade school dropout has the same editing privileges as a university professor. Other editors are unlikely to ask -- or care -- about anyone's academic credentials. The same applies to literary credentials -- my kindergarten-age son has the same editing ability as a professor with one hundred peer-reviewed articles on her resume. There is no guarantee that any particular edit will improve the article, which is why one's peers have the authority to revert to a previous version (although, of course, there is no guarantee any particular revert will improve things, either). The intent of the model is that, over time, knowledge will drive out ignorance, and good writing will triumph over bad, but again, that's not certain. Regarding the University of Chicago Style Book -- yes, it is standard some places, but not here. Wikipedia has its own standards, again developed by consensus. If you enjoy the challenge, you can help improve the article by editing for content or style, or by improving the community standards and guidelines. If not, you might be more comfortable with a more conventional encyclopedia, owned by some particular body, who chooses staff for the project based on their expertise, who decides on an editorial and production schedule, and with articles written, edited and peer-reviewed by professionals. But please don't take offense that this is not what Wikipedia is. Darkstar8799 (talk) 20:20, 20 July 2010 (UTC) Darkstar8799 (talk) 20:22, 20 July 2010 (UTC)
Just to note the previous comment is over two years old and bruce may not be watching the article. --Jim Sweeney (talk) 20:33, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

In the paragraph:

Canadian assault (para) incomplete location reference[edit]

Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee'Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160 Bodies of a Canadian soldier and a U.S. Army Ranger lying among damaged landing craft and "Churchill" tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee' Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160

The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore.

The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.

The Black Watch landing is the first mention of Blue Beach as a location, but it is referred to as if it were mentioned previously. It is not. One might assume that Blue Beach is at Puys, but that is only implied.

Please clarify this. Did the Black Watch in fact land at Puys, and is that where Blue beach is? (As is implied by the text) Or is Blue beach somewhere else, perhaps close to Puys?

(I lost an uncle at Dieppe, I am proud to say that he single handedly took out a machine gun nest and got mention for it in The Shame and The Glory.)

--Tsingi (talk) 19:15, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

3.1 Air Forces[edit]

The article states 200 german fighter planes whereas the linked article (like most other sources) about the Focke Wulf FW190 states 115 fighters. That's a vast difference in numbers.

Also i cannot find any other sources confirming the appraisement that the allied fighter planes where at the extent of their operating range, giving the Luftwaffe fighters de facto numerical or/and air superiority over the battlefield. This is even entirely unlogical considering that one of the targets of the raid was to lure the Luftwaffe into a large encounter.

On the other hand i miss any reference of the factor - again i refer to the Fw190 article - that the Focke Wulf Fw190 was at that time a scourge for the RAF, outperforming the Spitfire in almost every aspect. It seems appropriate to conclude the RAF fighters actually HAD a decent numerical superiority over the battlefield but took a severe beating nevertheless (RAF fighter losses 106 vs. Luftwaffe fighter losses 25 including crashes, once again refering to the Fw190 article).

Flip a wig (talk) 19:44, 17 April 2008 (UTC)

Page vandalism[edit]

See the line: Them damned Brits did not plan on success and sent the Canucks through a mass slaughter to appease those Commies in the East. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 201.229.40.153 (talk) 00:46, 25 May 2008 (UTC)

Dates and numbers of casualties[edit]

I have corrected dates and casualty figures which were off. For example, 1946 was liberally used as the year of the raid, and zeros had been added to casualty figures for some unknown reason.

Involvement of Poland[edit]

I think good idea is adding Poland to list of participants in this operation. In oppose to Free France, which send 15 soldiers, Poland send Destroyer - ORP Ślązak, which shot down 4 aircrafts, (2x Do-217, 1x Me-109 and 1x Ju-88), together with other British destroyer sunk German Patrol Boat and carry shore bombardment operations. Also in battle fought Polish Air Force in number of 5 SQNs (302nd, 303th, 306th, 309th and 317th). Together it will be roughly more than 300 soldiers, 20 times more than Free France. 94.101.16.13 (talk) 23:24, 19 January 2010 (UTC)

in oppose to Poland Free French are overlooked inthere, the Free Fench were also pilots of the All-Free French squadrons that are not listed here. just like French casualties:0 listed, while there is already french pilot Emile Fayolle who was shot by AA during the operation and nobody cares, poles included. Cliché Online (talk) 03:28, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

why canadians[edit]

Is there any source talking about the reasons why the british sended canadians to this "suicide" attack ?Blablaaa (talk) 06:09, 18 July 2010 (UTC)

while overflewing the article i missed the sentenceBlablaaa (talk) 06:14, 18 July 2010 (UTC)
The operation was originally conceived as a means of proving to the Americans that any assault on the Atlantic Wall was impossible at that time. With America having recently entered the war some American generals were pushing for an immediate landing in France. The British felt that they were drastically underestimating the task involved, and so attempted to persuade the Americans that a landing was impossible until specialised equipment had been designed and produced, as well as a much larger number of invasion troops than the Americans had envisaged, been obtained. For one thing the necessity of providing a port to supply the invasion force was something the British regarded as vital. Certain Americans refused to believe this and continued to push the CCOS for immediate landings. The British, knowing that any landing at the present time would be beaten off, staged the Dieppe landing to prove to the Americans how impractical any landings would be. The original plan was to use all UK personnel but the Canadians were pushing to be used in action, and so they were chosen, and eventually made up the greater part of the personnel involved. The stated aims of the landing were deliberately limited and without knowing the actual purpose (stated above) may well seem puzzling, not to say wasteful in lives and materiel.
The invisible IP above is spouting nonsense about the raid being conceived to "prove" something to American generals - for one thing, the U.S. JCS made it very clear to Roosevelt that no 2nd front on the European mainland was possible in 1942 - and Roosevelt AND Churchill communicated this in no uncertain terms to Stalin. I don't know who these loose-canon (unspecified) "American generals" are supposed to be, but they'd have had to have been extremely naive. HammerFilmFan (talk) 20:31, 19 August 2012 (UTC)
To understand the difficulty of landing (and staying) in Occupied France one only needs to see the extent of the eventual preparations for the June 1944 Operation Overlord - this sort of vast undertaking just wasn't possible in 1942 - indeed it took two years to prepare for it. It was probably the most technically difficult and complicated operation of the entire war.
It also could be used as proof to Stalin that the West was doing its best to defeat Hitler. Having said that I'm not sure the operation wasn't expected to be a failure and that's why Canadians were used (losing thousands of Brits would have been very unpopular in the U.K. to say the least, whereas Canadian voters have very little say in removing British ministers from office). The Canadians were set up in my opinion, with some Brits and a small number of Americans involved (I don't think Canada had suffered any major losses in the war up to then, so there may have been a sentiment that it was their "turn" to pay the piper). (It would be interesting if future historians ever uncovered any documentation along these lines, although if true I'm sure it was the kind of thing that would have been kept out of print as much as possible.)Historian932 (talk) 16:00, 14 January 2012 (UTC)
Churchill was very aware of the risks of disproportionate losses of Dominions troops posed to the support from the Empire which, while it was generally unwavering, was not without its problems, especially with the change in government in NZ, and various issues in India. The Admiralty could not afford to risk a capital ship at this stage, the perilous superiority at sea was critical to all the allied efforts. Remember that the forces landed were 4 times the size of the defending forces. Landing craft were one of the most important constraints for Overlord and even once the foot-hold had been established, a constant stream of supply ships, adapted to unload directly on the mulberries, continued for a very considerable time. Without this raid it is possible that D-Day would have been under-resourced, as the pressures to "go early" were not inconsiderable. It's also worth noting that the Germans were constrained to keep a significant number of divisions on the "Atlantic Wall" which were therefore unavailable for the Eastern front, or other operations. All the best: Rich Farmbrough17:56, 3 December 2014 (UTC).

Calgary Highlander involvement[edit]

Someone keeps removing the mention of the Calgary Highlanders at Dieppe. This involvement is porved by the Mention in Despatches. Please leave in.70.70.160.153 70.70.160.153 (talk) 15:01, 21 July 2010 (UTC) (talk) 14:59, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

Actually I'm having a little diffculty fully substantiating that they were Mentioned (though they were undoubtedly there). http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/details-result.asp?Edoc_Id=7692664 and http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/details-result.asp?Edoc_Id=7692663 suggests the Mentions were gazetted on 22 December, which would be The London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 35830. p. 5549. 22 December 1942. This has a DCM to Harry Wichtacz for Dieppe, but that's the only award listed. Also the Clagary Highlanders officer who was killed ashore was a staff officer, not holding a regimetnal appointment, so it seems a little misleading to mention him. David Underdown (talk) 15:51, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
So what you saying is they provided a platoon that stayed on the transports ? I think this is overdue weight as they were assigned to the division and are included in the OOB --Jim Sweeney (talk) 19:04, 21 July 2010 (UTC)
The Calgary Highlander webpage itself lists Lyster & Pittaway as being Mentioned in Despatches. See: http://www.calgaryhighlanders.com/honours/mentionindespatches.htm 70.70.160.153 (talk) 20:28, 21 July 2010 (UTC) As to the issue of staying on the transports, they were fully engaged in battle, as the deaths of the naval gunners on board demonstrated. Members of the platoon (Anderson, Pittaway, and Lyster) manned the naval gun and were credited with an enemy aircraft kill. Why is it "misleading" to mention ANYONE killed ashore?
The National Archives in the UK list
Recommendation for Award for Lyster, W L
Rank: Serjeant
Service No: M11342
Regiment: The Calgary Highlanders
Award: Mention
at http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/details-result.asp?Edoc_Id=7692663&queryType=1&resultcount=5 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.70.160.153 (talk) 02:42, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
No I just think in a divisional sized battle its overdue weight to single out one platoon. Unless they did something outstanding. Even then it would possibly be one or two men not the 30+ in the platoon --Jim Sweeney (talk) 07:28, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
I'm inclined to agree with Jim. I feel it's misleading to mention Insinger as he was not functioning as a regimental officer, but in a staff role - he could have been from any regiment. The National Archives documents are the recommendations - I've found others in the file before where no award was ultimately made. The recommendations themselves don't actually have a Gazette date on them, which is unusual in my experience - I suspect the date shown on the info page has been taken from another docuemtn in the same "batch". The definitive record is the London Gazette, and I've tried all sorts of searches, and simply can't find either Pittaway or Lyster - unfortunatley the search engine is not 100% reliable sicne there are inevitably errors in the process of converting scanned images to text. David Underdown (talk) 09:42, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
I have found the certificate of mention in Despatches for W.L.Lyster, indicating it was published in the London Gazette, 2 October 1942. It is signed by the Secretary of War, the signature I cannot make out, but it looks like, 'P.J.Grigg'. If you forward an e-mail address I can send a copy, or upload to Wikipedia. I cannot find a copy of the one for B.Pittaway. Stuart lyster (talk) 15:37, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
No need, with the date I've been able to track down the gazette online - The London Gazette: (Supplement) no. 35729. p. 4330. 2 October 1942. Both are named, and it's clearly stated that all the Mentions are for Dieppe. In fact this Gazette seems to be the main set of rewards for the raid, it's already listed in teh article for the VCs, but I didn't think to look in that yesterday. Can't see why the name search wouldn't work anyway, I did also trying to search on their army numebrs, which would have worked if I'd thought to try without the M prefix on the front. David Underdown (talk) 16:10, 22 July 2010 (UTC)
The above does raise a point in that the naval action is not mentioned at all, most of the losses will have been landing craft but there is at least one picture in the IWM database of the destroyer going down.--Jim Sweeney (talk) 10:40, 22 July 2010 (UTC)

Intro quibble[edit]

The intro says the navy lost 34 ships, but the figure seems a lot less impressive when you learn that 33 of them were only landing craft. Should those be counted as ships? You couldn't sail one to Rio... --Piledhigheranddeeper (talk) 02:50, 19 August 2010 (UTC)

How did the Germans know?[edit]

I seems that the British broadcast their intentions over the airwaives. Google News list 12 related stories from around June 9, see here. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 17:41, 10 September 2010 (UTC)

  • The article discusses that the Germans seemed to be prepared for general rather than specific attacks on the coast. Part of the official explanation of this raid was to assist the Russians by drawing German forces into France for its defence and thus making them unavailable elsewhere. I have no specific information, though my interest is fast being raised, but logically it makes sense to do anything you could to make the Germans believe an attack was imminent somewhere, which seems to be what they did. Sandpiper (talk) 13:12, 18 April 2015 (UTC)

Citation templates[edit]

I have restored the {{Citation}} templates. They are the Wikipedia norm. If you do not like the way the the references differ, please consider mowing the other sources to templates as well. An please – do not ask to be nominated for the lamest edit wars page! -- Petri Krohn (talk) 10:32, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

They are not a norm, neither recommended nor approved and when there are errors in author, title, publisher, date and format, then they are changed. The entire article is written in a bibliographic style and that is the norm, once established, other editors are expected to use a consistent style. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 13:43, 11 September 2010 (UTC).

Removed unsourced material[edit]

I have deleted a claim* concerning a link between the shackling of German EPWs and the Commando order that has been questioned since August of last year. It currently posses as much credibility as the statement "Some mathematicians believe that 1+1=3" without a sorce as to which would think so.

  • "It is however believed to have contributed to Hitler's decision to issue the Commando Order later that year." — Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.182.76.119 (talk) 19:33, 13 August 2011 (UTC)

Cemetery[edit]

"the headstones have been placed back-to-back in double rows, the norm for a German war cemetery, but unlike any other Commonwealth War Graves Commission site. "

Lyness RN Cemetery is laid out like that and I have seen the CWGC section of other cemeteries like that. jmb (talk) 00:33, 21 September 2011 (UTC)

Debate over German foreknowledge[edit]

There was another curious incident. In a book called (I think) "Dieppe - Dawn of Decision" there was a reproduction of a newspaper advertisement which appeard a little before the raid, mentioning Dieppe, and showing a woman gathering roses. But the roses' stems were of barbed wire, and she was cutting them with wire cutters. Again, if I remember, it was investigated, but nothing suspicious was uncovered. Baska436 (talk) 03:10, 27 November 2011 (UTC)

Intended to fail?[edit]

Split from 'Pinch Raid' Argument

There is an alternative explanation, the raid was intended to fail.

-- Petri Krohn (talk) 00:40, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

  • No. It was just a cock up. The Allies had no chance of holding a bridgehead in France in 1942. Zilch. Zero. None. It was mounted in a desperate attempt to stop the USSR making a seperate peace with the nazis. Consider. This is august 1942. The Soviet army has been pushed back to the Volga. The oilfields are on the verge of being lost. In the ME, Rommel is only a 100 miles from the canal, and einsatzgruppen are being prepared to murder the Jewish population of the then named palestine. In the FE, things are still dangerously fluid, despite Midway. The battle of the atlantic is being lost. Some of the highest tonnage losses were in the spring-summer of 42.
The Allies were desperate. QED. Dieppe. Irondome (talk) 00:52, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Here is another source from today. A veteran of the battle is quoted:
“I came to the conclusion that the attack was meant to be a disaster. ... I’m absolutely certain it was intended to be a failure.”
-- Petri Krohn (talk) 01:09, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
P.S. – Another quote from the same source: Brigadier General Forbes West:
“I feel that from the day planning began, it was intended to be a failure,” ... “Perhaps not as costly a failure, but a failure nevertheless. The British were being pressed by the Russians and Americans to open a second front, so we were put in with the firm intention of being destroyed. Men at the Chiefs of Staff level would consider 4,000 casualties a small price to pay for convincing the Russians and Americans an invasion would be a disaster.”
--Petri Krohn (talk) 01:38, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
  • Nahh. It wont wash. And that first website looks a bit dodgy :) Irondome (talk) 01:16, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
The Allies NEVER had the intention of "holding a bridgehead" in this operation - that's why it was a Raid. QED. 99.245.11.41 (talk) 01:22, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Precisely. There was a doable plan to invade and hold the Cherbourg peninsula if the Sovs collapsed, think that was Operation Sledgehammer but it would have been carried out in the late autumn of 42. It was hoped that the invading force could create a lodgement and be reinforced over the winter of 42-43, but it was pretty desperate stuff. Even the Americans knew Operation Roundup was an impossibilty, so they would have supported Sledgehammer. Irondome (talk) 01:28, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Soooo ... I have no idea what that has to do with the Dieppe Raid being set up to fail. Anyway, this talk page shouldn't be for general discussion of the Dieppe Raid, but about the article.99.245.11.41 (talk) 01:39, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
I didnt say anything about it "being set up to fail" quite the opposite. If Dieppe had fallen then a bridgehead would have been created, de facto. The Allies would have taken their time to leave. I suggest roundup and sledgehammer be added to links at bottom. And maybe Conspiracy Theories LOL Seriously, I suggest another section, discussing this very point. I think we can reach consesnsus that it was merely a failed raid in force, and NOT some sacrificial, planned slaughter. Irondome (talk) 01:46, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
No, the Allies were never going to stay, so, again, there was never going to be a bridgehead. The 10th Panzer had been put on alert, and could have been there in hours - no time for "taking their time to leave". But, anyway, sorry, this article is no place for OR. If someone has credible sources proposing this, it could be included.99.245.11.41 (talk) 02:03, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Re: "were never going to stay" – Yes, but the raid is universally accepted to be a failure. The only question is why it failed. -- Petri Krohn (talk) 02:52, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
  • I will check for any sources that may discuss what was actually planned if Dieppe was captured, i.e the operational plan should discuss exploitation, demolitions, capture of intelligence. There would have been there the best part of a day if it had succeeded. Irondome (talk) 02:37, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
  • Where is the documentary evidence that the raid was designed to be a failure? Whatever the MOTIVATIONS of the plan, it was just a cock-up. The Allies didnt "plan" to be intercepted at sea, dooming the attack immediately, and they didnt "plan" to be shot to bits on the shingle. This is verging on Conspiracy Theories :) Irondome (talk) 00:58, 30 August 2012 (UTC)

Review of infobox required[edit]

Polish forces is not supported in article, and the Americans weren't involved either. --Walter Görlitz (talk) 05:31, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

Correction, after reading the article, the Americans were involved but their command is not mentioned in the infobox. Still not clear on Polish involvement. --Walter Görlitz (talk) 05:35, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
The Rangers appear to have been attached to No 4 Commando. Info box amended to reflect what info we have on that. Irondome (talk) 14:20, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

To be honest, I can't say I agree with the American listing n the infobox. 50 observers, who did not even constitute a combat unit, doesn't to my mind seem like a force or belligerent to include. Nations with far greater contributions are routinely excluded from infoboxes as they do not count as a significant enough element of the conflict. In this case, I'd also be tempted to remove the Poles form the infobox, as their contribution doesn't appear to have been any greater than the Norwegians or Belgians who also had RAF squadrons involved. Ranger Steve Talk 14:04, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

If the Rangers were only observers, they don't deserve mention as combatants. Especially if Belgians & Norwegians in RAF aren't mentioned. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:34, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
  • Please can you provide a source to back up your claim that US Rangers present were "observers" Irondome (talk) 15:49, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────Rangers at Dieppe: The First Combat Action of U.S. Army Rangers in World War II by Jim DeFelice, 2009, pp. 105, 111; the 49 "observers" made up of 44 troops and five officers from the 1st Ranger Battalion were assigned as observers but in the heat of battle, participated fully with at least three Rangers killed and several captured. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 16:02, 29 August 2012 (UTC).

  • Indeed. The Ranger force were on shore for 4 hours, and mostly provided heavy weapon support. They were fully committed. Hardly passive "observers". These were the first U.S ground forces to see combat in the European Theatre in WW2. Noteworthy. Keep as is. Irondome (talk) 16:12, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
The Rangers were drawn from a range of companies within first battalion and didn't fight as a single unit; rather they were attached to several other British and Canadian units. Even if they had fought as a complete unit, the addition of a platoon and a half worth of infantry to the infobox is excessive. This point was discussed some time ago in similar circumstances. I have never heard that they provided heavy weapon support. Can you ref that? Ranger Steve Talk 16:17, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
  • www.thedropzone.org/europe/raids/koons.html. Short interview with Frank Koons, Ist ranger Btn. Groups of 4 or so Rangers appear to have been attached to Marine platoons. They appear not to have trained with the British units prior to the op, due to time constraints. There is no indication that they were not there for anything but direct combat. Koons operated a Boys anti- tank rifle from a barn. They appear to have pitched in and helped where needed. Irondome (talk) 16:30, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
He says he was in a barn with men armed with a Boys rifle. That's quite different to saying that the Rangers provided heavy weapons support. I'm not contesting that they pitched in, but the addition of 50 men to a landing force of some 5,000 doesn't constitute much of a contribution. The fact remains that this was a joint British/Canadian op, with a handful of American soldiers attached to British and Canadian units. They didn't contribute to the planning and they didn't supply any formation to the Order of Battle. I can't see any justification for including them in the belligerent box - although I wouldn't dispute including them in the strength box. Ranger Steve Talk 16:42, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

But they should certainly be mentioned in the body of the article, expanded to state this was the first ground engagement of US troops in the European theatre. Its noteworthy. How about a note by Belligerent or strength box making a note of that point?Irondome (talk) 16:45, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

It's fine in the article. I'm sure there's a lot more info that can be included on the Ranger participation (there's very little at the moment), but that doesn't justify mis-classing them as a major contributor in the infobox. At present, it makes it look as if this was a joint British/Canadian/US operation. It wasn't. Ranger Steve Talk 16:53, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
  • Concur. Removed from Belligerent box. Irondome (talk) 16:57, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
  • Added US to strengths box. I think its ok there. Irondome (talk) 18:08, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
I think that looks much better. I've modified the word order a weeny bit though, as it makes more grammatical sense that way. The other question is the Poles. I see they did contribute a destroyer as well, but I'm not sure on the need to list them under belligerents. From my understanding of the Polish armed forces during the war this destroyer wouldn't have been a RN unit, so does anyone think it could it be listed/clarified under strengths instead? Ranger Steve Talk 21:09, 29 August 2012 (UTC)
  • A tricky one. Suggest Polish Armed Forces in the West listed in strengths box. Im assuming that would be the Polish destroyer, the ORP Slazak, (ex Hunt- Class) the 80 or so Poles of No 10 Commando, and the Polish air assets that were in action, 303 and 317 Polish Fighter Squadrons. Dunno if thats an unacceptably high level of detail though. Irondome (talk) 21:30, 29 August 2012 (UTC)

'Pinch Raid' Argument[edit]

I've just seen the source video for the argument that the 'purpose' of the raid was to obtain an Enigma machine and documentation. I'm not convinced, although the video doesn't mention any primary sources. The Brits already had a fully-functional Enigma by Aug '42 (http://www.intelligentanswers.co.uk/index.php?topic=4544.0), so what would have been the point of mounting a Division-sized op to obtain one? Codebooks etc would have been more valuable though, clearly. In the video clip, a lot got made of the presence of Ian Fleming offshore, but the fact he was there is hardly news - he's mentioned in one book I've seen from '93.

I wonder, is this a case of desperately looking for a purpose behind the tragedy? I'm speculating because I haven't seen the sources that O'Keefe bases his argments on, but the argument that the purpose of Dieppe (as opposed to one of the objectives along the way) being to do with Enigma) is an after-the-fact justification as much as anything else. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Fulleraaron (talkcontribs) 19:43, 15 August 2012 (UTC)

From Wikipedia: "On 1 February 1942, the Enigma messages to and from Atlantic U-boats which Bletchley Park called Shark became significantly different from the rest of the traffic which they called Dolphin. This was because a new Enigma version had been brought into use. It was a development of the 3-rotor Enigma with the reflector replaced by a thin rotor and a thin reflector." Reading of U-Boat traffic wasn't re-established until December of 1942.99.245.11.41 (talk) 01:58, 19 August 2012 (UTC)
And how does a pinch from Dieppe's Heer command help BP read Kriegsmarine traffic? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 07:06, 19 August 2012 (UTC)
Well, the Kriegsmarine's M3 was based on the army's Enigma I, so ... yeah, I know, it's weak, but it's conceivable that the Allies were so desperate to crack the M4 that they were willing to take almost any chance.99.245.11.41 (talk) 17:58, 19 August 2012 (UTC)
I'm not a historian, but I find O'Keefe's argument compelling. The trouble is that it's not the usual way of presenting a serious account of his research and theories. But they appear to be well-researched and backed up by documentary evidence. The operation to recover codebooks, documentation or even a new Enigma machine itself would appear to be motivated by extreme desperation, once the three-rotor version had been replaced by a newer one, with the resultant increase in attacks on shipping by U-boats. Dieppe would certainly have been the nearest target which gave opportunity to steal this material. – Agendum (talk) 22:16, 19 August 2012 (UTC)
Supposedly the search plan for the raid has been found in the archives. This targets the Hotel Moderne, which had been commandeered by German Naval Intelligence. It might be assumed that they had one of the new 4-wheel Enigmas. Andy Dingley (talk) 01:41, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Hitting KM intel makes a certain amount of sense. (As for the Heer machine, don't forget, the Brits got an Enigma from the Poles.) I do think the conventional wisdom is correct, tho. This is a morale-builder & a demonstration of determination to stay in the fight, just as the equally ill-conceived, & equally buggered, Op Menace.
The proposition the Brits had the remotest intention of staying simply does not stand scrutiny. They hadn't the capacity to supply a force across the Channel. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 02:36, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
Having just seen the TV doc based on O'Keefe, I have to say, the proposition is nonsense. O'Keefe is making astounding leaps of conjecture, from the involvement of NID in intelligence gathering to being responsible for guiding the op; from raising an "intelligence commando" to using it as a central piece of an operation; from wanting to recover the 4-rotor Enigma to mounting a major operation essentially as a cover... Meanwhile, he completely ignores the fact recovery of documents & equipment would be routine practise, & ignores the fact Tunny (?) didn't need to be read clear to avoid U-boats, when the mere fact they were so garrulous made them vulnerable to DF. If this is the caliber of the research, I'd discount the claims as hogwash. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 04:56, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
As Tunny was completely unrelated to tactical U boat operations, I'd question just where the "hogwash" is.
O'Keefe appears to have turned up documentary evidence that puts several pieces together to indicate there was a second, even greater, intel purpose behind Dieppe. It took place at a time of utter crisis at Bletchley. It also explains some otherwise bizarre aspects of the OOB, such as why a barely seaworthy river gunboat like Locust was tasked with such a central role, and a role with almost no value to the beach landing other than to quickly retrieve personnel from the centre of Dieppe, if it hadn't been for Locust's shallow draft and ability to cross most of the likely barriers to the harbour. Now much beyond this is conjecture, but that's O'Keefe's problem and we just have to report appropriately. If you should happen to find a telex in the PRO from Churchill to Welchman saying "Chill dude, losing Ultra is no big problem", then please cite it, but until then we have it on excellent authority that there was a major panic over the 4 rotor machine making the bombes unworkable. Andy Dingley (talk) 14:43, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
♠"Tunny was completely unrelated " I may have misidentified it, not looking it up, first...
♠O'Keefe may, indeed, have uncovered an additional objective to JUBILEE.
♠For an intel codo to ride along would surprise me not one bit. It was fairly standard in the Pacific for the intel weenies to inform the operators of what docs & gear were worth looking for, & worth keeping.
♠It's a hell of a leap from that to it being the primary objective. If it was the primary objective, the op wouldn't have looked like JUBILEE. It would have looked like Bruneval, or Telemark--or "The Guns of Navarone".
♠As for the "panic", I'm not going to say senior Brits weren't in a lather about it. I am saying the influence of Enigma on the outcome was overstated, & their fears were overblown. Don't forget, this is the same crowd who seriously considered abandoning convoy at the very brink of defeat of the U-boat...& the very people who'd failed to employ their resources most effectively, thereby precipitating the crisis. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:49, 20 August 2012 (UTC)
It has long been known that Dieppe was "like Bruneval", because of Pourville. That's opportunism, and the tasking of a small detachment. The O'Keefe claim, particularly as regards Locust, is rather bigger. Andy Dingley (talk) 16:53, 20 August 2012 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── The claim made by David O'Keefe has some merit in that original source documents were obtained and echoing Andy's thoughts, with a bit of revision, the "pinch" mission may have been a "secondary" not "second" goal of the Dieppe Raid. The Indiana Jones treatment, however, of the docu-drama shown on History Channel is not as convincing. The role of O'Keefe as resident military historian on at least four other documentaries, may or may not lend credence to his assertions of a "find." FWiW Bzuk (talk) 17:42, 20 August 2012 (UTC).

♠I have no problem with the proposition of 30AU being attached, & Locust being a significant contribution. (I'd count that a "ridealong".) It's the History Channel's treatment of it, apparently based on O'Keefe, that it was the primary driver, which is unsupportable.
♠I do wonder if it wouldn't have been counterproductive; as soon as the Germans found the 4-rotor missing, they'd change the rotors & keys...
♠FYI, the Facebook page on the doc (found here) is deleting criticism of the proposition O'Keefe is advancing. There was a fairly extensive comment up a day or so ago. It's entirely gone, as are any critical remarks by the same poster. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:49, 22 August 2012 (UTC)
Worthy of note that Dr. Jack Granatstein apparently finds the proposition preposterous, or at least, not compelling - see his blog - and raises the important and simple question - why on earth would the Allies tip the Germans off that they have a working Enigma machine, by actually stealing one in such a manner that the Germans would know they had it? Kind of defeats the purpose of having technology the enemy doesn't realize you've got. Ridiculous that an encyclopedia article would use "some TV show" as evidence. Let O'Keefe publish his findings in a peer-reviewed, creditable journal first, then perhaps it would merit inclusion. It's nice that the Vancouver Sun believes O'Keefe has done his due diligence. Let his peers in the historical community now sign off, too.131.137.245.209 (talk) 02:55, 23 August 2012 (UTC)
Why is it "unsupportable"? O'Keefe is pretty clear that he found no reference to Dieppe in any communications prior to its discussion in many NID documents in early '42.99.245.11.41 (talk) 03:24, 23 August 2012 (UTC)
♠Granatstein's right, & I'd believe him before O'Keefe. This would be the height of stupidity (providing 30AU didn't make sure there were no survivors & there was evidence the building had been destroyed, which O'Keefe isn't saying). As for "peer reviewed", it's scheduled to come out in a book soon, so O'Keefe says on the Facebook page. I imagine it will get pretty scathing comment from historiographers.
♠"found no reference to Dieppe" It's unsupportable for the reasons stated. It's stupid, it's counterproductive, & it smacks of spy novel. Mounting a major landing as a cover for a snatch is something Fleming might've conceived in fiction; to get sensible officers to agree to it IRL is something else again.
♠This proposal is sexy, but unlikely. It's much more probable this was another dumb idea, on par with Dakar, designed to keep the Germans guessing & the Sovs & Americans persuaded the Brits were in to the end, & just like Dakar, it didn't go off as planned. Just as with the Pearl Harbor conspiracy, incompetence is more common. TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 06:05 & 06:10, 23 August 2012 (UTC)

The released documents themselves show that the attack on the Naval HQ to get anew model 4 wheel Enigma was objective NO2. The fact that planning for this attack was started early on before the attack developed into a major operation is very important. This is all consistent with the Enigma pinch being an early and a key objective. Churchill was always attracted to the unusual in operations. He was depending very heavily on Enigma to read enemy intentions. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.62.226.243 (talk) 21:28, 3 April 2013 (UTC)

Just saw a documentary on this, which is presumably the documentary referred to. Have to say I found it convincing and littered with references to original documentation supporting his case. Certainly these are oblique, but given the entire question of codebreaking was utmost secret, this is not surprising. The most convincing argument above against the raid being for the central aim of capturing a 4 rotor enigma and ancillary documentation is the question whether this could be done in secret without Germans realising it had taken place, which would lead them to change their codes again. However, virtually all British successes in breaking German codes relied upon actual captures of equipment and codes, even where these only showed the general areas of attack. It might therefore be considered vital to capture more machinery. It is quite possible Germans would have reacted by changing their procedures but still used the actual machine, believing it to be inherently unbreakable with known technology, which of course it was (the British having started to use newly invented electronic computers to do this).

I think I saw something recently which suggested the actual breaking of the 4 rotor enigma was a question of sheer genius by one individual. This is not the sort of thing you can rely upon in a desperate situation. Had the naval code remained unbroken and worse been adopted by the army, this might have led to a reverse of the final result of the war. Against this background losing a few thousand lives in a raid is pretty small beer, even if from the outset you felt it had a small chance of success. Anything else said about it officially would naturally be aimed at providing a credible explanation why it took place, though it remains true it did increase pressure on Germany to take seriously attacks against France, thereby tying down troops.

This interpretation of events also explains a couple of other points mentioned in the article and considered criticisms of British planning. Logically, a bombardment of the harbour would be completely counterproductive if it blew up the German intelligence headquarters they were seeking to raid. Committing reserves to what was already a failed operation makes rather more sense, if the reserves in question were not reserves at all, but the central commando group tasked with the central objective, who saw a slim alternative way to carry out their mission. Given the stakes here, their total loss would be a small price against a potential huge payoff. O'Keefe also suggests that this only took place after the raid commander and intelligence officers on board the British ships had met to discuss the possibilities.

It immediately occurs to me to question some of the failings in planning of the raid, in light of the actual objective rather than the claimed ones. I don't know enough to comment on this, but am not at all surprised that even a very important military operation would suffer from bad planning. I was struck by the extreme youth of some of the important people in the operation, which most probably reflects the huge unpreparedness of Britain for all out war and lack of practical experience. However, I must also consider just what would be a successful outcome from the British perspective? To launch a successful raid leading to the capture of Dieppe might be considered a disastrous outcome since it might then lead to Germany taking the risk of invasion far too seriously. Ideally, the raid would capture its objective and then allow itself to be beaten back. So it might have been a difficult decision to decided how to scale a raid intended to appear to fail. Ultimate failure in invading France was part of the plan, and this is pretty much agreed.

Flemming, who personally took part in the raid, wrote the Bond books because of his real intelligence experiences. O'Keefe's work is a crunch point reinterpretation of past events. While it may continue to take some years to become mainstream, this article is fundamentally failing to inform readers of the true situation regarding academic interpretation of this raid if does not properly explain O'Keefe's reinterpretation. Sandpiper (talk) 14:30, 18 April 2015 (UTC)

♠I have no problem with mentioning O'Keefe's proposal (tho that documentary is far from "convincing"). I do have a real problem with giving it any genuine credibility. The difference between his notion and the captured U-boat machines is, the Germans had no way of knowing what happened to the U-boats; they just disappeared. Here, there would be no question the Brits had snatched a machine--& that would make doing it counterproductive...which O'Keefe seems not to understand. Beyond that is the improbability of persuading anybody in the high command to countenance doing something so stupid--namely, compromising the fact you're reading the German code. Even if the Germans don't guess BP is doing it, provoking a change of code (when BP is doing it), which this notional mission would undoubtedly do, is stupid. Nobody in the high command is that stupid. What I can't understand is, why O'Keefe can't see this himself.
I was trying to address this point above. It is a while since I was reading about this stuff so my facts are from memory. However, the enigma device was just a machine. It worked by the operator setting a predetermined combination on the rotors and then typing in the message. A coded version came out. In order to break the code two things are necessary. One is the machine itself, and the other is the initial combination. Without the combination, the Germans believed the machine encoding to be unbreakable. So, to change the code all they need do is issue new combinations to their troops to use the exact same machine. Even if the British had the machine, it should make no difference. If they thought the British had captured some combinations, just change them.
Obviously capturing combinations was the ideal solution, but what the codebreakers did was devise methods to try multiple combinations until sense came out. The four rotor machine made this harder because it had many more combinations, and then there was the question of exactly how it worked to substitute letters in a message. The British did all this with machines they devised and then computers to run through combinations very fast. My understanding is they needed a machine to know how it functioned to copy it. It was deemed essential, though I am not certain now whether in fact they eventually got round this. It doesnt really matter if they did, it is sufficient the British believed at that point in time that their access to German coded information had already partially ceased, and might totally cease at any moment if the new machines were universally adopted.
As to your suggestion such a raid would give away the fact the British were after codes, well, the events do not seem to have convinced you that this is what they were doing, even after being presented with some evidence to that effect. One might imagine the tanks detailed to attack the harbour were intended to cause considerable property damage which would somewhat destroy evidence of exactly what had been taken. Aside from this camouflage, the Brits chief difficulty was exactly making use of decoded information without seeming to do so. If the Germans realised the Brits were in possession of information which came from their messages, then they would have changed something (and indeed did change their procedures if not the machines). Codebreaking was suspected, but never to the point of accepting their unbreakable machine encoding had been compromised. The Brits real defence against Germans changing their coding system was not to give any indications they knew anything secret.Sandpiper (talk) 23:30, 18 April 2015 (UTC)
♠To go beyond that and suggest "scaling a raid for failure" is preposterous in the extreme. That would undermine Britain's credibility with the French, the Russians, and (most important of all) the Americans. It would call in question Britain's intent to win the war. What possible goal in Dieppe could be worth that? TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 15:22, 18 April 2015 (UTC)
This raid was patently designed to fail. What real objective did it serve? The best case outcome was to capture and hold a French town for a few days and then go home. That sounds like sheer insanity to me. Such very peculiar behaviour by the Brits has been somewhat obscured by the fact the raid has been dismissed as a dismal failure, thus avoiding questions as to what real objective it might have had. In any circumstance, how could troops be safely extracted without significant losses? This was a Dunkirk rerun staged by the British. Churchill is quoted as saying it was a trial run to practice an invasion, just to see how it might go wrong. You say, 'what possible goal in Dieppe could be worth that'. Well indeed, there was no goal in invading Dieppe per se which justified the raid at all. So it is necessary to consider what tangible benefits there could be. The raid did demonstrate Britain was serious in at least probing German defences for weakness, and forced the Germans to address this with troops. It no doubt provided practice in this sort of warfare. On the other hand, the article suggests the Germans were somewhat complacently satisfied in that their preparations had worked.Sandpiper (talk) 23:30, 18 April 2015 (UTC)
♠"In order to break the code two things are necessary. One is the machine itself, and the other is the initial combination." Actually, no. The Brits did it without either, in the case of the U-boat machine (the one notionally the objective).
I dont know the details of how this was eventually done, but the real point is that at the time of the raid it had not been done, and so they needed a solution, fast.Sandpiper (talk)
♠"Without the combination, the Germans believed the machine encoding to be unbreakable." They believed it, because they had no idea the Brits had a copy (via Poland) of the Heer machine & because they believed it was practically unbreakable. (That is, it would take an insane amount of effort.) They were wrong.
we arent really disagreeing here, you also are saying the Germans thought the Brits having a machine didnt matter.Sandpiper (talk)
♠The issue here is precisely the one you illustrate: if the Germans knew the Brits had captured an Enigma machine, they would change it. And if you give the Brits a copy of the actual machine, simple key changes (which you suggest) are not going to be enough: uncovering the key is a practical problem to solve.
No, it isnt. The security of the machine is the very large number of possible combinations which can be set, which you mentioned above. Sandpiper (talk)
♠"If they thought the British had captured some combinations, just change them." On that, you're right. Capturing the keys was not really a big deal; they expired in time anyhow. What's at issue is, do the Germans know they've lost the machine? And they certainly would.
well that is the centre of this disagreement: a question of historical fact, whether or not Germans thought it mattered. The german navy adopted the four rotor machine because they felt the 3 rotor might be breakable. This implies they felt the four rotor intrinsically secure. I suspect however, it isnt quite so simple as saying they could redesign the entire thing. What they did was an evolutionary rather than revolutionary change to the mechanism. Manufacturing issues might have played a part in discouraging change, as indeed operator error with a more complex machine. Operator error was very important for codebreaking. (Though I am not aware the Germans understood this).Sandpiper (talk)
♠"even after being presented with some evidence to that effect" Some, yes. Insufficient to persuade me that was the main objective. As noted, extraordinary claims, require extraordinary evidence.
Well, no, not really. It seems to me that what was extraordinary, and has been regarded as extraordinary by historians is why this foolish raid was conducted at all with such predictable high losses, with no obvious objective. The code machine objective in fact make the entire raid more explicable and less extraordinary. This is one aspect which makes it more credible to my mind. Sandpiper (talk)
♠"The Brits real defence against Germans changing their coding system was not to give any indications they knew anything secret." And that is precisely why O'Keefe's thesis fails: if this raid alerts the Germans to the Brits having Enigma, they're going to change the machine, making the whole raid counterproductive. A simple thing like giving operators another spare codewheel, or increasing the frequency of wheel changes, would mean longer & more frequent blackouts--& the raid has made thins worse, not better.
♠"This raid was patently designed to fail" Was it? Making the Germans draw forces away from Russia or North Africa would be a worthwhile thing, even if Dieppe was never held at all. Compare the USN carrier raids in the Pacific: the Brits called them "tip & run" raids. If you make the enemy divert forces, or attention, you've achieved a worthwhile goal. Was it bungled? Yes. Again, to claim it was deliberately bungled requires extraordinary evidence--stupidity or incompetence is much more likely.
I think you missed my point. The question is whether sending in 5000 men and losing half of them, predictably, was sensible. I really dont see how such a large force, although still too small to be a real threat, could possibly get in and out safely. Thus it must have been designed with the knowledge losses would be high. Designed to fail. I continue to contend, that had it in fact succeeded perfectly, no losses, Dieppe wholly wrecked, this would have been counter productive for the allied cause. Sandpiper (talk)
♠"The raid did demonstrate Britain was serious in at least probing German defences for weakness, and forced the Germans to address this with troops. It no doubt provided practice in this sort of warfare." I would call those laudable goals, also, so we're not in broad disagreement on it.
No, we are not. But its a balance between trying to divert German attention from Russia, but not putting them so much on guard they take measures which really would have prevented an invasion. What you want ideally is lots of Germans complacently smoking cigars and enjoying French hospitality, not patrolling massively. Sandpiper (talk) 17:33, 27 April 2015 (UTC)
♠You've overlooked the goal of demonstrating British intent to fight on regardless, which was necessary for home & French morale, as well as a demonstration to (in particular) the Sovs (always mistrustful). Not to mention the morale boost to France, in effect saying, "You're not forgotten". Doubtless there were other factors I've overlooked.
No, I don't mean to disregard this. Its all rolled into the problem of on the one hand appearing to be be doing something, but on the other not so much as to cause Germany to react in an unsurmountable way.Sandpiper (talk)
♠And then there's the question I initially raised: how does having (another) 3-rotor Heer machine help crack the 4-rotor Kriegsmachine one? Exactly? Since the Brits already have a copy of the 3-rotor anyhow? (If they'd sent codos to BdU, it might just make sense...although Dönitz was helping the Brits with such an insane amount of needless traffic...)
Someone else posted, they aimed to raid the naval headquarters, where one might suppose naval machines were to be found.Sandpiper (talk)
♠In short, the "pinch" has not been sufficiently substantiated, & the historiography for a bungle (& not an intentional one) is pretty well documented. Until, unless, you have better (actual) evidence for either the pinch or the planned bungle..TREKphiler any time you're ready, Uhura 20:43, 21 April 2015 (UTC) (P.S. It's a bit off-form to break up other people's posts...)
Well, of course most of the weight of existing historiography is not going to discuss codes. This has been reported as new research based on previously secret documents. Until they ceased to be secret, no one was going to write about them. It should be pointed out that enigma codebreaking remained highest secret after the war, because Britain was still involved in intercepting messages being sent by foreign nations with the same system for quite some time. We still spy on other nations, but I guess they have all given up enigma by now. (breaking posts? sorry, but I thought that was wiki style! Point by point response is very useful.) Sandpiper (talk)
Bit surprised this tosh-based thread has resurrected itself to be honest. Irondome (talk) 20:47, 21 April 2015 (UTC)
Well that would be because it isn't tosh. The basic premise is very sound. New documents become available. New interpretation of events. This is a very usual process in history. Sandpiper (talk)

I will add an analogy. At the start of WW1 a number of German warships were stationed around the world, and for a while they carried out very successful raids on British Shipping and ports. Eventually, however, the British diverted sufficient powerful ships to chase them down and deal with the problem. Churchill was forced to send sufficient forces, diverted from England at a time a German naval strike at home was feared. Exactly the same applies here, Churchill again in charge. If the British succeeded too well, they would make their own task of invading France more difficult. Everyone agrees invading Europe was already in mind as a longer term plan. I have also seen historical review of the Germans consideration of whether or not they needed to extend their defences. Another example is the Gallipoli fiasco from WW1, which Churchill must have had very much in mind, since he was the cabinet minister responsible for overseeing it, and who got the blame for its failure. That was a classic example of successively more powerful attacks, but which were all too small to deal with the defences as they existed at the time, and merely served to tip the hand of the Turks that the Brits would be coming back with bigger forces, and they needed to prepare. Churchill more than anyone must have had this in mind. Sandpiper (talk) 17:33, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Happened to see an edition of the antiques roadshow from Bletchley park. One of the staff there bought out an enigma machine and was talking about it. He said, as I said somewhere above, that never in the war did the Germans come to believe that it was possible to decode an enigmas message without the relevant settings, the total number of combinations being so vast. This is as I said above, the Germans never believed that the British possessing a machine compromised its security. Sandpiper (talk) 18:48, 9 May 2015 (UTC)

One day in August, O'Keefe[edit]

Ok, so got hold of the guy's book. 2013, pub Alfred Knopf, Toronto, Canada, isbn 9780345807694. Some reviews of the book comment that a large part of it is not about the raid, but about the intelligence war leading up to it, and in particular the naval war. I noticed a few points so far, with regard to the discussion above.

The book comments on the very high importance placed on ensuring that the British could continue to read German coded messages. At one point it cites Churchill authorising an unlimited budget for the codebreaking effort, and the setting up of combined operations groups to carry out military action with the express aim of obtaining codes.

He quotes an intelligence document, the Connaught report, which investigated the best ways to obtain codes, etc, and which concluded that an attack on a land command centre would be one of the best ways to do this. One difficulty was identifying targets where codes would be available, but another was preventing Germans destroying any such material as soon as they realised capture was inevitable. In this regard the report considered that a command post would be amongst the slowest in taking any such action, because of the need to maintain communications to the very last moment. Surprise was always essential. It was also considered always essential that any operation have an overt military significance other than capturing codes. Every proposed operation against Germany was vetted to consider its potential for capturing code materials, and nothing by way of naval operations was advanced unless it had this potential. Significant resistance to O'Keef's view above is based on the difficulty of Dieppe as a target. O'Keefe's argument is that documentary evidence exists that British intelligence had concluded this was the right approach.

British success was not simply due to breaking the enigma codes, but also to information gained from simpler codes. These were used by Germans in emergency when the enigma failed, for very short messages and for support services, such as harbour management. All these provided clues which cumulatively were of significant value. The British maintained a file of the most useful codes to break, and it wasnt just the obvious ones. Germans concentrating on destroying the highest priority items might miss some which turned out to be very valuable. British understanding of the code system and the mechanical bombe machines designed to run through combinations much faster than an operator could, meant the codebreakers could make use of partial information to break codes. However the bombes designed to assist in breaking three rotor enigma were highly sophisticated devises for the time which could not be mass produced, and were anyway too slow to break codes for the four rota enigma machines in time for the information to be useful. Practically, the limited number of machines were used to break three rotor codes still in use.

The Germans were correct to assume that simply possessing enigma machines was not in itself sufficient to break the codes. At least at this point in the war, the British relied upon captured information about settings to be able to read the messages. So definitive knowledge by Germans that the British had machines was not in itself sufficient to cause them to drop the system. Yes, if they knew settings had been compromised they would change them, but obtaining the new machine was a critical essential step which in itself would not be self-negating, even if the Germans knew it had happened. The British always took steps to hide the fact codes might have been taken whenever possible.

The introduction of the 4 rotor enigma was an event anticipated by the British, because of a captured box (without machine) and because of errors in German codes sent out, where they were supposed to use 4 rotor machines in three rotor mode as they were being introduced. The 4 rotor began to be used 1 February 1942, and at the same time other codes were changed. This led to essentially a complete break in the intelligence which the British had been using to guide convoy routes and direct naval ships to attack German submarines. Three rotor enigma was still used for surface ships (British codename 'dolphin'), but German submarines were using the four rotor system (codename 'shark') to direct their movements at sea. German submarines extended their operations to the US coast in Feb 1942, where US defences were less than well organised.(Ok p.148) Before the four rotor system was finally cracked in December, 7.1 million tons of shipping was lost to submarines, compared to the 4.5 million tons which was regarded as acceptable loss rate, based on new building.(OK. p.160) 1.5 million tons of tankers lost, reaching a 1 in 4 loss rate per journey, while replacement was running at 200,000 tons per year. Convoy routes were made longer by thousands of miles to try to avoid submarines, meaning turnaround times were extended and each ship could transport less per year. Submarine numbers were something the British could still track, and they were steadily increasing. Fuel deliveries in 1942 dropped by 10% and were only delivering 75% of demand. U-boat commanders described this as their 'second happy time'. This was a crisis potentially sufficient to lose the war for lack of intelligence material which could stem the losses of physical material.

O'Keefe quotes the Admiralty Plans Division, " All this points to the expectation, and intelligence tends to confirm this, that in the Atlantic the German navy will during the spring and summer of this year [1942] make an all out effort to break down our sea power, and bring the war to an end. For us it is vital to win this battle by providing the adequate counter to the anticipated German naval and air measures".(Ok p.165) His point is that in fact the situation was fast approaching desperate, which again relates to comments made above as to why the British might apply such a high level of resources to a pretty suicidal mission. On the US side he quotes General George Marshall writing to Admiral Ernest King in June 42 (heads of army and navy), "losses by submarine off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort...I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy". The US gave equal priority and funding to its own codebreaking efforts as to the Manhattan Project. The US was getting very upset at the UK's inability to come up with useful intelligence.(Ok p.174) Sandpiper (talk) 20:34, 14 May 2015 (UTC)

O'Keefe rounds up his argument on the importance of pinches to aid codebreaking by stating that the four rotor code was finally broken because of material taken from a captured U-boat in October 2014.(P.399) He argues that there is written contemporary evidence that the concept of a pinch as one aim of the raid was always there. He further argues that there is sufficient evidence to conclude it was the primary aim. Somewhere he states that Churchill issued an order that no discussion of 'ultra' material should be included in minutes of meetings at all, and of course some of this material still remains secret today. It is therefore unsurprising and no discredit on previous historians, that none has addressed this aspect of the raid.

He argues the plan for the raid evolved as it went. Originally there were two plans, one calling for a frontal assault on Dieppe, and another concentrating the attack from behind the town, from landings either side and with air drops of troops. Also an initial bombardment before the attack by bomb and potentially shipboard artillery was considered. It was originally planned to take place in June over the sweep of two tides, which was reduced to one both due to practical reasons because of the changed tide heights at other times, but also because the raid planners preferred the reduction in time ashore, even though it required objectives to be achieved very quickly. These changes also necessitated reduction in scope of the targets, but these always included an attack by specially trained commandos on the potential sources of code information within and near the harbour. In fact, all orders to troops concentrated on the need to take pinch targets within the harbour, and directed successive groups of troops to concentrate on this if their predecessors had failed, rather than concentrating on other specific targets (although these never actually mentioned a pinch). Priority was placed on taking and holding the route for pinch forces, the few who were briefed on exactly where to look and what to take, to enter the harbour and get out with whatever they might obtain. Half the troops involved were detailed to the pinch operation (p.400). During the raid, senior commanders ignored alternatives where German resistance was less and they might have broken out into the town, continuing to concentrate initial forces and reserves on the pinch route. Potential for material damage, which might have formed the basis for a claimed victory over the Germans was ignored.(p.401) As predicted, during the raid, code materials from the ships in harbour was collected and dropped overboard by a team of German troops with these specific standing orders. This didnt go quite as well as planned, with the result material ended up scattered over the quay, where it might still have been captured.(p. 402)

Mountbatten, in charge of Combined operations headquarters, in charge of planning the raid, writing in 1969 commented, 'Brookie spoke to me personally about the desire of the Canadians to be brought into the raiding operation as soon as possible. My recollection is that I protested strongly because Dieppe was such a large scale and uncertain operation. We were still trying to find out things and even if successful in all our aims there would be nothing much to show for it to the outside world and we were bound to have heavy casualties". In 1969 Ultra remained completely secret, but this acknowledged without really explaining, that even at best case outcome the raid would publicly have little gain which could be admitted to. This also addressed the question of why Canadian troops were used, which had no little to do with their desire to become involved in some tangible action against Germany rather than just sitting about in England. (p.255-257) There was always the difficulty of not sending any more people than absolutely necessary on any raid who really understood the aims of capturing code materials, in case they were captured. Sandpiper (talk) 07:54, 18 May 2015 (UTC)

Article revisions as per O'Keefe[edit]

I have started listing above some of the main points I have spotted from O'Keefe's book. This is work in progress, and so far I have only just reached the planning stage for the raid. While there is a specific section in the article about a pinch raid theory, it is clear from the book that this is far more than a theory. The book refers to contemporary secret documents which in general show that a very high priority was placed on pinch raids because of the vital need to break German codes, and a recognised danger of losing the war if this could not be done, both by the UK and the US. Plainly there is much more to be said about this, but it impacts more than the section currently listed as 'Enigma pinch theory'. For example, it needs a mention in the lead, background section, plan section, and I dare say further on where the course of the raid is described. It remains to be seen what O'Keefe has to say about evaluation of the raid, but I rather thing his view will completely contradict earlier analysis that the raid was misconceived because it had no clear objective rather than being a gesture to keep Germans busy, and have something to say about why it was planned the way it was, which has also been criticised in the past.

The book seems perfectly sensible to me and referenced to contemporary documents. On the basis of what it says, I would go ahead and make relevant alterations to the article. There does seem to be some resistance to this, however, so I would ask anyone interested to list here alternative sources which contradict O'Keefe. In this regard I would point out the difficulty of relying on any sources predating O'Keefe's work, which makes use of secret documents only released in recent years. Some of these have been available for some time, so there may be comment taking them into account, or there may not.

A quick look at some other articles on wiki about raids on Germany suggests that they too need updating. O'Keefe essentially addresses the question of raiding from the perspective of the need to obtain codebreaking materials, and how this impacted on all planning for raids. Sandpiper (talk) 08:09, 16 May 2015 (UTC)

Suggested new lede 20/5/13[edit]

Actually, Irondome, I don't think the lede is the place for lengthy quotations, especially as this one doesn't add much. Nor is it really suitable for a lot of references or links. I feel that my re-sequencing of the material did actually clarify the story. 109.154.9.232 (talk) 02:26, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

I am glad you came here to discuss. I think this is quite a large issue in terms of the correct lede and consensus building is the way to go. I think the quotation has its place in the lede, although a move to a sepearte section is arguable. You did arguably unbalance the lede however, removed some useful (for other WP readers) links, removed a cited paragraph; and made a completely POV and uncited assertion in your version of the lede end. I suggest you actually create an Ed "profile" It helps enormously in credibility when edding WP. Just a suggestion. I suspect you are an old WP hand. Regards Irondome (talk) 02:36, 20 May 2013 (UTC)

Non-Canadian involvement[edit]

Whilst the majority of infantrymen, thus casualties, were Canadian, and the Raid was a key event in Canadian military history (perhaps as important as Vimy Ridge), I think that this article over-eggs the role of the Canadian contingent to the detriment of the other forces. Whilst Canada is mentioned twice in the opening paragraph, none of the other countries involved (UK, USA, France) is mentioned at all. Including Royal Navy and Royal Air Force commitments, the UK had almost as many servicemen involved as Canada did. In fact, of the British forces, 555 sailors and 275 commandos died, countless more were wounded or captured, 1 destroyer and 33 landing craft were destroyed, and 106 planes were shot down. The attack was also important in the history of American involvement in World War Two on account of it being the first combat between American and German ground forces in the war. Whilst it is understandable that the latter is reduced to a footnote, it is unacceptable that the former is. I am editing the opening paragraph to rectify the problem and to change some wording (as part of it is just a copy of a later paragragh); if there is an objection to the phrasing or stylistics, please keep the message the same: That this was a true Allied mission. Bastin8 13:12, 22 September 2005 (UTC)

Good point Bastin8; I've included the US Rangers under "trivia" - not to trivialize their experiences there, but I don't know that their contribution was especially significant in any tactical sense, as they were employed in small groups. It certainly does deserve a mention however. I am not aware of any "French" involvement in the land forces at Dieppe. I disagree that Dieppe was a "key" moment in Canadian military history. It was nothing of the sort. It was a bloody disaster. Far more important were the military skills we developed later on - the APC, for example, was a Canadian invention in Normandy. Dieppe should be a footnote to our own history yet Canadians seem to dwell on it with relish. Why, frankly, escapes me. Michael Dorosh 23:14, 5 December 2005 (UTC) EDIT - ah, I see the French component has been added under 'trivia' - well done, and thanks! Michael Dorosh 18:00, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

Not sure if it fits here, but McNaughton was eager for Canadian troops to enter combat. So why did WSC refuse to use them in NAfr? I know Granatstein says Monty had a low opinion of their COs; was this widely shared? Was it enough? Trekphiler 09:46, 16 December 2005 (UTC)
...and how many Poles were substantially involved in the Dieppe Raid? FWiW Bzuk (talk) 02:11, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
The Polish destroyer ORP Slazak took part in the raid, and recovered troops from the beach. As far as I know that was the only Free Polish unit involved. Mediatech492 (talk) 02:39, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
RAF No. 303 Squadron also took part in the aerial battle. In terms of significant numbers, AFAIK, the Polish contribution was extremely limited. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 10:26, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
According to Operation Jubilee order of battle, five Polish squadrons took part, but I don't know about the exact extent of their involvement. I lobbied for the removal of the Americans from the belligerent's box - I'm less certain of the Poles, but if they do get removed, so should the French. However, their contribution can still be listed in the Strength box. Ranger Steve Talk 11:03, 29 May 2013 (UTC)
Glad I found this going on. I oppose the Polish removal. Even at this stage the ORB shows at least 5 fighter squadrons, at least one large Polish destroyer and I assume at least a COY in strength in the 10th inter allied commando. This is a substantial air land sea contribution force and does not justify the polish flags removal at least without discussion. Irondome (talk) 20:06, 29 May 2013 (UTC)

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── More than this is needed as no authoritative reference source lists the Polish forces as a substantial or meaningful element in the Dieppe Raid. If there is a reference source that can be cited, it would considerably bolster the case. FWiW, I am a Polish-Canadian, and a RCAF Historian, and have never considered the Free Polish forces playing a significant role in the Dieppe Raid. FWiW Bzuk (talk) 13:41, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

I would argue that at least 5 squadrons of aircraft, at least 1 large destroyer (I believe there was at least another Polish vessel) and perhaps over a COY in ground forces is a "significant" contribution, in terms of Polands' military and political plight at the time. The Polish army under the "Western" Polish leadership would and could have willingly provided a far larger ground contingent if Mountbatten et al had requested it. Would suggest, relative to contemporary national force strengths, that Poland be included. Cheers! Irondome (talk) 02:00, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Defending forces[edit]

The article says: Dieppe and the flanking cliffs were well defended; the 1,500-strong garrison from the 302nd German Infantry Division comprised the 570th, 571st and 572nd Infantry Regiments, each of two battalions, the 302nd Artillery Regiment, the 302nd Reconnaissance Battalion, the 302nd Anti-tank Battalion, the 302nd Engineer Battalion and 302nd Signal Battalion.

How can that be? A German regiment in itself was 3,000 men strong. Should one say that the garrison originated from the 302.ID, that in itself comprised three regiments and an arty regiment as well as some additional support, it would seem right. In its current form - it is beloney! There was a much stronger German force in the Dieppe region than a mere 1,500 men (of 571.IR). The around 1,500 men strong garrison itself comprised some men of 571.IR and some division support troops as well as coastal battery and FLAK units. The 302nd division was positioned behind the coast line in the entire region. Grebbegoos (talk) 12:05, 2 June 2013 (UTC)

You assume that the units were at full strength, which they were not. Garrison units were perpetually undermanned as the demands of manpower for the Russian front perpetually squeezed them for every spare man. Furthermore not every man in these units was deployed in the town itself. Many were deployed in and around nearby villages and scattered throughout the surrounding countryside and in no position to take part in the battle on that day. Not to mention those on leave, under medical care or on any sort of detached duty. The numbers only represent those troops that were on the scene that day

Beach Comber[edit]

If a link to the article Beach Comber, a war pigeon highly decorated for heroism for his important role in the Dieppe Raid, can not be worked into this article, might it be listed in a "See Also" or some such? Chrisrus (talk) 20:19, 9 July 2013 (UTC)

I don't see any problems having this dutiful descendent of the dinosaurs added to the "See also" section Irondome (talk) 22:08, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
I'm slightly suprised that the article has no see also section. Irondome (talk) 22:15, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Done. It is perfectly relevant and meets all WP criteria. Irondome (talk) 22:34, 9 July 2013 (UTC)
Thanks, that's great. If there could be found a good way to incorporate it appropriately into the text of the article, that would also be good. Chrisrus (talk) 06:12, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

Dieppe[edit]

The usage of Dieppe is under discussion, see talk:Dieppe -- 76.65.128.222 (talk) 04:04, 10 July 2013 (UTC)

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