Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War
| Indian Intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War | |||||||
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| Part of the Sri Lankan civil war | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam | |||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Velupillai Prabhakaran | |||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| IPKF: 1,000+ killed Sri Lanka: 26 Killed ; 578 Wounded |
LTTE: 8000+ killed | ||||||
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The Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka intended to perform a peacekeeping role. The deployment followed the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord between India and Sri Lanka of 1987 which was intended to end the Sri Lankan Civil War between militant Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists, principally the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Sri Lankan military.
The original intention was the Indian Peace Keeping Force would not be involved in large scale military operations. However, after a few months, the Indian Peace Keeping Force engaged the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in a series of battles. During the two years in which it was deployed, the IPKF fought numerous battles against the LTTE. The IPKF began withdrawing in 1989, and completed the withdrawal in 1990.
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[edit] The Indian intervention
[edit] Background
The LTTE and other Tamil militant groups developed strong relationships with political parties in South India, such as Dravidar Kazhagam (led by K. Veeramani), Kamaraj Congress (led by Nedumaran) and Pure Tamil Movement (led by Perinchintanarayanan) during late 1970s.[1] These Tamil parties firmly backed the militants' cause of creating a separate Tamil Eelam within Sri Lanka. Thereafter, LTTE developed relations with M. G. Ramachandran and M. Karunanidhi, who served as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, succeeding one another. They also became sympathetic towards militants' cause and allowed establishment of their training camps within Tamil Nadu state. But it was not until August 1983, the Central Government of India (GoI) involved in facilitating and training these militants.
Government of India involved in Sri Lankan Civil War based on several concerns including its desire to project India as the regional power in the area and worries about India's own Tamils seeking independence. The latter was particularly strong in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where ethnic kinship led to strong support for independence for Sri Lankan Tamils. Throughout the conflict, the Indian central and state governments have supported both sides in different ways. Although Sri Lanka was a key member of Non-Aligned Movement in its initial stages, Government of Sri Lanka's policies became pro-western as J. R. Jayewardene was elected prime minister with his landslide victory in 1977 parliamentary election. Subsequently he introduced a new constitution and Open economy to Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is the first South-Asian country to adopt Liberal open economy.[2] Together with these developments, India was also concerned about
- United States raising the strength of broadcasting facilities belonged to Voice of America (VOA) in Sri Lanka, which could pose a threat to India's defense communication systems
- Frequent high-profile visits of US defense officials to Sri Lanka including US Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
- Sri Lankan government granting the tenders to expand oil storage complex at China Bay, Trincomalee to Singapore companies
- Establishment of Israeli Interests Section in the American Embassy in Colombo
- Sri Lanka government's purchase of European and Chinese military hardware
- Sri Lanka government hiring Keenie Meenie Services (which includes ex-Special Air Service troops), a Channel Island-based British mercenary company, to train the Sri Lankan Special Task Force, a unit under the command of Ravi Jayewardene, the son of J. R Jayawardene
- Presence of Israeli Shin Bet intelligence operatives to train Sri Lankan troops on intelligence operations, Pakistani Special Services Group led by Brigadier Tariq Mohommad to assist Sri Lankan commandos and South African mercenaries to train Sri Lanka Air Force pilots in low contour flying, in Colombo, etc.[3]
Moreover, President J. R. Jayawardene did not enjoy with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi, the same warm relationship he had with her father, Premier Jawaharlal Nehru.[1] Thus, with the outbreak of Black July ethnic riots, Indian government decided to support the insurgent groups operating in Northern Sri Lanka.
[edit] Training the militants
Beginning in August 1983, till May 1987, India, through its intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), provided arms, training and monetary support to 6 Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups, namely Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA). It was a Top Secret operation. Even the state governments or Sri Lankan opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam were not aware of such a mission until April 1984. The LTTE's rise is widely attributed to the initial backing it received from RAW. It is believed that by supporting different militant groups, the Indian government hoped to keep the Tamil independence movement divided and be able to exert overt control over it.[4]
During that period, 32 camps were set up all over India to train these militants.[1] However Prime Minister Indira Gandhi maintained the position that "We have never interfered with the internal developments of any country in the past and we will not do so now." Contrary to her statement, 3363 Tamil insurgents, including 10 batches of LTTE (405 men and 90 women) were given military training to fight against Sri Lankan armed forces during the succeeding years.[5] Initially 350 TELO cardres were trained at Dehradun, in the hills of Uttar Pradesh. It was followed with training for 200 cadres from EROS, 100 from EPRLF, and 70 from PLOTE.[3] LTTE was the last insurgent group to enter the training. First batch of Tigers were trained in Establishment 22 based in Chakrata, Uttarakhand. Second batch was trained in Himachal Pradesh. 8 other batches of LTTE were trained in Tamil Nadu. Ironically, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam alias Dhanu, who carried out the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and Sivarasan - the key conspirator were among the militants trained by RAW, in Nainital, South India.[6]
[edit] Operation Poomalai
India became more actively involved in the late 1980s, and on June 5, 1987, the Indian Air Force airdropped food parcels to Jaffna while it was under siege by Sri Lankan forces. At a time when the Sri Lankan government stated they were close to defeating the LTTE, India dropped 25 tons of food and medicine by parachute into areas held by the LTTE in a direct move of support toward the rebels.[7] Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene. Under this accord, the Sri Lankan Government made a number of concessions to Tamil demands, including a devolution of power to the provinces, a merger—subject to later referendum—of the Northern and the Eastern provinces into the single province, and official status for the Tamil language (this was enacted as the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka). India agreed to establish order in the North and East through a force dubbed the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), and to cease assisting Tamil insurgents. Militant groups including the LTTE, although initially reluctant, agreed to surrender their arms to the IPKF, which initially oversaw a cease-fire and a modest disarmament of the militant groups.
The signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, so soon after JR Jayawardene's declaration that he would fight the Indians to the last bullet, led to unrest in south. The arrival of the IPKF to take over control of most areas in the North of the country enabled the Sri Lanka government to shift its forces to the south (in Indian aircraft) to quell the protests. This led to an uprising by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna in the south, which was put down bloodily over the next two years.
[edit] Conflict with the LTTE
While most Tamil militant groups laid down their weapons and agreed to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict, the LTTE refused to disarm its fighters.[8] Keen to ensure the success of the accord, the IPKF then tried to demobilize the LTTE by force and ended up in full-scale conflict with them. The three year long conflict was also marked by the IPKF being accused of committing various abuses of human rights by many human rights groups as well as some within the Indian media. The IPKF also soon met stiff opposition from the Tamils.[9][10]
[edit] Operation Pawan
Operation Pawan was the codename assigned to the operations by the Indian Peace Keeping Force to take control of Jaffna from the LTTE in late 1987 to enforce the disarmament of the LTTE as a part of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE rule, something that the Sri Lankan army had then tried and failed to achieve for several years. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the IPKF lost around 214 soldiers.[11]
[edit] The Jaffna University Helidrop
The Jaffna University Helidrop was the first of the operations launched by the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) aimed at disarming the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) by force and securing the town of Jaffna, Sri Lanka, in the opening stages of Operation Pawan during the active Indian mediation in the Sri Lankan Civil War. Mounted on the midnight of 12 October 1988, the operation was planned as a fast heliborne assault involving Mi-8's of the No.109 HU, the 10th Para Commandos and a contingent of the 13th Sikh LI. The aim of the operation was to capture the LTTE leadership at Jaffna University building which served as the Tactical Headquarters of the LTTE, which was expected to shorten Operation Pawan, the battle for Jaffna. However, the operation ended disastrously, failing to capture its objectives -owing to intelligence and planning failures. The helidropped force suffered significant casualties, with nearly the entire Sikh LI detachment of twenty nine troops falling to a man, along with six Paracommandos falling in battle.
[edit] Withdrawal from Sri Lanka
Sri Lankan nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence in Sri Lanka. These led to the Sri Lankan government's call for India to quit the island, and they allegedly entered into a secret deal with the LTTE that culminated in a ceasefire. The LTTE and IPKF continued to have frequent hostilities, and according to some reports, the Sri Lankan government even armed the rebels in order to see the back of the Indian forces.[12] Although casualties among the IPKF mounted, and calls for the withdrawal of the IPKF from both sides of the Sri Lankan conflict grew, Gandhi refused to remove the IPKF from Sri Lanka. However, following his defeat in Indian parliamentary elections in December 1989, the new prime Minister V. P. Singh ordered the withdrawal of the IPKF, and their last ship left Sri Lanka on March 24, 1990. During the IPKF's stay in Sri Lanka, there had been many cases of massacres on innocent Sri Lankan Tamil civilians by the Indian army , such as the 1989 Valvettiturai massacre and the Jaffna hospital massacre.
In the long term, the Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War was a tactical victory for the Sri Lankan Government. The Indian intervention angered the Tamil Tigers who retaliated by killing over a thousand IPKF soldiers as well as assassinating Rajiv Gandhi which in the long term effectually ended Indian government co-operation with the LTTE and instead initiated close co-operation between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments to defeat the Tamil Tigers.[13]
[edit] See also
[edit] Further reading
- Gunaratna, Rohan. (1997). International & Regional Security Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency, AABC for International Studies. ISBN 955-9506-00-5
- Gunaratna, Rohan. (1998). Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security, Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research. ISBN 955-8093-00-9
- Gunaratna, Rohan. (October 1, 1987). War and Peace in Sri Lanka: With a Post-Accord Report From Jaffna, Sri Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies. ISBN 955-8093-00-9
[edit] References
- ^ a b c "LTTE: the Indian connection". Sunday Times. 1997. http://sundaytimes.lk/970119/plus4.html. Retrieved 2011-07-25.
- ^ "Sri Lanka – an Overview". Fulbright commission. http://www.fulbrightsrilanka.com/?page_id=561. Retrieved 2011-07-25.
- ^ a b "Chapter 30: Whirlpool of violence, Sri Lanka: The Untold Story". Asia Times. 2002. http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DC09Df04.html. Retrieved 2011-07-25.
- ^ Asia Times Who's behind the LTTE split?.
- ^ ""Uppermost in our minds was to save the Gandhis' name"". Express India. 1997. http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19971212/34650923.html. Retrieved 2011-07-25.
- ^ "Killing Rajiv Gandhi: Dhanu's sacrificial metamorphosis in death". tandfonline.com. 2009. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19472490903387191. Retrieved 2011-07-25.
- ^ Weisman, Steven R. (5 June 1987). "India airlifts aid to tamil rebels". STEVEN R. WEISMAN (New York Times). http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9B0DE0D8173FF936A35755C0A961948260&n=Top%2fNews%2fWorld%2fCountries%20and%20Territories%2fIndia. Retrieved April 9, 2010.
- ^ "Tamil rebels abduct 2 rivals, Sri Lankan military says". Associated Press. 12 December 2006. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/latestnews/20061228/43353.htm.
- ^ Balasingham, Adele. (2003) The Will to Freedom - An Inside View of Tamil Resistance. Fairmax Publishing Ltd, 2nd ed. ISBN 1-903679-03-6.
- ^ NorthEast Secretariat report on Human rights 1974 - 2004 (see Further Reading section).
- ^ Operation Pawan. The Battle for Jaffna.
- ^ Dissanayaka, T.D.S.A.: "War or Peace in Sri Lanka, Volume II", p. 332. Swastika (Pvt.) Ltd., 1998.
- ^ Dissanayaka, T.D.S.A.: "War or Peace in Sri Lanka, Volume II", p. 332. Swastika (Pvt.) Ltd., 1998.
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