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{{EngvarB|date=January 2014}}
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| footer = Classical Indian Mādhyamika thinkers. Clockwise from upper left: [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] (founder), [[Bhāviveka]] and [[Chandrakirti]] (commentators), [[Śāntarakṣita]] (synthesized the school with [[Yogacara]]).
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[[File:IMG 1972 Sakya.jpg|thumb|right|The traditions of [[Tibetan Buddhism]] traditionally follow the [[Mūlasarvāstivāda]] [[Vinaya]]]]
{{MahayanaBuddhism}}
{{EarlyBuddhism}}
{{for|the ancient city of Madhyamika|Nagari, Rajasthan}}
The '''Sarvāstivāda''' ([[Sanskrit]]; {{zh|c=說一切有部|p=Shuō Yīqièyǒu Bù}}) were an early school of [[Buddhism]] that held to the existence of all [[dharma]]s in the past, present and future, the "three times".{{sfn|de La Vallée-Poussin|1990|p=807}}
'''Mādhyamaka''' ("Middle way" or "Centrism"; {{lang-sa|Mādhyamaka}}, {{zh|t=中觀见|p=Zhōngguān Jìan}}, [[Tibetic languages|Tibetan]]: ''dbu ma pa'') also known as ''Śūnyavāda'' (the [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] doctrine) and ''Niḥsvabhāvavāda'' (the no [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] doctrine) refers to a tradition of [[Buddhist philosophy]] and practice founded by the Indian philosopher [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] (c. 150-250 CE).<ref name="Buddhist Thought">[[Paul Williams (British professor)|Williams, Paul]] (2000). ''Buddhist Thought'' Routledge, p140.</ref><ref>Wynne, Alexander, Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-sunyavada.</ref> The foundational text of the Mādhyamaka tradition is [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]]'s ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' (Root Verses on the Middle Way). More broadly, Mādhyamaka also refers to the ultimate nature of phenomena and the realization of this in [[Buddhist meditation|meditative equipoise]].<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 29-30.</ref>


The Sarvāstivādins were one of the most influential Buddhist monastic groups, flourishing throughout Northwest India, Northern India, and [[Central Asia]]. The Sarvāstivādins are believed to have given rise to the [[Mulasarvastivada|Mūlasarvāstivāda]] sect, although the relationship between these two groups has not yet been fully determined.
Mādhyamaka thought had a major influence on the subsequent development of the [[Mahayana]] Buddhist tradition. It is the dominant interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in [[Tibetan Buddhism]] and has also been influential in [[East Asian Buddhism|East Asian Buddhist]] thought.<ref>Hugon, Pascale, "Tibetan Epistemology and Philosophy of Language", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/epistemology-language-tibetan/</nowiki>>.</ref>


==Name==
According to the classical Mādhyamaka thinkers''',''' all [[Dharma#Dharmas in Buddhist phenomenology|phenomena]] (''dharmas'') are [[śūnyatā|empty]] (''śūnya'') of "nature,"{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=70}} a "substance" or "essence" ([[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']]) which gives them "solid and independent existence," because they are [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependently co-arisen]].{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=590}} But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}{{sfn|Garfield|1994}}{{sfn|Garfield|2012}}
''Sarvāstivāda'' is a [[Sanskrit]] term that can be glossed as: "the theory of all exists". The Sarvāstivāda argued that all [[dharma]]s exist in the past, present and future, the "three times". [[Vasubandhu]]'s ''[[Abhidharmakośakārikā]]'' states, "He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods [past, present and future] is held to be a Sarvāstivādin."{{sfn|de La Vallée-Poussin|1990|p=807}}


Although there is some dispute over how the word "Sarvāstivāda" is to be analyzed, the general consensus is that it is to be [[Parsing|parsed]] into three parts: ''sarva'' "all" or "every" + ''asti'' "exist" + ''vada'' "speak", "say" or "theory". This equates perfectly with the Chinese term, ''Shuōyīqièyǒu bù'' ({{zh|c=說一切有部}}),<ref>Taisho 27, n1545</ref> which is literally "the sect that speaks of the existence of everything," as used by [[Xuanzang]] and other translators.
==Etymology==


The Sarvāstivāda was also known by other names, particularly ''hetuvada'' and ''yuktivada''. Hetuvada comes from hetu – 'cause', which indicates their emphasis on causation and conditionality. Yuktivada comes from yukti – 'reason' or even 'logic', which shows their use of rational argument and syllogism.
''Madhya'' is a Sanskrit word meaning "middle". It is cognate with Latin ''med-iu-s'' and English ''mid''. The ''-ma'' suffix is a superlative, giving ''madhyama'' the meaning of "mid-most" or "medium". The ''-ka'' suffix is used to form adjectives, thus ''madhyamaka'' means "middleling". The ''-ika'' suffix is used to form possessives, with a collective sense, thus ''mādhyamika'' mean "belonging to the mid-most" (the ''-ika'' suffix regularly causes a lengthening of the first vowel and elision of the final ''-a'').


==Origination and history==
In a Buddhist context these terms refer to the "middle path" (''madhyama pratipada'') between the extremes of annihilationism (''ucchedavāda'') and eternalism (''śassatavāda''), for example:
<blockquote>
''ity etāv ubhāv antāv anupagamya madhyamayā pratipadā tathāgato dharmaṃ deśayati |'' - Kātyāyana Sūtra. <br />


According to Charles Prebish, "there is a great deal of mystery surrounding the rise and early development of the Sarvāstivādin school."<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43">''Buddhism: A Modern Perspective''. Charles S. Prebish. Penn State Press: 1975. {{ISBN|0-271-01195-5}} pg 42-43</ref>
Thus, the Tathāgata teaches the Dharma by a middle path avoiding both these extremes. </blockquote>


In Central Asia, several Buddhist monastic groups were historically prevalent. According to some accounts, the Sarvāstivādins emerged from the [[Sthavira nikāya]], a small group of conservatives, who split from the reformist majority Mahāsāṃghikas at the Second Buddhist council. According to this account, they were expelled from Magadha, and moved to northwestern India where they developed into the Sarvāstivādin school.<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43"/>
* ''Madhyamaka'' refers to the school of thought associated with Nāgārjuna and his commentators.
* ''Mādhyamika'' refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school.


A number of scholars have identified three distinct major phases of missionary activity seen in the history of [[Buddhism in Central Asia]], which are associated with respectively the [[Dharmaguptaka]], Sarvāstivāda, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda,<ref>Willemen, Charles. Dessein, Bart. Cox, Collett. ''Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism''. 1997. p. 126</ref> and the origins of the Sarvastivada have also been related to Asoka sending Majjhantika on a mission to [[Gandhara]], which had an early presence of the Sarvastivada.<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43"/> The Sarvāstivādins in turn are believed to have given rise to the [[Mulasarvastivada|Mūlasarvāstivāda]] sect, although the relationship between these two groups has not yet been fully determined. According to Prebish, "this episode corresponds well with one Sarvāstivādin tradition stating that Madhyantika (the Sanskrit counterpart of the Pali Majjhantika) converted the city of Kasmir, which seems to have close ties with Gandhara."<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43"/>
Note that in both words the stress is on the first syllable.


A third tradition says that a community of Sarvāstivādin monks was established at [[Mathura]] by the patriarch [[Upagupta]].<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43"/>
==Philosophical overview==


===Early history - Kanishka===
{{Buddhist Philosophy sidebar}}
The Sarvāstivāda enjoyed the patronage of [[Kanishka]] (c. 127–150 CE) of the [[Kushan Empire]], during which time they were greatly strengthened, and became one of the dominant sects of Buddhism for the next thousand years,<ref name="Buddhism 1975. pg 42-43"/> flourishing throughout Northwest India, North India, and [[Central Asia]]
=== Svabhāva, what Mādhyamaka denies ===
{{main|Svabhava}}
Central to Mādhyamaka philosophy is ''[[śūnyatā]]'', "emptiness", and this refers to the central idea that [[Dhamma theory|dharmas]] are empty of [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']].<ref name=":2">Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 12, 25.</ref> This term has been translated variously as essence, intrinsic nature, inherent existence, own being and substance.<ref>Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, p. 180.</ref><ref name=":0">Westerhoff, Jan Christoph, "Nāgārjuna", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/nagarjuna/</nowiki>>.</ref><ref name=":2" /> Furthermore, according to Richard P. Hayes, svabhava can be interpreted as either "identity" or as "causal independence".{{sfn|Hayes|2003|p=4}} Likewise, Westerhoff notes that [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] is a complex concept that has ontological and cognitive aspects. The ontological aspects include [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] as [[essence]], as a property which makes an object what it is, as well as [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] as [[Substance theory|substance]], meaning, as the Mādhyamaka thinker [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] defines it, something that does "not depend on anything else".<ref name=":2" /> It is substance-[[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']], the objective and independent existence of any object or concept, which Mādhyamaka arguments mostly focus on refuting.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 30.</ref> A common structure which Mādhyamaka uses to negate [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] is the [[Catuṣkoṭi|''catuṣkoṭi'']] ("four corners" or tetralemma), which roughly consists of four alternatives: some proposition is true, it is false, it is both, or it is neither true or false. Some of the major topics discussed by classical Mādhyamaka include [[causality]], change, and [[personal identity]].<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 200.</ref>


When the Sarvāstivāda school held a synod in Kashmir during the reign of [[Kanishka II]] (c. 158-176), the [[Gandhara]]n most important text, the Astagrantha of Katyayaniputra was rewritten in Sanskrit making necessary revisions. This revised text was now known as [[Jnanaprasthana|''Jñānaprasthāna'']] "Course of Knowledge". Though the Gandharan Astagrantha had many vibhaṣas (commentaries), the new [[Kashmir]]i Astagrantha i.e. the ''Jñānaprasthāna'' had a Sanskrit Mahāvibhaṣa, compiled by the Kashmir Sarvāstivāda synod. The ''Jñānaprasthāna'' and its Mahāvibhaṣa, which took more than a generation to complete, were then declared the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, said to be "Buddha’s word", ''Buddhabhāṣita''.
Mādhyamaka's denial of [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] does not mean a [[Nihilism|nihilistic]] denial of all things, for in a conventional everyday sense, Mādhyamaka does accept that one can speak of "things", and yet ''ultimately'' these things are empty of inherent existence.{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} Furthermore, "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above phenomenal reality.{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}{{sfn|Garfield|1994}}{{sfn|Garfield|2012}}


This new Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, however, was not readily accepted by the Gandharan Sarvāstivādins, though gradually they adapted their views to the new Kashmiri orthodoxy. The Gandharan Sarvāstivādins used the same vinaya from [[Mathura]]. As a matter of fact, their abhidharma was meant for meditational practices. They made use of the ''Hṛdaya'', a manual for attaining [[arhatship]]. However, the long Gandharan Vinaya was abridged to a Sanskrit ''Dashabhanavara'' in the Kashmir synod by removing the [[avadana]]s and [[Jataka tales|Jātaka tales]], stories, and illustrations. After the declaration of the [[vaibhāṣika]] orthodoxy, the Gandharan non-vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins, the majority, were called [[Sautrāntika]]s "those who uphold the sutras".
[[Svabhava|''Svabhāva'']]'s cognitive aspect is merely a superimposition (''samāropa'') that beings make when they perceive and conceive of things. In this sense then, emptiness does not exist as some kind of primordial reality, but it is simply a corrective to a mistaken conception of how things exist.<ref name=":0" /> This idea of [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] that Mādhyamaka denies is then not just a conceptual philosophical theory, but it is a [[cognitive distortion]] that beings automatically impose on the world, such as when we regard the [[Skandha|five aggregates]] as constituting a single [[Ātman (Hinduism)|self]]. [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] compares it to someone who suffers from [[vitreous floaters]] that cause the illusion of hairs appearing in their visual field.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 45.</ref> This cognitive dimension of [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] means that just understanding and assenting to Mādhyamaka reasoning is not enough to end the suffering caused by our [[Reification (fallacy)|reification]] of the world, just like understanding how an [[optical illusion]] works does not make it stop functioning. What is required is a kind of [[cognitive shift]] (termed ''realization'') in the way the world appears and therefore some kind of practice to lead to this shift.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 13.</ref> As Candrakirti says:<blockquote>For one on the road of [[Samsara|cyclic existence]] who pursues an inverted view due to [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorance]], a mistaken object such as the superimposition (''samāropa'') on the [[Skandha|aggregates]] appears as real, but it does not appear to one who is close to the view of the real nature of things.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 48.</ref></blockquote>Much of Mādhyamaka philosophy centers on showing how various [[Essentialism|essentialist]] ideas have absurd conclusions through [[Reductio ad absurdum|''reductio ad absurdum'']] arguments (known as ''prasanga'' in Sanskrit). Chapter 15 of [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]]'s ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' centers on the words [[svabhava]] {{refn|group=note|'Own-beings',{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=360}} unique nature or substance,{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=162}} an identifying characteristic; an identity; an essence,{{sfn|Hayes|1994|p=317}}}} parabhava{{refn|group=note|A differentiating characteristic,{{sfn|Hayes|1994|p=317}} the fact of being dependent,{{sfn|Hayes|1994|p=317}}}} [[bhava]] {{refn|group=note|'Being',{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} 'self-nature or substance'{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=165}}}} and [[abhava]].{{refn|group=note|Not being present; absence:{{sfn|Hayes|1994|p=316}}}} According to Peter Harvey:


=== Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika subschools===
{{quote|Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature{{refn|group=note|svabhava}} (''Mk.'' ch. 15) argues that anything which arises according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have no inherent nature, for what is depends on what conditions it. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'other-nature' (''para-bhava''), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on something ''else'' which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature, there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (''bhava''). If there is no true existent, then there can be no non-existent (''abhava'').{{sfn|Harvey|1995|p=97}}}}
The Sarvāstivāda comprised two subschools, the [[Vaibhāṣika]] and the [[Sautrāntika]]. Pioneering work on the subject was undertaken by Ch. Willemen in 1975, and more recently in 2006 (Abhidharmahṛdaya) and in 2008 in the Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies (Tokyo). The Vaibhāṣika was formed by adherents of the ''[[Mahavibhasa|Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra]]'', comprising the orthodox Kasmiri branch of the Sarvāstivāda school. The Vaibhāśika-Sarvāstivāda, which had by far the most "comprehensive edifice of doctrinal systematics" of the [[early Buddhist schools]],<ref>"one does not find anywhere else a body of doctrine as organized or as complete as theirs" . . ."Indeed, no other competing schools have ever come close to building up such a comprehensive edifice of doctrinal systematics as the Vaibhāśika." ''The Sautrantika theory of seeds (bija ) revisited: With special reference to the ideological continuity between Vasubandhu's theory of seeds and its Srilata/Darstantika precedents'' by Park, Changhwan, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2007 pg 2</ref> was widely influential in India and beyond.<ref>''A Study of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: The Historical Development of the Concept of Karma in the Sarvāstivāda Thought''. PhD thesis by Wataru S. Ryose. University of Wisconsin-Madison: 1987 pg 3</ref>


In contrast to the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntika Sarvāstivādins did not uphold the ''[[Mahavibhasa|Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra]]'', but rather emphasized the Buddhist sūtras. The name ''Sautrāntika'' means "those who uphold the sūtras." According to the ''{{IAST|Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya}}'', the Sautrāntikas held the doctrine that there may be many contemporaneous buddhas.{{sfn|Xing|2005|p=66}}
An important element of Mādhyamaka refutation is that the classical Buddhist doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent arising]] (the idea that every phenomena is dependent on other phenomena) cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or substance" and that therefore essence theories are contrary not only to the Buddhist scriptures but to the very ideas of [[causality]] and change.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=165, 162}} Any enduring [[Svabhāva|essential nature]] would prevent any causal interaction, or any kind of origination. For things would simply always have been, and will always continue to be, without any change.<ref>Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 40-41, 322-333.</ref>{{refn|group=note|Nāgārjuna equates svabhāva (essence) with bhāva (existence) in Chapter 15 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā}} As [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] writes in the MMK:<blockquote>We state that conditioned origination is emptiness. It is mere designation depending on something, and it is the middle path. (24.18)


===Mūlasarvāstivādins===
Since nothing has arisen without depending on something, there is nothing that is not empty. (24.19) <ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 146.</ref></blockquote>
A number of theories have been posited by academics as to how the two are related, which Bhikkhu Sujato summaries as follows:
=== The two truths ===
{{quote|The uncertainty around this school has led to a number of hypotheses. Frauwallner’s theory holds that the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya is the disciplinary code of an early Buddhist community based in [[Mathura, Uttar Pradesh|Mathura]], which was quite independent in its establishment as a monastic community from the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmir (although of course this does not mean that they were different in terms of doctrine). Lamotte, opposing Frauwallner, asserts that the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya was a late Kaśmīr compilation made to complete the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya. Warder suggests that the Mūlasarvāstivādins were a later development of the Sarvāstivāda, whose main innovations were literary, the compilation of the large Vinaya and the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna Sūtra, which kept the early doctrines but brought the style up to date with contemporary literary developments. Enomoto pulls the rug out from all these theories by asserting that Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin are really the same. Meanwhile, Willemen, Dessein, and Cox have developed the theory that the Sautrantikas, a branch or tendency within the Sarvāstivādin group of schools, emerged in Gandhāra and Bactria around 200 CE. Although they were the earlier group, they temporarily lost ground to the Kaśmīr Vaibhāśika school due to the political influence of Kaṇiṣka. In later years the Sautrantikas became known as Mūlasarvāstivādins and regained the ascendancy. I have elsewhere given my reasons for disagreeing with the theories of Enomoto and Willemen et al. Neither Warder nor Lamotte give sufficient evidence to back up their theories. We are left with Frauwallner’s theory, which in this respect has stood the test of time.<ref>{{cite book|author=Bhikkhu Sujato|title=Sects & Sectarianism: The origins of Buddhist Schools|url=https://santifm.org/santipada/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Sects__Sectarianism_Bhikkhu_Sujato.pdf|page=135|year=2012 |publisher=Santipada}}</ref>}}
{{main|Two truths doctrine}}
Beginning with [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]], Mādhyamaka discerns [[Two truths doctrine|two levels of truth]], conventional truth (everyday [[Common sense|commonsense]] reality) and ultimate truth ([[Śūnyatā|emptiness]]).{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}<ref name=":5">Rje Tsong Khapa; Garfield, Jay; Geshe Ngawang Samten (translators), Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. xx.</ref> Ultimately, Mādhyamaka argues that all phenomena are empty of ''svabhava'' and only exist in dependence on other causes, conditions and concepts. Conventionally, Mādhyamaka holds that beings do perceive concrete objects which they are aware of empirically.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}} In Madhyamaka this phenomenal world is the limited truth - ''samvrti satya,'' which literally means “to completely cover, conceal, or obscure” and arises due to [[Avidyā (Buddhism)|ignorance]].<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 80, 83.</ref> This seeming reality does not ''really'' exist as the highest truth realized by [[Prajñā (Buddhism)|wisdom]] which is ''paramartha satya'' (''parama'' is literally “supreme or ultimate,” and ''[[artha]]'' means “object, purpose, or actuality”)'','' and yet it has a kind of conventional reality which has its uses for reaching liberation.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 81.</ref> This limited truth includes everything, including the [[Gautama Buddha|Buddha]] himself, the teachings ([[Dharma]]), liberation and even Nāgārjuna's own arguments.<ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 149.</ref> This [[Two truths doctrine|two truth schema]] which did not deny the importance of convention allowed Nāgārjuna to defend himself against charges of [[nihilism]], understanding both correctly meant seeing the middle way:<blockquote>"Without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught. Without understanding the ultimate, nirvana is not attained."<ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 150.</ref></blockquote>The limited, perceived reality is an experiential reality or a [[Nominalism|nominal]] reality which beings impute on the ultimate reality, it is not an ontological reality with substantial or independent existence.{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=73}}<ref name=":5" /> Hence, the two truths aren't two metaphysical realities, but according to Karl Brunnholzl, "the two realities refer to just what is experienced by two different types of beings with different types and scopes of perception."<ref name=":14">Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 74.</ref> As [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] says:<blockquote>It is through the perfect and the false seeing of all entities That the entities that are thus found bear two natures. The object of perfect seeing is true reality, And false seeing is seeming reality.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 73.</ref></blockquote>This means that the distinction between the two truths is primarily [[Epistemology|epistemological]] and depending on the cognition of the observer, not [[Ontology|ontological]].<ref name=":14" /> As [[Shantideva]] says there are "two kinds of world", "the one of yogins and the one of common people."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, p. 79.</ref> The seeming reality is the world of [[Saṃsāra|samsara]] because conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. As [[Buddhapalita]] states: "unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them." <ref>Tsongkhapa, Garfield, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (Volume 3), 2002, p. 210.</ref>


The Kasmira orthodoxy, the Vaibhāṣikas disappeared in the later part of the 7th century. Subsequently, the old Gandharan Sarvāstivādins, the non-Vaibhāṣika Sautrantikas, were named Mūlasarvāstivādins, who then at a later date went to Tibet. It has been suggested that the minority Vaibhāṣikas were absorbed into the majority Sautrantika Sarvāstivādins as a possible result of the latter’s adaptations.
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment, both material ''and'' intellectual.{{sfn|Hayes|2003|p=8-9}}


Moreover, ''Mishrakabhidharmahrdaya'', a title which means that 'sautrantika views were mixed with Vaibhāṣika views' was composed by Dharmatrata in the 4th century in Gandharan area. Vasubandhu (ca.350-430), a native from Purusapura in Gandhara, composed his Kosa based on this text and the Astagrantha. While in Kasmira, he wrote his karikas which were well received there but he faced intense opposition, notably from Samghabhadra, a leading Sarvāstivāda pundit, when he composed his bhasya. By his bhasya, Vasubandhu made it clear to the Vaibhāṣikas that he was a sautrantika, which is why he was fiercely opposed by the Sarvāstivāda vaibhasikas in Kasmira.
===The nature of ultimate reality===
{{main|Śūnyatā}}According to Paul Williams, Nāgārjuna associates emptiness with the [[Two truths doctrine|ultimate truth]] but his conception of emptiness is not some kind of [[Absolute (philosophy)|Absolute]], but rather it is the very absence of true existence with regards to the conventional reality of things and events in the world.<ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 147.</ref> Because the ultimate is itself empty, it is also explained as a "transcendence of deception" and hence is a kind of [[Apophatic theology|apophatic]] truth which experiences the lack of substance.<ref group="web" name="Susan Kahn" /><ref>Wynne, Alexander, Early Buddhist Teaching as Proto-sunyavada.</ref>


In reply to Vasubhandhu’s bhasya, Samghabhadra wrote a text, the Nyayanusara 'according to reason'. This work is presently only extant in Chinese (from Xuanzang’s translation and little is known of it in English).
Because the nature of ultimate reality is said to be empty, even of "emptiness" itself, along with the very framework of the two truths are also conventional realities, and not part of the ultimate. This is often called "the emptiness of emptiness" and refers to the fact that even though Madhyamikas speak of emptiness as the ultimate unconditioned nature of things, this emptiness is itself empty of any real existence.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 111.</ref>


== Appearance and language ==
The two truths themselves are therefore just a practical tool used to teach others, but do not exist within the actual meditative equipoise that realizes the ultimate.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 75.</ref> As Candrakirti says: "the noble ones who have accomplished what is to be accomplished do not see anything that is delusive or not delusive."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 76.</ref> From within the experience of the enlightened ones there is only one reality which appears non-conceptually, as Nāgārjuna says in the Sixty stanzas on reasoning: "that nirvana is the sole reality, is what the Victors have declared."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 76-77.</ref> [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka's]] ''Madhyamakahrdayakārikā'' describes the ultimate truth through a negation of all four possibilities of the [[Catuṣkoṭi|''catuskoti'']]:<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 84.</ref><blockquote>Its character is neither existent, nor nonexistent, Nor both existent and nonexistent, nor neither. Centrists should know true reality That is free from these four possibilities.</blockquote>[[Atiśa|Atisha]] describes the ultimate as "here, there is no seeing and no seer, No beginning and no end, just peace...It is nonconceptual and nonreferential...it is inexpressible, unobservable, unchanging, and unconditioned."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 83-84.</ref> Because of the non-conceptual nature of the ultimate, according to Brunnholzl, the two truths are ultimately inexpressible as “one” or “different.”<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 89.</ref>


===The middle path===
=== Appearance ===
Between 148 and 170 CE, the [[Parthia]]n monk [[An Shigao]] came to China and translated a work which described the color of monastic robes (Skt. ''[[Kasaya (clothing)|kāṣāya]]'') utitized in five major Indian Buddhist sects, called ''Da Biqiu Sanqian Weiyi'' (大比丘三千威儀).<ref name="Hino, Shoun 2004. p. 55">Hino, Shoun. ''Three Mountains and Seven Rivers.'' 2004. p. 55</ref> Another text translated at a later date, the ''Śāriputraparipṛcchā'', contains a very similar passage with nearly the same information.<ref name="Hino, Shoun 2004. p. 55"/> In the earlier source, the Sarvāstivāda are described as wearing dark red robes, while the [[Dharmagupta]]s are described as wearing black robes.<ref name="Hino, Shoun 2004. pp. 55-56">Hino, Shoun. ''Three Mountains and Seven Rivers.'' 2004. pp. 55-56</ref> However, in the corresponding passage found in the later ''Śāriputraparipṛcchā'', the Sarvāstivāda are described as wearing black robes and the Dharmaguptas as wearing dark red robes.<ref name="Hino, Shoun 2004. pp. 55-56"/> In traditions of [[Tibetan Buddhism]], which follow the [[Mūlasarvāstivāda]] Vinaya, red robes are regarded as characteristic of their tradition.<ref>Mohr, Thea. Tsedroen, Jampa. ''Dignity and Discipline: Reviving Full Ordination for Buddhist Nuns.'' 2010. p. 266</ref>
{{main|Middle Way}}
As noted by Roger Jackson, non-Buddhist and Buddhist writers ancient and modern, have argued that the Mādhyamaka philosophy is [[Nihilism|nihilistic]] and this view has been challenged by others who argue that it is a middle way (''madhyamāpratipad'') between nihilism and eternalism.<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oyJjCx_tEiMC&pg=PA4|title=The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy|author=Junjirō Takakusu|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|year=1998|isbn=978-81-208-1592-6|pages=4, 105–107}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i9gm9CzNd5EC|title=Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan|author=Hajime Nakamura|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass|year=1991|isbn=978-81-208-0764-8|pages=590–591 footnote 20}}, Quote: "Already in India, 'sunyata' was liable to be misunderstood as nothingness or nihil'. (...) The [[Sarvastivada|Sarvastivadins]] of Hinayana Buddhism viewed the Madhyamika school as 'one that argues that everything is nothing. (...) It is only natural that most of the Western scholars call the ''prajnaparamita sutra'' or the doctrine of the Madhyamika school nihilism since criticisms were already expressed in India. Against such criticisms, however, Nagarjuna, founder of the Madhyamika school says, 'you are ignorant of the function of sunyata, the meaning of the sunyata and sunyata itself'."</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CjkRAQAAIAAJ|title=Mādhyamika Śūnyatā, a Reappraisal: A Reappraisal of Mādhyamika Philosophical Enterprise with Special Reference to Nāgārjuna and Chandrakīrti|author=G. C. Nayak|date=2001|publisher=Indian Council of Philosophical Research|isbn=978-81-85636-47-4|pages=9–12}}</ref> Mādhyamaka philosophers themselves explicitly rejected the nihilist interpretation, as Nāgārjuna writes: "through explaining true reality as it is, the seeming [<nowiki/>[[Samvriti|''samvrti'']]] does not become disrupted."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 212.</ref> [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] also responds to the charge of nihilism in his ''[[Prasannapada|Lucid Words]]'':
<nowiki/><blockquote>Therefore, emptiness is taught in order to completely pacify all discursiveness without exception. So if the purpose of emptiness is the complete peace of all discursiveness and you just increase the web of discursiveness by thinking that the meaning of emptiness is nonexistence, you do not realize the purpose of emptiness [at all].<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 214.</ref></blockquote>Some scholars (Murti) interpret emptiness as described by Nāgārjuna as a Buddhist transcendental [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]], while other scholars such as [[David Kalupahana]] consider this a mistake since this would not make it a middle way.<ref name="ferrer1022">Jorge Noguera Ferrer, ''Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality.'' SUNY Press, 2002, page 102-103.</ref><ref>[[David J. Kalupahana]], ''Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.'' SUNY Press, 1986, pages 48-50.</ref>


=== Language ===
Mādhyamaka thinkers also argue that since things have the nature of lacking true existence or own being (''niḥsvabhāva''), all things are mere conceptual constructs (''prajñaptimatra'') because they are just impermanent collections of causes and conditions.<ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 141.</ref> This also applies to the principle of causality itself, since ''everything'' is dependently originated.<ref>Williams, Paul. ''Buddhist Thought.'' Routledge 2000, page 142.</ref> Therefore in Mādhyamaka, phenomena appear to arise and cease, but in an ultimate sense they do not arise or remain as inherently existent phenomena.<ref name="Tsondru, Mabja 2011, pages 56-582">Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.</ref><ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 151-152.</ref>{{refn|group=note|Chapter 21 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā goes into the reasoning behind this.<ref name="Tsondru, Mabja 2011, pages 56-58"/>}} This is believed by Madhyamaka philosophers to show that both views of [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] or eternalist existence (such as the Hindu ideas of [[Brahman]] or ''sat-dravya'') and [[nihilism]] are untenable<ref>Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417</ref><ref>unclear</ref>{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} These two views are considered to be the ''two extremes'' that Madhyamaka steers clear from:
During the first century BCE, in the Gandharan cultural area (consisting of [[Oddiyana]], [[Gandhara]] and [[Bactria]], [[Tokharistan]], across the [[Khyber Pass]]), the [[Sthavira nikāya|Sthaviriyas]] used the [[Gāndhārī language]] to write their literature using the [[Kharosthi]].


The Tibetan historian [[Buton Rinchen Drub]] wrote that the [[Mahāsāṃghika]]s used Prākrit, the Sarvāstivādins used Sanskrit, the Sthavira nikāya used [[Paiśācī]], and the [[Saṃmitīya]] used [[Apabhraṃśa]].{{sfn|Yao|2012|p=9}}
# ''Essentialism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or ''eternalism'' (sastavadava){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - a belief that things inherently or substantially exist and are therefore efficacious objects of [[tṛṣṇā|craving]] and [[Upādāna|clinging]];{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies at the basis of all suffering.{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}}
#''Nihilism''{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=88 footnote}} or ''annihilationism'' (ucchedavada){{sfn|Warder|2000|p=361}} - views that lead one to believe that there is no need to be responsible for one's actions, such as the idea one is annihilated at death or that nothing has causal effects, but also the idea that absolutely nothing exists.


==Teachings==
=== The usefulness of reason ===
In Mādhyamaka, [[reason]] and [[debate]] is understood as a means to an end (liberation), and therefore it must be founded on the wish to help oneself and others end suffering.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 174-175.</ref> Reason and logical arguments (such as those employed by classical [[Indian philosophy|Indian philosophers]], i.e. [[Pramana|''pramana'']]) however, are also seen as being empty of any true validity or reality. They only serve are conventional remedies for our delusions.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 199.</ref> Nāgārjuna famously attacked the notion that one could establish a valid cognition or epistemic proof ([[Pramana|''pramana'']]) in his ''Vigrahavyāvartanī'': <blockquote>If your objects are well established through valid cognitions, tell us how you establish these valid cognitions. If you think they are established through other valid cognitions, there is an [[infinite regress]]. Then, the first one is not established, nor are the middle ones, nor the last. If these [valid cognitions] are established even without valid cognition, what you say is ruined. In that case, there is an inconsistency, And you ought to provide an argument for this distinction.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 200.</ref></blockquote>[[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] comments on this statement by stating that Madhyamaka does not completely deny the use of pramanas conventionally, and yet ultimately they do not have a foundation:<blockquote>Therefore we assert that mundane objects are known through the four kinds of authoritative cognition. They are mutually dependent: When there is authoritative cognition, there are objects of knowledge; when there are objects of knowledge, there is authoritative cognition. But neither authoritative cognition nor objects of knowledge exist inherently.<ref name=":20" /></blockquote>To the charge that if Nāgārjuna's arguments and words are also empty they therefore lack the power to refute anything, Nāgārjuna responds that:<blockquote>My words are without nature. Therefore, my thesis is not ruined. Since there is no inconsistency, I do not have to state an argument for a distinction.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 202.</ref></blockquote>Further Nāgārjuna states:<blockquote>Just as one magical creation may be annihilated by another magical creation, and one illusory person by another person produced by an illusionist, This negation is the same.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 203.</ref></blockquote>[[Shantideva]] makes the same point when he states "thus, when one’s son dies in a dream, the conception “he does not exist” removes the thought that he does exist, but it is also delusive."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 203-204.</ref> In other words, Mādhyamaka does not deny that their arguments are not ''ultimately'' valid in some [[Foundationalism|foundational]] sense, just like all things. However, conventionally one is still able to use the opponent's own reasoning apparatus to refute their theories and help them see their errors. This remedial deconstruction does not replace their theories with another one, but simply dissolves all views, including the very fictional system of epistemic warrants (''pramanas'') used to establish them.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 202-203.</ref> The point of Mādhyamaka reasoning is not to establish any abstract validity or universal truth, it is simply a pragmatic project aimed at ending delusion and suffering.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 217.</ref>


===All exists===
Nāgārjuna also argues that Mādhyamaka only negates things conventionally, since ultimately, there is nothing there to negate, "I do not negate anything and there is also nothing to be negated."<ref name=":15">Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 206.</ref> Therefore, it is only from the perspective of those who cling to the existence of things that it seems as if something is being negated. But Mādhyamaka is not annihilating something, merely elucidating that this true existence never existed in the first place.<ref name=":15" />
{{unreferenced section|date=July 2015}}


Although the sarvastitva was the central thesis, there were different theories on how 'sarvam' and even 'asti' were actually to be explained and understood among the Gandharan diverse Sarvāstivādins. Vasubandhu’s ''Koshabhasya'', an elaborate yoga manual based on the Hrdaya, describes four main theses on sarvasti:
Thus, Mādhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be depicted by concepts.{{sfn|Cheng|1981}}{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=102}} According to [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]], this creates a sort of tension in Mādhyamaka literature, since it has use some concepts to convey its teachings.{{sfn|Garfield|1995|p=102}}
{{quote|There are four types of Sarvāstivādins accordingly as they teach a difference in existence (''bhavanyathatva''), a difference in characteristic (''laksananyathatva''), a difference in condition (''avasthanyathatva''), and mutual difference (''anyonyathatva'').}}


Later Sarvāstivāda takes a combination of the first and third theses as its model. It was on this basis that the school’s doctrines were defended in the face of growing external, and sometimes even internal, criticism.
=== Soteriology ===


The doctrines of Sarvāstivāda were not confined to 'all exists', but also include the theory of momentariness (''ksanika''), conjoining (''samprayukta'') and simultaneity (''sahabhu''), conditionality (''hetu'' and ''pratyaya''), the culmination of the spiritual path (''marga''), and others. These doctrines are all inter-connected and it is the principle of 'all exists' that is the axial doctrine holding the larger movement together when the precise details of other doctrines are at stake.
For Mādhyamaka, the realization of emptiness is not just a satisfactory theory about the world, but a key understanding which allows one to reach liberation or [[nirvana]]. Nāgārjuna states in the MMK:<blockquote>With the cessation of ignorance, formations will not arise. Moreover, the cessation of ignorance occurs through right understanding. Through the cessation of this and that [link of dependent origination] this and that [other link] will not come about. The entire mass of suffering thereby completely ceases.<ref name=":4">Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 47.</ref></blockquote>[[Pratītyasamutpāda|Dependent origination]] is the fundamental Buddhist analysis of the arising of suffering and therefore, according to Nāgārjuna, the cognitive shift which sees the nonexistence of [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] leads to the cessation of the first link in this chain of suffering, which then leads to the ending of the entire chain of causes and thus, of all suffering.<ref name=":4" /> Nāgārjuna also states:<blockquote>Liberation (''moksa'') results from the cessation of actions (''karman'') and defilements (''klesa''). Actions and defilements result from representations (''vikalpa''). These from false imagining (''prapañca''). False imagining stops in emptiness (''sunyata''). (18.5)<ref>Bronkhorst (2009), p. 148.</ref></blockquote>Therefore, the ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but to gain a [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|liberated mind]] which does not cling to anything. To realize this, meditation on emptiness may proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of both [[Fetter (Buddhism)#Identity view (sakkāya-diṭṭhi)|self]], objects and mental states,{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=295-310}} culminating in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom."{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=310}}{{refn|group=note|See also [[Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga]], for early, Madhyamaka-like texts from the Buddhist canon on freedom from views.}} Moreover, the path to understand the ultimate truth is not one that negates or invalidates relative truths. Instead it is only through properly understanding and using the relative truth that the ultimate can be attained, as [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka]] says;<blockquote>In order to guide beginners a method is taught, comparable to the steps of a staircase that leads to perfect Buddhahood. Ultimate reality is only to be entered once we have understood seeming reality.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 108.</ref></blockquote>


=== Does Mādhyamaka have a position? ===
=== The Three Vehicles ===
Regarding divisions of practice, the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins are known to have employed the outlook of Buddhist practice as consisting of the Three Vehicles:{{sfn|Nakamura|1980|p=189}}
Nāgārjuna is famous for arguing that his philosophy was not a view, and that he in fact did not take any position or thesis whatsoever since this would just be another form of clinging to some form of existence.<ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 146.</ref> In his ''Vigrahavyavartani'', Nāgārjuna states:<blockquote>If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault. Since I have no position, I am not at fault at all. If there were anything to be observed through direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition], it would be something to be established or rejected. However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 218.</ref></blockquote>
# [[Śrāvakayāna]]
Likewise in his ''Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning'', Nāgārjuna says: "By taking any standpoint whatsoever, you will be snatched by the cunning snakes of the afflictions. Those whose minds have no standpoint, will not be caught." <ref>Brunnholzl, Karl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition, Shambhala, 2004, page 34.</ref> Randall Collins states that for Nāgārjuna, ultimate reality is simply the idea that "no concepts are intelligible", while Ferrer notes that Nagarjuna criticized those whose mind held any "positions and beliefs", including the [[View (Buddhism)|view]] of emptiness, as Nāgārjuna says: "The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all [[View (Buddhism)|views]]. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible."<ref>Jorge Noguera Ferrer, ''Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality.'' SUNY Press, 2002, pages 102. The quote is from the [[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]].</ref><ref name="collins221">Randall Collins, ''The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change.'' Harvard University Press, 2000, pages 221-222.</ref> [[Aryadeva]] echoes this idea in his Four Hundred Verses:<blockquote>"First, one puts an end to what is not meritorious. In the middle, one puts an end to identity. Later, one puts an end to all views. Those who understand this are skilled."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 172.</ref></blockquote>However, other texts mention a specific Mādhyamaka thesis or view. [[Shantideva]] for example says "one cannot uphold any faultfinding in the thesis of emptiness" and [[Bhāviveka|Bhavaviveka's]] ''Blaze of Reasoning'' says: "as for our thesis, it is the emptiness of nature, because this is the nature of phenomena."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 219.</ref> [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]] notes that Nagarjuna and Candrakirti both make positive arguments. He cites the MMK which states: "There does not exist anything that is not dependently arisen. Therefore there does not exist anything that is not empty" as well as Candrakirti's commentary on it which clearly states "We assert the statement 'emptiness itself is a designation.'"<ref name=":20" />
# [[Pratyekabuddhayāna]]
# Bodhisattvayāna


=== Views on the Buddha ===
These positions however, are not a contradiction, since Mādhyamaka can be said to have the "thesis of emptiness" only conventionally, in the context of debating or explaining it. According to Brunnholzl, even though Mādhyamaka thinkers may express a thesis pedagogically, what they deny is that "they have any thesis that involves real existence or reference points or any thesis that is to be defended from their own point of view."<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 221.</ref>
Sarvāstivādins viewed the Buddha's physical body (Skt. ''rūpakāya'') as being impure and improper for taking refuge in, and they instead regarded taking refuge in the Buddha as taking refuge in the [[Dharmakāya]] of the Buddha.{{sfn|Xing|2005|p=49}}
{{quote|Some people say that to take refuge in the Buddha is to take refuge in the body of the Tathāgata, which comprises head, neck, stomach, back, hands and feet. It is explained that the body, born of father and mother, is composed of defiled ''dharmas'', and therefore is not a source of refuge. The refuge is the Buddha's fully accomplished qualities (''aśaikṣadharmāḥ'') which comprise ''bodhi'' and the ''dharmakāya.''}}


=== Views on arhats ===
Karl Brunnholzl states that Mādhyamaka analysis applies to all systems of thought, ideas and concepts, including Mādhyamaka itself. This is because, the nature of Mādhyamaka is "the deconstruction of any system and conceptualization whatsoever, including itself".<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 160.</ref> In the Root verses on the Middle Way, Nagarjuna illustrates this point:<blockquote>By the flaw of having views about emptiness, those of little understanding are ruined, just as when incorrectly seizing a snake or mistakenly practicing an awareness-mantra.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2001, p. 209.</ref></blockquote>
According to [[A.K. Warder]], the Sarvāstivādins held the same position as the [[Mahāsāṃghika]] branch regarding [[arhat]]s, considering them to be imperfect and fallible.<ref>Warder, A.K. ''Indian Buddhism''. 2000. p. 277</ref> In the Sarvāstivādin ''Nāgadatta Sūtra'', the [[Mahīśāsaka]] view of women is criticized in a narrative about a bhikṣuṇī named Nāgadatta. Here, the demon [[Mara (demon)|Māra]] takes the form of her father, and tries to convince her to work toward the lower stage of an arhat, rather than that of a fully enlightened buddha (Skt. ''[[samyaksambuddha]]'').{{sfn|Kalupahana|2001|p=109}}
{{quote|Māra therefore took the disguise of Nāgadatta's father and said thus to Nāgadatta: "Your thought is too serious. [[Buddhahood]] is too difficult to attain. It takes a hundred thousand nayutas of [[crore|koṭi]]s of [[Kalpa (aeon)|kalpa]]s to become a Buddha. Since few people attain Buddhahood in this world, why don't you attain Arhatship? For the experience of Arhatship is the same as that of [[nirvana|nirvāṇa]]; moreover, it is easy to attain Arhatship...."}}


In her reply, Nāgadatta rejects arhatship as a lower path, saying, "A Buddha's wisdom is like empty space of the ten-quarters, which can enlighten innumerable people. But an Arhat's wisdom is inferior."{{sfn|Kalupahana|2001|p=109}}
==Origins and sources==
===Early Buddhist Texts===
It is well known that the only sutra that [[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] explicitly cites in his ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' (Chapter 15.7) is the "Advice to Kātyāyana", stating that "according to the Instructions to [[Katyayana (Buddhist)|Katyayana]], both existence and nonexistence are criticized by the Blessed One who opposed being and non-being."<ref name=":11">Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 185.</ref> This appears to have been a Sanskrit version of the ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta]]'' ([[Samyutta Nikaya|Saṃyutta Nikāya]] ii.16-17).<ref name=":11" /> The ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta]]'' itself says: <blockquote>This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends on a duality–upon the notion of existence and the notion of nonexistence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of nonexistence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world.<ref name=":11" /> </blockquote>Joseph Walser also points out that verse six of chapter 15 contains an allusion to the “''Mahahatthipadopama sutta''”, another sutta of the ''Nidanavagga'', the collection which also contains the ''[[Kaccānagotta Sutta|Kaccānagotta]],'' and which contains various suttas that focus on the avoidance of extreme views, which are all held to be associated with either the extreme of eternality (''sasvata'') or the extreme of disruption (''uccheda'')''.<ref name=":11" />'' Another allusion to an [[Early Buddhist Texts|early buddhist text]] noted by Walser is in Nagarjuna's Ratnavali chapter 1, where he makes reference to a statement in the ''Kevaddha sutta.''<ref>Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 186-187</ref>


=== Views on bodhisattvas ===
The [[Atthakavagga and Parayanavagga|''Aṭṭhakavagga'' (Pali, "Octet Chapter") and the ''Pārāyanavagga'' (Pali, "Way to the Far Shore Chapter")]] are two small collections of suttas within the [[Pali Canon|Pāli Canon]] of [[Theravada]] [[Buddhism]].{{refn|group=note|In the Pali canon, these chapters are the fourth and fifth chapters of the [[Khuddaka Nikaya]]'s [[Sutta Nipata]], respectively.}} They are among the earliest existing Buddhist literature, and place considerable emphasis on the rejection of, or non-attachment to, all [[View (Buddhism)|views]]. Gomez compared them to later Madhyamaka philosophy, which in its [[Prasangika|{{IAST|Prasaṅgika}}]] form especially makes a method of rejecting others' views rather than proposing its own.{{sfn|Gomez|1976}}
Regarding divisions of practice, the ''Mahāvibhāṣā'' is known to employ the outlook of Buddhist practice as consisting of the Three Vehicles.{{sfn|Nakamura|1980|p=189}} The Sarvāstivādins also did not hold that it was impossible, or even impractical to strive to become a fully enlightened buddha (Skt. ''samyaksaṃbuddha''), and therefore they admitted the path of a [[bodhisattva]] as a valid one.<ref>Baruah, Bibhuti. ''Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism''. 2008. p. 457</ref> References to Bodhisattvayāna and the practice of the Six [[Pāramitā]]s are commonly found in Sarvāstivāda works as well.<ref>Baruah, Bibhuti. ''Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism''. 2008. p. 456</ref>


The ''Mahāvibhāṣā'' of the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins includes a schema of four pāramitās: generosity (''dāna''), discipline (''[[śīla]]''), energy (''vīrya''), and wisdom (''[[Wisdom in Buddhism|prajñā]]''), and it says that the four pāramitās and six pāramitās are essentially equivalent.{{sfn|Xing|2005|p=48}}
Tillman Vetter, although agreeing overall with Gomez's observations, suggests some refinements on historical and doctrinal grounds.{{sfn|Vetter|1988}} First, he notes that neither of these short collections of suttas are homogeneous and hence are not all amenable to Gomez' proposals. According to Vetter, those suttas which do lend support to Gomez probably originated with a heterodox ascetic group that pre-dated the Buddha, and were integrated into the Buddhist Sangha at an early date, bringing with them some suttas that were already in existence and also composing further suttas in which they tried to combine their own teachings with those of the Buddha.{{sfn|Vetter|1988}}


{{quote|Foreign teachers hold that there are six ''pāramitās'', adding patience (''kṣānti'') and meditation (''[[jhana|dhyāna]]''). But the teachers of [[Kashmir|Kaśmīra]] say that the last two are included in the first four. Patience is included in discipline and meditation in intuitive knowledge; they are accomplished upon completion of discipline and wisdom.}}
Paul Fuller has rejected the arguments of Gomez and Vetter.{{sfn|Fuller|2005}} He finds that
{{quote|... the Nikayas and the Atthakavagga present the same cognitive attitude toward [[View (Buddhism)|views]], wrong or right.{{sfn|Fuller|2005|p=151}}}}


== Canon ==
Alexander Wynne also rejects both of Vetter's claims that the Parayanavagga shows a chronological stratification, and a different attitude toward mindfulness and liberating insight than do other works.{{sfn|Wynne|2007|p=75}}{{refn|group=note|Wynne devotes a chapter to the Parayanavagga.}}


===Vinaya===
===Abhidharma and early Buddhist schools===
The [[Dharmaguptaka]] are known to have rejected the authority of the Sarvāstivāda [[pratimoksha|pratimokṣa]] rules on the grounds that the original teachings of the Buddha had been lost.<ref>Baruah, Bibhuti. ''Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism''. 2008. p. 52</ref>
The Madhyamaka school has been perhaps simplistically regarded as a reaction against the development of Buddhist [[Abhidharma]], however according to Joseph Walser, this is problematic.<ref name=":6">Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 225.</ref> In Abhidharma, [[Dhamma theory|dharmas]] are characterized by defining traits (''lakṣaṇa'') or own-existence ([[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']]). The ''[[Abhidharmakośakārikā|Abhidharmakośabhāṣya]]'' states for example: “''dharma'' means ‘upholding,’ [namely], upholding intrinsic nature (''svabhāva'')”, while the ''[[Mahavibhasa|Mahāvibhāṣā]]'' states “intrinsic nature is able to uphold its own identity and not lose it”.<ref name=":8">Ronkin, Noa, "Abhidharma", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/abhidharma/</nowiki>>.</ref> However this does not mean that all Abhidharma systems hold that dharmas exist independently in an ontological sense, since all Buddhist schools hold that (most) dharmas are [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependently originated]], this doctrine being a central core Buddhist view, rather in Abhidharma, [[Svabhava|''svabhāva'']] is typically something which arises dependent on other conditions and qualities.<ref name=":8" /> [[Svabhava|''Svabhāva'']] in the early Abhidharma systems then, is not a kind of ontological essentialism, but it is a way to categorize dharmas according to their distinctive characteristics. According to Noa Ronkin, the idea of ''svabhava'' evolved towards ontological dimension in the [[Sarvāstivādin]] [[Vaibhāṣika|Vaibhasika]] school's interpretation, which began to also use the term ''dravya'' which means "real existence".<ref name=":8" /> This then, may have been the shift which Nagarjuna sought to attack when he targets certain Sarvastivada tenets.


The complete Sarvāstivāda Vinaya is extant in the [[Chinese Buddhist canon]]. In its early history, the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya was the most common vinaya tradition in China. However, [[Chinese Buddhism]] later settled on the [[Dharmaguptaka]] Vinaya. In the 7th century, Yijing wrote that in eastern China, most people followed the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, while the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya was used in earlier times in [[Guanzhong]] (the region around [[Chang'an]]), and that the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya was prominent in the [[Yangzi River]] area and further south.<ref>Mohr, Thea. Tsedroen, Jampa. ''Dignity and Discipline: Reviving Full Ordination for Buddhist Nuns.'' 2010. p. 187</ref> In the 7th century, the existence of multiple Vinaya lineages throughout China was criticized by prominent Vinaya masters such as Yijing and Dao'an (654&ndash;717). In the early 8th century, Daoan gained the support of [[Emperor Zhongzong of Tang]], and an imperial edict was issued that the saṃgha in China should use only the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya for ordination.<ref>Heirman, Ann. Bumbacher, Stephan Peter. ''The Spread of Buddhism''. 2007. pp. 194-195</ref>
However, the relationship between Madhyamaka and Abhidharma is complex, as Joseph Walser notes, "Nagarjuna’s position vis-à-vis abhidharma is neither a blanket denial nor a blanket acceptance. Nagarjuna’s arguments entertain certain abhidharmic standpoints while refuting others."<ref name=":6" /> One example can be seen in Nagarjuna's Ratnavali which makes supports the study of a list of 57 moral faults which he takes from an Abhidharma text named the ''Ksudravastuka.''<ref>Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 227.</ref> Abhidharmic analysis figures prominently in Madhyamaka treatises, and authoritative commentators like Candrakīrti emphasize that Abhidharmic categories function as a viable (and favored) system of conventional truths - they are more refined than ordinary categories, and they are not dependent on either the extreme of eternalism or on the extreme view of the discontinuity of karma, as the non-Buddhist categories of the time did.


===Āgamas===
Walser also notes that Nagarjuna's theories have much in common with the view of a sub-sect of the [[Mahāsāṃghika|Mahasamgikas]] called the [[Prajñaptivāda|Prajñaptivadins]], who held that suffering was ''prajñapti'' (“designation by provisional naming”) "based on conditioned entities that are themselves reciprocally designated" (''anyonya prajñapti'').<ref name=":10">Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 234.</ref> David Burton argues that for Nagarjuna, "dependently arisen entities have merely conceptually constructed existence (''prajñaptisat'')".<ref name=":10" /> Commenting on this, Walser writes that "Nagarjuna is arguing for a thesis that the Prajñaptivádins already held, using a concept of prajñapti that they were already using."<ref>Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 239.</ref>
Scholars at present have "a nearly complete collection of sūtras from the Sarvāstivāda school"<ref>[http://santipada.googlepages.com/whatthebuddhareallytaught Bhikkhu Sujato: The Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas]</ref> thanks to a recent discovery in Afghanistan of roughly two-thirds of the Dīrgha Āgama in Sanskrit. The Madhyama Āgama (T26, Chinese trans. Gotama Saṅghadeva) and Saṃyukta Āgama (T99, Chinese trans. Guṇabhadra) have long been available in Chinese translation. The Sarvāstivāda is therefore the only early school besides the Theravada for which we have a roughly complete sutra collection, although unlike the Theravada it has not all been preserved in the original language.


===Prajñāpāramitā===
===Abhidharma===
During the first century, the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma primarily consisted of the ''Abhidharmahrdaya'' authored by Dharmashresthin, a native from Tokharistan, and the ''Ashtagrantha'' authored/compiled by Katyayaniputra. Both texts were translated by Samghadeva in 391 AD and in 183 AD. respectively, but they were not completed until 390 in Southern China.
Madhyamaka thought is also closely related to a number of Mahāyāna sources; traditionally, the [[Prajnaparamita|Prajñāpāramitā]] sūtras are the literature most closely associated with Madhyamaka – understood, at least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Sūtras. Traditional accounts also depict Nāgārjuna as retrieving some of the larger Prajñāpāramitā sūtras from the world of the Nāgas (explaining in part the etymology of his name). Prajñā or ‘higher cognition’ is a recurrent term in Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of Abhidharma, ‘insight’ (vipaśyanā) and ‘analysis of the dharmas’ (dharmapravicaya). Within a specifically Mahāyāna context, Prajñā figures as the most prominent in a list of Six Pāramitās (‘perfections’ or ‘perfect masteries’) that a Bodhisattva needs to cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood. Madhyamaka offers conceptual tools to analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and contemplation the type of view that the Sūtras express more authoritatively (being considered word of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajñāpāramitā literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the [[Bodhisattva]] path; thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the Madhyamaka approach. Allusions to the prajñaparamita sutras can be found in Nagarjuna's work. One example is in the opening stanza of the [[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā|Root Verses on the Middle Way]], which seem to allude to the following statement found in two prajñaparamita texts: <blockquote>And how does he wisely know conditioned co-production? He wisely knows it as neither production, nor stopping, neither cut oª nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming nor going away, as the appeasement of all futile discoursings, and as bliss.<ref name=":11">Walser, Joseph, Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Culture, Columbia University Press, 2005, p. 170.</ref></blockquote>The first stanza of Nagarjuna's root verses meanwhile, state:<blockquote>I pay homage to the Fully Enlightened One whose true, venerable words teach dependent-origination to be the blissful pacification of all mental proliferation, neither production, nor stopping, neither cut off nor eternal, neither single nor manifold, neither coming, nor going away.<ref name=":11" /></blockquote>


The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma consists of seven texts. The texts of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma are:
===Pyrrhonism===
* ''[[Jnanaprasthana|Jñānaprasthāna]]'' ("Foundation of Knowledge") (T. 1543-1544)
Because of the high degree of similarity between Madhyamaka and [[Pyrrhonism]],<ref>Adrian Kuzminski, ''Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism'' 2008</ref> [[Thomas McEvilley]]<ref>Thomas McEvilley, ''The Shape of Ancient Thought'' 2002 pp499-505</ref> and Matthew Neale<ref>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMZwyPdY7eg&t=52s</ref> suspect that Nāgārjuna was influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India. [[Pyrrho]] of Elis (c. 360-c. 270 BCE), who is credited with founding this school of [[Philosophical skepticism|skeptical philosophy]], was himself influenced by Buddhist philosophy during his stay in India with [[Alexander the Great]]'s army.
* ''[[Prakaranapada|Prakaraṇapāda]]'' ("Exposition") (T. 1541-1542)
* ''[[Vijnanakaya|Vijñānakāya]]'' ("Body of Consciousness") (T. 1539)
* ''[[Dharmaskandha]]'' ("Aggregation of Dharmas") (T. 1537)
* ''[[Prajnaptisastra|Prajñaptiśāstra]]'' ("Treatise on Designations") (T. 1538)
* ''[[Dhatukaya|Dhātukāya]]'' ("Body of Elements") (T. 1540)
* ''[[Sangitiparyaya|Saṅgītiparyāya]]'' ("Discourses on Gathering Together") (T. 1536)


Following these, are the texts that became the authority of the Vaibhāṣika:
== Classical Indian Mādhyamaka ==
* ''[[Mahavibhasa|Mahāvibhāṣā]]'' ("Great Commentary" on the ''Jñānaprasthāna'') (T. 1545)
[[File:Nagarjuna and Aryadeva as Two Great Indian Buddhist Scholastics - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|[[Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] (right) and [[Aryadeva|Āryadeva]] (middle).]]


Sarvāstivādin meditation teachers also worked on the [[Dhyāna sutras]] ({{zh|c=禪經}}), a group of early Buddhist meditation texts which were translated into Chinese and became influential in the development of Chinese Buddhist meditation methods.
=== Nāgārjuna ===
As Jan Westerhoff notes, while [[Nāgārjuna]] is "one of the greatest thinkers in the history of Asian philosophy...contemporary scholars agree on hardly any details concerning him". This includes exactly when he lived (it can be narrowed down some time in the first three centuries CE), where he lived (Joseph Walser suggests [[Amaravati|Amarāvatī]] in east [[Deccan Plateau|Deccan]]) and exactly what constitutes his written corpus.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 4.</ref> Numerous texts are attributed to him, but it is at least agreed by some scholars that what is called the Yukti (analytical) corpus is the core of his philosophical work. These texts are the "Root verses on the Middle way" (''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]],'' MMK), the "Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning" (''''Yuktiṣāṣṭika''''), the "Dispeller of Objections" (''Vigrahavyāvartanī''), the "Treatise on Pulverization" (''''Vaidalyaprakaraṇa'''') and the "Precious Garland" (''Ratnāvalī'').<ref name=":1">Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 5-6.</ref> However, even the attribution of each one of these has been question by some modern scholars, except for the the MMK which is by


All of these works have been translated into Chinese, and are now part of the [[Chinese Buddhist canon]]. In the Chinese context, the word ''abhidharma'' refers to the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, although at a minimum the Dharmaguptaka, [[Pudgalavada]] and [[Theravada]] also had abhidharmas.
definition seen as his major work.<ref name=":1" />


==Relationship to Mahāyāna==
[[Nāgārjuna]]'s main goal is often seen by scholars as refuting the [[essentialism]] of certain Buddhist [[Abhidharma]] schools (mainly [[Vaibhāṣika|''Vaibhasika'']]) which posited theories of [[Svabhava|''svabhava'']] (essential nature) and also the Hindu [[Nyaya|Nyāya]] and [[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]] schools which posited a theory of ontological substances (''dravyatas'').<ref>Wasler, Joseph. ''Nagarjuna in Context.'' New York: Columibia University Press. 2005, pgs. 225-263.</ref> In the MMK he used ''[[Prasaṅgika|reductio ad absurdum]]'' arguments (''prasanga'') to show that any theory of substance or essence was unsustainable and therefore, phenomena (''dharmas'') such as change, causality, and sense perception were empty (''sunya'') of any essential existence. [[Nāgārjuna]] also famously equated the emptiness of [[Dhamma theory|''dharmas'']] with their [[dependent origination]].{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=120}}<ref>Tsondru, Mabja. ''Ornament of Reason.'' Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 66-71, 447-477.</ref><ref>Williams, Paul, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, 2002, p 142.</ref>{{refn|group=note|[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]] 24:18}}
The Sarvāstivādins of [[Kasmira Kingdom|Kāśmīra]] held the ''{{IAST|Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra}}'' as authoritative, and thus were given the moniker of being Vaibhāṣikas. The ''{{IAST|Mahāvibhāṣā}}'' is thought to have been authored around 150 CE, around the time of [[Kanishka|Kaniṣka]] (127–151 CE) of the [[Kushan Empire|Kuṣāṇa Empire]].<ref>Potter, Karl. ''Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.'' 1998. p. 112</ref> This massive treatise of Abhidharma (200 fascicles in Chinese) contains a great deal of material with what appear to be strong affinities to [[Mahāyāna]] doctrines.<ref>Potter, Karl. ''Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.'' 1998. p. 117</ref> The ''{{IAST|Mahāvibhāṣā}}'' is also said to illustrate the accommodations reached between the [[Hinayana|Hīnayāna]] and Mahāyāna traditions, as well as the means by which Mahāyāna doctrines would become accepted.<ref>Potter, Karl. ''Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D.'' 1998. p. 111</ref> The ''{{IAST|Mahāvibhāṣā}}'' also defines the [[Mahayana sutras|Mahāyāna sūtras]] and the role in their Buddhist canon. Here they are described as ''Vaipulya'' doctrines, with "Vaipulya" being a commonly used synonym for Mahāyāna. The ''{{IAST|Mahāvibhāṣā}}'' reads:<ref name="Walser, Joseph 2005. p. 156">Walser, Joseph. ''Nāgārjuna in Context: Mahāyāna Buddhism and Early Indian Culture.'' 2005. p. 156</ref>
{{quote|What is the Vaipulya? It is said to be all the sūtras corresponding to elaborations on the meanings of the exceedingly profound dharmas.}}


According to a number of scholars, Mahāyāna Buddhism flourished during the time of the Kuṣāṇa Empire, and this is illustrated in the form of Mahāyāna influence on the ''Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra''.<ref>Willemen, Charles. Dessein, Bart. Cox, Collett. ''Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism''. 1997. p. 123</ref> The ''Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa'' also records that Kaniṣka presided over the establishment of [[Prajnaparamita|Prajñāpāramitā]] doctrines in the northwest of India.<ref>Ray, Reginald. ''Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations.'' 1999. p. 410</ref> [[Étienne Lamotte]] has also pointed out that a Sarvāstivāda master is known to have stated that the Mahāyāna Prajñā sūtras were to be found amongst their Vaipulya sūtras.<ref name="Walser, Joseph 2005. p. 156"/> According to Paul Williams, the similarly massive ''[[Mahāprajñāpāramitāupadeśa]]'' also has a clear association with the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins.<ref>Williams, Paul, and Tribe, Anthony. ''Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition.'' 2000. p. 100</ref>
Because of his philosophical work, Nāgārjuna is seen by some modern interpreters as restoring the [[Middle way]] of the Buddha, which had become challenged by absolutist metaphysical tendencies in certain philosophical quarters.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994}}{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=120}}

=== Classical Mādhyamaka Commentators ===
Nāgārjuna's pupil [[Āryadeva]] (3rd century CE) emphasized the [[Bodhisattva|Bodhisattva-ideal]]. His works are regarded as a supplement to Nāgārjuna's,{{sfn|Warder|2000|p=368}} on which he commented.{{sfn|Rizzi|1988|p=2}} Āryadeva wrote refutations of the theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.{{sfn|Rizzi|1988|p=2}}

An influential commentator on Nāgārjuna was [[Buddhapālita]] (470–550) who has been interpreted as developing the '<nowiki/>''[[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|prāsaṅgika]]''' approach to Nāgārjuna's works in his ''Madhyamakavṛtti'' (now only extant in Tibetan) which follows the orthodox Madhyamaka method by critiquing essentialism only through [[reductio ad absurdum]] arguments.<ref name=":3" />L ike Nāgārjuna, instead of putting forth any positive position of his own, [[Buddhapālita]] merely seeks to show how all philosophical positions are untenable and self contradictory without putting forth a positive thesis.<ref name=":3">Hayes, Richard, "Madhyamaka", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/madhyamaka/</nowiki>>.</ref>

[[Buddhapālita]]'s method is often contrasted with that of [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka]] (c. 500 – c. 578), who argued in his ''Prajñāpadīpa'' (Lamp of Wisdom) for the use of logical arguments using the [[pramana|''pramana'']] based epistemology of Indian logicians like [[Dignāga]]. Typical of Mādhyamaka, [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka]] criticized Buddhist Abhidharma, as well as [[Samkhya|Sāṃkhya]], [[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]] and the [[Jainism|Jains]] in his works, but he also criticized [[Buddhapālita]] for refusing to put forth a positive thesis. [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka]] argued that Mādhyamika's could put forth positive arguments of one's own, instead of just criticizing other's arguments, a tactic called ''vitaṇḍā'' (attacking) which was seen in bad form in Indian philosophical circles. He argued that the position of a Madhyamaka was simply that phenomena are devoid of an inherent nature.<ref name=":3" /> This approach has been labeled the [[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|svātantrika]] style of Madhyamaka by Tibetan philosophers and commentators.

Another influential commentator, [[Chandrakirti|Candrakīrti]] (<abbr>c.</abbr> 600–650), sought to defend [[Buddhapālita]] and critiqued Bhāvaviveka's position (and [[Dignāga]]) that one must construct independent (''svatantra'') arguments on the grounds that it contained a subtle essentialism.<ref name=":3" /> He argued that Madhyamikas must make no positive assertions and need not construct formal arguments, but must merely show the untenable consequences (''prasaṅga'') of all philosophical positions put forth by their adversary until they become silent.<ref name=":16">Garfield, Jay; Edelglass, William; The Oxford Handbook of World philosophy</ref> [[Candrakīrti]] also criticized the Buddhist [[Yogachara|Yogācāra]] school, which he saw as positing a form of subjective [[idealism]] due to their doctrine of "appearance only" (''vijñaptimatra''). [[Candrakīrti]] faults the [[Yogachara|Yogācāra]] school for not realizing that the nature of consciousness is also a conditioned phenomenon, and for privileging consciousness over its objects ontologically, instead of seeing that ''everything'' is empty.<ref name=":16" /> [[Candrakīrti]] wrote the ''Prasannapadā'' (Clear Words), a highly influential commentary on the ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' as well as the ''Madhyamakāvatāra,'' an introduction to Mādhyamaka. His works are central to the understanding of Madhyamaka in [[Tibetan Buddhism]].

[[Shantideva|Śāntideva]] (end 7th century – first half 8th century) is well known for his ''[[Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra]]'', ''A Guide to the [[Bodhisattva]]'s Way of Life''. He united "a deep religiousness and joy of exposure together with the unquestioned Madhyamaka orthodoxy".{{sfn|Rizzi|1988|p=5}}

===Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka===
The eighth century saw a synthesis of the Buddhist [[Yogacara|Yogācāra]] tradition with Mādhyamaka, beginning with the work of the Buddhist philosopher [[Jñānagarbha]] and his student [[Śāntarakṣita]] (8th-century) who, like Bhāvaviveka, also adopted some of the terminology of the Buddhist pramana tradition, in their time best represented by [[Dharmakirti|Dharmakīrti]].<ref name=":3" /> Like the classical Mādhyamaka, Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka approaches ultimate truth through the prasaṅga method of showing absurd consequences. However, when speaking of conventional reality they also make positive assertions and autonomous arguments like [[Bhāviveka|Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakirti|Dharmakīrti]]. [[Śāntarakṣita]] also subsumed the [[Yogachara|Yogācāra]] system into his presentation of the conventional, accepting their idealism on a conventional level as a preparation for the ultimate truth of Mādhyamaka.<ref name=":3" />{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=117-122}} In his ''Madhyamakālaṃkāra'' (verses 92-93), [[Śāntarakṣita]] says:<blockquote>By relying on the Mind Only (''cittamatra''), know that external entities do not exist. And by relying on this [Madhyamaka] system, know that no self at all exists, even in that [mind]. Therefore, due to holding the reigns of logic as one rides the chariots of the two systems, one attains [the path of] the actual Mahayanist.<ref>Blumenthal, James, The Ornament of the Middle Way A Study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita, Snow Lion, 2004, p. 245. </ref></blockquote>[[Shantarakshita|Śāntarakṣita]] and his student [[Kamalaśīla]] were influential in initial the spread of Mādhyamaka to Tibet.{{refn|group=note|Alex Trisoglio: "In the 8th century, Shantarakshita went to Tibet and founded the monastery at Samyé. He was not a direct disciple of Bhavaviveka, but the disciple of one of his disciples. He combined the Madhyamika-Svatantrika and Cittamatra schools, and created a new school of Madhyamika called Svatantrika-Yogachara-Madhyamika. His disciple Kamalashila, who wrote The Stages of Meditation upon Madhyamika (uma’i sgom rim), developed his ideas further, and together they were very influential in Tibet."{{cite book|last=Khyentse Rinpoche|first=Dzongsar Jamyang|title=Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary|year=2003|publisher=Khyentse Foundation|location=Dordogne, France|pages=8|url=http://www.siddharthasintent.org/|edition=1st|editor=Alex Trisoglio|accessdate=7 January 2013|format=PDF|chapter=Introduction}}}}

==Tibetan Buddhism==

{{multiple image|perrow = 2|total_width=300
| image1 = Tsonkapa, 16th century, Collection of Rubin Museum of Art.jpg
| image2 = Gorampa Sonam Sengge.jpg
| image3 = 8th Karmapa with disciples.jpg
| image4 = MiphamNew.jpg
| footer = Some major Tibetan Mādhyamikas. Clockwise from upper left: [[Tsongkhapa]], [[Gorampa]], [[Ju Mipham]], [[Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama|Mikyö Dorje]].

}}

Madhyamaka philosophy obtained a central position in all the main [[Tibetan Buddhism|Tibetan Buddhist]] schools, all whom consider themselves to be Madhyamikas. Madhyamaka thought has been categorized in various ways in India and Tibet.{{refn|group=note|In his Tattvaratnāvalī, the Indian scholar Advayavajra classified Madhyamaka into "those who uphold non-duality from the simile of illusion" (''māyopamādvayavādin'') and "those who uphold non-placement into any dharma" (''sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavādin''); furthermore, in the Madhyamakaṣaṭka he envisaged a specifically Vajrayāna type of Madhyamaka.{{citation needed|date=May 2015}}}}

=== Early transmission ===
Influential early figures who are important in the transmission of Madhyamaka to Tibet include the Yogacara-Madhyamika [[Śāntarakṣita]] (725–788), and his students [[Haribhadra (Buddhist philosopher)|Haribhadra]] and [[Kamalaśīla|Kamalashila]] (740-795) as well as the later figures of [[Atiśa|Atisha]] (982–1054) and his pupil [[Dromtön]] (1005–1064) who were mainly influenced by [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]]'s Madhyamaka.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 51.</ref>

The early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet saw these two main strands of philosophical views in debate with each other. The first was the camp which defended the Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation centered on the works of the scholars of the Sangphu monastery founded by [[Ngok Loden Sherab|Ngog Loden Sherab]] (1059-1109) and also includes Chapa Chokyi Senge (1109-1169).<ref name=":7">Dunne, John D. (2011). "Madhyamaka in India and Tibet." In Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy.” Edited by J. Garfield and W. Edelglass. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 206-221.</ref> The second camp was those who championed the work of [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] over the Yogacara-Madhyamaka interpretation, and included [[Patsab Nyima Drakpa|Patsab Nyima Drag]] (b. 1055) and Jayananda (fl 12th century).<ref name=":7" /> According to John Dunne, it was the Madhyamaka interpretation and the works of Candrakirti which became dominant over time in Tibet.<ref name=":7" />

==== Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations ====
{{main article|Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction}}

In [[Tibet|Tibetan]] Buddhist scholarship, a distinction began to be made between the Autonomist (''[[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|Svātantrika]], rang rgyud pa'') and Consequentialist (''[[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|Prāsaṅgika]], Thal ’gyur pa'') approaches to Madhyamaka reasoning. The distinction was one invented by Tibetans, and not one made by classical Indian Madhyamikas.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 333.</ref> Tibetans mainly use the terms to refer to the logical procedures used by [[Bhavaviveka]] (who argued for the use of ''[[Svatantrika|svatantra-anumana]]'' or autonomous syllogisms) and [[Buddhapalita]] (who held that one should only use ''[[Prasaṅgika|prasanga]]'', or ''[[reductio ad absurdum]]'').{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=131-141}} Tibetan Buddhism further divides ''[[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|svātantrika]]'' into into [[Sautrāntika|Sautrantika]] Svātantrika Madhyamaka (applied to [[Bhāviveka]]), and [[Yogachara|Yogācāra]] Svātantrika Madhyamaka ([[Śāntarakṣita]] and [[Kamalaśīla]]).{{sfn|Cornu|2001|p=138}}

The svātantrika states that conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a subject that is established as appearing in common - the proponent and opponent use the same kind of valid cognition to establish it. The name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous arguments in debate.{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=131-141}} In contrast, the central technique avowed by the [[Prasaṅgika|{{IAST|prasaṅgika}}]] is to show by ''{{IAST|prasaṅga}}'' (or [[reductio ad absurdum]]) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nāsti", "it is", or "it is not") or [[View (Buddhism)|view]] regarding phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional ({{IAST|saṃvṛti}} or ''lokavyavahāra''). The ''prāsaṅgika'' holds that it is not necessary for the proponent and opponent to use the same kind of valid cognition ([[Pramana|''pramana'']]) to establish a common subject; indeed it is possible to change the view of an opponent through a [[Reductio ad absurdum|reductio]] argument.

Although presented as a divide in doctrine, the major difference between svātantrika and prasangika may be between two style of reasoning and arguing, while the division itself is exclusively Tibetan. Tibetan scholars were aware of alternative Madhyamaka sub-classifications, but later Tibetan doxography emphasizes the nomenclature of prāsaṅgika versus svātantrika. No conclusive evidence can show the existence of an Indian antecedent, and it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances. Both Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas cited material in the [[Āgama (Buddhism)|āgamas]] in support of their arguments.{{sfn|Gombrich|1996|p=27-28}}

The Tibetan [[Longchen Rabjam]] noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti favored the {{IAST|prasaṅga}} approach when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions such as when describing the paths of Buddhist practice in his ''[[Madhyamakāvatāra|Madhyamakavatāra]]''. Therefore even {{IAST|prāsaṅgikas}} make positive assertions when discussing conventional practice, they simply stick to using reductios specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=131-141}}

=== Jonang and shentong ===
Further Tibetan philosophical developments began in response to the works of the scholar [[Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen|Dölpopa Shérap Gyeltsen]] (1292–1361) and led to two distinctly opposed Tibetan Madhyamaka views on the nature of ultimate reality.{{sfn|Cornu|2001|p=145, 150}}<ref>Stearns, Cyrus (2010). ''The Buddha from Dölpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dölpopa Sherab Gyaltsen''(Rev. and enl. ed.). Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications. [[International Standard Book Number|ISBN]] [[Special:BookSources/9781559393430|9781559393430]]. Retrieved 2 May 2015.</ref> [[Dolpopa]], founder of the [[Jonang]] school, viewed the Buddha and [[Buddha Nature]] as ''not'' intrinsically empty, but as truly real, unconditioned, and replete with eternal, changeless virtues.<ref>Hopkins, 2006, pp 8-15</ref> In the Jonang school, ultimate reality, i.e. Buddha Nature ([[Tathagatagarbha|''tathagatagarbha'']]) is only empty of what is impermanent and conditioned (conventional reality), not of its own self which is ultimate [[Buddhahood]] and the [[Luminous mind|luminous nature of mind]].<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl, Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p 108.</ref> In [[Jonang]], this ultimate reality is a "ground or substratum" which is "uncreated and indestructible, noncomposite and beyond the chain of dependent origination."<ref>Stearns, Cyrus (1999), The Buddha from Dolpo: A Study of the Life and Thought of the Tibetan Master Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen, State University of New York Press, p. 82.</ref> An important Tibetan treatise on Emptiness and the Buddha Nature is found in [[Dolpopa|Dolpopa's]] voluminous study, ''Mountain Doctrine''.<ref>Hopkins, 2006.</ref> Basing himself on the Indian ''[[Tathāgatagarbha sūtras]]'' as his main sources, [[Dolpopa]] described the Buddha Nature as:<blockquote>[N]on-material emptiness, emptiness that is far from an annihilatory emptiness, great emptiness that is the ultimate pristine wisdom of superiors ...Buddha earlier than all Buddhas, ... causeless original Buddha.{{sfn|Hopkins|2006|p=14}}</blockquote>

This "great emptiness" i.e. the ''tathāgatagarbha'' is said to be filled with eternal powers and virtues:{{quote|[P]ermanent, stable, eternal, everlasting. Not compounded by causes and conditions, the matrix-of-one-gone-thus is intrinsically endowed with ultimate buddha qualities of body, speech, and mind such as the ten powers; it is not something that did not exist before and is newly produced; it is self-arisen.'{{sfn|Hopkins|2006|p=8}}}}The Jonang position came to be known as "emptiness of other" (''gzhan stong, shentong),'' because it held that the ultimate truth was positive reality that was not empty of its own nature, only empty of what it was other than itself.<ref name=":822">Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 29.</ref> Dolpopa considered his view a form of Madhyamaka, and called his system "Great Madhyamaka".<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 502.</ref> Dolpopa opposed what he called [[Rangtong-Shentong|rangtong]] (self-empty), the view that ultimate reality is that which is empty of self nature in a relative and absolute sense, that is to say that it is empty of everything, including itself. It is thus not a transcendental ground or metaphysical absolute which includes all the eternal Buddha qualities. This rangtong shentong distinction became a central issue of contention among Tibetan Buddhist philosophers.

Alternative interpretations of the shentong view is also taught outside of Jonang. Some [[Kagyu]] figures, like [[Jamgon Kongtrul]] (1813–1899) as well as the unorthodox [[Sakya]] philosopher [[Sakya Chokden]] (1428–1507), supported their own forms of shentong.

===Tsongkhapa and Gelug===
{{Seealso|Prasaṅgika according to Tsongkhapa}}
The [[Gelug|Gelug school]] was founded in the beginning of the 15th century by [[Je Tsongkhapa]] (1357–1419).{{sfn|Snelling|1987|p=207}} Tsongkhapa's conception of emptiness draws mainly from the works of [[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|"prāsaṅgika"]] Indian thinkers like Buddhapalita, Candrakirti, and Shantideva and he argued that only their interpretation of Nagarjuna was ultimately correct. According to José I. Cabezón, Tsongkhapa also argued that the ultimate truth or emptiness was "an absolute negation (''med dgag'')—the negation of inherent existence—and that nothing was exempt from being empty, including emptiness itself."<ref name=":82">Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 29.</ref> He also maintained that the ultimate truth could be understood conceptually, an understanding which could later be transformed into a non-conceptual one. However, this could only be done through the use of Madhyamika reasoning, which he also sought to unify with the logical theories of [[Dharmakirti]].<ref name=":82" /> Because of Tsongkhapa's view of emptiness as an absolute negation, he strongly attacked the other empty views of [[Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen|Dolpopa]] in his works. Tsongkhapa major work on Madhyamaka is his commentary on the MMK called "Ocean of Reasoning".{{sfn|rJe Tsong Kha Pa|2006}}

According to [[Thupten Jinpa]], Tsongkhapa's "doctrine of the object of negation" is one of his most innovative but also controversial ideas.&nbsp;Tsongkhapa pointed out that if one wants to steer a middle course between the extremes of "over-negation" (straying into [[nihilism]]) and "under-negation" (and thus [[Reification (fallacy)|reification]]), it is important to have a clear concept of exactly what is being negated in Madhyamaka analysis.<ref name=":17" /><ref name=":18">Sparham, Gareth, "Tsongkhapa", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/tsongkhapa/</nowiki>>.</ref> Tsongkhapa's understanding of the object of negation (Tib. ''dgag bya'') is subtle, and he describes it as an "innate apprehension of self-existence" which Thupten Jinpa glosses as a belief that we have that leads us to "perceive things and events as possessing some kind of intrinsic existence and identity." Tsongkhapa's Madhyamaka therefore, does not deny the conventional existence of things ''per se'', but merely rejects our way of experiencing things as existing in an [[Essentialism|essentialist]] way, which are false projections or imputations.<ref name=":17">Learman, Oliver (editor), Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, Routledge, 2001, p. 374.</ref> This is the root of ignorance, which for Tsongkhapa is an "active defiling agency" (Sk. ''kleśāvaraṇa'') which projects a false sense of reality onto objects.<ref name=":17" /> Because conventional existence (or 'mere appearance') as an interdependent phenomenon devoid of inherent existence is not negated (khegs pa) or "rationally undermined" in his analysis, Tsongkhapa's approach was criticized by other Tibetan Madhyamikas who preferred an anti-realist interpretation of Madhyamaka.<ref>Cowherds, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist, Oxford University Press; 1 edition (December 24, 2010), p. 77</ref> As Garfield and Thakchoe note, this allows for a "robust sense of the reality of the conventional world in the context of emptiness".<ref>Cowherds, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist, Oxford University Press; 1 edition (December 24, 2010), p. 82.</ref>

Following Candrakirti, Tsongkhapa also rejected the [[Yogachara|Yogacara]] view of mind only, and instead defended the conventional existence of external objects even though ultimately they are mere "thought constructions" (Tib. ''rtog pas btags tsam'') of a deluded mind.<ref name=":18" /> Tsongkhapa also followed Candrakirti in rejecting ''svātantra'' (“autonomous”) reasoning, arguing that it was enough to show the unwelcome consequences (''prasaṅga'') of essentialist positions.<ref name=":18" />

Gelug scholarship has generally maintained and defended Tsongkhapa's positions up until the present day, even if there are lively debates considering issues of interpretation. [[Gendün Chöphel|Gendun Chopel]] and the [[14th Dalai Lama]] are some of the most influential modern figures in Gelug Madhyamaka.

=== Sakya ===
The Sakya school has generally held a classic [[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|prāsaṅgika]] position following [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] closely, though with significant differences from the Gelug. Sakya scholars of Madhyamika, such as Rendawa Shyönnu Lodrö (1349–1412) and Rongtön Sheja Kunrig (1367–1450) were early critics of the "other empty" view.<ref>Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 30.</ref>

[[Gorampa|Gorampa Sonam Senge]] (1429-1489) was an important philosopher which defended the orthodox [[Sakya]] Madhyamika position, critiquing both Dolpopa and Tsongkhapa's interpretations. His interpretations have become the orthodox Sakya view. According to Cabezón, Gorampa called his version of Madhyamaka "the Middle Way <i>qua</i> freedom from extremes" (<i>mtha’ bral dbu ma</i>) or "Middle Way ''qua'' freedom from proliferations" (<i>spros bral kyi dbu ma</i>) and claimed that the ultimate truth was ineffable, beyond predication or concept.<ref>Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 46-48.</ref> Cabezón states that Gorampa's interpretation of Madhyamaka is "committed to a more literal reading of the Indian sources than either Dolpopa’s or Tsongkhapa’s, which is to say that it tends to take the Indian texts at face value."<ref>Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 49.</ref> For Gorampa, emptiness is not just the absence of inherent existence, but it is the absence of the four extremes in all phenomena i.e. existence, nonexistence, both and neither (see: [[Catuṣkoṭi|''catuskoti'']]), ''without any further qualification''.<ref name=":9">Cabezón, José Ignacio; Lobsang Dargyay, ''Freedom from Extremes Gorampa's "Distinguishing the Views" and the Polemics of Emptiness (Part of Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism)'', p. 50.</ref> In other words conventional truths are also an object of negation, because as Gorampa states "they are not found at all when subjected to ultimate rational analysis".<ref>Cowherds, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist, Oxford University Press; 1 edition (December 24, 2010), p. 84.</ref>

Hence, in contrast to the view of Tsongkhapa for example, Gorampa's Madhyamaka negates ''existence'' ''itself'', instead of merely negating "ultimate existence" or "inherent existence".<ref name=":9" /> As Garfield and Thakchoe note, for Tsongkhapa, conventional truth is "a kind of truth", "a way of being real" while for Gorampa, it is "entirely false", "unreal" and "ruth only from the perspective of fools."<ref>Cowherds, Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist, Oxford University Press; 1 edition (December 24, 2010), p. 74, 87.</ref>

Regarding the Ultimate truth, Gorampa saw this as being divided into two parts:<ref name=":9" />

* The emptiness that is reached by rational analysis (this is actually only an analogue, and not the real thing).

* The emptiness that yogis fathom by means of their own individual gnosis, the real ultimate truth, which is reached by negating the previous rational understanding of emptiness.

Unlike most orthodox Sakyas, the philosopher [[Sakya Chokden]], a contemporary of Gorampa, also promoted a form of shentong as being complementary to rangtong. He saw shentong as useful for meditative practice, while rangtong as useful for cutting through views. <ref>Brunnholzl, Karl; Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p. 107.</ref>

=== Kagyu ===
<p>In the [[Kagyu]] tradition, there is a broad field of opinion on the nature of emptiness, with some holding the other empty view while others holding different positions. One influential Kagyu thinker was [[Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama|Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama.]] His view synthesized Madhyamaka and Yogacara perspectives. According to Brunnholzl, regarding his position in the rangtong shentong debate he "can be said to regard these two as not being mutually exclusive and to combine them in a creative synthesis."<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl, Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p 99.</ref> However, [[Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama|Rangjung Dorje]] never uses these terms in any of his works and thus any claims to him being a promoter of shentong or otherwise is a later interpretation.<ref>Brunnholzl, Karl, Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, p 114.</ref></p>Several Kagyu figures disagree with the view that shentong is a form of Madhyamaka. According to Brunnholzl, [[Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama]] (1507–1554) and [[Pawo Rinpoche|Second Pawo Rinpoche Tsugla Trengwa]] see the term "Shentong Madhyamaka" as a misnomer, for them the Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu and the system of Nagarjuna are "two clearly distinguished systems". They also refute the idea that there is "a permanent, intrinsically existing Buddha nature".<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 446..</ref><p>[[Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama|Mikyö Dorje]] also argues that the language of other emptiness does not appear in any of the sutras or the treatises of the Indian masters. He attacks the view of [[Dolpopa Sherab Gyaltsen|Dolpopa]] as being against the sutras of ultimate meaning which state that all phenomena are emptiness as well as being against the treatises of the Indian masters.<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 447.</ref> [[Mikyö Dorje, 8th Karmapa Lama|Mikyö Dorje]] rejects both perspectives of rangtong and shentong as true descriptions of ultimate reality, which he sees as being "the utter peace of all discursiveness regarding being empty and not being empty".<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 448.</ref></p>One of the most influential Kagyu philosophers in recent times was [[Jamgon Kongtrul|Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Taye]] (1813–1899) who advocated a system of Shentong Madhyamaka and held that primordial wisdom was "never empty of its own nature and it is there all the time".<ref>Brunnholzl, 2004, page 501.</ref><ref>Ringu Tulku, The Ri-me Philosophy of Jamgon Kongtrul the Great: A Study of the Buddhist Lineages of Tibet 2007, p 219.</ref>

The modern Kagyu teacher [[Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche|Khenpo Tsultrim]] (1934–), in his ''Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness'', presents five stages of meditation, which he relates to five tenet systems.{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=19-26}}{{sfn|Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso|1994}} He holds the "Shentong Madhyamaka" as the highest view, above prasangika. He sees this as a meditation on ''Paramarthasatya'' ("Absolute Reality"),{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=21}}{{refn|According to Hookham, non-dual experience is Ultimate Reality.{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=37}}|name="Absolute"|group=note}} ''Buddhajnana'',{{refn|According to Hookham, "The Chinese Tathagarba schools describe Buddhajnana as the totality of all that is, which pervades every part of all that is in its totality."{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=37}} According to Hookham, for Shentong Buddhajnana is "the non-dual nature of Mind completely unobscured and endowed with its countless Buddha Qualities (''Buddhagunas'').{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=37}}|name="Buddhajnana"|group=note}} which is beyond concepts, and described by terms as "truly existing."{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=22}} This approach helps "to overcome certain residual subtle concepts,"{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=22}} and "the habit – fosterd on the earlier stages of the path – of negating whatever experience arises in his/her mind."{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=23}} It destroys false concepts, as does prasangika, but it also alerts the practitioner "to the presence of a dynamic, positive Reality that is to be experienced once the conceptual mind is defeated."{{sfn|Hookham|1991|p=23}}

=== Nyingma ===
In the [[Nyingma]] school, like in Kagyu, there is a variety of views. Some Nyingma thinkers promoted shentong, like [[Katok Tsewang Norbu]], but the most influential Nyingma thinkers like [[Longchenpa]] and [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso|Ju Mipham]] held a more classical [[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|prāsaṅgika]] interpretation while at the same time seeking to harmonize it with the view of [[Dzogchen]] tantras which are traditionally seen as the pinnacle of the Nyingma view.

According to [[Sonam Thakchoe]], the Ultimate truth in the Nyingma tradition, following [[Longchenpa]], is mainly seen as being that "reality which transcends any mode of thinking and speech, one that unmistakenly appears to the nonerroneous cognitive processes of the exalted and awakened beings" and this is said to be "inexpressible beyond words and thoughts" as well as the reality that is the "transcendence of all elaborations.<ref name=":13">Thakchoe, Sonam, "The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<nowiki>https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/twotruths-tibet/</nowiki>>.</ref>

The most influential modern Nyingma scholar is [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso]] (1846–1912). He developed a unique theory of Madhyamaka, with two models of the two truths. While the adopts the traditional Madhyamaka model of two truths, in which the ultimate truth is emptiness, he also developed a second model, in which the ultimate truth is "Reality as it is" (''de bzhin nyid'') which is "established as ultimately real" (''bden par grub pa'').<ref name=":13" /> This ultimate truth is associated with the Dzogchen concept of [[Rigpa]]. While it might seem that this system conflicts with the traditional Madhyamaka interpretation, for Mipham this is not so. For while the traditional model which sees emptiness and ultimate truth as a negation is referring to the analysis of experience, the second Dzogchen influenced model refers to the experience of unity in meditation.<ref>Duckworth; Jamgon Mipam, His life and teachings, Pg 81.</ref> Douglas Duckworth sees Mipham's work as an attempt to bring together the two main Mahayana philosophical systems of yogacara and madhyamaka, as well as shentong and rangtong into a coherent system in which both are seen as being of definitive meaning.<ref>Duckworth, Jamgon Mipam, His life and teachings, 82.</ref>

Regarding the ''svatantrika prasangika'' debate, [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso|Ju Mipham]] explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose, either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using only ''{{IAST|prasaṅga}}'' methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham felt that the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika was no different from the ultimate truth of the Prāsaṅgika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.{{sfn|Shantarakshita|2005|p=131-141}}
== East Asian Madhyamaka ==

http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/ChineseMadhyamaka.htm

http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/volltexte/2014/146/chapter/HamburgUP_HBS03_Ho_LinRadich_Mirror.pdf

http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/phil542136.pdf

http://enlight.lib.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-JOCP/jc21442.htm

=== Sānlùn school ===
[[East Asian Mādhyamaka|Chinese Madhyamaka]] (known as ''Sānlùn,'' or the three treatise school) began with the work of [[Kumārajīva]] (344–413 CE) who translated the works of Nāgārjuna (including the MMK, also known in China as the ''Chung lun'', “''Madhyamakaśāstra''”; [[Taishō Tripiṭaka|Taishō]] 1564) to Chinese. Another influential text in Chinese Madhyamaka which was said to have been translated by Kumārajīva was the ''Ta-chih-tu lun'', or *''Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa Śāstra'' (“Treatise which is a Teaching on the Great Perfection of Wisdom [Sūtra]”). According to Dan Arnold, this text is only extant in Kumārajīva's translation and has material that differs from the work of Nāgārjuna. In spite of this, the ''Ta-chih-tu lun'' became a central text for Chinese interpretations of Madhyamaka emptiness.<ref>Arnold, Dan, ''Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy'', Internet Encyclopedia of philosophy.</ref> ''Sānlùn'' figures like Kumārajīva's pupil [[Sengzhao]] (384–414), and the later [[Jizang]] (549–623) were influential in restoring a more orthodox and non-essentialist interpretation of emptiness to Chinese Buddhism. [[Yin Shun]] (1906–2005) is one modern figure aligned with ''Sānlùn.''

Sengzhao is often seen as the founder of ''Sānlùn.'' He was influenced not just by Indian Madhyamaka and [[Mahayana sutras]] like the [[Vimalakirti Sutra|Vimalakirti]], but also by [[Taoism|Taoist]] works and he widely quotes the [[Tao Te Ching|Lao-tzu]] and the [[Zhuangzi (book)|Chuang-tzu]] and uses terminology of the Neo-Daoist "Mystery Learning" ([[Xuanxue|''xuanxue'']] 玄学) tradition while maintaining a uniquely Buddhist philosophical view.<ref>Liebenthal, Walter, Chao-Lun The Treatises of Seng Chao, 1968, p. 8.</ref><ref name=":112">Cuma Ozkan, A comparative analysis: Buddhist Madhyamaka and Daoist Chongxuan (twofold mystery) in the early Tang (618-720) University of Iowa, 2013.</ref> In his essay "The Emptiness of the Non-Absolute" (''buzhenkong'', 不眞空), Sengzhao points out that the nature of phenomena cannot be taken as being either existent or inexistent:<blockquote href="#CITEREFChenh1981">Hence, there are indeed reasons why myriad dharmas are inexistent and cannot be taken as existent; there are reasons why [myriad dharmas] are not inexistent and cannot be taken as inexistent. Why? If we would say that they exist, their existent is not real; if we would say that they don’t exist, their phenomenal forms have taken shape. Having forms and shapes, they are not inexistent. Being not real, they are not truly existent. Hence the meaning of bu zhen kong [not really empty, 不眞空] is made manifest.<ref name=":11" /> </blockquote>Sengzhao saw the central problem in understanding emptiness as the discriminatory activity of ''[[Conceptual proliferation|prapañca]].'' According to Sengzhao, delusion arises through a dependent relationship between phenomenal things, naming, thought and reification and correct understanding lies outside of words and concepts. Thus, while emptiness is the lack of intrinsic self in all things, this emptiness is not itself an absolute and cannot be grasped by the conceptual mind, it can be only be realized through non-conceptual wisdom (''[[Prajñā (Buddhism)|prajña]]'').<ref>Dippmann, Jeffrey, Sengzhao (Seng-Chao c. 378—413 C.E.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</ref>

[[Jizang]] (549–623) was another central figure in Chinese Madhyamaka who wrote numerous commentaries on Nagarjuna and Aryadeva and is considered to be the leading representative of the school.<ref name=":102">Fox, Alan, Self-reflection in the Sanlun Tradition: Madhyamika as the "Deconstructive Conscience" of Buddhism, Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 19 (1992) pp. 1-24.</ref> [[Jizang]] called his method "deconstructing what is misleading and revealing what is corrective". He insisted that one must never settle on any particular viewpoint or perspective but constantly reexamine one's formulations to avoid reifications of thought and behavior.<ref name=":102" /> In his commentary on the MMK, Jizang's method and understanding of emptiness can be seen:<blockquote href="#CITEREFRenard2010">The Abhidharma thinkers regard the four holy truths as true. The Satyasiddhi regards merely the truth of cessation of suffering, i.e., the principle of emptiness and equality, as true. The southern Mahāyāna tradition regards the principle that refutes truths as true, and the northern [Mahāyāna tradition] regards thatness [suchness] and prajñā as as true… Examining these all together, if there is a single [true] principle, it is an eternal view, which is false. If there is no principle at all, it is an evil view, which is also false. Being both existent and non-existent consists of the eternal and nihilistic views altogether. Being neither existent nor nonexistent is a foolish view. One replete with these four phrases has all [wrong] views. One without these four phrases has a severe nihilistic view. Now that [one] does not know how to name what a mind has nothing to rely upon and is free from conceptual construction, [he] foists “thatness” [suchness] upon it, one attains sainthood of the three vehicles… Being deluded in regard to thatness [suchness], one falls into the six realms of disturbed life and death.<ref name=":11" /> </blockquote>In one of his early treatises called "The Meaning of the two Truths" (''Erdiyi''), Jizang, expounds the steps to realize the nature of the ultimate truth of emptiness as follows:<blockquote href="#CITEREFBhattacharya1943">In the first step, one recognises reality of the phenomena on the conventional level, but assumes their non-reality on the ultimate level. In the second step, one becomes aware of Being or Non-Being on the conventional level and negates both at the ultimate level. In the third step, one either asserts or negates Being and Non-Being on the conventional level, neither confi rming nor rejecting them on the ultimate level. Hence, there is ultimately no assertion or negation anymore; therefore, on the conventional level, one becomes free to accept or reject anything.</blockquote>

=== Chán ===
The [[Zen|Chán/Zen-tradition]] emulated Madhyamaka-thought via the San-lun Buddhists, influencing its supposedly "illogical" way of communicating "absolute truth."{{sfn|Cheng|1981}} The Madhyamika of Sengzhao for example, influenced the views of the Chan patriarch [[Shenhui|Shen Hui]] (670-762), a critical figure in the development of Chan, as can be seen by his "Illuminating the Essential Doctrine" (''Hsie Tsung Chi''). This text emphasizes that true emptiness or [[Tathātā|Suchness]] cannot be known through thought since it is free from thought (''wu-nien''): <ref name=":12">Zeuschner, Robert B., ''The Hsie Tsung Chi (An Early Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist Text)'' Journal of Chinese Philosophy V. 3 (1976) pp. 253-268.</ref><blockquote href="#CITEREFHayes2003">Thus we come to realize that both selves and things are, in their essence, empty, and existence and non-existence both disappear.</blockquote><blockquote href="#CITEREFHayes2003">Mind is fundamentally non-action; the way is truly no-thought (''wu-nien'').</blockquote><blockquote>There is no thought, no reflection, no seeking, no attainment, no this, no that, no coming, no going.</blockquote>Shen Hui also states that true emptiness is not nothing, but it is a "Subtle Existence" (''miao-yu''), which is just "Great Prajña." <ref name=":12" />

==Modern era==
====Thich Nhat Hanh====
[[Thich Nhat Hanh]] explains the Madhyamaka concept of emptiness through the related concept of interdependence. In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead, all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana ethics to environmental ethics.{{sfn|Thich Nhat Hanh|1988}}

====Modern Madhyamaka====
Madhyamaka forms an alternative to the [[Perennial philosophy|Perennialist]] and essentialist [[neo-Advaita]] understanding of [[nondualism]] common in modern spirituality.<ref group="web">[http://www.emptiness.co/ Emptiness. Buddhist and Beyond]</ref><ref group="web">[http://thenonbuddhist.com/ The Non-Buddhist]</ref><ref group="web">[http://emptinessteachings.com/ Emptiness teachings]</ref> The classical Madhyamaka-teachings are complemented with western ([[Postmodern philosophy|post-modern]]) philosophy,<ref group="web">[http://www.emptiness.co/5westernbooks2 ''Review of Richard Rorty's "Philosophy and Social Hope"'']</ref> [[critical sociology]],<ref group="web">[http://thenonbuddhist.com/2014/01/12/tsongkhapa-in-praise-of-relativity-the-essence-of-eloquence/ Patrick jennings (2014), ''Tsongkhapa: In Praise of Relativity; The Essence of Eloquence''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150518074106/http://thenonbuddhist.com/2014/01/12/tsongkhapa-in-praise-of-relativity-the-essence-of-eloquence/|date=2015-05-18}}</ref> and [[social constructionism]].<ref group="web">[http://www.emptiness.co/5westernbooks1 emptiness.co, ''Review of Kenneth J. Gergen's "An Invitation to Social Construction"'']</ref> These approaches stress that there is no transcendental reality beyond this phenomenal world,<ref group="web">[http://emptinessteachings.com/2014/09/11/the-two-truths-of-buddhism-and-the-emptiness-of-emptiness/ Susan Kahn, ''The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness.'']</ref> and in some cases even explicitly distinguish themselves from neo-Advaita approaches.<ref group="web">[http://www.emptiness.co/adv_to_empt emptiness.co, ''Coming from the Advaitic/Awareness Teachings? Special Pointers'']</ref>

==In Western scholarship==
As noted by Ruegg, Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Madhyamaka, including: "[[nihilism]], [[monism]], [[Irrationality|irrationalism]], [[misology]], [[agnosticism]], [[Skepticism|scepticism]], criticism, dialectic, [[mysticism]], [[acosmism]], [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolutism]], [[relativism]], [[nominalism]], and linguistic analysis with therapeutic value".{{sfn|Ruegg|1981|p=2}} [[Jay L. Garfield]] likewise notes:

{{quote|"Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as canonical interpreters. Nagarjuna has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003)".{{sfn|Garfield and Samten|2006|p=xx}}|sign=|source=}}

These interpretations "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do they reflect the content of Nāgārjuna's concepts".{{sfn|Daye|1971|p=77}}

According to Andrew Tuck, the Western study of Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka can be divided into three phases:<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 9-10</ref>

# The [[Kantianism|Kantian]] phase, exemplified by [[Fyodor Shcherbatskoy|Theodore Stcherbatsky]]’s "The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna" (1927) who argued that Nagarjuna divides the world into appearance (samsara) and an absolute noumenal reality (nirvana). This is also seen in T. R. V. Murti’s 1955 "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism".
# The analytic phase, exemplified by Richard Robinson’s 1957 article “Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna’s System”, sought to explain Madhyamaka using [[analytic philosophy]]'s [[Logic|logical]] apparatus.
# The post-Wittgensteinian phase, exemplified by Frederick Streng’s "Emptiness" and Chris Gudmunsen’s "Wittgenstein and Buddhism", "set out to stress similarities between Nāgārjuna and in particular the later [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]] and his criticism of analytic philosophy.

The Sri Lankan philosopher [[David Kalupahana]] meanwhile saw Madhyamaka as a response to certain essentialist philosophical tendencies which had arisen after the time of the Buddha and sees it as a restoration of the early Buddhist middle way [[Pragmatism|pragmatist]] position.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992}}{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994}}

Among the critical voices, [[Richard Hayes (professor)|Richard P. Hayes]] (influenced by Richard Robinson's view that Nagarjuna's logic fails modern tests for validity) interprets the works of Nagarjuna as "primitive" and guilty "errors in reasoning" such as that of [[equivocation]]. Hayes states that Nagarjuna was relying on the different meanings of the word ''svabhava'' to make statements which were not logical and that his work relies on various "fallacies and tricks".{{sfn|Hayes|2003|p=3-5}}<ref name=":19">C. W. Huntington, Jr., The nature of the Madhyamika trick, J Indian Philos (2007) 35:103–131 DOI 10.1007/s10781-007-9018-4</ref> William Magee strongly disagrees with Hayes, referring to Tsonghkhapa's interpretation of Nagarjuna to argue that Hayes misidentifies Nagarjuna's understanding of the different meanings of the term ''svabhava.''<ref>Magee, 1999, p. 126, "Hayes is misidentifying Nagarjuna's intended meaning of ''svabhava''. In contradistinction to Hayes' belief that Nagarjuna speaks equivocably of an identity nature and a causally independent, non-existent nature, Dzong-ka-ba feels that in chapter XV.1-2 Nagarjuna uses the term ''svabhava'' to refer to an existent emptiness nature."</ref>

Many recent western scholars (such as Garfield,{{sfn|Garfield|1995}} Napper,{{sfn|Napper|1989}} Hopkins,{{sfn|Hopkins|1996}}) have tended to adopt a [[Gelug]] Prāsaṅgika influenced interpretation of Madhyamaka. However, American philosopher Mark Siderits is one exception, who has attempted to defend the Svātantrika position as a coherent and rational interpretation of Madhyamaka.<ref>Siderits, Mark, Studies in Buddhist philosophy, p 38.</ref>

C.W. Huntington meanwhile has been particularly critical of the modern Western attempt to read Nagarjuna "through the lens of modern [[Modern logic|symbolic logic]]" and to see him as compatible with [[Analytic philosophy|analytical philosophy]]'s logical system.<ref name=":19" /> He argues that in reading Nagarjuna, a thinker who he sees as "profoundly distrustful of logic", in an overly logical manner, we "prejudice our understanding of Nagarjuna’s insistence that he has no proposition (''pratijña'')."<ref name=":19" /> He puts forth a more literary interpretation that focuses on the ''effect'' Nagarjuna was attempting to "conjure" on his readers (i.e. an experience of having no [[View (Buddhism)|views]]) instead of asking how it works (or doesn't) in a logical manner.<ref name=":19" /> In response to this, [[Jay L. Garfield|Jay Garfield]] defends the logical reading of Nagarjuna through the use of anglo-american analytical philosophy as well as arguing that "Nagarjuna and Candrakirti deploy arguments, take themselves to do so, and even if they did not, we would be wise to do so in commenting on their texts".<ref name=":20">Garfield, Jay L. Turning a Madhyamaka Trick: Reply to Huntington, J Indian Philos (2008) 36:507–527 DOI 10.1007/s10781-008-9045-9
</ref>

Another recent interpreter, [[Jan Westerhoff]], argues that Madhyamaka is a kind of [[anti-foundationalism]], "which does not just deny the objective, intrinsic, and mind-independent existence of some class of objects, but rejects such existence for any kinds of objects that we could regard as the most fundamental building-blocks of the world."<ref>Westerhoff, Jan, Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford University Press; 1 edition (February 23, 2009), p. 208.</ref>

==Influences and critiques==

=== Yogacara ===
The [[Yogachara|Yogacara]] school was the other major Mahayana philosophical school (darsana) in India and its complex relationship with Madhyamaka changed over time. The [[Sandhinirmocana Sutra|Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra]], perhaps the earliest Yogacara text, proclaims itself as being above the doctrine of emptiness taught in other sutras. According to Paul Williams, the Saṃdhinirmocana claims that other sutras that teach emptiness as well as Madhyamika teachings on emptiness are merely skillful means and thus are not definitive, like the teachings in the Saṃdhinirmocana.<ref>Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism, the doctrinal foundations, 2009, p. 86.</ref> As Mark Siderits points out, Yogacara authors like [[Asanga]] were careful to point out that the doctrine of emptiness required interpretation in lieu of their three natures theory which posits an inexpressible ultimate that is the object of a Buddha's cognition.<ref name=":24">Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 115.</ref> Asanga also argued that one cannot say that all things are empty unless there ''are'' things to be seen as either empty or non-empty in the first place.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 116.</ref> Asanga attacks the view which states "The truth is that all is just conceptual fictions” by stating:<blockquote>As for their view, due to the absence of the thing itself which serves as basis of the concept, conceptual fictions must all likewise absolutely not exist. How then will it be true that all is just conceptual fictions? Through this conception on their part, reality, conceptual fiction, and the two together are all denied. Because they deny both conceptual fiction and reality, they should be considered the nihilist-in-chief.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 124.</ref></blockquote>[[Asanga]] also critiqued Madhyamaka because he held that it could lead to a laxity in the following of ethical precepts as well as for being "imaginatively constructed views that are arrived at only through reasoning."<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 117.</ref> He further states:<blockquote>How, again, is emptiness wrongly conceptualized? Some ascetics and Brahmins do not acknowledge that [viz. intrinsic nature] of which something is empty. Nor do they acknowledge that which is empty [viz. things and dharmas]. It is in this way that emptiness is said to be wrongly conceived. For what reason? Because that of which it is empty is non-existent, but that which is empty is existent— it is thus that emptiness is possible. What will be empty of what, where, when everything is unreal? This thing’s being devoid of that is not [then] possible. Thus emptiness is wrongly conceptualized in this case.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 125.</ref></blockquote>Asanga also wrote that "if nothing is real, there cannot be any ideas (''prajñapti''). Someone who holds this view is a nihilist, with whom one should not speak or share living quarters. This person falls into a bad rebirth and takes others with him."<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 129.</ref> [[Vasubandhu]] also states that emptiness does not mean that things have no intrinsic nature, but that this nature is "inexpressible and only to be apprehended by a kind of cognition that transcends the subject-object duality."<ref name=":24" /> Thus early Yogacarins were engaged in a project to reinterpret the radical Madhyamaka view of emptiness. Later Yogacarins like [[Sthiramati]] and [[Dharmapala of Nalanda|Dharmapala]] debated with their Madhyamika contemporaries.<ref>Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism, the doctrinal foundations, 2009, p. 88.</ref> However, Yogacara authors also commented on Madhyamika texts. As noted by Garfield, "Asaṅga, Sthiramati, and Guṇamati composed commentaries on the foundational text of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna’s ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā''."<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 6.</ref>

According to [[Xuanzang]], [[Bhāviveka|Bhavaviveka]], who critiques Yogacara views in his ''Madhyamakahṛdayakārikāḥ'', was disturbed by the views of Yogacarins and their critiques of Madhyamaka as nihilism, and himself traveled to [[Nalanda]] to debate Dharmapala face to face, but Dharmapala refused.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 127.</ref> Bhavaviveka quotes the attacks from the Yogacarins in his texts as claiming that while the Yogacara approach to prajñaparamita is the "means to attain omniscience", the Madhyamaka approach which "concentrates on the negation of arising and cessation" is not.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 131.</ref> Bhavaviveka responds to various Yogacara attacks and views in his ''Tarkajvālā'' (Blaze of reason) including the view that there are no external objects ([[idealism]]), the view that there is no use for logical argumentation (''tarka''), and the view that the dependent nature (''paratantra-svabhāva'') exists in an absolute sense.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. Westerhoff, Jan, Madhyamaka and Yogacara, allies or rivals? p. 135.</ref>

=== Advaita Vedanta ===
Several modern scholars have argued that the early [[Advaita Vedanta]] thinker [[Gaudapada]] (c.6th century CE), was influenced by Madhyamaka thought. They note that he borrowed the concept of "ajāta" (un-born) from Madhyamaka philosophy,{{sfn|Renard|2010|p=157}}{{sfn|Comans|2000|p=35-36}} which also uses the term "anutpāda" (non-arising, un-originated, non-production).{{sfn|Bhattacharya|1943|p=49}}<ref group="web">[http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?script=HK&beginning=0+&tinput=anutpAda+&trans=Translate&direction=AU Sanskrit Dictionary for Spoken Sanskrit, ''Anutpāda'']</ref> The Buddhist tradition usually uses the term "anutpāda" for the absence of an origin{{sfn|Renard|2010|p=157}}{{sfn|Bhattacharya|1943|p=49}} or [[sunyata]].{{sfn|Renard|2010|p=160}}{{refn|group=note|The term is also used in the [[Lankavatara Sutra]].{{sfn|Suzuki|1999}} According to D.T Suzuki, "anutpada" is not the opposite of "utpada", but transcends opposites. It is the [[Kensho|seeing into the true nature of existence]],{{sfn|Suzuki|1999|p=123-124}} the seeing that "all objects are without self-substance".{{sfn|Suzuki|1999|p=168}}}} "Ajātivāda" is the fundamental philosophical doctrine of [[Gaudapada]].{{sfn|Sarma|1996|p=127}} According to Gaudapada, the Absolute ([[Brahman]]) is not subject to birth, change and death. Echoing Nagarjuna's use of the [[Catuṣkoṭi|catuskoti]], Gaudapada writes that "nothing whatsoever is originated either from itself or from something else; nothing whatsoever existent, non-existent, or both existent and non-existent is originated."<ref name=":21">Ben-Ami Scharfstein, A Comparative History of World Philosophy: From the Upanishads to Kant, p 380.</ref>

However, it has been noted that Gaudapada's ultimate philosophical perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna's in that Gaudapada posits a metaphysical absolute based on the [[Mandukya Upanishad]] and thus he remains primarily a [[Vedanta|Vedantin]].{{sfn|Comans|2000|p=36}} The Absolute is ''aja'', the unborn eternal.{{sfn|Sarma|1996|p=127}} The empirical [[world]] of [[phenomenon|appearances]] is considered unreal, and not [[Existence|absolutely existent]].{{sfn|Sarma|1996|p=127}} In this sense, Gaudapada also shares a doctrine of [[Two truths doctrine|two truths]] or two levels of reality with Madhyamaka. According to Gaudapada, this absolute, [[Brahman]], cannot undergo alteration, so the phenomenal world cannot arise from Brahman. If the world cannot arise, yet is an empirical fact, then the world has to be an unreal{{refn|group=note|C.q. "transitory"}} appearance of Brahman. From the level of ultimate truth (''paramārthatā'') the phenomenal world is ''[[Maya (illusion)|Maya]]'' (illusion).{{sfn|Comans|2000|p=36}}

Richard King notes that the fourth prakarana of the ''Gaudapadiyakarika'' promotes several Mahayana Buddhist ideas, such as a [[Middle Way|middle way]] free from extremes, not being attached to dharmas and it even references beings called "Buddhas". King notes that this could be an attempt to either reach a [[rapprochement]] with Buddhists or to woo Buddhists over to Vedanta.<ref name=":22">King, Richard, Early Advaita and Madhyamaka Buddhism: The case of the ''Gaudapadiyakarika.''</ref> However, King adds that "from a Madhyamaka perspective, the ''Gaudapadiyakarika''<nowiki/>'s acceptance of an unchanging Absolute supporting the world of appearances is a mistaken form of eternalism, despite Gaudapadian protestations to the contrary."<ref name=":22" />

[[Adi Shankara|Shankara]] (early 8th century), a later Advaitin, directly dismissed Madhyamaka as irrational and nihilistic, stating that it was a kind of nihilism that held that "absolutely nothing exists" and that this view:<ref name=":21" /><ref>Gregory Joseph Darling, An Evaluation of the Vedāntic Critique of Buddhism p 358.</ref> <blockquote>is contradicted by all means of right knowledge and requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) - for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.<ref name=":23">Reynolds, Eric T. On the relationship of Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamika Buddhism, 1969.</ref></blockquote>This critique was upheld by most post Shankara Advaitins. However this did not prevent later [[Vedanta]] thinkers like [[Bhāskara (philosopher)|Bhaskara]] of accusing Shankara of being a crypto-buddhist for his view that everyday reality is Maya and that [[Brahman]] has no qualities and is undifferentiated.<ref name=":23" /> Another Vedantin philosopher, [[Ramanuja]] (1017–1137), directly compared Shankara's "mayavada" views to Madhyamaka, arguing that if [[Maya (religion)|Maya]]/[[Avidya (Hinduism)|Avidya]] is unreal, "that would involve the acceptance of the Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void".<ref name=":23" /> This critique by comparison is also echoed by the later philosophers like [[Madhvacharya|Madhva]] as well as [[Vijnanabhiksu|Vijñanabhiksu]] (15th or 16th century), who goes as far as to call Shankara a [[Āstika and nāstika|nastika]] (unorthodox).<ref name=":23" /> Later Advaitins also acknowledged the similarity of their doctrine with Madhyamaka. Vimuktatma states that if by ''asat'' (nonbeing), the Madhyamaka means Maya and not mere negation, then he is close to Vedanta. Sadananda also states that if by [[Śūnyatā|Sunya]], what is meant is the reality beyond the intellect, then the Madhyamaka accepts Vedanta.<ref name=":23" /> [[Shriharsha|Sri Harsha]] notes that the two schools are similar, but they differ in that Advaita holds consciousness to be pure, real and eternal, while Madhyamaka denies this.<ref name=":23" />

=== Jain philosophy ===
Modern scholars such as Jeffery Long have also noted that the influential [[Jain philosophy|Jain]] philosopher [[Kundakunda]] also adopted a theory of [[Two truths doctrine|two truths]], possibly under the influence of Nagarjuna.<ref>Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction, page 66, 216.</ref> According to W. J. Johnson he also adopts other Buddhist terms like [[Prajñā (Buddhism)|prajña]] under the influence of Nagarjuna, though he applies the term to knowledge of the Self (jiva), which is also the ultimate perspective (''niścayanaya),'' which is distinguished from the worldly perspective (''vyavahāranaya'')''.''<ref>W. J. Johnson, Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1995, p 285.</ref>

The Jain philosopher [[Haribhadra]] also mentions Madhyamaka. In both the ''Yogabindu'' and the [[Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya|''Yogadrstisamuccaya'']], Haribhadra singles out Nagarjuna's claim that [[Saṃsāra|samsara]] and [[nirvana]] are not different for criticism, labeling the view a "fantasy".<ref>Chapple, Christopher Key, John Thomas Casey (Translator), Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga With a New Translation of Haribhadra's Yogadrstisamuccaya, p. 60.</ref>

=== Taoism ===
It is well known that medieval Chinese [[Taoism]] was influenced by Mahayana Buddhism. One particular school, the Chongxuan (重玄, "Twofold Mystery") founded by Cheng Xuanying (fl.632-650), was particularly involved in borrowing and adapting Madhyamaka concepts like emptiness, the two truths and the [[Catuṣkoṭi|catuskoti]] into their [[Taoist philosophy|Taoist philosophical]] system.<ref>Cuma Ozkan, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: BUDDHIST MADHYAMAKA AND DAOIST CHONGXUAN (TWOFOLD MYSTERY) IN THE EARLY TANG (618-720), 2013.</ref>

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
*[[Prajnaparamita]]
*[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā|Mulamadhyamakakarika]]
*[[East Asian Mādhyamaka]]
*[[Śūnyatā]]
*[[Two Truths Doctrine]]
*[[Yogacara]]
*[[Anti-foundationalism]]
*[[Nihilism]]
*[[Anti-realism]]
*[[Nondualism]]
*[[Relativism]]
*[[Golden mean (philosophy)]]
{{div col end}}

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note|35em}}


==References==
==References==
{{Reflist}}


===Published references===
===Sources===
{{reflist|30em}}

===Web references===
{{Reflist|group=web}}

==Sources==
{{refbegin}}
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book|ref=harv|last=Kalupahana|first=David|authorlink=David Kalupahana|title=Buddhist Thought and Ritual|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x_FJcRDXhfQC|year=2001|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publ.|isbn=978-81-208-1773-9}}
* {{Citation | last =Arena| first =Leonardo Vittorio| year =2012| title = Nonsense as the Meaning| publisher=ebook}}
* {{cite book|ref=harv|last=Kalupahana|first=David|authorlink=David Kalupahana|title=Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GOYGAAAAYAAJ|year=1975|publisher=University Press of Hawaii|isbn=978-0-8248-0298-1}}
*Arnold, Dan (2010). Nāgārjuna’s ‘Middle Way’: A Non-Eliminative Understanding of Selflessness. In:Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 64, no.253: 367-395
* {{cite book|ref=harv|last=Nakamura|first=Hajime|authorlink=Hajime Nakamura|title=Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w0A7y4TCeVQC|year=1980|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publ.|isbn=978-81-208-0272-8}}
* {{Citation | last =Bhattacharya | first =Vidhushekhara | year =1943 | title =Gauḍapādakārikā | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{cite book|ref=harv|author1=Vasubandhu|authorlink1=Vasubandhu|last2=de La Vallée-Poussin|first2=Louis |authorlink2=Louis de La Vallée-Poussin|title=Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FWpiNAEACAAJ|date=1 June 1990|publisher=Asian Humanities Press|isbn=978-0-89581-913-0}}
* {{Citation | last =Brunnholzl | first =Karl | year =2004 | title =Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition | publisher =Snow Lion Publications}}
* {{cite book|ref=harv|last=Xing|first=Guang|title=The Concept of the Buddha: Its Evolution from Early Buddhism to the Trikāya Theory|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DTWZLMGFFgkC|year=2005|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-33344-3}}
* {{Citation | last =Cheng | first =Hsueh-Li | year =1981 | title =The Roots of Zen Buddhism | journal =Journal of Chinese Philosophy |volume=8 |pages=451–478 | url =http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/roots_of_zen.htm | doi=10.1111/j.1540-6253.1981.tb00267.x}}
* {{cite book|ref=harv|last=Yao|first=Zhihua|title=The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_uYR4sSsoSIC|year=2012|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-28745-1}}
* {{Citation | last =Comans | first =Michael | year =2000 | title =The Method of Early Advaita Vedānta: A Study of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, and Padmapāda | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{Citation | last =Cornu | first =Philippe | year =2001 | chapter =Nawoord | title =Schijn en werkelijkheid. De twee waarheden in de vier boeddhistische leerstelsels | publisher =KunchabPublicaties}}
* {{Citation | last =Daye | first =Douglas D. | year =1971 | title =Major Schools of the Mahayana: Madhyamaka. In:Charles S. Prebisch, Buddhism, A Modern Perspective. Pages 76-96. | isbn =978-0-271-01195-0}}
* {{Citation | last =Fuller | first =Paul | year =2005 | title =The Notion of Diṭṭhi in Theravāda Buddhism: The Point of View | publisher =Routledge | url =http://www.misterdanger.net/books/Buddhism%20Books/The%20notion%20of%20Ditthi.pdf | deadurl =yes | archiveurl =https://web.archive.org/web/20141202094809/http://www.misterdanger.net/books/Buddhism%20Books/The%20notion%20of%20Ditthi.pdf | archivedate =2014-12-02 | df = }}
* {{Citation | last =Garfield | first =Jay L. | year =1994 | title =Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why did Nagarjuana start with causation? | journal =Philosophy East & West |volume=44 |issue=2 |pages= | url =http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Dependent_Arising.htm}}
* {{Citation | last =Garfield | first =Jay L. | year =1995 | title =The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way | place =Oxford | publisher =Oxford University Press}}
* {{Citation | last =Garfield | first =Jay L. | year =2012 | title =Madhyamaka is not emptiness | publisher =smith College, University of melbourne | url =http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/docs/garfield_nihilism.pdf}}
* {{Citation | last =Gomez | first =Luis O. | year =1976 | title =Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon | journal =Philosophy East and West |volume=26 |issue=2 |pages=137–165 | url =http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/gomez.htm | doi=10.2307/1398186}}
* {{Citation | last =Harvey | first =Peter | year =1995 | title =An introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, history and practices | publisher =Cambridge University Press}}
* {{Citation | last =Hayes | first =Richard P. | year =1994 | title =Nagarjuna's appeal. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 22: 299-378}}
* {{Citation | last =Hayes | first =Richard P. | year =2003 | title =Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox,Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? | url =http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Master_of_Paradox.pdf}}
* {{Citation | last1 =Hookham | first1 =S.K.| authorlink1 =Shenpen Hookham | year=1991 | title=The Buddha within : Tathagatagarbha doctrine according to the Shentong interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhaga | publisher =State University of New York Press | location=Albany, NY | isbn=978-0791403587}}
* {{Citation | last =Hopkins | first =Jeffrey | last2 =Napper | first2 =Elizabeth | year =1996 | title =Meditation on Emptiness}}
* {{Citation | last =Kalupahana | first =David J. | author-link = | year =1992 | title =The Principles of Buddhist Psychology | place =Delhi | publisher =ri Satguru Publications }}
* {{Citation | last =Kalupahana | first =David J. | year =1994 | title =A History of Buddhist philosophy | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited}}
* {{Citation | last =Loy | first =David | year =2006 | title =Second Buddha : Nagarjuna - Buddhism's Greatest Philosopher. In: Winter 2006 edition of Tricycle : The Buddhist Review | url =http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/SecondBuddha_Nagarjuna_Loy.html}}
* {{Citation | last =Magee | first =William | year =1999 | title =The Nature of Things. Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World | place =Ithaca, New York | publisher =Snow Lion}}
* {{Citation| last =Napper | first =Elizabeth | year =1989 | title =Dependent-Arising and Emptiness | isbn =0-86171-057-6}}
* {{Citation|last=Ng |first=Yu-kwan |title=Chih-i and Madhyamika |date=1990 |publisher=dissertation, McMaster University |location=Hamilton, Ontario |page=1 |url=http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9558&context=opendissertations |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20140203140705/http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9558&context=opendissertations |archivedate=February 3, 2014 }}
* {{Citation | last =Renard | first =Philip | year =2010 | title =Non-Dualisme. De directe bevrijdingsweg | place =Cothen | publisher =Uitgeverij Juwelenschip}}
* {{Citation | last =Rizzi | first =Cesare | year =1988 | title =Candrakirti | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited}}
* {{Citation | last =Ruegg | first =D. Seyfort | year =1981 | title =The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (A History of Indian literature) | publisher =Harrassowitz | isbn =978-3-447-02204-0}}
* {{Citation | last =Sarma | first =Chandradhar | year =1996 | title =The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{Citation | last1 =[[Shantarakshita]] | last2 =[[Ju Mipham]] | year =2005 | title =The Adornment of the Middle Way |publisher =Padmakara Translation | isbn =1-59030-241-9}}
* {{Citation | last =Suzuki | first =Daisetz Teitarō | authorlink =D.T. Suzuki | year =1999 | title =Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{Citation | last =Thich Nhat Hanh | year =1988 | title =The Heart of Understanding: Commentaries on the Prajnaparamita Heart Sutra}}
* {{cite book|last1=Tsongkhapa|first1=Lobsang Dragpa|title=Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind|year=1993|publisher=State University of New York|location=Albany, NY|isbn=0791414795|url=https://books.google.com/books?isbn=0791414795/ |edition=1་|last2=Sparham|first2= Gareth, trans.; in collaboration with Shotaro Iida|editor=Kapstein, Matthew|accessdate=18 December 2012|language=Tibetan, English}}
* {{Citation | last =Tsong Khapa | year =2002 | title =The great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment: Volume 3| publisher =Snow Lion Publications | isbn =1-55939-166-9}}
* {{Citation | last1 =rJe Tsong Kha Pa | last2 =Garfield (tr.)| first2 =Jay L. | last3 =Samten (tr.)| first3 =Ngawang | year =2006 | title =Ocean of Reasoning | place =Oxford | publisher =Oxford University Press | isbn = 978-0-19-514733-9}}
* {{Citation | last =Vetter | first =Tilmann | year =1988 | title =The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism | publisher =BRILL | isbn =90-04-08959-4 | url =http://ahandfulofleaves.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/the-ideas-and-meditative-practices-of-early-buddhism_vetter.pdf}}
* {{Citation | last =Warder | first =A. K. | year =2000 | title=Indian Buddhism | place=Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass Publishers}}
* {{Citation | last =Williams | first =Paul | year =2000 | title =Buddhist Thought | publisher =Routledge}}
* {{Citation | last =Wynne | first =Alexander | year =2007 | title =The Origin of Buddhist Meditation | publisher =Routledge}}
{{refend}}
{{refend}}


==Further reading==
==Further reading==
* For a critical examination of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the [[Āgama (Buddhism)|Samyuktagama]], see [[David Kalupahana]], ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.''{{sfn|Kalupahana|1975|pp=76-78}}
* {{Citation | last =Brunnholzl | first =Karl | year =2004 | title =Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition | publisher =Snow Lion Publications}}
* For a Sautrantika refutation of the Sarvāstivādin use of the Samyuktagama, see Theodore Stcherbatsky, ''The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma.''<ref>Theodore Stcherbatsky, ''The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma.'' Asian Educational Services, 2003, page 76. This is a reprint of a much earlier work and the analysis is now quite dated; the first appendix however contains translations of polemical materials.</ref>
* {{Citation | last =Della Santina | first =Peter | year =1986 | title =Madhyamaka Schools in India | place =New Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{Citation | last =Harris | first =Ian Charles | year =1991 | title =The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism | place =New York | publisher =E. J.Brill}}
* {{Citation | last =His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) | year =2009 | title =The Middle Way: Faith Grounded in Reason | place =Boston | publisher =Wisdom Publications}}
* Huntington, C. W., Jr. (1989). The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Madhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press
* {{Citation | last =Jones | first =Richard H. | year =2014 | title =Nagarjuna: Buddhism's Most Important Philosopher | place =New York | publisher =Jackson Square Books}}
* {{Citation | last =Jones | first =Richard H. | year =2012| title =Indian Madhyamaka Buddhist Philosophy After Nagarjuna, 2 vols.| place =New York | publisher =Jackson Square Books}}
* Narain, Harsh. The Mādhyamika mind. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1997.
* {{Citation | last =Newland | first =Guy | year =2008 | title =Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path | place =Boston| publisher =Snow Lion}}
* {{Citation | last =Ruegg | first =David S. | year =1981 | title =The Literature of the Madhyamaka School in India | place =Wiesbaden| publisher =Otto Harrassowitz}}
* {{Citation | last =Westeroff | first =Jan. | year =2009 | title =Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction| place =Oxford | publisher =Oxford University Press}}

==External links==
{{commons category}}
* [https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/a-history-of-indian-philosophy-volume-1/d/doc209753.html The Mādhyamika or the Śūnyavāda school], Surendranath Dasgupta, 1940
* {{cite IEP |url-id=b-madhya |title=Madhyamaka Buddhism}}
* {{cite IEP |url-id=nagarjun |title=Nagarjuna}}
* [http://bahai-library.com/winters_nagarjuna Thinking in Buddhism: Nagarjuna's Middle Way]
* [http://www.thezensite.com/MainPages/nagarjuna.html thezensite: articles on Nagarjuna]
* [http://www.madhyamaka.com Introduction to the Middle Way] A contemporary commentary based on the teachings of Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/madhyamaka/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Madhyamaka]
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Nagarjuna]


{{Buddhism topics}}
{{Buddhism topics}}


[[Category:Nikaya schools]]
{{Authority control}}
[[Category:Early Buddhist schools]]

[[Category:Madhyamaka| ]]
[[Category:Nondualism]]
[[Category:Rangtong]]

Revision as of 21:48, 18 September 2018

The traditions of Tibetan Buddhism traditionally follow the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya

The Sarvāstivāda (Sanskrit; Chinese: 說一切有部; pinyin: Shuō Yīqièyǒu Bù) were an early school of Buddhism that held to the existence of all dharmas in the past, present and future, the "three times".[1]

The Sarvāstivādins were one of the most influential Buddhist monastic groups, flourishing throughout Northwest India, Northern India, and Central Asia. The Sarvāstivādins are believed to have given rise to the Mūlasarvāstivāda sect, although the relationship between these two groups has not yet been fully determined.

Name

Sarvāstivāda is a Sanskrit term that can be glossed as: "the theory of all exists". The Sarvāstivāda argued that all dharmas exist in the past, present and future, the "three times". Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośakārikā states, "He who affirms the existence of the dharmas of the three time periods [past, present and future] is held to be a Sarvāstivādin."[1]

Although there is some dispute over how the word "Sarvāstivāda" is to be analyzed, the general consensus is that it is to be parsed into three parts: sarva "all" or "every" + asti "exist" + vada "speak", "say" or "theory". This equates perfectly with the Chinese term, Shuōyīqièyǒu bù (Chinese: 說一切有部),[2] which is literally "the sect that speaks of the existence of everything," as used by Xuanzang and other translators.

The Sarvāstivāda was also known by other names, particularly hetuvada and yuktivada. Hetuvada comes from hetu – 'cause', which indicates their emphasis on causation and conditionality. Yuktivada comes from yukti – 'reason' or even 'logic', which shows their use of rational argument and syllogism.

Origination and history

According to Charles Prebish, "there is a great deal of mystery surrounding the rise and early development of the Sarvāstivādin school."[3]

In Central Asia, several Buddhist monastic groups were historically prevalent. According to some accounts, the Sarvāstivādins emerged from the Sthavira nikāya, a small group of conservatives, who split from the reformist majority Mahāsāṃghikas at the Second Buddhist council. According to this account, they were expelled from Magadha, and moved to northwestern India where they developed into the Sarvāstivādin school.[3]

A number of scholars have identified three distinct major phases of missionary activity seen in the history of Buddhism in Central Asia, which are associated with respectively the Dharmaguptaka, Sarvāstivāda, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda,[4] and the origins of the Sarvastivada have also been related to Asoka sending Majjhantika on a mission to Gandhara, which had an early presence of the Sarvastivada.[3] The Sarvāstivādins in turn are believed to have given rise to the Mūlasarvāstivāda sect, although the relationship between these two groups has not yet been fully determined. According to Prebish, "this episode corresponds well with one Sarvāstivādin tradition stating that Madhyantika (the Sanskrit counterpart of the Pali Majjhantika) converted the city of Kasmir, which seems to have close ties with Gandhara."[3]

A third tradition says that a community of Sarvāstivādin monks was established at Mathura by the patriarch Upagupta.[3]

Early history - Kanishka

The Sarvāstivāda enjoyed the patronage of Kanishka (c. 127–150 CE) of the Kushan Empire, during which time they were greatly strengthened, and became one of the dominant sects of Buddhism for the next thousand years,[3] flourishing throughout Northwest India, North India, and Central Asia

When the Sarvāstivāda school held a synod in Kashmir during the reign of Kanishka II (c. 158-176), the Gandharan most important text, the Astagrantha of Katyayaniputra was rewritten in Sanskrit making necessary revisions. This revised text was now known as Jñānaprasthāna "Course of Knowledge". Though the Gandharan Astagrantha had many vibhaṣas (commentaries), the new Kashmiri Astagrantha i.e. the Jñānaprasthāna had a Sanskrit Mahāvibhaṣa, compiled by the Kashmir Sarvāstivāda synod. The Jñānaprasthāna and its Mahāvibhaṣa, which took more than a generation to complete, were then declared the Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, said to be "Buddha’s word", Buddhabhāṣita.

This new Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, however, was not readily accepted by the Gandharan Sarvāstivādins, though gradually they adapted their views to the new Kashmiri orthodoxy. The Gandharan Sarvāstivādins used the same vinaya from Mathura. As a matter of fact, their abhidharma was meant for meditational practices. They made use of the Hṛdaya, a manual for attaining arhatship. However, the long Gandharan Vinaya was abridged to a Sanskrit Dashabhanavara in the Kashmir synod by removing the avadanas and Jātaka tales, stories, and illustrations. After the declaration of the vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, the Gandharan non-vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins, the majority, were called Sautrāntikas "those who uphold the sutras".

Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika subschools

The Sarvāstivāda comprised two subschools, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika. Pioneering work on the subject was undertaken by Ch. Willemen in 1975, and more recently in 2006 (Abhidharmahṛdaya) and in 2008 in the Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies (Tokyo). The Vaibhāṣika was formed by adherents of the Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra, comprising the orthodox Kasmiri branch of the Sarvāstivāda school. The Vaibhāśika-Sarvāstivāda, which had by far the most "comprehensive edifice of doctrinal systematics" of the early Buddhist schools,[5] was widely influential in India and beyond.[6]

In contrast to the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrāntika Sarvāstivādins did not uphold the Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra, but rather emphasized the Buddhist sūtras. The name Sautrāntika means "those who uphold the sūtras." According to the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, the Sautrāntikas held the doctrine that there may be many contemporaneous buddhas.[7]

Mūlasarvāstivādins

A number of theories have been posited by academics as to how the two are related, which Bhikkhu Sujato summaries as follows:

The uncertainty around this school has led to a number of hypotheses. Frauwallner’s theory holds that the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya is the disciplinary code of an early Buddhist community based in Mathura, which was quite independent in its establishment as a monastic community from the Sarvāstivādins of Kaśmir (although of course this does not mean that they were different in terms of doctrine). Lamotte, opposing Frauwallner, asserts that the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya was a late Kaśmīr compilation made to complete the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya. Warder suggests that the Mūlasarvāstivādins were a later development of the Sarvāstivāda, whose main innovations were literary, the compilation of the large Vinaya and the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna Sūtra, which kept the early doctrines but brought the style up to date with contemporary literary developments. Enomoto pulls the rug out from all these theories by asserting that Sarvāstivādin and Mūlasarvāstivādin are really the same. Meanwhile, Willemen, Dessein, and Cox have developed the theory that the Sautrantikas, a branch or tendency within the Sarvāstivādin group of schools, emerged in Gandhāra and Bactria around 200 CE. Although they were the earlier group, they temporarily lost ground to the Kaśmīr Vaibhāśika school due to the political influence of Kaṇiṣka. In later years the Sautrantikas became known as Mūlasarvāstivādins and regained the ascendancy. I have elsewhere given my reasons for disagreeing with the theories of Enomoto and Willemen et al. Neither Warder nor Lamotte give sufficient evidence to back up their theories. We are left with Frauwallner’s theory, which in this respect has stood the test of time.[8]

The Kasmira orthodoxy, the Vaibhāṣikas disappeared in the later part of the 7th century. Subsequently, the old Gandharan Sarvāstivādins, the non-Vaibhāṣika Sautrantikas, were named Mūlasarvāstivādins, who then at a later date went to Tibet. It has been suggested that the minority Vaibhāṣikas were absorbed into the majority Sautrantika Sarvāstivādins as a possible result of the latter’s adaptations.

Moreover, Mishrakabhidharmahrdaya, a title which means that 'sautrantika views were mixed with Vaibhāṣika views' was composed by Dharmatrata in the 4th century in Gandharan area. Vasubandhu (ca.350-430), a native from Purusapura in Gandhara, composed his Kosa based on this text and the Astagrantha. While in Kasmira, he wrote his karikas which were well received there but he faced intense opposition, notably from Samghabhadra, a leading Sarvāstivāda pundit, when he composed his bhasya. By his bhasya, Vasubandhu made it clear to the Vaibhāṣikas that he was a sautrantika, which is why he was fiercely opposed by the Sarvāstivāda vaibhasikas in Kasmira.

In reply to Vasubhandhu’s bhasya, Samghabhadra wrote a text, the Nyayanusara 'according to reason'. This work is presently only extant in Chinese (from Xuanzang’s translation and little is known of it in English).

Appearance and language

Appearance

Between 148 and 170 CE, the Parthian monk An Shigao came to China and translated a work which described the color of monastic robes (Skt. kāṣāya) utitized in five major Indian Buddhist sects, called Da Biqiu Sanqian Weiyi (大比丘三千威儀).[9] Another text translated at a later date, the Śāriputraparipṛcchā, contains a very similar passage with nearly the same information.[9] In the earlier source, the Sarvāstivāda are described as wearing dark red robes, while the Dharmaguptas are described as wearing black robes.[10] However, in the corresponding passage found in the later Śāriputraparipṛcchā, the Sarvāstivāda are described as wearing black robes and the Dharmaguptas as wearing dark red robes.[10] In traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, which follow the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, red robes are regarded as characteristic of their tradition.[11]

Language

During the first century BCE, in the Gandharan cultural area (consisting of Oddiyana, Gandhara and Bactria, Tokharistan, across the Khyber Pass), the Sthaviriyas used the Gāndhārī language to write their literature using the Kharosthi.

The Tibetan historian Buton Rinchen Drub wrote that the Mahāsāṃghikas used Prākrit, the Sarvāstivādins used Sanskrit, the Sthavira nikāya used Paiśācī, and the Saṃmitīya used Apabhraṃśa.[12]

Teachings

All exists

Although the sarvastitva was the central thesis, there were different theories on how 'sarvam' and even 'asti' were actually to be explained and understood among the Gandharan diverse Sarvāstivādins. Vasubandhu’s Koshabhasya, an elaborate yoga manual based on the Hrdaya, describes four main theses on sarvasti:

There are four types of Sarvāstivādins accordingly as they teach a difference in existence (bhavanyathatva), a difference in characteristic (laksananyathatva), a difference in condition (avasthanyathatva), and mutual difference (anyonyathatva).

Later Sarvāstivāda takes a combination of the first and third theses as its model. It was on this basis that the school’s doctrines were defended in the face of growing external, and sometimes even internal, criticism.

The doctrines of Sarvāstivāda were not confined to 'all exists', but also include the theory of momentariness (ksanika), conjoining (samprayukta) and simultaneity (sahabhu), conditionality (hetu and pratyaya), the culmination of the spiritual path (marga), and others. These doctrines are all inter-connected and it is the principle of 'all exists' that is the axial doctrine holding the larger movement together when the precise details of other doctrines are at stake.

The Three Vehicles

Regarding divisions of practice, the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins are known to have employed the outlook of Buddhist practice as consisting of the Three Vehicles:[13]

  1. Śrāvakayāna
  2. Pratyekabuddhayāna
  3. Bodhisattvayāna

Views on the Buddha

Sarvāstivādins viewed the Buddha's physical body (Skt. rūpakāya) as being impure and improper for taking refuge in, and they instead regarded taking refuge in the Buddha as taking refuge in the Dharmakāya of the Buddha.[14]

Some people say that to take refuge in the Buddha is to take refuge in the body of the Tathāgata, which comprises head, neck, stomach, back, hands and feet. It is explained that the body, born of father and mother, is composed of defiled dharmas, and therefore is not a source of refuge. The refuge is the Buddha's fully accomplished qualities (aśaikṣadharmāḥ) which comprise bodhi and the dharmakāya.

Views on arhats

According to A.K. Warder, the Sarvāstivādins held the same position as the Mahāsāṃghika branch regarding arhats, considering them to be imperfect and fallible.[15] In the Sarvāstivādin Nāgadatta Sūtra, the Mahīśāsaka view of women is criticized in a narrative about a bhikṣuṇī named Nāgadatta. Here, the demon Māra takes the form of her father, and tries to convince her to work toward the lower stage of an arhat, rather than that of a fully enlightened buddha (Skt. samyaksambuddha).[16]

Māra therefore took the disguise of Nāgadatta's father and said thus to Nāgadatta: "Your thought is too serious. Buddhahood is too difficult to attain. It takes a hundred thousand nayutas of koṭis of kalpas to become a Buddha. Since few people attain Buddhahood in this world, why don't you attain Arhatship? For the experience of Arhatship is the same as that of nirvāṇa; moreover, it is easy to attain Arhatship...."

In her reply, Nāgadatta rejects arhatship as a lower path, saying, "A Buddha's wisdom is like empty space of the ten-quarters, which can enlighten innumerable people. But an Arhat's wisdom is inferior."[16]

Views on bodhisattvas

Regarding divisions of practice, the Mahāvibhāṣā is known to employ the outlook of Buddhist practice as consisting of the Three Vehicles.[13] The Sarvāstivādins also did not hold that it was impossible, or even impractical to strive to become a fully enlightened buddha (Skt. samyaksaṃbuddha), and therefore they admitted the path of a bodhisattva as a valid one.[17] References to Bodhisattvayāna and the practice of the Six Pāramitās are commonly found in Sarvāstivāda works as well.[18]

The Mahāvibhāṣā of the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins includes a schema of four pāramitās: generosity (dāna), discipline (śīla), energy (vīrya), and wisdom (prajñā), and it says that the four pāramitās and six pāramitās are essentially equivalent.[19]

Foreign teachers hold that there are six pāramitās, adding patience (kṣānti) and meditation (dhyāna). But the teachers of Kaśmīra say that the last two are included in the first four. Patience is included in discipline and meditation in intuitive knowledge; they are accomplished upon completion of discipline and wisdom.

Canon

Vinaya

The Dharmaguptaka are known to have rejected the authority of the Sarvāstivāda pratimokṣa rules on the grounds that the original teachings of the Buddha had been lost.[20]

The complete Sarvāstivāda Vinaya is extant in the Chinese Buddhist canon. In its early history, the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya was the most common vinaya tradition in China. However, Chinese Buddhism later settled on the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya. In the 7th century, Yijing wrote that in eastern China, most people followed the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, while the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya was used in earlier times in Guanzhong (the region around Chang'an), and that the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya was prominent in the Yangzi River area and further south.[21] In the 7th century, the existence of multiple Vinaya lineages throughout China was criticized by prominent Vinaya masters such as Yijing and Dao'an (654–717). In the early 8th century, Daoan gained the support of Emperor Zhongzong of Tang, and an imperial edict was issued that the saṃgha in China should use only the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya for ordination.[22]

Āgamas

Scholars at present have "a nearly complete collection of sūtras from the Sarvāstivāda school"[23] thanks to a recent discovery in Afghanistan of roughly two-thirds of the Dīrgha Āgama in Sanskrit. The Madhyama Āgama (T26, Chinese trans. Gotama Saṅghadeva) and Saṃyukta Āgama (T99, Chinese trans. Guṇabhadra) have long been available in Chinese translation. The Sarvāstivāda is therefore the only early school besides the Theravada for which we have a roughly complete sutra collection, although unlike the Theravada it has not all been preserved in the original language.

Abhidharma

During the first century, the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma primarily consisted of the Abhidharmahrdaya authored by Dharmashresthin, a native from Tokharistan, and the Ashtagrantha authored/compiled by Katyayaniputra. Both texts were translated by Samghadeva in 391 AD and in 183 AD. respectively, but they were not completed until 390 in Southern China.

The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma consists of seven texts. The texts of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma are:

Following these, are the texts that became the authority of the Vaibhāṣika:

Sarvāstivādin meditation teachers also worked on the Dhyāna sutras (Chinese: 禪經), a group of early Buddhist meditation texts which were translated into Chinese and became influential in the development of Chinese Buddhist meditation methods.

All of these works have been translated into Chinese, and are now part of the Chinese Buddhist canon. In the Chinese context, the word abhidharma refers to the Sarvāstivāda abhidharma, although at a minimum the Dharmaguptaka, Pudgalavada and Theravada also had abhidharmas.

Relationship to Mahāyāna

The Sarvāstivādins of Kāśmīra held the Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra as authoritative, and thus were given the moniker of being Vaibhāṣikas. The Mahāvibhāṣā is thought to have been authored around 150 CE, around the time of Kaniṣka (127–151 CE) of the Kuṣāṇa Empire.[24] This massive treatise of Abhidharma (200 fascicles in Chinese) contains a great deal of material with what appear to be strong affinities to Mahāyāna doctrines.[25] The Mahāvibhāṣā is also said to illustrate the accommodations reached between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna traditions, as well as the means by which Mahāyāna doctrines would become accepted.[26] The Mahāvibhāṣā also defines the Mahāyāna sūtras and the role in their Buddhist canon. Here they are described as Vaipulya doctrines, with "Vaipulya" being a commonly used synonym for Mahāyāna. The Mahāvibhāṣā reads:[27]

What is the Vaipulya? It is said to be all the sūtras corresponding to elaborations on the meanings of the exceedingly profound dharmas.

According to a number of scholars, Mahāyāna Buddhism flourished during the time of the Kuṣāṇa Empire, and this is illustrated in the form of Mahāyāna influence on the Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra.[28] The Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa also records that Kaniṣka presided over the establishment of Prajñāpāramitā doctrines in the northwest of India.[29] Étienne Lamotte has also pointed out that a Sarvāstivāda master is known to have stated that the Mahāyāna Prajñā sūtras were to be found amongst their Vaipulya sūtras.[27] According to Paul Williams, the similarly massive Mahāprajñāpāramitāupadeśa also has a clear association with the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins.[30]

References

  1. ^ a b de La Vallée-Poussin 1990, p. 807.
  2. ^ Taisho 27, n1545
  3. ^ a b c d e f Buddhism: A Modern Perspective. Charles S. Prebish. Penn State Press: 1975. ISBN 0-271-01195-5 pg 42-43
  4. ^ Willemen, Charles. Dessein, Bart. Cox, Collett. Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism. 1997. p. 126
  5. ^ "one does not find anywhere else a body of doctrine as organized or as complete as theirs" . . ."Indeed, no other competing schools have ever come close to building up such a comprehensive edifice of doctrinal systematics as the Vaibhāśika." The Sautrantika theory of seeds (bija ) revisited: With special reference to the ideological continuity between Vasubandhu's theory of seeds and its Srilata/Darstantika precedents by Park, Changhwan, PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2007 pg 2
  6. ^ A Study of the Abhidharmahṛdaya: The Historical Development of the Concept of Karma in the Sarvāstivāda Thought. PhD thesis by Wataru S. Ryose. University of Wisconsin-Madison: 1987 pg 3
  7. ^ Xing 2005, p. 66.
  8. ^ Bhikkhu Sujato (2012). Sects & Sectarianism: The origins of Buddhist Schools (PDF). Santipada. p. 135.
  9. ^ a b Hino, Shoun. Three Mountains and Seven Rivers. 2004. p. 55
  10. ^ a b Hino, Shoun. Three Mountains and Seven Rivers. 2004. pp. 55-56
  11. ^ Mohr, Thea. Tsedroen, Jampa. Dignity and Discipline: Reviving Full Ordination for Buddhist Nuns. 2010. p. 266
  12. ^ Yao 2012, p. 9.
  13. ^ a b Nakamura 1980, p. 189.
  14. ^ Xing 2005, p. 49.
  15. ^ Warder, A.K. Indian Buddhism. 2000. p. 277
  16. ^ a b Kalupahana 2001, p. 109.
  17. ^ Baruah, Bibhuti. Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism. 2008. p. 457
  18. ^ Baruah, Bibhuti. Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism. 2008. p. 456
  19. ^ Xing 2005, p. 48.
  20. ^ Baruah, Bibhuti. Buddhist Sects and Sectarianism. 2008. p. 52
  21. ^ Mohr, Thea. Tsedroen, Jampa. Dignity and Discipline: Reviving Full Ordination for Buddhist Nuns. 2010. p. 187
  22. ^ Heirman, Ann. Bumbacher, Stephan Peter. The Spread of Buddhism. 2007. pp. 194-195
  23. ^ Bhikkhu Sujato: The Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas
  24. ^ Potter, Karl. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. 1998. p. 112
  25. ^ Potter, Karl. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. 1998. p. 117
  26. ^ Potter, Karl. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. 1998. p. 111
  27. ^ a b Walser, Joseph. Nāgārjuna in Context: Mahāyāna Buddhism and Early Indian Culture. 2005. p. 156
  28. ^ Willemen, Charles. Dessein, Bart. Cox, Collett. Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism. 1997. p. 123
  29. ^ Ray, Reginald. Buddhist Saints in India: A Study in Buddhist Values and Orientations. 1999. p. 410
  30. ^ Williams, Paul, and Tribe, Anthony. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. 2000. p. 100

Sources

Further reading

  • For a critical examination of the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of the Samyuktagama, see David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.[1]
  • For a Sautrantika refutation of the Sarvāstivādin use of the Samyuktagama, see Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma.[2]
  1. ^ Kalupahana 1975, pp. 76–78.
  2. ^ Theodore Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word Dharma. Asian Educational Services, 2003, page 76. This is a reprint of a much earlier work and the analysis is now quite dated; the first appendix however contains translations of polemical materials.