Kofi Annan Syrian peace plan

The Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria or the U.N.-Arab League peace envoy for Syria, launched in February 2012, is considered the most serious international attempt to resolve the Syrian uprising in the Middle East diplomatically. The peace plan enforced a cease-fire to take place across Syria since 10 April 2012, though in reality the cease-fire was announced by the Syrian government on 14 April.

Following the Houla massacre and the consequent Free Syrian Army (FSA) ultimatum to the Syrian government, the cease fire practically collapsed towards the end of May 2012, as the FSA began nation-wide offensives against the government troops. On 1 June, the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad vowed to crush the anti-regime uprising, after the FSA announced that it was resuming “defensive operations.”

Chronology

On 23 February 2012, Annan was appointed as the U.N.-Arab League special envoy to Syria in an attempt to end the increasingly violent uprising that began in March 2011.

On 16 March, a 6-point peace plan was submitted to the UN. On 24 March 2012, Kofi Annan flew to Moscow in an effort to secure strong Russian support for his efforts to bring about a cease-fire and open political dialogue. On 27 March, the envoy's office said that the Syrian government had accepted the peace proposal, and would be working to implement it.

On 4 April, Annan told the U.N. Security Council that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had given assurances he would "immediately" start pulling back his forces and complete a military withdrawal from urban areas by 10 April. Annan also said that if the cease-fire was successful, an unarmed U.N. monitoring mission of some 200 to 250 observers could be brought into Syria to monitor compliance to its terms.

Syria’s army intensified its assaults on opposition strongholds almost immediately after agreeing to the Annan plan, activist organizations said.. For their part, and in breach of the last sentence of point 2 of the plan (below), the opposition refused to provide any commitments in writing. Similarly all involved states ('all relevant elements') did not provide commitments as per point 2.

On 5 April, Syrian U.N. Ambassador Bashar Jaafari told reporters at the United Nations that the Assad government would not abide by Annan’s cease-fire plan unless outside countries ('all relevant elements') supporting the opposition first pledged in writing to stop aiding rebel fighters. He also said that police would not be withdrawn from population centers because, unlike the military, they are not included in the 6 point plan (below).

On 21 April, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2043 as basis for the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) for an initial 90-day period.

On 23 April, the violence in Syria allegedly peaked again with as many as 80 people claimed to be killed nationwide.

On 1 May, Hervé Ladsous, the United Nations (UN) Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said that both sides had violated the 12 April ceasefire agreement. UN chief Ban Ki-moon said it was vital that government and opposition alike cooperate fully with the UN observer force.

With increased fighting by the second half of May and as a consequence of the Houla massacre, the cease-fire was considered to be on the verge of collapse. On 29 May, Kofi Annan headed for Syria by himself to prevent the ensuing crisis.

The Free Syrian army announced on 30 May that they were giving president Bashar al-Assad a 48-hour deadline to abide by an international peace plan to end violence.

Following the Houla massacre and the consequent FSA ultimatum to the Syrian government, the cease fire practically collapsed towards the end of May 2012, as FSA began nation-wide offensives against the government troops. On 1 June, the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad vowed to crush an anti-regime uprising, after the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) announced that it was resuming "defensive operations".

6-point peace plan

The text of the six-point plan: '

(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;

(2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilise the country.

To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres.

As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.

Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;

(3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;

(4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

(5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

(6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.

Subsequent political efforts

UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan drew up a transitional plan for discussion by the Action Group on Syria in Geneva over the weekend of 30 June. It was agreed on by all parties, and Annan was broadly positive about it, with his spokesperson talking of a perceived "shift" in the Chinese and Russian positions that should not be underestimated. The one contentious issue was a Russian block, backed by China, on an agreement that precluded a role for Assad. This issue in particular led to the transitional agreement being described as "dangerous" by the FSA and many activists within Syria, who rejected the very idea of "a unity government with the assassins of our children". Geneva was similarly rejected by the SNC and the LCC. Both Syria and Iran were excluded from the conference (Annan and Ban Ki-moon had wanted Iran present, but the US and Europe successfully insisted otherwise), and they also, perhaps unsurprisingly, rejected it. NATO emphasised there would no military intervention, that a political solution on the back of a ceasefire remained the only answer.

Meetings over two days in Cairo, hosted by the Arab League, attempted to get a disparate group of nearly 250 opposition figures, most of whom were exiles, to discuss the new international plan for a transitional Syrian government, as well as to move toward a broad, common vision for a post-Assad Syria. It was partially successful in some respects, but it was boycotted and criticised by the FSA and many activists in Syria, resulted in a fracas over Kurdish nationality, and the Syrian Revolution General Commission withdrawing in profound disagreement. The SNC saw the meeting, and a proposed follow up, as a threat to its position, and so rejected the process. Salman Shaikh of the Brookings Doha Center argued that "Cairo was just too big. It was trying to bring together too many people, some of whom have no credibility on the ground anyway." In perhaps another sign of a Russian "shift", the Russian ambassador to Cairo had addressed the opposition meeting; a month prior, the Russians refused to even attend such a meeting.

Annan arrived in Syria for the third time on 8 July for talks with Assad, and the visit was described by both sides as constructive. Annan said he had a plan he could take away for discussion with the opposition. In an interview published the day before, he had again stressed that Iran had to be part of the solution, and noted that, while Russia and China were repeatedly and loudly denounced as barriers to resolving the situation, little was ever said about the flood of arms and money to the opposition doing that was doing its fair share of inflaming the violence. Annan then went on to Iran.

On 9 July, Iran effectively called for a unity government and re-pledged its support for Assad by stating that external interference should be contingent upon the outcome of Syria's presidential elections of 2014. Russian President Vladimir Putin, by contrast and perhaps providing further evidence of a Russian shift, said that the two sides should be "forced" to start talking with each other. Putin pressured Assad to be more flexible, insisting that he talk with adversaries, invited opposition delegations for discussions, and restricted shipments of new weapons to Syria. SNC delegates expressed their belief that Russia was preparing "a new era" in its engagement with Syria, and that they "felt a shift in the Russians' position" during the Paris Friends of Syria meeting. Previously agreed refurbishments of Syrian military equipment would continue, however, and Russia also modulated its shift by sending two destroyers and three amphibious landing vessels carrying marines in a show of support for Assad.

Leading dissident Michel Kilo duly headed a delegation to Moscow on 9 July 2012. Russia tried to emphasise its possible role as a bridge between the two sides. Kilo, though not apparently averse to the idea, explained that while his National Committee for Democratic Change was interested in dialogue, Assad's casting of the opposition as "terrorists" and "armed gangs" meant he refused to acknowledge them as representatives of the Syrian people. Without even recognition, talks were impossible. On 10 July, Russia called for another Action Group meeting, though excluded discussion on the fate of Assad, and emphasised that Iran's presence at the meeting would be helpful. The country's call came just before a delegation from the SNC went to Russia for discussions, where it reiterated that any transitional arrangement could only take place after Assad had fallen, one way or another.

See also

• Syrian conflict peace proposals
• International reactions to the 2011–2012 Syrian uprising
• Robert Mood