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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by MarioGom (talk | contribs) at 19:01, 16 May 2023 (On Douglas MacArthur II kidnapping attempt: duped sig). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

RFC, 15 December 2022

Should we replace the sentence (It is also Iran's largest and most active political opposition group.[1][2][3]) with the following?

Some sources has described it as Iran's main,[4] most active,[1] or biggest opposition group,[5] Other sources described it as a "tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania"[6] that has "little support inside Iran today"[7] and "can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded"[8]

Yes or No? Ghazaalch (talk) 05:55, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Alternative proposal

  • Some sources has described it as Iran's main,[9] most active,[1] or biggest opposition group,[10] More recent sources say this once-prominent group[11] is now a fringe revolutionary group[12][13][14] with little support inside Iran.[15][16][17]

Ghazaalch (talk) 07:35, 15 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Survey, 15 December 2022

  • Yes. Per talk above, I am Quoting Prinsgezinde who said If we have conflicting sources, then per WP:CONFLICTING, we should prefer the most up-to-date reliable sources and, if a conflict still exists, provide all viewpoints... the fact that there are sources expressly saying that its size is exaggerated makes calling it the biggest opposition group in the lead (with the other view not expressed) undue.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:17, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes: This line needs to change. It is a violation on NPOV with respect to what reliable sources, and an extreme example of cherrypicking in favour of aggrandizing statements. I would perhaps ditch the overly specific quote about it being "stranded in Albania" in the visible text and maybe make that a note after the quote about it having little support inside Iran (since these lines are two sides of the same coin). The key point here, however, is that the PMOI is objectively tiny (~3,000 members) - that's only twice as many members as the Official Monster Raving Loony Party, which is basically a joke party in the UK. Iran's Kurdish armed opposition, while fragmented, is demonstrably larger, but split across a myriad of small groups. Many of the statements about the PMOI are dated and hark back to when it had tens of thousands of members. Today, it is possible that the PMOI may still be the largest opposition group by numbers, but only because the Iranian opposition in general is so fragmented, not because it is actually large - and that is why it is so important to have the other statements noting that is actually rather small. Perhaps a present-day membership estimate would also be warranted in this statement? Iskandar323 (talk) 06:44, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
    Happier still with the abridged version suggested by Ghazaalch in the discussion, which ditches some of the quotes/detail in favour of paraphrasing. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:35, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
I agree that the way this proposal has been formulated is essentially flawed, but length is only a part of the reason. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

"tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania" is WP:UNDUE or/and WP:FALSEBALANCE of what is in most of the academic literature (I added some sources just below).

"has "little support inside Iran today" is a loaded statement. See RFC, 10 December 2022 about the executions of some Iranians that cooperated with the MEK in Iran, or even the Iranian diplomat terror plot trial which happened in mainland Europe. These examples are just the tip of the iceberg of what supporting the MEK involves in Iran (we're currently seeing something similar with Iranians supporting the Mahsa Amini protests in Iran).

"(albeit illegally) funded" is a False dilemma because it has nothing to do with the MEK being the regime's opposition.

In this talk page we already verified that most sources describe the MEK as the regime's main or major or most active opposing group (since the 1979 revolution).

  • "Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), Iran's major armed opposition group"[18]
  • "the main opposition organization in Iran, the PMOI (known also as Mujahideen Khalq)"[19]
  • "Iran's most active opposition group"[20]
  • "And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic" [21]
  • "Iran’s main opposition group"[22]
  • "the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group."[23]

Fad Ariff (talk) 13:06, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Fad Ariff's quotes speak of the past and have nothing to do with the current situation of the Mojahedin Khalq. The fourth quote (Abrahamian) for instance, begins with: "By June 1981, it could muster over half a million into the streets of Tehran... And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest..."Ali Ahwazi (talk) 13:20, 19 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: Prinsgezinde moved this discussion to the "discussion" section where it belongs, and it is here again. However, I put my response there.Ghazaalch (talk) 08:04, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: "No one but admins should be clerking the MEK talk page, pretty much ever." [7] Fad Ariff (talk) 13:13, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Partial yes, I agree that the other side should be mentioned but I think that's too much detail. Can we paraphrase it and indicate that some current RS describe it as overstating its size and having relatively little support? Prinsgezinde (talk) 20:59, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. There are several problems with Ghazaalch's proposal here. The biggest one is that it has some clearly UNDUE issues, particularly for the lead of the article. The following are more (recent) sources all still describing the MEK as the main opposition to the Iranian regime: "members of the MEK, the main opposition organization to the regime"[24], "the presence in Albania of over 3,000 mujahideen (MEK), also known as the opposition of the Iranian regime"[25], "focusing on the main opposition movement MEK"[26], "Supporters of the Iranian resistance and the main opposition MEK rally in Lafayette Park, near the White House."[27],
Having "support" inside Iran (there isn't any credible data about what people openly think in Iran, especially about political opposition groups) or how a Think Tank describes its "funding" is a non sequitur to most (current and older) sources which describe the MEK as the main opposition group to the regime. Retain the lead's longstanding (WP:DUE) version. Iraniangal777 (talk) 08:35, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
@Iraniangal777: I would implore you to assess the quality of the sources you reference a little more seriously. Of the above, only Politico is clearly reliable. The European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre is clearly not. Both clearly not very professionally produced pdfs listed above were composed by Claude Moniquet, who is simply the owner of the aforementioned ESISC, which is his own lobby group, making this nothing more than self-published opinion (and from a lobby group at that, and therefore possibly as part of paid promotional work). This is the antithesis of a reliable source, and I would hope that you only even put this source forward because you hadn't looked at the details too closely. The Security Science Journal looks a little more like a valid source, but on closer inspection it also raises some questions (and eyebrows). It claims to be peer-reviewed and clearly masquerades as a journal, but it is not published by a serious academic or non-academic publisher, but instead the Institute for National and International Security, which would appear to be some sort of Serbia-based thinktank of unclear providence whose main claim to fame is publishing said journal. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:33, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
I'm also not sure how you can in good faith lambast the extremely well-grounded research of the RAND Corporation, which is an incredibly prominent and widely referenced US research institute and think tank, while in the same breath citing a quite clearly dubious Serbian imitation of the same (I'm assuming that self-contradiction is not your intent). Iskandar323 (talk) 09:39, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: Security Science Journal is not reliable? What about "Kurdish Politics in Iran" published by Cambridge University Press (2021)? or "The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East" published by Threshold Editions? or "Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?" published by Nova Science Publishers or "Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin"? Also not reliable? Fad Ariff (talk) 13:13, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Umm yes, not everything with 'journal' in it is reliable. If I self-publish "The Iskandar Journal of Awesomeness" tomorrow, it would not automatically be trustworthy for having the word 'journal' in it. Also, when it comes to history, source quality is not just about publishing. Cambridge University Press is obviously a trustworthy publisher, but that doesn't mean everything from CUP is stellar material. For subjects such as this, we still want to see works authored by specialist historians, political science professionals and other experts. Simon & Schuster, which is the parent of Threshold Editions, is also an established publisher. That doesn't necessarily make any work by any author it publishes awesome. Basic stuff really. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:04, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
These sources are not self published, and that academic literature should also require some kind of awesomeness seal of approval does not form part of WP:RELIABILITY. The author Ervand Abrahamian who wrote "Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin" is an Iranian historian for example, but if you have doubts, please use the section "Discussion". Fad Ariff (talk) 13:03, 17 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center reports by Claude Moniquet (2/4 sources above) are indeed self-published. Iskandar323 (talk) 14:16, 17 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Perfect, let's not use that journal. I just started a List of sources supporting MEK as main or major (etc.) opposition group below. So far there are 15 sources and if necessary I will add some more (but those look enough). Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
@MA Javadi: MOS:INTRO is just a general guideline about the entire lead, which already contains all of the information about why the topic is noteworthy. This discussion is about neutrality in the opening paragraph, which is covered in MOS:OPEN. Neutrality in the opening section of the lead with respect to reliable sources is, as in all things on Wikipedia, core policy and of critical importance. The MEK's role as a major opposition group (and military outfit) is largely in the past, so aside from neutrality issues there is also the clear need to reflect the group's current status. Iskandar323 (talk) 08:22, 18 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
The same rules apply because no matter what guideline you throw at this, the MEK is not known for being a "tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania", which is why having that in the lead would be factually wrong. I also see many sources here that still support it being the prominent opposition to the regime, so I support to leave that as is and focus instead on making the lead shorter (it's way too long). - MA Javadi (talk) 09:01, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
If you note my response, I also voiced my concerns about including that specific quoted detail on Albania, but the proposal is still an overall improvement in terms of balance, and as I've noted below, there is not even any direct contradiction between the statements about it being a prominent opposition group and also being tiny. The excess history is the main problem in the lead (a common problem on many articles), though actually the overall lead is far from the worst example I've seen in terms of pure length. The 6 paragraphs is not great, however. Iskandar323 (talk) 10:33, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
It is a direct contradiction when you see there is only one source supporting "tiny" and "stranded", and over a dozen sources supporting main or major (etc.) Describing a group with over 3000 members as "tiny" is subjective, but the solution to that would be to add the membership count rather than an opinion about whether 3000 people is a "tiny" group of people. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
By the same measure, "main" or "major" is highly subjective when a group has only 3000 members. All of these statements are similar. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:12, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
"Main" and "tiny" are too completely different signifiers. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:23, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
They are different, but not mutually exclusive descriptors based on different perspectives. I've explained all this in discussion. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:30, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
They are mutually exclusive, and "tiny" is supported by just one source while "main" by many sources. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
No, giant and tiny, or major and minor, are antonyms; "main" and "tiny" are not. Again, this is explained in the discussion. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:29, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes. The lead should provide an updated view of the group as the recent academic reliable sources say. As MOS:OPEN requires, the opening paragraph should be neutral. Ghazaalch's is neutral since it contains the major POVs in a summarized style. All that brilliant past from 1979 Iranian Revolution, to conflict with the Islamic Republic government (1981–1988), to siding with Saddam in Iran-Iraq war, to 1988 execution of MEK prisoners and finally escaping from Iran, belongs to the past. No one denies that. Even the sources given by Ghazaalch confirm it when they say for example "this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded." But we are talking about most up-to-date reliable sources.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 07:19, 18 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. It's evident that Ghazaalch’s proposal is faulty (even by his own review). I see many reliable sources from the last 10 years still using terms like "main opposition" for the MEK, while only 1 source is describing it as a "tiny revolutionary group". Also as others have said the claim about support inside Iran is a small detail part of a much larger context (the Iranian regime has one of the worst track records for censorship regarding anything opposing the government, see its laws for "spreading corruption on Earth" or human rights for example). This is an bad RFC and should be a procedural close. NMasiha (talk) 20:15, 19 December 2022 (UTC)This user has been globally banned from editing Wikimedia sites.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:55, 21 January 2023 (UTC) [reply]
    As you have highlighted, Ghazaalch has offered an alternative wording below. That is how discussion works. That his first suggestion was not to everybody's tastes does not mean it is a bad RFC - which is a term reserved for discussions with non-neutral wording or confused or unclear questions. This one is perfectly straightforward. Detailed context is likewise something for the body of an article; the lead is just a summary. However, that the PMOI, which claims to by a major opposition group, has little to no support within its home country, is highly significant. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:11, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Reliable sources talk for themselves; and some uninvolved users have already voted "Yes". NMasiha's logic here is the like of a banned user who was warned by the admin,Vanamonde who wrote:I am particularly tired of "The MEK is the subject of propaganda by the Iranian government" being used to stonewall any and all criticism.Ghazaalch (talk) 14:39, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
The MEK's support within Iran is a completely different RFC topic. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
The proposed text above includes the addition of text about the group's support within Iran, so quite clearly it is directly pertinent to the topic. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:32, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes, it is misleading to simply describe MEK as the largest opposition group in Iran. No objection to further iterations on the proposed text to refine or simplify it, or to add more sources, of course. MarioGom (talk) 08:13, 22 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • No, there are too many outstanding issues with this RFC to recklessly change the lead as proposed. For starters, "tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania" doesn't even come close to accurately or duely describing what the MEK is. Just in these last few years alone the regime has plotted several terrorist attacks against the MEK in Europe. Why would the regime plot such attacks against a "tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania? There are just too many reliable sources and documented facts in the article to ignore the MEK as the major Iranian opposition. A better proposal than this one would be needed before considering changing the longstanding version in the lead. Alex-h (talk) 22:38, 14 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
See the alternative proposal.Ghazaalch (talk) 07:43, 15 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
That (your fourth?) proposal doesn't duely represent at all what's in the page. This RFC is a train wreck. Start a new topic in this talk page and figure out a proposal there before opening an RFC. Alex-h (talk) 22:21, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
There is currently one alternative proposal.Ghazaalch (talk) 08:24, 17 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. It seems that the first proposal has been rejected already for being incorrect, but the latest proposal (15 January 2023) is also incorrect for the reasons said by MA Javadi (MOS:LEAD, "emphasis given to material should reflect its relative importance to the subject"). Hogo-2020 (talk) 20:52, 28 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It is a generous proposal to provide counter point information instead of proposing to delete the outdated information. I don't know why some of the community here are against it. I wonder if they haven't read the lists of sources provided below([8][9][10])?Ali Ahwazi (talk) 19:55, 30 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes to alternative proposal. The current text absolutely has to go. It is HUGE WP:V and WP:NPOV violation in the very first paragraph of the article. While the MEK was indeed the largest opposition in the 1980s, I have provided dozens of more recent sources showing that is no longer the case. Such a clear WP:V violation can't be allowed to stand, and certainly not in wikipedia's voice.VR talk 13:05, 9 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion, 15 December 2022

Fad Ariff, it doesn't matter if you can rebuke these sources. It's vital that we all agree that Wikipedia is about summarizing and representing reliable sources, not about "getting it right". Not that getting it right isn't the goal, but it's an impossible task in and of itself. That's why we use sources. We have multiple reliable sources arguing that it is not the largest organization or even as large as it claims. The only sources that refer to it as the "biggest or "most active" group are the pay-walled Times article and two articles from 1989 and 2001. We need to use current sources if we want to put something in the lead that claims to describe its current status, so anything that's over 10 years old is definitely unusable and frankly 5 or so years old is already pushing it. Alternatively we leave it out altogether. Prinsgezinde (talk) 20:56, 15 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Prinsgezinde, and welcome to this talk page. You are right that we should want to summarize from reliable sources, I agree. Have you read the article? Similar content about what you’re referring to is already summarized there. What is questionable is Ghazaalch’s proposal in this RFC since there is a lot in the academic literature supporting the lead’s original version, while this isn't the case with Ghazaalch’s proposal. And this is a source from Cambridge University Press from 2021: "Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), Iran's major armed opposition group"[28] Fad Ariff (talk) 13:13, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, most of the quotations you provided above were tagged [failed verification] and you had to remove them from the lede. You are presenting them again here. The first quotation, for example, "Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), Iran's major armed opposition group"[26] continues with "...based in Iraq" in the source and pertains to the pre-2003 situation (as Iskandar said in the above talk). The second quotation ("the main opposition organization in Iran, the PMOI (known also as Mujahideen Khalq)") starts with According to his findings… that shows it is Casaca’s opinion not the author's. The same thing can be said about other tagged sources. Moreover the source you presented call MEK as main or most active opposition group in passing, thus they are less reliable than the sources that provide analysis. That is why they should be given less weight, and that is why they are more summarized. In fact they are not summarized. Main and most active or biggest opposition group are the whole thing that are said about MEK in that sources. But in the other side, there are analyses like the following:
  • "Analysts say it [MEK] has little support inside Iran today...Often described by Iranian and western political observers as a cult…even Iran hawks in Washington who favour regime change tend to dismiss the MEK’s influence in Iran. “The Iranian people hate the MEK so the notion that they are somehow going to be part of the future of Iran is laughable, completely,”..."[29]
  • after siding with Saddam – who indiscriminately bombed Iranian cities and routinely used chemical weapons in a war that cost a million lives – the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran. Members were now widely regarded as traitors...It would be hard to find a serious observer who believes the MEK has the capacity or support within Iran … US and UK politicians loudly supporting a tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania are playing a simpler game: backing the MEK is the easiest way to irritate Tehran. And the MEK, in turn, is only one small part of a wider Trump administration strategy ... …this group is not democratic and anyway has no constituency inside Iran…[30]
  • MeK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded.[31]
About the (albeit illegally) there is a long section in the article but you cannot stand a words of it in the lead.Ghazaalch (talk) 07:55, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: you’re a bit all over the place here, but I’ll try to respond as neatly as I can. The academic literature supports Main or most active or biggest opposition group (even if you added [failed verification] tags to them). The sources you list here are not as good or as many as the other sources, but I agree they should be represented in one of the article's sections. About the {{tq|(albeit illegally)}, it has really nothing to do with the rest of the material. We can have a new RFC about what sections should be represented in the lead if you want. And what do you mean by "you cannot stand a words of it in the lead"? Fad Ariff (talk) 13:13, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
There are 500 words on fundraising in the article out of about 17,000 words total, which is roughly 3%. The lead is also 500 words, so if we were to fairly summarise information on the group's dubious fundraising activities, this information would be due about 15 words ... so just two words on the subject is actually a rather merciful amount. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:14, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Iskandar323, in an article that has length issues, there shouldn't be a section on fundraising with 500 words (when WP:SUMMARYSTYLE and WP:PARAPHRASE are policy). While that section should be better paraphrased, comparing it to the MEK being the regime’s opposition is a false dilemma. But you are free to make a counter-proposal with logical and evidence-supported explanations as said by another editor below. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:03, 17 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
I'm stuck at: "there shouldn't be a section on fundraising..." umm why? Of course there should; this is highly relevant for organizations. Iskandar323 (talk) 14:03, 17 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • Those of you who prefer a different description are free to make their counter-proposals in the discussion section, complete with reliable sources, and logical and evidence-supported explanations of why they are better. If you invoke a policy or guideline you are advised to explain how and why it applies. so that it may be given the consideration it deserves.· · · Peter Southwood (talk): 17:01, 16 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
A key point here is that all of the different statements here can potentially be simultaneously valid (most are highly relativistic) - it could potentially be the biggest opposition group while also being objectively tiny, since most Iranian opposition groups are tiny (depending on whether or not you count the likes of the Green Movement). Equally, it can be both the most active group and also have very little support inside Iran. While it has been suggested that some of these sources conflict with each other, this is not self-evidently the case. The only real conflict here is providing a balanced, well-rounded appreciation of what all reliable sources have to say on the matter, and the current version, which provides an unbalanced and demonstrably partial set of cherrypicked qualifiers. Iskandar323 (talk) 08:15, 18 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch: I would consider withdrawing this RFC. Considering the discussion, and the sources added below, we could workshop a new RFC that considers all feedback given up to this point. MarioGom (talk) 17:13, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@MarioGom: OK. I know you as an uninvolved editor. Feel free to close or moderate any RFC you like. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:37, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

List of sources supporting MEK as main or major (etc.) opposition group

1) " The Mek is the most prominent and well-organized opposition group to the ruling Iranian government in existence today." (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2014 )[32]

2) "Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), Iran's major armed opposition group" (Cambridge University Press, 2021)[33]

3) "the main opposition organization in Iran, the PMOI (known also as Mujahideen Khalq)" (Threshold Editions, 2010)[34]

4) "the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group." (The Times, 2021)[35]

5) "Iran's most active opposition group" (Nova Publishers, 2001)[36]

6) "And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic" (IB Tauris, 2021)[37]

7)"The MEK has been the leading opposition voice against the Islamic Republic for years." (Newsweek, 2019)[38]

8) "The theocratic regime’s new onslaught against its opponents, most notably against the principal opposition, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq (PMOI/MEK), is a serious indicator of changing times in Iran." (International Policy Digest, 2018)[39]

9) the main democratic Iranian opposition movement, the People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI/MEK) (UPI, 2022)[40]

10) "Iran’s main opposition group" (The Telegraph, 2008)[41]

11) "is reputedly the largest militant Iranian opposition group committed to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014)[42]

12) "largest Iranian armed opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization" (Human Rights Watch, 2022)[43]

13) "The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or the MEK, the country's leading pro-democracy opposition group" (IB Times, 2022)[44]

14) "Government fights to keep ban on main Iranian opposition group (The Guardian, 2008)[45]

15) "Supporters of the Iranian resistance and the main opposition MEK rally in Lafayette Park, near the White House." (Politico, 2020)[46]

Fad Ariff (talk) 13:02, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

Ok, sources. Lovely. Is there a point to accompany this? No one is trying to remove statements to the effect of the above - just balance the lead intro. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:10, 19 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
Note that the IB Times piece is not an independent source: Hassan Nayeb Agha, a member of Iran's National Soccer Team at the 1978 World Cup, is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. [11] MarioGom (talk) 17:06, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The sources that show the MEK has been changed from a political group to a terrorist/cultish group

  • "MEK’s metamorphosis from an opposition group to designated terrorist organization..."[47]
  • "Gradually the organization transformed into a cult around the personality of their leader, Masoud Rajavi. The following statements by two lower rank leaders of theorganization reveal the essence of this cult of personality."[48]
  • "As an objective historian, the author does not seek to judge, but only to explain how the Mojahedin have since evolved into what is clearly more of a Messianic cult than a political party. Rajavi's unlimited power over the dwindling membership, exercised by tight organization and control and by indoctrination, means that the Mojahedin sect now resembles a totalitarian dictatorship."[49]
  • "From 1985, Rajavi transformed the PMOI from a mass movement into a cult with himself as its guru. Among the weird decrees, Rajavi has ordered many married members to stop conjugal relations, and others to get divorce."[50]
  • "By 1985 - 86, Masoud Rajavi, the already absolute leader of the PMOI , turned the organization into a cult, where he was praised and regarded to be the equivalent of Prophets Abraham, Jesus, Mohammad, Shia Imam Ali and Shia Imam Hussein."[51]
  • "It has since gradually evolved into a strange mix of a radical cult centered around its leaders,the Rajavis, and opposition to the Iranian regime from 1988 onwards."[52]
  • "MEK, a cult-like terrorist organization that espouses regime change has links to Saudi Arabia."[53]
  • "Rajavi's personality cult ... forced a number of Mojahedin activists to leave the organization."[54]
More WP:COATRACK with no context, again. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • The M.E.K. advocacy campaign has included full-page newspaper advertisements identifying the group as “Iran’s Main Opposition” — an absurd distortion in the view of most Iran specialists; leaders of Iran’s broad opposition, known as the Green Movement, have denounced the group. The M.E.K. has hired high-priced lobbyists like the Washington firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. Its lawyers in Europe won a long fight to persuade the European Union to drop its own listing of the M.E.K. as a terrorist group in 2009.[55]
  • "Although the group's leadership is being touted as a secular, democratic alternative to Iran's clerical establishment, exiled members describe the organization as an authoritarian personality cult that enforces "weekly ideological cleansings" and family separation among its ranks...Elizabeth Rubin, who has profiled the group extensively, wrote in 2011, the MEK "is not only irrelevant to the cause of Iran's democratic activists, but a totalitarian cult that will come back to haunt us."[56]

Ghazaalch (talk) 05:46, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

The sources that show MEK has a little or no support inside Iran

  • Analysts say it has little support inside Iran today, where it is regarded as a terrorist organisation and has been accused of assassinating senior politicians and targeting civilians.[57]
  • MEK developed a significant base of support in Iran immediately after the revolution, but ...[its] alliance with the hated Saddam Hussein embitered most Iranians and largely eliminated whatever respect the MEK may have won from its earlier resistance. After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the United States allowed the MEK to keep its small arms and control its own military base, originally established by Saddam’s officials. [58]
  • "When [MEK] lost, it became the tool of Saddam Hussein until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and is now little more than a Rajavi cult with little influence in Iran and even less popularity."[59]
  • "While the Mujahedin remains the most widely feared opposition group because of period raids across the Shatt al-Arab, it is also the most discredited among the Iranian people who have not forgotten the Mujahedin's support of Iraq in the war against Iran."[60]
  • the notorious Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK) [61]
  • Since that moment, the group has been widely seen as a pariah among the Iranian public.[47]
  • the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran. Members were now widely regarded as traitors.[62]
More WP:COATRACK with no context, again. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
  • "described by State Department officials as a repressive cult despised by most Iranians and Iraqis ... the official said, the group is “hated almost universally by the Iranian population,” in part for siding with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war"[63]
  • Mujahideen-e Khalq, a cultlike terrorist organization that is despised by many Iranians...the MEK relinquished its legitimacy among many Iranians through a campaign of terror tactics and support for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in the 1980s."[64]

Ghazaalch (talk) 05:47, 21 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]

The sources that shows MEK is a fringe/small organization

  • "the US was able to convince Albania to accept the 2,700 remaining members – who were brought to Tirana on a series of charter flights between 2014 and 2016...the US and UK politicians loudly supporting a tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania ... a fringe Iranian revolutionary group that has been exiled to Albania, known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran..."[65]
@Ghazaalch: did you just repeat the same source from your proposal 3 more times here, and then described it as "The sources that shows MEK is a small organization"? Fad Ariff (talk) 13:09, 20 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]
I would add more sources if you give me the time. As Vice regent once wrote, High quality journalistic sources published in recent years have called the MEK a "fringe" group: New York Times, CBC News, Washington Post and an expert quoted in NBC News:
  • the organization as a fringe group... Their population in Iran hovers between negligible and nill[66]
  • "to protect and resettle about 3,400 members of the group, known as the M.E.K...a fringe Iranian opposition group, long an ally of Saddam Hussein, that is designated as a terrorist organization... "[67]
  • "Mark Wallace, who has drawn criticism for including a fringe Iranian diaspora group, Mujahideen-e Khalq, or MEK"[68]
  • "Harper was in Paris last weekend at a "Free Iran" rally hosted by a fringe group of militant Iranian exiles known as the Mujahedin-e Khalj (MEK)..."[69]

Ghazaalch (talk) 09:06, 22 December 2022 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ a b c Katzman 2001, p. 97. sfn error: multiple targets (18×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  2. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  3. ^ "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. Archived from the original on March 22, 2022. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  4. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  5. ^ "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. Archived from the original on March 22, 2022. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  6. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16. after siding with Saddam – who indiscriminately bombed Iranian cities and routinely used chemical weapons in a war that cost a million lives – the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran. Members were now widely regarded as traitors.
  7. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times.
  8. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. MeK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded.
  9. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph. Iran's main opposition group
  10. ^ "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. Archived from the original on March 22, 2022. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group
  11. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. MeK repeatedly claims to be the most influential opposition group in that country, in reality it appears that this once-prominent dissident group can now validly claim only to be highly organized and well (albeit illegally) funded.
  12. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. 2011. ...a fringe Iranian opposition group, long an ally of Saddam Hussein, that is designated as a terrorist organization...
  13. ^ "Western signs of support for Iranian dissident group will only deepen the divide with Tehran". CBC News. 2018. a "Free Iran" rally hosted by a fringe group of militant Iranian exiles known as the Mujahedin-e Khalj (MEK)...
  14. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16. Members were now widely regarded as traitors...US and UK politicians loudly supporting a tiny revolutionary group stranded in Albania...
  15. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16. after siding with Saddam – who indiscriminately bombed Iranian cities and routinely used chemical weapons in a war that cost a million lives – the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran.
  16. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. Analysts say it [MEK] has little support inside Iran today...Often described by Iranian and western political observers as a cult ...The Iranian people hate the MEK so the notion that they are somehow going to be part of the future of Iran is laughable, completely,"...
  17. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. 2011. described by State Department officials as a repressive cult despised by most Iranians and Iraqis ... the official said, the group is "hated almost universally by the Iranian population," in part for siding with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war
  18. ^ Hassaniyan, Allan (2021). Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilisation since 1947. Cambridge University Press. p. 172.
  19. ^ Phares, Walid (2010). The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. Threshold Editions. p. 173.
  20. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. Iran's most active opposition group
  21. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic...
  22. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph.
  23. ^ "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group {{cite news}}: |archive-url= requires |archive-date= (help)
  24. ^ Moniquet, Claude. "The Recent Iranian Terrorist Plots in Europe." European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (2019)
  25. ^ Shay, Shaul. "ALBANIA AND THE IRANIAN TERROR THREAT." Security Science Journal 1.1 (2020): 35-44.
  26. ^ Moniquet, Claude. The Risk of Terrorist Actions and Intelligence Operations of the Iranian "Security" Apparatus against the Iranian Opposition in Exile in 2022, European Srategic Inteligence and Security Centre: 2022
  27. ^ "Patrick Kennedy's ties to Iranian exile group becomes campaign issue in South Jersey". Politico.
  28. ^ Hassaniyan, Allan (2021). Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilisation since 1947. Cambridge University Press. p. 172.
  29. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times.
  30. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16.
  31. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  32. ^ The World Almanac of Islamism: 2014. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2014. p. 172.
  33. ^ Hassaniyan, Allan (2021). Kurdish Politics in Iran: Crossborder Interactions and Mobilisation since 1947. Cambridge University Press. p. 172.
  34. ^ Phares, Walid (2010). The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East. Threshold Editions. p. 173.
  35. ^ "People's Mujahidin Seeking Regime Change in Tehran". The Times. the biggest and most resilient Iranian opposition group {{cite news}}: |archive-url= requires |archive-date= (help)
  36. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. Iran's most active opposition group
  37. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. And many foreign diplomats considered it to be by far the largest, the best disciplined, and the most heavily armed of all the opposition organizations. As the main foe of the Islamic Republic...
  38. ^ [1]
  39. ^ [2]
  40. ^ "Mike Pompeo offers momentous support for Iranian opposition".
  41. ^ "Ban on Iran opposition should be lifted, says EU court". Telegraph.
  42. ^ [3]
  43. ^ [4]
  44. ^ [5]
  45. ^ [6]
  46. ^ "Patrick Kennedy's ties to Iranian exile group becomes campaign issue in South Jersey". Politico.
  47. ^ a b "Spain's Vox Party Hates Muslims—Except the Ones Who Fund It". Foreign Policy. 2019.
  48. ^ Dorraj, M. (2006). "THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF SECT AND SECTARIANISM IN IRANIAN POLITICS: 1960-1979". Journal of Third World Studies. 23 (2). University Press of Florida. doi:10.2307/45194310.
  49. ^ Anthony Hyman (April 1990). "Radical Islam: the Iranian Mojahedin". International Affairs (journal). 66 (2). doi:10.2307/2621451.
  50. ^ Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini. University Press of America. p. 58.
  51. ^ Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini. University Press of America. p. 63.
  52. ^ Anthony H. Cordesman, Sam Khazai. Iraq in Crisis. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 213.
  53. ^ Seyed Hossein Mousavian. A New Structure for Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 53.
  54. ^ Ervand Abrahamian. The Iranian Mojahedin. Yale University Press. p. 255.
  55. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. 2011.
  56. ^ "Western signs of support for Iranian dissident group will only deepen the divide with Tehran". CBC News. 2018.
  57. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times.
  58. ^ The Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East Crisis, by Reese Erlich
  59. ^ Anthony Cordesman (2014). Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 145.
  60. ^ Sandra Mackey (1998). The Iranians. p. 372.
  61. ^ Reisinezhad, Arash (2022). "Saudi Arabia Is Not Prepared To Play Nice With Iran". National Interest.
  62. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16.
  63. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. 2011.
  64. ^ Hudson, John. "Trump, Iran's Rouhani descend on same corner of New York but remain far apart". Washington Post.
  65. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16.
  66. ^ "Giuliani's work for Iranian group with bloody past could lead to more legal woes". NBC news. 2019.
  67. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. 2011.
  68. ^ Hudson, John. "Trump, Iran's Rouhani descend on same corner of New York but remain far apart". Washington Post.
  69. ^ "Western signs of support for Iranian dissident group will only deepen the divide with Tehran". CBC News. 2018.

RFC, 14 January 2023

The first sentence in the lead reads:

This sentence has not been updated yet. Should it be replaced with:

... is an unpopular[4][5] Iranian militant opposition group headquartered in Albania.[6][7][8]

Ali Ahwazi (talk) 20:14, 14 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ Crane, Keith; Lal, Rollie (2008). Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities. Rand Corporation. ISBN 9780833045270. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  2. ^ Pike, John. "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)". www.globalsecurity.org. Archived from the original on 22 December 2018. Retrieved 5 October 2018. ...the largest and most militant group opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  3. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 5 October 2018. ...the largest militant Iranian opposition group committed to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic,
  4. ^ Torbati, Yeganeh (2017). "Former U.S. officials urge Trump to talk with Iranian MEK group". Reuters. The MEK's supporters present the group as a viable alternative to Iran's theocracy, though analysts say it is unpopular among Iranians for its past alignment with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians.
  5. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 77. sfn error: multiple targets (30×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)
  6. ^ Crane, Keith; Lal, Rollie (2008). Iran's Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities. Rand Corporation. ISBN 9780833045270. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  7. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 5 October 2018. ...the largest militant Iranian opposition group committed to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic,
  8. ^ "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". the Guardian. 2018-11-09. Retrieved 2022-11-16.

Survey, 14 January 2023

@SMcCandlish: the considered part was deleted. It looks better now. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 11:03, 15 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion, 14 January 2023

As it currently stands, I would say there's no consensus, leaning towards accepting a modified version. During this RFC, it seems the main objection was the usage of unpopular, and the proposer was fine with removing it. Given that there seems to be no one uninvolved that is willing to close this RFC, I'm proposing a slightly modified version that will probably be more agreeable by everyone:

Replacing [...] is an Iranian political-militant organization.
with [...] is an Iranian political-militant organization headquartered in Albania.

So, just adding where they are headquartered, which is well supported by sources. I have left out of this proposal any other wording changes. What do you think? MarioGom (talk) 17:11, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@MarioGom: I Agree.Ghazaalch (talk) 05:37, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It is Okey MarioGom. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 18:26, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's okay, but not better than the proposed. Iskandar323 (talk) 18:47, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I changed it [14] as a compromise solution. Let's see if it sticks. MarioGom (talk) 22:09, 14 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

RFC, 16 January 2023

Should the following sentence about the 1992 embassy attacks be added to the article?

According to MEK representatives, the attacks were a way to protest the bombing of a MEK military base where several people had been killed and wounded.[1]

Yes or No? Fad Ariff (talk) 13:08, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Alternative proposal by Ghazaalch

According to MEK representatives, the attacks were a way to protest the bombing of a MEK military base in Iraq, where a rebel fighter had been killed and others wounded. Iran, acknowledging the raid, said it was carried out in retaliation for attacks on two villages in the west of Iran by the Iraq-backed MEK guerrillas.[2]

As discussed in the above discussion,

  1. Including only MEK's response and discluding Tehran response is against WP:NPV.
  2. The word several in Fad Ariff's proposal is implying many killing, while there is one killing in the source.
  3. Writing "people had been killed" instead of "fighter had been killed" is misleading.
  4. It is important that MEK launched the attack with the support of Saddam Hussein of Iraq, where MEK's base was located. Removing Saddam's role is misrepresenting the source.

The last three issues apply to Fad Ariff's alternative proposal too.


Sources

  1. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.
  2. ^ Mcfadden, Robert D. (6 April 1992). "Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations". The New York Times.

Survey, 16 January 2023

  • Yes. A MEK response about this incident is WP:DUE. There have also been some discussions about the possibility of expanding the material about the 1992 embassy incident, but we don't seem to agree how exactly to do that. In case there is also a consensus for expanding this material, I added my proposal about that below. But there has been some consensus that a MEK response about the attacks is WP:DUE material for this article, so I support adding that at least. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:08, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes it seems to be fairly straight forward. See the Guardian. Lukewarmbeer (talk) 15:38, 16 January 2023‎ (UTC)[reply]
    Though the Guardian wording is more neutral and factual: "The assault was in response to an Iranian air force bombing raid on an MEK base in Iraq." Iskandar323 (talk) 17:12, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • No: For the same reasons raised against this exact, poorly written phrasing in Talk:People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran#1992 embassy attacks (WP:RFCBEFORE) and then unhelpfully ignored in this proposal - namely that "protest" is an extremely POV and inappropriate way to describe violent attacks on 11 different embassies, and that "several people had been killed and wounded" is deeply counterfactual phrasing - you don't simply blend casualties and injuries together: there was exactly one death, and you either state that or you don't. All of the feedback has been ignored. Iskandar323 (talk) 16:12, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    To clarify, something along the lines of the wording in the Guardian would be fine, but I oppose the proposal in its presented form. Iskandar323 (talk) 04:29, 17 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes to including that fact. Including self-declared motivations, as covered in reliable sources makes sense. Without prejudice to improving wording, or adding more sources such as The Guardian. MarioGom (talk) 20:18, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
MarioGom, does this vote mean you agree with Alternative proposal by Ghazaalch too? Ghazaalch (talk) 08:24, 20 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I would agree to any of the proposals. At some point we need to move on. MarioGom (talk) 17:16, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you Iskandar323 and SMcCandlish for the feedback. I modified the alternative proposal. As for the word "protest", in the source we read A statement by the Bonn headquarters of People's Mujahedeen, ... said the attacks were meant to protest the bombing of a base of the National Liberation Army. That is why I used the word "protest".Ghazaalch (talk) 04:42, 18 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@SMcCandlish: Is this vote yours, and is it in support to Alternative proposal by Ghazaalch? (it isn't clear) Fad Ariff (talk) 13:02, 19 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes (I have fixed the sig now), and yes (the text I revised only appears in that version).  — SMcCandlish ¢ 😼  14:57, 19 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion, 16 January 2023

If the material about the 1992 embassy is to be expanded beyond a MEK response, this would be my proposal.

In April 1992, the MEK demonstrators invaded 10 Iranian embassies with demonstrators looting property and taking hostages. According to the MEK, the attacks were in protest of the bombing of a MEK military base where several people had been killed and wounded. The Iranian regime acknowledged the bombing while saying it had been carried out in retaliation for a MEK attack on two villages in western Iran.

Fad Ariff (talk) 13:08, 16 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

That's problematic for multiple reasons, including redundancy and use of loaded wording like "regime".  — SMcCandlish ¢ 😼  13:03, 18 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
"Iranian Regime" is widely used. Just Google it. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:04, 25 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
We do not Google to see if a given material should be included in the article or not. We usually look into the given source.Ghazaalch (talk) 08:05, 26 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I requested a formal closure of this RFC. It seems there is a partial consensus, and further proposals discussed here can just be attempted through WP:BRD or subsequent RFC... MarioGom (talk) 20:15, 11 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

RFC 31 January 2023

The lede currently contains the following:

Should it be replaced with the following?

Yes or No? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 15:05, 31 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Notes

  1. ^ Khomeini declared that "those who had failed to endorse the Constitution could not be trusted to abide by that Constitution."[4]

Survey, 31 January 2023

Yes as discussed above by Iskandar and Ghazaalch, currently, Rajavi is not mentioned anywhere in the lead as the elected leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Moreover, linking the first part of the current sentence ("the MEK boycotted the December 1979 Iranian constitutional referendum ") to the second part ("and Khomeini prevented Massoud Rajavi and other MEK members from running for office.[40][41][42]") is WP:SYNTH, since Goulka (the first source) doesn't talk about the referendum at all. Note that and other MEK members is only mentioned in Goulka.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 15:05, 31 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion, 31 January 2023

There were no objections to this proposal, but I think the sources need some improvement in formatting. Would this look correct?

After the fall of Pahlavi, the MEK boycotted the December 1979 Iranian constitutional referendum, which led to Khomeini barring MEK leader Massoud Rajavi from the 1980 Iranian presidential election.[a][3][7]

This would prevent removing the Goulka et al. citation, and arranging the others in a more standard way. Ali Ahwazi: How does this look like? --MarioGom (talk) 22:23, 14 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@MarioGom: It looks good. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 11:49, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
 Done [15]. MarioGom (talk) 13:53, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. Archived from the original (PDF) on 22 February 2016. However, after the fall of the Shah, Khomeini suppressed opposition and prevented Rajavi and many MeK members from running for office in the new government.
  2. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 197–198. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  3. ^ a b Katzman 2001, p. 101. sfn error: multiple targets (18×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help) Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEKatzman2001101" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  4. ^ a b Abrahamian 1989, p. 198. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help) Cite error: The named reference "FOOTNOTEAbrahamian1989198" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  5. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The Mojahedin also refused to participate in the referendum held in December to ratify the Constitution drafted by the Assembly of Experts … Once the Constitution had been ratified, the Mojahedin tried to field Rajavi as their presidential candidate ... Khomeini promptly responded by barring Rajavi from the election by declaring that those who had failed to endorse the Constitution could not be trusted to abide by that Constitution.
  6. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. Khomeini refused to allow Masud Rajavi to run in January 1980 presidential elections because the PMOI had boycotted a referendum on the Islamic republican constitution.
  7. ^ Goulka et al. 2009, p. 2. "However, after the fall of the Shah, Khomeini suppressed opposition and prevented Rajavi and many MeK members from running for office in the new government." sfn error: multiple targets (30×): CITEREFGoulkaHansellWilkeLarson2009 (help)

Material about marriage (WP:RFCBEFORE)

We had a discussion about adding in section "Ideological revolution and women's rights" that

For some Iranians, the marriage institution was being used as a means to challenge "unjust organization orders" at the time in Iran. For MEK members, the marriage between Massoud and Maryam Rajavi became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages.[1]

Even though the material is from a reliable source, Iskandar323 and Ghazaalch rejected this saying more sources are needed (which doesn't make sense because Abrahamian is used as the only source for most of that section). Whatever logic is used for one source needs to also apply to other sources, or we can solve this by RFC. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:04, 31 January 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ali Ahwazi:, @Ghazaalch:, @Iskandar323:, @Iraniangal777:, do you have any objections with the implementation of material in the article? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:15, 27 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I object to it as currently worded. The first sentence can just go - that's a general observation about the revolution and leftist principles in Iran, not specifically about the MEK. The second sentence should add the context and not flip the meaning around (the sources says divorce, not marriage (it also makes more sense that way around!)), so it's: "Following the 1985 ideological revolution, Maryam Rajavi's decision to divorce her (existing) husband (and marry Massoud Rajavi) became a platform for women involved with the MEK to challenge their own forced marriages." - the bits in brackets one could either take or leave, but the emphasis is on divorce in the text. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:27, 27 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: your suggestions are not based on what is in the book, which reads "Following the revolution, leftists either did not get married out of fear of being identified, or they pursued marriage to remain anonymous before the state. For some women, however, the institution of marriage was used to challenge unjust organizational orders. For members of the Mojahedin, Rajavi's decision to divorce her husband for ideological reasons became a platform for women involved in the organization to challenge forced marriages following the 1985 ideological revolution. Many argued that if Rajavi had the choice to marry who she saw as her political equal, then they should be given the same opportunity." Do you have a suggestion based on what is in the book? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:05, 28 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I've read it. I'm not sure what you mean. My suggestion is based on that text. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:08, 28 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Iskandar323: The source doesn't say Rajavi's decision to divorce her (existing) husband (and marry Massoud Rajavi) became...”, it says "Rajavi's decision to divorce her husband for ideological reasons became...". Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage to Massoud Rajavi is material already covered in the article, there is even a full paragraph about it and cited to Abrahamian. That is a violation of WP:FALSEBALANCE, and this would be my proposal for making this material more balanced -

"For some Iranians, the marriage institution was being used as a means to challenge "unjust organization orders" at the time in Iran. For MEK members, the marriage between Massoud and Maryam Rajavi became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages.[1] According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate the ideological revolution. This was signified as an "act of supreme sacrifice designed to promote collective leadership and appeal to the female half of the Iranian populace." This was both criticized and praised according to different reports.[2]"

If you have a different proposal, then please provide it, otherwise I'll implement this edit per WP:FALSEBALANCE. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:16, 29 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Your proposed edit is a frankly bizarre inversion of the material as it is presented in the actual source. The source is about the 'divorce being a platform', and so is my suggestion; yours makes it about marriage, which flips it entirely on its head. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:32, 29 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: Ok, let's have it your way and put 'divorce being a platform' instead of 'marriage'. I'll implement this edit if you have no further objections. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:09, 31 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Well I don't like the way that your proposed addition is now three times as long as the original proposal that we have been discussing and now skews itself significantly towards whatever bizarre ideological take the MEK came up with for it all. That said, I don't mind the "appeal to the female half of the Iranian populace part", though I'd ditch the rest, so both the ideological facilitation sentence, which is meaningless, and the "supreme sacrifice" crap, because that's self-aggrandizing promotional bullshit. Iskandar323 (talk) 07:02, 3 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: the addition is longer because it proposes to replace the full paragraph cited to Abrahamian with a more balanced paragraph (what we have been discussing). I'll implement this edit if you have no further objections. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:13, 5 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Since you haven't even stated plainly which paragraph you are planning to replace, how could one have anything but objections? What is it that you plan on deleting? It would have been useful to mention that earlier. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:27, 5 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's the same Abrahamian paragraph we have been talking about that includes cherrypicked lines about the marriage. The point of this discussion is to sort out all of the information concerning Rajavi’s marriage. I have implemented the edit so you can make a more specific objection. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:13, 7 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
You have no consensus for changing that material, as is more than evident from no one agreeing to the addition, and changing the scope of this discussion midway through from discussing adding select information to adding some information and deleting other material has just turned this thread into a directionless mess. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:19, 7 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ a b Saeidi, Shirin (2022). Women and the Islamic Republic: How Gendered Citizenship Conditions the Iranian State (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 66). Cambridge University Press. p. 127.
  2. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)

1981 events in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)

By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground.[1][2]

In June 1981, the MEK organized the 20 June 1981 Iranian protests against the Islamic Republic in support of president Abolhassan Banisadr, claiming that the Islamic Republic had carried out a secret coup d'état.[3][4] Afterwards, the government arrested and executed numerous MEK members and sympathizers.[5][6][7] As the Iran regime started to clamp down on civil and human rights, the MEK initiated attacks targeting the clerical leadership that lasted until 1982.[8][9]

The above sentences in the lead are related to the events of 1981. I think they should be written in a neutral point of view. Currently they are a combination of cherrypicked information from various sources. In order to reach a consensus, I think we should prioritize scholarly sources that are really expert on MEK, such as Abrahamian's Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, Katzman's Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, and RAND's The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum. Here is my proposal:


On 20 June 1981, the MEK held an anti-Khomeini demonstration that turned into an armed confrontation which the MEK was badly defeated. President BaniSadr who was perceived as encouraging MEK, was removed as President the next day.[10][11] On June 28, the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party was blown up and more than 70 members of the leadership, including Beheshti, were killed. MEK have stated that the bombing was a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime's atrocities".[12][13] Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris, where they formed the National Council of Resistance of Iran.[14][15] During the exile, the underground network that remained in Iran continued to plan and carry out attacks.[16][17] MEK is also accused of the August 1981 bombing that killed Iran's president and prime minister, Rajai and Bahonar.[18][19]

Ghazaalch (talk) 11:17, 3 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: Agree that not mentioning the bombing(s), of which it was prominently accused, is strange. I am definitely in support of mentioning the first bombing and somewhat supportive of mentioning the second, and I think the first sentence (the one in the previous paragraph) should be outright removed because it makes little sense to mention the same thing twice. However, I think some of the wording in the proposal could be improved upon. For one, "that turned into an armed confrontation which the MEK was badly defeated" probably needs some more nuance. It is unlikely that, even if they had enough weapons (which I don't know about as most sources don't mention it), protesters could stand a chance against the army, so calling it an armed confrontation is at least unintuitive. It's also unlikely that all of the protesters were part of the MEK. Would need some direct quotes from multiple sources or a change of wording, and even then I think getting a consensus would be difficult. "badly defeated" is also not very encyclopedic. "Having failed to bring down the regime" should also probably be removed because the group remains active. That part may be about that bombing, but in that case it's too much for us to assume that they assumed the bombing would bring down the regime. I know the source uses those words, but I think WP:TONE applies here. Prinsgezinde (talk) 22:33, 11 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you Prinsgezinde. This article needs help from uninvolved editors like you. I modified the paragraph as bellow. See if it is better now?Ghazaalch (talk) 16:39, 14 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
On June 20, the MEK together with BaniSadr encouraged the masses to repeat the 1979 revolution.[20][21] After Khomeini removed Banisadr from power, the MEK started attacks against IRP targets. On June 28, the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party was blown up and more than 70 members of the leadership were killed.[22][23][24] MEK stated that the bombing was a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime’s atrocities".[25] Facing the subsequent repression of the MEK by the IRP, BaniSadr and Rajavi fled to Paris, where they formed the NCRI.[26][27][28] During the exile, the underground network that remained in Iran continued to plan and carry out attacks[29][30] and it allegedly conducted the August 1981 bombing that killed Iran's president and prime minister, Rajai and Bahonar.[31][32][33]

Hello @SMcCandlish, MarioGom, Iskandar323, Vice regent, and Fad Ariff: Any other comment to make the proposal better and shorter?Ghazaalch (talk) 03:32, 19 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The revised version seems okay to me, but I am not a subject-matter expert.  — SMcCandlish ¢ 😼  00:55, 20 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It seems that there is no objection, so I put it in the article. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:32, 21 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

There are multiple inaccuracies with Ghazaalch's proposal. Hafte Tir bombing article says The Iranian government first blamed SAVAK and the Iraqi regime. Two days later, on 30 June, the People's Mujahedin of Iran was accused by Khomeini of being behind the attack. Several non-Iranian sources also believe the bombing was conducted by the People's Mujahedin of Iran. Several years later, Iran executed four "Iraqi agents" for the bombing. In 1985, Iranian military intelligence stated that the bombing was not conducted by the MEK but by pro-monarchy officers in the Iranian army. According to Ervand Abrahamian, "whatever the truth, the Islamic Republic used the incident to wage war on the Left opposition in general and the Mojahedin in particular." According to Kenneth Katzman, "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombings may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, to rid themselves of rivals within the IRP." There are many fingers pointing to many different possible groups to be putting this in this lead as fact. "MEK stated that the bombing was a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime's atrocities" What does this have to do with the bombings themselves? Nothing at all. "On June 20, the MEK together with BaniSadr encouraged the masses to repeat the 1979 revolution" is also inaccurate. Banisdar was impeached, and the Iranian people rose up against the Islamic republic in protest. "After Khomeini removed Banisadr from power, the MEK started attacks against IRP targets." is also inaccurate. The MEK attacked IRP officials after IRP officials started attacking political adversaries in Iran.

What is in the lead now does not seem cherrypicked or inaccurate. By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground. That is accurate according to academic literature and not cherrypicked. In June 1981, the MEK organized the 20 June 1981 Iranian protests against the Islamic Republic in support of president Abolhassan Banisadr, claiming that the Islamic Republic had carried out a secret coup d'état. Afterwards, the government arrested and executed numerous MEK members and sympathizers. That is also accurate according to academic literature and not cherrypicked. As the Iran regime started to clamp down on civil and human rights, the MEK initiated attacks targeting the clerical leadership that lasted until 1982. That is also accurate according to academic literature and not cherrypicked. We even already had a conclusive RFC about part of this a few months ago. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:06, 21 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The line "MEK stated that the bombing was a "natural and necessary reaction to the regime's atrocities" is obviously the MEK's POV on the bombing - something required for balance. The Hafte Tir bombing page, while a Wikipedia page and not a reliable source itself, does not cast significant doubt on the responsibility of the MEK for the bombing. There are several scholarly sources attesting that the bombing was the MEK. The main sources otherwise are a Tasnim News Agency report, an IRGC-linked outlit, from 2017 trying to partially blame the US and Israel as well, and a single statement in 1985, attributed by Abrahamian to Iranian military intelligence, blaming 'royalist' elements - a claim not supported anywhere else in the page, and also not supported by Abrahamian, only attributed, as mentioned. The text "On June 20, the MEK together with BaniSadr encouraged the masses to repeat the 1979 revolution" is meanwhile attributed directly to Abrahamian, so quite clearly it is the original text that is inaccurate. As the Guardian piece also makes plain, the order of events was clearly protests first, removal of Banisadr later. Your statement that people rose up after Banisadr was removed is not in the original text - that is just unsourced in your comment. The part about attacks on the IRP is also sourced, while your comments, again, are not. The line "By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground." is simply a bit vague, and I would be interested to know exactly what Abrahamian wrote. But from the details currently provided in the body, it references 'by early 1981', not just 'by 1981'; it is also unclear if there was a wholesale ban on the organization, or simply a clampdown on its activities and the issuance of arrest warrants for its leaders (who obviously did go underground). It later notes that middle-level organizers were only detained after the 20 June protests. It is likewise unclear what the "secret coup d'état" sentence is referring to, since, chronologically, Banisadr was only removed afterwards. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:39, 22 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you for the feedbacks. Fad Ariff do you see any issue with this modified proposal:

On June 20, 1981, the MEk organized a demonstration against Khomeini with the aim of overthrowing the regime, in which 50 demonstrators were killed.[34][35][36] President BaniSadr who was perceived as encouraging MEK, was removed as President the next day.[37][38] On June 28, the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party was blown up and more than 70 members of the leadership were killed. Several sources accuse MEK for the bombing.[39][40][41][42][43][44][45] Facing the subsequent repression of the MEK by the IRP, BaniSadr and Rajavi fled to Paris, where they formed the NCRI.[46][47][48] During the exile, the underground network that remained in Iran continued to plan and carry out attacks[49][50] and it allegedly conducted the August 1981 bombing that killed Iran's president and prime minister, Rajai and Bahonar.[51][52][53]

Ghazaalch (talk) 10:26, 23 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The lead's original version is a more accurate review of the academic literature and the article's sections. Also cherrypicked allegations is not something for the lead. Looking at those pages about the bombings for example the only things that seem beyond doubt is that "Khomeini blamed the MEK, which didn't take credit but also never denied responsibility"[54], and that the bombings "were shocking displays of the regime's faulty security and infiltration by foes".[55] The sources in those articles also attest that "It is possible, as Claude Van England notes, that those who planted the bombs were assisted by the Mujaahideen though they were not actually members of the organization. Much of the expertise involved was thus not necessarily that of the old Mujahideen, but may have been the product of collective efforts with other opponents of the regime."[56] Also that "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombing may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, including current iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rasanjani, to rid themselves of rivals with the IRP"[57] Abrahamian also says "Even now it is not clear who planted the bomb", and that "SAVAK", "the Iraqi regime", "the Mojahedin", "Iraqi agents", "Mehdi Tafari", "royalist army officers" were all either charged or accused.[58] Another source also attests that "the bomb explosion in Tehran on 30 August 1981 - which killed Muhammad Ali Rajai, the newly elected president of the IRI, as well as prime minister Muhammad Javad Bahunar - was attributed to the United States and its local agents."[59] Fad Ariff (talk) 13:10, 23 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, you said that the bombings may not have been carried out by MEK and should not be stated as fact. If you take a look at both proposals, you will see that they not have been stated as fact. However, it is a fact that several sources hold MEK responsible for these bombings. You say that there are other sources that name other suspects other than the MEK, which is irrelevant. If you don't give me a reasonable reason for your objection, I'll put it on the lede.Ghazaalch (talk) 10:37, 24 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I didn't say that the bombings "may not have been carried out by the MEK", I said "cherrypicked allegations is not something for the lead", and then showed you why using the academic literature. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:00, 24 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
All you did was provide your own selection of cherrypicked quotes. The MEK is widely implicated, and remains the prime suspect by some margin. There are other theories, but no properly coalesced counter-narrative. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:06, 24 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 206. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ "Making Sense of The MeK". National Interest. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  3. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645.
  4. ^ Svensson, Isak (2013). Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars. ISBN 978-0702249563. On 20 June 1981, MEK organized a peaceful demonstration attended by up to 50 000 participants, who advanced towards parliament. Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards opened fire, which resulted in 50 deaths, 200 injured, and 1 000 arrested in the area around Tehran University
  5. ^ Katzman 2001, pp. 98–101. sfn error: multiple targets (18×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 36, 218, 219. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference auto7 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74. ISBN 978-0-19-049170-3. Unsurprisingly, the decision to fight alongside Saddam was viewed as traitorous by the vast majority of Iranians and destroyed the MKO's standing in its homeland.
  9. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  10. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  11. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime.
  12. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220, . ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  13. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 2–3. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. After that, the MeK launched violent attacks against IRP targets, the largest of which— the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters—killed more than 70 members of the leadership.
  14. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  15. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 2–3. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  16. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  17. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  18. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  19. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  20. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...
  21. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution.
  22. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. After Khomeini... forced Banisadr out of office on June 21, 1981, the MeK declared an "armed struggle" against the IRP ...The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system.
  23. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
  24. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics. Routledge. pp. 79–80. ISBN 978-1-135-97687-3. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar.
  25. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris
  27. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime
  28. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982 , most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  29. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  30. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  31. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  32. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  33. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 9781610692861. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  34. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime.
  35. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest of half a million people in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution… 50 demonstrators were killed, with 200 wounded. Banisadr was removed from office...
  36. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. On June 20, 1981, the PMPI held a major anti-Khomeini demonstration that turned into an armed confrontation in which the PMOI was badly defeated.
  37. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  38. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 68, 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. On 21 June, the Majles voted to remove Bani-Sadr from the presidency on the grounds of'incompetence… The day after the vote, Khomeini appointed Beheshti, Rafsanjani, and Rajai to a Presidential Council to carry out the responsibilities of the chief executive until the country could elect a new president.
  39. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. After Khomeini... forced Banisadr out of office on June 21, 1981, the MeK declared an "armed struggle" against the IRP ...The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system.
  40. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
  41. ^ Colgan, Jeff (31 January 2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press 2013. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-107-02967-5.
  42. ^ S. Ismael, Jacqueline; Perry, Glenn; Y. Ismael, Tareq (5 October 2015). Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and change. Routledge (2015). p. 181. ISBN 978-1-317-66283-9.
  43. ^ Newton, Michael (17 April 2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO (2014). p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  44. ^ Pedde, Nicola. "ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MOJAHEDIN E-KA". ojs.uniroma1.
  45. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
  46. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris
  47. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime
  48. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982 , most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  49. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  50. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  51. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  52. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  53. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 9781610692861. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  54. ^ O'Hern, Steven K. (2012). Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps. Potomac Books. p. 32. ISBN 978-1-59797-823-1.
  55. ^ Amanat, Abbas (2019). Iran: A Modern History. Yale University Press. p. 803.
  56. ^ Ram, Haggay (Summer 1992). "Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran". Middle East Journal. 46 (3): 426–439. JSTOR 42763892.
  57. ^ Kenneth Katzman (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Albert V. Benliot (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova Publishers. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  58. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  59. ^ Pirseyedi, Bobi (2017). Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Routledge. p. 190.

RFC, 25 February 2023

Should we include 1981 bombings in the lede? Yes or No? Ghazaalch (talk) 18:05, 25 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Currently we have the following sentences related to the events of 1981 in lede:

  • By 1981, authorities had banned the MEK and begun a major crackdown on the group's members and supporters, driving the organization underground.[1][2]
  • In June 1981, the MEK organized the 20 June 1981 Iranian protests against the Islamic Republic in support of president Abolhassan Banisadr, claiming that the Islamic Republic had carried out a secret coup d'état.[3][4] Afterwards, the government arrested and executed numerous MEK members and sympathizers.[5][6][7] As the Iran regime started to clamp down on civil and human rights, the MEK initiated attacks targeting the clerical leadership that lasted until 1982.[8][9]

Should we replace them with the following paragraph?

Survey, 25 February 2023

  • Yes the main events of the 1981 as attested by many scholarly sources are the Assassinations allegedly done by MEK, but there is no coverage of them in the lede. Of course, there are some sources that mention other suspects besides the MEK, but most of the sources consider MEK responsible for the bombings. Fad Ariff objected above (see 1981 events in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)) that it should not be stated as fact, that is why I used the word "allegedly" in my proposal. I hope it is okay now.Ghazaalch (talk) 18:15, 25 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • No. The lead's original version is a more accurate review of the academic literature and the article's sections. Also cherrypicked allegations is not something for the lead. Looking at those pages about the bombings for example the only things that seem beyond doubt is that "Khomeini blamed the MEK, which didn't take credit but also never denied responsibility"[30], and that the bombings "were shocking displays of the regime's faulty security and infiltration by foes".[31] The sources in those articles also attest that "It is possible, as Claude Van England notes, that those who planted the bombs were assisted by the Mujaahideen though they were not actually members of the organization. Much of the expertise involved was thus not necessarily that of the old Mujahideen, but may have been the product of collective efforts with other opponents of the regime."[32] Also that "there has been much speculation among academics and observers that these bombing may have actually been planned by senior IRP leaders, including current iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rasanjani, to rid themselves of rivals with the IRP"[33] Abrahamian also says "Even now it is not clear who planted the bomb", and that "SAVAK", "the Iraqi regime", "the Mojahedin", "Iraqi agents", "Mehdi Tafari", "royalist army officers" were all either charged or accused.[34] Another source also attests that "the bomb explosion in Tehran on 30 August 1981 - which killed Muhammad Ali Rajai, the newly elected president of the IRI, as well as prime minister Muhammad Javad Bahunar - was attributed to the United States and its local agents."[35] We also already had a conclusive RFC about part of what Ghazaalch wants to remove from the lead a few months ago. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:06, 27 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Some of the key words in those statements are 'possible' and 'speculation' - you are transparently avoiding the sources that assign blame in no such uncertain times, e.g.: [16], [17]. That alternative postulations exist does not detract from the mainstream narrative, and frankly, given the number of sources fingering the MEK for this particular bombing, it's a bit ridiculous. If the IRP wanted to make a scene with a, sigh, false flag operation, it hardy need to blow up 70 of its own members to do so. Again, speculation. Iskandar323 (talk) 15:01, 27 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, there are many scholarly sources that say the bombings are done by MEK, how many scholarly sources say that they are not? Nothing. If you can't find a similar number of scholarly sources that deny the allegation, then your argument amounts to WP:FALSEBALANCE. As Iskandar323 said, you are trying to cherrypick some speculations from some sources that if you look into them you'll find that those speculations are not even the authors' view. The last quote for example starts with "according to ..." which you preferred to cut it from your quotation. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:58, 28 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch, your proposal acknowledges that all this finger pointing largely consists of only allegations, yet your proposal wants to remove verified content from the lead and replace it with allegations. Fad Ariff (talk) 13:30, 28 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes Wikipedia:LEAD: the lead section should be a summary of most important contents of the article. The 1981 bombings are among the most important contents of this article and contain a large section called Assassination. The current version of the lede is biased because it keep repeating that Islamic Republic of Iran banned and executed members of MEK because of a peaceful demonstration.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 18:36, 3 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Discussion, 25 February 2023

Hello Stara Marusya. I am agree with your edit here, however since part of the lede you changed is under an RFC, I guess you should revert the part, but you could put your vote concerning changing the whole lede in above RFCs. Thank you. Ghazaalch (talk) 07:06, 8 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 206. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  2. ^ "Making Sense of The MeK". National Interest. Retrieved 21 November 2019.
  3. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  4. ^ Svensson, Isak (2013). Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars. ISBN 978-0702249563. On 20 June 1981, MEK organized a peaceful demonstration attended by up to 50 000 participants, who advanced towards parliament. Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards opened fire, which resulted in 50 deaths, 200 injured, and 1 000 arrested in the area around Tehran University
  5. ^ Katzman 2001, pp. 98–101. sfn error: multiple targets (18×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, pp. 36, 218, 219. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ Cite error: The named reference auto7 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Ostovar, Afshon (2016). Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74. ISBN 978-0-19-049170-3. Unsurprisingly, the decision to fight alongside Saddam was viewed as traitorous by the vast majority of Iranians and destroyed the MKO's standing in its homeland.
  9. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  10. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 206–207, 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. by the fateful day of 20 June, the Mojahedin - together with Bani-Sadr - were exhorting the masses to repeat their 'heroic revolution of 1978-9'...The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime.
  11. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. On 20 June 1981, the MEK organised a mass protest of half a million people in Tehran, with the aim of triggering a second revolution… 50 demonstrators were killed, with 200 wounded. Banisadr was removed from office...
  12. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. On June 20, 1981, the PMPI held a major anti-Khomeini demonstration that turned into an armed confrontation in which the PMOI was badly defeated.
  13. ^ Sinkaya, Bayram (2015). The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations. Routledge. p. 105. ISBN 978-1138853645. The most drastic show of terror instigated by the MKO was the blast of a bomb placed in the IRP headquarter on 28 June 1980 that killed more than seventy prominent members of the IRP, including Ayatollah Beheshti, founder of the IRP and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; four cabinet ministers; and twenty-seven members of the Majles.
  14. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 57. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. The most ambitious attack attributed to the MeK was the bombing of the IRP's Tehran headquarters on June 28, 1981. This attack killed more than 71 members of the Iranian leadership, including cleric Ayatollah Beheshti, who was both secretary-general of the IRP and chief justice of the IRI's judicial system.
  15. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. pp. 79–80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar
  16. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. the MEK leaders found that they had no role in the new regime…In response, supporters launched a terror campaign against Khomeini's regime. On June 28, 1981, two bombs killed 74 members of the Khomeini Islamic Republic Party (IRP) at a party conference in Tehran.
  17. ^ Colgan, Jeff (31 January 2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press 2013. p. 167. ISBN 978-1-107-02967-5.
  18. ^ S. Ismael, Jacqueline; Perry, Glenn; Y. Ismael, Tareq (5 October 2015). Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East: Continuity and change. Routledge (2015). p. 181. ISBN 978-1-317-66283-9.
  19. ^ Newton, Michael (17 April 2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO (2014). p. 27. ISBN 978-1-61069-286-1.
  20. ^ Pedde, Nicola. "ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF THE MOJAHEDIN E-KA". ojs.uniroma1.
  21. ^ McGreal, Chris (21 September 2012). "Q&A: what is the MEK and why did the US call it a terrorist organisation?". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
  22. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 58. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Khomeini's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps brutally suppressed the MeK, arresting and executing thousands of members and supporters. The armed revolt was poorly planned and short-lived. On July 29, 1981, Rajavi, the MeK leadership, and Banisadr escaped to Paris
  23. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. p. 219. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. The success of 1978-9 had not been duplicated. Having failed to bring down the regime, Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled to Paris where they tried to minimize their defeat by claiming that the true intention of 20 June had not been so much to overthrow the whole regime
  24. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857. These attacks led to a brutal crackdown on all dissidents. Throughout 1981 a mini - civil war existed between the Khomeini regime and the MEK . By the end of 1982 , most MEK operatives in Iran had been eradicated . By the time, most MEK leaders left Iran for refugee in France.
  25. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 220–221, 258. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. By the autumn of 1981, the Mojahedin were carrying out daily attacks...The number of assassinations and armed attacks initiated by the Mojahedin fell from the peak of three per day in July 1981 to five per week in February 1982, and to five per month by December 1982.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  27. ^ Newton, Michael (2014). Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia [2 volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 27. ISBN 9781610692861. Retrieved 19 July 2019. On August 30, 1981, a bomb exploded in the Tehran office of Iranian prime minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. The blast killed Bahonar, as well as President Mohammad-Ali Rajai...Survivors described the explosion occurring when one victim opened a briefcase, brought into the office by Massoud Kashmiri, a state security official. Subsequent investigation revealed that Kashmiri was an agent of the leftist People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK)
  28. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  29. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 85. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  30. ^ O'Hern, Steven K. (2012). Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows While America Sleeps. Potomac Books. p. 32. ISBN 978-1-59797-823-1.
  31. ^ Amanat, Abbas (2019). Iran: A Modern History. Yale University Press. p. 803.
  32. ^ Ram, Haggay (Summer 1992). "Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran". Middle East Journal. 46 (3): 426–439. JSTOR 42763892.
  33. ^ Kenneth Katzman (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Albert V. Benliot (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova Publishers. p. 101. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  34. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 219–220. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3.
  35. ^ Pirseyedi, Bobi (2017). Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy: Diplomacy of Discontent (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Routledge. p. 190.

Rajavi's "ideological revolution" in the lede (WP:RFCBEFORE)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.


Currently there is no information about Rajavi's "ideological revolution" in the lede. I suggest changing the fourth paragraph of the lede from:

to:

Ali Ahwazi (talk) 17:16, 5 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I think we could do the replacement. Ghazaalch (talk) 16:21, 24 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: Considering that there are no objections, I will implement the new proposal. Do you have any comments? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 22:33, 25 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
There are many different things to consider about the ideological revolution. Why would you choose something about "divorces" specifically for the lead? Also why would you remove "so in response, it re-established its base in Iraq" from the lead? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:17, 27 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Because there is currently no information about the current MEK leader and the way she became the leader, in the Lede. If you have no other objection I will implement the changes. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:02, 28 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
You have not addressed either one of my objections. If you want to put material about the ideological revolution in the lead, why not add for example that "For MEK members, the marriage between Massoud and Maryam Rajavi became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages."[27]? Also why would you remove "so in response, it re-established its base in Iraq" from the lead? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:03, 28 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Because what I proposed is a fact and what you propose is an opinion. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:34, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
First, Shirin Saeidi’s passage is not an opinion. Second, you are attempting to remove from the lead review of the academic literature with cherry picking. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Shirin Saeidi’s passage is Wikipedia:Cherrypicking because it is not supported by mainstream sources about MEK. Ali Ahwazi's addition, in contrary, is supported by multiple academic sources written by subject matter experts.Ghazaalch (talk) 14:09, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

RFC, 30 March 2023

Should we add some information about Maryam Rajavi, and the way she became a leader of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran to the lede? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:34, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]


To add the information about Maryam Rajavi, I suggest changing the fourth paragraph of the lede from:

to:

Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:46, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Survey, 30 March 2023

Yes. Because currently there is no information about Maryam Rajavi as a leader of the People's Mojahedin-e Khalq, and the way she became the leader, in the Lede. Note that I condensed the old information of the paragraph a bit to make more room for new information. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 08:46, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

  • Comment: There are a variety of problems with this RFC. First, the MEK has two current leaders, not one. Second, Ali Ahwazi’s proposal doesn’t address his own RFC question and instead cherry picks a small aspect of a very complicated ideological revolution. These problems were mentioned in the above discussion, where Ali Ahwazi proposes to replace review of the academic literature with cherry picking. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:01, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, I fixed the first problem for Ali Ahwazi. I do not understand the second. What you mean by Ali Ahwazi’s proposal doesn’t address his own RFC question? Ghazaalch (talk) 13:53, 30 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch the RFC question suggests that we should replace some (indisputable) material with some information about how Maryam Rajavi became a leader of this group. Although something like 'Maryam Rajavi was a candidate for the parliamentary elections in Tehran in 1980, and was elected as the Mojahedin's joint-leader in 1985, later becoming the Secretary General of the organization' would be a suitable proposal for this, Ali Ahwazi's proposal is the usual WP:COATRACKing with no context. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 31 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ali Ahwazi's proposal is not a replacement, but it is an addition. And as you see, nothing important has been removed from the lede. Now tell me what is disputed about adding some information about Rajavi's ideological revolution and the way he turned the MEK from an active political group into a Cult of personality? there are at least two sections concerning these changes in the main body of the article. Why shouldn't we have a bit of them in the lede?Ghazaalch (talk) 14:03, 31 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion, 30 March 2023

Sources

  1. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  2. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  3. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  4. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  5. ^ a b c d Piazza 1994, pp. 9–43.
  6. ^ a b c d Lorentz, Dominique; David, Carr-Brown (14 November 2001), La République atomique [The Atomic Republic] (in French), Arte TV
  7. ^ a b c d Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 July 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian. ...by then sheltered in camps in Iraq, fought against Iran alongside the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein...
  8. ^ a b c d Farrokh, Kaveh (20 December 2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.
  9. ^ a b c d Buchan, James (15 October 2013). Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences. Simon and Schuster. p. 317. ISBN 978-1-4165-9777-3. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  10. ^ a b c d Al-Hassan, Omar (1989). Strategic Survey of the Middle East. Brassey's. p. 7. ISBN 978-0-08-037703-2. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  11. ^ a b c d Alaolmolki, Nozar (1991). Struggle for Dominance in the Persian Gulf: Past, Present, and Future Prospects. University of Michigan. p. 105. ISBN 9780820415901. Retrieved 17 October 2020.
  12. ^ a b c d Cohen, Ronen A. (2018-11-02). "The Mojahedin-e Khalq versus the Islamic Republic of Iran: from war to propaganda and the war on propaganda and diplomacy". Middle Eastern Studies. 54 (6): 1000–1014. doi:10.1080/00263206.2018.1478813. ISSN 0026-3206. S2CID 149542445.
  13. ^ a b c d Abrahamian 1989, p. 208. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  14. ^ a b c d Graff, James (14 December 2006). "Iran's Armed Opposition Wins a Battle — In Court". Time. Archived from the original on 28 April 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  15. ^ a b c d "Behind the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK)". Archived from the original on 28 September 2009. Retrieved 3 August 2009.
  16. ^ a b c d "Khomeini fatwa 'led to killing of 30,000 in Iran'". The Independent. Archived from the original on 10 February 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
  17. ^ a b c d "I was lucky to escape with my life. The massacre of Iranian political prisoners in 1988 must now be investigated". The Independent. Archived from the original on 25 May 2022.
  18. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  19. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  20. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  21. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  22. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage...Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  23. ^ Regencia, Ted (2018). "MEK's violent past looms over US lobby for regime change in Iran". Aljazeera.
  24. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. By 1987, the PMOI had formally established the NLA, set up base camps along the Iran Iraq border, and began conducting military exercises and attacks inside Iran. Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate.
  25. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Prior to its exile, the MeK was the most popular dissident group in Iran. It lost much of its popularity due to its willingness to fight with Saddam—the instigator of the destructive Iran-Iraq War—and to kill Iranian conscripts.)
  26. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  27. ^ Saeidi, Shirin (2022). Women and the Islamic Republic: How Gendered Citizenship Conditions the Iranian State (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 66). Cambridge University Press. p. 127.
  28. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  29. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  30. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  31. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  32. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8
  33. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Rajavi, as the head of the organization, launched an "ideological revolution", banning marriage and enforcing mandatory "eternal" divorce on all members, who were required to separate from their husbands or wives. He married one of the new divorcees, Maryam Azodanlu, who became, in effect, his chief lieutenant and took his name.
  34. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 60, 71. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. In 1985, Rajavi announced that he had appointed Maryam Azodanlu, the wife of his close associate Mehdi Abrishamchi, as co-leader of the MeK. She would soon divorce her husband and marry Rajavi. Together, they would launch a new "ideological revolution" that would, over time, transform the MeK into a cult group… As a part of the "ideological revolution," the Rajavis mandated divorce.
  35. ^ Cohen, Ronen (2009). The Rise and Fall of the Mojahedin Khalq, 1987-1997: Their Survival After the Islamic Revolution and Resistance to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 32–39. ISBN 978-1845192709. At the Neshest it took Rajavi five days to convince members of his main revolutionary demand - that they should divorce their spouses. He wanted to ensure that members' sexual identity would be denied and thus bring about their complete devotion to himself as their leader... Massoud and Maryam Rajavi were married in February 1985. Members were given an ideological explanation: "Maryam chose to divorce her husband in favour of her marriage to the Mojahedin's ideological leader so that she could work with him as cooperating leading partners."
  36. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (1989). Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin. I.B. Tauris. pp. 251–255. ISBN 978-1-85043-077-3. the Mojahedin had raetamorphized from a mass movement into an inward-looking sect in many ways similar to religious cults found the world over. This metamorphosis rapidly crystallized in early 1985 with Rajavi's new marriage...Until then, Mojahedin activists had known Maryam Azodanlu as merely the younger sister of a veteran member, and the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, one of Rajavi's close colleagues…proclamation also mentioned almost in passing that Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to pave the way for this 'great revolution...It smacked of wife-swapping, especially when Abrishamchi announced his own marriage to Khiabani's younger sister...
  37. ^ Regencia, Ted (2018). "MEK's violent past looms over US lobby for regime change in Iran". Aljazeera.
  38. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 102. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9. By 1987, the PMOI had formally established the NLA, set up base camps along the Iran Iraq border, and began conducting military exercises and attacks inside Iran. Many analysts believe the PMOI's decision to ally with Iraq caused its support inside Iran to evaporate.
  39. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. 4. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. Prior to its exile, the MeK was the most popular dissident group in Iran. It lost much of its popularity due to its willingness to fight with Saddam—the instigator of the destructive Iran-Iraq War—and to kill Iranian conscripts.)
  40. ^ Buchta, Wilfried (2000), Who rules Iran?: the structure of power in the Islamic Republic, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 52–54, ISBN 978-0-944029-39-8


VF

@Ghazaalch: since you removed ‘verification fail’ from the sources '[1]' and '[2]', can you show how those sources support those statements? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:01, 6 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch and Iskandar323: "The MeK carried out a number of violent attacks on a range of Iranian government and Western targets that it deemed to be supportive of the Shah." That is only cited to RAND, so why are you stating it as fact? But I think the main problems here are about the Assassination of Paul R. Shaffer and John H. Turner, for example, which are attributed to: Vahid Afrakhteh, a founding member of Peykar, who confessed to the killing and later was executed. What about the U.S. civilians killed in 1976 as well as Harold Price or Lewis Lee Hawkins? The article is saying that despite Vahid Afrakhteh and Bahram Aram confessing to the killings of Americans, some sources have nevertheless attributed the assassinations to the MEK. Why are you overlooking that information? Also nobody has commented on the pending challenge concerning WP:V in Piazza 1994 and Abrahamian 1982. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:05, 12 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Except it's not just cited to RAND, is it? Because RAND in turn cites Slavin and Abrahamian, which anyone can see if they take but a few seconds to look at the footnotes. And yes, the footnote expands that the MEK has claimed that it wasn't responsible (as per usual), and has tried to shift the blame elsewhere, but, as always, MEK denials are just MEK denials. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:45, 12 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
But wait, the sources in Lewis Lee Hawkins, Assassination of Paul R. Shaffer and John H. Turner, and in this article show that the people who confessed to these assassinations were part of a different group. Why would you ignore that? ParadaJulio (talk) 09:03, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Both of those pages are start-class and clearly have major problems. Peykar only became Peykar in 1978, and the split between the two MEK splinters only occurred in October 1975 - that's on the Peykar page - so later. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:25, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
No, @Iskandar323: Those pages don't have "major problems", and the schism separating the group into a Marxist camp and a Muslim camp started in 1973 (that's on the MEK page), with its official announcement in 1975 . Those who were charged and executed for these assassinations belonged to the Marxist camp (rival of the MEK). It's clearly said in the citations of those articles. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:11, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, so you agree it started splitting on 1973, but only actually split on October 1975, i.e.: up until that point, the same. It doesn't matter what 'camp' of MEK they were in; they were still in MEK at that point. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:43, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
"By 1973, the members of the Marxist–Leninist MEK launched an "internal ideological struggle" "This new group adopted a Marxist, more secular and extremist identity" "This led to two rival Mojahedin, each with its own publication, its own organization, and its own activities" "The new group was known initially as the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist). A few months before the Iranian Revolution, the majority of the Marxist Mojahedin renamed themselves Peykar"[3][4][5][6]. The information in the article makes it clear that the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist), as it became known in 1973, is not the same group as the Muslim MEK (the subject of the page). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:10, 14 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Read again: it "led to" two rival groups - yes, separate groups, from October 1975, when they actually split. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:42, 14 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
WP:HUH? By 1973, the new group was called the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist), and by 1975 the same group was called Peykar (read also the Peykar page: "Originating in 1972 and officially founded in 1975, by the early 1980s Peykar was no longer considered active."[7]. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:21, 17 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
"Founded in 1975..." - that this needs explaining over and over again just raises WP:CIR issues. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:29, 17 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
WP:HUH?? "By 1973, the new group was called the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist)". Sources are saying that the members of the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist) were the ones charged for this. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:05, 18 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It helps when you read full sentences. By 1973, the members of the Marxist–Leninist MEK launched an "internal ideological struggle". N.B. "internal". Iskandar323 (talk) 17:01, 18 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Read the full sentence if you prefer, it still doesn't change the fact that this was attributed to members of Marxist Mojahedin, a group that broke away from the MEK and became the MEK's rival. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:13, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: why have you not replied about removing the ‘verification fail’ from the sources '[1]' and '[2]'? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:12, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The last two paragraphs of the lead

These are the last two paragraph of the lede:

In 2002, the MEK was a source for claims about the nuclear program of Iran.[8] Following the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, the MEK signed a ceasefire agreement with the U.S. and put down their arms in Camp Ashraf.[9][10] The European Union, Canada, the United States, and Japan have previously listed the MEK as a terrorist organization. The MEK is designated as a terrorist organization by Iran and Iraq.[11]

In June 2004, the U.S. designated MEK members in Camp Ashraf ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention, relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War[12][13][14][15] which expired in 2009 after the attainment of the full sovereignty of Iraq.[16] Its critics have described the group as "resembling a cult",[17][18][19] while its backers describe the group as proponents of "a free and democratic Iran" that could become the next government there.[20]


I'm going to merge them as bellow and add some context:

In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries. [21][22] [23] since 1997, MeK was listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and many other countries.[24][25][26] Following the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, the U.S. did not hand over MEK fighters to Iran.[27][28] Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran.[29][30]In June 2004, Donald Rumsfeld designated the MeK as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[31][32] Since 2009, when the Iraqi government became openly hostile to MEK, the U.S. led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq.[33] At the same time the MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[34][35][36][37] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[38][39][40]

Any comment? Ghazaalch (talk) 17:32, 7 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

This proposal provides the readers with more information, especially about the recent history of the Mojahedin-e Khalgh, and should replace the existing information.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 19:29, 10 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff:, do you see any problem with this? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:38, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Why are you trying to remove that the MEK was a source for the nuclear program of Iran, or about its cease-fire agreement in 2003, or that its terrorist designation was removed by all the Western countries? And why would you want to add instead that the U.S. did not hand over MEK to the I.R., or that Cheney argued that it should be used as a proxy against the I.R.? Your proposal also has copyright violations, but balancing any form of neutrality seems to be the worst part. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:16, 13 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
You have to admit that the current two paragraphs are consisting of some irrelevant sentences with no context. What I did was to provide the contexts for readers who don't know, for example, why America signed a ceasefire with a terrorist group. Adding the context to an already long article, requires us to condense or remove the information that are not very important, such as the information about MEK being the source of claims about Iran's nuclear program, etc. Nevertheless, to address your objections, I have modified the above proposal as follows:

In April 1992, MEK carried out attacks against Iranian embassies in 13 countries.[41][42][43] Periodic attacks on Iranian targets continued until May 2003, but ended during the US-led invasion of Iraq,[44][45][46] when Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases. The leadership of MEK ordered its members not to resist.[47][48] Then U.S. forces signed a ceasefire with the group that the US had designated as a terrorist organization in 1997.[49][50][51] US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the MEK should be treated as a terrorist group, but Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney argued that the MEK should be used against Iran. In June 2004, Donald Rumsfeld designated MEK as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention.[52][53] By 2009, when the Iraqi government became hostile to MEK, the United States led efforts to get the group's members out of Iraq.[54] At the same time the MEK paid Western political influencers to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organizations.[55][56][57][58] After it was no longer designated as a terrorist group, the US was able to convince Albania to accept the remaining 2,700 members who were brought to Tirana between 2014 and 2016.[59][60][61]

@Fad Ariff:, Do you see any problem with this new proposal? Ghazaalch (talk) 10:04, 15 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Fad Ariff:, Do you see any problem with this new proposal?Ghazaalch (talk) 09:03, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: Yes, fundamentally a WP:POVFORK problem. I'll be more specific after I've addressed your other recent edits with similar problems. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:17, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: can you explain how WP:POVFORK apply here? could you name other POVs that are not included in this proposal? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:56, 23 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: You say you "provide the contexts for readers who don't know" but instead you're trying to remove any established neutrality from the lead and replace it with cherrypicks. The attacks on Iranian embassies derived from attacks on the Mojahedin, but you don't say anything about the last part. Likewise, the attacks against the I.R. were about a power struggle between the two. Also the reasons why the MEK was removed from the terrorist lists is incorrect ("Secretary of State Clinton said in a statement that the decision was made because the MEK had renounced violence and had cooperated in closing their Iraqi paramilitary base.") You're still removing that the MEK was a source about the nuclear program of Iran, or that most of the countries that had previously listed it as a terrorist organization no longer do. Your edits also still contain a lot of copyright violations, and having to explain all these things to you each time is a huge WP:TIMESINK. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:25, 24 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, pp. 141–142.
  2. ^ a b Piazza 1994, p. 14.
  3. ^ Vahabzadeh, Peyman (2010). Guerrilla Odyssey: Modernization, Secularism, Democracy, and the Fadai Period of National Liberation In Iran, 1971–1979. Syracuse University Press. pp. 167–169.
  4. ^ Abrahamian 1982, pp. 493–4.
  5. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, University of California Press (1999), p. 151
  6. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 152. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)
  7. ^ The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. Palgrave Macmillan. 2018. p. 8. ASIN B07FBB6L8Y. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |authors= ignored (help)
  8. ^ Katzman 2001, p. 105. sfn error: multiple targets (18×): CITEREFKatzman2001 (help)
  9. ^ Jehl, Douglas; Gordon, Michael R. (29 April 2003). "American Forces Reach Cease-Fire With Terror Group". The New York Times.
  10. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  11. ^ Cite error: The named reference bdt45cgf112 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  12. ^ "URGENT ACTION DETAINEES HELD INCOMMUNICADO RISK TORTURE" (PDF). Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  13. ^ "FACTBOX-Who are the People's Mujahideen of Iran?". Reuters. 26 January 2009. Retrieved 2 April 2022.
  14. ^ Wills, Siobhán (2010). "The Obligations Due to Former 'Protected Persons' in Conflicts that have Ceased to be International: The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran". Journal of Conflict and Security Law. 15 (1): 117–139. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krq002.
  15. ^ Said, Wadie (2015). Crimes of Terror: The Legal and Political Implications of Federal Terrorism Prosecutions. OUP USA. ISBN 978-0199969494. Retrieved 2 April 2022. in 2004 obtained 'protected person' status under the Fourth Geneva Convention for all PMOI members at Camp Ashraf based on the U.S. investigators' conclusions that none was a combatant or had committed a crime under any U.S. laws; disbanded its military units and disarmed the Pmoi members at Ashraf, all of whom signed a document rejecting violence and terror
  16. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  17. ^ Erlich, Reese (2018). The Iran Agenda Today: The Real Story Inside Iran and What's Wrong with U.S. Policy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-429-94157-3. Retrieved 14 January 2020. But critics question that commitment given the cult of personality built around MEK's leader, Maryam Rjavi.
  18. ^ "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  19. ^ CBC
  20. ^ "Trump allies' visit throws light on secretive Iranian opposition group". The Guardian. 15 July 2019.
  21. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  22. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  23. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  24. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  25. ^ Jehl, Douglas (April 29, 2003). "AMERICAN FORCES AND TERROR GROUP REACH CEASE-FIRE". New York Times.
  26. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. xi. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  27. ^ Graff, James (Dec. 14, 2006). "Iran's Armed Opposition Wins a Battle — In Court". Time. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  28. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. xiv, 17. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  29. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  30. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. xiv, 17. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  31. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 5, 41. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  32. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  33. ^ Harb, Ali (17 July 2019). "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  34. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  35. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. Nov 27, 2011.
  36. ^ Milani, Abbas (August 18, 2011). "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest.
  37. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. 2018.
  38. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  39. ^ ALGHURABI, REZA. "Terrorism and Corruption: Albania's Issues with EU Accession". Retrieved JULY 17 ,2019. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  40. ^ Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 Jul 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian.
  41. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  42. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  43. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  44. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  45. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 105. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  46. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  47. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  48. ^ Fayazmanesh, Sasan (2008). The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN 0-203-94620-0.
  49. ^ Jehl, Douglas (April 29, 2003). "AMERICAN FORCES AND TERROR GROUP REACH CEASE-FIRE". New York Times.
  50. ^ Atkins, Stephen E. (2004). Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Greenwood. p. 212. ISBN 978-0313324857.
  51. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. p. xi. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016.
  52. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state, argued that the MEK was on the list of terrorist organisations and should be treated as such. But Iran hawks, including then secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, and vice-president Dick Cheney, argued that the MEK should be used as a weapon against the Islamic republic – the next target in the neoconservative roadmap for remaking the Middle East.
  53. ^ Goulka, Jeremiah; Hansell, Lydia; Wilke, Elizabeth; Larson, Judith (2009). The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (PDF) (Report). RAND corporation. pp. 5, 17, 41. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 February 2016. in June 2004, without tribunal review, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld determined the legal status of the MeK. Instead of prisoners of war, he designated MeK members as civilian "protected persons" under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention... the United States selectively chose to apply the Geneva Conventions to a designated terrorist organization and, further, to grant it a special status... Although maintaining the MeK as a possible proxy force in a regime change mission may have appeared reasonable to some U.S. policymakers and analysts in 2003, MNF-I's heightened understanding of the MeK, its operations, and its cult practices have shown that the group would offer limited operational value and questionable intelligence value.
  54. ^ Harb, Ali (17 July 2019). "How Iranian MEK went from US terror list to halls of Congress". Middle East Eye.
  55. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019. the MEK donated to political campaigns, blanketed Washington with advertisements and paid western political influencers fees to pen op-eds and give speeches – and to lobby for its removal from the list of designated terrorist organisations.
  56. ^ "For Obscure Iranian Exile Group, Broad Support in U.S." New York Times. Nov 27, 2011. The American advocates have been well paid, hired through their speaking agencies and collecting fees of $10,000 to $50,000 for speeches on behalf of the Iranian group. Some have been flown to Paris, Berlin and Brussels for appearances.
  57. ^ Milani, Abbas (August 18, 2011). "The Inside Story of America's Favorite Terrorist Group". National Interest. And so their remarkably well-oiled machine of PR firms, powerful American politicians (all handsomely paid for services rendered) and other pressure groups is now at it again. These advocates repeat what the MEK and its many front organizations claim: The group has jettisoned its violent past and is now, in its new incarnation, a key component of the democratic movement.
  58. ^ "John Bolton support for Iranian opposition spooks Tehran". Financial Times. 2018.
  59. ^ Merat, Arron (9 November 2018). "Terrorists, cultists – or champions of Iranian democracy? The wild wild story of the MEK". News agency. theguardian.com. theguardian. Retrieved 9 February 2019.
  60. ^ ALGHURABI, REZA. "Terrorism and Corruption: Albania's Issues with EU Accession". Retrieved JULY 17 ,2019. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |access-date= (help)
  61. ^ Dehghan, Saeed Kamali (2 Jul 2018). "Who is the Iranian group targeted by bombers and beloved of Trump allies?". The Guardian.

Unexplained revert of Literal translation of "Mujahedin-e-Khalq"(WP:RFCBEFORE)

@Fad Ariff: why did you delete the literal translation of Mojahedin-e khalq? Ghazaalch (talk) 21:35, 14 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: see this post by User:Hogo-2020 , and this report by User:Iraniangal777. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:18, 17 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I am restoring a discussion here by Vice regent:

Here are 25 sources that use the two English translations for MEK:

Honestly, this should not have been a controversial edit. All I did was add English translation of the Farsi/Arabic name and provided 6 scholarly sources. I should not have to dig up 25 sources just to make small edits.VR talk 17:22, 29 December 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Fad Ariff, if you do not give me a reasonable explanation for the revert, I would restore it. Ghazaalch (talk) 09:17, 18 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch, once again, your addition is only representative of a small handful of sources. If we are following WP:WEIGHT (and we should be), then an alternative name should be in proportion to other alternative names. ‘People's Holy Warriors (of Iran),’ is far off from being in that category. The "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)" is the group's name. "Mujahedin-e khalq", "MEK", "MKO", and "People’s Mujahedin of Iran" is what is prevalent in academic sources as the group’s other names. Hogo-2020 (talk) 11:20, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I don't see anything in WP:WEIGHT about excluding information (here a simple literal translation) altogether just because you just don't like it. There are more than enough sources using this term to justify a three-word mention. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:50, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: No more objections? Ghazaalch (talk) 09:06, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: yes, WP:UNDUEWEIGHT like Hogo is saying. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:34, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Parroting policy is not the same thing as explaining how it applies. WP:ALTNAME says nothing about ignoring alt names. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:12, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, as I said above this is about adding a literal translation for MEK's original/Persian name, and it is quite often in articles like this.Ghazaalch (talk) 06:40, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
How on Earth the English translations, as used by at least 25 reliable sources, included several academic sources are not due weight? Of course they are due weight. MarioGom (talk) 19:20, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes I started the RFC when you failed to give a satisfying response here. Ghazaalch (talk) 16:27, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Amin Saikal. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton University Press. p. xxii.
  2. ^ The Cambridge History of Iran, volume 7. =Cambridge University Press. 1968. p. 1061.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  3. ^ Christian Emery (2013). US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 60.
  4. ^ Mohsen Sazegara and Maria J. Stephan. Civilian Jihad. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 188.
  5. ^ Charles Kurzman. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press. p. 146.
  6. ^ this PhD thesis
  7. ^ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Taylor & Francis. p. 398.
  8. ^ Ronen A. Cohen. Revolution Under Attack: The Forqan Group of Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 28.
  9. ^ Amin Saikal. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. p. 37.
  10. ^ Larry C. Johnson (February 1, 2001). "The Future of Terrorism". American Behavioral Scientist. 44 (6): 899.
  11. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  12. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  13. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.

More unexplained reverts by Fad Ariff

@Fad Ariff: You reverted another edit by Ghazaalch and me and wrote see talk page in your edit summary. There is no explanation on the talk page. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 11:48, 18 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

See VF discussion. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:14, 18 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff:, I don't see any explanation there. Please explain what is wrong with adding Its members killed several US military personnel and civilian contractors in the 1970s and supported the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979.[1][2][3] to the lede?
Also, why did you change MEK assailants to men while the source says "MEK assailants" not "men"? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 19:55, 19 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Read it again. There is a lot of material there attributing that to the Mojahedin M.L. (Marxist–Leninist). And support for the seizure of the US embassy in 1979 is not something for the lead, particularly considering the group itself denies it. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:13, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: There are many sources that talk about assassinations carried out by MEK, it doesn't matter if they were Islamist MEK or Marxist-Leninist MEK, because, as Iskandar323 pointed out, until 1978 they were two branches of the same organization. See page 163 of Abrahamian's book where he entitled one of the sections of his book "Two Mojahedins (1975-8)"
Now explain what is wrong with adding Its members killed several US military personnel and civilian contractors in the 1970s and supported the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979.[4][5][6] to the lede?
Also explain, why did you change MEK assailants to men while the source says "MEK assailants" not "men"? Ali Ahwazi (talk) 20:26, 1 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
To clarify, it appears that the MEK officially split in October 1975, which I suppose the Abrahamian chapter heading above also aligns with - confirming that there was no split (other than ideological) prior to that. The key point is that all of the notable assassinations of American personnel and contractors also occurred prior to October 1975. Iskandar323 (talk) 05:27, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Look at this other chat I already had with Iskandar323. When I suggested we resolve this with WP:3O, Iskandar323 stopped replying. The sources are crystal clear about what happened between the Marxist and the Muslim Mojahedin, and also about when these things started to happen. Would you be willing to participate at WP:3O? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Jehl, Douglas; Gordon, Michael R. (29 April 2003). "American Forces Reach Cease-Fire With Terror Group". The New York Times.
  2. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  3. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".
  4. ^ Jehl, Douglas; Gordon, Michael R. (29 April 2003). "American Forces Reach Cease-Fire With Terror Group". The New York Times.
  5. ^ "Patterns of Global Terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State" (PDF). 2009-2017.state.gov. p. 105. Retrieved 21 July 2022.
  6. ^ "Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)".

RFC, Literal translation of Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)

Should we include the literal translation of Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in the article? Yes or No? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:51, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Proposal

I suggest putting a parenthesis in front of "Mojahedin-e-Khalq" in the Other names section and add the following green material inside it:

Survey

Yes, As discussed above, it is often necessary to include a literal translation for the article titles that are not originally in English, but there has been stonewalling. These are some other sourses for above proposal:

Ghazaalch (talk) 06:59, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

  • Yes - Is this really contentious? It's useful, well sourced information. Of course it should be included. Heck, I'd consider it vandalism to remove, given the sources provided. Fieari (talk) 04:28, 27 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Yes - not really controversial and never really should have been. Just well-worn translations. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:44, 27 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • No - These are not "literal" translations, and WP:UNDUEWEIGHT and WP:CHERRYPICKING are the main problems with Ghazaalch's proposal. The group's name is already translated into English throughout the page. Actually one of the main books used in the page summarizes it as "Mojahedin-e khalq (the Persian translation of People's Mojahedin)"[20]. Ghazaalch is cherrypicking some translations and trying to add them as official translations in a section reserved for WP:ALTNAMES, but these aren't official (or even WP:DUE) translations. Newcomers should look at this analysis where the academic literature was rigorously reviewed and where this same conclusion was reached. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:23, 27 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Could you please clarify your objection, it doesn't make a lot of sense to me. "People's Mojahedin" isn't a translation because Mojahedin isn't English, so that literally can't be the "real" translation. And how can all the references given above be cherrypicking when those are all mainstream well established WP:RS? Fieari (talk) 07:33, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Did you see the links? "Mojahedin" (Mujahideen, Mujahidin, etc.) has many definitions. In some cases, "A mujahid (Arabic: مجاهد mujāhid) is one who struggles for the sake of Allah and Islam. The literal meaning of "Mujahid" is "struggler" or "striver" and common in Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian names. The plural form of mujāhid is mujāhidūn in standard Arabic but the colloquial or dialectal form mujāhidīn (alternately spelled mujahideen) is more frequently encountered." In other cases, it's defined as "warrior, fighter, contender, combatant, struggler, striver". Iraniangal777 below linked the Mujahideen page with more definitions and translations (all established from WP:RS consensus). And Mojahedin (Mujahideen, etc.) is the only word that this RFC is meant to translate since the rest of it is already in English ("People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran"). There are so many sources providing different spellings, variants, and translations of those variants, that it would be inaccurate to declare that there is a "literal" or "official" translation or meaning of the word. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Just because that's their official name doesn't mean it's "in English", and the literal translations are what they are because they are present in reliable sources. Generic meanings of Mujahideen are not the subject here. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:56, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • No:
    In the last discussion we had about this, Ghazaalch and Vice regent were claiming that "People’s Strugglers" and "Holy Warriors" should be added to the group's alternative names using these same sources. Ghazaalch now changed the approach saying that these are "literal translations" of the group's name, but the problem with that is that they're not. Fundamentally, "People’s Strugglers" and "Holy Warriors" are two completely different interpretations, so they both cannot be the same literal translation of the same name. Even Ghazaalch's sources vary about this:
    Mujahideen-e Khalq (the People's Strugglers)[21]
    Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (People's Strugglers of Iran)[22]
    the People's Strugglers of Iran (Mojahedin-i Khalq-i Iran - known heneforth as MEK)[23]
    Mujahidin-i Khalq (Holy Warriors for the People")[24]
    The Mujahedine Khalq (MEK; People's Holy Warriors)[25]
    Mojahedin-e Khalq (People's Holy Warriors)[26]
    If "People Strugglers" or "Holy Warriors" were the common (or literal) translations, then this would be clear in the literature, but the most common translation of Mojahedin-e-Khalq is People’s Mujahedin of Iran, and there are plenty sources in the article that corroborate this. Hogo-2020 (talk) 13:30, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
    Are you claiming that the list of sources provided are not reliable sources? It's not uncommon for translations to vary, as translation is not an exact science-- it has to go through interpretation. I am not surprised at all that there are multiple possible translations of it. Typically, when multiple translations are in common use, we include them all. There certainly do seem to be a lot of sources using these translations of the name, suggesting they are in common use. Fieari (talk) 07:34, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • Yes, of course. Translations to English as used in several reliable sources, including academic sources, belong to the article and are due weight. Wikipedia has no obligation to conform to the NCRI branding guide for English publications. MarioGom (talk) 19:24, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
This is confusing. Why vote in this rfc and then remove the entire section about other names in the article? Iraniangal777 (talk) 14:14, 10 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I did not remove the section, I restructured it. I explained my rationale in edit summaries and in #Other names section. This does not change my !vote to this RFC, which can still apply to the lede or a footnote. MarioGom (talk) 16:50, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Discussion

The title of the article is "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran", which is already translated into English except for the word "Mojahedin". Mojahedin-e-Khalq is only an alt name. "Mojahedin", or Mujahideen, is already analysed in the Mujahideen page. Why not just link that somewhere in this page? Iraniangal777 (talk) 09:07, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Mojahedin-e-Khalq is a Farsi/Arabic name and there is no literal translation for it in the article. Even if it is an alt name as you say, there should be no problem adding it to the "other names" section. Ghazaalch (talk) 10:04, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Mojahedin-e khalq (the Persian translation of People's Mojahedin)[27] That solves it as well. Ghazaalch, cherrypicking translations of alternative names that aren't considered alternative names creates WP:POVFORK problems. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:09, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
We usually translate from the original name and the original name is "Mojahedin-e-Khalq". Just because you have found a source that did it the other way around, it doesn't mean we have to do the same.Ghazaalch (talk) 13:50, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff, What does this have to do with POVFORK?VR talk 14:43, 26 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
  • (Invited by the bot) May I suggest you state and explain the proposal briefly and exactly and then separate your other discussion etc. as a part of your response. The way that it is structured now I don't think that you'll et much feedback. Sincerely, North8000 (talk) 14:02, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you North8000, see if this is better now? Ghazaalch (talk) 16:18, 20 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The most common name is, once again and as always, irrelevant to the discussion of alt names. Iskandar323 (talk) 13:58, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]


Sources

  1. ^ Amin Saikal. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton University Press. p. xxii.
  2. ^ Christian Emery (2013). US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 60.
  3. ^ Mohsen Sazegara and Maria J. Stephan. Civilian Jihad. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 188.
  4. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  5. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  6. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.
  7. ^ Amin Saikal. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton University Press. p. xxii.
  8. ^ The Cambridge History of Iran, volume 7. =Cambridge University Press. 1968. p. 1061.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  9. ^ Christian Emery (2013). US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 60.
  10. ^ Mohsen Sazegara and Maria J. Stephan. Civilian Jihad. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 188.
  11. ^ Charles Kurzman. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Harvard University Press. p. 146.
  12. ^ this PhD thesis
  13. ^ Barry Rubin, Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. Taylor & Francis. p. 398.
  14. ^ Ronen A. Cohen. Revolution Under Attack: The Forqan Group of Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 28.
  15. ^ Amin Saikal. Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic. Princeton University Press. p. 37.
  16. ^ Larry C. Johnson (February 1, 2001). "The Future of Terrorism". American Behavioral Scientist. 44 (6): 899.
  17. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  18. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  19. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.
  20. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 98. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.
  21. ^ Amin Saikal. The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton University Press. p. xxii.
  22. ^ Mohsen Sazegara and Maria J. Stephan. Civilian Jihad. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 188.
  23. ^ Christian Emery (2013). US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 60.
  24. ^ Gavin R. G. Hambly. The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7. Cambridge University Press. p. 284.
  25. ^ "Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)". Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. ABC-CLIO. p. 208.
  26. ^ Mahan Abedin (2019). Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State. C. Hurst & Co. p. 60.
  27. ^ Katzman, Kenneth (2001). "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran". In Benliot, Albert V. (ed.). Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, Or Normal Country?. Nova. p. 98. ISBN 978-1-56072-954-9.

Workshop, Maryam Rajavi's divorce and marriage

Following the suggestion from User:Vanamonde93, the content about Maryam Rajavi’s divorce and marriage needs more workshop before going for a RFC. @Iskandar323, Ghazaalch, Ali Ahwazi, and Hogo-2020: I suggest it be more balanced with other material, like this:

For some Iranians, the marriage institution was being used as a means to challenge "unjust organization orders" at the time in Iran. For MEK members, Maryam Rajavi's divorce became a platform for women to challenge forced marriages.[1] According to the announcement, Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi had recently divorced in order to facilitate the ideological revolution. This was signified as an "act of supreme sacrifice designed to promote collective leadership and appeal to the female half of the Iranian populace." This was both criticized and praised according to different reports.[2]

What are your objections or suggestions? Fad Ariff (talk) 11:48, 22 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I will prepare my proposal in a few days.Ali Ahwazi (talk) 16:49, 23 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
This is stupid euphemism, and we don't entertain euphemism. Maryam Azodanlu and Mehdi Abrishamchi quite clearly divorced so that Massoud Rajavi could marry her (and it wasn't 'recently divorced'; they divorced and re-married more or less instantaneously). Maybe "facilitate the ideological revolution" is meant to be some sort of sexual euphemism, but, again, WP:EUPHEMISM. The only real "unjust organization order" in the sordid tale of the MEK was the prohibition on relationships between members following the "ideological revolution" while Massoud married Maryam - which again ... "act of supreme sacrifice" ... pfft - if we're going to include any crap like this then we also need to properly contextualize it and expand on the criticism, which I imagine calls this out as the weird and frankly creepy propagandistic bullshit that it all is. Iskandar323 (talk) 14:09, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
The new version sounds cult-ish. Is the new version really better supported by sources more than the previous one? I would be very surprised. MarioGom (talk) 20:23, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Saeidi, Shirin (2022). Women and the Islamic Republic: How Gendered Citizenship Conditions the Iranian State (Cambridge Middle East Studies, Series Number 66). Cambridge University Press. p. 127.
  2. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)

Another unexplained revert by Fad Ariff

@Fad Ariff:, explain why you deleted this sources? Ghazaalch (talk) 07:15, 23 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch: my revert was explained in my edit summary, so please stop with the defamatory titles. You placed three sources after "Also according to Ervand Abrahamian, "the incident was equally outrageous in the eyes of the secularists, especially among the modern intelligentsia. It projected onto the public arena a matter that should have been treated as a private issue between two individuals."", but I cannot see how those sources can be used to support that quote or even make that paragraph more proportionate (I pinged you about this in the above section). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:22, 24 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff: You also removed Many criticized Maryam Azodanlu's giving up her own maiden name (something most Iranian women did not do and she herself had not done in her previous marriage). They would question whether this was in line with her claims of being a staunch feminist.[1]. Are you objecting that addition too? MarioGom (talk) 20:26, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
MarioGom: That material is still in the article. I'm objecting that the full paragraph is made up of cherrypicked lines cited only to Abrahamian. Don't you think it should be more WP:BALANCED with other POV (even from Abrahamian or other authors)? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, I replaced the one-sourced material with another text which has 4 sources. I hope you are satisfied now. Ghazaalch (talk) 08:59, 5 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch, the objective was to make that paragraph more WP:BALANCED with other views and context, and you expanded using the same types of views. I'm reverting your edits to the original stable version and starting another proposal. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:34, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: whose objective was that? Just you? Iskandar323 called your proposed addition a "bizarre inversion of the material as it is presented in the actual source" and MarioGom called it "cult-ish". And the policies say: While it is important to account for all significant viewpoints on any topic, Wikipedia policy does not state or imply that every minority view, fringe theory, or extraordinary claim needs to be presented along with commonly accepted mainstream scholarship as if they were of equal validity. If you do not give an acceptable explanation for your reverts I would restore them. Ghazaalch (talk) 13:31, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch, please calm down. My objection to the current material in that paragraph is WP:Balance problem, and I also think your version was not neutral. If my proposal has not been approved, I will make another one (like I said in my last comment). Fad Ariff (talk) 12:07, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, I warn you to stop deleting other people's verified additions to this article. This article is about a cult-like militant opposition group that has carried out many assassinations and has been designated as a terrorist organization by almost all countries for years. So it is obvious that you can find a lot of negatives and few positives in the goup's history. Now, does WP:Balance and Wikipedia:Neutral point of view mean we should use the negatives and positives in this article equally, or should we look into the mainstream sources? Ghazaalch (talk) 04:11, 10 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Skewed lead

As an uninvolved reader, when reading the lede, I can't help but feel as if it is meant to present the organization as a nearly infallible group that has unjustly been bullied around by everyone in power. Everyone is to blame, except the group or its ideologies itself. Every decision or action the organization has undertaken up to the present, is presented in such way to make it seem as if those decisions were always "the right thing to do" in the grand scheme of things. At least, that's the overal feel I get from reading.

For instance, how come there's barely anything in the lede about the financial and political support the group has received in the past, and still continues to receive in the present day? That's crucial info regarding the way an organization operates and functions. The fact it "sided" with Iraq in the 80s doesn't cut it; there's much more to it than just that, both before, during and after the Iran-Iraq War. The lede is quick to reveal US "backing" of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (as early as the first sentence of alinea #2), yet the entirety of the lede barely contains anything (if anything at all) about the MEK's own extensive ties to the US, the Mossad, as well as formerly the Soviet Union and even the Taliban.

The lede currently doesn't pass WP:LEDE in this regard IMO, and contains too much detail about the organization's decades old history (i.e. imbalanced), which makes it dfficult to read. For the record: this is not an accusation towards any of the users who've been working dilligently on improving this page. Just my 0.02$ on aspects that can perhaps be improved in order to make this page shine even brighter. - LouisAragon (talk) 20:51, 27 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@LouisAragon: Welcome to the wonderful world that is the MEK. I think pretty much all the group does these days is work to gentrify their checkered history and con Western politicians - like Trump and company [42] - into believing that they are some form of credible opposition in Iran in order to extract checks to supplement whatever other forms of illicit funding they are getting. Iskandar323 (talk) 08:14, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
LouisAragon’s discussion here is very similar to that of Prinsgezinde here. To address their comment I (and Ali Ahwazi) tried to start some RFCs aimed at modifying the lede (see above RFCs). However I do not know whether it helps or not because there are always some accounts that vote "No" without giving a plausible reason, and there are always some mediators that just count the votes while closing the RFCs. Ghazaalch (talk) 08:40, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ghazaalch what do you mean by "here are always some accounts that vote "No" without giving a plausible reason, and there are always some mediators that just count the votes while closing the RFCs"? Preconceptions are often strong in this topic, so we need to focus instead on what is in most of the academic literature. If anyone here provides such a review, I'll also provide my 0.02$ there. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:08, 28 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
To make an example, while voting "No" in above RFC you explain: The group's name is already translated into English throughout the page. Actually one of the main books used in the page summarizes it as "Mojahedin-e khalq (the Persian translation of People's Mojahedin)"[20]. Ghazaalch is cherrypicking some translations... Then Fieari asks you it doesn't make a lot of sense to me. "People's Mojahedin" isn't a translation because Mojahedin isn't English, so that literally can't be the "real" translation. And how can all the references given above be cherrypicking when those are all mainstream well established WP:RS? and you have no reasonable answer. Also Vice regent asks you @Fad Ariff, What does this have to do with POVFORK? and again you have no answer. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:04, 29 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: here is the answer about my vote to Fieari. That you don't like my vote or my answer does not mean they are not "reasonable" or "plausible". Earlier you also said that I "cannot stand a words of it in the lead", and when I also asked you about that, you did not reply. You are also accusing mediators of "just count the votes while closing the RFCs", but you don't have any proof about that either, so these all look like senseless accusations. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:06, 29 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff, Like Ghazaalch and others, I am not satisfied with your explanations either. Also not satisfied with your unexplained reverts. Ali Ahwazi (talk) 07:16, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Ali Ahwazi, I am also dissatisfied with your and Ghazaalch's explanations, but that does not give me grounds to make false remarks against others like you both do. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:10, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
LouisAragon: This article needs more editors willing to improve it based on reliable sources and other content policies... and be able to follow up with the insufferable amount of RFCs that are needed for everything, as well as the recurrent RFC manipulation with sockpuppets and meatpuppets. You have all my moral support if you're up for it ;-) MarioGom (talk) 20:32, 2 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you all for your input. I'm glad there are more users that have spotted the same POV-loaded problems in the lede. I will propose a new draft version for the lede, hopefully in the near future (if time allows). But if anyone wants to beat me to it in the meantime, by all means, please go ahead and I will provide feedback/my 0.02$ as soon as possible. - LouisAragon (talk) 23:38, 6 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@LouisAragon, MarioGom, Iskandar323, Vice regent, Fieari, and Ali Ahwazi: Most parts of the lede is currently under RFC. Can we edit the parts, or should we find someone to close the RFCs first? Or we should withdraw the RFCs? Which one do you deem advisable? Ghazaalch (talk) 06:48, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I think the current RFCs should not prevent LouisAragon proposing a completely new version. If that gains any traction, it could supersede the previous RFCs. MarioGom (talk) 17:19, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Agree. But, my experience say that we could never reach consensus with some users who are here to remove any material that are critical of MEK. That is why I had to start that much RFCs. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:37, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Process is that you wait until May 20th to close unless there is very clear concensus to WP:SNOW close it, or if it's withdrawn, and there's good reason to follow process particularly when there is disagreement-- and the more disagreement, the more you should go to WP:CR for an impartial ending. There, the closer won't just count the !votes, although that is allowed to influence the result... they need to actually read over the arguments and determine whether there are legitimate arguments on each side, if the arguments have been answered, and so forth. But regardless of the process for this RFC, there's nothing wrong with having another concurrent RFC in the meantime. Or not even a formal RFC, just a discussion here on the talk page while waiting for this RFC to close. You only need an RFC when there is disagreement, and I suspect there's hardly disagreement when you're just workshopping specific wordings, which you can do with the assumption that this RFC will end a particular way even without it formally doing so as long as it sticks to the talk page here. For the main page? I strongly recommend waiting 'till it closes. Waiting out the month when there are disagreements as to what is or isn't POV being resolved by won't hurt too much. Fieari (talk) 01:52, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I'm sorry! I somehow didn't fully understand your question! (Blame bleary eyed early morning editing) This RFC is limited in scope, and of course anything within its scope shouldn't be touched on the main page, but aspects of the article, including the lead, that are NOT within the scope of this RFC... that can follow the usual WP:BRD method like anything else. So don't touch the translation question, but go ahead and fix anything else without worries. Fieari (talk) 01:56, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fieari: We are not just talking about the RFC immediately above. There are a dozen of open RFCs above. Ghazaalch (talk) 05:37, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Nothing prevents anyone from proposing a completely new version of the lede in the talk page, which goes beyond the scope of any single open RFC. Ongoing RFCs do not prohibit further proposals. MarioGom (talk) 22:36, 14 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

WP:SPLIT proposal

So it's pretty obvious that, despite being WP:TOOBIG at more than 100kB of readable prose, the bulk of this article's length is going nowhere, since everything is contentious, and nothing can be agreed upon, so the obvious solution is the standard history split to History of X, i.e. History of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran. In this particular instance, such a split will be doubly useful in helping to differentiate between the history of the MEK of yesteryear when it was first a prominent opposition and militant group in Iran, later in an exiled form in neighboring Iraq, and today's current organization. This would also help refocus the article as a whole on the latter. Iskandar323 (talk) 11:05, 3 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

While I think that one or more splits would make sense, I don't think they are going to solve any problem with disputes. They might actually amplify them: dispute for the split history article content, and dispute for the summarized content in the main article. MarioGom (talk) 19:01, 3 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I don't believe I claimed it would solve the disputes. But I am thinking more of a clean split, where all of the material is removed, and only a brief summary reconstituted here - otherwise the desired reduction in page length wouldn't happen. Iskandar323 (talk) 19:08, 3 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I also think this would amplify disagreements. If a page reduction is the objective, then removing some WP:OVERCITE, or some repetitive or trivial material (like I.R. propaganda "documentaries" about the MEK), would surely get the article below 100kb. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:11, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It's not like 100kB is a good article length; that's still the upper limit before a split is more or less required, per WP:TOOBIG, but articles are actually recommended to be divided as soon as they start passing the 60kB threshold, and small changes here and there are not going to have a big impact. Iskandar323 (talk) 12:21, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
We should first try to clean the article from all the excessive material it has (and it has a lot), and then see if we need a different article. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:39, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Given how controversial this article is, I think we can afford some overciting here, with abundant footnotes and quotes. In fact, I think this also justifies some excess in article length as measured in bytes. MarioGom (talk) 22:40, 14 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Checking Islamic State (301kb) and Al-Qaeda (304kb) compared to People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (274kb), I do not think we have a so pressing size issue. Some splits might make sense, but I think that more often WP:TOOBIG is just an excuse to remove material when there are simply no policy-based arguments justifying it. MarioGom (talk) 20:19, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
WP:TOOBIG is based on readable prose size, not back-end page size. By this metric, Islamic State is 60kB, Al-Qaeda is 89kB, and this page has 103kB. Any page over 100kB is pretty out of control. Iskandar323 (talk) 04:44, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Good point. MarioGom (talk) 05:52, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Documentary films section

People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran § Documentary films sections looks too long and trivial for the main article, and there is a good in-depth list at List of works about the People's Mujahedin of Iran. I think this section in the main article should either be removed, or replaced by a short prose summary and a {{Main}} link to the full list. What do you think? MarioGom (talk) 06:10, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

The material already looks fairly duplicative, since it's already been copied to the list. More generally, the sourcing quality is terrible. Many of these documentaries are of extremely questionable notability, having only poorly referenced fa.wiki pages, or references to marginal quality sources at this end - so yes, I am all for a trimming of the material on the page here. Only a handful look good. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:45, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I would keep the entries, or a mention of the entries, supported by the Lesch book source, those with en.wiki main article links, and possibly, though not too fussed, the ones with Tehran Times & Mehr news links, i.e.: Cyanide and Mina's choice. Iskandar323 (talk) 06:50, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
MarioGom I agree, and it would also help reduce article length. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:07, 4 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
 Done [43]. Feel free to improve or expand the summary. MarioGom (talk) 17:26, 7 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
I agree, although I am skeptical about the edits made by some users who tend to remove the parts that are critical of MEK.Ghazaalch (talk) 05:37, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Sources

  1. ^ Abrahamian 1989, p. 251–253. sfn error: multiple targets (22×): CITEREFAbrahamian1989 (help)

Unexplained Revert of attacks on 13 Iranian embassies

@Fad Ariff:, why you did delete this information from the lede? Ghazaalch (talk) 03:17, 5 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

@Ghazaalch:, read WP:ES, and then the edit summary (Rv Ghazaalch. This is not "new information".), and then in the article "In April 1992, the MEK attacked 10 Iranian embassies including the Iranian Mission to the United Nations in New York using different weapons, taking hostages, and injuring Iranian ambassadors and embassy employees. There were dozens of arrests.". Fad Ariff (talk) 12:30, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: You're just trying to justify your reverts by listing some irrelevant Wikipedia policy. The content you quoted belongs to the main body of the article. What I did was to add a summary of the material to the Lede. So please explain why you reverted it. Ghazaalch (talk) 13:44, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: calm down. You said that my revert was not explained, and I’m just showing you that it was. Just because some content is in the body, it doesn’t mean it needs to go in the lead. You have been editing this article long enough to know that. You are making many edits, and many of those are nonconstructive, and it makes things very difficult to maintain order. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:04, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: When I proposed adding the material to the article above, you objected that I should have included MEK's view as well, that say attacks on Iranian embassies derived from attacks on the Mojahedin that is why I included a note explaining MEK's view/response, also Iran's view/response to the the attacks. Now you are objecting that attacks on 13 Iranian embassies is not significant enough to go to the lede. Can you explain what makes it insignificant? Ghazaalch (talk) 04:44, 10 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Ghazaalch: where did I say this was "insignificant"? What I said was that just because some content is in the body, it doesn't mean it needs to go in the lead. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:08, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: So if you agree that the material is significant enough to go to the lede, what made you to delete it from the lede?Ghazaalch (talk) 16:21, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

WP:NINJA changes in the lead

@Iskandar323: why did you delete this information from the lead which said that "In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between Massoud Rajavi and Tariq Aziz.[1][2][3][4]"? Fad Ariff (talk) 12:30, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Umm ... I didn't? As that's a key detail. I just shortened it to "In 1983, the MEK allied with Iraq..." Iskandar323 (talk) 12:59, 8 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Iskandar323: You didn't just shorten it, you changed it to something that is not supported in the sources. The sources don't say that the MEK allied with Iraq in 1983, they say that a 1983 meeting between Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz and Massoud Rajavi was considered "ties", but not an alliance between the country and the group. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:01, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
What fresh nonsense is this? I changed it from "alliance" to the synonymous "allied". Iskandar323 (talk) 12:16, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
It seems you have an objection to content that was already present before the edit you cited. It is not clear if you're objecting to anything about this particular edit. MarioGom (talk) 17:52, 9 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
If the sources say "ties" and not "alliance", I think that's a noteworthy distinction. I have copyedited the lead in a way I think better represents the article. Fad Ariff (talk) 12:08, 10 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
If the mainstream sources say "alliance" and not "ties", cherry-picking a text that say "ties" is not accepted. Ghazaalch (talk) 07:52, 12 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
@Fad Ariff: "started ties with" is illiterate English - please think of a better phrasing that satisfies your peccadillos in this area. Iskandar323 (talk) 05:57, 13 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]
Fad Ariff: The article already had "alliance" before the edit:
  • Before: In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq
  • After: In 1983, the MEK allied with Iraq,
I understand you're objecting to such content, but that has nothing to do with the edit you cited, WP:NINJA, or anything remotely close. So let's stop this. Please. MarioGom (talk) 19:59, 11 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
  2. ^ Piazza 1994: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
  3. ^ "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mojahedin, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran-Iraq War"
  4. ^ Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.

Other names section

Iraniangal777: I made a few changes to the Other names section to make it a Structure section (diff). My rationale is that the section contents is not that much about alternative, synonymous names, but about organizational structure and fronts. Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization is an equivalent name already listed in the first lede line, while National Liberation Army of Iran and National Council of Resistance of Iran are front organizations, not merely alternative names. As part of this restructure, I also moved the paragraph about monafiqeen further down in the body ([44]) and the comment about the lack of an official name to a footnote in the history section ([45]). Do you have any objection to this rationale? MarioGom (talk) 21:52, 14 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Yeah, it makes sense. I'd been meaning to do something about the MKO duplication myself. Iskandar323 (talk) 18:54, 15 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

On Douglas MacArthur II kidnapping attempt

This paragraph on Douglas MacArthur II kidnapping attempt could be improved:

According to Jamestown Foundation the MEK tried to kidnap the U.S. Ambassador to Iran Douglas MacArthur II in 1970.[1] Some sources attribute the attempted kidnap to other groups.[2][failed verification][3][4][5][failed verification][6]

I don't think it needs in-text attribution, but it lacks a lot of context. What I could grasp is that there was a kidnapping attempt on 30 November 1970 (some sources seem to get the date, even year wrong) by unnamed gunmen. Then there is a disparity in sources when it comes to attribution. And it could have played a role in Rajavi's later arrest. Anyone up to helping with gathering sources about this event? --MarioGom (talk) 19:00, 16 May 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Abedin, Mahan. "Mojahedin-e-Khalq: Saddam's Iranian Allies - Jamestown". Jamestown. Retrieved 11 September 2018.
  2. ^ Rahnema, Ali (2021), Call to Arms: Iran's Marxist Revolutionaries: Formation and Evolution of the Fada'is, 1964–1976 (Radical Histories of the Middle East), Simon & Schuster, ISBN 9781786079862
  3. ^ Taheri, Amir (1986), The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, Adler & Adler Pub, p. 168, ISBN 9780917561047
  4. ^ Steele, Robert (2021), The Shah's Imperial Celebrations of 1971: Nationalism, Culture and Politics in Late Pahlavi Iran, I.B. Tauris, p. 118, During this period the threat from militant organizations in Iran was high. An attack on a military outpost in the village of Siahkal, by a radical Marxist-Leninist urban guerrilla group named Fadaiyan-e Khalq (Martyrs for the Masses), on 8 February 1971, ushered in a new phase of opposition to the Shah's regime. Moreover, and alarmingly for the security services, the group made it one of their principal objectives to disrupt the Celebrations. Around the time of the festivities, US Ambassador Douglas Macarthur was almost kidnapped by gunmen who ambushed his limousine, and a plan to kidnap the British ambassador, Peter Ramsbotham, was also uncovered. More attempted kidnappings prompted an increase in security, as the Dutch ambassador explained in a report in early October... SAVAK later claimed that sixty members of the Iranian Liberation Organization were charged with plotting to carry out kidnappings during the Celebrations.
  5. ^ "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972 - Office of the Historian". history.state.gov.
  6. ^ Zanchetta, Barbara (2013), The Transformation of American International Power in the 1970s, Cambridge University Press, p. 254


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