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the quote

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Stimpson's oft-quoted "gentlemen" line may have been driven by budgetary constraints; as well, the Army was then establishing Signals Intelligence Service (noted in Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups, 1999 & 2004) under Friedman, who was unquestionably the most brilliant cryptanalyst of his generation, & the perceived need for MI-8 may have diminished. Or we may conclude Stimpson was less scrupulous than he pretended. Trekphiler 00:15, 12 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]


FURTHER TO THE ABOVE:

From reading multiple sources, long ago, my understanding is as follows. Sec. Stimpson made a walking tour of the Cryptology section, overseen by Herbert O. Yardley. Yardley was anxious to please and impress his sour-pussed visitor. He mentioned proudly the names of various nations whose code had been cracked, but this got no reaction from Stimson, verbal or nonverbal. Finally Yardley said: "Of course, we can read all VATICAN traffic." It was at this point that Stimson spun on his heel and walked out. The quote was not, I believe, spoken to Yardley and his staff but included in the written document that dissolved MI-8 one or two days later.

What history overlooks here is this. Cryptology is like a game with offense and defense. Each nation engages Both Ways in a contest with each other nation. If the Vatican had coders and decoders for their own traffic, it is a fair guess that some effort went into decoding traffic of Others, particularly codes of the Italian government. It is hardly imaginable to me that if Herbert O. Yardley had sailed for Rome in 1930 and asked if there might be a job for him in the Vatican, that he would have been turned down because Pope Pius XI felt that gentlemen did not read other gentlemen's mail. A companion quote is "spying is the world's second oldest profession". Cryptology serves motivations and needs of those deliberately engaged in world power contests. It is not necessary to encode data such as genuflections per month or soap consumption to launder cassocks.

Trylon 13:41, 9 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Where is the source of this famous quote? According to some sources, it wasn't written or said in 1929, but was a justification written in 1948 of closing down MI-8. Hexmaster, 213.66.100.72 21:32, 12 July 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Vetoing of Kyoto for atomic bomb

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I'm slightly surprised by the following statement:

"They honeymooned in the Japanese city of Kyoto, which such made an impression on him that in 1945 it led him to veto the dropping of an atomic bomb on the city, which was one of the four shortlisted targets."

Is this really how such major decisions are made? This same assertion was made in the Notes & Queries section of The Guardian yesterday (by one Tomo Katagiri of Edinburgh) and I came here to check it out.

In the external links section is a link to a selection of Stimson's diary and papers relating to the bomb selected and annotated by Doug Long. Section 8 includes the following, referring to a discussion with President Truman (notes by Doug Long in square brackets):

"We had a few words more about the S-1 program, and I again gave him my reasons for eliminating one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. He again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act [a-bombing Kyoto, Japan's cultural center] might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria [which Russia was about to invade, as part of the Yalta Conference agreement with the U.S. and Great Britain]."

Could we perhaps have some source for the honeymoon theory. If there is any basis for thinking it was a factor in Stimson's decision then it should be included. --Spondoolicks 14:54, 19 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Stimson had been in Kyoto three times in the 1920s on official visits to Japan. (They still take VIP's there), and he never mentioned the honeymoon story. Stimson had very solid reasons for removing Kyoto -- and as a former Secreatry of State he knew all about diplomacy. Rjensen 17:27, 19 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
The "Honeymoon" theory is supported by a quote in the Edwin O. Reischauer article. studerby 14:02, 29 August 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Stimson's reasoning, elucidated in a magazine article he published shortly after the war on the reasons for dropping the Bomb and later repeated in Bundy, On Active Service and Peace and War, was that the ancient city of Kyoto had such religious and cultural significance that the shock of its destruction would foster unyielding hatred against America, possibly bolster the Japanese will to fight to the last man (a disquieting implacable courage they'd already amply demonstrated, and a major reason the Bomb was used), and certainly impede post-War cooperation. Hiroshima and Nagasaki in contrast had no such cultural significance. It is true though, that Stimson had visited Kyoto which gave him a personal relation and a connection to the people living there, while he had never seen and knew nobody living in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. ElijahBosley (talk) 22:05, 19 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]
It's definitely a false reading to say that his alleged "honeymoon" was a significant factor, and should have reduced prominence in this entry on that basis (it's mentioned 3x with the clear implication that it was the sole factor that saved the city in one of those mentions in this entry). Other articles argue he didn't honeymoon in Kyoto at all.[1] And the prominence of this claim has resulted in its inclusion in the recent Oppenheimer movie for dramatic effect.[2] Furthermore, the DailyBeast article that this entry references DOES NOT make the claim that is attributed to it. I had to look it up in the Internet Archive, but the mention of a honeymoon is incidental, not critical as this entry claims. [3] On those grounds I'm going to remove the more openly false statements about the unverifiable "honeymoon". I don't know if mention of it belongs at all, but it is a commonly believed and repeated claim at this point, even though the evidence I've seen isn't in favor of it, so I'll leave that for others to consider. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 168.166.55.11 (talk) 00:25, 25 July 2023 (UTC)[reply]

References

Morgenthau-Plan

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And his protest against the Morgenthau Plan ??? --172.178.219.147 08:52, 25 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

what's your suggestion? Rjensen 09:00, 25 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]


First:Please excuse my bad English. My suggestion is :In 1944 Stimson called the Morgenthau plan "a crime against civilization". (As Cordell Hull and Anthony Eden did.) [1]

--172.178.219.147 14:32, 25 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

"Getting Japan to fire the first shot"

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Pearl harbor conspiracy theorists are fond of making much of Stimson's diary entries in the months prior to December 7th.

  • October 16 entry:
""We face the delicate question of the diplomatic fencing to be done so as to be sure Japan is put into the wrong and makes the first bad move - overt move."
  • November 25, 1941 diary entry:
"The question was how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot...."
  • Source:Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries [microfilm edition] (New Haven: Yale University Library,

1973), entry for October 16, 1941. as cited in [2]


UNlike the conspiracy theorists, the author of the Princeton book honestly points out, the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. You look at a particular straw in the wind and it proves nothing, but as you gather evidence, each brushstroke is added and gradually a larger picture takes shape. Personally I have no conclusion about what the American leadership were thinking. They clearly were aware of Japanese intentions and their past propensity for "surprize attacks". There were some random orders that suggest there were attempts to engineer incidents- though much smaller in scale than the Pearl Harbor attack.


WP does not have the space to list such voluminous "brushstrokes". Nonetheless, the particular facts need to be reported, and my inclination is to include them without interpretation or conclusions drawn.

What the leadership was thinking is enormously important historically, so something really should be said concerning some of the more notable Stimson diary entries.

How does that sound to folks? -Mak 16:50, 7 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

we can report that Stimson was determined NOT to fire the first shot. Rjensen 17:05, 7 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]
The evidence is not at all conclusive on that score either. Perhaps we just report the controversy and include some of the quotes. In both these cases, Stimson was focused on how to get Japan to make a particular move, not on what actions the US should avoid taking. One does not necessarily imply the other. -Mak 02:04, 8 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Well no: to have Japan fire the first shot certainly means the US (and allies) does not fire the first shot. This was Stimson's warning to US Army & Air Force to not shoot first. Rjensen 23:28, 10 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]
You are making a different point, one that very well may be accurate, but one that is not especially surprizing or of much interest. If it is an important point to make about Stimson, relying on such indirection only invites questions. Surely if Stimson was so "determined" as you assert, the historian would be looking for the explicitly recorded instructions to the military leaders or some scribble of them in his diary.
Contrast Stimson's sentiments with those of Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis. There is much more to be said than the fact that JFK didn't want the US firing the first shot. He also doesn't want the Kruschev to miscalculate and fire the first shot either. Is that where Stimson's mind is? Hardly. No such sentiment is expressed in the Stimson passages. It is easy to read these two passages and form the impression that the US was instead focussed on setting the most politically favorable conditions under which the war would begin. Certainly, I think it is not difficult to form the conclusion that it would have been foolish of the US leadership to expect that war with the Japanese could be avoided, and the only thing she really could hope to control was what Stimson was directing his attention to in these passages. -Mak 01:48, 18 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Did he do nothing of note between Pearl Harbour and Nagasaki?Andycjp 08:02, 19 September 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The Morgenthau Plan

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Mr Rjensen, the text you inserted some months back that Stimson halted the Morgenthau plan smells very much like unsubstantiated POV to me. And your refusal to include my sentence that makes it less misleading to the reader is certainly POV, i.e. that although the plan was not formaly implemented it did influence policy. Now, you obviously have much spare time, so I wonder if you would oblige me by reading maybe 30 pages from a book available online.

The sections:

  • 1 Section: by Richard Dominic Wiggers, The United States and the Refusal to Feed German Civilians after World War II pp. 274 - 288

and

  • 2 Section by CHARLES M. BARBER, The Isolationist as Interventionist: Senator William Langer on the Subject of Ethnic Cleansing, March 29, l946 pp.244 -

This might also be beneficial to take a peek at. *The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, by Ray Salvatore Jennings May 2003, Peaceworks No. 49, United States Institute of Peace

Or you could bother to read the suggested reading in the Morgenthau plan article.

--Stor stark7 Talk 21:02, 17 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

neither of your sources mentions Stimson, so I don't think they add to this bio of Stimson. Now you try some reading: say [3].—The preceding unsigned comment was added by Rjensen (talkcontribs) .

Mr Rjensen, please stop weasling! You know very well what my beef with you is about, so don’t try to sidestep the issue.

You had written “Stimson thus retained overall control of the U.S. occupation zone in Germany, and the Morgenthau plan never went into effect.”

The last part of that sentence misleads the reader to think that this is the end all of the subject!

My addition of the sentence “It did however end up influencing U.S. policy in the early occupation years.” was promptly deleted by you with some weak excuse relating to Eisenhower.

You then proceed to sidestep my suggestion that you read some literature that deals with the policies that were in fact effected in Germany (Such as JCS 1067 which had it‘s origin in the Morgenthau Plan) and their origins, by referring to the fact that that they don’t mention Stimpson. Mr Jensen, please don’t lie. Ray Salvatore Jennings report does indeed mention Stimson!

You then have the gall to suggest that I read a book that you obviously have not read yourself!

Let me quote from the book in question (paperback issue) to you:

Page 233. Refering to Truman’s signing of the governing directive to the U.S. occupation forces in Germany, the JCS 1067/8 on May 10, 1945: ..Morgenthau told his staff that Truman’s endorsement was a “big day for the treasury”. He just hoped that “somebody doesn’t recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan.” He wrote to his sons that the directive to Eisenhower was plenty tough, and if carried out at all in the spirit in which it is conceived, I don’t see how Germany can rise to make war again for at least another fifty years.”

Page 270. On August 9, 1945, at a meeting between Stimson and Eisenhower and Clay discussing the JCS 1067/8 “He [Stimson] warned that “no matter how vindictive” Americans felt now, unless Clay restored “an economic life” to the Germans, he would be “repudiated by the very people who gave you these instructions.” Stimson adviced Clay, “Sure, you’ve got to live with 1067.” But they mustn’t “let this country starve to death.”.

Lets turn to another source, one of which I listed above in my first post. Ray Salvatore Jennings report: A few snippets from what it has to say of the JCS 1067, (there is lots more) :

  • “The directive grew out of what came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan, named after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who advocated strict rules to punish and pacify the Germans under the premise of collective guilt and to ensure that the nation would never again remilitarize to threaten Europe or the United States.”
  • Michael Beschloss’s book The Conquerors describes how Clay was constrained in carrying out his mission by Washington’s micromanagement and by JCS 1067, the blueprint for U.S. occupation that limited the kinds of assistance available to postwar Germany. This directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff was punitive and restrictive,
  • Clay was able to use his expertise to restore public utilities, clear roads, and move rations and supplies to prevent starvation and disease, but he was prohibited from providing economic or reconstruction assistance of any kind.2
  • During the winter of 1945–46, Clay grew increasingly concerned about the growing influence of the Soviets.“There is no choice,” Clay often repeated,“between becoming a communist on 1500 calories and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories. ”Clay exploited a loophole in JCS 1067 to increase daily humanitarian rations to 1,500 calories per day.He warned Washington that without additional assistance, growing food shortages and economic misery would pave the way to a communist Germany. Clay’s appeal, economic stagnation in Europe, and sluggish recovery on the Continent prompted Washington to reevaluate the punitive style of the first months of occupation and to reconsider doubts over whether Germans were able to meaningfully participate in the management of their own affairs.9
  • By the summer of 1947, Marshall had successfully made the argument that JCS 1067 must be rescinded on “national security grounds” and replaced by JCS 1779. Drawing on earlier memos from Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Marshall pushed aside concerns over denazification and punitive reminders of defeat. The Marshall Plan saw the reconstruction of Germany and Europe in geostrategic terms, a strong viable German economy and democracy being necessary not only for enhanced security againstthe Soviets but also for the eventual exit of occupation troops. The course correction had taken nearly two years to determine, but it was dramatic once it began.

Mr Rjensen, please stop misleading the readers by pushing your POV that there were no effects of the Morgenthau Plan.

--Stor stark7 Talk 20:08, 19 September 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Photographs of Henry L. Stimson

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Sec'y Stimson & Gen. Grant, Lawn Party, Gov's Island http://memory.loc.gov/service/pnp/ggbain/09400/09435v.jpg (Library of Congress http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.09435) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bear1952 (talkcontribs) 01:31, 17 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

The Committee of Three

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I'm surprised his membership in "The Committee of Three" is left out. Along with Stimson, it included former Japanese Ambassador Joseph Grew and Admiral Forrester who all agreed it would've been wiser to take a softer more 'face-saving' line by war's end with the Japanese and despite Stimson's invaluable participation with Britain to create the atom bombs, the committee was, to my surprise, against our unconditional surrender terms, had written the Potsdam Delcaration differently than announced & against prolonging the war(in their opinion) to use the bombs, especially on civilians. None of which I learnt till recently. All of which is the opposite of my prior impression of Stimson.

Until I learnt about this, I did not know they wrote the original Potsdam Declaration, that they were against unconditional surrender, initially offered to let the Japanese keep their Emperor but that Byrnes and Truman had infuriated them by re-writing the declaration themselves to exclude that vital offer. In fact, I had a completely different picture of Stimson in my mind till recently.

From the bios I read on these men, they believed we could have ended the war earlier and on better terms for us and worse terms for Stalin and the communists if we'd kept with the original text and 'softer line'. We knew Stalin wasn't forwarding Japan's capitulation negotiation requests from decoding Japan's own diplomatic codes. Stimson, who took the original hard line on the Japanese over Manchuria, was crucial to the atomic bombs being realized, yet to his change in attitude by war's end seems important to me.

According to the Oxford encyclopedia on WWII, recent documents 'prised' out of archival shelters and secrecy acts indicate a very different picture of Stimson than commonly portrayed to date. They quote his released biography 'History might find that the United States, in its delay in stating its position on unconditional surrender terms, had prolonged the war.' This is a very different picture of Stimson than I learnt in history classes 20-30 years ago. I only learnt of this studying Ambassador Grew who was similarily quoted: Grew stated, "If surrender could have been brought about in May 1945 or even in June or July before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." I never heard of this 'Committee of Three' nor their protesting of unconditional surrender, the Potsdam Declaration, use of atom bomb and Stimson's concerns over the War Crime Trials too.

It seems a shame to leave out this very important change of attitude and participation by leaving out "The Committee of Three" altogether.

Sadly it might have saved all sides many lives and we might have been in a better position to prevent the spread of communism throughout East Asia settling with Japan before Stalin got his foot in the door.

Therefore, I just think it's an important aspect of his life and career if not legacy(total reversal of my perception personally) that is worthy of mention and expounding.(along with Grew and Forrestal).

Any supporters to this inclusion and expounding? TheBalderdasher (talk) 20:52, 3 May 2008 (UTC)[reply]

You have my vote. I'm all for the inclusion of this important information. I checked your sources and some of my own and see that you are right. For the sake of Stimson's remembrance I think this should definately be explained.AthabascaCree (talk) 06:06, 4 May 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Progressive v. conservative

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How about if we just call him Republican? Or drop the party affiliation from the lede altogether? The meaning of Progressive has changed since Stimson'stime, and so has Conservative. Progressives: Teddy Roosevelt who invaded Cuba, was considered Progressive. And he was also conservative, our first major conservationist. Back when conservatives were known for wanting to conserve trees. Go figure. The labels are kinda beside the point and mentioning in the lede Stimson's political affiliation seems like overemphasis: makes it sound like all that mattered was his party politics. That did matter, don't get me wrong, Roosevelt needed bipartisan support for the war he knew was coming. But Stimson was the guy who mobilized a reluctant American to take on the strongest, deadliest, military power on earth. That is more important than party affiliation, or ideological label. Both proved to be beside the point facing the emergency of world war.ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 00:54, 28 November 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Republican partisanship

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How could Stimson be "born into a family long involved in Republican Party politics" when he was born in 1867 and the Republican party was at the time only 12 years old, emerging "out of a coalition of anti-slavery Whigs and Free Soil Democrats" in 1854 and receiving its name only in 1855? ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 23:12, 9 July 2011 (UTC)[reply]

"long involved in Republican politics"

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We've waited a year for the "citation needed" template to bear fruit. But no substantiation of that "family long involved in Republican politics" phrase and there is no indication Stimson's father, a surgeon, had any political involvement whatever. So out it goes. ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 15:29, 21 June 2012 (UTC

Henry L. Stimson's obituary, published in the New Yirk Times at this death, claims he was from NY and his father was a wealthy financier, not a surgeon. LindaK19 (talk) 19:14, 20 March 2013 (UTC)LindaK19[reply]

Hi LindaK19--thanks for the inspiration to go look it up. You might want to read a little further in the New York Times obituary. It says: "Henry Stimson's father had made enough money as a banker in his early career to permit him to enjoy the luxury of studying medicine in Zurich and Paris and establishing a large and extremely lucrative practice in New York". He was a surgeon, and a famous one who invented some surgical techniques still used . ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 19:30, 20 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
ys and after his mother died he was mostly raised by his grandfather = tight-knit family. Rjensen (talk) 16:31, 22 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks Rjensen. I added a "cite needed" to that sentence in the article because--well, because a cite is needed. Perhaps the original source might have some info on why being raised by a grandfather mattered in his subsequent life, or in Wikipedia terms, is "notable."ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 16:55, 22 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
the cite was already there--it's in footnote 1 where it belongs. (click to read the text and see for yourself). The point is that he was in a tight-knit family and that his grandfather was at least as influential on him as his father or mother (she died when he was young). Rjensen (talk) 21:57, 22 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Ah, I see what you mean. The former law review editor in me (like a virus) instinctively expects a footnote on every sentence, but on Wikipedia I'll have to be content to see the footnote delayed a few sentences. In gratitude, the appropriate response is here. ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 16:43, 23 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Stimson Diary

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I believe that the Stimson quote regarding "maneuver[ing] the Japanese into firing the first shot" should either be put in full context or removed from this page. Without a very lengthy analysis of the context, the quote conveys the idea that Pearl Harbor was an "inside job," which is rejected by most reputable historians. — Preceding unsigned comment added by HannaBarberaFanatic (talkcontribs) 23:22, 7 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]

What is the "context" that ought to be added? ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 01:49, 8 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Stimson and FDR expected Japan would attack the US Allies, not the US. Current JSTOR pp 73-4 says: Stimson and his colleagues were not anticipating an early Japanese blow against the Philippines or Guam, to say nothing of Hawaii. What they did expect and await was a movement against some such place as Thailand or, possibly, Singapore. When, therefore, Roosevelt "brought up," in Stimson's words, "the event that we were likely to be attacked," he could have meant "we" only in the sense of what he and Stimson assumed to be our side, including the British and the Dutch. ....The fact that the President and his advisers on November 25 did not expect the Japanese soon to strike at American territory was precisely the reason why the question "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot" was such a "difficult proposition." Since the Japanese were not thought likely to initiate hostilities against the United States itself, the problem was how to put them into a position of seeming to fire the "first shot" at this country. The policy makers, on November 25 and 28, considered two ways of doing this. One was a diplomatic "maneuver," a warn- ing to Japan; and the other a political "maneuver," a message to Congress and the people. Both the dispatch to Japan and the address to Congress were to be phrased in such a way that, if the Japanese proceeded with their southward movement, even though they did not touch any American territory, they would nevertheless appear to be deliberately assailing our vital interests and, in that sense, attacking us. Rjensen (talk) 01:17, 21 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks that is indeed useful context. I am not sure how it would be condensed to fit in the appropriate paragraph, but will leave that to you if you feel it ought to be included.ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 13:59, 21 March 2013 (UTC)[reply]

The Doug Long source

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There is no proof to say that the person Doug Long forged and created the Stimson diary himself. He just copied and pasted the information and by adding commentaries himself. The writings on the Doug Long page is long and detailed and is the copy and paste of the Stimson papers that many Americans don't want to show, because it reveals the truth including his heart attack scares and other details that Americans don't want to know or care because it is contradicting the norm and propaganda that was fed to the US after the bombing. I say Doug Long just copied and pasted the info and there is no proof that he wrote the 9 pages himself. This is Stimson's writing and careful and detailed search of his papers in other websites and libraries will recreate these diaries.

Doug Long is obviously little critical of the bombing, and the reverts done by certain people are of the opposite view and I think there should be middle ground. I'm in the middle. I'm not blaming anything but I'm trying to show the human aspect of this atomic bombing so that people can get the whole picture. Nobody is perfect and I'm trying to show that. Careful analysis of these kinds of histories are essential for the future generation. Falsities will create more falsities. 75.70.142.23 (talk) 16:28, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Nope, the WP:BURDEN is on you to show that Long is WP:RS. From every indication I see, Long has created his own webpage and is thus WP:SPS. It is not an acceptable source. Stimson wrote diaries, and they are published by the Yale University Library OCLC 62029043. So Long's copying of them may be a copyright violation. That is just another reason why Wikipedia cannot use long. (In the meantime, note that I have requested that your IP account be blocked for vandalism. It was not just the disruptive Long edits that have prompted this request.) – S. Rich (talk) 16:45, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Doug Long admits that he thinks the Hiroshima bombing was unnecessary (http://www.doug-long.com/rambling.htm), so I don't think we want to introduce his slanted point of view via cherry-picked excerpts. Furthermore, Wikipedia aims to use reliable secondary sources over primary sources. (Stimson's diary is a primary source). Nine times out of ten, if you're drawing sourcing from a private website, you're doing it wrong. Chris Troutman (talk) 16:54, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Doug Long is a self-published source, and he is not an acknowledged topic expert. The source fails WP:RS. We cannot use it. Binksternet (talk) 17:26, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
every historian who works on the topic has an opinion, and Long's is the same as many scholars. His transcription is VERY useful and not controversial. It should be listed in the external links. His annotations are innocuous and not POV (they identify various people that Stimson mentions). It's a primary source and Wikipedia editors often link to excerpts from primary sources. The Diary was written by a government official during his course of duties for the purpose of helping him keep track of decisions, so it is not eligible for copyright. Rjensen (talk) 20:32, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
I am well aware that some hold Long's position about dropping the bomb. Regardless, I think the wiki is better served by using some good secondary sources over Long's self-published analysis of a primary source. I am fine including the page as an external link but I do not support using it as a reference. Chris Troutman (talk) 22:21, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Assuming that the diary is a government document and therefore not subject to copyright is not well founded. Several reasons bear this out. 1. The diaries cover the years 1904-1945, and include years when he was not in office. 2. They are not in the US Archives. 3. The microfilm edition of the diaries contains 169 reels of material, which have been indexed and catelogued by non-government archivists. Regarding Doug Long, WorldCat has a single listing OCLC 45397291 for a SPS e-book. He is not RS. His website, with all its' pages, is clearly WP:ELNO. – S. Rich (talk) 22:26, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
The Long excerpts in question deal only with 1945 when Stimson was on the government payroll. He dictated them every night to his government secretary who typed them up. The index and catalog are not included. Rjensen (talk) 23:33, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
It is still WP:ELNO #11 because Long is not a recognized authority. Binksternet (talk) 23:44, 26 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Maybe you are not an unrecognized authority. What makes you say he is unrecognized authority. Are you an recognized authority for removing his source. At least he wrote information on the web, so people can see different point of view. Long is a messenger and nothing more. The article can have total POV bias by citing many valid sources, but it still can be POV. For instance, if I write an article about war and the all the valid sources are from the one side of the conflict, would that mean the article is perfect. No. It is relative. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.134.24.94 (talkcontribs) 02:01, 27 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
No that does not work. ELNO#11 is about "Blogs, personal web pages and most fansites." Instead this is a retyping of a major primary source. Long is the re-typist and Stimson is the source. Long also says he has Yale Library's permission ("published here with the authorization of the Yale University Library" he says). All the historians, from every side, have used the Stimson diary and linking to it enhances the quality of Wikipedia's coverage. Rjensen (talk) 00:06, 27 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]
How many times this should be said. Stimson is the source, saying, writer of *his* diary. It came out of this mouth. Long copied it from somewhere with permission. In other words, Long didn't create the diary. He is republishing information. For instance, if I write my diary and gave to some institution, a person 40 years later asks for that diary and publishes on the web, would that mean the publisher is falsifying my diary and is unreliable source. Long is just a messenger.(talk) 01:59, 27 May 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Bias? Atomic Bomb + Stimson's Vision

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The language in these two sections seems oddly skewed.

Re: Atomic Bomb First: The analysis of the three days between Hiroshima and Nagasaki as "nothing seemed to happen" rather than "with no surrender being offered during this time" or something more specific is troubling. The war didn't just 'stop' for three days. Events, rather than nothing, was still happening. I'm not an expert on Wikipedia policy (clearly), but isn't clarity and adherence to the denotative value of words a basic value of an enycolopaedia?

Secondly: Considering the next part of the phrase: "he had Truman drop "Fat Man" on Nagasaki on August 9". The denotative value of this phrase is that Stimson ultimately made the call to bomb Nagasaki. While certainly influential over Truman, "encouraged" would be a more accurate turn of phrase. Further, General Groves and Admiral Purnell had long advocated use of two bombs in a 1-2 punch, which makes the portrayal of Stimson as the unilateral force behind the bomb even more suspect. Additionally, as the intended target was Kokura with Nagasaki as a secondary target, the sentence is objectively wrong from that perspective as well. The decision to bomb Nagasaki was made by Bocks Car pilot Charles Sweeney after three failed passes at Kokura.

Finally: The final line "The Japanese offered to surrender on August 10" directly implies that the Japanese decided to surrender as a direct result of the nuclear war, but the article fails to make this an actual position. Given that a discussion of surrendering was already occurring on the ninth, and the importance of the Soviet invasion, this line ultimately constitutes grave content bias. The surrender of Japan article gives a much clearer picture of events, and fundamentally links the Soviet Invasion into the key events. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan#August_8.E2.80.939:_Soviet_invasion_and_Nagasaki

Regarding: "Stimson's Vision" The language in the first line is clearly biased, and the first line has nothing to do with the rest of the section. Let's review:

"In retrospect historians debate whether the impact of continued blockade, relentless bombing, and the Russian invasion of Manchuria would have somehow forced the Emperor to surrender sometime in late 1945 or early 1946 even without the atomic bombs (though not without very large numbers of Japanese casualties.)" --- This entire sentence should be removed.

has not been, if not removed I will remove it Juror1 (talk) 00:17, 23 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

First: The use of "retrospect" is wholly redundant, as all historians consider things in retrospect. Rather, the connotation here is that these views are less valuable because they are being made in hindsight, similar to someone dismissing something with "hindsight is 20/20".

Second: The use of "somehow" colours these historians views as flimsy, and could be removed from the sentence without changing its meaning at all.

Third: The use of "even" is inappropriate for the same reason as "somehow". It does not change the meaning of the sentence other than to imply that without the atomic bombs, ending the war would be much harder. As this sentence is purporting to discuss the views of revisionist historians and not the metaphorical difficulty of stopping Japan sans A-bomb, this seems inappropriate.

Fourth: The parenthetical "(though not without very large numbers of Japanese casualties.)" appears to be an editorial comment, unless all revisionist historians have asides in their work where they confirm that this alternative course of action would have caused great numbers of Japanese casualties. I do not see how this parenthetical has any place in the article.

Fifth: The citation for this sentence says "for "revisionists" who reject use of the bomb, see Gar Alperovitz..." This appears to be a comment directed entirely at revisionist readers – it literally says "for 'revisionists'" – to support a pro-bombing POV, rather than a citation providing evidence of revisionist historian claims.

Sixth: This sentence seems completely unnecessary to the rest of the paragraph, which pretty much just goes on to fawn over Stimson for what a genius he is. The conjuction "but", which leads to the rest of the paragraph, is used to fabricate a connection; however, there is no direct contrast or connection between these historians' views and Stimson's nuclear philosophies, which are the subject of the rest of the paragraph.

To Conclude: Both the jus ad bellum for the atomic bombings and the Surrender of Japan are extremely complicated topics. Both subjects have their own wikipedia articles (see below) that should be linked to directly. That said, as the discussion of historical revisionism and jus ad bellum consists of only a single flawed sentence with little relation to the rest of the article, it should probably be removed from the article entirely. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_the_atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki

lol

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> Once again, Stimson defied all criticism about his age by proving that he was still as prescient and on top of his game as ever.

lol — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.43.3.130 (talk) 19:57, 21 December 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Stimson's view of the bomb and "speculation."

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In his biography "The First Wise Man," David F. Schmitz writes of Stimson the following: "Although he would later become the leading public defender of the use of the bombs, Stimson was not comfortable with all the decisions made at the time nor in complete agreement with the use of the bomb as a diplomatic weapon. In the end, he concluded that providing the Japanese with some sort of guarantee of retaining the Emperor would have shortened the war and possibly made the use of the atomic bombs unnecessary."

I added the following sentence with Schmitz as a source: "Stimson would ultimately conclude that if the United States had guaranteed the Japanese that they would retain their Emperor, they would have surrendered and therefore ended the war early, possibly making the use of atomic bombs unnecessary."

I believe this is a straightforward summary of the source. ElijahBosley modified the sentence to read, "With hindsight, Stimson later speculated that if the United States had earlier acceded to the Japanese demand that they retain their Emperor (as the ultimate terms of surrender did) the war might have ended sooner, possibly making the use of atomic bombs unnecessary."

The phrase "with hindsight" is an editorial addition not included in the source, and appears to have no purpose other than to dismiss Stimson's judgment. The word "speculate" is a WP:WEASEL word with the same effect, only more egregious. The use of the phrase "acceded to the Japanese demand" has no relation to the source text, nor does the editorial addition, "as the ultimate terms of the surrender did."

Lastly, the end of the sentence as modified appears, almost comically (almost certainly unintentionally) to suggest that the war might have ended, but the bombs been dropped anyway.

I'm sorry to be so harsh but I can't see a single positive outcome of this edit and have restored my original sentence. -Darouet (talk) 22:33, 19 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]

I take your point about "speculated" being a weasel word (as is "possibly"). I agree that it a straightforward summary of the source. However the wording remains poor, both in the article, and in Schmitz, who cites no sources, lowering his status as a reliable source. The reader might also take "Although he would later" to be in contradiction with "In the end". What is the source? What did Stimson actually have to say about it? In his memoirs (written with McGeorge Bundy, and therefore in the third person) he wrote:

Only on the question of the Emperor did Stimson take, in 1945, a conciliatory view; only on this question did he later believe that history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war.

— Stimson and Bundy, "On Active Service in Peace and War" (1948), pp. 628-629
Thus, Stimson believed that it might have shortened the war. He was wrong about the verdict of history though; while most historians believe that it was a good idea, the verdict of history is that it did not shorten the war (which is not by any means the same as a consensus that the atomic bombs were necessary or sufficient). In his 1947 Harpers article (the source of "later become the leading public defender of the use of the bombs"), he wrote (again with Bundy, but in the first person this time):

In the light of the formidable problem which thus confronted us, I felt that every possible step should be taken to compel a surrender of the homelands, and withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Asiatic mainland and from other positions, before we had commenced an invasion. We held two cards to assist us in such an effort. One was the traditional veneration in which the Japanese Emperor was held by his subjects and he power which was thus vested in him over his loyal troops. It was for this reason that I suggested in my memorandum of July 2 that his dynasty should be continued. The second card was the use of the atomic bomb in the manner best calculated to persuade that Emperor and the counselors about him to submit to our demand for what was essentially unconditional surrender, placing his immense power over his people and his troops subject to our orders.

The editorial addition "as the ultimate terms of the surrender did" is plain wrong.
Thus, "with hindsight" and "might" are correct. I am not going to make any WP:BOLD changes, but my recommendation would be to substitute the quote from Stimson and Bundy. Hawkeye7 (talk) 23:55, 19 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for your thoughtful note. I agree with much of what you write. Obviously Stimson's Harper's essay is one of the more forceful defenses of the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that Stimson's Harper's essay did not capture all his thinking on the matter. For this reason I fear that the phrase "with hindsight" would paint a false picture of Simpson's views on the subject, given his repeated arguments, before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that modified surrender terms could end the war without the bombs.
In May 1945, Stimson and Joseph Grew argued that Truman, to end the war and avoid ruining Japan, should make it clear that Japanese unconditional surrender did not include forfeiture of the Japanese emperor or nation. Herbert Feis writes in "The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" that "Grew and Stimson had said that they shared [Forrestal's] belief that it would be regrettable if we had to lay Japan in ruins before it would submit, and that for many reasons the American government would be well advised to try to secure the end before the damage was complete. The three cabinet officers agreed to propose to the President that he let the Japanese know that if they submitted to our demand for unconditional surrender they would not be destroyed as a nation nor condemned to prolonged suffering." (pp.15-16)
In July, Stimson recommended that Allied demands include the possibility of Japan retaining some form of constitutional monarchy. Truman however did not accept these recommendations. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes in "Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan" that, "Framing his request around the US interest in forestalling Soviet expansion in Asia, [Stimson] made an eleventh-hour effort to include the promise of preservation of the monarchical system in the proclamation. Stimson met with Truman on July 24 and attempted to revive the clause that had been stricken out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stimson wrote in his diary, "I then spoke of the importance which I attributed to the reassurance of the Japanese on the continuance of their dynasty, and I had felt that the insertion of that in the formal warning was important and might be just the thing that would make or mar their acceptance." Truman told him that... it was impossible to change it... etc." (pp.156-7)
After Stimson's Harper's essay, Grew, who opposed using the weapons, challenged Stimson's account. Gar Alperovitz, in "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," quotes from Stimson's private reply: "This is a difficult and rather touchy business because, as you know, feelings ran high and there were very fine men, who should have known better, working on the other side." (p.476)
I don't think we should whitewash Stimson's deep involvement in the decision to use the weapons or later defense of that decision, but it should be noted that before and after the event, he believed a diplomatic solution was feasible, and argued for this. -Darouet (talk) 01:49, 20 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Reading all of this erudition, and with gratitude for y'all quoting the original sources, I wonder if there is objection to changing "would" to "might," and eliminating what becomes a redundant "possibly", so it reads: "Stimson would ultimately conclude that if the United States had guaranteed the Japanese that they would retain their Emperor, they might have surrendered, making the use of atomic bombs unnecessary."ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 13:44, 20 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Elijah - I think your proposal is ideal and improves the current language to make it more accurate and concise. -Darouet (talk) 15:11, 20 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
It's clear from all the quotes above (Hawkeye's too) that this section is woefully inadequate and perhaps misleading. For instance the section purveys Stimson's own insistence that he directed atomic policy, while historians recognize that Byrnes in fact held greater authority. The section ignores the debates over diplomacy and the bomb, of which Stimson was at the center. Anyway these can be addressed in time... just putting it out there. -Darouet (talk) 15:02, 21 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Reliable sources I think are largely agreed that Stimson dominated and controlled policy regarding the bomb, not Byrnes. It was a military matter and Byrnes was out of the loop. There was one episode in 1945 that is especially revealing. Stimson normally relayed all his decisions about atomic issues thru General Marshall. Marshall was out of town and could not be reached and the matter was urgent so Simpson gave orders directly to Groves-- who was astonished: no civilian had ever given him a command. for the first time Groves realized that Stimson called the shots. Truman's decision-making was almost entirely in conjunction with Stimson, not Byrnes. Rjensen (talk) 15:10, 21 May 2016 (UTC)[reply]
This was related to the exemption of Kyoto from the target list. Stimson knew that Groves wanted this, and he wanted to make it clear to Groves that he did not. Stimson had no authority whatsoever to issue orders to Groves directly; they had to come through Marshall. And Stimson knew that Marshall was loath to over-ride his subordinates. So Groves could have gone ahead and put Kyoto back on the target list. But Groves had on occasion bypassed Marshall and gone to Stimson to get what he wanted, so that would have been a consideration. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:01, 15 June 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Sadly Rjensen I don't have time to investigate this more closely right now, but a book I recently read by Richard Rhodes, "The Making of the Atomic Bomb," states that Byrnes had greater influence and authority over Truman and over the decision about the bomb than did Stimson. Furthermore the two books I quote above - Hasegawa and Feis - appear to suggest the same. I think that, when we have time, we should revisit this question. -Darouet (talk) 19:33, 15 June 2016 (UTC)[reply]
Reading Rhodes is always a very good start, but you have to remember that he is more like a tertiary source. The argument about Byrnes comes from Alperovitz, and has been contested by younger historians. Byrnes certainly did have greater influence over Truman than Stimson, but it is vitally important to understand that there was no decision taken by Truman relating to the use of the atomic bombs. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:01, 15 June 2016 (UTC)[reply]

How old was he? And the cat?

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There have been changes to the age in the title for Stimson's portrait as a child. But there is no clear date on the original Wiki-images file, it says "circa." So maybe best to say "Stimson as a child with Mimi the cat" and not try to pin down his age. ElijahBosley (talk ☞) 16:24, 20 September 2016 (UTC)[reply]

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