Talk:Louis XIV

Citation suggestion

Under Early Acts a citation is needed at the end of the third paragraph (this would be a new citation 23). I cannot edit the article directly but I suggest this book chapter by David Parrot.

https://academic.oup.com/book/33734/chapter/288372979

In this text he writes (bold added):

"The essence of the regime was the management of allies and clients within the political establishment to concentrate power and influence, creating a commitment to support ministerial policies on the basis of shared political and material interests. This network of alliances started at the top of society: the occasionally fraught but long-lasting alliance between Richelieu and Henri II, prince de Condé, brought great political benefits to Richelieu, primarily by legitimizing his regime via the adherence of a prince of the royal blood.77 Beneath the rapport with Condé, a sporadic network of ministerial alliances descended down through tiers of the great nobility, and were in some cases secured by matrimonial alliances: Bernard de La Valette, second duc d’Épernon; Henri de Guise-Lorraine, comte d’Harcourt; Antoine de Gramont, comte de Guiche.78 The network extended through families and groupings within the noblesse de robe with power and influence in key judicial and financial institutions. It could include families whose members, holding the office of maître des requêtes in the Paris Parlement, might be commissioned to act as intendants with instructions to try to impose or collect taxes in provinces, neutralize opposition, or satisfy the various financiers that outstanding revenues or debts would be collected. But many other members of the network of clients were themselves part of the provincial elites—nobles, churchmen, or office-holders, tasked with trying to break down resistance to tax demands, overseeing unpopular legislation, and buying off or intimidating opponents of Richelieu’s policies in the provinces and within local institutions.79

An essentially personalized network linked a nexus of ministerial supporters across court, central government, provinces, and institutions. What bound them to ministerial policies was not ideological commitment to Richelieu’s priorities in foreign policy, still less a belief that Richelieu’s rule was synonymous with political modernization or state-building. What motivated and maintained their adherence was an alignment of interests. As the burdens of sustaining the war effort grew heavier, the task of selling and maintaining ministerial policies became harder and generated more antagonism between the exponents of ministerial policy and their opponents. Yet the benefits of adherence to a powerful patronage network could provide a range of advantages in terms of appointments for relatives and friends, career advancement, political influence, and judicial protection. For many of those in the higher reaches of ministerial clienteles, or the political allies of Richelieu and, later, Mazarin, involvement on favourable terms in the financing of the war effort became one of the largest attractions of cooperation with the regime. ‘Exploitative finance seems the glue which held together the Mazarinist regime’, as William Beik bluntly summed up this mechanism.80 The perception was widely shared that the only access to the king and royal favour lay through the minister and his clients, and this was indeed a situation that Richelieu wished to create, even if he was not wholly successful. Moreover, the king’s decisions in matters of favour were perceived as subordinate to those of the cardinal-minister. The claim that the ‘king counted for nothing’ in appointments and promotions to military office, though demonstrably not true, became a regular and bitter complaint in the officer corps, which was split between those who enjoyed advancement because they were the cardinal’s clients, and those marginalized or excluded despite their services.81

A lot of resentment and hostility was generated by this essentially informal regime through which the cardinal and his allies gained control of the mechanisms of government and used them to short-circuit the ‘ordinary’ system of royal authority based on established institutions and traditional rights. This hostility should be emphasized." Djorenstein (talk) 14:55, 8 September 2023 (UTC)

"L'Etat c'est moi" listed at Redirects for discussion

The redirect L'Etat c'est moi has been listed at redirects for discussion to determine whether its use and function meets the redirect guidelines. Readers of this page are welcome to comment on this redirect at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2023 December 11 § L'Etat c'est moi until a consensus is reached. Silcox (talk) 06:27, 11 December 2023 (UTC)

Correction requested.

Heading - Personal reign and reforms Section - Coming of age and early reforms

Paragraph 6 sentence 1. Nobility is spelled incorrectly. Keio9011565 (talk) 00:47, 21 March 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 4 May 2024

Elady years and the fonde requires sources. 64.189.18.39 (talk) 10:28, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Charliehdb (talk) 13:10, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 4 May 2024 (2)

Majority and the fordne requires sources 64.189.18.39 (talk) 10:29, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Charliehdb (talk) 13:10, 4 May 2024 (UTC)

Semi-protected edit request on 16 June 2024

Add additional citations to minority and the Fronde add a space between the and Fronde. 64.189.18.30 (talk) 13:59, 16 June 2024 (UTC)