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2017 Venezuelan regional elections

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2017 Venezuelan regional elections

← 2012 15 October 2017 (2017-10-15) 2021 →
Turnout61.14% Increase
 
Alliance GPPSB MUD
Popular vote 5,817,344 4,984,830
Percentage 52.68 Decrease 45.14% Increase

Results by state.
Red denotes states won by the Great Patriotic Pole. Blue denotes those won by the Coalition for Democratic Unity.

Regional elections were held in Venezuela on 15 October 2017 to elect state governors.[1] The two main participants were the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) opposition coalition and the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP) alliance of the ruling Bolivarian government. The election resulted in a victory for the GPP, which won the majority of governorships. The GPP won 18 out of the 23 governorships, while the MUD won the remaining five. Four Democratic Action governors of five opposition governors elected decided to be sworn in under the Bolivarian government-led National Constituent Assembly despite promises to never recognize the body.[2]

Irregularities

Delayed elections

Controversy arose surrounding on whether the election would be held or not since the government-leaning National Electoral Council (CNE) had not determined a date only two months ahead of the expected election date in December 2016, when the mandates of the governors of the 23 states of the country expired, with some believing that this is due to the belief that if elections were held, the ruling party, United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), would suffer one of its largest losses in over a decade.[3] Luis Emilio Rondón [es], rector of the National Electoral Council (CNE), explained that the CNE has received complaints related to delays in the setting up of the polling stations and the arrival of their staff, as well as "technical problems with voting machines".[4]

On 18 October 2016, the president of the National Electoral Council (CNE), Tibisay Lucena, stated that regional elections would not be held until mid-2017, stating the delay was due to a so-called "economic war" and low oil prices. Government sources stated that the true reason of the delay was the hope that higher oil prices may raise the popularity of the PSUV.[5]

Lucena finally announced on 23 May 2017 that elections were to be held on 10 December 2017.[6] However, during the 5th session of the 2017 Constituent Assembly of Venezuela, it was later suggested to move ahead the elections into October 2017.[7] A month before the elections, 15 October 2017 was selected as the date for regional elections.[1]

Relocation of voting centers

Luis Emilio Rondón [es] denounced several irregularities throughout the campaign, which were also criticised by the opposition and governments such as Canada and the United States, and considered that the electoral body has taken several illegal measures aimed at demobilizing voters in areas identified as opposition strongholds.[4] The Democratic Unity Roundtable issued a statement declaring:

The abrupt changes of voting centers is a technique known as crazy mouse used by the Nicaraguan government to confuse opposition voters. Since 2006, when Daniel Ortega came to power in Nicaragua, all elections have been fraudulent through the use of various mechanisms, including shock groups similar to the colectivos. This is widely known by the international community.[8]

They claimed Daniel Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo are allies of president Nicolás Maduro and that "both have now become in the principal advisors of Maduro in the organization of electoral frauds". In a statement, the MUD demanded the Executive Branch the immediate expulsion of Nicaraguan advisors and asked the Organization of American States (OAS) and the governments of the region to demand Nicaragua not to meddle in the internal affairs of Venezuela, saying that "we reject the participation of Nicaragua in any initiative related with the situation of Venezuela". Liliana Hernández, electoral coordinator of the MUD, denounced that the CNE did not allow international observers and did not accredit the Venezuelan Electoral Observatory for the accompaniment during the regional elections.[9]

The relocation happened in less than 72 hours of the election of more than 250 voting centers, many of which located in traditionally opposition zones.[4] Due to the relocation of voting centers by the government, some middle class Venezuelans who usually support the opposition were forced to vote in poor communities filled with crime, deterring voter participation in some cases.[10] Three days before elections, the Bolivarian government-led CNE changed hundreds of voting locations affecting over 700,000 voters in predominately opposition areas, publishing a table with the affected polling stations, with the Miranda and Mérida states being the most affected, with 232,428 and 129,520 voters, respectively. The CNE cited security reasons, though opposition members believe the move was to cause confusion and prevent voter participation.[11][12]

Broadcasting

Rondón also criticized the state television network, Venezolana de Televisión, for transmitting pro-government messages which is forbidden by law, describing it as "regretful" that the very public network "is violating the electoral regulations".[4]

Ineligible candidates

The CNE had refused to remove MUD politicians who had lost primaries before the election from boards that voter would choose from. Venezuelans seeking to vote for an opposition candidate had the possibility of voting for an ineligible candidate out of confusion.[13]

Election day

Venezuelans chanting "We have to vote" at a voting center closed by the government.

Although the Venezuelan Electoral Observatory declared that "there are incidents but these are more isolated than generalized", it reported several irregularities, including reports of absence of witnesses in voting centers, that the CNE web portal still had outdated data on the relocation of polling stations, that Carlos Ocariz, candidate for the Miranda state, postponed his right to vote because he was attacked, and that a polling stating located in Palo Verde, Caracas [es], asked voters to pass by a "red point" of the United Socialist Party (PSUV) to verify their information after voting.[14]

During the elections there was refusal by the Plan República [es] and board members for media to cover the process. In the Fermín Toro school of Valencia one of the electoral witnesses denounced that their credential was taken away by an official after taking photos of the center. Until the dawn, the System of Public Media transmitted electoral propaganda of the pro-government candidates, violating the electoral norm. In Los Teques several electoral boards opened late and with accidental members (voters waiting in line and board witnesses).[15]

Daniel Ascanio, president of the Federation of Student Centers of the Simón Bolívar University, declared that government supporters took control of the largest polling stating in Guarenas to prevent voters to cast their ballot.[16] Despite that at 10:00am VST the MUD registered more than 620 irregular incidents, the opposition coalition assured that the complaints still represented a low percentage and they were being dealt with regionally to solve the problems.[17] Minister of Defense Padrino López reported the commission of 26 alleged electoral crimes, and Foro Penal reported 15 related arrests, including one for taking a picture of the electoral ballot, among which most of the detainees were released.[18]

Election ink was not used like in previous elections.[19] In several polling stations, power outages and failing voter machines led to longer than expected wait times for voters.[20] Pro-government colectivos were seen riding motorcycles near voting centers in some cities;[21] Eduardo Vale, a MUD councilor of Maracaibo, denounced that with Molotov cocktails were thrown at one center.[22] Journalists were reportedly assaulted in Trujillo[23] and Zulia.[24]

Results

The Democratic Unity Roundtable issued a statement setting a position and denouncing the several irregularities during the process, among which were:

  1. An electoral population of at least 1,000,080 voters was prevented or hindered from voting in centers historically favorable to the opposition by damaged machines, boards that did not open or that had unjustified delays until late at night.
  2. More than 700 thousand Venezuelans who were migrated from their centers 48 hours before the election and even on the day of the election.
  3. An affected electoral population of at least 350,000 citizens affected by violence and intimidation inside and outside the electoral centers which prevented or hindered the free exercise of the vote.
  4. At least 90,537 null votes that should have been awarded to opposition candidates as a result of the impediment of replacing candidates already retired in fraud to the law.
  5. Coercion and blackmail of public employees and beneficiaries of social programs forcing them to vote with the accompaniment of PSUV leaders and through the Carnet de la Patria, which prevents the exercise of a free vote.
  6. Voters that exercised multiple votes and disrespecting the principle "one elector one vote", facilitated by the absence of indelible ink for the first time in our history.
  7. Irregular extensions after the time of the legal closure.
  8. Obstruction of the audits of the citizen verification process, which impeded the verification of the consistency between the votes cast and the results transmitted.
  9. Numeric inconsistency of historic electoral results as well as with all the studies, polls and exit polls carried out.[25]

The National Electoral Council published results for Bolívar on its website confirming the victory of the opposition candidate, then deleted them hours later. The opposition candidate to the Bolívar state governorship, Andrés Velásquez, announced before the CNE counted the voters that the results that showed him as the winner were "irreversible", declaring having 100% of the ballots, pointing out that the CNE did not count them to try to revert the obtained advantage and assuring that until the moment he had 50.42% of the adjudicated votes, while the Socialist Party had 49.58%, 268,361 votes.[26] On 18 October, Velásquez denounced the appointment of candidate Justo Noguera Pietri to the governorship as "fraud", claiming the existence of invalid ballots.[27] The same day, parliamentarian Enrique Márquez showed comparisons of the voting records from several voting boards with the results shown by the CNE, in which they subtracted votes from Andrés Velásquez and added votes to Justo Noguera Pietri, including a board showing a participation percentage of 96.67%.[28]

In the evening, spokesman for the MUD Ramon Guillermo Aveledo stated that opposition candidates elected into office would not subordinate to the Constituent National Assembly, saying "The Constitution is in force and says that the governor is sworn in before the Legislative Council".[29] Minutes before Tibisay Lucena announced preliminary results, the MUD advised voters that the CNE had different results than the ones calculated by observers.[30]

The substitutions that are our right and are established in the constitution were not allowed illegally. With 48 hours left for the boards to be installed the CNE unscrupulously and illegally made a move and changed the voting centers to 225 thousand Mirandinos.

Carlos Ocariz

The opposition candidate Carlos Ocariz declared that he would not recognize Héctor Rodríguez, his rival candidate, as governor of Miranda. As part of the complaints made by the opposition candidate, he explained that for example in 403 centers out of 1118 "we could not connect with the witnesses because they shut down the telephone lines". He described having "all the acts and we are reviewing them. But it is not a matter only of acts " since "in many voting centers they took our witnesses by force". He explained that "the substitutions that are our right and are established in the constitution were not allowed illegally. With 48 hours left for the boards to be installed the CNE unscrupulously and illegally made a move and changed the voting centers to 225 thousand Mirandinos". He also explained that they did a re-engineering with the centers relocation and that "it affected the results remarkably". He added that the persons that were mobilized in buses to the relocated centers were assaulted and beaten, and that violence was used as a tool to prevent the vote. "We saw the massification of the multiple vote as there was no indelible ink", adding that Venezuela currently faces "an absolutely fraudulent system". "There are numerical inconsistencies between the polls and the election results."[31]

Public opinion

Graphical summary
The blue line represents percentage that favor MUD. The red line represents percentage that favor GPP. Unfilled dots represent individual results of the polls seen below.

Poll results are listed in the tables below in chronological order and using the date the survey's fieldwork was done, as opposed to the date of publication. If such date is unknown, the date of publication is given instead. The highest percentage figure in each polling survey is displayed in bold, and the background shaded in the leading party's colour.

Date(s)
conducted
Polling organization Sample size MUD GPP Undecided Lead
Aug 2016 Datincorp 1,199 47% 20% 31% 27%
12–24 Nov 2016 Venebarometro 1,200 52.5% 27.5% 6.5% 25%
15–30 Nov 2016 Hercon 1,200 51.65% 21.21% 11.03% 30.44%
20 Jan – 6 Feb 2017 Hercon 1,200 51.5% 20.9% 12.5% 30.6%
28 Jan – 8 Feb 2017 Venebarometro 1,200 55% 26% 19% 29%
9–27 Feb 2017 Meganalisis 1,150 36.3% 11.9% 27.9% 24.4%
15–30 April 2017 Hercon 1,200 65.5% 17.2% 11.1% 48.3%
Aug 2017 Delphos 65% 35% 30%
1–5 Aug 2017 Hercon 1,000 40% 18.4% 5.2% 21.6%
20–29 Aug 2017 Hercon 1,200 53.8% 19.3% 5.3% 34.5%
Sept 2017 Delphos 38% 20% 23% 18%
1–20 Sept 2017 Venebarometro 1,500 51.7% 27.6% 20.7% 24.1%
Oct 2017 Datanalisis 44.7% 21.1% 23.6%
Oct 2017 Ecoanalítica 63.4% 36.4% 27.0%
Oct 2017 Poder y Estrategia - 61% 30% 2% 31%
Oct 2017 Hercon 1,000 59.2% 30.5% 8.3% 28.7%

Results

Preliminary

Most voted opposition parties in each state

According to Lucena, the MUD opposition coalition had only won 5 of 22 governorships in Venezuela – Anzoátegui, Mérida, Nueva Esparta, Táchira and Zulia – in what she called "irreversible results", while the GPP alliance of the Bolivarian government had won the remaining 17. There was no word on the results of the final state, Bolívar.[30][32]

Final results

State GPP candidate % MUD candidate %
Amazonas Miguel Rodríguez 60.09%[33] Bernabé Gutiérrez 31.08%
Anzoátegui Aristóbulo Isturiz 47.06% Antonio Barreto Sira 51.69%
Apure Ramón Carrizales 52.13% José Montilla  31.79%
Aragua Rodolfo Marco Torres 57.02% Ismael García 39.43%
Barinas Argenis Chávez 53.11% Freddy Superlano 44.14%
Bolívar Justo Noguera 49.09%[33] Andrés Velásquez 48.83%
Carabobo Rafael Lacava 52.75% Alejandro Feo La Cruz 45.62%
Cojedes Margaud Godoy 55.68% Alberto Galindez 42.71%
Delta Amacuro Lisetta Hernández 60.24% Larissa González 38.14%
Falcón Víctor Clark 52.44% Eliézer Sirit 43.93%
Guárico José Vásquez 61.77% Pedro Loreto 37.29%
Lara Carmen Meléndez 58.33% Henri Falcón 40.27%
Mérida Jehyson Guzmán 46.54% Ramón Guevara 50.82%
Miranda Héctor Rodríguez 52.78% Carlos Ocariz 45.67%
Monagas Yelitza Santaella 54.07% Guillermo Call 43.83%
Nueva Esparta Carlos Mata Figueroa 47.40% Alfredo Díaz 51.87%
Portuguesa Rafael Calles 64.51% María Beatriz Martínez 32.94%
Sucre Edwin Rojas 59.79% Robert Alcalá 38.86%
Táchira José Vielma Mora 35.41% Laidy Gómez 63.27%
Trujillo Henry Rangel Silva 59.75% Carlos González 37.74%
Vargas Jorge García Carneiro 52.98% José Manuel Olivares 45.57%
Yaracuy Julio León Heredia 62.13% Luis Parra 35.56%
Zulia Francisco Arias Cárdenas 47.38% Juan Pablo Guanipa 51.35%

Aftermath

Following the elections where the opposition only won five of twenty-three governorships, disillusionment with the opposition movement grew, especially after four of five opposition governors elected belonging to Democratic Action decided to be sworn in under the Bolivarian government-led National Constituent Assembly despite promises to never recognize the body.[34]

Reactions

Governments and supranational organisations

Domestic

  • Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD): Gerardo Blyde [es], the head of the MUD campaign command, dismissed the results and reaffirmed the distrust of the results offered by the National Electoral Council.[40]
  • Venebarómetro: Edgar Gutiérrez, director of the pollster Venebarómetro, declared that "the results are absolutely inconsistent with all the polls that showed a chavismo in a frank minority".[41]
  • President Maduro responded to accusations of election fraud by saying that the election was "the most audited and secure in the world" and that "nobody can commit fraud".[42]
  • Henri Falcón and Alejandro Feo La Cruz [es], opposition candidates for the Lara and Carabobo states respectively, broke with the opposition coalition's official position conceding defeat in the elections; while denouncing irregularities in the process, they also regretted the abstention of many voters.[42]

References

  1. ^ a b "Venezuela sets Oct. 15 for regional vote favoring opposition". The Washington Post. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 12 September 2017.
  2. ^ Aponte, Andreina; Polanco, Angry (25 October 2017). "Venezuelan opposition disarray heaps pain on protesters". Reuters. Retrieved 26 October 2017.
  3. ^ Vasquez S., Alex (6 October 2016). "Venezuela skipping regional election to keep Chavista governors in place, critics say". Fox News Latino. Archived from the original on 7 October 2016. Retrieved 7 October 2016.
  4. ^ a b c d "Rector electoral venezolano reporta retrasos en constitución de mesas de voto". AsíMismo (in Spanish). 16 October 2017. Archived from the original on 16 October 2017. Retrieved 10 May 2018.
  5. ^ Cawthorne, Andrew (19 October 2016). "Venezuela delays state elections to 2017, opposition angry". Reuters. Retrieved 19 October 2016.
  6. ^ "As Venezuela unrest spreads, Maduro presses on with plans to rewrite charter". Reuters. 24 May 2017. Retrieved 24 May 2017.
  7. ^ "Constituyente cubana apobó adelantar las elecciones regionales para el mes de octubre". La Patilla (in Spanish). 12 August 2017. Retrieved 13 August 2017.
  8. ^ "MUD exigió expulsar a grupo de expertos de Nicaragua por "injerencia" fraudulenta". El Cooperante. 14 October 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  9. ^ "Liliana Hernández: A Tibisay no le gusta la observación internacional". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  10. ^ "Opposition vies for landmark victory in polarized Venezuela". ABC News. 15 October 2017. Archived from the original on 20 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  11. ^ "715.502 electores fueron afectados por reubicación de centros de votación". El Nacional (in Spanish). 12 October 2017. Retrieved 14 October 2017.
  12. ^ Armario, Christine (13 October 2017). "AP Explains: What's at stake in Venezuela vote for governors". Lincoln Journal Star. Associated Press. Retrieved 14 October 2017.
  13. ^ "Venezuela regional elections: Maduro's party sweeps board". Deutsche Welle. 16 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  14. ^ Avendaño, Shari (15 October 2017). "OEV: Hay incidentes pero son más aislados que generalizados (segundo reporte Cocuyo Electoral)". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 October 2017.
  15. ^ Del Giudice, Pola (15 October 2017). "Retraso en instalación de mesas domina jornada en Altos Mirandinos". El Pitazo (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 October 2017.
  16. ^ "Electores votaron en Guarenas pese al amedrentamiento de colectivos armados". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  17. ^ Lozada, Mariel. "Las irregularidades denunciadas al inicio del proceso electoral el #15Oct" (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 2017-10-16.
  18. ^ "Foro Penal reporta 15 detenidos este # 15 Oct". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Archived from the original on 16 October 2017.
  19. ^ "Rondón: CNE will not use indelible ink in the regional ones". El Nacional (in Spanish). 14 September 2017. Retrieved 17 October 2017.
  20. ^ "Conozca las denuncias más frecuentes en la mitad de la jornada electoral". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  21. ^ "Colectivos rondan centros de votación en Guarenas". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 17 October 2017.
  22. ^ "Denuncian agresiones de grupos oficialistas en centro de votación del Zulia". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  23. ^ "Colectivos amenazaron con arma a periodista en Trujillo". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  24. ^ "En Zulia agredieron a un equipo de periodistas en centro de votación". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 15 October 2017.
  25. ^ "[Comunicado] MUD exige "auditoría total, cuantitativa y cualitativa" de todo el proceso electoral". Runrunes. 16 October 2017. Retrieved 18 October 2017.
  26. ^ Ibis, León (17 October 2017). "Son irreversibles los resultados que me dan ganador en Bolívar, afirma Andrés Velásquez" (in Spanish). Efecto Cocuyo. Archived from the original on 18 October 2017. Retrieved 18 October 2017.
  27. ^ "Andrés Velásquez: Con 100% de actas en mano puedo demostrar que esto es un fraude". Efecto Cocuyo (in European Spanish). 18 October 2017. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  28. ^ "Oposición venezolana publica actas sobre 'fraude' electoral cometido por el chavismo". El Nuevo Herald (in Spanish). Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  29. ^ "MUD: Gobernadores no se subordinarán a la ANC". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  30. ^ a b "CNE dio resultados irreversibles en 22 estados del país". El Nacional (in Spanish). 15 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  31. ^ León, Ibis (16 October 2017). "Carlos Ocariz: No reconocemos a Héctor Rodríguez como ganador de la gobernación". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 October 2017.
  32. ^ Cawthorne, Andrew (16 October 2017). "Venezuela socialists win regional vote, opposition sees fraud". Reuters. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  33. ^ a b "Divulgación Elecciones Regionales 2017" (in Spanish). Consejo Nacional Electoral. 18 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
  34. ^ Aponte, Andreina; Polanco, Angry (25 October 2017). "Venezuelan opposition disarray heaps pain on protesters". Reuters. Retrieved 26 October 2017.
  35. ^ "Argentina y otros 11 países reclamaron "auditoría independiente" a los comicios regionales en Venezuela". La Voz (in European Spanish). 17 October 2017. Retrieved 21 October 2017.
  36. ^ "Elecciones regionales en Venezuela no cambiarán "línea de acción" de UE". El Nacional (in Spanish). Agence France-Presse. 16 October 2017.
  37. ^ "Canadá: Cierre de centros de votación impide elecciones libres y justas". La Patilla (in European Spanish). 13 October 2017. Retrieved 14 October 2017.
  38. ^ "Israel pide al Gobierno que permita a la oposición competir con libertad". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). EFE. 15 October 2017. Archived from the original on 16 October 2017. Retrieved 5 May 2018.
  39. ^ "EEUU considera que elecciones en Venezuela no fueron "libres" ni "justas"". El Universal (in Spanish). 16 October 2017. Archived from the original on 16 October 2017.
  40. ^ Flores Riofrio, Jorge (15 October 2017). "La MUD no reconocerá ninguno de los resultados de las elecciones regionales del #15Oct". Efecto Cocuyo (in Spanish). Archived from the original on 16 October 2017. Retrieved 16 October 2017.
  41. ^ "Venebarómetro: Los resultados son absolutamente inconsistentes". La Patilla (in Spanish). 16 October 2017.
  42. ^ a b "Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro defends Sunday's vote". Al Jazeera. 18 October 2017. Retrieved 7 May 2018.