Moral particularism
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Moral particularism is a theory in meta-ethics that there are no moral principles and that moral judgement is determined by relevant factors in a particular context.[1] This stands in stark contrast to other prominent moral theories, such as deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics.
History
The term "particularism" was coined to designate this position by R. M. Hare, in 1963 (Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon, p. 18).
Views
Jonathan Dancy argued that cases, whether they're imagined or otherwise, contain certain elements from which we can infer certain moral ideas.[2]
Criticisms
A criticism of moral particularism is that it is inherently irrational; as to be rational in relation to moral thought that you have to be consistent and apply that consistently to moral issues which Moral Particularism does not.[3]
Further reading
- Hooker B, Little MO (eds.) (2001). Moral particularism. OUP.
- Dancy, Jonathan (2004). Ethics without principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
References
External links
- Dancy, Jonathan (2005). "Moral particularism", in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Tsu, Peter Shiu-Hwa. "Moral Particularism", in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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