Cuban intervention in Angola

File:Angola Map.jpg After gaining independence from Portugal, Angola became entangled in a power struggle among three major groups: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. These groups quickly became involved in a civil war and in the wider Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. UNITA and FNLA were mainly supported by the United States, South Africa and Zaire, while Cuba and the Soviet Union backed the MPLA. Cuba eventually deployed troops to Angola, leading to the MPLA's victory in the civil war and effectively foiling South Africa’s and the United States’ attempts to keep or to remove the MPLA from power. Cuba successfully stabilized and supported the Angolan government against the UNITA insurgency, backed by South Africa and the US. This was instrumental in the independence of Namibia and eventually in the decline of the Apartheid regime.

Cuban Internationalism

From its inception the Cuban Revolution defined itself as internationalist. Within a year after the revolution Cuba took on civil and military assignments in the southern hemisphere. Although still a third world country itself, Cuba supported African, Central American and Asian countries with military, health and educational resources. These "overseas adventures" not only irritated the US, but quite often were a "major headache" for the Kremlin.

In the mid 1960s, Africa moved to the centre of Cuba’s foreign activities. African revolutionaries like Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto requested the Cubans for help in their struggles for liberation. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa and the independence of Angola, the Cuban government decided in autumn of 1975 to intervene on a large scale militarily against in defence of the MPLA. This intervention, which turned Cuba for a short time in the midst of the Cold War into a “global player”, and some argue that it not only resulted in the independence of Namibia but that it also accelerated the decline of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It was also the start for other military interventions as well as substantial development aid in Africa. Deployments in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Benin in support of beleaguered leftist governments followed. Through the 1980s, apart from military personnel there were tens of thousands of Cuban development workers (doctors, teachers, constructors, technicians) working in Africa and a similar amount of young Africans enjoyed free studies in Cuba.

Already in 1961 in its first mission Cuba supported the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria against France. Shortly after Algerian independence Morocco started a border dispute in October 1963 in which Cuba sent troops to help Algeria (see: Sand War ). From a Memorandum of 20 October, 1963 by Major Raúl Castro it can be seen, that great importance was attached to the decent behaviour of the troops and good relations giving strict instructions on conduct.

In 1965 Cuba supported a rebellion of adherents of Lumumba (Simba Rebellion) in Congo-Leopoldville (today Democratic Republic of the Congo) under the personal leadership of Ernesto Che Guevara. Among the insurgents was also Laurent-Désiré Kabila who, 30 years later, would dispossess long-time dictator Mobutu. This secret Cuban mission turned out to be a complete failure. In contrast Cuba’s influence was decisive in Guinea-Bissau’s war of independence against Portugal from 1966 to 1974.

In the 1970s and 1980s Cuba stepped up its military presence abroad, especially in Africa. It had up to 50,000 men stationed in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia and hundreds in other countries. Cuban forces played a key role in the Ogaden War 1977/78 between Ethiopia and Somalia and kept a substantial garrison stationed in Ethiopia. In the Mozambican Civil War beginning in 1977 and in Congo-Brazzaville (today Republic of the Congo) Cubans acted as advisors. Congo-Brazzaville acted as a supply base for the Angola mission.

The relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union had never been easy and Cuba's activities caused quite some irritation in the Kremlin. These tensions did not escape the attention of the US secret service CIA which remarked in a report shortly after the death of Che Guevara: "Brezhnev thinks that Castro is some sort of idiot, and Castro probably isn’t too fond of Brezhnev either." Much of the tension, according to this analysis, has been caused by Cuba's encouragement of guerrilla warfare in many Latin American countries, while the Soviets tried to expand both diplomatic and economic ties with those governments the Cubans were trying to overthrow.

The Carnation Revolution and Independence negotiations

Main article: Angolan War of Independence

See also: Carnation Revolution

The Carnation Revolution 25 April 1974 in Portugal took the rest of the world by surprise. Suddenly and unexpectedly Portugal’s last two African colonies Mozambique and Angola, found themselves confronted with independence without further struggle. Mozambique’s independence was granted without much ado on 25 June 1975. But Angola remained a bone of contention between the three rivalling liberation movements MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola-proper and FLEC (Cabinda Independence Organisation) in Cabinda.

Until then these movements had their priority in fighting the colonial power. They initially had no clear alliances and over the years they all had enjoyed support from a wide range of often the same countries. By the time of the Portuguese Revolution they had more or less drifted into either the eastern (MPLA) or the western (FNLA, UNITA, FLEC) camp. With the disappearance of Portugal as the main foe their ethnic and ideological rivalries moved to the fore. The disunity or the refusal of the three main movements to come to any terms prevented the Portuguese from handing over power. The Alvor Agreement, signed on 15 January, proved to be no solid foundation for the procedure. The transitional government this agreement provided for was equally composed of the three liberation movements and Portugal and was sworn in on 31 January, 1975; independence day was set for 11 November 1975, the same day of the cease fire. FLEC was not part of the deal because it fought for the independence of Cabinda, which the Portuguese had administratively joined as an exclave to Angola.

Civil War: Struggle for the capital

Fighting in Luanda, in MPLA terms the “Second war of liberation”, broke out already two weeks after the transitional government took office. FNLA troops, flown in from Zaire, already had begun moving into Luanda in October 1974. The MPLA followed later and in smaller numbers. The fighting quickly spread throughout the whole country. Each movement tried to get itself into the best strategic positions, most importantly, to be in control of the capital on the day of independence. In a meeting by the National Security Council (NSC) on 27 June 1975 US President Ford puts straight that, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, meaning that UNITA-Leader Jonas Savimbi should be in control of Luanda before the elections. FNLA and UNITA, after secret talks including South Africa and Zaire, formed an alliance and withdrew from the transitional government which officially came to an end on 14 August.

The MPLA succeeded in driving the FNLA out of Luanda by 9 July. The FNLA took up positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of the capital, from where it kept up its pressure, and it eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.

Foreign interventions

The Angolan liberation movements already had a long history of foreign support in various ways, starting in the early 1960s soon after their establishment. This support came from all directions and with the movement’s main focus on fighting the Portuguese colonial power it was not necessarily clear from the beginning, in which camp they would end up.

The FNLA had its base in Zaire from where it received the bulk of its support. FNLA-Leader Holden Roberto was linked to Mobutu by marriage and obligated to him for many past favours. Thus, over the years, the FNLA had become little more than an extension of Mobutu’s own armed forces. Much of Zaire’s support came indirectly from the US, which Zaire’s leader Mobutu had close ties with. US-support for the FNLA was taken up by the Kennedy administration in 1960. Zaire was also the first country to send troops to Angola in March 1975 and to engage in fighting against the MPLA by the summer of that year. In late January 1975, just before the provisional government of Angola was to take office according to the Alvor agreement, a “high level U.S. government policy-making body authorized a grant of 300,000 US$” to the FNLA. In the summer of 1974 the Chinese were the first to post 200 military instructors in Zaire where they trained FNLA troops and also supplied military assistance. On 27 October, 1975, they were also the first to withdraw their military instructors. North Koreans who had been training Mobutu’s elite division, the Kamanyola, also trained the FNLA but withdrew their support for Zaire and the FNLA by the end of December 1975.

UNITA, which split away from FNLA in 1965/66 initially was Maoist and received some support from China. The US increased its support for the FNLA and for the first time took up funding of UNITA. On 18 July 1975 Ford approved covert CIA operation "IA FEATURE" to aid FLNA and UNITA with money, arms and instructors. US military instructors (CIA) arrived in southern Angola in early August where they closely cooperated with their South African counterparts who arrived around the same time.

Other countries with their own clandestine support for FNLA and UNITA were Great Britain and France.

The East bloc countries established first ties with the MPLA during their struggle against the Portuguese. But support remained clandestine, came in trickles and sometimes ceased. This was the case in 1972, when the MPLA came under strong pressure from the Portuguese and was torn by internal strife (struggle between MPLA-Leader Agustinho Neto and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The trickle of Soviet and Chinese aid, which they had received through the 1960s was discontinued; only Yugoslavia continued to send supplies to the MPLA.

Direct Soviet aid to the MPLA in the civil war began in 1975 in the form of arms deliveries by sea and air via Brazzaville and Dar-es-Salaam. Soviet assistance to the MPLA was always somewhat reluctant; they never fully trusted them and their relationship was to remain ambivalent through the following years. Even after the South African invasion the Soviets only sent arms but no instructors for the use of the sophisticated weapons. Among the other Eastern Bloc countries the MPLA had well established contacts with East Germany and Romania. East Germany shipped larger amounts of non-military supply.

Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War

Cuba’s first contacts to the MPLA dated back to the 1960s, when Cuba took up support in 1963/1964, while the MPLA had its headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville (formerly French Congo). In 1966 Agustinho Neto himself, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the commander in chief of the MPLA who was later to die in the war, made a trip to Cuba where they met Castro. The encounter in Congo-Brazzaville ended in disappointment for both sides and relations cooled. A few MPLA guerrillas continued to receive military training in Cuba but apart from that contacts between Cuba and the MPLA remained distant

In a memorandum of 22 November 1972 by Cuban Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro it says: “For some time now we have discussed the possibility of entering Angola and Mozambique with the objective of getting to know the revolutionary movements in those countries. These movements have been a mystery even for those socialist countries that give them considerable aid. This research would help us give more focused aid to those movements. I don’t consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: South Africa, Rhodesia, Zaire, and the Portuguese colonies.

Our comrades in the MPLA solicited us this May for the following:

• a) That we train 10 men in Cuba in guerrilla warfare ….
• b) That we send a crew to fly a DC-3 ….
• c) They want to send a high level delegation to Cuba ….

… Both movements will coordinate with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia for safe passage of our comrades through their territories".

These considerations in 1972 bore no fruit and Cuba's attentions remained focused on Guinea-Bissau. It was only after the Portuguese Revolution that an MPLA delegation brought a request for economic aid, military training and arms to Cuba on 26 July, 1974. In early October Cuba received another request, this time more urgent, for 5 Cuban military officers to help organise the MPLA army, FAPLA. In December 1974 / January 1975 Cuba sent Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo on a fact finding mission to Angola to assess the situation. In a letter of 26 January, 1975, handed to Cadelo and Morales, Neto listed what the MPLA wanted from Cuba:

“1. The establishment, organization, and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to train military staff. 2. A ship to transport the war materiel that we have in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if it were in a Cuban ship, could take place outside of territorial waters. 3. Weapons and transportation for the Rapid Deployment Unit (Brigada de Intervencion) that we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions. 4. Transmitters and receivers to resolve communication problems of widely dispersed military units. 5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men. 6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic. 7. Assistance in training trade union leaders. 8. Assistance in organizing schools to teach Marxism… 9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially instruction manuals. 10. Financial assistance while we are establishing and organizing ourselves.“

Although Cuba was considering the establishment of a military mission (military training) in Angola, again there was no official response to this request. It was only reiterated by the MPLA in May 1975 when Cuban commander Flavio Bravo met Neto in Brazzaville while the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their African colonies.

The MPLA’s hopes for aid were turned to the eastern Bloc countries from where not enough help materialised according to their wishes. Neto is quoted in a Cuban report complaining about Moscow's lacklustre support. He also expressed hope that the war in Angola would become a vital issue in the fight against imperialism and socialism". But neither the USSR nor the MPLA itself expected a major war to break out before independence. In March 1975 the MPLA sent ca. 100 members for training in the Soviet Union and the requested financial assistance (100,000US$) it received from Yugoslavia.

South African involvement

Portugal’s sudden retreat from Angola and Mozambique in 1974 ended a history of military and intelligence cooperation with the colonial power against the Angolan and Namibian liberation movements dating back to the 1960s. According to apartheid historiography South African involvement, what it calls the “South African Border War”, started in 1966, when the conflict with SWAPO, which had its bases in Zambia, first flared up. With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the establishment of black rule in the two former colonies South Africa lost a valuable buffer between itself and black Africa. These new governments being leftist posed an even larger threat to the Apartheid regime.

On 14 July, 1975 Prime Minister Vorster approved a list of weapons worth 14 million US$ to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA. First arms shipments for FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August 1975.

On 9 August, 1975 the SADF moved some 50km into southern Angola in aid of FNLA and UNITA and occupied the Ruacana hydroelectric complex and other installations on the Cuene River. The “defence” of the Cunene Dam complex in Namibia’s border was South Africa’s justification for the first permanent installation of regular SADF units inside Angola.

On 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical support. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fighting SWAPO. In addition, on 22 August 1975 the SADF launched operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola. Due to the recent MPLA’s successes UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola and it became clear to South Africa that the MPLA would win the struggle without its military intervention.

On 14 October, the South Africans launched secret Operation Savannah, and a first of several South African columns (task force Zulu) crossed into Angola from Namibia, advancing very quickly. A second task force, Foxbat, invaded Angola in mid-October. The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.

The United States had known of South Africa's covert plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as at odds with the version in his memoirs and in contrast to what President Ford told the Chinese, who supported the FNLA but were worried about South African engagement in Angola.

Cuban Military Mission

The problem of all liberation movements was the lack of skilled soldiers especially to handle the more and more sophisticated weaponry. Until late August Cuba only had a few technical advisors in Angola, which the CIA took note of. Neto had repeatedly and urgently requested for 100 Cuban instructors but it was only after careful assessment of the situation Cuba decided to establish four military training centres, "Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria" (CIR) in Angola. On 3 August a Cuban delegation travelled for the second time to Angola to assess the situation and the necessary aid. In a memorandum of 11 August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explained the reasons for the visit and briefed on the contents of the talks. He underlined that the aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November was taken into account and the awareness that “the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power”. The delegation handed over 100,000 US dollars. Arguelles also mentioned that Neto had complained “of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and “that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs”. Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola as “clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces.

After the return of the delegation the Cubans considered the options of their instructors in Angola in case of an invasion by South Africa or Zaire which would be either “guerrilla war” or withdrawal to Zambia, where Cuba proceeded to open an embassy. On August 15, Castro urged the USSR to increase support for the MPLA and offered to send special troops. The Russians declined.

Instead of the requested 100 the CIRs were staffed by almost 500 Cubans which were to train about 5,300 Angolans in three to six months. These 500 men included 17 in a medical brigade and 284 officers. The dispatch started in late August and the most urgently needed specialists used international commercial flights; the remaining were brought on ships and two Cuban planes. The arrival of two Cuban ships in Angola in early October with instructors on board was reported by the CIA without raising any alarm in Washington. The CIRs were placed in Cabinda, Benguela, Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar). The CIR in Cabinda comprised of almost half of the total, 191 men, while the others had 66 or 67 each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country The reason for the stronger detachment in Cabinda was the perceived threat from Zaire either to Cabinda or to the Congo. By the time the training centres were fully staffed and operational on 18-20 October, unnoticed by the world, Operation Savannah was already in full swing.

Operation Carlota

In contrast to the continuing successes in the south, where by mid October the MPLA had gained control of 12 of Angola’s provinces and most urban centres, they only barely managed to keep the well equipped FNLA and its allies abreast on the northern front just east of Luanda. The FNLA received arms and equipment from the U.S. via Zaire starting in the end of July. From July to November the front moved back and forth between Caxito and Kifangondo. Netu asked the Soviet Union for more support which had no intention to send any staff before independence and only reluctantly sent more arms.

Forty instructors from the CIR Salazar were the first Cubans to become involved in the defence of Kifangondo on October 23. A second group supported the MPLA on October 28 along the same defence line to the east of Kifangondo.

File:Angola unita.png

The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. South African advisors and antitank weapons had helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October. By 20 October Zulu took Rocadas, by 24 October Sa da Bandeira, by October 28 Mocamedes. On 2-3 November, Cuban instructors for the third time got involved in the fighting, this time 35 to 40 men from the CIR Benguela, when they unsuccessfully tried to help the MPLA stop the Zulu advance near Catengue. On 6 November Zulu took the abandoned harbour city of Benguela, thus seizing control of the terminal of the Benguela railroad, and on 7 November Lobito. In central Angola, combat unit Foxbat with a squadron of armoured cars had moved 800 km north toward Luanda. The MPLA could not prevent the SADF and UNITA from occupying all of southern Angola and coming within 100 km of Luanda. With the FNLA attacking from the east the situation for the MPLA only a few days before independence looked dim.

Cuba steps in

It was only after the MPLA debacle at Catengue that the Cubans became fully aware of the South African invasion and that Luanda would be taken unless they took immediate action. On 4 November Castro decided to send in troops. The same day, a first plane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first two Cuban planes arrived in Luanda with the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces. Operation Carlota had started with only three medium range Bristol Britannia turboprop planes, which had to refuel twice along the way. An artillery regiment was following by sea. The first priority of the Cubans was helping the MPLA to keep hold of Luanda. The MPLA had not officially requested an intervention. The matter had only been discussed with the Cuban military mission.

Fidel Castro explained the Cuban intervention: "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, we offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola. see also:

Unlike the Cuban foreign engagements in the sixties this was no secret operation. Castro decided to support Angola in all openness, sending special forces and 35,000 men infantry by the end of 1976, deploying them at their own expense from November 1975 to January 1976. Thus, with Operation Carlota, named after the leader of a revolt against slavery in Cuba on 5 November 1843, Cuba became a major player in the conflict.

The deployment of troops was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, this also took the USSR by surprise. The Russians were forced to accept the Cuban troop deployment so as not to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the United States. Instead, they had in mind to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to a degree of support by arranging for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola.

The Cuban troops able to intervene on the side of the MPLA before the declaration of independence were basically the ones posted in the 3 CIRs, the 100 specialists that arrived in Luanda on 7 November and the first 158 men special forces of Operation Carlota arriving on 2 planes on 9 November. The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were immediately dispatched to the nearby front at Kifangondo where a battle was already raging. They supported 850 MPLA, 200 Katangas and one Soviet advisor. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on 7 November, among them canons, mortars and 6 of the infamous BM21S Katyushas, multiple rocket launchers with 48 launchers.

The northern front

Two days before independence the most immanent danger for the MPLA came from the FNLA east of Kifangondo, supported by three battalions of Zairian infantry troops, Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent and a South African group led by General Ben de Wet Roos. They had broken through the first line at Porto Quipiri, about 50 km from Luanda.

On 10 November the MPLA and the Cubans warded off the last big attack of the FNLA and its allies, thus securing the capital for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power “to the people of Angola” and shortly after midnight Netu proclaimed the independence of Angola. Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo. Yet, UNITA and FNLA could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.

For the US it took a few days before they registered how bad the FNLA and the Zairians had been routed at Kifangondo. But even then they did not register the full significance of the Cuban involvement since the news from the southern front in their view were still positive. Kissinger, like the South Africans, was shaken by the scale of the Soviet and Cuban response. The CIA’s Angolan task force at CIA headquarters at Langley had been so confident of success by the Zairian and South African regulars, that on November 11 the members had celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their crepe paper decorated offices.

The US first acknowledged Cuban troops in Angola in an official statement on 24 November 1975. Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez: ‘Our intelligence services have grown so bad that we only found out that Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already there.’ At that moment, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola—more even than Kissinger imagined. Indeed, there were so many ships anchored in the bay of Luanda that Neto said to a functionary close to him: ‘It’s not right’, if they go on like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves.’ It is unlikely that even the Cubans had foreseen that their solidarity aid to the Angolan people would reach such proportions. It had been clear to them right from the start, however, that the action had to be swift, decisive, and at all costs successful.

Due to the hostility between the USA and Cuba the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted . Of course the US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference. The Americans also depicted the motivations and timings of the Cubans differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in Vietnam. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf.

Castro regarded the US response to the Cuban intervention: “Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before November 11th? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism.

On the day of independence the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola inland toward Zaire and Cabinda. By 8 November around 1000 FAPLA troops and 232 Cubans had managed to hold Cabinda, where, with US consent, Zairian troops, FLEC guerrillas and French mercenaries had launched an attack.

On 3 December 1975, in a meeting with US and Chinese officials including Deng Xiaoping (Vice Premier and deputy of Mao Zedong), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State / Foreign Minister), Brent Scowcroft (Assistant to the President for NSA) and George H. W. Bush (Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed. To concerns raised by the Chinese about US entreaties to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement Kissinger responds, that the US is prepared to “push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created”. It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in”. He also said that he had approved 35 million US dollars more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. The round discussed and agreed who should support FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner considering the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.

As long as the Cubans were operating on their own through December and January their troops came in slowly but steadily. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota the Soviets agreed to ten charter flights on long-range IL-62 jets, starting on 8 January. More troops also arrived on Cuban ships. By early February, with increasing numbers in Cuban troops and sophisticated weaponry, the tide changed in favour of MPLA. The final offensive in the North started on 1 January and by late February the MPLA and 300 Cubans completely annihilated the FNLA and drove what was left of them and the Zairean army out of the country. The last mercenaries already left the north by 17 Januray. The South African contingent on the northern front led by General Ben de Wet Roos had already been evacuated by ship on 28 November.

SADF advance is stopped

Through November and December the SADF in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 and although it still had the edge over FAPLA and the Cubans and in spite of determined efforts to advance northward from Novo Redondo it was unable to break through the defences. With more Cuban troops and supplies arriving by the day, Luanda was to remain out of reach. In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops took Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December. By mid-December it became necessary to extend military service and to call in reserves. “An indication of the seriousness of the situation …. is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place”. By late December Cuba had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda. Apart from being “bogged down” on the southern front, there were two other setbacks for the South Africans.

The world takes notice

The South Africans had managed to keep their invasion hidden from the world view for quite some time. It even took the MPLA until 23 October to notice that not white mercenaries but the SADF was advancing. Yet it took another whole month for the world press to take notice: On 23 November a major western newspaper, the Washington Post, announced that regular South African troops were fighting inside Angola. Although other papers were still slow to follow, e. g. the New York Times on 12 December, the fact eventually became internationally known. Even the South African population itself had been kept in the dark and it was only on 19 December that the people learned more about what was called the “Border War”, when papers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and the Cubans. As a result the few “friends” South Africa still had strived to distance themselves from the apartheid regime and with international pressure building up Pretoria became increasingly isolated. Even UNITA made an attempt to save face, branding the South African “invaders”.

Withdrawal of official US-support

It was only when the US administration asked Congress for 28 million US$ for IAFEATURE that Congress really paid attention to the events in Angola. By then “the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the stench of US-collusion with Pretoria hung in the air. Worse, the growing numbers of Cuban troops had derailed the CIA’s plans and the administration seemed at a loss what to do next.” The money was not approved and on 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment banning covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill sponsored by Dick Clark extended the ban. (Clark Amendment)

The US administration resorted to other means of support for FNLA and UNITA of which one was raising mercenaries. The CIA initiated a covert programme to recruit Brazilians and Europeans, mostly Portuguese and British, to fight in the north of Angola. Altogether they managed to enlist around 250 men, but by the time meaningful numbers arrived in January 1975 the campaign in the north was all but over.

A report by Henry Kissinger of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:

"2. There follows an updated situation report based on classified sources.
A: Diplomatic

• (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded OAU meeting, one delegation, headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba’s ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
• (2) In late December early January a MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.

B: Military

• (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of US dollars 30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and material, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
• (2) Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization).
• (3) Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
• (4) Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda’s airport complex.
• (5) Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-42 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-42 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL ? which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-42 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.

C: Other:

• All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.

"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola." "Cuban sources, however, indicate that the number hovered around 3,500 to 4,000." This more or less would have put the Cubans at par with the South Africans on the southern front.

South Africa and UNITA withdraw

Pretoria had to decide whether it would stay in the game and bring in more troops. In late December there were heated debates between Vorster, foreign minister Muller, defence minister Botha, head of BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) van den Bergh and a number of senior officials as to withdraw or to stay. Zaire, UNITA and the US urged South Africa to stay. But the US would not openly endorse the South African invasion and assure continuing military assistance in case of an escalation. Sobered by the Cuban’s performance and by the West’s cold shoulder, Pretoria chose to fold. On 30 December Vorster decided to withdraw after the OAU emergency session in Addis Ababa on 13 January to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border.

The sentiment of the Pretoria government at the time was expressed in a speech by Botha before South African parliament on 17 April, 1978: “Against which neighbouring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years, when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story: the story must be told and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch”. During January the SADF abandoned the towns of Cela and Novo Redondo on 25 January and FAPLA and the Cubans started first small offensive probes to the south. But apart from a few skirmishes the Cubans stayed well behind the retreating South Africans. By early February 1976 the SADF had retreated to the far south of Angola, leaving behind mine fields and blown up bridges. Four to five thousand troops were to hold a strip along the Namibian border up to 80 km deep until Angola at least gave assurance that it wouldn’t supply bases for SWAPO and that it would continue supply electricity to Namibia from the Cuene dams. While the Cubans and FAPLA were slowly approaching the southern border, South Africa and Angola took up indirect negotiations about South African withdrawal brokered by the British and Soviet governments. On 27 March Botha announced the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 27 March. On that day the last 60 military vehicles crossed the border into Namibia.

Without South African support UNITA collapsed under the FAPLA attacks. Whatever remained retreated into Zaire. Especially among African countries UNITA was publicly discredited by its links with the apartheid regime, the CIA and white mercenaries. “Savimbi's political career appeared to be over. But he was saved by the cold war and his usefulness to the US and South Africa”.

“Despite a massive South African military invasion through Namibia up to the coast in an attempt to take Luanda, and a pincer movement from the north with Zairian troops and white mercenaries on behalf of the FNLA and UNITA, the arrival of Cuban troops in Operation Carlota saved the MPLA and its newly established independent government” and it profoundly altered the balance of power in southern Africa. Without Cuban intervention, the South Africans would have seized Luanda before anyone reported that they had crossed the border. With “Operation Carlota” Cuba had become a main player in the conflict. With the retreat of the South Africans from Angola and by securing the country for the MPLA, the Cubans had achieved their goal. But for the South Africans retreating from Angola without having achieved anything was humiliating. The MPLA victory was not only a severe blow to Kissinger and the U.S., but also to the apartheid regime, which as a result of the Angolan debacle became even more militaristic and reactionary.

The legacy of Angola according the South African paper, the Rand Daily Mail, was the blows to South African pride and the boost to African nationalism which has seen South Africa forced to retreat. To South African blacks Angola showed the SADF is vulnerable: “Their racist arrogance shrank when our MPLA comrades thrashed them in Angola”. Another way to look at it was that “in Angola Black troops – Cubans and Angolans – have defeated White troops in military exchanges. Whether the bulk of the offensive was by Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of this war’s battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning, and are not White; and that psychological edge, that advantage the White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping away. White elitism has suffered an irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know it”. A South African member of parliament warned: “We must expect a hardening of the attitudes of our own Non-Whites”. As a retired South African Brigadier put it: “Angola may well be regarded as South Africa’s Bay of Pigs” In addition to that the country found itself completely isolated. The UN Security Council met to consider “the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People’s Republic of Angola” and branded South Africa the aggressor on 31 March 1976, demanding it compensate Angola for war damages. Apart from losing international standing the South Africans also could not prevent SWAPO from regaining its positions along the Namibian border. Many military observers considered 27 March as the actual start of SWAPO insurgency in Namibia.

Cuban involvement in Angola in the late 1970s and in the 1980s

At the height of the deployment Cuba had 35 to 40 thousand military personnel stationed in Angola. In addition to that more and more technical, medical and educational staff came to fill the gaps the Portuguese had left behind. After South Africa had left Angola, the FNLA had all but disappeared from the scene and UNITA had mainly receded to Zaire. The MPLA government was internationally recognized, albeit not by the US.

At their March 14 meeting in Conakry, when victory was already assured, Castro and Neto decided that the Cubans would withdraw gradually, leaving behind for as long as necessary enough men to organize a strong, modern army, capable of guaranteeing Angola's future internal security and national independence without outside help. By the end of May more than 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba, and many more were on the way.

The Cubans had high hopes that after their victory in Angola, in co-operation with the USSR, they could free all of southern Africa from the influence of the US and China. In Angola they put up a training camp for Namibian, Rhodesian and South African guerrillas. But one result of the events in Angola in 1976 was the American’s heightened attention to African affairs, especially in the south of the continent. Kissinger worried, “if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.” The need to distance themselves from outcasts in the eyes of black Africa this also meant the US would drop support for the white regime in Rhodesia, a price it was willing to pay to “thwart communism”. Within five years of the independence of Angola, Rhodesia emerged as the next independent black-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, something Ian Smith, the former Rhodesian prime minister vowed would not happen within a century.

In the following years Cuba kept itself engaged in a number of other African countries. In 1978 Cuba sent 16,000 troops to Ethiopia Ogaden Conflict, but this time in close coordination with the Soviets. Smaller military missions were active in the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Cuban technical, educational and medical staff in the tens of thousands was working in even more countries: Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, the Congo and Benin. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on full Cuban scholarships per year on the island.

The Civil War continues

Scope of operations.

Towards the end of the 1970s, Angola slipped away from wider international public attention. UNITA was able to continue its insurgency operations in the south because of military and logistical support from South Africa and the Angolan government still had not gained control over the whole country. Cuban presence in Angola was initially greatly reduced after the retreat of the South Africans but soon again was increased due to tensions between Angola and Zaire in March 1977 (see Shaba Invasion). Mobuto accused Angola of instigating and supporting an attack of the FNLC (Front National pour la Libération du Congo on the Zairian province of Shaba and Neto charged Mobutu with harbouring and supporting the FNLA and FLEC. Only 2 months later the Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and foiling the Nitista Plot when Nito Alves and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster, which is another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Neto as well as the differing interests between the Soviets and the Cubans. Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened.

Angola's Cuando Cubango province

Soon after its retreat from Angola, South Africa waged a war from neighbouring Namibia against South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The Namibian liberation organization operated out of Angola with support of the Angolan government against the occupation of Southwest Africa by the Apartheid regime. To this end, South Africa continued to support UNITA's fight against the Angolan government and SWAPO to deny SWAPO a safe zone on Angola's southern border with Namibia. They SADF established bases in Cuando Cubango Province in south-eastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) supplied UNITA with air cover from bases in Namibia. South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi’s image abroad, especially in the US. Apart from being a friend to African tyrants Savimbi became the toast of the Reagan White House and was feted by the rightwing establishment in many countries.

Negotiations and War

In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the ‘’’Contact Group’’’, to work with South Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favour of the installation of a SWAPO government in Namibia.

Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions and UNITA’s northward expansion in the east forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military personnel from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba. The first large scale incursions by the SADF occurred in May 1978 when it raided a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga, killing hundreds of people. By the end of 1979, following the bombing of Lubango, an undeclared border war was in full swing.

Neto died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow. And was succeeded by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Barely one month later Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, immediately taking a harder line with Angola: The Cubans were absolutely to be driven out of Angola. The Reagan administration also resumed aid to UNITA. With the support of the US and South Africa UNITA became one the best equipped resistance movements of all times. They even received FIM-92 Stingers from the US which until then had been reserved for their closest allies.

In the early 1980s, the United States, in their endeavour to get the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, became directly involved in negotiations with Angola. Angola pointed out it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it wasn’t for the continuing South African incursions and threat at its southern border. The most obvious solution was an independent Namibia which South Africa had to give up. After having to accept a leftist regime in Angola, Pretoria was reluctant to relinquish control of Namibia because of the possibility that the first elections would bring its “traditional nemesis”, SWAPO, to power. It continued to attend negotiating sessions of the Contact Group throughout the early 1980s, always prepared to bargain but never ready to settle. Cuba, not involved in the negotiations, basically agreed to such a solution paving the way to Namibia’s freedom. Yet, towards the end of Reagan’s second term in office, the negotiations had not born any fruit.

After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia failed in January 1981, South African military aggression increased against Angolan targets and SWAPO guerrillas. In August 1981, the SADF launched ‘’’Operation Protea’’’ with several thousand troops penetrating 120 kilometres into south-western Angola. Not only fighting SWAPO the South Africans openly intensified assaults on Angolan economic targets and occupied Angolan territory, particularly in Cunene Province. Through 1982 and 1983 the SAAF also participated in operations by UNITA, more and more infiltrating the countryside, far exceeding its previous hit and -run operations aimed primarily at the Benguela Railway. The UNITA insurgency and border war had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure, and the fights created hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA guerrillas also took foreign technicians as hostages.

In 1987, the FAPLA, with Soviet support, launched an offensive against UNITA. Cuba’s and the Soviets strategic opinions differed considerably and the Cubans did not participate. They had advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which already controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened massively in the southeast, stopped and threw back the Angolan forces. By early November, the SADF had cornered FAPLA units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them. Cuito Cuanavale, only a village, was important as a forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola and was considered an important gateway to the north. Pretoria committed its best troops and most sophisticated military hardware to its capture. The Russians were inexperienced on the African theatre and in spite of considerable aid were unable to turn the tide. UNITA inflicted one defeat after the other. In a valley near the Lomba River, FAPLA and the Soviets were routed and they left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died and a part of the Angolan army was closed in.

The United Nations Security Council demanded the SADF’s unconditional withdrawal from Angola, but the US ensured that there were no repercussions for South Africa. US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.”

As the situation for the besieged Angolan troops became critical, the Cuban troops stationed in Angola felt impelled to intervene as not to let their Angolan and Soviet allies suffer total defeat. In Cuba’s view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. On 15 November 1987 Castro decided to reinforce the troops stationed in Angola by sending fresh detachments, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Eventually Cuban troop strength doubled to about 50,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to counter SAAF air supremacy, which was a critical factor in repelling the South Africans. Castro wanted to push the South Africans out of Angola for good and viewed preventing the fall of Cuito as imperative.

As in 1975, the USSR again was not informed in advance of Cuba’s decision to intervene, one reason being that the relationship had become pretty strained. Castro was especially suspicious of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of détente with the US.

Cuito Cuanavale in Angola

Cuito Cuanavale in south-eastern Angola became the major battle site between Cuban, Angolan and South African forces. It was the biggest battle on African soil since World War Two and in it course around 20.000 soldiers were killed. Cuban planes and 1 500 Cuban soldiers reinforced the Angolans at Cuito and the town and the base did not fall. On 23 March 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault “was brought to a grinding and definite halt” by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. While the situation at Cuito remained at a stalemate, in south-western Angola Cuban units advanced towards the Namibian border. The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle “involved serious risks” withdrew.

On 26 May, 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that “heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border”. The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on 26 June that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SAAF. He added that “the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety” in South Africa.

While the fighting at Cuito continued and Cuban troops were following the retreating South Africans in the south-west towards the Namibian border, attempts for a negotiated arrangement continued. This time only governments were to take part in the negotiations, which excluded participation by UNITA. The two paramount issues were whether South Africa would finally accept implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, prescribing Namibia’s independence, and whether the parties could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. The Americans did not have in mind to include the Cubans in the talks. Castro let the Americans know that negotiations including the Cubans would be much more promising. Hereupon US foreign minister George Schultz authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia but not the US-embargo of Cuba.

Three Powers Accord

The Cuban government joined negotiations on 28 January, 1988. Thus for the first time it participated in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia. The first rounds started out in the Presidential Palace in Luanda while the fighting in Cuito Cuanavale continued. The talks were later moved to Cairo, with rounds in Geneva, London, and finally in New York. The South African government joined negotiations in Cairo on 3 May expecting Resolution 435 to be modified. Defence Minister Malan and President P.W. Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only “if Russia and its proxies did the same.” They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On 16 March, 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was “offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon.”

But the Cubans in Angola had reversed the situation on the ground. In fact, the US wondered whether the Cubans would stop their advance at the Namibian border. Thus, Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation, responded to the South African demands: “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over… South Africa is acting as though it was a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that the talks had taken place “against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic.”<refGleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: > Crocker to Secretary of State, June 26, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> As the war during the negotiations continued, on 27 June, 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border. The CIA reported that “Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defences” highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after the Cuban’s air strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, “to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend.”

A ceasefire was finally agreed upon on 8 August, 1988. The South Africans were out of Angola by 30 August 1988, before the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola had been discussed. On 22 December 1988, one month before Reagan’s second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the Three Powers Accord in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and, within 30 months, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

The accord ended 13 years of Cuban military presence in Angola which was finalized in stages one month early on 25 May 1991. At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo) and Ethiopia.

Aftermath

Despite Washington’s efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of Southern African history. As W. Freeman, ambassador, US state department, department for African policies, put it into words: “Castro could regard himself as father of Namibia’s independence and as the one who put an end to colonialism in Africa. Indeed, Cuba demonstrated responsibility and maturity. This should have been acknowledged by the USA as an important gesture and merited a respective answer. But American politics concerning relations with Cuba are absolutely poisoned, hence Cuba, which had acted really responsibly, was denied the slightest appreciation it had deserved” . At least Crocker had admitted when he cabled Shultz during the negotions, on 25 August, 1988: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”

In a national ceremony on 7 December, 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. According to Cuban government figures, during all of the "internationalist" missions carried out in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola on May 25, 1991, a total of 2,077 Cubans was killed. Historians estimated the Cuban casualties were around 10,000. In the years of Cuba's engagement 450,000 Cuban soldiers and development workers had been to Africa.

At the negations in 1988 the South Africans had been asked for the release of Nelson Mandela as a sign of goodwill, which was denied. Mandela remained in captivity until 2 February 1990 when the ANC African National Congress ban was lifted. In July 1991, as ANC leader, Mandela travelled to Havana to personally thank Castro for his country's pivotal role in the fight against apartheid. He underscored Cuba's vital role in a speech delivered in Havana: "The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character - We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defence of one of us - The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation!" The military defeat suffered by South Africa in Angola and Namibia, largely thanks to the contribution of Cuban troops, was considered a decisive blow in bringing down the racist apartheid regime.

Free elections in Namibia were held in November 1989 with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote in spite of Pretoria’s attempts to swing it in favour of other parties. Namibia gained independence in March 1990. The situation in Angola was anything but settled and the country continued to be ravaged by civil war for more than a decade. In spite of free elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms. Peace only returned to Angola following Savimbi’s death in 2002.

See also

• South African Border War
• Angolan Civil War

Further reading

• "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
• ICAIC (Instituto cubano del arte e industria cinematograficos)
• Gleijeses, Piero: Kuba in Afrika 1975–1991. In: Bernd Greiner /Christian Th. Müller / Dierk Walter (Hrsg.): Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg, 2006, ISBN
• Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press)
• Arte TV: Fidel, der Che und die afrikanische Odyssee
• Departement Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Hamburg über den Krieg in Angola(Hamburg University)
• Afrika-Bulletin Nr. 123, August/September 2006 mit Schwerpunktthema Angola
• Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt zur Geschichte Angolas(German foreign ministry)
• Welt Online: Wie Castro die Revolution exportierte
• Christine Hatzky: Kuba in Afrika(Duisburg University)
• The National Security Archive: Secret Cuban Documents on Africa Involvement
• Saney, Isaac, "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117.
• Nelson Mendela & Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! (New York:Pathfinder Press, 1991)
• Pazzanita, Anthony G, "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 29 No 1 (March 1991): pp. 83-114.
• Stockwell, John, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978)
• Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two: Repression and Resistance