Cuban intervention in Angola: Difference between revisions
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After gaining independence from [[Portugal]], [[Angola]] became entangled in a power struggle among three major groups: UNITA, FNLA and MPLA. These groups quickly became involved in the wider [[Cold War]] tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. |
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After gaining independence from [[Portugal]], [[Angola]] became entangled in a power struggle among three major groups: [[MPLA]], [[FNLA]] and [[UNITA]]. These groups quickly became involved in a civil war and in the wider [[Cold War]] tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. |
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UNITA and FNLA were mainly supported by the United States and South Africa, while [[Cuba]] and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref><ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)</ref> Its intervention was credited with the MPLA's victory in the war, which included two other US and China- backed Angolan factions, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola ([[UNITA]]) of [[Jonas Savimbi]]) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) headed by [[Holden Roberto]]. |
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UNITA and FNLA were mainly supported by the [[United States]], [[South Africa]] and [[Zaire]], while [[Cuba]] and the [[Soviet Union]] backed the MPLA. Cuba eventually deployed troops to Angola, leading to the MPLA's victory in the civil war and effectively foiling South Africa’s and the United States’ attempts to keep or to remove the MPLA from power. Cuba successfully stabilized and supported the Angolan government against the UNITA insurgency, backed by South Africa and the US. This was instrumental in the independence of [[Namibia]] and eventually in the decline of the [[Apartheid]] regime.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref><ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)</ref> |
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==Cuban Internationalism== |
==Cuban Internationalism== |
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{{Mergeto|History of Cuba|date=January 2008}} |
{{Mergeto|History of Cuba|date=January 2008}} |
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From its inception the [[Cuban Revolution]] defined itself as [[internationalist]]. Within a year after the revolution Cuba took on civil and military assignments in the southern hemisphere. Although still a third world country itself, Cuba supported African, Central American and Asian countries with military, health and educational resources. These "overseas adventures" drew the attention of US and were often a "major headache" for the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>[http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/50-9.aspx Jime Lobe]</ref> |
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From its inception the [[Cuban Revolution]] defined itself as [[internationalist]]. Within a year after the revolution Cuba took on civil and military assignments in the southern hemisphere. Although still a third world country itself, Cuba supported African, Central American and Asian countries with military, health and educational resources. These "overseas adventures" not only irritated the US, but quite often were a "major headache" for the [[Kremlin]]. <ref>[http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/50-9.aspx Jime Lobe]</ref> |
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In the mid 1960s, Africa moved to the center of Cuba’s foreign activities. African revolutionaries like [[Patrice Lumumba]], [[Amilcar Cabral]] and [[Agostinho Neto]] requested the Cubans for help in their struggles for liberation. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa and the independence of [[Angola]], the Cuban government decided in autumn of 1975 to intervene on a large scale militarily against in defense of the MPLA. This intervention, which turned Cuba for a short time in the midst of the [[Cold War]] into a “global player”, and some argue that it resulted in the independence of [[Namibia]] and accelerated the decline of the [[Apartheid]] regime in South Africa. It was also the start for other military interventions as well as substantial development aid in Africa. Deployments in [[Ethiopia]], [[Mozambique]], [[Guinea]], [[Guinea-Bissau]] and [[Benin]] in support of beleaguered leftist governments followed. Through the 1980s, apart from military personnel there were tens of thousands of Cuban development workers (doctors, teachers, constructors, technicians) working in Africa and a similar amount of young Africans enjoyed free studies in Cuba. |
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In the mid 1960s, Africa moved to the centre of Cuba’s foreign activities. African revolutionaries like [[Patrice Lumumba]], [[Amilcar Cabral]] and [[Agostinho Neto]] requested the Cubans for help in their struggles for liberation. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa and the independence of [[Angola]], the Cuban government decided in autumn of 1975 to intervene on a large scale militarily against in defence of the MPLA. This intervention, which turned Cuba for a short time in the midst of the [[Cold War]] into a “global player”, and some argue that it not only resulted in the independence of [[Namibia]] but that it also accelerated the decline of the [[Apartheid]] regime in South Africa. It was also the start for other military interventions as well as substantial development aid in Africa. Deployments in [[Ethiopia]], [[Mozambique]], [[Guinea]], [[Guinea-Bissau]] and [[Benin]] in support of beleaguered leftist governments followed. Through the 1980s, apart from military personnel there were tens of thousands of Cuban development workers (doctors, teachers, constructors, technicians) working in Africa and a similar amount of young Africans enjoyed free studies in Cuba. |
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Between 1961 and 1989 not only the two superpowers United States and the Soviet Union were fighting each other in Africa, as often assumed, but four opposite parties with clearly defined opposite interests: The Soviets wanted to expand their influence into another continent, the US were after the resources, the former European colonial powers saw their power dwindle away and the young African nations defended their newly won independence. |
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Already in 1961 in its first mission Cuba supported the [[National Liberation Front]] (FLN) in [[Algeria]] against France. |
Already in 1961 in its first mission Cuba supported the [[National Liberation Front]] (FLN) in [[Algeria]] against France. Shortly after Algerian independence Morocco started a border dispute in October 1963 in which Cuba sent troops to help Algeria (see: [[Sand War]] ). From a Memorandum of 20 October, 1963 by Major [[Raúl Castro]] it can be seen, that great importance was attached to the decent behaviour of the troops and good relations giving strict instructions on conduct. <ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses10.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])</ref> |
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In 1965 Cuba supported a rebellion of [[Lumumba]] (Simba Rebellion) in Congo-Leopoldville (today [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]]) under the personal leadership of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]]. Among the insurgents was also [[Laurent-Désiré Kabila]] who, 30 years later would |
In 1965 Cuba supported a rebellion of adherents of [[Lumumba]] (Simba Rebellion) in Congo-Leopoldville (today [[Democratic Republic of the Congo]]) under the personal leadership of [[Ernesto Che Guevara]]. Among the insurgents was also [[Laurent-Désiré Kabila]] who, 30 years later, would dispossess long-time dictator [[Mobutu]]. This secret Cuban mission turned out to be a complete failure. <ref>Ernesto Che Guevara: "The African Dream" The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. With an Introduction by Richard Gott (New York: Grove Press, 2001)</ref> In contrast Cuba’s influence was decisive in [[Guinea-Bissau]]’s war of independence against [[Portugal]] from 1966 to 1974. |
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In the 1970s and |
In the 1970s and 1980s Cuba stepped up its military presence abroad, especially in Africa. It had up to 50,000 men stationed in Angola, 24,000 in [[Ethiopia]] and hundreds in other countries. Cuban forces played a key role in the [[Ogaden War]] 1977/78 between Ethiopia and [[Somalia]] and kept a substantial garrison stationed in Ethiopia. In the [[Mozambican Civil War]] beginning in 1977 and in Congo-Brazzaville (today [[Republic of the Congo]]) Cubans acted as advisors. Congo-Brazzaville acted as a supply base for the Angola mission. |
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Cuba |
The relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union had never been easy and Cuba's activities caused quite some irritation in the Kremlin. These tensions did not escape the attention of the US secret service [[CIA]] which remarked in a report shortly after the death of Che Guevara: "[[Brezhnev]] thinks that Castro is some sort of idiot, and Castro probably isn’t too fond of Brezhnev either." <ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses8.pdf (Document obtained through Freedom of Information Act)</ref> Much of the tension, according to this analysis, has been caused by Cuba's encouragement of [[guerrilla warfare]] in many Latin American countries, while the Soviets tried to expand both diplomatic and economic ties with those governments the Cubans were trying to overthrow. |
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==The Carnation Revolution and Independence negotiations== |
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{{Mergeto|Angolan War of Independence|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|Angolan War of Independence}} |
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{{seealso|Carnation Revolution}} |
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The [[Carnation Revolution]] 25 April 1974 in Portugal took the rest of the world by surprise. Suddenly and unexpectedly Portugal’s last two African colonies [[Mozambique]] and Angola, found themselves confronted with independence without further struggle. Mozambique’s independence was granted without much ado on 25 June 1975. But Angola remained a bone of contention between the three rivalling liberation movements MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola-proper and [[FLEC]] (Cabinda Independence Organisation) in [[Cabinda]]. |
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Until then these movements had their priority in fighting the colonial power. They initially had no clear alliances and over the years they all had enjoyed support from a wide range of often the same countries. By the time of the Portuguese Revolution they had more or less drifted into either the eastern (MPLA) or the western (FNLA, UNITA, FLEC) camp. With the disappearance of Portugal as the main foe their ethnic and ideological rivalries moved to the fore. The disunity or the refusal of the three main movements to come to any terms prevented the Portuguese from handing over power. The [[Alvor Agreement]], signed on 15 January, proved to be no solid foundation for the procedure. The transitional government this agreement provided for was equally composed of the three liberation movements and Portugal and was sworn in on 31 January, 1975; independence day was set for 11 November 1975, the same day of the cease fire. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0044)</ref> <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002</ref> FLEC was not part of the deal because it fought for the independence of [[Cabinda]], which the Portuguese had administratively joined as an exclave to Angola. |
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==Civil War: Struggle for the capital== |
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Fighting in [[Luanda]], in MPLA terms the “Second war of liberation”, broke out already two weeks after the transitional government took office. FNLA troops, flown in from Zaire, already had begun moving into Luanda in October 1974. The MPLA followed later and in smaller numbers. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 250</ref> The fighting quickly spread throughout the whole country. Each movement tried to get itself into the best strategic positions, most importantly, to be in control of the capital on the day of independence. In a meeting by the [[National Security Council]] (NSC) on 27 June 1975 US President Ford puts straight that, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, meaning that UNITA-Leader [[Jonas Savimbi]] should be in control of Luanda before the elections. <ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)</ref> FNLA and UNITA, after secret talks including South Africa and Zaire, formed an alliance and withdrew from the transitional government which officially came to an end on 14 August. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0046)</ref> |
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The MPLA succeeded in driving the FNLA out of Luanda by 9 July. The FNLA took up positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of the capital, from where it kept up its pressure, and it eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0046)</ref> |
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==Foreign interventions== |
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The Angolan liberation movements already had a long history of foreign support in various ways, starting in the early 1960s soon after their establishment. This support came from all directions and with the movement’s main focus on fighting the Portuguese colonial power it was not necessarily clear from the beginning, in which camp they would end up. |
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The FNLA had its base in Zaire from where it received the bulk of its support. FNLA-Leader [[Holden Roberto]] was linked to Mobutu by marriage and obligated to him for many past favours. Thus, over the years, the FNLA had become little more than an extension of Mobutu’s own armed forces. Much of Zaire’s support came indirectly from the US, which Zaire’s leader Mobutu had close ties with. US-support for the FNLA was taken up by the [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administration in 1960. Zaire was also the first country to send troops to Angola in March 1975 and to engage in fighting against the MPLA by the summer of that year. |
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<ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> In late January 1975, just before the provisional government of Angola was to take office according to the Alvor agreement, a “high level U.S. government policy-making body authorized a grant of 300,000 US$” to the FNLA. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)</ref> |
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In the summer of 1974 the Chinese were the first to post 200 military instructors in Zaire where they trained FNLA troops and also supplied military assistance. On 27 October, 1975, they were also the first to withdraw their military instructors. |
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North Koreans who had been training Mobutu’s elite division, the [[Kamanyola]], also trained the FNLA but withdrew their support for Zaire and the FNLA by the end of December 1975. <ref> Klinghoffer, A. J. in: The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, Boulder, 1980</ref> |
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UNITA, which split away from FNLA in 1965/66 initially was Maoist and received some support from China. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0040)</ref> |
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The US increased its support for the FNLA and for the first time took up funding of UNITA. On 18 July 1975 Ford approved covert CIA operation "[[IA FEATURE]]" to aid FLNA and UNITA with money, arms and instructors. US military instructors (CIA) arrived in southern Angola in early August where they closely cooperated with their South African counterparts who arrived around the same time. |
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Other countries with their own clandestine support for FNLA and UNITA were [[Great Britain]] and [[France]]. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)</ref> <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 293-294, 296-297</ref> |
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The East bloc countries established first ties with the MPLA during their struggle against the Portuguese. But support remained clandestine, came in trickles and sometimes ceased. This was the case in 1972, when the MPLA came under strong pressure from the Portuguese and was torn by internal strife (struggle between MPLA-Leader [[Agustinho Neto]] and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The trickle of Soviet and Chinese aid, which they had received through the 1960s was discontinued; only [[Yugoslavia]] continued to send supplies to the MPLA. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)</ref> <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 293-294, 296-297</ref> |
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Direct Soviet aid to the MPLA in the civil war began in 1975 in the form of arms deliveries by sea and air via [[Brazzaville]] and [[Dar-es-Salaam]]. <ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> Soviet assistance to the MPLA was always somewhat reluctant; they never fully trusted them and their relationship was to remain ambivalent through the following years. Even after the South African invasion the Soviets only sent arms but no instructors for the use of the sophisticated weapons. <ref> http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses3.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces]) </ref> |
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Among the other Eastern Bloc countries the MPLA had well established contacts with East Germany and Romania. East Germany shipped larger amounts of non-military supply. |
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==Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War== |
==Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War== |
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{{Mergeto|Angola-Cuba relations|date=January 2008}} |
{{Mergeto|Angola-Cuba relations|date=January 2008}} |
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Cuba’s first contacts to the MPLA dated back to the 1960s, when Cuba took up support in 1963/1964, while the MPLA had its headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville (formerly French Congo). In 1966 [[Agustinho Neto]] himself, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the commander in chief of the MPLA who was later to die in the war, made a trip to Cuba where they met Castro. The encounter in Congo-Brazzaville ended in disappointment for both sides and relations cooled. A few MPLA guerrillas continued to receive military training in Cuba but apart from that contacts between Cuba and the MPLA remained distant <ref>Mabeko, Tali in: Dissidences, p. 348</ref> <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0039)</ref> |
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In 1972 the MPLA had come under strong pressure from the Portuguese and was torn by internal strife (struggle between Neto and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The trickle of Soviet and Chinese aid, which they had received through the 1960s was discontinued; only Yugoslavia still sent supplies the MPLA. |
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Unlike with other liberation movements in Africa Cuba was quite late in devoting attention to the ones in Angola and Mozambique, which had been operating for a number of years and receiving aid from other countries. The Cubans and the MPLA had their first encounter in 1965-67 in Congo-Brazzaville (formerly French Congo), where the MPLA had shifted its headquarters, and in Cabinda. This encounter had ended in disappointment for both sides. Beginning in 1965 a few MPLA guerillas received military training in Cuba but apart from that contacts between Cuba and the MPLA remained distant<ref>Tali, Mabeko in: Dissidences, p. 348</ref><ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0039)</ref> |
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In a memorandum of 22 |
In a memorandum of 22 November 1972 by Cuban Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major [[Raúl Castro]] it says: |
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“For some time now we have discussed the possibility of entering Angola and Mozambique with the objective of getting to know the revolutionary movements in those countries. These movements have been a mystery even for those socialist countries that give them considerable aid. This research would help us give more focused aid to those movements. |
“For some time now we have discussed the possibility of entering Angola and Mozambique with the objective of getting to know the revolutionary movements in those countries. These movements have been a mystery even for those socialist countries that give them considerable aid. This research would help us give more focused aid to those movements. |
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I don’t consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: |
I don’t consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: South Africa, [[Rhodesia]], Zaire, and the Portuguese colonies. |
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Our comrades in the MPLA solicited us this May for the following: |
Our comrades in the MPLA solicited us this May for the following: |
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Line 32: | Line 66: | ||
*b) That we send a crew to fly a [[DC-3]] …. |
*b) That we send a crew to fly a [[DC-3]] …. |
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*c) They want to send a high level delegation to Cuba …. |
*c) They want to send a high level delegation to Cuba …. |
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… Both movements will coordinate with the governments of [[Tanzania]] and [[Zambia]] for safe passage of our comrades through their territories".<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses7.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces]) </ref> |
… Both movements will coordinate with the governments of [[Tanzania]] and [[Zambia]] for safe passage of our comrades through their territories". <ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses7.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces]) </ref> |
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Cuba's attentions remained focused on Guinea-Bissau. It was only after the Portuguese Revolution that an MPLA delegation brought a request for economic aid, military training and arms to Cuba on |
These considerations in 1972 bore no fruit and Cuba's attentions remained focused on Guinea-Bissau. It was only after the Portuguese Revolution that an MPLA delegation brought a request for economic aid, military training and arms to Cuba on 26 July, 1974. In early October Cuba received another request, this time more urgent, for 5 Cuban military officers to help organise the MPLA army, FAPLA. In December 1974 / January 1975 Cuba sent Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo on a fact finding mission to Angola to assess the situation.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 244-245 (Quotations from interview with Cadelo and from Cienfuegos to Senen Casas, Havana, November 22, 1974)</ref> In a letter of 26 January, 1975, handed to Cadelo and Morales, Neto listed what the MPLA wanted from Cuba: |
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“1. The establishment, organization, and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to train military staff. |
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2. A ship to transport the war materiel that we have in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if it were in a Cuban ship, could take place outside of territorial waters. |
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3. Weapons and transportation for the Rapid Deployment Unit (Brigada de Intervencion) that we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions. |
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4. Transmitters and receivers to resolve communication problems of widely dispersed military units. |
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5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men. |
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6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic. |
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7. Assistance in training trade union leaders. |
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8. Assistance in organizing schools to teach Marxism… |
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9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially instruction manuals. |
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10. Financial assistance while we are establishing and organizing ourselves.“ <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: (Agostinho Neto: Necesidades urgentes. Lista dirigada al Comite Central del Partido Communista de Cuba, January 26, 1975, enclosed in “Visita”, p. 22-23)</ref> |
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Although Cuba was considering the establishment of a military mission in Angola, again there was no official response to this request. It was only reiterated by the MPLA in May |
Although Cuba was considering the establishment of a military mission (military training) in Angola, again there was no official response to this request. It was only reiterated by the MPLA in May 1975 when Cuban commander Flavio Bravo met Neto in Brazzaville while the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their African colonies. <ref> Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm </ref> |
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The MPLA’s hopes for aid were turned to the eastern Bloc countries from where not enough help materialised according to their wishes. Neto is quoted in a Cuban report complaining about Moscow's lacklustre support. He also expressed hope that the war in Angola would become ''a vital issue in the fight against imperialism and socialism". But neither the USSR nor the MPLA itself expected a major war to break out before independence. <ref>Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9, p. 24</ref> In March 1975 the MPLA sent ca. 100 members for training in the Soviet Union and the requested financial assistance (100,000US$) it received from Yugoslavia. |
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==The Carnation Revolution and Independence of Angola== |
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{{Mergeto|Angolan War of Independence|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|Angolan War of Independence}} |
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{{seealso|Carnation Revolution}} |
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The [[Carnation Revolution]] 25 April 1974 in Portugal led to the sudden decolonization of its last two African colonies [[Mozambique]] and [[Angola]], which also were the very last colonies on the African continent. [[Guinea-Bissau]], another Portuguese colony, had just gained it independence in the previous year. Mozambique’s independence was granted without much ado on 25 June 1975. But Angola became involved in a civil war between rivaling liberation movements |
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*[[Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola]] (’’’MPLA’’’) headed by [[Agostinho Neto]], |
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*[[União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola]] (’’’UNITA’’’) headed by [[Jonas Savimbi]] and |
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*Frente Nacional da Libertação de Angola (’’’[[FNLA]]’’’) headed by [[Holden Roberto]]. |
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==South African involvement== |
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The three movements had their roots in Angola's major ethnic groups. |
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The MPLA had its base among the Mbundu, but also many supporters in the urban centres, especially in the capital [[Luanda]]. Its largely Mulatto character helped it to transcend ethnic divisions so that it also appealed to other ethnic groups across the country. Thus the MPLA's base couldn't be pinpointed to a certain area as with the other two movements. The MPLA had been supported by [[Yugoslavia]] and [[Eastern Bloc]] countries since the 1960s, as were [[Lumumba]] (Kongo-Léopoldville) and [[Amílcar Cabral]] ([[Guinea-Bissau]]).<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002, p. 235</ref> |
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Portugal’s sudden retreat from Angola and Mozambique in 1974 ended a history of military and intelligence cooperation with the colonial power against the Angolan and Namibian liberation movements dating back to the 1960s. According to apartheid historiography South African involvement, what it calls the “[[South African Border War]]”, started in 1966, when the conflict with SWAPO, which had its bases in Zambia, first flared up. With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the establishment of black rule in the two former colonies South Africa lost a valuable buffer between itself and black Africa. These new governments being leftist posed an even larger threat to the Apartheid regime. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298</ref> <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)</ref> |
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The FNLA had its base among the Bakongo in northwestern Angola had received over the course of time aid from a host of countries: Algeria, Ghana, Israel, France, Romania, People’s Republic of China, South Africa and United States. Unlike the MPLA and UNITA, the FNLA operated only within its ethnic area. UNITA was active in the southeast of the country and was based on the [[Ovimbundu]], the largest ethnic group of Angola. It had received support an even wider range of countries than the FNLA: [[Bulgaria]], [[Egypt]], [[France]], [[Israel]], [[Morocco]], [[People’s Republic of China]], [[North Korea]] (later to officially recognize the MPLA-government), [[Saudi Arabia]], [[South Africa]], United States, [[Zaire]] and [[Zambia]].<ref>Messiant in: Angola, les voies, pt. 1, p. 160</ref><ref>Heimer in: Décolonisation, p. 53</ref> |
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MPLA and UNITA also operated in eastern Angola among other ethnic groups. |
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On 14 July, 1975 Prime Minister [[B. J. Vorster|Vorster]] approved a list of weapons worth 14 million US$ to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, p. 64-65</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80</ref> First arms shipments for FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August 1975. |
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The refusal of the three movements to sit for multi-lateral negotiations prevented the Portuguese from handing over power. After continuous attempts delegations of the movements met in Alvor, Portugal to discuss a framework of terms for the changeover of power. During the one-week talks they prepared the transition to independence of Angola but the [[Alvor Agreement]] was no solid foundation for the procedure. Most important of all, there was no agreement on which movement should furnish the provisional or first president of the country until the first elections scheduled for 11 November 1975.<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002</ref> |
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On 9 August, 1975 the SADF moved some 50km into southern Angola in aid of FNLA and UNITA and occupied the [[Ruacana hydroelectric complex]] and other installations on the [[Cuene River]]. The “defence” of the [[Cunene Dam]] complex in Namibia’s border was South Africa’s justification for the first permanent installation of regular SADF units inside Angola. <ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> |
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===Struggle for the capital=== |
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Fighting broke out two weeks after the transitional government took office in January, composed of the three liberation movements according to the [[Alvor Agreement]]. Each tried to get itself into the best strategic positions with occupation of the capital was seen as a key to foreign recognition.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)</ref> FNLA and MPLA fought for control of [[Luanda]] and the MPLA succeeded in driving the FNLA out of the capital by July 9. The FNLA took up positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of Luanda, from which it kept attacking, supported by units from Zaire. As fighting in the country increased it was yet fanned by various sides, most of all the superpowers. Angola very quickly became the venue of a violent confrontation between the two blocks. |
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On 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical support. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fighting SWAPO.<ref>du Preez in: Avontuur, p. 28</ref> <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)</ref> In addition, on 22 August 1975 the SADF launched operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola. |
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The civil war in Angola broke out only shortly after the end of the [[Vietnam War]] and the United States was sensitive to any possible setbacks in other regions of the world. Success of a leftist liberation movement with the aid of the [[USSR]] and Cuba would have been the result of a first serious interference ever by the [[Eastern Bloc]] in the internal affairs of an African country. The United States would have considered this to be a strategic threat. In a meeting by the [[National Security Council]] (NSC) on 27. June 1975 including President [[Gerald Ford]], Secretary of State [[Henry Kissinger]], Secretary of Defence [[James Schlesinger]], and CIA Director [[William Egan Colby]] among others, one of the topics of discussion was the development in Angola in light of Soviet aid to the MPLA. Comparing the situation to the civil war in the Congo, where the US and their allies had succeeded in holding the capital Leopoldville which led to control of the majority of the country occupation of Luanda was considered key. |
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Due to the recent MPLA’s successes UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DOS, in: Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence, Sept. 22, 1975, p 4-5, National Security Archive, Washington</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Le Monde, Sept. 13, 1975, p. 3</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Diaz Arguelles to Colomé, October 1, 1975, p. 11</ref> and it became clear to South Africa that the MPLA would win the struggle without its military intervention. |
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On 14 October, the South Africans launched secret [[Operation Savannah (Angola)|Operation Savannah]], and a first of several South African columns (task force Zulu) crossed into Angola from Namibia, advancing very quickly. A second task force, Foxbat, invaded Angola in mid-October. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298</ref> <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)</ref> The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80</ref><ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 32, 63, 86</ref><ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 93-101</ref> |
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Different options for the US to respond to the situation were considered: neutrality, a hands-off posture or a diplomatic campaign which Kissinger thought nothing of. Then a section in the notes is blackened out but from the further course of the discussion it can be assumed that as a third option Kissinger proposes the active support of UNITA and FNLA. Kissinger indicates that the CIA's oversight committee had authorised actions both for money and arms. The first two options mentioned before are discarded for various considerations and reasons. In the further course of the conversation President Ford puts straight that, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, meaning that Savimbi should be in control of Luanda before the elections. An insightful comment of Secretary Schlesinger is, that the US “might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola. [[Cabinda]] in the clutches of Mobutu would mean far greater security of the petroleum resources”. In any case success must be certain before anything is done otherwise the US should remain neutral. For the president it is unacceptable to do nothing. He orders a study to get some options prepared.<ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)</ref> |
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The United States had known of South Africa's covert plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as at odds with the version in his memoirs and in contrast to what President Ford told the Chinese, who supported the FNLA but were worried about South African engagement in Angola.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press)</ref> |
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==Cuban Military Mission== |
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On 3. August a Cuban delegation again traveled to Angola to assess the situation the necessary aid. In a memorandum of 11. August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explains the reasons for the visit and briefs on the contents of the talks. He underlines that the “aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November” is taken into account and the awareness that “the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power”. The delegation handed over 100,000 US dollars. |
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Arguelles also mentions that Neto complained “of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and “that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs”. Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola as “clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces.<ref> http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses5.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces]) </ref> |
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The problem of all liberation movements was the lack of skilled soldiers especially to handle the more and more sophisticated weaponry. Until late August Cuba only had a few technical advisors in Angola, which the CIA took note of. <ref>CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4, NSA</ref> Neto had repeatedly and urgently requested for 100 Cuban instructors but it was only after careful assessment of the situation Cuba decided to establish four military training centres, "''Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria''" (CIR) in Angola. |
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At the request of the MPLA, by October 18-20, Cuba established 4 military training centres, "''Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria''" (CIR), staffed by almost 500 Cubans in [[Cabinda]], [[Benguela]], Henrique de Carvalho and Salazar. The CIR in Cabinda comprised of almost half of the total. 40 instructors from the CIR Salazar were the first to become involved in fighting on October 23 during the defense of Kifangondo. A second group helped the MPLA on October 28 along the same defense line to the east of Kifangondo.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 259-261, 269</ref> |
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On 3 August a Cuban delegation travelled for the second time to Angola to assess the situation and the necessary aid. In a memorandum of 11 August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explained the reasons for the visit and briefed on the contents of the talks. He underlined that the aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November was taken into account and the awareness that “the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power”. The delegation handed over 100,000 US dollars. |
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Arguelles also mentioned that Neto had complained “of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and “that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs”. Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola as “clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces. <ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/</ref> <ref> http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses5.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces]) </ref> |
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After the return of the delegation the Cubans considered the options of their instructors in Angola in case of an invasion by South Africa or Zaire which would be either “guerrilla war” or withdrawal to Zambia, where Cuba proceeded to open an embassy. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 255</ref> On August 15, Castro urged the USSR to increase support for the MPLA and offered to send special troops. The Russians declined. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis 1974-76: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International Project Bulletin, n.8-9, p. 25</ref> |
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South Africa was also anxious to prevent the establishment of a [[Marxist]]-socialist system by the MPLA in its vicinity. With the independence of Mozambique and Angola, it had lost a valuable buffer between itself and black Africa. In addition to that, with leftist governments in both of these countries, it had reason to assume that Namibia and South Africa itself would be the next targets of liberation movements. First arms shipments for FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August. On September 4, Prime Minister [[B. J. Vorster|Vorster]] authorised the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical support. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fighting SWAPO.<ref>du Preez in: Avontuur, p. 28</ref> Also, on August 22 the SADF launched operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola. The first military encounter between MPLA and South African advisors occurred on October 5, when they were leading a unit of UNITA forces to confront the MPLA advancing on [[Huambo|Nova Lisboa]] (later named Huambo). UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola and it became clear to South Africa that the MPLA would win the struggle without its military intervention. On October 14, secret [[Operation Savannah (Angola) |
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|Operation Savannah]] started, and a first South African column (called Zulu) crossed the southern border of Angola, advancing very quickly.<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298</ref> A second task force, Foxbat, landed in Angola in mid-October. The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from southwestern Angola, from the central region and finally the capture of Luanda.<ref>Don Geldehuys in: Diplomacy, p. 80</ref><ref>du Preez in: Avontuur, pp. 32, 63, 86</ref><ref>Spies in: Operasie, pp. 93-101</ref> By October 20 Zulu took Rocadas, by October 24 Sa da Bandeira, by October 28 Mocamedes. On November 2-3, 35 to 40 Cuban instructors from the CIR Benguela were involved for the third time in the fighting, when the MPLA tried to stop the Zulu advance near Catengue. On November 6 the SADF took [[Benguela]], on November 7 [[Lobito]]. |
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Instead of the requested 100 the CIRs were staffed by almost 500 Cubans which were to train about 5,300 Angolans in three to six months. These 500 men included 17 in a medical brigade and 284 officers. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Composicion de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4</ref> The dispatch started in late August and the most urgently needed specialists used international commercial flights; the remaining were brought on ships and two Cuban planes. The arrival of two Cuban ships in Angola in early October with instructors on board was reported by the CIA<ref>CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4</ref> without raising any alarm in Washington. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 228</ref> |
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===Operation Carlota=== |
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The CIRs were placed in [[Cabinda]], [[Benguela]], Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar). The CIR in Cabinda comprised of almost half of the total, 191 men, while the others had 66 or 67 each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country The reason for the stronger detachment in Cabinda was the perceived threat from Zaire either to Cabinda or to the Congo. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 255-256, 265</ref> By the time the training centres were fully staffed and operational on 18-20 October, unnoticed by the world, Operation Savannah was already in full swing. |
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Netu had asked the Soviet Union for support. The Russians sent arms but did not have in mind to intervene before independence. |
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In contrast, Cuba was ready to help, as explained by [[Fidel Castro]]: "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, be offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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==Operation Carlota== |
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Unlike the Cuban engagements in the sixties this was no secret operation. Castro decided to support Angola in all openness, sending special forces and 35,000 men infantry by the end of 1976, deploying them at their own expense from November 1975 to January 1976. Thus, with "'''Operation Carlota'''," named after the leader of a revolt against slavery in Cuba on 5 November 1843, Cuba became a major player in the conflict. |
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In contrast to the continuing successes in the south, where by mid October the MPLA had gained control of 12 of Angola’s provinces and most urban centres, they only barely managed to keep the well equipped FNLA and its allies abreast on the northern front just east of Luanda. <ref>Washington Post, August 24, 1975, B1</ref> The FNLA received arms and equipment from the U.S. via Zaire starting in the end of July. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 258</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Rand Daily Mail, August 3, 1975, p. 5</ref> From July to November the front moved back and forth between Caxito and Kifangondo. Netu asked the Soviet Union for more support which had no intention to send any staff before independence and only reluctantly sent more arms. |
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The deployment of troops was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, this took the USSR by surprise.<ref> N. Broutens, Soviet Politbüro, dept. chief foreign affairs, in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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The Russians were forced to accept the Cuban troop deployment so as not to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the United States, instead they tried to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to arrange for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola. Of course the US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf.<ref>Frank Wisner Jr., Ambassador, US-Foreign Ministry , in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri </ref> Due to the hostility between the United States and Cuba, the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted.<ref>Hermann Cohen, National Security Council, United States, in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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Forty instructors from the CIR Salazar were the first Cubans to become involved in the defence of Kifangondo on October 23. A second group supported the MPLA on October 28 along the same defence line to the east of Kifangondo.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 269</ref> |
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Castro regarded the attitude of the United States: “Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before 11 November? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of [[Internationalism]].<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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{{Image:Angola unita.png|Maximun UNITA expansion in Angola civil WAR Angola}} |
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The Americans depicted the situation differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in Vietnam. |
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The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. South African advisors and antitank weapons had helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October. By 20 October Zulu took Rocadas, by 24 October Sa da Bandeira, by October 28 Mocamedes. |
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The United States had known of South Africa's covert plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as at odds with the version in his memoirs and in contrast to what President Ford told the Chinese, who were worried about South African engagement in Angola.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press)</ref> |
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On 2-3 November, Cuban instructors for the third time got involved in the fighting, this time 35 to 40 men from the CIR Benguela, when they unsuccessfully tried to help the MPLA stop the Zulu advance near Catengue. On 6 November Zulu took the abandoned harbour city of [[Benguela]], thus seizing control of the terminal of the Benguela railroad, and on 7 November [[Lobito]]. In central Angola, combat unit Foxbat with a squadron of armoured cars had moved 800 km north toward Luanda. <ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> The MPLA could not prevent the SADF and UNITA from occupying all of southern Angola and coming within 100 km of Luanda. With the FNLA attacking from the east the situation for the MPLA only a few days before independence looked dim. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)</ref> |
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==Cuba steps in== |
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===Battle of Kifangondo and Declaration of Independence=== |
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{{Mergeto|Battle of Quifangondo|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|Battle of Quifangondo}} |
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Two days before independence the most immanent danger for the MPLA came from the FNLA outside Kifangono, supported by 1,200 troops from Zaire, European mercenaries and Kifangondo had been the second line, after the FNLA, supported by three battalions of Zairian infantry troops and Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent and a South African group led by General Roos had broken through the first line at Porto Quipiri, about 50 km from Luanda.<ref>http://www.angola.org.uk/newsletter100.htm</ref> Kifangondo was defended by 850 MPLA, 200 Katangans, 88 Cubans and one Soviet advisor. The first two Cuban planes with about 100 combat troops landed in Luanda in the evening of November 9. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on November 7, among them canons, mortars and 6 of the infamous BM21S [[Katyusha]]s, multiple rocket launchers with 48 launchers. In the battle of Kifangondo on November 10 the FAPLA managed to repel the onslaught of the FNLA, saving Luanda for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power and shortly after midnight Netu proclaimed the independence and the People's Republic of Angola.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp. 310-311 </ref> Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), pp. 310-311 </ref> Yet, they could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.<ref>Quotations from Bridgeland in: Savimbi, p. 151</ref><ref>Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 3</ref><ref>Jornal Novo, Nov. 12, 1975, p. 15</ref> |
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It was only after the MPLA debacle at Catengue that the Cubans became fully aware of the South African invasion and that Luanda would be taken unless they took immediate action. On 4 November Castro decided to send in troops. The same day, a first plane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first two Cuban planes arrived in Luanda with the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces. [[Operation Carlota]] had started with only three medium range [[Bristol Britannia]] turboprop planes, which had to refuel twice along the way. An artillery regiment was following by sea. <ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref><ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Batallon de Tropas Especiales, n. d.</ref> The first priority of the Cubans was helping the MPLA to keep hold of Luanda. |
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==The Civil War, a Proxy War== |
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The MPLA had not officially requested an intervention. The matter had only been discussed with the Cuban military mission. |
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{{Mergeto|Angolan Civil War|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|Angolan Civil War}} |
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This did not end the fighting. More than half the country was in the hands of either UNITA and South Africans in the south and FNLA and Zaireans in the north. The US did not recognize Neto’s government and were more determined than ever to topple the pro-Soviet administration.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref><ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press </ref> |
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In the north the FAPLA managed to push the FNLA north on its own so the Cubans could turn their whole support to the southern front. |
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[[Fidel Castro]] explained the Cuban intervention: "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, we offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> see also: <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis 1974-76: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International Project Bulletin, n.8-9, p. 25</ref> |
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On November 13 Zulu took Novo Redondo and headed further north for Porto Amboim. The advance along the coast was stopped at the river Queve, north of Novo Redondo, just short of Porto Amboim and the South Africans moved east to Cela, already occupied by Foxbat, in order to take another road north from there. The Cubans followed and it and laid an ambush for the SADF just northwest of Cela on November 23. At a bridge 2 km north of Ebo the Cubans executed their ambush on the SADF and UNITA.<ref>Quotations from Spies in: Operasie, pp. 180-191</ref> The FAPLA was not involved. The fighting lasted from early morning until afternoon; After severe casualties on both sides and a loss of six or seven Eland armored cars the SDAF and UNITA retreated to Cela.<ref>Hernandez Gattorno to Dias Arguelles, November 23, 1975</ref><ref>Breytenbach in: Forged, p. 132</ref> This skirmish was the first SADF defeat.<ref>Quotations from Breytenbach in: Sword, p. 58</ref> In propaganda terms the battle of Ebo was also a victory.<ref>Iko Carreira, Angolan Minister of Defense in: O Pensamento, p. 141</ref> |
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Unlike the Cuban foreign engagements in the sixties this was no secret operation. Castro decided to support Angola in all openness, sending special forces and 35,000 men infantry by the end of 1976, deploying them at their own expense from November 1975 to January 1976. Thus, with '''Operation Carlota''', named after the leader of a revolt against slavery in Cuba on 5 November 1843, Cuba became a major player in the conflict. |
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By then there were approximately 1,300 Cubans in Angola. Another 1,250 arrived by ship between November 27 and December 1. The Soviet Union supported the Cubans with arms but not yet with transportation facillities for troops. On the northern front the FNLA was retreating and the South Africans with General Roos were evacuated from the north on November 28. |
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The deployment of troops was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, this also took the USSR by surprise.<ref> N. Broutens, Soviet Politbüro, dept. chief foreign affairs, in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59min) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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On the southern front the SADF, numbering 2,900 men, still had an edge over the Cubans both in numbers and equipment. Nevertheless they were unable to break the Cuban defenses. The Cubans had the rainy season in their favour.<ref>Quotations from Breytenbach in: Sword, p. 62</ref><ref>Observer, Dec. 7, 1975, p. 11</ref><ref>Times, December 11, 1975, p. 7</ref> In spite of a breakthrough on December 12 near Catofe, the SADF remained bogged down. An attempt to control the [[Benguela Railway]] from Luso to the Zaire border a day before also was unsuccessful. In November the international press (not the South African which was only allowed to write about "border wars") finally started reporting on the South African invasion of Angola. In addition, pictures of SADF soldiers captured by the Cubans were circulated on December 18. International pressure on South Africa was building up. |
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The Russians were forced to accept the Cuban troop deployment so as not to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the United States. Instead, they had in mind to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to a degree of support by arranging for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola. |
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The Cuban troops able to intervene on the side of the MPLA before the declaration of independence were basically the ones posted in the 3 CIRs, the 100 specialists that arrived in Luanda on 7 November and the first 158 men special forces of Operation Carlota arriving on 2 planes on 9 November. The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were immediately dispatched to the nearby front at Kifangondo where a battle was already raging. They supported 850 MPLA, 200 [[Katanga]]s and one Soviet advisor. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on 7 November, among them canons, mortars and 6 of the infamous BM21S [[Katyusha]]s, multiple rocket launchers with 48 launchers. |
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On 3. December 1975, in a meeting with US and Chinese officials including [[Deng Xiaoping]] (Vice Premier and deputy of [[Mao Zedong]]), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President [[Gerald Ford]], [[Henry Kissinger]] (Secretary of State / Foreign Minister), [[Brent Scowcroft]] (Assistant to the President for NSA) and [[George H. W. Bush]] (Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed. To concerns raised by the Chinese about US entreaties to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement Kissinger responds, that the US is prepared to “push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created”.<ref name="gleijeses4"> {{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses4.pdf|title=Memorandum of Conversation (between United States and China)|date=December 3, 1975|publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}} (Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord)</ref> Yet, the Chinese still supported the FLNA and UNITA against MPLA. |
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==The northern front== |
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It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in”.<ref name="gleijeses4"/> He also said that he had approved 35 million US dollars more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. The round discussed and agreed who should support FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner considering the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.<ref name="gleijeses4"/> |
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Two days before independence the most immanent danger for the MPLA came from the FNLA east of Kifangondo, supported by three battalions of Zairian infantry troops, Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent and a South African group led by General Ben de Wet Roos. They had broken through the first line at Porto Quipiri, about 50 km from Luanda. <ref>http://www.angola.org.uk/newsletter100.htm</ref> |
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President [[Gerald Ford]] accorded support to UNITA, but Congress —worried that there would be another [[Vietnam]]— prohibited a secret engagement of the US in Angola. Although support for UNITA still arrived through other channels, e.g. via [[Israel]],<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press </ref> this enabled the government in Luanda to keep FNLA and UNITA in check. South Africa also retreated from Angola, but kept up its support for UNITA from neighbouring [[Namibia]]. |
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On 10 November the MPLA and the Cubans warded off the last big attack of the FNLA and its allies, thus securing the capital for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power “to the people of Angola” and shortly after midnight Netu proclaimed the independence of Angola. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 310-311</ref> Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 310-311</ref> Yet, UNITA and FNLA could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.<ref>Quotations from Bridgeland in: Savimbi, p. 151</ref><ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 3</ref><ref>Jornal Novo, Nov. 12, 1975, p. 15</ref> |
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Castro traveled to Angola to participate in the independence and victory celebrations. Of the 17 revolutions supported by Cuba in Africa, none had been as successful as this one.<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press </ref> Following the celebrations Castro criss-crossed the African continent for three weeks and was greeted everywhere as a hero of liberation. |
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For the US it took a few days before they registered how bad the FNLA and the Zairians had been routed at Kifangondo. But even then they did not register the full significance of the Cuban involvement since the news from the southern front in their view were still positive. <ref>CIA, Intelligence Checklist, November 14, 1975, p. A2-A5, NSA</ref> Kissinger, like the South Africans, was shaken by the scale of the Soviet and Cuban response. The CIA’s Angolan task force at CIA headquarters at Langley had been so confident of success by the Zairian and South African regulars, that on November 11 the members had celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their crepe paper decorated offices. <ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> |
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The US first acknowledged Cuban troops in Angola in an official statement on 24 November 1975. Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez: ‘Our intelligence services have grown so bad that we only found out that Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already there.’ At that moment, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola—more even than Kissinger imagined. Indeed, there were so many ships anchored in the bay of Luanda that Neto said to a functionary close to him: ‘It’s not right’, if they go on like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves.’ It is unlikely that even the Cubans had foreseen that their solidarity aid to the Angolan people would reach such proportions. It had been clear to them right from the start, however, that the action had to be swift, decisive, and at all costs successful.<ref> Márquez, Gabriel García in: Operation Carlota, New Left Review I/101-102, January-April 1977</ref> |
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Due to the hostility between the USA and Cuba the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted <ref> Hermann Cohen, National Security Council, USA, in “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri </ref>. Of course the US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference. The Americans also depicted the motivations and timings of the Cubans differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in Vietnam. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf. <ref>Frank Wisner Jr., Ambassador, US-Foreign Ministry , in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri </ref> |
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Castro regarded the US response to the Cuban intervention: “Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before November 11th? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of [[Internationalism]].<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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On the day of independence the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola inland toward Zaire and Cabinda. By 8 November around 1000 FAPLA troops and 232 Cubans had managed to hold Cabinda, where, with US consent, Zairian troops, FLEC guerrillas and French mercenaries had launched an attack.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 319-320 </ref> |
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On 3 December 1975, in a meeting with US and Chinese officials including [[Deng Xiaoping]] (Vice Premier and deputy of [[Mao Zedong]]), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President [[Gerald Ford]], [[Henry Kissinger]] (Secretary of State / Foreign Minister), [[Brent Scowcroft]] (Assistant to the President for NSA) and [[George H. W. Bush]] (Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed. To concerns raised by the Chinese about US entreaties to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement Kissinger responds, that the US is prepared to “push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created”. <ref name="gleijeses4"> {{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses4.pdf|title=Memorandum of Conversation (between United States and China)|date=December 3, 1975|publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}} (Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord)</ref> It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in”.<ref name="gleijeses4"/> He also said that he had approved 35 million US dollars more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. The round discussed and agreed who should support FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner considering the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.<ref name="gleijeses4"/> |
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As long as the Cubans were operating on their own through December and January their troops came in slowly but steadily. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota the Soviets agreed to ten charter flights on long-range IL-62 jets, starting on 8 January. <ref> http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses2.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces])</ref> |
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More troops also arrived on Cuban ships. By early February, with increasing numbers in Cuban troops and sophisticated weaponry, the tide changed in favour of MPLA. The final offensive in the North started on 1 January and by late February the MPLA and 300 Cubans completely annihilated the FNLA and drove what was left of them and the Zairean army out of the country. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Vermerk über das Gespräch m. d. Präsidenten d. VR Angola, Genossen Dr. Agositinho Neto, am 26.2.1976, p. 2, SED, DY30IV2/2.035/128</ref> The last mercenaries already left the north by 17 Januray.<ref>Guardian, Manchester, February 18, 1976, p. 2</ref> The South African contingent on the northern front led by General Ben de Wet Roos had already been evacuated by ship on 28 November. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa’s Border War, 1966-1989, Gibraltar, 1989, p. 51-52</ref> <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 140 –143</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 121-122</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: de Villiers, PW, p. 259</ref> |
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==The southern front== |
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==SADF advance is stopped== |
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Through November and December the SADF in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 <ref> Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 215</ref> and although it still had the edge over FAPLA and the Cubans and in spite of determined efforts to advance northward from Novo Redondo it was unable to break through the defences. With more Cuban troops and supplies arriving by the day, Luanda was to remain out of reach. <ref>Observer, December 7, 1975, p. 11</ref> <ref>Times, December 11, 1975, p. 7</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 154-73</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 203 –18</ref> In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops took Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 186-201</ref> By mid-December it became necessary to extend military service and to call in reserves. <ref>Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8, December 28, 1975, E3 (quoting Botha)</ref> <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa’s Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar,1989, p. 55</ref> “An indication of the seriousness of the situation …. is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place”.<ref>Rand Daily Mail, January 16</ref> By late December Cuba had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 325 </ref> |
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Apart from being “bogged down” <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to all American Republic Diplomatic posts, December 20, 1975, NSA</ref> on the southern front, there were two other setbacks for the South Africans. |
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==The world takes notice== |
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The South Africans had managed to keep their invasion hidden from the world view for quite some time. It even took the MPLA until 23 October to notice that not white mercenaries but the SADF was advancing. Yet it took another whole month for the world press to take notice: On 23 November a major western newspaper, the Washington Post, announced that regular South African troops were fighting inside Angola. Although other papers were still slow to follow, e. g. the New York Times on 12 December, the fact eventually became internationally known. Even the South African population itself had been kept in the dark and it was only on 19 December that the people learned more about what was called the “Border War”, when papers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and the Cubans. |
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As a result the few “friends” South Africa still had strived to distance themselves from the apartheid regime and with international pressure building up Pretoria became increasingly isolated. Even UNITA made an attempt to save face, branding the South African “invaders”. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 325</ref> |
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==Withdrawal of official US-support== |
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It was only when the US administration asked Congress for 28 million US$ for IAFEATURE that Congress really paid attention to the events in Angola. By then “the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the stench of US-collusion with Pretoria hung in the air. Worse, the growing numbers of Cuban troops had derailed the CIA’s plans and the administration seemed at a loss what to do next.”<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 332</ref> The money was not approved and on 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment banning covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill sponsored by Dick Clark extended the ban. ([[Clark Amendment]]) <ref>http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clark.htm</ref> |
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The US administration resorted to other means of support for FNLA and UNITA of which one was raising mercenaries. The CIA initiated a covert programme to recruit Brazilians and Europeans, mostly Portuguese and British, to fight in the north of Angola. Altogether they managed to enlist around 250 men, but by the time meaningful numbers arrived in January 1975 the campaign in the north was all but over. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 334-337</ref> |
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A report by [[Henry Kissinger]] of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses1.pdf|title=(Document obtained from Department of State files through FOIA)|date=January 1976|publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref> |
A report by [[Henry Kissinger]] of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses1.pdf|title=(Document obtained from Department of State files through FOIA)|date=January 1976|publisher=[[United States Department of State]]}}</ref> |
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Line 143: | Line 193: | ||
*All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.}} |
*All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.}} |
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"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola."<ref> |
"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola."<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, Dec. 20, 1975</ref> "Cuban sources, however, indicate that the number hovered around 3,500 to 4,000."<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: "Informe", p. 11</ref> This more or less would have put the Cubans at par with the South Africans on the southern front. |
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==South Africa and UNITA withdraw== |
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By late January 1976 the FNLA was crumbling. In late February the northern zone was completely taken by government forces.<ref>Vermerk über das Gespräch mit dem Präsidenten der VR Angola, Genossen Dr. Agostinho Neto, am 26.2.1976 ..., p. 2, SED, DY30IV 2/2.035/128</ref> |
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After the South African incursion into Angola become internationally known, all former allies scrambled to distance themselves from South Africa and it became totally isolated. On December 19 the US Senate cut further funds for IAFEATURE. Continuous attempts to crack the Cuban defenses failed.<ref>Generals Andre van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Viljoen in Spies: Operasie, pp. 259, 261, 264</ref> "The operations in Angola had exposed certain deficiencies in the South African weaponry and equipment ...This was especially true of the SADF's artillery, which had been badly outranged by the Cubans' Soviet-supplied artillery and rocket systems"<ref>Dorning: A Concise History, p. 21</ref> |
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Pretoria had to decide whether it would stay in the game and bring in more troops. In late December there were heated debates between Vorster, foreign minister Muller, defence minister Botha, head of BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) van den Bergh and a number of senior officials as to withdraw or to stay. Zaire, UNITA and the US urged South Africa to stay. But the US would not openly endorse the South African invasion and assure continuing military assistance in case of an escalation. Sobered by the Cuban’s performance and by the West’s cold shoulder, Pretoria chose to fold. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 337, 341</ref> <ref>World (Johannesburg), December 3, 1975, p. 1: Quotations from Admiral H. H. Biermann</ref> <ref>Thom, William in: Angola’s 1975-76 Civil War, Autumn 1998, 1-44, p. 31</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: See the pessimistic reports of Generals André van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Viljoen in Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 259, 261, 264</ref> |
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On January 16 the SADF withdrew from Cela and January 25 the Cubans entered Novo Redondo.<ref>CIA, National Intelligence Daily, Jan. 8, 1976</ref><ref>"Informe", p. 14</ref> On December 30 Vorster decided to withdraw the SADF to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border; withdrawal began January 14 with Cubans and the FAPLA retaking possession of the territory. The SADF intended to keep a strip of 80 km along the border to prevent the SWAPO from moving in and to hold the Cuene dams which produced electricity for Namibia. But Angola wanted the South Africans completely out of the country.<ref>Iko Careira (Angolan Defense Minister)in "Vermerk", p. 3</ref> In the meantime western countries started recognising the MPLA government. |
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On 30 December Vorster decided to withdraw after the OAU emergency session in Addis Ababa on 13 January to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 260-263</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: de Villers Dirk and Johanna in: PW-A biography of South Africa’s President PW Botha, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1984, p. 266-269</ref> |
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The sentiment of the Pretoria government at the time was expressed in a speech by Botha before South African parliament on 17 April, 1978: “Against which neighbouring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years, when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story: the story must be told and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch”. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Botha, P. W., January 27, 1976, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, col. 114</ref> |
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After assurances by the Neto government, that the dams will not be damaged and electricity supplies to Namibia will be continued, the remaining SADF troops left Angola an March 27, 1976. |
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During January the SADF abandoned the towns of Cela and Novo Redondo on 25 January <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: CIA, National Intelligence Daily, January 8, 1976</ref> and FAPLA and the Cubans started first small offensive probes to the south. But apart from a few skirmishes the Cubans stayed well behind the retreating South Africans. By early February 1976 the SADF had retreated to the far south of Angola, leaving behind mine fields and blown up bridges. Four to five thousand troops were to hold a strip along the Namibian border up to 80 km deep until Angola at least gave assurance that it wouldn’t supply bases for SWAPO and that it would continue supply electricity to Namibia from the Cuene dams. <ref>Washington Post, February 4, 1976, p. 1</ref> |
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While the Cubans and FAPLA were slowly approaching the southern border, South Africa and Angola took up indirect negotiations about South African withdrawal brokered by the British and Soviet governments. On 27 March Botha announced the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 27 March. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, March 25, 1976, cols. 3916-17</ref> On that day the last 60 military vehicles crossed the border into Namibia. |
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Without South African support UNITA collapsed under the FAPLA attacks. Whatever remained retreated into Zaire. Especially among African countries UNITA was publicly discredited by its links with the apartheid regime, the CIA and white mercenaries. “Savimbi's political career appeared to be over. But he was saved by the cold war and his usefulness to the US and South Africa”. <ref> Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html</ref> |
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During the retreat of the SADF the UN Security Council met to consider "the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola". On March 31, 1976 it voted 9 : 1, branding South Africa the aggressor and demanding it to compensate Angola for war damages. Western countries did not block the resolution. |
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“Despite a massive South African military invasion through Namibia up to the coast in an attempt to take Luanda, and a pincer movement from the north with Zairian troops and white mercenaries on behalf of the FNLA and UNITA, the arrival of Cuban troops in Operation Carlota saved the MPLA and its newly established independent government” and it profoundly altered the balance of power in southern Africa. <ref> Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html</ref> <ref> IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003</ref> Without Cuban intervention, the South Africans would have seized Luanda before anyone reported that they had crossed the border. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 327</ref> |
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===The Civil War continues=== |
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With “Operation Carlota” Cuba had become a main player in the conflict. With the retreat of the South Africans from Angola and by securing the country for the MPLA, the Cubans had achieved their goal. But for the South Africans retreating from Angola without having achieved anything was humiliating. The MPLA victory was not only a severe blow to Kissinger and the U.S., but also to the apartheid regime, which as a result of the Angolan debacle became even more militaristic and reactionary. <ref> Christopher Saunders, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa in: Journal of Military History (Society for Military History), http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1saunders.html</ref> |
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The legacy of Angola according the South African paper, the Rand Daily Mail, was the blows to South African pride and the boost to African nationalism which has seen South Africa forced to retreat. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 346</ref> To South African blacks Angola showed the SADF is vulnerable: “Their racist arrogance shrank when our MPLA comrades thrashed them in Angola”. <ref>Rand Daily Mail, February 17, 1976, p. 10</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: American Embassy London to Secretary of State, March 2, 1976, p. 2, DOS MF 8904623</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Republic of South Africa, Report, 1:579, Quoting African National Congress (ANC) pamphlet issued to celebrate the event</ref> |
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Until the end of the 1970s, Angola slipped away from wider international public interest although the fighting in the country continued. UNITA still operated in the south and President Netu asked the Cubans to keep some units in the country. Netu died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow. His successor was [[Jose Eduardo Dos Santos]] who has remained in office to this day. Barely one month later [[Ronald Reagan]], who immediately wanted to take a harder line with Angola, became President of the United States. The Cubans were to be driven out of Angola.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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Another way to look at it was that “in Angola Black troops – Cubans and Angolans – have defeated White troops in military exchanges. Whether the bulk of the offensive was by Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of this war’s battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning, and are not White; and that psychological edge, that advantage the White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping away. White elitism has suffered an irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know it”. <ref>Sargent, Roger in: Rand Daily Mail, February 13, 1976, p. 13</ref> A South African member of parliament warned: “We must expect a hardening of the attitudes of our own Non-Whites”. <ref>Jacobs, Gideon (United Party) in: Rand Daily Mail, February 28, 1976, p. 6</ref> |
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As a retired South African Brigadier put it: “Angola may well be regarded as South Africa’s Bay of Pigs”<ref>Le Monde, March 30, 1976, p. 6</ref> <ref>Willers, J. G. (Brigadier Ret.) in: Letter to the editor, Cape Times, April 28, 1976, p. 10</ref> In addition to that the country found itself completely isolated. |
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The UN Security Council met to consider “the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People’s Republic of Angola” and branded South Africa the aggressor on 31 March 1976, demanding it compensate Angola for war damages. |
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Apart from losing international standing the South Africans also could not prevent SWAPO from regaining its positions along the Namibian border. Many military observers considered 27 March as the actual start of SWAPO insurgency in Namibia. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Geldenhuys, Jannie in: A General’s Story, p. 58-59</ref> |
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==Cuban involvement in Angola in the late 1970s and in the 1980s== |
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As of 1975, South Africa waged a war from neighbouring [[Namibia]] against [[South West Africa People's Organization]] ([[SWAPO]]). The Namibian liberation organization operated out of Angola with support of the Angolan government against the occupation of Southwest Africa by the Apartheid regime. To this end, South Africa supported UNITA's continuing fight against the Angolan government and SWAPO to deny SWAPO a safe zone on Angola's southern border with Namibia. South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi’s image abroad, especially in the US.<ref>General [[Magnus Malan]], South African Minister of Defence in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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At the height of the deployment Cuba had 35 to 40 thousand military personnel stationed in Angola. In addition to that more and more technical, medical and educational staff came to fill the gaps the Portuguese had left behind. |
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The Angolan government still did not have control over the whole country. With the support of the US and South Africa UNITA became one the best equipped resistance movement of all times. They received [[FIM-92 Stinger]]s anti-aircraft missiles from the US. Savimbi did not hope for a victory, but to force the MPLA back to the negotiation table.<ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press</ref> While the [[CIA]] continued to build up UNITA, the aim of the US-foreign ministry was a peace plan which stipulated Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola and South Africa’s retreat from [[Namibia]].<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> Cuba basically agreed to such a solution if it paved Namibia’s way into freedom, but it remained an open question as to who should make the first move. |
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After South Africa had left Angola, the FNLA had all but disappeared from the scene and UNITA had mainly receded to Zaire. The MPLA government was internationally recognized, albeit not by the US. |
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At their March 14 meeting in Conakry, when victory was already assured, Castro and Neto decided that the Cubans would withdraw gradually, leaving behind for as long as necessary enough men to organize a strong, modern army, capable of guaranteeing Angola's future internal security and national independence without outside help. By the end of May more than 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba, and many more were on the way.<ref> Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, 1976, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm</ref> |
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Towards the end of Reagan’s second term in office, the negotiations did not bear fruit. While they dragged on each party tried to improve its starting position. The Angolan government again asked the USSR for help in order to give a final blow to UNITA. But the Russians were ignorant of the African theatre and in spite of considerable aid, UNITA inflicted one defeat after the other on FAPLA. In a valley near the Lomba River, they were routed and the Soviets left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died and a part of the Angolan army got closed in.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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The Cubans had high hopes that after their victory in Angola, in co-operation with the USSR, they could free all of southern Africa from the influence of the US and China.<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Matthews, Herbert in: Forward with Fidel Castro, Anywhere, New York Times, March 4, 1976, p. 31</ref> In Angola they put up a training camp for Namibian, Rhodesian and South African guerrillas. But one result of the events in Angola in 1976 was the American’s heightened attention to African affairs, especially in the south of the continent. Kissinger worried, “if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.” The need to distance themselves from outcasts in the eyes of black Africa this also meant the US would drop support for the white regime in Rhodesia, a price it was willing to pay to “thwart communism”. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Quotations from Kissinger, NSC meeting, April 7, 1976, p. 13, NSAd, NSC Meeting Minutes, box 2, GRFL</ref> <ref>Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p. 51</ref> |
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===Battle of Cuito Cuanavale=== |
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Within five years of the independence of Angola, Rhodesia emerged as the next independent black-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, something Ian Smith, the former Rhodesian prime minister vowed would not happen within a century. |
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{{Mergeto|Battle of Cuito Cuanavale|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|Battle of Cuito Cuanavale}} |
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[[Image:Angola Cuito Cuanavale.png|thumb|Cuito Cuanavale in Angola]] |
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In 1987 the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) launched an offensive against UNITA. The Cubans had advised against this operation because it would create the pretext for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. The South Africans jumped to the aid of UNITA. In spite of Soviet aid the Angolan forces were stopped and forced back. In a battle near the river Lomba the FAPLA and Russians were routed and the Soviets left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2,000 Angolan were killed in action. The fighting had became centered around the town of [[Cuito Cuanavale]] in the southeast of Angola. Also located there was an important forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola. South Africa committed a 3000 man force to support the UNITA positions which included the new G-5 artillery pieces.<ref>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/g5.htm</ref> |
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In the following years Cuba kept itself engaged in a number of other African countries. In 1978 Cuba sent 16,000 troops to Ethiopia [[Ogaden Conflict]], but this time in close coordination with the Soviets. Smaller military missions were active in the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Cuban technical, educational and medical staff in the tens of thousands was working in even more countries: Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, the Congo and Benin. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on full Cuban scholarships per year on the island. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 392</ref> |
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As the situation for the besieged Angolan troops became critical. The Cuban troops still stationed in Angola felt impelled to intervene as not to let their Angolan and Soviet allies suffer total defeat. On 15 November 1987 Cuba again decided upon a massive intervention and to reinforce its forces in Angola by sending additional detachments, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. As in 1975, the USSR again was not informed in advance. The relationship between Havana and Moscow had become strained since President [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] initiated his policy of détente with the West of which Castro was very suspicious. |
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==The Civil War continues== |
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Eventually Cuban troop strength rose to more than 50,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south, where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was able to achieve [[air supremacy]] to some extent, but its significance was seriously diminished by South African tactics, Cuban pilot's poor [[close air support]] techniques and UNITA's American-supplied [[FIM-92 Stinger|Stinger]] anti-aircraft missiles.<ref>{{cite book|last=Stiff|first=Peter|title=The Covert War: Koevoet Operations in Namibia|publisher=Galago Publishing Pty Ltd|date=2000| isbn=1919854037}}</ref> |
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[[Image:South Africa Border War Map.png|right|thumb|300px|Scope of operations.]] |
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The battle was the largest military engagement in Africa since the North African battles of the Second World War and in its course thousands of soldiers were killed. Arrayed on one side were the armed forces of Cuba, Angola and SWAPO numbering around 40,000; on the other, 3,000 members of the South African Defence Forces, several thousand UNITA and South African Territorial Forces.<ref>http://www.shunpiking.com/bhs2007/0402-BHS2-IS-SAncuba.htm</ref> |
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Towards the end of the 1970s, Angola slipped away from wider international public attention. UNITA was able to continue its insurgency operations in the south because of military and logistical support from South Africa and the Angolan government still had not gained control over the whole country. Cuban presence in Angola was initially greatly reduced after the retreat of the South Africans but soon again was increased due to tensions between Angola and Zaire in March 1977 (see [[Shaba Invasion]]). Mobuto accused Angola of instigating and supporting an attack of the [[FNLC]] (Front National pour la Libération du Congo on the Zairian province of Shaba and Neto charged Mobutu with harbouring and supporting the FNLA and FLEC. Only 2 months later the Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and foiling the [[Nitista Plot]] when [[Nito Alves]] and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster, which is another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Neto as well as the differing interests between the Soviets and the Cubans. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0050)</ref> <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0051)</ref> Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, 2005, p. 129–131</ref> |
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[[Image:Angola Provinces Cuando Cubango 250px.png|right|thumb|[[Angola]]'s Cuando Cubango province]] |
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After six months there was no decisive victory and again the United States tried for a negotiated arrangement, this time only between the governments, which excluded participation by UNITA. The US did not have in mind to include Cuba in the negotiations. Castro informed the US that negotiations including the Cubans would hold more promise. Hereupon US foreign minister [[George Schultz]] authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia and not the US-embargo of Cuba.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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Soon after its retreat from Angola, South Africa waged a war from neighbouring [[Namibia]] against [[South West Africa People's Organization]] ([[SWAPO]]). The Namibian liberation organization operated out of Angola with support of the Angolan government against the occupation of Southwest Africa by the Apartheid regime. To this end, South Africa continued to support UNITA's fight against the Angolan government and SWAPO to deny SWAPO a safe zone on Angola's southern border with Namibia. They SADF established bases in Cuando Cubango Province in south-eastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) supplied UNITA with air cover from bases in Namibia. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0053)</ref> South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi’s image abroad, especially in the US. Apart from being a friend to African tyrants Savimbi became the toast of the Reagan White House and was feted by the rightwing establishment in many countries. <ref>General [[Magnus Malan]], South African Minister of Defence in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> <ref> Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html</ref> |
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==Negotiations and War== |
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==Three Powers Accord== |
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{{Mergeto|New York Accords|date=January 2008}} |
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{{main|New York Accords}} |
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Thus Cuba for the first time participated in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia. The first rounds started out in the Presidential Palace in [[Luanda]] while the fighting in [[Cuito Cuanavale]] continued. The talks were later moved to [[Cairo]] and finally to New York. |
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In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the ‘’’Contact Group’’’, to work with South Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favour of the installation of a SWAPO government in Namibia. <ref>Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. http://countrystudies.us/angola/48.htm</ref><ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0057)</ref> |
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On 22 December 1988, one month before U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]]’s second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the [[New York Accords|Three Powers Accord]] in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola within 30 months. |
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Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions and UNITA’s northward expansion in the east forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military personnel from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0051)</ref> The first large scale incursions by the SADF occurred in May 1978 when it raided a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga, killing hundreds of people. By the end of 1979, following the bombing of Lubango, an undeclared border war was in full swing. <ref>Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0053)</ref> |
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The withdrawal of the Cubans ended 13 years of military presence and was finalized in stages one month early on 25 May 1991. At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from [[Pointe-Noire]] [[Republic of the Congo]] and [[Ethiopia]]. |
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Neto died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow. And was succeeded by [[Jose Eduardo Dos Santos]]. Barely one month later [[Ronald Reagan]] became President of the United States, immediately taking a harder line with Angola: The Cubans were absolutely to be driven out of Angola.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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The Reagan administration also resumed aid to UNITA. With the support of the US and South Africa UNITA became one the best equipped resistance movements of all times. They even received [[FIM-92 Stinger]]s from the US which until then had been reserved for their closest allies. <ref> Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press</ref> |
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In the early 1980s, the United States, in their endeavour to get the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, became directly involved in negotiations with Angola. Angola pointed out it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it wasn’t for the continuing South African incursions and threat at its southern border. The most obvious solution was an independent Namibia which South Africa had to give up. After having to accept a leftist regime in Angola, Pretoria was reluctant to relinquish control of Namibia because of the possibility that the first elections would bring its “traditional nemesis”, SWAPO, to power. It continued to attend negotiating sessions of the Contact Group throughout the early 1980s, always prepared to bargain but never ready to settle. <ref>Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. http://countrystudies.us/angola/48.htm</ref> Cuba, not involved in the negotiations, basically agreed to such a solution paving the way to Namibia’s freedom. Yet, towards the end of Reagan’s second term in office, the negotiations had not born any fruit. <ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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[[Chester Crocker]], a key American figure in the discussions, claims "As of mid-November, the UNITA/SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down thousands of FAPLA's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters. Following the disastrous rout of the Cuban advance by a small and mobile SADF force, all sides were determined to settle the Namibia question rather than waste more resources and money."<ref>{{cite book|title=High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=9D1xAQAACAAJ&dq=High+Noon+in+Southern+Africa:+Making+Peace+in+a+Rough+Neighborhood|last=Crocker|first=Chester A.|publisher=W.W. Norton|date=1992|isbn=0393034321}}</ref> |
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After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia failed in January 1981, South African military aggression increased against Angolan targets and SWAPO guerrillas. In August 1981, the SADF launched ‘’’Operation Protea’’’ with several thousand troops penetrating 120 kilometres into south-western Angola. Not only fighting SWAPO the South Africans openly intensified assaults on Angolan economic targets and occupied Angolan territory, particularly in Cunene Province. Through 1982 and 1983 the SAAF also participated in operations by UNITA, more and more infiltrating the countryside, far exceeding its previous hit and -run operations aimed primarily at the Benguela Railway. The UNITA insurgency and border war had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure, and the fights created hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA guerrillas also took foreign technicians as hostages. <ref>The Library of Congress, February 1989, |
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On 7 December 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. Historian estimate the Cuban casualties, which officially have always been kept secret, at around 10,000.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE1D8103EF932A35754C0A961948260|title= Cuba Is Mired in Angola, Top Defector Says|date=July 1, 1987|publisher=[[New York Times]]|first=Nathan C|last=Nash}}</ref> From the first engagement on 24 April 1965, Cuba had sent 450,000 soldiers and development workers to Africa. |
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http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0057)</ref> |
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In 1987, the FAPLA, with Soviet support, launched an offensive against UNITA. Cuba’s and the Soviets strategic opinions differed considerably and the Cubans did not participate. They had advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which already controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened massively in the southeast, stopped and threw back the Angolan forces. By early November, the SADF had cornered FAPLA units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them. <ref>Mail & Guardian Online: Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 |
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http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/</ref> Cuito Cuanavale, only a village, was important as a forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola and was considered an important gateway to the north. Pretoria committed its best troops and most sophisticated military hardware to its capture. The Russians were inexperienced on the African theatre and in spite of considerable aid were unable to turn the tide. UNITA inflicted one defeat after the other. In a valley near the Lomba River, FAPLA and the Soviets were routed and they left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died and a part of the Angolan army was closed in.<ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> |
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The United Nations Security Council demanded the SADF’s unconditional withdrawal from Angola, but the US ensured that there were no repercussions for South Africa. US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.” <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, December 5, 1987, Freedom of Information Act</ref> |
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As the situation for the besieged Angolan troops became critical, the Cuban troops stationed in Angola felt impelled to intervene as not to let their Angolan and Soviet allies suffer total defeat. In Cuba’s view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. On 15 November 1987 Castro decided to reinforce the troops stationed in Angola by sending fresh detachments, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Eventually Cuban troop strength doubled to about 50,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to counter SAAF air supremacy, which was a critical factor in repelling the South Africans. Castro wanted to push the South Africans out of Angola for good and viewed preventing the fall of Cuito as imperative. <ref>Transcripción sobre la reunión del Comandante en Jefe con la delegación de políticos de África del Sur (Companero Slovo), Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (CIFAR), Havana</ref> |
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As in 1975, the USSR again was not informed in advance of Cuba’s decision to intervene, one reason being that the relationship had become pretty strained. Castro was especially suspicious of President [[Mikhail Gorbachev]]’s policy of détente with the US. <ref>Saney, Issac in: African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117</ref> |
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[[Image:Angola Cuito Cuanavale.png|thumb|Cuito Cuanavale in Angola]] |
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[[Cuito Cuanavale]] in south-eastern Angola became the major battle site between Cuban, Angolan and South African forces. It was the biggest battle on African soil since World War Two and in it course around 20.000 soldiers were killed. Cuban planes and 1 500 Cuban soldiers reinforced the Angolans at Cuito and the town and the base did not fall. On 23 March 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault “was brought to a grinding and definite halt” by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. <ref>Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 |
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http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/</ref> |
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While the situation at Cuito remained at a stalemate, in south-western Angola Cuban units advanced towards the Namibian border. The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle “involved serious risks” withdrew. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) to Secretary of State, May 13, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> |
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On 26 May, 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that “heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border”. The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on 26 June that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SAAF. He added that “the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety” in South Africa. <ref>Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007. |
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http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/</ref> |
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While the fighting at Cuito continued and Cuban troops were following the retreating South Africans in the south-west towards the Namibian border, attempts for a negotiated arrangement continued. This time only governments were to take part in the negotiations, which excluded participation by UNITA. The two paramount issues were whether South Africa would finally accept implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, prescribing Namibia’s independence, and whether the parties could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. The Americans did not have in mind to include the Cubans in the talks. Castro let the Americans know that negotiations including the Cubans would be much more promising. Hereupon US foreign minister [[George Schultz]] authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia but not the US-embargo of Cuba. <ref> “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri </ref> |
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==Three Powers Accord== |
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The Cuban government joined negotiations on 28 January, 1988. Thus for the first time it participated in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia. The first rounds started out in the Presidential Palace in Luanda while the fighting in Cuito Cuanavale continued. The talks were later moved to Cairo, with rounds in Geneva, London, and finally in New York. The South African government joined negotiations in Cairo on 3 May expecting Resolution 435 to be modified. Defence Minister Malan and President P.W. Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only “if Russia and its proxies did the same.” They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On 16 March, 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was “offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon.” |
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But the Cubans in Angola had reversed the situation on the ground. In fact, the US wondered whether the Cubans would stop their advance at the Namibian border. <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: “Entrevista de Risquet con Chester Crocker, 26/6/88”, ACC</ref> Thus, Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation, responded to the South African demands: “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over… South Africa is acting as though it was a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” <ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: “Actas das Conversaçôes Quadripartidas entre a RPA, Cuba, Estados Unidos de América e a Africa do Sul realizadas no Cairo de 24-26.06.988”, Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havanna</ref> Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that the talks had taken place “against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic.”<refGleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: > Crocker to Secretary of State, June 26, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> |
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As the war during the negotiations continued, on 27 June, 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border. The CIA reported that “Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defences” highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after the Cuban’s air strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, “to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend.” <ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: CIA, “South Africa-Angola-Cuba”, June 29, 1988, Freedom of Information Act and CIA, “South Africa-Angola-Namibia”, July 1, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> |
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A ceasefire was finally agreed upon on 8 August, 1988.<ref name="timeline">Alao, Abiodun. ''Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa'', 1994. Pages XIX-XXI.</ref> The South Africans were out of Angola by 30 August 1988, before the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola had been discussed. |
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On 22 December 1988, one month before Reagan’s second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the [[New York Accords|Three Powers Accord]] in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and, within 30 months, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. |
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The accord ended 13 years of Cuban military presence in Angola which was finalized in stages one month early on 25 May 1991. At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from [[Pointe Noire]] (Republic of the Congo) and [[Ethiopia]]. |
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==Aftermath== |
==Aftermath== |
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Despite Washington’s efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of Southern African history. As W. Freeman, ambassador, US state department, department for African policies, put it into words: “Castro could regard himself as father of Namibia’s independence and as the one who put an end to colonialism in Africa. Indeed, Cuba demonstrated responsibility and maturity. This should have been acknowledged by the USA as an important gesture and merited a respective answer. But American politics concerning relations with Cuba are absolutely poisoned, hence Cuba, which had acted really responsibly, was denied the slightest appreciation it had deserved” <ref> “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri </ref>. At least Crocker had admitted when he cabled Shultz during the negotions, on 25 August, 1988: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”<ref>Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Crocker to Secretary of State, August 25, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> |
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In 1989 the former Expeditionary Force commander in Angola [[Arnaldo Ochoa]] was arrested by the Cuban government accused of drug trafficking and corruption. He was executed by firing squad on July, 12 1989. |
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In a national ceremony on 7 December, 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. According to Cuban government figures, during all of the "internationalist" missions carried out in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola on May 25, 1991, a total of 2,077 Cubans was killed. Historians estimated the Cuban casualties were around 10,000.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE1D8103EF932A35754C0A961948260|title= Cuba Is Mired in Angola, Top Defector Says|date=July 1, 1987|publisher=[[New York Times]]|first=Nathan C|last=Nash}}</ref> In the years of Cuba's engagement 450,000 Cuban soldiers and development workers had been to Africa. |
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At the negations in 1988 the South Africans had been asked for the release of [[Nelson Mandela]] as a sign of goodwill, which was denied. <ref>"Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri</ref> Mandela remained in captivity until 2 February 1990 when the ANC [[African National Congress]] ban was lifted. |
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In July 1991, as ANC leader, Mandela travelled to Havana to personally thank Castro for his country's pivotal role in the fight against apartheid. He underscored Cuba's vital role in a speech delivered in Havana: |
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"The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character - We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defence of one of us - The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation!" The military defeat suffered by South Africa in Angola and Namibia, largely thanks to the contribution of Cuban troops, was considered a decisive blow in bringing down the racist apartheid regime. <ref>http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31247</ref> |
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Free elections in Namibia were held in November 1989 with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote in spite of Pretoria’s attempts to swing it in favour of other parties. <ref>The Guardian, July 26, 1991</ref> Namibia gained independence in March 1990. |
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The situation in Angola was anything but settled and the country continued to be ravaged by civil war for more than a decade. In spite of free elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms. Peace only returned to Angola following Savimbi’s death in 2002. |
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Namibia gained independence, but Angola continued to be ravaged by [[Angolan Civil War|civil war]] for more than a decade. In spite of free elections, UNITA leader [[Jonas Savimbi]] would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms. Peace only returned to Angola following the weakening of UNITA with the death of their leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
Revision as of 17:51, 22 February 2008
This article needs additional citations for verification. (January 2008) |
File:Angola Map.jpg After gaining independence from Portugal, Angola became entangled in a power struggle among three major groups: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. These groups quickly became involved in a civil war and in the wider Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. UNITA and FNLA were mainly supported by the United States, South Africa and Zaire, while Cuba and the Soviet Union backed the MPLA. Cuba eventually deployed troops to Angola, leading to the MPLA's victory in the civil war and effectively foiling South Africa’s and the United States’ attempts to keep or to remove the MPLA from power. Cuba successfully stabilized and supported the Angolan government against the UNITA insurgency, backed by South Africa and the US. This was instrumental in the independence of Namibia and eventually in the decline of the Apartheid regime.[1][2]
Cuban Internationalism
![]() | It has been suggested that this article be merged into History of Cuba. (Discuss) Proposed since January 2008. |
From its inception the Cuban Revolution defined itself as internationalist. Within a year after the revolution Cuba took on civil and military assignments in the southern hemisphere. Although still a third world country itself, Cuba supported African, Central American and Asian countries with military, health and educational resources. These "overseas adventures" not only irritated the US, but quite often were a "major headache" for the Kremlin. [3]
In the mid 1960s, Africa moved to the centre of Cuba’s foreign activities. African revolutionaries like Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto requested the Cubans for help in their struggles for liberation. After the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa and the independence of Angola, the Cuban government decided in autumn of 1975 to intervene on a large scale militarily against in defence of the MPLA. This intervention, which turned Cuba for a short time in the midst of the Cold War into a “global player”, and some argue that it not only resulted in the independence of Namibia but that it also accelerated the decline of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. It was also the start for other military interventions as well as substantial development aid in Africa. Deployments in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Benin in support of beleaguered leftist governments followed. Through the 1980s, apart from military personnel there were tens of thousands of Cuban development workers (doctors, teachers, constructors, technicians) working in Africa and a similar amount of young Africans enjoyed free studies in Cuba.
Already in 1961 in its first mission Cuba supported the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria against France. Shortly after Algerian independence Morocco started a border dispute in October 1963 in which Cuba sent troops to help Algeria (see: Sand War ). From a Memorandum of 20 October, 1963 by Major Raúl Castro it can be seen, that great importance was attached to the decent behaviour of the troops and good relations giving strict instructions on conduct. [4]
In 1965 Cuba supported a rebellion of adherents of Lumumba (Simba Rebellion) in Congo-Leopoldville (today Democratic Republic of the Congo) under the personal leadership of Ernesto Che Guevara. Among the insurgents was also Laurent-Désiré Kabila who, 30 years later, would dispossess long-time dictator Mobutu. This secret Cuban mission turned out to be a complete failure. [5] In contrast Cuba’s influence was decisive in Guinea-Bissau’s war of independence against Portugal from 1966 to 1974.
In the 1970s and 1980s Cuba stepped up its military presence abroad, especially in Africa. It had up to 50,000 men stationed in Angola, 24,000 in Ethiopia and hundreds in other countries. Cuban forces played a key role in the Ogaden War 1977/78 between Ethiopia and Somalia and kept a substantial garrison stationed in Ethiopia. In the Mozambican Civil War beginning in 1977 and in Congo-Brazzaville (today Republic of the Congo) Cubans acted as advisors. Congo-Brazzaville acted as a supply base for the Angola mission.
The relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union had never been easy and Cuba's activities caused quite some irritation in the Kremlin. These tensions did not escape the attention of the US secret service CIA which remarked in a report shortly after the death of Che Guevara: "Brezhnev thinks that Castro is some sort of idiot, and Castro probably isn’t too fond of Brezhnev either." [6] Much of the tension, according to this analysis, has been caused by Cuba's encouragement of guerrilla warfare in many Latin American countries, while the Soviets tried to expand both diplomatic and economic ties with those governments the Cubans were trying to overthrow.
The Carnation Revolution and Independence negotiations
![]() | It has been suggested that this article be merged into Angolan War of Independence. (Discuss) Proposed since January 2008. |
The Carnation Revolution 25 April 1974 in Portugal took the rest of the world by surprise. Suddenly and unexpectedly Portugal’s last two African colonies Mozambique and Angola, found themselves confronted with independence without further struggle. Mozambique’s independence was granted without much ado on 25 June 1975. But Angola remained a bone of contention between the three rivalling liberation movements MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola-proper and FLEC (Cabinda Independence Organisation) in Cabinda.
Until then these movements had their priority in fighting the colonial power. They initially had no clear alliances and over the years they all had enjoyed support from a wide range of often the same countries. By the time of the Portuguese Revolution they had more or less drifted into either the eastern (MPLA) or the western (FNLA, UNITA, FLEC) camp. With the disappearance of Portugal as the main foe their ethnic and ideological rivalries moved to the fore. The disunity or the refusal of the three main movements to come to any terms prevented the Portuguese from handing over power. The Alvor Agreement, signed on 15 January, proved to be no solid foundation for the procedure. The transitional government this agreement provided for was equally composed of the three liberation movements and Portugal and was sworn in on 31 January, 1975; independence day was set for 11 November 1975, the same day of the cease fire. [7] [8] FLEC was not part of the deal because it fought for the independence of Cabinda, which the Portuguese had administratively joined as an exclave to Angola.
Civil War: Struggle for the capital
Fighting in Luanda, in MPLA terms the “Second war of liberation”, broke out already two weeks after the transitional government took office. FNLA troops, flown in from Zaire, already had begun moving into Luanda in October 1974. The MPLA followed later and in smaller numbers. [9] The fighting quickly spread throughout the whole country. Each movement tried to get itself into the best strategic positions, most importantly, to be in control of the capital on the day of independence. In a meeting by the National Security Council (NSC) on 27 June 1975 US President Ford puts straight that, in spite of planned elections, it is important to get “his man” in first, meaning that UNITA-Leader Jonas Savimbi should be in control of Luanda before the elections. [10] FNLA and UNITA, after secret talks including South Africa and Zaire, formed an alliance and withdrew from the transitional government which officially came to an end on 14 August. [11]
The MPLA succeeded in driving the FNLA out of Luanda by 9 July. The FNLA took up positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of the capital, from where it kept up its pressure, and it eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire. [12]
Foreign interventions
The Angolan liberation movements already had a long history of foreign support in various ways, starting in the early 1960s soon after their establishment. This support came from all directions and with the movement’s main focus on fighting the Portuguese colonial power it was not necessarily clear from the beginning, in which camp they would end up.
The FNLA had its base in Zaire from where it received the bulk of its support. FNLA-Leader Holden Roberto was linked to Mobutu by marriage and obligated to him for many past favours. Thus, over the years, the FNLA had become little more than an extension of Mobutu’s own armed forces. Much of Zaire’s support came indirectly from the US, which Zaire’s leader Mobutu had close ties with. US-support for the FNLA was taken up by the Kennedy administration in 1960. Zaire was also the first country to send troops to Angola in March 1975 and to engage in fighting against the MPLA by the summer of that year. [13] In late January 1975, just before the provisional government of Angola was to take office according to the Alvor agreement, a “high level U.S. government policy-making body authorized a grant of 300,000 US$” to the FNLA. [14] In the summer of 1974 the Chinese were the first to post 200 military instructors in Zaire where they trained FNLA troops and also supplied military assistance. On 27 October, 1975, they were also the first to withdraw their military instructors. North Koreans who had been training Mobutu’s elite division, the Kamanyola, also trained the FNLA but withdrew their support for Zaire and the FNLA by the end of December 1975. [15]
UNITA, which split away from FNLA in 1965/66 initially was Maoist and received some support from China. [16] The US increased its support for the FNLA and for the first time took up funding of UNITA. On 18 July 1975 Ford approved covert CIA operation "IA FEATURE" to aid FLNA and UNITA with money, arms and instructors. US military instructors (CIA) arrived in southern Angola in early August where they closely cooperated with their South African counterparts who arrived around the same time.
Other countries with their own clandestine support for FNLA and UNITA were Great Britain and France. [17] [18]
The East bloc countries established first ties with the MPLA during their struggle against the Portuguese. But support remained clandestine, came in trickles and sometimes ceased. This was the case in 1972, when the MPLA came under strong pressure from the Portuguese and was torn by internal strife (struggle between MPLA-Leader Agustinho Neto and Chipenda from 1972 to 1974). The trickle of Soviet and Chinese aid, which they had received through the 1960s was discontinued; only Yugoslavia continued to send supplies to the MPLA. [19] [20]
Direct Soviet aid to the MPLA in the civil war began in 1975 in the form of arms deliveries by sea and air via Brazzaville and Dar-es-Salaam. [21] Soviet assistance to the MPLA was always somewhat reluctant; they never fully trusted them and their relationship was to remain ambivalent through the following years. Even after the South African invasion the Soviets only sent arms but no instructors for the use of the sophisticated weapons. [22] Among the other Eastern Bloc countries the MPLA had well established contacts with East Germany and Romania. East Germany shipped larger amounts of non-military supply.
Cuba and the MPLA before the Civil War
![]() | It has been suggested that this article be merged into Angola-Cuba relations. (Discuss) Proposed since January 2008. |
Cuba’s first contacts to the MPLA dated back to the 1960s, when Cuba took up support in 1963/1964, while the MPLA had its headquarters in Congo-Brazzaville (formerly French Congo). In 1966 Agustinho Neto himself, accompanied by Hoji Ya Henda, the commander in chief of the MPLA who was later to die in the war, made a trip to Cuba where they met Castro. The encounter in Congo-Brazzaville ended in disappointment for both sides and relations cooled. A few MPLA guerrillas continued to receive military training in Cuba but apart from that contacts between Cuba and the MPLA remained distant [23] [24]
In a memorandum of 22 November 1972 by Cuban Major Manuel Piñeiro Lozada to Major Raúl Castro it says: “For some time now we have discussed the possibility of entering Angola and Mozambique with the objective of getting to know the revolutionary movements in those countries. These movements have been a mystery even for those socialist countries that give them considerable aid. This research would help us give more focused aid to those movements. I don’t consider it necessary to delineate the strategic importance of these countries, it takes only pointing out that a change in the course of events of the wars that are developing in both countries could signify a change in all the forces in the African continent. For the first time two independent countries in Africa from which a bigger war could be waged would have common borders with the region with the principle investment and the strongest political-military knot of Imperialism in Africa exist: South Africa, Rhodesia, Zaire, and the Portuguese colonies.
Our comrades in the MPLA solicited us this May for the following:
- a) That we train 10 men in Cuba in guerrilla warfare ….
- b) That we send a crew to fly a DC-3 ….
- c) They want to send a high level delegation to Cuba ….
… Both movements will coordinate with the governments of Tanzania and Zambia for safe passage of our comrades through their territories". [25]
These considerations in 1972 bore no fruit and Cuba's attentions remained focused on Guinea-Bissau. It was only after the Portuguese Revolution that an MPLA delegation brought a request for economic aid, military training and arms to Cuba on 26 July, 1974. In early October Cuba received another request, this time more urgent, for 5 Cuban military officers to help organise the MPLA army, FAPLA. In December 1974 / January 1975 Cuba sent Major Alfonso Perez Morales and Carlos Cadelo on a fact finding mission to Angola to assess the situation.[26] In a letter of 26 January, 1975, handed to Cadelo and Morales, Neto listed what the MPLA wanted from Cuba:
“1. The establishment, organization, and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to train military staff. 2. A ship to transport the war materiel that we have in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if it were in a Cuban ship, could take place outside of territorial waters. 3. Weapons and transportation for the Rapid Deployment Unit (Brigada de Intervencion) that we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions. 4. Transmitters and receivers to resolve communication problems of widely dispersed military units. 5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men. 6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic. 7. Assistance in training trade union leaders. 8. Assistance in organizing schools to teach Marxism… 9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially instruction manuals. 10. Financial assistance while we are establishing and organizing ourselves.“ [27]
Although Cuba was considering the establishment of a military mission (military training) in Angola, again there was no official response to this request. It was only reiterated by the MPLA in May 1975 when Cuban commander Flavio Bravo met Neto in Brazzaville while the Portuguese were preparing to withdraw from their African colonies. [28]
The MPLA’s hopes for aid were turned to the eastern Bloc countries from where not enough help materialised according to their wishes. Neto is quoted in a Cuban report complaining about Moscow's lacklustre support. He also expressed hope that the war in Angola would become a vital issue in the fight against imperialism and socialism". But neither the USSR nor the MPLA itself expected a major war to break out before independence. [29] In March 1975 the MPLA sent ca. 100 members for training in the Soviet Union and the requested financial assistance (100,000US$) it received from Yugoslavia.
South African involvement
Portugal’s sudden retreat from Angola and Mozambique in 1974 ended a history of military and intelligence cooperation with the colonial power against the Angolan and Namibian liberation movements dating back to the 1960s. According to apartheid historiography South African involvement, what it calls the “South African Border War”, started in 1966, when the conflict with SWAPO, which had its bases in Zambia, first flared up. With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the establishment of black rule in the two former colonies South Africa lost a valuable buffer between itself and black Africa. These new governments being leftist posed an even larger threat to the Apartheid regime. [30] [31]
On 14 July, 1975 Prime Minister Vorster approved a list of weapons worth 14 million US$ to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA. [32] [33] First arms shipments for FNLA and UNITA from South Africa arrived in August 1975.
On 9 August, 1975 the SADF moved some 50km into southern Angola in aid of FNLA and UNITA and occupied the Ruacana hydroelectric complex and other installations on the Cuene River. The “defence” of the Cunene Dam complex in Namibia’s border was South Africa’s justification for the first permanent installation of regular SADF units inside Angola. [34]
On 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical support. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fighting SWAPO.[35] [36] In addition, on 22 August 1975 the SADF launched operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola. Due to the recent MPLA’s successes UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola [37] [38] [39] and it became clear to South Africa that the MPLA would win the struggle without its military intervention.
On 14 October, the South Africans launched secret Operation Savannah, and a first of several South African columns (task force Zulu) crossed into Angola from Namibia, advancing very quickly. A second task force, Foxbat, invaded Angola in mid-October. [40] [41] The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.[42][43][44]
The United States had known of South Africa's covert plans in advance and co-operated militarily with its forces, contrary to Kissinger's testimony to Congress at the time, as well as at odds with the version in his memoirs and in contrast to what President Ford told the Chinese, who supported the FNLA but were worried about South African engagement in Angola.[45]
Cuban Military Mission
The problem of all liberation movements was the lack of skilled soldiers especially to handle the more and more sophisticated weaponry. Until late August Cuba only had a few technical advisors in Angola, which the CIA took note of. [46] Neto had repeatedly and urgently requested for 100 Cuban instructors but it was only after careful assessment of the situation Cuba decided to establish four military training centres, "Centros de Instruccion Revolucionaria" (CIR) in Angola. On 3 August a Cuban delegation travelled for the second time to Angola to assess the situation and the necessary aid. In a memorandum of 11 August 1975 Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl Castro explained the reasons for the visit and briefed on the contents of the talks. He underlined that the aggression on the part of the FNLA and of Mobutu to the MPLA and the possible development of future actions until independence in the month of November was taken into account and the awareness that “the reactionaries and the imperialists would try all possible methods to avoid having the forces of the MPLA take power”. The delegation handed over 100,000 US dollars. Arguelles also mentioned that Neto had complained “of the little amount of aid from socialist countries and “that the USSR detained aid to the MPLA in 1972, even though they told us that they are now helping with arms, but it’s very little compared with their vast needs”. Arguelles agreed with Neto as he saw the sides in Angola as “clearly defined, that the FNLA and UNITA represented the international imperialist forces and the Portuguese reaction, and the MPLA represented the progressive and nationalist forces. [47] [48]
After the return of the delegation the Cubans considered the options of their instructors in Angola in case of an invasion by South Africa or Zaire which would be either “guerrilla war” or withdrawal to Zambia, where Cuba proceeded to open an embassy. [49] On August 15, Castro urged the USSR to increase support for the MPLA and offered to send special troops. The Russians declined. [50]
Instead of the requested 100 the CIRs were staffed by almost 500 Cubans which were to train about 5,300 Angolans in three to six months. These 500 men included 17 in a medical brigade and 284 officers. [51] The dispatch started in late August and the most urgently needed specialists used international commercial flights; the remaining were brought on ships and two Cuban planes. The arrival of two Cuban ships in Angola in early October with instructors on board was reported by the CIA[52] without raising any alarm in Washington. [53] The CIRs were placed in Cabinda, Benguela, Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar). The CIR in Cabinda comprised of almost half of the total, 191 men, while the others had 66 or 67 each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country The reason for the stronger detachment in Cabinda was the perceived threat from Zaire either to Cabinda or to the Congo. [54] By the time the training centres were fully staffed and operational on 18-20 October, unnoticed by the world, Operation Savannah was already in full swing.
Operation Carlota
In contrast to the continuing successes in the south, where by mid October the MPLA had gained control of 12 of Angola’s provinces and most urban centres, they only barely managed to keep the well equipped FNLA and its allies abreast on the northern front just east of Luanda. [55] The FNLA received arms and equipment from the U.S. via Zaire starting in the end of July. [56] [57] From July to November the front moved back and forth between Caxito and Kifangondo. Netu asked the Soviet Union for more support which had no intention to send any staff before independence and only reluctantly sent more arms.
Forty instructors from the CIR Salazar were the first Cubans to become involved in the defence of Kifangondo on October 23. A second group supported the MPLA on October 28 along the same defence line to the east of Kifangondo.[58]
The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. South African advisors and antitank weapons had helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October. By 20 October Zulu took Rocadas, by 24 October Sa da Bandeira, by October 28 Mocamedes. On 2-3 November, Cuban instructors for the third time got involved in the fighting, this time 35 to 40 men from the CIR Benguela, when they unsuccessfully tried to help the MPLA stop the Zulu advance near Catengue. On 6 November Zulu took the abandoned harbour city of Benguela, thus seizing control of the terminal of the Benguela railroad, and on 7 November Lobito. In central Angola, combat unit Foxbat with a squadron of armoured cars had moved 800 km north toward Luanda. [59] The MPLA could not prevent the SADF and UNITA from occupying all of southern Angola and coming within 100 km of Luanda. With the FNLA attacking from the east the situation for the MPLA only a few days before independence looked dim. [60]
Cuba steps in
It was only after the MPLA debacle at Catengue that the Cubans became fully aware of the South African invasion and that Luanda would be taken unless they took immediate action. On 4 November Castro decided to send in troops. The same day, a first plane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first two Cuban planes arrived in Luanda with the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces. Operation Carlota had started with only three medium range Bristol Britannia turboprop planes, which had to refuel twice along the way. An artillery regiment was following by sea. [61][62] The first priority of the Cubans was helping the MPLA to keep hold of Luanda. The MPLA had not officially requested an intervention. The matter had only been discussed with the Cuban military mission.
Fidel Castro explained the Cuban intervention: "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, we offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola.[63] see also: [64]
Unlike the Cuban foreign engagements in the sixties this was no secret operation. Castro decided to support Angola in all openness, sending special forces and 35,000 men infantry by the end of 1976, deploying them at their own expense from November 1975 to January 1976. Thus, with Operation Carlota, named after the leader of a revolt against slavery in Cuba on 5 November 1843, Cuba became a major player in the conflict.
The deployment of troops was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, this also took the USSR by surprise.[65] The Russians were forced to accept the Cuban troop deployment so as not to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the United States. Instead, they had in mind to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to a degree of support by arranging for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola.
The Cuban troops able to intervene on the side of the MPLA before the declaration of independence were basically the ones posted in the 3 CIRs, the 100 specialists that arrived in Luanda on 7 November and the first 158 men special forces of Operation Carlota arriving on 2 planes on 9 November. The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were immediately dispatched to the nearby front at Kifangondo where a battle was already raging. They supported 850 MPLA, 200 Katangas and one Soviet advisor. Heavy weapons had already arrived from Cuba by ship on 7 November, among them canons, mortars and 6 of the infamous BM21S Katyushas, multiple rocket launchers with 48 launchers.
The northern front
Two days before independence the most immanent danger for the MPLA came from the FNLA east of Kifangondo, supported by three battalions of Zairian infantry troops, Portuguese mercenaries, a few resident advisors, among them a small CIA contingent and a South African group led by General Ben de Wet Roos. They had broken through the first line at Porto Quipiri, about 50 km from Luanda. [66]
On 10 November the MPLA and the Cubans warded off the last big attack of the FNLA and its allies, thus securing the capital for the MPLA. On the same day the Portuguese handed over power “to the people of Angola” and shortly after midnight Netu proclaimed the independence of Angola. [67] Urged by the CIA and other clandestine foreign services FNLA and UNITA announced the proclamation of a Democratic People's Republic with the temporary capital at Huambo.[68] Yet, UNITA and FNLA could not agree on a united government and fighting between them already broke out in Huambo on the eve of independence day.[69][70][71]
For the US it took a few days before they registered how bad the FNLA and the Zairians had been routed at Kifangondo. But even then they did not register the full significance of the Cuban involvement since the news from the southern front in their view were still positive. [72] Kissinger, like the South Africans, was shaken by the scale of the Soviet and Cuban response. The CIA’s Angolan task force at CIA headquarters at Langley had been so confident of success by the Zairian and South African regulars, that on November 11 the members had celebrated Angolan independence with wine and cheese in their crepe paper decorated offices. [73]
The US first acknowledged Cuban troops in Angola in an official statement on 24 November 1975. Kissinger remarked to Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez: ‘Our intelligence services have grown so bad that we only found out that Cubans were being sent to Angola after they were already there.’ At that moment, there were many Cuban troops, military specialists and civilian technicians in Angola—more even than Kissinger imagined. Indeed, there were so many ships anchored in the bay of Luanda that Neto said to a functionary close to him: ‘It’s not right’, if they go on like that, the Cubans will ruin themselves.’ It is unlikely that even the Cubans had foreseen that their solidarity aid to the Angolan people would reach such proportions. It had been clear to them right from the start, however, that the action had to be swift, decisive, and at all costs successful.[74]
Due to the hostility between the USA and Cuba the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted [75]. Of course the US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference. The Americans also depicted the motivations and timings of the Cubans differently: They claimed that South Africa had to intervene after Cuba sent troops in support of the MPLA and that the war in Angola was a major new challenge to US power by an expansionist Moscow newly confident following communist victories in Vietnam. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf. [76]
Castro regarded the US response to the Cuban intervention: “Why were they vexed? Why had they planned everything to take possession of Angola before November 11th? Angola is a country rich in resources. In Cabinda there is lots of oil. Some imperialists wonder why we help the Angolans, which interests we have. They are used to thinking that one country helps another one only when it wants its oil, copper, diamonds or other resources. No, we are not after material interests and it is logical that this is not understood by the imperialist. They only know chauvinistic, nationalistic and selfish criteria. By helping the people of Angola we are fulfilling a fundamental duty of Internationalism.[77]
On the day of independence the MPLA held little more than the capital and a strip of central Angola inland toward Zaire and Cabinda. By 8 November around 1000 FAPLA troops and 232 Cubans had managed to hold Cabinda, where, with US consent, Zairian troops, FLEC guerrillas and French mercenaries had launched an attack.[78]
On 3 December 1975, in a meeting with US and Chinese officials including Deng Xiaoping (Vice Premier and deputy of Mao Zedong), Chiao Kuan-hua (Foreign Minister), President Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger (Secretary of State / Foreign Minister), Brent Scowcroft (Assistant to the President for NSA) and George H. W. Bush (Chief of US Liaison Office in Peking) international issues were discussed. To concerns raised by the Chinese about US entreaties to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement Kissinger responds, that the US is prepared to “push out South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created”. [79] It is in this meeting that President Ford told the Chinese: “We had nothing to do with the South African involvement, and we will take action to get South Africa out, provided a balance can be maintained for their not being in”.[79] He also said that he had approved 35 million US dollars more (in support of the north) above what had been done before. The round discussed and agreed who should support FNLA or UNITA by which means and in what manner considering the sensitivities of the neighbouring countries.[79]
As long as the Cubans were operating on their own through December and January their troops came in slowly but steadily. Two months after the start of Operation Carlota the Soviets agreed to ten charter flights on long-range IL-62 jets, starting on 8 January. [80] More troops also arrived on Cuban ships. By early February, with increasing numbers in Cuban troops and sophisticated weaponry, the tide changed in favour of MPLA. The final offensive in the North started on 1 January and by late February the MPLA and 300 Cubans completely annihilated the FNLA and drove what was left of them and the Zairean army out of the country. [81] The last mercenaries already left the north by 17 Januray.[82] The South African contingent on the northern front led by General Ben de Wet Roos had already been evacuated by ship on 28 November. [83] [84] [85] [86]
The southern front
SADF advance is stopped
Through November and December the SADF in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 [87] and although it still had the edge over FAPLA and the Cubans and in spite of determined efforts to advance northward from Novo Redondo it was unable to break through the defences. With more Cuban troops and supplies arriving by the day, Luanda was to remain out of reach. [88] [89] [90] [91] In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops took Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December. [92] By mid-December it became necessary to extend military service and to call in reserves. [93] [94] “An indication of the seriousness of the situation …. is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place”.[95] By late December Cuba had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda. [96] Apart from being “bogged down” [97] on the southern front, there were two other setbacks for the South Africans.
The world takes notice
The South Africans had managed to keep their invasion hidden from the world view for quite some time. It even took the MPLA until 23 October to notice that not white mercenaries but the SADF was advancing. Yet it took another whole month for the world press to take notice: On 23 November a major western newspaper, the Washington Post, announced that regular South African troops were fighting inside Angola. Although other papers were still slow to follow, e. g. the New York Times on 12 December, the fact eventually became internationally known. Even the South African population itself had been kept in the dark and it was only on 19 December that the people learned more about what was called the “Border War”, when papers published pictures of SADF soldiers captured by FAPLA and the Cubans. As a result the few “friends” South Africa still had strived to distance themselves from the apartheid regime and with international pressure building up Pretoria became increasingly isolated. Even UNITA made an attempt to save face, branding the South African “invaders”. [98]
Withdrawal of official US-support
It was only when the US administration asked Congress for 28 million US$ for IAFEATURE that Congress really paid attention to the events in Angola. By then “the evidence of the South African invasion was overwhelming and the stench of US-collusion with Pretoria hung in the air. Worse, the growing numbers of Cuban troops had derailed the CIA’s plans and the administration seemed at a loss what to do next.”[99] The money was not approved and on 20 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed an amendment banning covert assistance to anti-Communist forces in Angola. Later that winter, an amendment to the foreign aid bill sponsored by Dick Clark extended the ban. (Clark Amendment) [100]
The US administration resorted to other means of support for FNLA and UNITA of which one was raising mercenaries. The CIA initiated a covert programme to recruit Brazilians and Europeans, mostly Portuguese and British, to fight in the north of Angola. Altogether they managed to enlist around 250 men, but by the time meaningful numbers arrived in January 1975 the campaign in the north was all but over. [101]
A report by Henry Kissinger of 13 January 1976 gives an insight into the activities and hostilities in Angola, inter alia:[102]
"2. There follows an updated situation report based on classified sources.
A: Diplomatic
- (1) Two Cuban delegations were present in Addis Ababa. During the just concluded OAU meeting, one delegation, headed by Osmany Cienfuegos, PCC ? Official concerned with Africa and Middle East and member of the PCC Central Committee, visited the Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Algeria prior to the OAU meeting. Another Cuban delegation was headed by Cuba’s ambassador Ricardo Alarcon.
- (2) In late December early January a MPLA delegation visited Jamaica, Guyana, Venezuela and Panama to obtain support for its cause. The delegation is still in the region.
B: Military
- (1) It is estimated that Cuba may now have as many as 9,000 troops in Angola, based on the number of Cuban airlifts and sealifts which have presently transited Angola. Military assistance to the MPLA may have cost Cuba the equivalent of US dollars 30 million. This figure includes the value of the military equipment that Cuba has sent to Angola, the costs of transporting men and material, and the cost of maintaining troops in the field.
- (2) Cuban troops bore the brunt of fighting in the MPLA offensive in the northern sector last week which resulted in MPLA capture of Uige (Carmona). The MPLA may be preparing for an offensive in the south, partially at the request of the SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization).
- (3) Eight Soviet fighters, probably MiG-17s, are reported being assembled in Luanda. These fighters arrived from an unknown source at the end of December. Eight MiGs, type unknown, are expected to be sent to Angola from Nigeria, numerous Cuban pilots arrived during December. The pilots are operating many aircraft now available to the MPLA including a Fokker Friendship F-27. The Cubans will operate the MiGs.
- (4) Cuban troops are in complete control of Luanda by January 9. They are conducting all security patrols, operating police checkpoints, and will apparently soon assume control of Luanda’s airport complex.
- (5) Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-42 aircraft (Soviet) in its airlift support operations. The IL-42 has double the capacity of Bristol Britannias and IL ? which Cuba has previously employed and has a longer range as well. IL-42 left Havana for Luanda Jan. 10. and Jan. 11.
C: Other:
- All Portuguese commercial flights now landing at Luanda carry as cargo as much food as possible. Food supplies available to the general population have become tight.
"US intelligence estimated that by December 20 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Cubans in Angola."[103] "Cuban sources, however, indicate that the number hovered around 3,500 to 4,000."[104] This more or less would have put the Cubans at par with the South Africans on the southern front.
South Africa and UNITA withdraw
Pretoria had to decide whether it would stay in the game and bring in more troops. In late December there were heated debates between Vorster, foreign minister Muller, defence minister Botha, head of BOSS (South African Bureau of State Security) van den Bergh and a number of senior officials as to withdraw or to stay. Zaire, UNITA and the US urged South Africa to stay. But the US would not openly endorse the South African invasion and assure continuing military assistance in case of an escalation. Sobered by the Cuban’s performance and by the West’s cold shoulder, Pretoria chose to fold. [105] [106] [107] [108] On 30 December Vorster decided to withdraw after the OAU emergency session in Addis Ababa on 13 January to a line 50 to 80 km north of the Namibian border.[109] [110]
The sentiment of the Pretoria government at the time was expressed in a speech by Botha before South African parliament on 17 April, 1978: “Against which neighbouring states have we taken aggressive steps? I know of only one occasion in recent years, when we crossed a border and that was in the case of Angola when we did so with the approval and knowledge of the Americans. But they left us in the lurch. We are going to retell that story: the story must be told and how we, with their knowledge, went in there and operated in Angola with their knowledge, how they encouraged us to act and, when we had nearly reached the climax, we were ruthlessly left in the lurch”. [111] During January the SADF abandoned the towns of Cela and Novo Redondo on 25 January [112] and FAPLA and the Cubans started first small offensive probes to the south. But apart from a few skirmishes the Cubans stayed well behind the retreating South Africans. By early February 1976 the SADF had retreated to the far south of Angola, leaving behind mine fields and blown up bridges. Four to five thousand troops were to hold a strip along the Namibian border up to 80 km deep until Angola at least gave assurance that it wouldn’t supply bases for SWAPO and that it would continue supply electricity to Namibia from the Cuene dams. [113] While the Cubans and FAPLA were slowly approaching the southern border, South Africa and Angola took up indirect negotiations about South African withdrawal brokered by the British and Soviet governments. On 27 March Botha announced the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by 27 March. [114] On that day the last 60 military vehicles crossed the border into Namibia.
Without South African support UNITA collapsed under the FAPLA attacks. Whatever remained retreated into Zaire. Especially among African countries UNITA was publicly discredited by its links with the apartheid regime, the CIA and white mercenaries. “Savimbi's political career appeared to be over. But he was saved by the cold war and his usefulness to the US and South Africa”. [115]
“Despite a massive South African military invasion through Namibia up to the coast in an attempt to take Luanda, and a pincer movement from the north with Zairian troops and white mercenaries on behalf of the FNLA and UNITA, the arrival of Cuban troops in Operation Carlota saved the MPLA and its newly established independent government” and it profoundly altered the balance of power in southern Africa. [116] [117] Without Cuban intervention, the South Africans would have seized Luanda before anyone reported that they had crossed the border. [118] With “Operation Carlota” Cuba had become a main player in the conflict. With the retreat of the South Africans from Angola and by securing the country for the MPLA, the Cubans had achieved their goal. But for the South Africans retreating from Angola without having achieved anything was humiliating. The MPLA victory was not only a severe blow to Kissinger and the U.S., but also to the apartheid regime, which as a result of the Angolan debacle became even more militaristic and reactionary. [119]
The legacy of Angola according the South African paper, the Rand Daily Mail, was the blows to South African pride and the boost to African nationalism which has seen South Africa forced to retreat. [120] To South African blacks Angola showed the SADF is vulnerable: “Their racist arrogance shrank when our MPLA comrades thrashed them in Angola”. [121] [122] [123] Another way to look at it was that “in Angola Black troops – Cubans and Angolans – have defeated White troops in military exchanges. Whether the bulk of the offensive was by Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of this war’s battlefield, for the reality is that they won, are winning, and are not White; and that psychological edge, that advantage the White man has enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is slipping away. White elitism has suffered an irreversible blow in Angola and Whites who have been there know it”. [124] A South African member of parliament warned: “We must expect a hardening of the attitudes of our own Non-Whites”. [125] As a retired South African Brigadier put it: “Angola may well be regarded as South Africa’s Bay of Pigs”[126] [127] In addition to that the country found itself completely isolated. The UN Security Council met to consider “the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People’s Republic of Angola” and branded South Africa the aggressor on 31 March 1976, demanding it compensate Angola for war damages. Apart from losing international standing the South Africans also could not prevent SWAPO from regaining its positions along the Namibian border. Many military observers considered 27 March as the actual start of SWAPO insurgency in Namibia. [128]
Cuban involvement in Angola in the late 1970s and in the 1980s
At the height of the deployment Cuba had 35 to 40 thousand military personnel stationed in Angola. In addition to that more and more technical, medical and educational staff came to fill the gaps the Portuguese had left behind. After South Africa had left Angola, the FNLA had all but disappeared from the scene and UNITA had mainly receded to Zaire. The MPLA government was internationally recognized, albeit not by the US.
At their March 14 meeting in Conakry, when victory was already assured, Castro and Neto decided that the Cubans would withdraw gradually, leaving behind for as long as necessary enough men to organize a strong, modern army, capable of guaranteeing Angola's future internal security and national independence without outside help. By the end of May more than 3,000 troops had already returned to Cuba, and many more were on the way.[129]
The Cubans had high hopes that after their victory in Angola, in co-operation with the USSR, they could free all of southern Africa from the influence of the US and China.[130] In Angola they put up a training camp for Namibian, Rhodesian and South African guerrillas. But one result of the events in Angola in 1976 was the American’s heightened attention to African affairs, especially in the south of the continent. Kissinger worried, “if the Cubans are involved there, Namibia is next and after that South Africa itself.” The need to distance themselves from outcasts in the eyes of black Africa this also meant the US would drop support for the white regime in Rhodesia, a price it was willing to pay to “thwart communism”. [131] [132] Within five years of the independence of Angola, Rhodesia emerged as the next independent black-ruled nation of Zimbabwe, something Ian Smith, the former Rhodesian prime minister vowed would not happen within a century.
In the following years Cuba kept itself engaged in a number of other African countries. In 1978 Cuba sent 16,000 troops to Ethiopia Ogaden Conflict, but this time in close coordination with the Soviets. Smaller military missions were active in the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Benin. Cuban technical, educational and medical staff in the tens of thousands was working in even more countries: Algeria (Tindouf), Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, the Congo and Benin. Up to 18,000 students from these countries studied on full Cuban scholarships per year on the island. [133]
The Civil War continues
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/a/a5/South_Africa_Border_War_Map.png/300px-South_Africa_Border_War_Map.png)
Towards the end of the 1970s, Angola slipped away from wider international public attention. UNITA was able to continue its insurgency operations in the south because of military and logistical support from South Africa and the Angolan government still had not gained control over the whole country. Cuban presence in Angola was initially greatly reduced after the retreat of the South Africans but soon again was increased due to tensions between Angola and Zaire in March 1977 (see Shaba Invasion). Mobuto accused Angola of instigating and supporting an attack of the FNLC (Front National pour la Libération du Congo on the Zairian province of Shaba and Neto charged Mobutu with harbouring and supporting the FNLA and FLEC. Only 2 months later the Cubans played a role in stabilizing the Neto government and foiling the Nitista Plot when Nito Alves and José van Dunem split from the government and led an uprising. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster, which is another indication of the mutual distrust between the Soviets and Neto as well as the differing interests between the Soviets and the Cubans. [134] [135] Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened. [136]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/63/Angola_Provinces_Cuando_Cubango_250px.png/220px-Angola_Provinces_Cuando_Cubango_250px.png)
Soon after its retreat from Angola, South Africa waged a war from neighbouring Namibia against South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The Namibian liberation organization operated out of Angola with support of the Angolan government against the occupation of Southwest Africa by the Apartheid regime. To this end, South Africa continued to support UNITA's fight against the Angolan government and SWAPO to deny SWAPO a safe zone on Angola's southern border with Namibia. They SADF established bases in Cuando Cubango Province in south-eastern Angola and the South African Air Force (SAAF) supplied UNITA with air cover from bases in Namibia. [137] South Africa also went to great lengths to brush up Savimbi’s image abroad, especially in the US. Apart from being a friend to African tyrants Savimbi became the toast of the Reagan White House and was feted by the rightwing establishment in many countries. [138] [139]
Negotiations and War
In 1977 Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and the United States formed an informal negotiating team, called the ‘’’Contact Group’’’, to work with South Africa to implement a UN plan for free elections in Namibia. The South African government, however, was fundamentally opposed to the UN plan, which it claimed was biased in favour of the installation of a SWAPO government in Namibia. [140][141]
Beginning in 1978, periodic South African incursions and UNITA’s northward expansion in the east forced the Angolan government to increase expenditures on Soviet military aid and to depend even more on military personnel from the USSR, East Germany and Cuba. [142] The first large scale incursions by the SADF occurred in May 1978 when it raided a Namibian refugee camp at Cassinga, killing hundreds of people. By the end of 1979, following the bombing of Lubango, an undeclared border war was in full swing. [143]
Neto died on 10 September 1979 while seeking medical treatment in Moscow. And was succeeded by Jose Eduardo Dos Santos. Barely one month later Ronald Reagan became President of the United States, immediately taking a harder line with Angola: The Cubans were absolutely to be driven out of Angola.[144] The Reagan administration also resumed aid to UNITA. With the support of the US and South Africa UNITA became one the best equipped resistance movements of all times. They even received FIM-92 Stingers from the US which until then had been reserved for their closest allies. [145]
In the early 1980s, the United States, in their endeavour to get the USSR and Cuba out of Angola, became directly involved in negotiations with Angola. Angola pointed out it could safely reduce the number of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors if it wasn’t for the continuing South African incursions and threat at its southern border. The most obvious solution was an independent Namibia which South Africa had to give up. After having to accept a leftist regime in Angola, Pretoria was reluctant to relinquish control of Namibia because of the possibility that the first elections would bring its “traditional nemesis”, SWAPO, to power. It continued to attend negotiating sessions of the Contact Group throughout the early 1980s, always prepared to bargain but never ready to settle. [146] Cuba, not involved in the negotiations, basically agreed to such a solution paving the way to Namibia’s freedom. Yet, towards the end of Reagan’s second term in office, the negotiations had not born any fruit. [147]
After the UN-sponsored talks on the future of Namibia failed in January 1981, South African military aggression increased against Angolan targets and SWAPO guerrillas. In August 1981, the SADF launched ‘’’Operation Protea’’’ with several thousand troops penetrating 120 kilometres into south-western Angola. Not only fighting SWAPO the South Africans openly intensified assaults on Angolan economic targets and occupied Angolan territory, particularly in Cunene Province. Through 1982 and 1983 the SAAF also participated in operations by UNITA, more and more infiltrating the countryside, far exceeding its previous hit and -run operations aimed primarily at the Benguela Railway. The UNITA insurgency and border war had a crippling effect on the Angolan economy, especially agriculture and infrastructure, and the fights created hundreds of thousands of refugees. UNITA guerrillas also took foreign technicians as hostages. [148]
In 1987, the FAPLA, with Soviet support, launched an offensive against UNITA. Cuba’s and the Soviets strategic opinions differed considerably and the Cubans did not participate. They had advised against this operation because it would create the opportunity for a significant South African invasion, which is what transpired. When the offensive started to succeed, the SADF, which already controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened massively in the southeast, stopped and threw back the Angolan forces. By early November, the SADF had cornered FAPLA units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised to destroy them. [149] Cuito Cuanavale, only a village, was important as a forward air base to patrol and defend southern Angola and was considered an important gateway to the north. Pretoria committed its best troops and most sophisticated military hardware to its capture. The Russians were inexperienced on the African theatre and in spite of considerable aid were unable to turn the tide. UNITA inflicted one defeat after the other. In a valley near the Lomba River, FAPLA and the Soviets were routed and they left behind large amounts of destroyed equipment. 2000 Angolans died and a part of the Angolan army was closed in.[150]
The United Nations Security Council demanded the SADF’s unconditional withdrawal from Angola, but the US ensured that there were no repercussions for South Africa. US Assistant Secretary for Africa Chester Crocker reassured Pretoria’s ambassador: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.” [151]
As the situation for the besieged Angolan troops became critical, the Cuban troops stationed in Angola felt impelled to intervene as not to let their Angolan and Soviet allies suffer total defeat. In Cuba’s view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. On 15 November 1987 Castro decided to reinforce the troops stationed in Angola by sending fresh detachments, arms and equipment, including tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons and aircraft. Eventually Cuban troop strength doubled to about 50,000, with 40,000 deployed in the south where the major engagements were occurring. Cuba was also able to counter SAAF air supremacy, which was a critical factor in repelling the South Africans. Castro wanted to push the South Africans out of Angola for good and viewed preventing the fall of Cuito as imperative. [152]
As in 1975, the USSR again was not informed in advance of Cuba’s decision to intervene, one reason being that the relationship had become pretty strained. Castro was especially suspicious of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of détente with the US. [153]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5d/Angola_Cuito_Cuanavale.png/220px-Angola_Cuito_Cuanavale.png)
Cuito Cuanavale in south-eastern Angola became the major battle site between Cuban, Angolan and South African forces. It was the biggest battle on African soil since World War Two and in it course around 20.000 soldiers were killed. Cuban planes and 1 500 Cuban soldiers reinforced the Angolans at Cuito and the town and the base did not fall. On 23 March 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault “was brought to a grinding and definite halt” by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. [154] While the situation at Cuito remained at a stalemate, in south-western Angola Cuban units advanced towards the Namibian border. The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle “involved serious risks” withdrew. [155]
On 26 May, 1988, the chief of the SADF announced that “heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces, integrated for the first time, have moved south within 60km of the Namibian border”. The South African administrator general in Namibia acknowledged on 26 June that Cuban MIG-23s were flying over Namibia, a dramatic reversal from earlier times when the skies had belonged to the SAAF. He added that “the presence of the Cubans had caused a flutter of anxiety” in South Africa. [156]
While the fighting at Cuito continued and Cuban troops were following the retreating South Africans in the south-west towards the Namibian border, attempts for a negotiated arrangement continued. This time only governments were to take part in the negotiations, which excluded participation by UNITA. The two paramount issues were whether South Africa would finally accept implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435, prescribing Namibia’s independence, and whether the parties could agree on a timetable for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. The Americans did not have in mind to include the Cubans in the talks. Castro let the Americans know that negotiations including the Cubans would be much more promising. Hereupon US foreign minister George Schultz authorized the American delegation to hold direct talks with the Cubans with the strict provision that they only discuss matters of Angola and Namibia but not the US-embargo of Cuba. [157]
Three Powers Accord
The Cuban government joined negotiations on 28 January, 1988. Thus for the first time it participated in the negotiations on the future of Angola and Namibia. The first rounds started out in the Presidential Palace in Luanda while the fighting in Cuito Cuanavale continued. The talks were later moved to Cairo, with rounds in Geneva, London, and finally in New York. The South African government joined negotiations in Cairo on 3 May expecting Resolution 435 to be modified. Defence Minister Malan and President P.W. Botha asserted that South Africa would withdraw from Angola only “if Russia and its proxies did the same.” They did not mention withdrawing from Namibia. On 16 March, 1988, Business Day reported that Pretoria was “offering to withdraw into Namibia -- not from Namibia -- in return for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. The implication is that South Africa has no real intention of giving up the territory any time soon.”
But the Cubans in Angola had reversed the situation on the ground. In fact, the US wondered whether the Cubans would stop their advance at the Namibian border. [158] Thus, Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban delegation, responded to the South African demands: “The time for your military adventures, for the acts of aggression that you have pursued with impunity, for your massacres of refugees ... is over… South Africa is acting as though it was a victorious army, rather than what it really is: a defeated aggressor that is withdrawing ... South Africa must face the fact that it will not obtain at the negotiating table what it could not achieve on the battlefield.” [159] [160] Crocker cabled Secretary of State George Shultz that the talks had taken place “against the backdrop of increasing military tension surrounding the large build-up of heavily armed Cuban troops in south-west Angola in close proximity to the Namibian border ... The Cuban build-up in southwest Angola has created an unpredictable military dynamic.”<refGleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: > Crocker to Secretary of State, June 26, 1988, Freedom of Information Act</ref> As the war during the negotiations continued, on 27 June, 1988, Cuban MIGs attacked SADF positions near the Calueque dam, 11km north of the Namibian border. The CIA reported that “Cuba’s successful use of air power and the apparent weakness of Pretoria’s air defences” highlighted the fact that Havana had achieved air superiority in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Only a few hours after the Cuban’s air strike, the SADF destroyed a nearby bridge over the Cunene River. They did so, the CIA surmised, “to deny Cuban and Angolan ground forces easy passage to the Namibia border and to reduce the number of positions they must defend.” [161]
A ceasefire was finally agreed upon on 8 August, 1988.[162] The South Africans were out of Angola by 30 August 1988, before the timetable of the Cuban withdrawal from Angola had been discussed. On 22 December 1988, one month before Reagan’s second term ended, Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed the Three Powers Accord in New York, arranging for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia, the independence of Namibia and, within 30 months, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.
The accord ended 13 years of Cuban military presence in Angola which was finalized in stages one month early on 25 May 1991. At the same time the Cubans removed their troops from Pointe Noire (Republic of the Congo) and Ethiopia.
Aftermath
Despite Washington’s efforts to stop it, Cuba changed the course of Southern African history. As W. Freeman, ambassador, US state department, department for African policies, put it into words: “Castro could regard himself as father of Namibia’s independence and as the one who put an end to colonialism in Africa. Indeed, Cuba demonstrated responsibility and maturity. This should have been acknowledged by the USA as an important gesture and merited a respective answer. But American politics concerning relations with Cuba are absolutely poisoned, hence Cuba, which had acted really responsibly, was denied the slightest appreciation it had deserved” [163]. At least Crocker had admitted when he cabled Shultz during the negotions, on 25 August, 1988: “Reading the Cubans is yet another art form. They are prepared for both war and peace. We witness considerable tactical finesse and genuinely creative moves at the table. This occurs against the backdrop of Castro’s grandiose bluster and his army’s unprecedented projection of power on the ground.”[164]
In a national ceremony on 7 December, 1988, all Cubans killed in Africa were buried in cemeteries across the island. According to Cuban government figures, during all of the "internationalist" missions carried out in Africa from the early 1960s to the withdrawal of the last soldier from Angola on May 25, 1991, a total of 2,077 Cubans was killed. Historians estimated the Cuban casualties were around 10,000.[165] In the years of Cuba's engagement 450,000 Cuban soldiers and development workers had been to Africa.
At the negations in 1988 the South Africans had been asked for the release of Nelson Mandela as a sign of goodwill, which was denied. [166] Mandela remained in captivity until 2 February 1990 when the ANC African National Congress ban was lifted. In July 1991, as ANC leader, Mandela travelled to Havana to personally thank Castro for his country's pivotal role in the fight against apartheid. He underscored Cuba's vital role in a speech delivered in Havana: "The Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice unparalleled for its principled and selfless character - We in Africa are used to being victims of countries wanting to carve up our territory or subvert our sovereignty. It is unparalleled in African history to have another people rise to the defence of one of us - The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for southern African liberation!" The military defeat suffered by South Africa in Angola and Namibia, largely thanks to the contribution of Cuban troops, was considered a decisive blow in bringing down the racist apartheid regime. [167]
Free elections in Namibia were held in November 1989 with SWAPO taking 57% of the vote in spite of Pretoria’s attempts to swing it in favour of other parties. [168] Namibia gained independence in March 1990. The situation in Angola was anything but settled and the country continued to be ravaged by civil war for more than a decade. In spite of free elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi would not accept the results and refused to join the Angolan parliament as opposition. Again UNITA took up arms. Peace only returned to Angola following Savimbi’s death in 2002.
See also
Further reading
- "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ICAIC (Instituto cubano del arte e industria cinematograficos)
- Gleijeses, Piero: Kuba in Afrika 1975–1991. In: Bernd Greiner /Christian Th. Müller / Dierk Walter (Hrsg.): Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg. Hamburg, 2006, ISBN
- Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press)
- Arte TV: Fidel, der Che und die afrikanische Odyssee
- Departement Sozialwissenschaften der Universität Hamburg über den Krieg in Angola(Hamburg University)
- Afrika-Bulletin Nr. 123, August/September 2006 mit Schwerpunktthema Angola
- Deutsches Auswärtiges Amt zur Geschichte Angolas(German foreign ministry)
- Welt Online: Wie Castro die Revolution exportierte
- Christine Hatzky: Kuba in Afrika(Duisburg University)
- The National Security Archive: Secret Cuban Documents on Africa Involvement
- Saney, Isaac, "African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117.
- Nelson Mendela & Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! (New York:Pathfinder Press, 1991)
- Pazzanita, Anthony G, "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola." The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 29 No 1 (March 1991): pp. 83-114.
- Stockwell, John, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978)
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report: Volume Two: Repression and Resistance
References
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press)
- ^ Jime Lobe
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses10.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])
- ^ Ernesto Che Guevara: "The African Dream" The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo. With an Introduction by Richard Gott (New York: Grove Press, 2001)
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses8.pdf (Document obtained through Freedom of Information Act)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0044)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 250
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf (Document obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0046)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0046)
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)
- ^ Klinghoffer, A. J. in: The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, Boulder, 1980
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0040)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 293-294, 296-297
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0045)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 293-294, 296-297
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses3.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces])
- ^ Mabeko, Tali in: Dissidences, p. 348
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0039)
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses7.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 244-245 (Quotations from interview with Cadelo and from Cienfuegos to Senen Casas, Havana, November 22, 1974)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: (Agostinho Neto: Necesidades urgentes. Lista dirigada al Comite Central del Partido Communista de Cuba, January 26, 1975, enclosed in “Visita”, p. 22-23)
- ^ Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm
- ^ Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9, p. 24
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, p. 64-65
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ du Preez in: Avontuur, p. 28
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DOS, in: Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence, Sept. 22, 1975, p 4-5, National Security Archive, Washington
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Le Monde, Sept. 13, 1975, p. 3
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Diaz Arguelles to Colomé, October 1, 1975, p. 11
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 32, 63, 86
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 93-101
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press)
- ^ CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4, NSA
- ^ http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses5.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Information Centre of the Revolutionary Armed Forces])
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) pp. 255
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis 1974-76: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International Project Bulletin, n.8-9, p. 25
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Composicion de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4
- ^ CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 228
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 255-256, 265
- ^ Washington Post, August 24, 1975, B1
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 258
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Rand Daily Mail, August 3, 1975, p. 5
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 269
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias: Batallon de Tropas Especiales, n. d.
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Westad, Odd Arne in: Moscow and the Angolan Crisis 1974-76: A New Pattern of Intervention, Cold War International Project Bulletin, n.8-9, p. 25
- ^ N. Broutens, Soviet Politbüro, dept. chief foreign affairs, in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59min) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ http://www.angola.org.uk/newsletter100.htm
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 310-311
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 310-311
- ^ Quotations from Bridgeland in: Savimbi, p. 151
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Rand Daily Mail, Nov. 10, 1975, p. 3
- ^ Jornal Novo, Nov. 12, 1975, p. 15
- ^ CIA, Intelligence Checklist, November 14, 1975, p. A2-A5, NSA
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ Márquez, Gabriel García in: Operation Carlota, New Left Review I/101-102, January-April 1977
- ^ Hermann Cohen, National Security Council, USA, in “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Frank Wisner Jr., Ambassador, US-Foreign Ministry , in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 319-320
- ^ a b c "Memorandum of Conversation (between United States and China)" (PDF). United States Department of State. December 3, 1975. (Document obtained by National Security Archive, from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord)
- ^ http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses2.pdf (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the Armed Forces])
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Vermerk über das Gespräch m. d. Präsidenten d. VR Angola, Genossen Dr. Agositinho Neto, am 26.2.1976, p. 2, SED, DY30IV2/2.035/128
- ^ Guardian, Manchester, February 18, 1976, p. 2
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa’s Border War, 1966-1989, Gibraltar, 1989, p. 51-52
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 140 –143
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 121-122
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: de Villiers, PW, p. 259
- ^ Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 215
- ^ Observer, December 7, 1975, p. 11
- ^ Times, December 11, 1975, p. 7
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 154-73
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 203 –18
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 186-201
- ^ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8, December 28, 1975, E3 (quoting Botha)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa’s Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar,1989, p. 55
- ^ Rand Daily Mail, January 16
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 325
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to all American Republic Diplomatic posts, December 20, 1975, NSA
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 325
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 332
- ^ http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clark.htm
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 334-337
- ^ "(Document obtained from Department of State files through FOIA)" (PDF). United States Department of State. January 1976.
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, Dec. 20, 1975
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: "Informe", p. 11
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 337, 341
- ^ World (Johannesburg), December 3, 1975, p. 1: Quotations from Admiral H. H. Biermann
- ^ Thom, William in: Angola’s 1975-76 Civil War, Autumn 1998, 1-44, p. 31
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: See the pessimistic reports of Generals André van Deventer, Magnus Malan and Viljoen in Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 259, 261, 264
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 260-263
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: de Villers Dirk and Johanna in: PW-A biography of South Africa’s President PW Botha, Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1984, p. 266-269
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Botha, P. W., January 27, 1976, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, col. 114
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: CIA, National Intelligence Daily, January 8, 1976
- ^ Washington Post, February 4, 1976, p. 1
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, March 25, 1976, cols. 3916-17
- ^ Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html
- ^ Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html
- ^ IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 327
- ^ Christopher Saunders, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa in: Journal of Military History (Society for Military History), http://muse.jhu.edu/demo/journal_of_military_history/v067/67.1saunders.html
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 346
- ^ Rand Daily Mail, February 17, 1976, p. 10
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: American Embassy London to Secretary of State, March 2, 1976, p. 2, DOS MF 8904623
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Republic of South Africa, Report, 1:579, Quoting African National Congress (ANC) pamphlet issued to celebrate the event
- ^ Sargent, Roger in: Rand Daily Mail, February 13, 1976, p. 13
- ^ Jacobs, Gideon (United Party) in: Rand Daily Mail, February 28, 1976, p. 6
- ^ Le Monde, March 30, 1976, p. 6
- ^ Willers, J. G. (Brigadier Ret.) in: Letter to the editor, Cape Times, April 28, 1976, p. 10
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Geldenhuys, Jannie in: A General’s Story, p. 58-59
- ^ Garcia Marquez, Gabriel in: Operation Carlota, 1976, http://www.rhodesia.nl/marquez.htm
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Matthews, Herbert in: Forward with Fidel Castro, Anywhere, New York Times, March 4, 1976, p. 31
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Quotations from Kissinger, NSC meeting, April 7, 1976, p. 13, NSAd, NSC Meeting Minutes, box 2, GRFL
- ^ Newsweek, May 10, 1976, p. 51
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 392
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0050)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0051)
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, 2005, p. 129–131
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0053)
- ^ General Magnus Malan, South African Minister of Defence in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Brittain, Victoria in: Guardian: Jonas Savimbi, Angolan nationalist whose ambition kept his country at war, February 25, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4362364,00.html
- ^ Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. http://countrystudies.us/angola/48.htm
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0057)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0051)
- ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0053)
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions, The University of North Carolina Press
- ^ Collelo, Thomas, ed. Angola: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991. http://countrystudies.us/angola/48.htm
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ The Library of Congress, February 1989, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0057)
- ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, December 5, 1987, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ Transcripción sobre la reunión del Comandante en Jefe con la delegación de políticos de África del Sur (Companero Slovo), Centro de Información de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (CIFAR), Havana
- ^ Saney, Issac in: African Stalingrad: The Cuban Revolution, Internationalism and the End of Apartheid, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September 2006): pp. 81-117
- ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) to Secretary of State, May 13, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007. http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
- ^ “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: “Entrevista de Risquet con Chester Crocker, 26/6/88”, ACC
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: “Actas das Conversaçôes Quadripartidas entre a RPA, Cuba, Estados Unidos de América e a Africa do Sul realizadas no Cairo de 24-26.06.988”, Archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Havanna
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: CIA, “South Africa-Angola-Cuba”, June 29, 1988, Freedom of Information Act and CIA, “South Africa-Angola-Namibia”, July 1, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ Alao, Abiodun. Brothers at War: Dissidence and Rebellion in Southern Africa, 1994. Pages XIX-XXI.
- ^ “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Crocker to Secretary of State, August 25, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
- ^ Nash, Nathan C (July 1, 1987). "Cuba Is Mired in Angola, Top Defector Says". New York Times.
- ^ "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri
- ^ http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31247
- ^ The Guardian, July 26, 1991