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<ref name="Morris2008p47">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=47|quote="The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine (most of it desert), consisting of the Negev"}}</ref>
<ref name="Morris2008p47">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=47|quote="The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine (most of it desert), consisting of the Negev"}}</ref>


⚫
<ref name="Louis2006p420">{{cite book|author=William Roger Louis|title=Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&pg=PA420|accessdate=16 August 2013|year=2006|publisher=I.B.Tauris|isbn=978-1-84511-347-6|pages=420|quote="To Bevin, ‘partition’ symbolized a bankruptcy of policy, the end of the road, and an admission of failure…. In Palestine he pursued the goal of the bi-national state with such tenacity…With a divided Palestine, Arab nationalism would continue to fester and would bring about the end of Britain’s paramount position in the Middle East. In sum, Bevin’s motivation must be found in areas of military power and economic resources, as well as in the idealism of the Commonwealth. Bevin believed that the answer to the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons should be sought in Europe rather than in Palestine, which he regarded as a predominantly Arab country. He found himself caught between a Jewish nationalism supercharged by the emotions of the Holocaust, and the anti-Zionism of the Arabs, without whose good will the British Empire in the Middle East would be doomed. The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without antagonizing the United States. The Middle East, in Bevin’s view, was second in importance only to Europe; but in order for Britain to remain the dominant regional power, both Arab cooperation and the support of the United States were vital. Without them, Britain’s influence would decline, and not only in the Middle East. Britain would sink to the status of a second-class European power like the Netherlands. That anxiety helps explain the emotional energy that Bevin and other British leaders expended on the regeneration of the British Empire in the Middle East and Africa "}}</ref>
<ref name="morris2008p67">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=67|quote= p. 67, "The League’s Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called “aggression,” “without mercy"'; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state."}}</ref>


⚫
<ref name="Louis2006p420">{{cite book|author=William Roger Louis|title=Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&pg=PA420|accessdate=16 August 2013|year=2006|publisher=I.B.Tauris|isbn=978-1-84511-347-6|pages=420|quote="To Bevin, ‘partition’ symbolized a bankruptcy of policy, the end of the road, and an admission of failure…. In Palestine he pursued the goal of the bi-national state with such tenacity…With a divided Palestine, Arab nationalism would continue to fester and would bring about the end of Britain’s paramount position in the Middle East. In sum, Bevin’s motivation must be found in areas of military power and economic resources, as well as in the idealism of the Commonwealth. Bevin believed that the answer to the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons should be sought in Europe rather than in Palestine, which he regarded as a predominantly Arab country. He found himself caught between a Jewish nationalism supercharged by the emotions of the Holocaust, and the anti-Zionism of the Arabs, without whose good will the British Empire in the Middle East would be doomed. The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without antagonizing the United States. The Middle East, in Bevin’s view, was second in importance only to Europe; but in order for Britain to remain the dominant regional power, both Arab cooperation and the support of the United States were vital. Without them, Britain’s influence would decline, and not only in the Middle East. Britain would sink to the status of a second-class European power like the Netherlands. That anxiety helps explain the emotional energy that Bevin and other British leaders expended on the regeneration of the British Empire in the Middle East and Africa "}}</ref>
<ref name="morris2008p73">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=73|quote="Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of 1 September 1947 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation.…. The British cabinet went one better: in the meeting on 4 December 1947 ... It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary, ... it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission. The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission “that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the [Mandate] Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine.” ... This sealed the commission’s fate and nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution. "}}</ref>
<ref name="morris2008p73">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=73|quote="Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of 1 September 1947 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation.…. The British cabinet went one better: in the meeting on 4 December 1947 ... It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary, ... it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission. The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission “that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the [Mandate] Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine.” ... This sealed the commission’s fate and nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution. "}}</ref>


<ref name="Morris2008p50">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=24 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|pages=50, 66, 67, 72|quote="p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: “The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East,” promised [[Jamal Husseini]].; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a “partition in disguise,” as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a “unitary” state, with an Arab majority and minority rights for the Jews. The AHC went one better and insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship" ; p.67, at 1947 "The League’s Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called “aggression,” “without mercy.” The League promised them, in line with Bludan, assistance “in manpower, money and equipment” should the United Nations endorse partition." ; p. 72, at Dec 1947 "The League vowed, in very general language, “to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,”; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state.; p.412 "Iraq’s prime minister had warned British diplomats that if the United Nations decided on a solution to the Palestine problem that was not “satisfactory” to the Arabs, “severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries.” "}}</ref>
<ref name="Morris2008p50">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=24 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|pages=50, 66, 67, 72|quote="p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: “The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East,” promised [[Jamal Husseini]].; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a “partition in disguise,” as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a “unitary” state, with an Arab majority and minority rights for the Jews. The AHC went one better and insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship" ; p.67, at 1947 "The League’s Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called “aggression,” “without mercy.” The League promised them, in line with Bludan, assistance “in manpower, money and equipment” should the United Nations endorse partition." ; p. 72, at Dec 1947 "The League vowed, in very general language, “to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,”; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state.; p.412 "Iraq’s prime minister had warned British diplomats that if the United Nations decided on a solution to the Palestine problem that was not “satisfactory” to the Arabs, “severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries.” "}}</ref>

<ref name="morris2008p61">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|pages=61|quote="The Arabs had failed to understand the tremendous impact of the Holocaust on the international community—and, in any event, appear to have used the selfsame methods, but with poor results.
Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, for example, offered one delegate—perhaps the Russian—a “huge, huge sum of money to vote for the Arabs” (the Russian declined, saying, “You want me to hang myself?”).
But the Arabs’ main tactic, amounting to blackmail, was the promise or threat of war should the assembly endorse partition. As early as mid-August 1947, Fawzi al-Qawuqji—soon to be named the head of the Arab League’s volunteer army in Palestine, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA)—threatened that, should the vote go the wrong way, “we will have to initiate total war. We will murder, wreck and ruin everything standing in our way, be it English, American or Jewish.” It would be a “holy war,” the Arabs suggested, which might even evolve into “World War III.” Cables to this effect poured in from Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Baghdad during the Ad Hoc Committee deliberations, becoming “more lurid,” according to Zionist officials, as the General Assembly vote drew near. The Arab states generally made no bones about their intention to support the Palestinians with “men, money and arms,” and sometimes hinted at an eventual invasion by their armies.
They also threatened the Western Powers, their traditional allies, with an oil embargo and/or abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc”}}</ref>

<ref name="morris2008p187">{{cite book|author=Benny Morris|title=1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=J5jtAAAAMAAJ|accessdate=13 July 2013|year=2008|publisher=Yale University Press|page=187|quote=" p. 187 ." Azzam told Kirkbride:...we will sweep them[the Jews] into the sea" . Al Quwwatli [ the Syrian president] told his people:"…we shall eradicate Zionism" ; p. 409 "Al Husseini…In March 1948 he told an interviewer in a Jaffa daily Al Sarih that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionist were Annihilated""}}</ref>

<ref name="Shulewitz2000p84">{{cite book|author=Malka Hillel Shulewitz|title=Forgotten Millions: The Modern Jewish Exodus from Arab Lands|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=97gumCmPYtYC|date=27 October 2000|publisher=Continuum|isbn=978-0-8264-4764-7|page=84|quote="The proposed solution might endanger a million Jews living in the Muslim countries. Partition of Palestine might create in those countries an anti-Semitism even more difficult to root out than the antisemitism which the Allies tried to eradicate in Germany...for the massacre of a large number of jews"; p.86 "Iraq formally and overtly identified Itself with the 1947 threats of Heykal Pasha a mere four days later. Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fadel Jamall, made the following statement: The masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab—Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside Palestine than there are in Palestine. …any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq: It will breed Interreliglous prejudice and hatred."}}</ref>


<ref name="Bloom2005p99">{{cite book|author=Jack Brian Bloom|title=Out of Step: Life-story of a Politician : Politics and Religion in a World at War|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Kr2gAAAAMAAJ|year=2005|publisher=Jack Bloom|isbn=978-0-620-35374-8|page=99|quote=" Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said, declared: “We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in."}}</ref>
<ref name="Bloom2005p99">{{cite book|author=Jack Brian Bloom|title=Out of Step: Life-story of a Politician : Politics and Religion in a World at War|url=http://books.google.com/books?id=Kr2gAAAAMAAJ|year=2005|publisher=Jack Bloom|isbn=978-0-620-35374-8|page=99|quote=" Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said, declared: “We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in."}}</ref>

Revision as of 19:36, 22 October 2013

"Partition of Palestine" redirects here. For the Partition of Palestine into Israel, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, see 1949 Armistice Agreements.

UN General Assembly
Resolution 181 (II)
UNSCOP (3 September 1947) and UN Ad Hoc Committee (25 November 1947) partition plans. The UN Ad Hoc committee proposal was voted on in the resolution.
DateNovember 29 1947
Meeting no.128
CodeA/RES/181(II) (Document)
Voting summary
  • 33 voted for
  • 13 voted against
  • 10 abstained
ResultRecommendation to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out in the resolution[1]
Wikisource has original text related to this article:

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a plan for the future government of Palestine. The Plan was described as a Plan of Partition with Economic Union which, after the termination of the British Mandate, would lead to the creation of independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of the Plan as Resolution 181(II).[2]

Part I of the Plan contained provisions dealing with the Termination of the Mandate, Partition and Independence. The Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw from Palestine no later than the previously announced date of 1 August 1948. The new states would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism, known as Zionism. Part II of the Plan included a detailed description of the proposed boundaries for each state.[3] The Plan also called for Economic Union between the proposed states, and for the protection of religious and minority rights.

The Plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency on behalf of the Jewish community, but rejected by Arab governments.

Immediately after adoption of the Resolution by the General Assembly, the Civil War broke out.[4] The partition plan was not implemented.[5]

Earlier proposals for partition

The League of Nations granted Britain a mandate over Palestine as part of the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. A British census of 1918 estimated 700,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews.[6]

In the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the British foreign secretary stated that the British government viewed “with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people [with the understanding that] nothing should be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine . . . .” .[6] Neither partition nor statehood was mentioned as the means of accomplishing the National Home. Lord Curzon, who later succeeded Balfour as foreign secretary, wrote a memorandum expressing concern about what would become of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine who had “occupied the country for the best part of 1,500 years” and would “not be content either to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of wood and drawers of water to the latter." [6]

In 1937, the Peel Commission proposed a Palestine divided into an Arab state, a much smaller Jewish state (about 15%), and an international zone. The Arab leadership rejected the plan. The two main Jewish leaders, Chaim Weizmann and Ben Gurion had convinced the Zionist Congress to approve equivocally the Peel recommendations as a basis for more negotiation.[7][8][qt 1][9] These proposals contained provisions for the relocation of Arab population to areas outside the borders of the new Jewish state, modelled on the population exchange between Greece and Turkey; they were also rejected by the Arab side.

The British Woodhead Commission considered several additional plans for partition. In 1938 the British government issued a policy statement declaring that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable". Representatives of Arabs and Jews were invited to London for the St. James Conference, which proved unsuccessful.[10]

The MacDonald White Paper of May 1939 declared that it was "not part of [the British government's] policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State" and sought to eliminate Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Jewish Agency hoped to persuade the British to restore Jewish immigration rights, and cooperated with the British in the war against Fascism. Aliyah Bet was organized to spirit Jews out of Nazi controlled Europe, despite the British prohibitions. The White Paper also led to the formation of Lehi, a small Jewish terrorist organization which opposed the British, and, at one time, sought to make an agreement with the Nazis.[citation needed] However Lehi had less than 100 members and after an investigation by a minor official, the Nazis lost interest. Nothing was ever decided.

UNSCOP

Further information: UNSCOP

Background

Map showing Jewish-owned land as of 31 March 1945, including land owned in full, shared in undivided land and State Lands under concession. This constituted 6% of the total land area, of which more than half was held by the JNF and PICA[11]

After World War II, despite pressure to allow the immigration of large numbers of Jewish Holocaust survivors to Palestine, the British maintained limits on Jewish immigration in line with the 1939 White Paper. The Jewish community rejected the restriction on immigration and also organized an armed resistance. These and United States pressure to end the anti-immigration policy led to the establishment of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. In April 1946, the committee reached a unanimous decision. The Committee approved the American condition of the immediate acceptance of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine. It also recommended that there be no Arab, and no Jewish State. US President Harry S. Truman angered the British government by issuing, without forewarning, a statement supporting the 100,000 refugees, but refusing to acknowledge the rest of the committee's findings. Bevin told the committee that he would accept their decision if it were unanimous [12] But the British government had conditioned the implementation of the report's recommendations on the US providing assistance if force would be required to do so, but that was not offered. The US War Department had issued an earlier report which stated that an open-ended US troop commitment of 300,000 personnel would be necessary to assist the British government in maintaining order against an Arab revolt.[13]

On 7 February 1947, Britain announced its intent to terminate the Mandate for Palestine. On 2 April 1947, Britain formally asked the United Nations to make recommendations regarding the future government of Palestine.[14] On 15 May 1947, the UN appointed the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), composed of representatives from eleven states. To make the committee more neutral, none of the Great Powers were represented. The UNSCOP spent three months conducting hearings and a general survey of the situation in Palestine.

On 18 July 1947, the SS Exodus, a ship packed with Holocaust Survivors wanting to immigrate to Palestine, arrived off the coast. The ship was intercepted by the Royal Navy and a struggle ensued in which two passengers and a crew member died. UNSCOP members watched as the Exodus passengers were forcibly transferred to ships bound for France. The passengers refused to disembark in France, and the British ultimately decided to transfer the passengers to Hamburg, Germany. The voyage resulted in spectacularly bad press for the British and was followed by UNSCOP members as they deliberated in Geneva.

UNSCOP Report

On 3 September 1947, the Committee reported to the General Assembly. CHAPTER V: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (I), Section A of the Report contained eleven proposed recommendations (I - XI) approved unanimously. Section B contained one proposed recommendation approved by a substantial majority dealing with the Jewish problem in general (XI). CHAPTER VI: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS (II) contained a Plan of Partition with Economic Union to which seven members of the Committee (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay), expressed themselves in favour. CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS (III) contained a comprehensive proposal that was voted upon and supported by three members (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) for a Federal State of Palestine. In CHAPTER VIII A number of members of the Committee expressed certain reservations and observations.[15]

Proposed division

See also: Land ownership of the British Mandate of Palestine
Land Ownership
Population Distribution
Two maps reviewed by UN Subcommittee 2 in considering partition

Both the Arab State and the Jewish State proposed by the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out in CHAPTER VI: RECOMMENDATIONS (III) of the UNSCOP report of 3 September 1947 were composed of three major sections, linked by extraterritorial crossroads. The Arab State would receive the Western Galilee, with the town of Acre, the hill country of Samaria and Judea, and the southern coast stretching from north of Isdud (now Ashdod) and encompassing what is now the Gaza Strip, with a section of desert along the Egyptian border. The Jewish State would receive the Coastal Plain, stretching from Haifa to Rehovot, the Eastern Galilee (surrounding the Sea of Galilee and including the Galilee panhandle) and the Negev desert,[qt 2] including the southern outpost of Umm Rashrash (now Eilat). The Corpus Separatum included Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and the surrounding areas.

The Plan tried its best to accommodate as many Jews as possible into the Jewish State. In many specific cases,[citation needed] this meant including areas of Arab majority (but with a significant Jewish minority) in the Jewish state. Thus the Jewish State would have an overall large Arab minority. Areas that were sparsely populated (like the Negev desert), were also included in the Jewish state to create room for immigration. According to the plan, Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state.

By virtue of Chapter 3, Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, resided in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem would, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they were resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.

The Plan would have had the following demographics (data based on 1945). This data does not reflect the actual land ownership by Jews, local Arabs, Ottomans and other land owners. This data also excludes the land designated to Arabs in Transjordan.

Territory Arab and other population % Arab and other Jewish population % Jewish Total population
Arab State 725,000 99% 10,000 1% 735,000
Jewish State 407,000 45% 498,000 55% 905,000
International 105,000 51% 100,000 49% 205,000
Total 1,237,000 67% 608,000 33% 1,845,000
Data from the Report of UNSCOP: 3 September 1947: CHAPTER 4: A COMMENTARY ON PARTITION

The land allocated to the Arab State in the final plan included about 43% of Mandatory Palestine[16][unreliable source?] and consisted of all of the highlands, except for Jerusalem, plus one-third of the coastline. The highlands contain the major aquifers of Palestine, which supplied water to the coastal cities of central Palestine, including Tel Aviv.[17][unreliable source?] The Jewish State was to receive 56% of Mandatory Palestine, a slightly larger area to accommodate the increasing numbers of Jews who would immigrate there.[16][unreliable source?] The Jewish State included three fertile lowland plains – the Sharon on the coast, the Jezreel Valley and the upper Jordan Valley. The bulk of the proposed Jewish State's territory, however, consisted of the Negev Desert.[qt 2] The desert was not suitable for agriculture, nor for urban development at that time. The Jewish State would also be given sole access to the Red Sea.

Ad Hoc Committee

Map comparing the borders of the 1947 partition plan and the armistice of 1949.
Boundaries defined in the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine:

  Area assigned for a Jewish state
    Area assigned for an Arab state
    Planned Corpus separatum with the intention that Jerusalem would be neither Jewish nor Arab
Armistice Demarcation Lines of 1949 (Green Line):

      Israeli controlled territory from 1949
    Egyptian and Jordanian controlled territory from 1948 until 1967

On 23 September 1947 the General Assembly established an ad hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to consider the UNSCOP report. Representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were invited and attended.[18]

During the committee's deliberations, the British government endorsed the report's recommendations concerning the end of the mandate, independence, and Jewish immigration. [citation needed] However, the British did "not feel able to implement" any agreement unless it was acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and asked that the General Assembly provide an alternative implementing authority if that proved to be the case.

The Arab Higher Committee rejected both the majority and minority recommendations within the UNSCOP report. They "concluded from a survey of Palestine history that Zionist claims to that country had no legal or moral basis". The Arab Higher Committee argued that only an Arab State in the whole of Palestine would be consistent with the UN Charter.

The Jewish Agency expressed support for most of the UNSCOP recommendations, but emphasized the "intense urge" of the overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to Palestine. The Jewish Agency criticized the proposed boundaries, especially in the Western Galilee and Western Jerusalem (outside of the old city), arguing that these should be included in the Jewish state. However, they agreed to accept the plan if "it would make possible the immediate re-establishment of the Jewish State with sovereign control of its own immigration."

Boundary changes

The ad hoc committee made a number of boundary changes to the UNSCOP recommendations before they were voted on by the General Assembly.

The predominantly Arab city of Jaffa, previously located within the Jewish state, was constituted as an enclave of the Arab State.

The Bedouin settlement and population figures were revised in a report submitted by a representative of the government of the United Kingdom on 1 November 1947. The Palestine Administration conducted an investigation and used the Royal Air Force to perform an aerial survey of the Beersheba District. They reported that the Bedouins had the greater part of two million dunams under cereal grain production. The administration counted 3,389 Bedouin houses together with 8,722 tents. The report explained that:

"It should be noted that the term Beersheba Bedouin has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it."[19]

On the basis of that investigation, the Palestine Administration estimated the Bedouin population at approximately 127,000. The report noted that the earlier population "estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to the statement, 22,000 Bedouins may be taken as normally residing in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the UNSCOP's majority plan, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State. It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State."[19] The boundary of the Arab state was modified to include Beersheba and a strip of the Negev desert along the Egyptian border,[qt 2] while a section of the Dead Sea shore and other additions were made to the Jewish State. This move increased the Jewish percentage in the Jewish state from 55% to 61%.[citation needed]

The proposed boundaries would also have placed 54 Arab villages on the opposite side of the border from their farm land.[citation needed] In response, the United Nations Palestine Commission was empowered to modify the boundaries "in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary". These modifications never occurred.

The vote

Passage of the resolution required a two-thirds majority of the valid votes, not counting abstaining and absent members, of the UN's then 56 member states. On 26 November, after filibustering by the Zionist delegation, the vote was postponed by three days.[20] According to multiple sources, had the vote been held on the original set date, it would have received a majority, but less than the required two-thirds.[21][22] The delay was used by supporters of Zionism in New York to put extra pressure on states not supporting the resolution.[20]

Reports of pressure for and against the Plan

Reports of pressure for the Plan

Proponents of the Plan reportedly put pressure on nations to vote yes to the Partition Plan. A telegram signed by 26 US senators with influence on foreign aid bills was sent to wavering countries, seeking their support for the partition plan.[23] Many nations reported pressure directed specifically at them:

  • United States (Vote: For): President Truman later noted, "The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike anything that had been seen there before, but that the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats—disturbed and annoyed me."[24]
  • India (Vote: Against): Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke with anger and contempt for the way the UN vote had been lined up. He said the Zionists had tried to bribe India with millions and at the same time his sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, had received daily warnings that her life was in danger unless "she voted right".[25]
  • Liberia (Vote: For): Liberia's Ambassador to the United States complained that the US delegation threatened aid cuts to several countries.[26] Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., President of Firestone Natural Rubber Company, with major holdings in the country, also pressured the Liberian government[21][23]
  • Philippines (Vote: For): In the days before the vote, the Philippines' representative General Carlos P. Romulo stated "We hold that the issue is primarily moral. The issue is whether the United Nations should accept responsibility for the enforcement of a policy which is clearly repugnant to the valid nationalist aspirations of the people of Palestine. The Philippines Government holds that the United Nations ought not to accept such responsibility". After a phone call from Washington, the representative was recalled and the Philippines' vote changed.[23]
  • Haiti (Vote: For): The promise of a five million dollar loan may have secured Haiti's vote for partition.[27]
  • France (Vote: For): Shortly before the vote, France's delegate to the United Nations was visited by Bernard Baruch, a long-term Jewish supporter of the Democratic Party who, during the recent world war, had been an economic adviser to President Roosevelt, and had latterly been appointed by President Truman as the United States' ambassador to the newly created UN Atomic Energy Commission. He was, privately, a supporter of the Irgun and it's front organization, the American League for a Free Palestine. Baruch implied that a French failure to support the resolution might cause planned American aid to France, which was badly needed for reconstruction, French currency reserves being exhausted and its balance of payments heavily in deficit, not to materialise. Previously, in order to avoid antagonising its Arab colonies, France had not publicly supported the resolution. After considering the danger of American aid being withheld, France finally voted in favour of it. So, too, did France's neighbours, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.[20]

Reports of pressure against the Plan

The Arabs appear to have used similar methods too, but with poor results. For instance, Wasif Kamal, an AHC official, tried to bribe a delegate.[qt 3]

The Arab states threatened that:

  • The Western Powers were threatened with an "oil embargo and abandonment and realignment with the Soviet Bloc".[qt 3]
  • Jamal Husseini promised, “The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East”.[qt 4] Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, said: “We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in".[qt 5]
  • Concerning jews in Arab countries:
  1. '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that “the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state.",[qt 6]"The proposed solution might endanger a million Jews living in the Muslim countries. Partition of Palestine might create in those countries an antisemitism even more difficult to root out than the antisemitism which the Allies tried to eradicate in Germany...for the massacre of a large number of Jews".[qt 7]
  2. Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Muhammad Fadhel al-Jamali, said: The masses in the Arab world cannot be restrained. The Arab—Jewish relationship in the Arab world will greatly deteriorate. There are more Jews in the Arab world outside Palestine than there are in Palestine. …any injustice imposed upon the Arabs of Palestine will disturb the harmony among Jews and non-Jews in Iraq: It will breed Inter religious prejudice and hatred.[qt 7][28]
  3. Iraq’s prime minister Nuri al-Said told British diplomats that if the United Nations solution would not be “satisfactory” , “severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries"[qt 4].

Final vote

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions and 1 absent, in favour of the modified Partition Plan. The final vote was as follows:

In favour, (33 countries, 72% of voting):

  • Latin American and Caribbean (13 countries):

 Bolivia

 Brazil

 Costa Rica

 Dominican Republic

 Ecuador

 Guatemala

 Haiti

 Nicaragua

 Panama

 Paraguay

 Peru

 Uruguay

 Venezuela

  • Western European and Others (12 countries):

 Belgium

 Denmark

 France

 Iceland

 Luxembourg

 Netherlands

 Norway

 Sweden

 Australia

 New Zealand

 Canada

 United States

  • Eastern European (5 countries):

 Byelorussian SSR

 Czechoslovakia

 Poland

 Ukrainian SSR

 Soviet Union

  • African (2 countries):

 Liberia

 South Africa

  • Asia-Pacific (1 country)

 Philippines

Against, (13 countries, 28% of voting):

  • Asia-Pacific (10 countries):

 Afghanistan

 India

 Iran

 Iraq

 Lebanon

 Pakistan

 Saudi Arabia

 Syria

 Turkey

 Yemen

  • Western European (1 country):

 Greece

  • African (1 country):

 Egypt

  • Latin American and Caribbean (1 country):

 Cuba

Abstentions, (10 countries):

  • Latin American and Caribbean (6 countries):

 Argentina

 Chile

 Colombia

 El Salvador

 Honduras

 Mexico

  • Asia-Pacific (1 country):

 Republic of China

  • African (1 country):

 Ethiopia

  • Western European and Others (1 country):

 United Kingdom

  • Eastern European (1 country):

 Yugoslavia

Absent, (1 country):

  • Asia-Pacific (1 country):

 Thailand

Votes by region

What later came to be known as the United Nations Regional Groups showed relatively aligned voting styles in the final vote. All Western nations voted for the resolution, with the exception of the United Kingdom (the Mandate holder), Greece and Turkey. The Soviet bloc also voted for partition, with the exception of Yugoslavia, which was to be expelled from Cominform the following year. The majority of Latin American nations voted for partition, with a sizeable minority abstaining. Asian countries voted against partition, with the exception of the Philippines.[29]

Regional Group Members in UNGA181 vote UNGA181 For UNGA181 Against UNGA181 Abstained
African 4 2 1 1
Asia-Pacific 11 1 9 1
Eastern European 6 5 0 1
LatAm and Caribb. 20 13 1 6
Western Eur. & Others 15 12 2 1
Total UN members 56 33 13 10

Reactions

Jewish reaction

Most Jews in Palestine and around the world reacted to the UN resolution with satisfaction, but some did not. The Jewish Agency accepted the resolution despite its dissatisfaction with such matters as Jewish emigration from Europe and the territorial limits set upon the proposed Jewish State.[30] Mainstream Zionist leaders emphasized the "heavy responsibility" of building a modern Jewish State, and committed to working towards a peaceful coexistence with the region's other inhabitants:[31][32] Jewish units in the United States hailed the action by the United Nations. Most welcomed the Palestine Plan but some felt it did not settle the problem.[33]

It is now our primary task to establish relations of peace and harmony with our Arab neighbors – Chaim Weizmann[34]

Some Revisionist Zionists rejected the partition plan as a renunciation of legitimately Jewish national territory.[33] Menachem Begin's Irgun Tsvai Leumi and the Lehi (The Stern Group, also known by their opponents as the Stern Gang), which had been fighting the British, rejected the plan. Begin warned that the partition would not bring peace because the Arabs would also attack the small state and that "in the war ahead we'll have to stand on our own, it will be a war on our existence and future".[35] He also stated that “the bisection of our homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized.”[36] Begin was sure that the creation of a Jewish state would make territorial expansion possible, “after the shedding of much blood."[37]

According to Simha Flapan, it is a myth that Zionists accepted the partition as a compromise by which the Jewish community abandoned ambitions for the whole of Palestine and recognized the rights of the Palestinians to their own state. Rather, Flapan says that his research suggests that the acceptance was only a tactical move aimed at thwarting the creation of the Palestinian state and increasing the territory assigned by the UN to the Jewish state.[38]

Addressing the Central Committee of the Histadrut (the Eretz Israel Workers Party) days after the UN vote to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion expressed his apprehension stating:

"…the total population of the Jewish State at the time of its establishment will be about one million, including almost 40% non-Jews. Such a [population] composition does not provide a stable basis for a Jewish State. This [demographic] fact must be viewed in all its clarity and acuteness. With such a [population] composition, there cannot even be absolute certainty that control will remain in the hands of the Jewish majority... There can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%".[39]

Arab reaction

The Arabs opposed any form of partition.

A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, was quoted by an Egyptian newspaper as predicting that Palestine would be overrun by Muslim volunteers.[40] This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.[41]

On 16 February 1948, UN Palestine Commission to the security council reported that: "Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein."[42] The Arabs were against the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem too.

Zionists tend to attribute Palestinian rejection of the plan to a mere intransigence but Arabs have always reiterated that it was rejected because it was unfair[dubious – discuss]: it gave the majority of the land (56%) to the Jews, who at that stage legally owned only 7% of it and remained a minority of the population.[43] There were also disproportionate allocations under the plan and the area under Jewish control contained 45% of the Palestinian population. The proposed Arab state was only given 45% of the land, much of which was unfit for agriculture. Jaffa, though geographically separated, was to be part of the Arab state.[43] However, most of the proposed Jewish state was the Negev desert.[44][qt 2]The plan allocated to the Jewish State most of the Negev desert that was sparsely populated and unsuitable for agriculture but also a "vital land bridge protecting British interests from the Suez Canal to Iraq"[45][46]

Few Palestinian Arabs joined the Arab Liberation Army because they suspected that the other Arab States did not plan on an independent Palestinian state. According to Ian Bickerton, for that reason many Palestinians favored partition and indicated a willingness to live alongside a Jewish state.[47] He also mentions that the Nashashibi family backed King Abdullah and union with Transjordan.[48] Abdullah appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as the Governor of the Arab areas occupied by troops of the Arab League. He was a former Prime Minister of Transjordan who supported partition of Palestine as proposed by the Peel Commission and the United Nations. Fakhri Nashashibi and Ragheb Bey Nashashibi were leaders of the movement that opposed the Mufti during the mandate period. Both men accepted partition. Bey was the mayor of Jerusalem. He resigned from the Arab Higher Committee because he accepted the United Nations partition proposal. Fu’ad Nasar, the Secretary of Arab Workers Congress, also accepted partition.

Arab reaction concerning Jews

The Arabs promised to respect the rights of the Jewish minority.[49] On 20 May 1948, Azzam told reporters "We are fighting for an Arab Palestine. Whatever the outcome the Arabs will stick to their offer of equal citizenship for Jews in Arab Palestine and let them be as Jewish as they like. In areas where they predominate they will have complete autonomy."[50]

The AHC demanded that in a Palestinian Arab state, the majority of the Jews should not be citizens (those who had not lived in Palestine before the British Mandate).[qt 4] The Arab League said that some of the Jews would have to be expelled from a Palestinian Arab state.[qt 8]

A few weeks after UNSCOP released its report, Azzam Pasha, the General Secretary of the Arab League, was quoted by an Egyptian newspaper as saying "Personally I hope the Jews do not force us into this war because it will be a war of elimination and it will be a dangerous massacre which history will record similarly to the Mongol massacre or the wars of the Crusades."[40] This statement from October 1947 has often been incorrectly reported as having been made much later on 15 May 1948.[41]

Azzam Pasha told Alec Kirkbride: "We will sweep them [the Jews] into the sea" . Shukri al-Quwatli [ the Syrian president] told his people:"We shall eradicate Zionism". Haj Amin al-Husseini said in March 1948 to an interviewer in a Jaffa daily "Al Sarih" that the Arabs did not intend merely to prevent partition but "would continue fighting until the Zionists were Annihilated".[qt 9]

British reaction

When Bevin received the partition proposal, he promptly ordered for it not to be imposed on the Arabs.[51][52][qt 10] The plan was vigorously debated in the British parliament.

In a British cabinet meeting at 4 December 1947, it was decided that the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948, the complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948, and in a sop to the Arab, Britain would not enforce the UN partition plan.[53] On 11 December 1947 Britain announced the Mandate would end at midnight 14 May 1948 and its sole task would be to complete withdrawal by 1 August 1948.[54] During the period in which the British withdrawal was completed, Britain refused to share the administration of Palestine with a proposed UN transition regime, to allow the UN Palestine Commission to establish a presence in Palestine earlier than a fortnight before the end of the Mandate, to allow the creation of official Jewish and Arab militias or to assist in smoothly handing over territory or authority to any successor.[55][qt 11]

Subsequent reactions

The United States declined to recognize the All-Palestine government in Gaza by explaining that it had accepted the UN Mediator's proposal. The Mediator had recommended that Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate including Transjordan, might form a union.[56] Bernadotte's diary said the Mufti had lost credibility on account of his unrealistic predictions regarding the defeat of the Jewish militias. Bernadotte noted "It would seem as though in existing circumstances most of the Palestinian Arabs would be quite content to be incorporated in Transjordan."[57]

Subsequent events

The partition plan was never fully implemented. On May 14, 1948, the day on which the British Mandate over Palestine expired, the Jewish People's Council gathered at the Tel Aviv Museum, and approved a proclamation, declaring "the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel, to be known as the State of Israel".[58] The 1948 Arab–Israeli War began with the invasion of, or intervention in, Palestine[59] by the Arab States on 15 May 1948.

In 1988, the Palestine Liberation Organization published the Palestinian Declaration of Independence relying on Resolution 181, arguing that the resolution continues to provide international legitimacy for the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence.[60] A number of scholars have written in support of this view.[61][62][63]

A General Assembly request for an advisory opinion, Resolution ES-10/14 (2004), specifically cited resolution 181(II) as a "relevant resolution", and asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) what are the legal consequences of the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. Judge Abdul Koroma explained the majority opinion: "The Court has also held that the right of self-determination as an established and recognized right under international law applies to the territory and to the Palestinian people. Accordingly, the exercise of such right entitles the Palestinian people to a State of their own as originally envisaged in resolution 181 (II) and subsequently confirmed."[64] In response, Prof. Paul De Waart said that the Court put the legality of the 1922 League of Nations Palestine Mandate and the 1947 UN Plan of Partition beyond doubt once and for all.[65]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. 1947. Retrieved 8 December 2012.
  2. ^ "A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947". United Nations. 1947. Retrieved 11 January 2012.
  3. ^ Part II. – Boundaries recommended in UNGA Res 181 Molinaro, Enrico The Holy Places of Jerusalem in Middle East Peace Agreements Page 78
  4. ^ Article "History of Palestine", Encyclopædia Britannica (2002 edition), article section written by Walid Ahmed Khalidi and Ian J. Bickerton.
  5. ^ Itzhak Galnoor (1995). The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement. SUNY Press. pp. 289–. ISBN 978-0-7914-2193-2. Retrieved 3 July 2012.
  6. ^ a b c Mansfield, Peter (1992), The Arabs, pp. 172–175, ISBN 0-14-014768-3
  7. ^ William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization, 2006, p.391
  8. ^ Benny Morris, One state, two states:resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, 2009, p. 66
  9. ^ Partner to Partition: The Jewish Agency's Partition Plan in the Mandate Era, Yosef Kats, Chapter 4, 1998 Edition, Routledge, ISBN 0-7146-4846-9
  10. ^ Palestine. Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. November, 1938. Cmd. 5893. [1]
  11. ^ A Survey of Palestine, Table 2 showing Holdings of Large Jewish Lands Owners as of December 31st, 1945, British Mandate: A Survey of Palestine: Volume I - Page 245. Chapter VIII: Land: Section 3.
  12. ^ [The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism, By William Roger Louis , 12985, p. 407]
  13. ^ Gurock, Jeffrey S. American Jewish History American Jewish Historical Society, page 243
  14. ^ Geselbracht, Raymond H. "The United States and the Recognition of Israel: A Chronology". Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum. Retrieved 28 November 2011.
  15. ^ UNITED NATIONS: General Assembly: A/364: 3 September 1947: OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: SUPPLEMENT No. 11: UNTIED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE: REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: VOLUME 1
  16. ^ a b UN Partition Plan at Merip.
  17. ^ Enoughie, Jeorge (29 April 2011). "History of Palestine, Part III : Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe)".
  18. ^ Yearbook of The United Nations 1947–48
  19. ^ a b A/AC.14/32, dated 11 November 1947, page 41
  20. ^ a b c Barr, James (2012). A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East. London: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-1-84739-457-6.
  21. ^ a b Hansard, 11 Dec 1947
  22. ^ Servant of God: a personal narrative, Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, 1983
  23. ^ a b c Before & after: U.S. foreign policy and the 11 September crisis By Phyllis Bennis
  24. ^ Lenczowski, George (1990). American Presidents and the Middle East. Duke University Press. p. 157. ISBN 0-8223-0972-6., p. 28, cite, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs 2, p. 158.
  25. ^ Heptulla, Najma (1991). Indo-West Asian relations: the Nehru era. Allied Publishers. p. 158. ISBN 81-7023-340-2.
  26. ^ Quigley, John B. (1990). Palestine and Israel: a challenge to justice. Duke University Press. p. 37. ISBN 0-8223-1023-6.
  27. ^ Ahron Bregman; Jihan El-Tahri (1998). The fifty years war: Israel and the Arabs. Penguin Books. p. 25. Retrieved 29 November 2011.
  28. ^ U.N General Assembly ,A/PV.126,28 November 1947,discussion on the Palestinian question, retrieved 15 October 2013
  29. ^ History of the Middle East by Saul S Friedman
  30. ^ The Question of Palestine: Brochure DPI/2517/Rev.1: Chapter 2, The Plan of Partiton and end of the British Mandate
  31. ^ "PALESTINE JEWRY JOYOUS AT NEWS; Ben-Gurion Voices Attitude of Grateful Responsibility – Jerusalem Arabs Silent". New York Times. 30 November 1947. p. 58. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
  32. ^ "VOTE ON PALESTINE CHEERED BY CROWD". New York Times. 30 November 1947. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
  33. ^ a b "JEWISH UNITS HERE HAIL ACTION BY U.N." New York Times. 30 November 1947. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
  34. ^ "Weizmann message". The Palestine post. 30 May 1948. Retrieved 9 October 2013.
  35. ^ Begin, Menachem, The Revolt 1978, p. 412.
  36. ^ Begin, Menachem, In The Underground: Writings and Documents 1977,vol 4,p. 70.
  37. ^ 'Aviezer Golan and Shlomo Nakdimon, Begin, Hebrew, Jerusalem, 1978", p.172, cited in Shima Flapan, The Birth of Israel, Pantheon Books, New York, 1988' p.32
  38. ^ The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, by Simha Flapan, Pantheon, 1988, ISBN 0-679-72098-7, pages 8-9
  39. ^ 'Jamal K Kanj, Children of Catastrophe, UK 2010'
  40. ^ a b Akhbar el-Yom, 11 October 2011, p9. The literal English translation is somewhat ambiguous, but the overall meaning is that the coming Arab defeat of the Jews will be remembered in the same way as the past Arab defeats of the Mongols and Crusaders are remembered.
  41. ^ a b Tom Segev (21 October 2011). "The makings of history / The blind misleading the blind". Haaretz.
  42. ^ UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION First Special Report to the Security Council
  43. ^ a b Wolffe, John (2005). Religion in History: Conflict, Conversion and Coexistence (Paperback). Manchester University Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-7190-7107-2.
  44. ^ UNTIED NATIONS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE A/364 3 September 1947
  45. ^ Anita Shapira, Yigal Allon, Native Son: A Biography, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p.239.
  46. ^ Itzhak Galnoor, The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement, State University of New York Press, 1994, p.195.
  47. ^ Bickerton, Ian J., Klausner, Carla L. (2001) A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 4th edition, Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-13-090303-5, page 88.
  48. ^ Bickerton & Klausner (2001), page 103
  49. ^ Tom Segev. "Arabs and Jews under the British Mandate".
  50. ^ Palestine Post, 21 May 1948, p. 3.
  51. ^ Morris 2008, p. 73
  52. ^ Louis 2006, p. 419
  53. ^ ["1948 A History of the First Arab-Israeli War",2008, Benny Morris, p. 74]
  54. ^ Roza El-Eini (2006). Mandated landscape: British imperial rule in Palestine, 1929–1948. Routledge. p. 367. ISBN 978-0-7146-5426-3. They accordingly announced on 11 December 1947, that the Mandate would end on 15 May 1948, from which date the sole task ... would be to ... withdrawal by 1 August 1948. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  55. ^ Arthur Koestler (March 2007). Promise and Fulfilment – Palestine 1917–1949. READ BOOKS. pp. 163–168. ISBN 978-1-4067-4723-2. Retrieved 13 October 2011.
  56. ^ See memo from Acting Secretary Lovett to Certain Diplomatic Offices, Foreign relations of the United States, 1949. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI, pages 1447–48
  57. ^ See Folke Bernadotte, "To Jerusalem", Hodder and Stoughton, 1951, pages 112–13
  58. ^ Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel: 14 May 1948
  59. ^ Cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 15 May 1948: Retrieved 4 May 2012
  60. ^ See "Request for the admission of the State of Palestine to Unesco as a Member State", UNESCO, 12 May 1989 [2]
  61. ^ See The Palestine Declaration To The International Criminal Court: The Statehood Issue [3] and Silverburg, Sanford R. (2002), "Palestine and International Law: Essays on Politics and Economics", Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Co, ISBN 0-7864-1191-0, pages 37–54
  62. ^ See Chapter 5 "Israel (1948–1949) and Palestine (1998–1999): Two Studies in the Creation of States", in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, and Stefan Talmon, eds., The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)
  63. ^ Sourcebook on public international law, by Tim Hillier, Routledge, 1998, ISBN 1-85941-050-2, page 217; and Prof. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, “Collective Responses to the Unilateral Declarations of Independence of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, An Application of the Legitimizing Function of the United Nations”, The British Yearbook of International Law, l990, pp.l35-l53
  64. ^ See paragraph 5, Separate opinion of Judge Koroma
  65. ^ See De Waart, Paul J.I.M., "International Court of Justice Firmly Walled in the Law of Power in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace Process", Leiden Journal of International Law, 18 (2005), pp. 467–487

Quotations

  1. ^ Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 48; p. 11 "while the Zionist movement, after much agonising, accepted the principle of partition and the proposals as a basis for negotiation"; p. 49 "In the end, after bitter debate, the Congress equivocally approved –by a vote of 299 to 160 – the Peel recommendations as a basis for further negotiation."
  2. ^ a b c d Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 47. Retrieved 13 July 2013. The Jews were to get 62 percent of Palestine (most of it desert), consisting of the Negev
  3. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference morris2008p61 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  4. ^ a b c Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. pp. 50, 66, 67, 72. Retrieved 24 July 2013. p. 50,"The Arab reaction was just as predictable: "The blood will flow like rivers in the Middle East," promised Jamal Husseini.; at 1947 "Haj Amin al-Husseini went one better: he denounced also the minority report, which, in his view, legitimized the Jewish foothold in Palestine, a "partition in disguise," as he put it." ; p.66, at 1946 "The League demanded independence for Palestine as a "unitary" state, with an Arab majority and minority rights for the Jews. The AHC went one better and insisted that the proportion of Jews to Arabs in the unitary state should stand at one to six, meaning that only Jews who lived in Palestine before the British Mandate be eligible for citizenship" ; p.67, at 1947 "The League's Political Committee met in Sofar, Lebanon, on 16–19 September, and urged the Palestine Arabs to fight partition, which it called "aggression," "without mercy." The League promised them, in line with Bludan, assistance "in manpower, money and equipment" should the United Nations endorse partition." ; p. 72, at Dec 1947 "The League vowed, in very general language, "to try to stymie the partition plan and prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,"; p. 70, '"On 24 November the head of the Egyptian delegation to the General Assembly, Muhammad Hussein Heykal, said that "the lives of 1,000,000 Jews in Moslem countries would be jeopardized by the establishment of a Jewish state.; p.412 "Iraq's prime minister had warned British diplomats that if the United Nations decided on a solution to the Palestine problem that was not "satisfactory" to the Arabs, "severe measures should [would?] be taken against all Jews in Arab countries."
  5. ^ Jack Brian Bloom (2005). Out of Step: Life-story of a Politician : Politics and Religion in a World at War. Jack Bloom. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-620-35374-8. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said, declared: "We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in.
  6. ^ Cite error: The named reference morris2008p67 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  7. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference Shulewitz2000p84 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  8. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 45. Retrieved 24 July 2013. "On 23 July, at Sofar, the Arab representatives completed their testimony before UNSCOP. Faranjieh, speaking for the Arab League, said that Jews "illegally" in Palestine would be expelled and that the future of many of those "legally" in the country but without Palestine citizenship would need to be resolved "by the future Arab government " {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 74 (help)
  9. ^ Cite error: The named reference morris2008p187 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  10. ^ William Roger Louis (2006). Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. I.B.Tauris. p. 420. ISBN 978-1-84511-347-6. Retrieved 16 August 2013. To Bevin, 'partition' symbolized a bankruptcy of policy, the end of the road, and an admission of failure…. In Palestine he pursued the goal of the bi-national state with such tenacity…With a divided Palestine, Arab nationalism would continue to fester and would bring about the end of Britain's paramount position in the Middle East. In sum, Bevin's motivation must be found in areas of military power and economic resources, as well as in the idealism of the Commonwealth. Bevin believed that the answer to the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons should be sought in Europe rather than in Palestine, which he regarded as a predominantly Arab country. He found himself caught between a Jewish nationalism supercharged by the emotions of the Holocaust, and the anti-Zionism of the Arabs, without whose good will the British Empire in the Middle East would be doomed. The British could not support a Jewish state without alienating the Arabs. Nor could the British impose a settlement acceptable to the Arab countries without antagonizing the United States. The Middle East, in Bevin's view, was second in importance only to Europe; but in order for Britain to remain the dominant regional power, both Arab cooperation and the support of the United States were vital. Without them, Britain's influence would decline, and not only in the Middle East. Britain would sink to the status of a second-class European power like the Netherlands. That anxiety helps explain the emotional energy that Bevin and other British leaders expended on the regeneration of the British Empire in the Middle East and Africa
  11. ^ Benny Morris (2008). 1948: a history of the first Arab-Israeli war. Yale University Press. p. 73. Retrieved 13 July 2013. Bevin regarded the UNSCOP majority report of 1 September 1947 as unjust and immoral. He promptly decided that Britain would not attempt to im- pose it on the Arabs; indeed, he expected them to resist its implementation.…. The British cabinet went one better: in the meeting on 4 December 1947 ... It decided, in a sop to the Arabs, to refrain from aiding the enforcement of the UN resolution, meaning the partition of Palestine. And in an important secret corollary, ... it agreed that Britain would do all in its power to delay until early May the arrival in Palestine of the UN (Implementation) Commission. The Foreign Office immediately informed the commission "that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the [Mandate] Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine." ... This sealed the commission's fate and nullified any possibility of an orderly implementation of the partition resolution.

References

Bibliography

  • Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge.
  • Arieh L. Avneri (1984). The Claim of Dispossession: Jewish Land Settlement and the Arabs, 1878–1948. Transaction Publishers.
  • Fischbach, Michael R. (2003). Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Columbia University Press.
  • Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge.
  • Khalaf, Issa (1991). Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration,. University at Albany, SUNY.
  • Louis, Wm. Roger (1986). The British Empire in the Middle East,: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford University Press.
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  • Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood.
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