Dieppe Raid

Dieppe Raid
Part of World War II
Dieppe's chert beach and cliff immediately following the raid on 19 August 1942. A Lynx Scout Car has been abandoned.
Date 19 August 1942 Location Dieppe, France Result German victory
Belligerents
Canada United Kingdom United States	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Louis Mountbatten J. H. Roberts E.V. Loustalot†	Gerd von Rundstedt
Strength
6,086	1,500
Casualties and losses
Canada: 950 dead, 2,340 captured or wounded; United Kingdom: 600; United States:4+;	311 dead, 280 wounded

The Dieppe Raid, also known as The Battle of Dieppe or Operation Jubilee, during World War II, was an Allied attack on the German-occupied port of Dieppe, Seine-Maritime on the Northern coast of France on August 19, 1942. Over 6,000 infantrymen, predominantly Canadian, were supported by large British naval and Allied air force contingents. The objective was to seize and hold a major port for a short period, both to prove it was possible and to gather intelligence from prisoners and captured materials while assessing the German responses. The raid was also intended to use air power to draw the Luftwaffe into a large, planned encounter.

No major objectives of the raid were accomplished. 3,623 of the 6,086 men who made it ashore were either killed, wounded, or captured. The Allied air forces failed to lure the Luftwaffe into open battle, and lost 119 planes, while the Royal Navy suffered 555 casualties. The catastrophe at Dieppe may have later influenced Allied preparations for Operation Torch and Operation Overlord.

Plan

The origins of the raid were unusual. Various raids had been planned, but the Dieppe raid was brought into reality only by the desires of the new Chief of Combined Operations, Louis Mountbatten. One of Mountbatten's principal assistants, Captain John Hughes-Hallett, served as Naval Commander of the raid. The actual raid was undertaken without the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and many elements in the planning suffered from the unofficial nature of the raid.

The previous Chief of Combined Operations, Roger Keyes, who had commanded the famous raid on Zeebrugge in 1918, had been ordered to organise raids on occupied Europe. He was replaced by Mountbatten in 1941, through the direct intervention of Winston Churchill, and a number of raids took place – notably on Vaagso, Bruneval, and the larger attack on St Nazaire. Detractors of Mountbatten have contended that all the raids prior to Dieppe were originated under the leadership of Keyes.

Operation Rutter

The 1942 raid on Dieppe was initially planned for July and code-named Operation Rutter. The aims were straightforward: to seize and hold a major port for a short period, to test the possibility of gathering intelligence from prisoners and captured materials, and to examine the German reaction. The nature of combined operations would also allow the Air Force to draw the Luftwaffe into a large, planned encounter and the use of Canadian troops would, it was hoped, satisfy the Canadian commanders following the long inactivity of Canadian forces in England. Churchill grew more supportive as the defeats in northern Africa incited a wave of press and parliamentary criticism.

Operation Rutter was approved in May 1942. It consisted of a main attack onto the Dieppe town beach, two flanking attacks by paratroops, a thousand sorties by Allied air forces and a naval bombardment. The Canadian 2nd Division would lead the attack, elements advancing as far as Arques. The operation was scaled down, especially the RAF bombing support as destruction of the town was not desired, but the troops boarded their ships on 5 July. In an ominous occurrence foreshadowing future events, on the eve of Rutter's departure, which coincided with the final day of favourable maritime conditions forecast, German bombers swept through and attacked the 250 strong allied flotilla moored off the south coast of England. In addition to causing the abortion of operation Rutter, it also illustrated to the Allied command how difficult maintaining the element of surprise would be in carrying out such an invasion.

Operation Jubilee

Almost all concerned believed that a raid on Dieppe was now out of the question; however, though Montgomery wanted it cancelled indefinitely, Mountbatten did not. He began reorganising the raid from 11 July as Operation Jubilee. Despite not receiving Combined Chiefs of Staff authorisation, Mountbatten instructed his staff to proceed in late July. This lack of top-level go-ahead resulted in certain dislocations in the planning. For example, the failure to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Inter-Service Security Board meant none of the intelligence agencies were involved, consequently the operation was mounted on information that was months out of date.

Order of battle

Main article: Operation Jubilee order of battle

Operation Jubilee still relied on the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division under Major General J. H. Roberts to attack Dieppe, Puys and Pourville, while the paratroop assault on the flank gun batteries was replaced by an amphibious assault by Commandos. Ground support was provided by thirty of the new Churchill tanks, delivered using the new LCTs.

Dieppe and the flanking cliffs were relatively weakly defended. The 571st Regiment was still under strength, with a total of 1,500 men. They were deployed thinly along the beaches of Dieppe and the neighboring towns, covering all the likely landing places. In respect of machine guns, mortars and artillery it was adequately protected with a concentration on the main approach, (particularly in the myriad of cliff caves), and with a reserve at the rear. They were stationed not only in the towns themselves, but also between the towns in open areas and highlands that overlook the beaches. A garrison of only 150 men, for example, defended the beaches at Dieppe, while a smaller garrison of 50 men defended the beaches at Puys. Lacking in terms of infantry capacity, the Germans would focus on setting up extensive defence perimeters throughout the area. Elements of the 571st defended the radar station near Pourville and the battery over the Scie at Varengeville. To the west the 570th Infantry Regiment were deployed near the battery at Berneval.

Air Forces

The massive Allied air support for the operation amounted to about 70 squadrons, with the overwhelming majority coming from RAF Fighter Command, including 48 squadrons of Spitfires including all three Eagle Squadrons.[1] The opposing Luftwaffe forces were: Jagdgeschwader 2 (JG2) and JG 26, comprised of 200 fighters, mostly the new Focke-Wulf 190s and about 100 bombers from Kampfgeschwader 2 (KG2), KG 45 and KG 77, mostly Dornier 217s. On paper at least, the Allies would have a numerical advantage. The Allies were, in reverse to the Battle of Britain, at the extent of the operating range of most fighters and had a limited time over target, while the Germans were mostly flying from or could refuel at nearby airfields. This enabled the Germans to maintain a numerical superiority and have air superiority over the battle area once they had concentrated their effort.

Attack

Almost 252 ships left various ports on the night of 18 August and as they approached the French coast early on the 19th, things began to go wrong.

Left Flank, Yellow Beaches: No. 3 Commando

The mission of Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater's No. 3 Commando was to neutralise a German coastal battery (code named GOEBBELS), near Berneval, which could engage the landing at Dieppe some 6 km to the west. The three 170 mm and four 105 mm of 2/770 Batterie had to be out of action by the time the main force approached the main beach.

The craft carrying No. 3 Commando, No. 5 Group, approaching the coast to the east were not warned of the approach of a German coastal convoy that had been located by British CHAIN HOME radar stations at 2130 hours. German S-boats escorting a German tanker torpedoed some of the landing craft and disabled the escorting gun boat. The Group was dispersed, with some losses, and the enemy's coastal defences were alerted. Only a handful of commandos under the Second in Command, Major Peter Young, landed and scaled the barbed wire laced cliffs. Eventually 18 Commandos reached the perimeter of the GOEBBLES Battery via Bernevall and engaged their target with small arms fire. Unable to destroy the guns, their sniping of the German gun crews, however, prevent the guns from firing effectively on the main assault. Thus, just a handful of determined British soldiers neutralised the most dangerous German coastal battery in the area of the raid for the most critical period of the operation.

Right Flank, Orange Beaches: No. 4 Commando

No. 4 Commando landed in force and destroyed their targets, providing the only success of the operation. Most of No. 4 safely returned to England. This portion of the raid was considered a model for future commando raids. Lord Lovat became famous as an officer here on Orange Beach.

Canadian main assault

Bodies of Canadian soldiers lying among damaged landing craft and 'Churchill' tanks of the Calgary Regiment following Operation 'Jubilee'
Credit: Library and Archives Canada / C-014160

The Canadians in the centre suffered greatly, at least in part due to the inexperience of Roberts, who unwisely committed the reserve force to the main beaches. Poor small unit leadership has also been blamed for failures once men went ashore.

The landing at Puys by the Royal Regiment of Canada was delayed and the potential advantages of surprise and darkness were lost. The well-placed German forces held the Canadians that did land on the beach with little difficulty. 225 men were killed, 264 surrendered and 33 made it back to England. The beach was defended by just 60 Germans, who at no time felt the need to reinforce their position. Several platoons of the Black Watch were also employed at Blue Beach; some of their casualties were suffered in a grenade-priming accident on the transport ships during the channel crossing.

On the other side of the town at Pourville the South Saskatchewan Regiment and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada made it ashore with few losses. The Saskatchewan advance on Dieppe was soon halted while the Camerons were halted just short of their objective. Both regiments suffered more as they withdrew; the bravery of the landing craft crew allowed 341 men to embark but increasing pressure meant that the rest were left to surrender. Another 141 had died.

The main attack was at three points: the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment (Calgary Tanks) in the middle with The Essex Scottish Regiment to the east and The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry to the west. Attacking thirty minutes after the flanking assaults and onto a steep pebble beach all the groups were met with intense fire. The eastern assault was held at the beach. By the end of the raid, The Essex Scottish Regiment had suffered 121 fatal casualties, with many others wounded and captured. The western assault gained a hold in a shore-front casino but few soldiers made it across the road and they were soon held. The tanks arrived a little late to discover their landing point was difficult. Twenty-nine of 58 tanks disembarked, 2 "drowned" in deep water, 27 made it ashore but only 15 managed to climb the chert pebles of the beach and cross both the anti-tank ditch that the Germans were still digging, and the sea-wall onto the esplanade under fire from pill boxes and flanking cliff top positions. However, they were completely stopped by anti-tank walls blocking exits from the Esplanade, were immobilized, or later returned to the beach to cover the withdrawal. The engineers whose job it was to clear such obstacles were unable to do so because of heavy fire which the tanks could not suppress. Back on the beach, the tanks provided fire support, as best they could, and covered the withdrawal.

The supporting naval bombardment was supplied by six Hunt Class destroyers, which did not have an appropriate coastal bombardment round, lacked sufficient weight of broadside and range to destroy the German strongpoints without themselves coming under heavy fire. They were also not able to communicate directly with those on the shore to make their bombardment effective.

The debacle was compounded when, acting on fragmentary messages, the reserve were committed to the Dieppe beach at around 07.00. The 584 men of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal took fire all the way to the beach and on it. Only 125 made it back to England. The other part of the reserve comprised 369 men of A Commando (later 40 Commando Royal Marines) were General Robert's reserve and, in their first action, were ordered to White Beach to support 'if possible'. The first of their craft landed under withering machine gun fire and their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Tiger" Phillips, put on white gloves to semaphore order his landing craft to withdraw. He was hit and killed in the process. All but one saw the signal and withdrew, though several craft were already hit. None of the Commandos who landed got more than a matter of yards up the beach.

At 1050 hours a general order to retreat was issued.

Aftermath

Heavy losses

Casualty figures vary: according to one source, of 6,090 men, 1,027 were killed and 2,340 captured. The Official History of the Canadian Army: Six Years of War (Vol 1 2nd ed) gives the figures of 907 Canadians being killed, including while in captivity. Some 2,210 Canadians of 4,963 that were sent made it back to England (it must be noted that nearly 1,000 of these never landed). The total number of fatal and non-fatal casualties, some of whom were evacuated off the beach, is given as 3,367. Overhead the Allied air forces lost 119 aircraft while the Luftwaffe lost just 46. As well, only 11 of the 60 tanks that were sent made it back. The German losses amounted to 311 killed and wounded missing soldiers.

POW policies

It transpired that a senior Canadian officer, Brigadier William Southam, had brought ashore his copy of the assault plan, which was a secret document. Though he attempted to bury it under the pebbles at the time of the surrender, Southam's action was spotted and the plan retrieved by the Germans. The plan (later criticised for its size and needless complexity) contained orders to shackle prisoners. In addition there were reports of German POWs’ bodies washing ashore with their hands tied. When this was brought to Hitler's attention he ordered the shackling of Canadian prisoners, which led to a reciprocating order by Churchill for German prisoners in Canada. Both orders quickly lost momentum in prison camps until being abandoned after intercession by the Swiss. It is however, believed to have contributed to Hitler's decision to issue his Commando Order later that year.

Second front

There have been various attempts to re-evaluate the raid against larger objectives. Picknet, Prince & Prior ("Friendly Fire" 2005) describe the raid's origins arising from fundamental disagreements between the Allies over strategy. Russia was demanding a second front be opened immediately, to relieve the pressure on them of German attack. They suspected the West of being quite happy to see the Communists and Nazis destroy each other. Roosevelt in reality was eager to accommodate Stalin, and also motivated by domestic politics. Left-wingers were following the Soviet line, former anti-war Isolationists were asking pointedly why Japan was not to be dealt with first, and the Press were impatient for action either way. Without consulting his other ally he therefore promised to Molotov during meetings in Washington May/June 1942, that he was prepared to hazard up to 120,000 men that year to help relieve pressure on the Russian front (knowing well that they could not and would not be American forces, still organizing and building up).

Churchill was aghast. While he fully appreciated the need to keep Russia in the war and America focused on the European theatre, and therefore saw the political logic for a show of force, understandably he balked at a full-scale strategic commitment uncertain of success. One Gallipoli in a lifetime was quite enough (a WWI debacle in which Churchill had himself played a role). Playing for time, he agreed to countersign their Washington Communique promising a second front in 1942, on the understanding it was to be "misinformation". The raid became the British response to this American and Russian fait accompli, a counterpart, unasked for "compromise". No evidence has ever come to light to support the dark rumours the operation was deliberately sabotaged. Nevertheless its failure had a desirable effect for the British on American overconfidence. One example of this retrospective justification was the presence by 1943 of 33 divisions on the Atlantic Wall.

Lessons learned

Some have argued that the hard lessons learned at Dieppe in 1942 were put to good use later in the war. The amphibious assaults at North Africa were only three months away. The more successful Normandy landings would occur later in 1944. Others still maintain amphibious assaults had already been developed in a modern sense as early as Gallipoli, and the lessons allegedly learned at Dieppe would have been made in subsequent operations such as the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) or the landings at Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE) and Anzio (Operation SHINGLE).

Regardless, due to experience at Dieppe, the British developed a whole range of specialist armoured vehicles to allow their engineers to perform many if not all of their tasks under armour. These vehicles were used to great effect in the British and Canadian landing in Normandy in 1944. There were also huge improvements made in shore-to-sea communications, and many more and bigger ships available for ship-to-shore bombardment support.

Debate over German foreknowledge

First hand accounts and memoirs of many Canadian veterans who documented their experiences on the shores of Dieppe remark about the preparedness of the German defenses as if they knew of the raid ahead of time. Commanding officer Lt. Labatt testified to having seen markers on the beach used for mortar practice, which appeared to have recently been placed. Furthermore, upon touching down on the Dieppe shore, the landing ships were immediately shelled with the utmost precision as troops began exiting. The recent target practice and subsequent precision shelling is indicative of a well prepared army. Although official historian C. P. Stacey discounts that mortar targets alluded to foreknowledge, Labatt's personal experience on the shores of Dieppe and testimony is one of many that hint that the Germans were expecting an attack. In another instance Major C. E. Page, while interrogating a German soldier, found out that 4 machine gun battalions were brought in specifically in anticipation of a raid. However, the most compelling information supporting German foreknowledge resides with the numerous accounts of interrogated German prisoners, German captors, and French citizens who all conveyed to Canadians that the Germans had been preparing for the anticipated allied landings for weeks. Clearly the German Army was ready for an assault at its peak strength in 1942, mainly because of the high level of training for German soldiers, and the large number of German military personnel still available for the defense of France during the summer of 1942. Either way, one conclusion the Western Allied leaders, American and UK, agreed on was waiting two more long years to let Germany bleed out mainly in the Soviet Union, as well as from British and American air attacks, and in North Africa and Italy before trying an invasion of Western Europe again.

Other forces involved

• 50 US Rangers went ashore at various locations in order to gain battle experience, suffering the first American land casualties of the war in Europe.
• 20 men of No. 3 Troop No. 10 (inter-allied) Commando participated in the raid. The various troops of No. 10 (inter-allied) Commando were generally known by their country of origin, be it Free French (No. 1 Troop), Dutch (No. 2 Troop), Belgian (No. 4 Troop), Norwegian (No. 5 Troop), Polish (No. 6 Troop), or Yugoslavian (No. 7 Troop). No. 3 was also known as X-Troop because it was composed of German speaking Jewish refugees from the continent. It was not until long after the war the origin of the men in this troop was made known.
• During the raid, a mortar platoon from the Calgary Highlanders commanded by Lt. FJ Reynolds was attached to the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade but stayed offshore. Sergeants Lyster and Pittaway were decorated with a Mention in Despatches for their part in shooting down two German aircraft, and one officer of the regiment was killed while ashore with a brigade headquarters.
• Seven Free-French ships was part of the naval component.
• There were at least 69 RAF squadrons committed. This included British (46), Canadian (9), Polish (7), Czech (2), Norwegian (2), Belgian (1), French (1), and New Zealand (1) squadrons. B-17s of 340th, 341st, 342nd, and 414th squadrons of the USAAF 97th Bombardment Group were also tasked.
• Foreign Ministry translator Paul Schmidt was tasked with the questioning of the captured Allied soldiers.

Later Events

• Three Victoria Crosses were awarded for the operation, one British (Patrick Anthony Porteous, Royal Artillery) and two Canadian (The Revd John Weir Foote padre to Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, and Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt O/C the South Saskatchewan Regiment ).
• The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division liberated Dieppe and held a victory parade shortly afterwards, in the first week of September 1944. The German garrison had fled as the division approached.
• Major General J.H. "Ham" Roberts, the commander of the 2nd Division, was not relieved right after Dieppe, and in fact commanded the division for several more months. In early 1943 he was transferred to command of reinforcement units in the United Kingdom. While some, including Roberts himself, feel he was made a scapegoat for Dieppe, historian Jack Granatstein in his book The Generals insists Roberts was simply not up to commanding a division and the cause of his dismissal was failure to perform adequately on Exercise SPARTAN, well after Dieppe. Roberts had served in the First World War as an artillery officer, and won the Military Cross in the summer of 1940 as a lieutenant colonel for saving the guns of his regiment (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery) from abandonment in France during the evacuation of the Second BEF.
• Air losses consisted of 64 Spitfires (including 6 USAAF aircraft), 20 Hurricane fighter bombers, 6 Boston bombers and 10 Mustang Mk1 Army Co-operation aircraft (for 62 Killed, 30 wounded, 17 POW). Lufwaffe losses were 23 FW-190 fighters, and 25 Dornier Do-217.
• Screen and theater actor Gerald MacIntosh Johnston was captured during the raid and later died in a German POW camp.

See also

• Operation Jubilee Order of Battle
• Atlantic Wall
• Battle of Normandy
• Dieppe, New Brunswick, a Canadian city named in honour of the fallen at Dieppe

Films

Dieppe, Television docudrama, 1993. Critical of Mountbatten and another planner, General Montgomery, and based on Brian Loring-Villa's book, "Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid." Discussion of the film and the raid here. The film is an accurate portrayal of life for the common soldier of the Canadian Army in England. A low budget means only the attack on Blue Beach is depicted; however, the focus of the film is divided between the grand strategic aims of the high command, the operational aims of the division staff, and the personal lives of the soldiers.

Dieppe: Don't call it a failure Documentary. Rebuttal to the above. Film manuscript

Dieppe, Bell Canada television commercial (?2003) depicts a modern-day Canadian traveller calling his grandfather at home in Canada from France. When the grandfather inquires about Paris, the traveller reports that he is actually in Dieppe, and called to offer his thanks.

Popular culture

The song "Nautical Disaster" by the Canadian rock band The Tragically Hip from their 1994 album Day for Night uses what is believed to be imagery of the Dieppe raid as a metaphor for a difficult or failing relationship between the singer and his counterpart, a woman named Susan. Singer Gordon Downie describes a dream about a battle "off the coast of France." Details which bear resemblance to the Dieppe raid are the location, the casualty count, and the description of a panicked evacuation. There were however, noticeable errors in the song. The lyrics also claim that 4,000 men died in the water, while in truth, there were a little over 1,000 troops killed. Secondly, the singer points it out in the lyrics as an afternoon, this is wrong since the raid took place in the morning.

The song "Dieppe", by French-Canadian folk-rock band Vilain Pingouin (appearing on their 1990 eponymous album) speaks indirectly of the sacrifice of war and the proud, combative and fatally stubborn French-Canadian attitude of the time, as well as the disagreement between the Allied forces command. The lyrics of longest song on the album (4:36), "Dieppe", are in French, and never include any direct name references. Only concepts are explored. The lyrics are written by singer Rudy Caya.

References

• Robertson, Terrence (1967). The Shame and the Glory. Toronto: McLelland & Stewart. ISBN 0-7710-7542-1.
• Villa, Brian L. (1991). Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-540804-7.
• Whitaker, Denis and Shelagh (1993). Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph. Whitby, Ontario: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Trade. ISBN 0-07-551641-1.

Further reading

• Saunders, Tim (2005). Dieppe Operation Jubilee. Barnsley S Yorkshire: Pen & Sword - Battleground Europe. ISBN 1 84415 245 6. A full accountof the fighting in and around Dieppe with battlefield tour details. Useful maps, photos and charts.
• Ford, Ken (2003). Dieppe 1942, Prelude to D-Day. London: Osprey Publishing (Campaign Series #127). Primer, with good 3-dimensional artwork of the battle area.
• Hugh, Henry (1993). Dieppe Through the Lens of the German War Photographer. London: After the Battle. pp. 64pp. ISBN 0-900-91376-2.[2] covers the actions of each one of the 29 tanks disembarked on the raid with photos, oral history, and primary sources.
• Leasor, James (1976). Green Beach. London: Corgi Books. Covers the actions of an RAF radar expert, Jack Nissen, assigned to capture German radar equipment, and the men assigned to guard him - and kill him if it seemed he might fall into enemy hands.
• Mordal, Jacques (1963). Dieppe: The Dawn of Decision. London: Souvenir Press. pp. 288pp. ISBN 0-450-05004-1. Decent, but not detailed, overview of the planning, mounting and execution of the Raid.
• Neillands, Robin (2005). The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Mission. London: Aurum Press. ISBN 1-84513-116-9. An overview by a British Historian
• Reynolds, Quentin (1943). Dress Rehearsal: The Story of Dieppe. Blue Ribbon Books, Random House Inc. Story of the Dieppe Raid by a journalist; obviously written under wartime constraints. Author admits it is not a "profound dissertation".
• Stacey, Colonel C.P. (1942). Canadian Military Preliminary Report (PDF). Canadian Military Headquarters. Report No.83.

External links

• Canadians and Dieppe - Photos, Video, Information and more
• Juno Beach Centre - The Dieppe Raid
• World War II Online Newspaper Archives - Dieppe Raid, 19 August 1942
• Tribute to Sgt's Bill Lyster and Bert Pittaway, Calgary Highlanders
• Calgary Highlanders at the Dieppe Raid, incl. Eswyn Lyster's, "Bloody Miracle", based on Sgt's Bill Lyster and Bert Pittaway's account of the day
• Raid on Dieppe
• CBC Digital Archives - The Contentious Legacy of Dieppe