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Revision as of 17:23, 15 May 2010
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A tax haven is a country or territory where certain taxes are levied at a low rate or not at all.
Individuals and/or corporate entities can find it attractive to move themselves to areas with reduced or nil taxation levels. This creates a situation of tax competition among governments. Different jurisdictions tend to be havens for different types of taxes, and for different categories of people and/or companies.
There are several definitions of tax havens. The Economist has tentatively adopted the description by Geoffrey Colin Powell (former economic adviser to Jersey): "What ... identifies an area as a tax haven is the existence of a composite tax structure established deliberately to take advantage of, and exploit, a worldwide demand for opportunities to engage in tax avoidance." The Economist points out that this definition would still exclude a number of jurisdictions traditionally thought of as tax havens.[1] Similarly, others have suggested that any country which modifies its tax laws to attract foreign capital could be considered a tax haven.[2] According to other definitions,[3] the central feature of a haven is that its laws and other measures can be used to evade or avoid the tax laws or regulations of other jurisdictions.
In its December 2008 report on the use of tax havens by American corporations,[4] the U.S. Government Accountability Office was unable to find a satisfactory definition of a tax haven but regarded the following characteristics as indicative of a tax haven:
- nil or nominal taxes;
- lack of effective exchange of tax information with foreign tax authorities;
- lack of transparency in the operation of legislative, legal or administrative provisions;
- no requirement for a substantive local presence; and
- self-promotion as an offshore financial center.
History
The use of differing tax laws between two or more countries to try to mitigate tax liability is probably as old as taxation itself. In Ancient Greece, some of the Greek Islands were used as depositories by the sea traders of the era to place their foreign goods to thus avoid the two-percent tax imposed by the city-state of Athens on imported goods. It is sometimes suggested that the practice first reached prominence through the avoidance of the Cinque ports and later the staple ports in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries respectively. In 1721, American colonies traded from Latin America to avoid British taxes.
Various countries claim to be the oldest tax haven in the world. For example, the Channel Islands claim their tax independence dating as far back as Norman Conquest, while the Isle of Man claims to trace its fiscal independence to even earlier times. Nonetheless, the modern concept of a tax haven is generally accepted to have emerged at an uncertain point in the immediate aftermath of World War I.[5] Bermuda sometimes optimistically claims to have been the first tax haven based upon the creation of the first offshore companies legislation in 1935 by the newly created law firm of Conyers Dill & Pearman.[6] However, the Bermudian claim is debatable when compared against the enactment of a Trust Law by Liechtenstein in 1926 to attract offshore capital.[7]
Most economic commentators suggest that the first "true" tax haven was Switzerland, followed closely by Liechtenstein.[8] Swiss banks had long been a capital haven for people fleeing social upheaval in Russia, Germany, South America and elsewhere. However, in the early part of the twentieth century, in the years immediately following World War I, many European governments raised taxes sharply to help pay for reconstruction efforts following the devastation of World War I. By and large, Switzerland, having remained neutral during the Great War, avoided these additional infrastructure costs and was consequently able to maintain a low level of taxes. As a result, there was a considerable influx of capital into the country for tax related reasons. It is difficult, nonetheless, to pinpoint a single event or precise date which clearly identifies the emergence of the modern tax haven.
Until the 1950s, tax havens were used to avoid personal taxation[citation needed] but since then jurisdictions have come to focus on attracting companies with low or no corporate tax. Centres which focus on providing financial services to corporations rather than private wealth management are more often knows as offshore financial centres.
This strategy generally relied on double taxation treaties between large jurisdictions and the tax haven, allowing corporations to structure group ownership through the smaller jurisdiction to reduce tax liability. Although some of these double tax treaties survive,[9] in the 1970s, most major countries began repealing their double taxation treaties with micro-states to prevent corporate tax leakage in this manner.
In the early to mid-1980s, most tax havens changed the focus of their legislation to create corporate vehicles which were "ring-fenced" and exempt from local taxation (although they usually could not trade locally either). These vehicles were usually called "exempt companies" or "International Business Corporations". However, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the OECD began a series of initiatives aimed at tax havens to curb the abuse of what the OECD referred to as "unfair tax competition". Under pressure from the OECD, most major tax havens repealed their laws permitting these ring-fenced vehicles to be incorporated, but concurrently they amended their tax laws so that a company which did not actually trade within the jurisdiction would not accrue any local tax liability.[10][failed verification]
Money and exchange control
Most tax havens have a double monetary control system which distinguish residents from non-resident as well as foreign currency from the domestic one. In general, residents are subject to monetary controls but not non-residents. A company, belonging to a non-resident, when trading overseas is seen as non-resident in terms of exchange control.
It is possible for a foreigner to create a company in a tax haven to trade internationally; the company’s operations will not be subject to exchange controls as long as it uses foreign currency to trade outside the tax haven.
Tax havens usually have currency easily convertible or linked to an easily convertible currency. Most are convertible to US dollars, euros or to pounds sterling.
Methodology
At the risk of gross oversimplification, it can be said that the advantages of tax havens are viewed in four principal contexts:[11]
- Personal residency. Since the early 20th century, wealthy individuals from high-tax jurisdictions have sought to relocate themselves in low-tax jurisdictions. In most countries in the world, residence is the primary basis of taxation – see Tax residence. In some cases the low-tax jurisdictions levy no, or only very low, income tax. But almost no tax haven assesses any kind of capital gains tax, or inheritance tax. Individuals who are unable to return to a high-tax country in which they used to reside for more than a few days a year are sometimes referred to as tax exiles.
- Asset holding. Asset holding involves utilizing a trust or a company, or a trust owning a company. The company or trust will be formed in one tax haven, and will usually be administered and resident in another. The function is to hold assets, which may consist of a portfolio of investments under management, trading companies or groups, physical assets such as real estate or valuable chattels. The essence of such arrangements is that by changing the ownership of the assets into an entity which is not resident in the high-tax jurisdiction, they cease to be taxable in that jurisdiction. Often the mechanism is employed to avoid a specific tax. For example, a wealthy testator could transfer his house into an offshore company; he can then settle the shares of the company on trust (with himself being a trustee with another trustee, whilst holding the beneficial life estate) for himself for life, and then to his daughter. On his death, the shares will automatically vest in the daughter, who thereby acquires the house, without the house having to go through probate and being assessed with inheritance tax.[12] (Most countries assess inheritance tax (and all other taxes) on real estate within their jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the owner, so this would not work with a house in most countries. It is more likely to be done with intangible assets.)
- Trading and other business activity. Many businesses which do not require a specific geographical location or extensive labor are set up in tax havens, to minimize tax exposure. Perhaps the best illustration of this is the number of reinsurance companies which have migrated to Bermuda over the years. Other examples include internet based services and group finance companies. In the 1970s and 1980s corporate groups were known to form offshore entities for the purposes of "reinvoicing". These reinvoicing companies simply made a margin without performing any economic function, but as the margin arose in a tax free jurisdiction, it allowed the group to "skim" profits from the high-tax jurisdiction. Most sophisticated tax codes now prevent transfer pricing scams of this nature.
- Financial intermediaries. Much of the economic activity in tax havens today consists of professional financial services such as mutual funds, banking, life insurance and pensions. Generally the funds are deposited with the intermediary in the low-tax jurisdiction, and the intermediary then on-lends or invests the money (often back into a high-tax jurisdiction). Although such systems do not normally avoid tax in the principal customer's jurisdiction, it enables financial service providers to provide multi-jurisdictional products without adding an additional layer of taxation. This has proved particularly successful in the area of offshore funds.[13]
The OECD and tax havens
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) identifies three key factors in considering whether a jurisdiction is a tax haven:[14]
- Nil or only nominal taxes. Tax havens impose nil or only nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances) and offer themselves, or are perceived to offer themselves, as a place to be used by non-residents to escape high taxes in their country of residence.
- Protection of personal financial information. Tax havens typically have laws or administrative practices under which businesses and individuals can benefit from strict rules and other protections against scrutiny by foreign tax authorities. This prevents the transmittance of information about taxpayers who are benefiting from the low tax jurisdiction.
- Lack of transparency. A lack of transparency in the operation of the legislative, legal or administrative provisions is another factor used to identify tax havens. The OECD is concerned that laws should be applied openly and consistently, and that information needed by foreign tax authorities to determine a taxpayer’s situation is available. Lack of transparency in one country can make it difficult, if not impossible, for other tax authorities to apply their laws effectively. ‘Secret rulings’, negotiated tax rates, or other practices that fail to apply the law openly and consistently are examples of a lack of transparency. Limited regulatory supervision or a government’s lack of legal access to financial records are contributing factors.
However the OECD found that its definition caught certain aspects of its members' tax systems (some countries have low or zero taxes for certain favored groups). Its later work has therefore focused on the single aspect of information exchange. This is generally thought to be an inadequate definition of a tax haven, but is politically expedient because it includes the small tax havens (with little power in the international political arena) but exempts the powerful countries with tax haven aspects such as the USA and UK.[15]
In deciding whether or not a jurisdiction is a tax haven, the first factor to look at is whether there are no or nominal taxes. If this is the case, the other two factors – whether or not there is an exchange of information and transparency – must be analyzed. Having no or nominal taxes is not sufficient, by itself, to characterize a jurisdiction as a tax haven. The OECD recognizes that every jurisdiction has a right to determine whether to impose direct taxes and, if so, to determine the appropriate tax rate.
Anti-avoidance
To avoid tax competition, many high tax jurisdictions have enacted legislation to counter the tax sheltering potential of tax havens. Generally, such legislation tends to operate in one of five ways:
- attributing the income and gains of the company or trust in the tax haven to a taxpayer in the high-tax jurisdiction on an arising basis. Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation is an example of this.
- transfer pricing rules, standardization of which has been greatly helped by the promulgation of OECD guidelines.
- restrictions on deductibility, or imposition of a withholding tax when payments are made to offshore recipients.
- taxation of receipts from the entity in the tax haven, sometimes enhanced by notional interest to reflect the element of deferred payment. The EU withholding tax is probably the best example of this.
- exit charges, or taxing of unrealized capital gains when an individual, trust or company emigrates.
However, many jurisdictions employ blunter rules. For example, in France securities regulations are such that it is not possible to have a public bond issue through a company incorporated in a tax haven.[16]
Also becoming increasingly popular is "forced disclosure" of tax mitigation schemes. Broadly, these involve the revenue authorities compelling tax advisors to reveal details of the scheme, so that the loopholes can be closed during the following tax year, usually by one of the five methods indicated above.[17] Although not specifically aimed at tax havens, given that so many tax mitigation schemes involve the use of offshore structures, the effect is much the same.
The United States has entered into Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEA) with a number of tax havens.[18]
Incentives
There are several reasons for a nation to become a tax haven. Some nations may find they do not need to charge as much as some industrialized countries in order for them to be earning sufficient income for their annual budgets. Some may offer a lower tax rate to larger corporations, in exchange for the companies locating a division of their parent company in the host country and employing some of the local population. Other domiciles find this is a way to encourage conglomerates from industrialized nations to transfer needed skills to the local population. Still yet, some countries simply find it costly to compete in many other sectors with industrialized nations and have found a low tax rate mixed with a little self-promotion can go a long way to attracting foreign companies.
Many industrialized countries claim that tax havens act unfairly by reducing tax revenue which would otherwise be theirs. Various pressure groups also claim that money launderers also use tax havens extensively,[19] although extensive financial and KYC regulations in tax havens can actually make money laundering more difficult than in large onshore financial centers with significantly higher volumes of transactions, such as New York City or London.[20] In 2000 the Financial Action Task Force published what came to be known as the "FATF Blacklist" of countries which were perceived to be uncooperative in relation to money laundering; although several tax havens have appeared on the list from time to time (including key jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, Bahamas and Liechtenstein), no offshore jurisdictions appear on the list at this time.
A very interesting incentive was Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise agreeing to sell more than 600 of their building stock to a firm in a tax haven. The sell-off, was made to Bermuda based Mapeley Steps Ltd in 2001: http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/default.asp?Page=9&PUBid=210&ISS=13230&SID=488943
Examples
The U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research has suggested that roughly 15% of countries in the world are tax havens, that these countries tend to be small and affluent, and that better governed and regulated countries are more likely to become tax havens, and are more likely to be successful if they become tax havens.[21]
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Some tax havens including some of the ones listed above do charge income tax as well as other taxes such as capital gains, inheritance tax, and so forth. Criteria distinguishing a taxpayer from a non-taxpayer can include citizenship and residency and source of income.
Former tax havens
- Beirut formerly had a reputation as the only tax haven in the Middle East. However, this changed after the Intra Bank crash of 1966,[35] and the subsequent political and military deterioration of Lebanon dissuaded foreign use as a tax haven.
- Liberia had a prosperous ship registration industry. The series of violent and bloody civil wars in the 1990s and early 2000s severely damaged confidence in the jurisdiction. The fact that the ship registration business still continues is partly a testament to its early success, and partly a testament to moving the national Shipping Registry to New York City.
- Tangier had a brief but colorful existence as a tax haven in the period between the end of effective control by the Spanish in 1945 until it was formally reunited with Morocco in 1956.
- A number of Pacific based tax havens have ceased to operate as tax havens in response to OECD demands for better regulation and transparency in the late 1990s.
Extent
While incomplete, and with the limitations discussed below, the available statistics nonetheless indicate that offshore banking is a very sizeable activity. IMF calculations based on BIS data suggest that for selected OFCs (Offshore Financial Centres), on balance sheet OFC cross-border assets reached a level of US$4.6 trillion at end-June 1999 (about 50 percent of total cross-border assets), of which US$0.9 trillion in the Caribbean, US$1 trillion in Asia, and most of the remaining US$2.7 trillion accounted for by the IFCs (International Financial Centers), namely London, the U.S. IBFs, and the JOM (Japanese Offshore Market).[36]
A 2006 academic paper indicated that: "in 1999, 59% of U.S. firms with significant foreign operations had affiliates in tax haven countries",[37] although they did not define "significant" for this purpose.
A January 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report said that the GAO had determined that 83 of the 100 largest U.S. publicly traded corporations and 63 of the 100 largest contractors for the U.S. federal government were maintaining subsidiaries in countries generally considered havens for avoiding taxes. The GAO did not review the companies' transactions to independently verify that the subsidiaries helped the companies reduce their tax burden, but said only that historically the purpose of such subsidiaries is to cut tax costs.[38]
Lost tax revenue
Tax Justice Network, an anti-tax haven pressure group, suggests that global tax revenue lost to tax havens exceeds US$255 billion per year, although those figures are not widely accepted. Estimates by the OECD suggest that by 2007 capital held offshore amounts to somewhere between US$5 trillion and US$7 trillion, making up approximately 6–8% of total global investments under management. Of this, approximately US$1.4 trillion is estimate to be held in the Cayman Islands alone.[39]
The Center for Freedom and Prosperity disputes claims about forgone tax revenue. Academic researchers also have found that tax havens actually boost prosperity in neighboring jurisdictions by creating tax-efficient platforms for economic activity – much of which would not occur if subject to onerous taxes if controlled by a domestic entity. Some support for this is found in academic studies which suggest that the tax elasticity of investment is approximately −0.6.[40]
In October 2009 research commissioned from Deloitte for the Foot Review of British Offshore Financial Centres indicated that much less tax had been lost to tax havens than previously had been thought. The report indicated "We estimate the total UK corporation tax potentially lost to avoidance activities to be up to £2 billion per annum, although it could be much lower." The report also dissected an earlier report by the TUC, which had concluded that tax avoidance by the 50 largest companies in the FTSE 100 was depriving the UK Treasury of approximately £11.8 billion. The TUC's analysis had looked at the reported profits of the companies and the amount of tax paid, which created a gap in tax revenues which was mostly due to differences in the accounting treatment of profit for taxation purposes, which were intended under the UK's tax rules.[41] The report also stressed that British Crown Dependencies make a "significant contribution to the liquidity of the UK market". In the second quarter of 2009, they provided net funds to banks in the UK totalling $323 billion (£195 billion), of which $218 billion came from Jersey, $74 billion from Guernsey and $40 billion from the Isle of Man.
Modern developments
Proposed German legislation
In January 2009, Peer Steinbrück, the German financial minister, announced a plan to amend fiscal laws. New regulations would disallow that payments to companies in certain countries that shield money from disclosure rules be declared as operative expenses. The effect of this would make banking in such states unattractive and expensive.[42]
Liechtenstein banking scandal
In February 2008 Germany announced that it had paid €4.2 million to Heinrich Kieber,[43] a former data archivist of LGT Treuhand, a Liechtenstein bank, for a list of 1,250 customers of the bank and their accounts' details. Investigations and arrests followed relating to charges of illegal tax evasion. The German authorities shared the data with U.S. tax authorities, but the British government paid a further £100,000 for the same data.[44] Other governments, notably Denmark and Sweden, refused to pay for the information regarding it as stolen property.[45] The Liechtenstein authorities subsequently accused the German authorities of espionage.[46]
However, regardless of whether unlawful tax evasion was being engaged in, the incident has fuelled the perception amongst European governments and press that tax havens provide facilities shrouded in secrecy designed to facilitate unlawful tax evasion, rather than legitimate tax planning and legal tax mitigation schemes. This in turn has led to a call for "crackdowns" on tax havens.[47] Whether the calls for such a crackdown are mere posturing or lead to more definitive activity by mainstream economies to restrict access to tax havens is yet to be seen. No definitive announcements or proposals have yet been made by the European Union or governments of the member states.
G20 tax havens blacklist
At the London G20 summit on 2 April 2009, G20 countries agreed to define a blacklist for tax havens, to be segmented according to a four-tier system, based on compliance with an "internationally agreed tax standard."[48] The list, drawn up by the OECD, was updated on 2 April 2009 in connection with the G20 meeting in London.[49] Further changes were made to the list on 7 April 2009 to remove countries from the non-cooperative category.[50] The four tiers are:
- Those that have substantially implemented the standard (includes countries such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Isle of Man, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States)
- Tax havens that have committed to – but not yet fully implemented – the standard (includes Andorra, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Liechtenstein, and Monaco)
- Financial centres that have committed to – but not yet fully implemented – the standard (includes Chile, Costa Rica,[51] Malaysia,[51] the Philippines,[51] Singapore, Switzerland, Uruguay[52] and three EU countries – Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg)
- Those that have not committed to the standard (now an empty category)
Those countries in the bottom tier were classified as being 'non-cooperative tax havens'. Uruguay was initially classified as being uncooperative. However, upon appeal the OECD stated that it did meet tax transparency rules and thus moved it up. The Philippines is already reported to be taking steps to remove itself from the blacklist and Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has suggested that Malaysia should not be in the bottom tier.[53] On April 7, 2009, the OECD, through its chief Angel Gurria, announced that Costa Rica, Malaysia, the Philippines and Uruguay have been removed from the blacklist after they had made "a full commitment to exchange information to the OECD standards."[51]
Despite calls from French President Nicolas Sarkozy for Hong Kong and Macau to be included separately from China on the list, they are as of yet not included independently, although it is expected that they will be added at a later date.[48]
Government response to the crackdown has been broadly supportive, although not universal.[54] Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has criticised the list, stating that it has "no credibility", for failing to include various states of the U.S.A. which provide incorporation infrastructure which are indistinguishable from the aspects of pure tax havens to which the G20 object.[55]
Foot report
In November 2009 Michael Foot delivered a report on the British Overseas Territories for HM Treasury.[56] The report indicated that whilst many of the Overseas Territories "had a good story to tell", others needed to improve in detection and prevention of financial crime. It also stressed the view that narrow tax bases presented long term strategic risks, and that the economies should seek to diversify and broaden their own tax bases. The report also indicated that tax revenue lost by the United Kingdom government appeared to be much smaller than had previously estimated (see above under Lost tax revenue), and also stressed the importance of the liquidity provided by the Overseas Territories to the United Kingdom. The Overseas Territories broadly welcomed the report,[57] but the pressure group Tax Justice Network commented "[a] weak man, born to be an apologist, has delivered a weak report."[58]
See also
- Asset protection
- ATTAC NGO's criticism of tax haven and underground economy
- Corporate haven
- Corporate Inversion
- Free port
- Free economic zone
- International Business Corporation
- List of offshore financial centres
- Offshore bank
- Offshore company
- Offshore Financial Centres
- Offshore trust
- Tax avoidance and tax evasion
- Tax resistance
- Tax exile
- Tax exporting
- UBS
Notes
- ^ Doggart, Caroline. 2002. Tax Havens and Their Uses (originally published 1970), Economist Intelligence Unit, ISBN 0862181631
- ^ The Truth About Tax Havens - retrieved 28 December 2007
- ^ [http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Identifying_Tax_Havens_Jul_07.pdf The Truth About Tax Havens - retrieved 28 December 2007]
- ^ "International Taxation: Large U.S. Corporations and Federal Contractors with Subsidiaries in Jurisdictions Listed as Tax Havens or Financial Privacy Jurisdictions GAO:GAO-09-157". Government Accountability Office. December 18, 2008. Retrieved 2009-01-21.
- ^ "[T]he tax haven is a creature of the twentieth century, and began to be used extensively because of the high levels of tax which prevailed after the First World War" at para 26.1, Tolley's International Tax Planning (2002), ISBN 0754513394
- ^ See generally Introduction to Tolley's International Initiatives Affecting Financial Havens (2001), ISBN 0-406-94264-1
- ^ The Personen- und Gesellschaftsrecht of 20 January 1926
- ^ Tolley's Tax Havens (2000), ISBN 0754504719
- ^ For example a double taxation treaty still exists between Barbados and Japan, and another between Cyprus and Russia. Mauritius has a double taxation treaty with India that is used for tax mitigation, although India is seeking to renegotiate the treaty, India to push for change in tax treaty with Mauritius
- ^ The best examples of this were probably Gibraltar and the British Virgin Islands.
- ^ Tolley's Offshore Service (2006), ISBN 1-405-71568-5
- ^ This is a simplistic example; in most sophisticated tax codes there are extensive provisions for catching "gifts" (such as a declaration of trust) made for a specified time preceding death.
- ^ It has been estimated over 75% of the world's hedge funds (probably the riskiest form of collective investment vehicle) are domiciled in the Cayman Islands, with nearly $1.1 trillion US AUM - Institutional Investor, 15 May 2006, although statistics in the hedge fund industry are notoriously speculative.
- ^ [http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_37427_30575447_1_1_1_37427,00.html Tax Haven Criteria - retrieved 26 February 2008]
- ^ Hay, Towards a level playing field - regulating corporate vehicles in cross border transactions, [1]
- ^ Companies incorporated in tax havens are often used as bond issuing vehicles in securitisations for tax reasons.
- ^ The United Kingdom is one country that has strict forced disclosure rules. - http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/aiu/index.htm
- ^ [2], [3], [4]
- ^ Such as ATTAC and the Tax Justice Network. See for example: Offshore watch
- ^ See for example the views expressed in The Guardian in 2001.
- ^ Working paper 12802, [5]. The paper implicitly adopts the "smaller" tax haven approach, ie. disregarding larger countries which have either low taxes rates (for example, Russia), or systems of taxation which permit them to be used to structure tax avoidance schemes (for example, the United Kingdom). It also excludes non-sovereign tax havens (for example, Delaware or Labuan).
- ^ Study shows Barbados is good for Canadian economy, By Randy Howard, Mon Mar 05 2007
- ^ Barbados and the OECD Press Release, The Development Division, January 31, 2002
- ^ http://ww1.transparency.org/newsletters/99.1/reforms.html#Barbados
- ^ Barbados fights (Tax Haven) label, Barbados Nation Newspaper, April 20
- ^ Barbados May Reap Rewards of Treaty Network, Worldwide Tax Daily, 30 April 2009
- ^ Barbados ad-campaign: "Barbados - OECD Approved"
- ^ Jurisdictions Committed to Improving Transparency and Establishing Effective Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration
- ^ Taxation, Gibraltar.gov
- ^ Gibraltar direct corporate taxes, Lawandtax-news.com.
- ^ Netherlands Antilles and Isle of Man to explore ways to combat arbitrary 'tax haven' listing, The CaribbeanNetNews, October 16, 2008
- ^ Temporary exemption from tax on foreign income for new migrants and certain returning New Zealanders, Inland Revenue New Zealand
- ^ Vanessa Houlder, "Harbours of resentment", Financial Times, December 1, 2008, p.11.
- ^ "Vanuatu to ditch tax haven", Anthony Klan, The Australian, May 6, 2008
- ^ "Election Under Fire". Time Magazine. 1976-05-17. Retrieved 2006-12-23.
- ^ "Offshore Financial Centers", International Monetary Fund background paper, June 23, 2000
- ^ Desai, Foley and Hines, "The demand for tax haven operations", Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006), page 514.
- ^ Carol D. Leonnig (January 16, 2009). "Report Finds Major U.S. Companies Have Offshore Tax Havens". Washington Post.
- ^ "Places in the sun", The Economist, February 22, 2007
- ^ Hines, Lessons from behavioral responses to international taxation, (1999) 52 National Tax Journal, pp. 305–322
- ^ The Times (2009-10-30). "Tax haven report lays emphasis on vital role of Crown Dependencies". Retrieved 2009-11-02.
- ^ Der Spiegel (17-01-2009). "Steinbrück forciert Kampf gegen Steuerparadiese" (in German). Retrieved 2009-01-17.
{{cite web}}
: Check date values in:|date=
(help) - ^ Mr Kieber seems to be an unlikely hero for law enforcement authorities. A convicted fraudster, reports indicate that after initially stealing the information, he blackmailed the Liechtenstein authorities into reducing and dropping criminal charges against him relating to property fraud in Spain. However, before returning the disks he made copies of which, which he later sold to foreign governments after he left the country. Further reports indicate that he now lives under a new name in Australia.[6]
- ^ The Guardian, 2 March 2008; The Daily Telegraph, 27 February 2008; Der Spiegel, 25 February 2008
- ^ Denmark's tax minister, Kristian Jensen, said: "I think it's a moral problem to reward a criminal for some information that he stole... I don't like this and I don't think this ethic is the best way to ensure that taxes are paid correctly."
- ^ The Daily Telegraph, 26 February 2008; Money Week, 29 February 2008
- ^ Accountancy Age, 3 March 2008; The Times, 9 March 2008; The Guardian, 5 March 2008
- ^ a b G20 declares door shut on tax havens, The Guardian, April 2, 2009
- ^ A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD Global Forum in implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard. OECD, April 2, 2009. Retrieved 3 April 2009.
- ^ Four more countries commit to OECD tax standards. OECD, April 7, 2009. Retrieved 8 April 2009.
- ^ a b c d BBC (2009-04-07). "OECD removes tax havens from list". BBC News. Retrieved 2009-04-07.
- ^ "Uruguay de-listed from group of non cooperative tax havens". 2009-04-03. Retrieved 2009-04-03.
{{cite news}}
: Text "MercoPress" ignored (help) - ^ "OECD names and shames tax havens". BBC News. 2009-04-03. Retrieved 2009-04-04.
- ^ "Save the tax havens – we need them". The Times. 2009-04-12. Retrieved 2009-04-14.
- ^ "Welcome to tax-dodge city, USA". The Guardian. 2009-04-10. Retrieved 2009-04-14.
- ^ "Michael Foot publishes final report". HM Treasury. 2009-10-29. Retrieved 2009-11-05.
- ^ "Governor and Premier Welcome Michael Foot Review Conclusions". 2009-10-30. Retrieved 2009-11-05.
- ^ "The Foot Report: a setback". Tax Justice Network. 2009-10-29. Retrieved 2009-11-05.
Further reading
- Raymond W. Baker, "Capitalism's Achilles' Heel: Dirty Money, and How to Renew the Free-Market System.", (2005)
- Henry, James S., "The Blood Bankers: Tales from the Global Underground Economy.", (2003)
- Carlo Scevola, Offshore Jurisdictions Guide, CS&P Fiduciaire, 2009, ISBN 978-1-60594-433-3
External links
- Offshore Banking directory of providers
- Offshore Banking and Financial Centers
- Offshore Financial Centers -- IMF Background Paper
- Offshore Jurisdictions, an independent review for the international investor
- Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding tax havens
- Tax Justice Network
- An OECD Proposal To Eliminate Tax Competition Would Mean Higher Taxes and Less Privacy – Heritage Foundation: Washington D.C.
- The Moral Case for tax Havens
- The Economics of Tax Competition: Harmonization vs. Liberalization
- "Why tax havens are a blessing" – the Cato Institute
- "Profiting from corruption: The role and responsibility of financial institutions" - U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre