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{{Buddhism}}
{{Buddhism}}
In [[Buddhism]], the term '''anattā''' ([[Pāli]]) or '''anātman''' ({{lang-sa|अनात्मन्}}) refers to the perception of "not-self", recommended as one of the seven beneficial perceptions<ref name="accesstoinsight.org">"Sañña Sutta: Perceptions" (AN 7.46), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an07/an07.046.than.html</ref> to be pursued along with right concentration. Along with the perception of ''dukkha'', and ''anicca'', is also formally classified among the [[three marks of existence]] in the Sutta commentaries. At least in the Theravāda it is ''not'' a metaphysical rejection of a self - a common misunderstanding.
In [[Buddhism]], the term '''anattā''' ([[Pāli]]) or '''anātman''' ({{lang-sa|अनात्मन्}}) refers to the perception of "not-self", recommended as one of the seven beneficial perceptions,<ref name="accesstoinsight.org">"Sañña Sutta: Perceptions" (AN 7.46), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an07/an07.046.than.html</ref> which along with the perception of ''dukkha'', and ''anicca'', is also formally classified among the [[three marks of existence]].


==''Anatta'' in the Theravāda tradition==
==Anatta in the Nikayas==
The ancient Indian word for self or essence is ''attā'' (Pāli) or ''ātman'' (Sanskrit), and is often thought to be an eternal substance that persists despite death. Hence the term ''anatta'' is often interpreted as referring to the denial of a self or essence. However, ''anatta'' is used in the early Buddhist texts, as a strategy to view the perception of self as conditioned processes (or even an action), instead of seeing the self as an entity or an essence. ''Anatta'' is not a rejection of a self, but is a strategy to see things differently. At the same time, beliefs in the existence of a self are not compatible with the Buddha's teachings either.
The ancient Indian word for self or essence is ''attā'' (Pāli) or ''ātman'' (Sanskrit), and is often thought to be an eternal substance that persists despite death. Hence the term ''anatta'' is often interpreted as referring to the denial of a self or essence. ''Anatta'' is used in the early Buddhist texts, as a strategy to view the perception of self as conditioned processes (or even an action), instead of seeing it as an entity or an essence.


Taken together with the perceptions of ''[[anicca]]'' (impermanence) and ''[[dukkha]]'' (imperfection), ''anatta'' (not self) perception is the last of the [[three marks of existence]], which when grasped strategically, leads to dispassion (''nibbida''). Dispassion then causes the mind to naturally tend to the deathless, and this is called release (''vimutti'').<ref name="Selves" />
Taken together with the perceptions of ''[[anicca]]'' (impermanence) and ''[[dukkha]]'' (imperfection), ''anatta'' (not self) perception is the last of the [[three marks of existence]], which when grasped strategically, leads to dispassion (''nibbida''). Dispassion then causes the mind to naturally tend to the deathless, and this is called release (''vimutti'').<ref name="Selves" />
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====Skillfull action====
====Skillfull action====
Because most philosophers focus on asserting or rejecting a self,<ref>Many Indian philosophers before, during, and after the Buddha propounded various theories of self. Even the philosophy of Romanticsm involved the assumption that the self is one with the universe, which is a form of self-view.</ref> when people approach Buddhism, they assume it is answering the same questions. Thus they approach the Dhamma with the assumption that ''anatta'' is the basic framework, and wonder how ''karma'' could ever fit into such a framework.<ref>For example: "If there is no self, then who or what is reborn?"</ref> But this brings assumptions that have no bearing on the Buddha's way of teaching. The Buddha's central teaching framework was ''karma'', which details the strategies of skillful action that can lead to long-term happiness. ''Anatta'' is just one of the strategies that fitted into this framework.<ref name="Selves">"Selves & Not-self: The Buddhist Teaching on Anatta", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selvesnotself.html</ref><ref>Thai forest monks in the lineage of Ajaan Mun Bhuridatto, including well known monks like Thanissaro Bhikku, and Ajahn Chah.</ref>
Because most philosophers focus on asserting or rejecting a self,<ref>Many Indian philosophers before, during, and after the Buddha propounded various theories of self. Even the philosophy of Romanticsm involved the assumption that the self is one with the universe, which is a form of self-view.</ref> when people approach Buddhism, they assume it is answering the same questions. Thus they approach the Dhamma with the assumption that ''anatta'' is the basic framework, and wonder how ''karma'' could ever fit into such a framework.<ref>For example: "If there is no self, then who or what is reborn?"</ref> But this brings assumptions that have no bearing on the Buddha's way of teaching. The Buddha's central teaching framework was ''karma''. ''Anatta'' is just one of the strategies that fitted into this framework.<ref name="Selves">"Selves & Not-self: The Buddhist Teaching on Anatta", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selvesnotself.html</ref><ref>Thai forest monks in the lineage of Ajaan Mun Bhuridatto, including well known monks like Thanissaro Bhikku, and Ajahn Chah.</ref>


The Buddha simply pointed out when the act of conceiving a self is skillful, and when it would be unskillful, and when the act of conceiving "not-self" is skillful, and when it is unskillful.<ref name="Selves"/> For example, the question ''"What, when '''I''' do it, would lead to '''my''' long-term benefit, and what would lead to '''my''' long-term harm?"'' involves skillful perceptions of self and is therefore a very skillful question, especially since it is framed in terms of ''karma''. But views such as ''"there is a self"'', ''"there is no self'', ''"because there is a self, one is reborn"'', or ''"despite there being no self, one is reborn"'', are all unskillful views.
The Buddha simply pointed out when the act of conceiving a self is skillful, and when it would be unskillful, and when the act of conceiving "not-self" is skillful, and when it is unskillful.<ref name="Selves"/> For example, the question ''"What, when '''I''' do it, would lead to '''my''' long-term benefit, and what would lead to '''my''' long-term harm?"'' involves skillful perceptions of self and is therefore a very skillful question, especially since it is framed in terms of ''karma''. But views such as ''"there is a self"'', ''"there is no self'', ''"because there is a self, one is reborn"'', or ''"despite there being no self, one is reborn"'', are all unskillful views.

In early Buddhism, a view or a belief was also considered an action, because views do have consequences. For example, if one believes that there is no moral impact of actions then the consequences can be very harmful, causing one to behave very dangerously<ref>http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.117.than.html#micchaditthi</ref>. Another example from modern history is the [[Nazi]] belief in racial superiority, which led to the [[Holocaust]] and the [[Second World War]].


====Moral responsibility====
====Moral responsibility====
The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility: the doctrine that posited an unchanging self as a subject<ref>That is a self that is always subject to the results of karma</ref>, which he calls "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".<ref name="Causality 1975, page 44">[[David Kalupahana]], ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.'' The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.</ref> Instead, the Buddha repeatedly asserted that there are skillful and unskillful actions,<ref>"Kusala Sutta: Skillful" (AN 2.19), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 4 August 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an02/an02.019.than.html</ref> and that the distinction between them is universal. In the Buddha's framework of ''karma'', the perception of self is skillful only to the extent that it brings about right view regarding actions, and motivates one to choose skillful actions.
The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility: the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which he calls "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".<ref name="Causality 1975, page 44">[[David Kalupahana]], ''Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.'' The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.</ref> Instead, the Buddha repeatedly asserted that there are skillful and unskillful actions,<ref>"Kusala Sutta: Skillful" (AN 2.19), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 4 August 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an02/an02.019.than.html</ref> and that the distinction between them is universal. In the Buddha's framework of ''karma'', the perception of self is only skillful to the extent that it brings about right view regarding actions, and motivates one to choose skillful actions.


===Understanding ''Anatta''===
===Views on self===
====''Anatta'' in context====
The gradual path of the Buddhist practice can be seen in two different parts<ref>See Introduction of ''The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha'', by Bhikkhu Ñānamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Wisdom Publications</ref>: one leading up to concentration, and one proceeding from concentration. The path leading up to concentration depends on the other seven path factors ([[Anupubbikatha]])<ref>Ganakamoggallana Sutta: The Discourse to Ganaka-Moggallana" (MN 107), translated from the Pali by I.B. Horner. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.107.horn.html</ref>:


====Existence and Non-existence====
{{Quote | text=Now what, monks, is noble right concentration with its supports & requisite conditions? Any singleness of mind equipped with these seven factors — right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, & right mindfulness — is called noble right concentration with its supports & requisite conditions. | sign=The Buddha | source=[http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.117.than.html Maha-cattarisaka Sutta: The Great Forty (MN 117)]}}
When asked about the existence of a self, the Buddha often refused to answer. Instead, he pointed out the drawbacks of thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.,<ref name="Kaccayanagotta Sutta 2013">"Kaccayanagotta Sutta: To Kaccayana Gotta (on Right View)" (SN 12.15), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html</ref> and recommended that one view phenomena as arising and passing away, based on impermanent conditions. This means that instead of the question ''"Is there a self?"'', it is recommended to ask ''"How does the perception of self originate?"''.<ref name="Kaccayanagotta Sutta 2013"/>


====Identity-view====
The teaching of ''anatta'' leads to progressively subtler happiness (still not liberative):
Identity-view is defined as one of the [[Fetter (Buddhism)|fetters]] to be abandoned, and a requirement for [[Sotāpanna|stream entry]]. By analyzing the characteristic of not-self as pervading all conditioned phenomena, and removing notions of "self" and "I-making", one is able to attain liberation. The Nikayas describe various views of self to be abandoned, such as "this is mine, this I am, this is my self", "I will be", "I will be this", "I will be otherwise" etc. A few of the suttas<ref name="MN 2 PTS">MN 2 (PTS)</ref><ref name="SN 22.81 PTS">SN 22.81 (PTS)</ref> even see belief in no self as tied up with the belief in a self. Views of "denial", in the form "I am not this", or "I will not be that", are thus rooted in the same 'I am' attitude; even the view "I do not exist" arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.<ref name="Peter Harvey 1995, pages 39,40">Peter Harvey, ''The Selfless Mind.'' Curzon Press 1995, pages 39,40.</ref>
* ''Generously gifting others can result in a subtle happiness that is preferable to sensual pleasure.'' In doing this one has to trade those objects and their pleasures, for the pleasure of seeing others benefit from one's actions. One is simultaneously using the perception of not-self towards the objects of unskillful desire, and the perception of self towards skillful actions.
* ''Associating with wise contemplatives leads to greater security and happiness than associating with companions in ruinous fun.'' In doing this one has to examine oneself and relinquish companions in ruin and actively seek wiser people. One isn't doing this to become proud or to condescend another, but to better oneself. Again this involves both perceptions of not-self with regard to unskillful actions and the perception of self towards skillful abidings.
* ''Renunciation results in the subtle pleasure of independence.'' In doing this one has to relinquish worldly possessions and learns to enjoy solitude, seclusion, and contentment with little. The Buddha makes this distinction between household happiness and renunciate happiness in [http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.137.than.html MN 137]
* ''Concentration results in rapture and pleasure that far exceed sensual pleasures.'' The Buddha often recommends enjoying the pleasures of ''jhāna'' instead of seeking sensual pleasures.


When demanded that the Buddha address the question of ''"who"'', as in ''"who feels"''<ref name="SN 12.12 PTS">SN 12.12 (PTS)</ref> or ''"who is reborn"'',<ref>SN 12.35 (PTS)</ref> he often responded with a description of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]], stating that the question of "who" brings with it assumptions that are incorrect.
Although all of these levels of happiness are skillful, and recommended on the way to liberation, they still do not match the happiness of complete liberation from ''samsāra''<ref>Samaññaphala Sutta: The Fruits of the Contemplative Life" (DN 2), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html</ref>. But one has to progressively grasp these higher forms of happiness and abandon the lower forms of happiness to progress on the path<ref>Ganakamoggallana Sutta: The Discourse to Ganaka-Moggallana" (MN 107), translated from the Pali by I.B. Horner. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.107.horn.html</ref><ref>Kuṭṭhi Sutta: The Leper" (Ud 5.3), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 3 September 2012, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.5.03.than.html</ref>. When all of them are mastered, the teaching of ''anatta'' focuses on the activities of the mind present in the state of concentration itself<ref>''"The Five Aggregates: A Study Guide"'', by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. ''Metta Forest Monastery''</ref>. The subtle activities of the mind (also called [[Skandha|the five ''clinging aggregates'']]) generate certain pleasures<ref>Bhikkhu Sutta: The Monk" (SN 22.36), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.036.than.htm</ref>, and those in turn are consumed by the mind. Relinquishing these in turn issues in full liberation, which is accompanied with the pleasure of release. ''Relinquishing even this pleasure of release, the mind is completely freed, beyond the categories of self, not-self, or the dimensions of time and space.''<ref>Jhana Sutta: Mental Absorption" (AN 9.36), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an09/an09.036.than.html</ref><ref>"No-self or Not-self?", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 24 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself2.html</ref><ref>"The Not-self Strategy", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 24 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notselfstrategy.html</ref><ref>Nibbāna Sutta: Unbinding (1)" (Ud 8.1), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 3 September 2012, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.8.01.than.html</ref><ref>Nibbāna Sutta: Unbinding (3)" (Ud 8.3), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 3 September 2012, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.8.03.than.html</ref>


====Wrong self-views====
====Identity-view (''sakkāya diṭṭhi'')====
There are three ways in which self views could be conceived and all three are said to be wrong views.{{citation needed|date=August 2014}} A wrong view is not wrong because it is factually incorrect, but because it leads to ''dukkha'' (suffering).{{citation needed|date=August 2014}}
There are three ways in which self views (''sakkāya diṭṭhi'') could be conceived and all three are said to be wrong views.<ref>Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta: The Shorter Instructions to Malunkya" (MN 63), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.063.than.html#views</ref> Saying that these views are "wrong views" is not a statement about the factual correctness of such views. An alternative expression may be "unskillful views"<ref>Alagaddupama Sutta: The Water-Snake Simile" (MN 22), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 17 December 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.022.than.html</ref> which underscores the point that they lead to ''dukkha'' (suffering), which is why the Buddha recommended dropping them. In doing so, the Buddha was ''not'' recommending replacing these views with the belief that there is no self<ref>See Translator's introduction to Alagaddupama Sutta (MN 22): http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.022.than.html</ref>. Such a belief is potentially quite pernicious since it can be the basis for denying any responsibility for immoral actions<ref>The Buddha's criterion for a contemplative included moral conscience and taking responsibilty for one's actions (MN 39) http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.039.than.html#consc</ref>. The following types of self-identity views are listed in the Suttas:


# The first is the view that "this is the self," which refers to identity view with regard to something. Example: belief that one is solely composed of physical processes (materialistic view that the body is all); belief that one is solely composed of mental processes (spiritual ideas similar to belief that the soul is all).
# The first is the view that "this is the self," which refers to identity view with regard to something, or passing blind judgement on the intrinsic quality of oneself.
# The second is the view that "the self is contained in something else," which refers to identity view as contained in something else. Example: belief that the soul is in the body; more fundamentally, the belief that we are in a particular place in space and time. This includes the belief in a cosmic self, like that of the [[Upanishads]].
# The second is the view that "the self is contained in something else," which refers to identity view as contained in something else.
# The third is the view that "the self possesses something else," which refers to the self possessing an entity such as a body or the self possessing some intrinsic quality. Example: belief that the self is innately pure and undefiled (like in [[neo-Vedanta]])<ref>See the note 1 under Pabhassara Sutta: Luminous" (AN 1.49-52), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an01/an01.049.than.html</ref>, or that it is intrinsically defiled (like in the Christian belief that all are sinners).
# The third is the view that "the self possesses something else," which refers to the self possessing an entity such as a body.


All these views types of identity view fetter one to ''samsāra'', and it is for this reason that they are wrong views.
All these types of identity-views are '''''actions''''' that [[Fetter (Buddhism)|fetter]] one to ''samsāra'', and it is for this reason that they are wrong views (or unskillful views). One of the requirements for [[Sotāpanna|stream entry]] (''sotāpatti'')<ref>Vera Sutta: Animosity" (AN 10.92), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an10/an10.092.than.html</ref><ref>Pubbakotthaka Sutta: Eastern Gatehouse" (SN 48.44), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn48/sn48.044.than.html</ref> is that the fetter of identity-view to be abandoned. But for that to happen one would have to see exactly how self-identity view fetters one to ''samsāra'', which is one of the key insights discerned with the concentrated mind<ref>Sabbasava Sutta: All the Fermentations" (MN 2), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.002.than.html</ref><ref>Sakka Sutta: To the Sakyan" (AN 3.73), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.073.than.html</ref>. To do this, instead of seeing experience in terms of ''I'', ''my'' and ''mine'', one is advised to see experience in terms of where there is any modicum of disturbance in it, and try to abandon it<ref>See the progression in the Cula-suññata Sutta: The Lesser Discourse on Emptiness" (MN 121), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.121.than.html</ref>.

But this does not mean that the perception of self is totally destroyed upon liberation. There are parts of the Pali Canon, where the Buddha talks about his past experience and feelings of pleasure and pain: ''"...I lived in refinement, utter refinement. My father built me three palaces..."''<ref>Sukhamala Sutta: Refinement" (AN 3.38), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 1 December 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.038.than.html</ref> Monks and nuns have to feed themselves and go on alms-round, all of which require self-identity view. The Canon explains that enlightened sage does not completely abandoning perceptions of self under all circumstances, but has instead mastered the use of the perception of self when required, and abandoning it when not required<ref>See ''Handful of Leaves - Vol II'', by Thanissaro Bhikkhu</ref>.

====Existence and Non-existence====
When asked about the existence of a self, the Buddha often refused to answer. Instead, he pointed out the drawbacks of thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.,<ref name="Kaccayanagotta Sutta 2013">"Kaccayanagotta Sutta: To Kaccayana Gotta (on Right View)" (SN 12.15), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html</ref> and recommended that one view phenomena as arising and passing away, based on impermanent conditions. This means that instead of the question ''"Is there a self?"'', it is recommended to ask ''"How does the perception of self originate?"''.<ref name="Kaccayanagotta Sutta 2013"/> In such contexts when demanded that he address the question of ''"who feels"''<ref name="SN 12.12 PTS">SN 12.12 (PTS)</ref> or ''"who is reborn"'',<ref>SN 12.35 (PTS)</ref> he often responded with a description of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent origination]], stating that the question of "who" brings with it assumptions that are incorrect.


====Eternalism and annihilationism====
====Eternalism and annihilationism====
While the concept of ''[[jiva]]'' in Hinduism and Jainism is distinct from the Buddhist concept of a self (''atta'', ''ātman''), certain concepts concerning ''jiva'' are seen to contradict the notion of anatta.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803110450281 |title=ucchedavāda |publisher=Oxfordindex.oup.com |author=Damien Keown |date=2004-01-01 |accessdate=2013-12-04}}</ref><ref name="SN 12.17 PTS">SN 12.17 (PTS)</ref> Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul or ''jiva'' distinct from the body, raises the question of the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha did not teach. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same and that there is nothing further after death, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also did not teach.<ref>Alagaddupama Sutta: The Water-Snake Simile" (MN 22), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 17 December 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.022.than.html</ref>
While the concept of ''[[jiva]]'' in Hinduism and Jainism is distinct from the Buddhist concept of a self (''atta'', ''ātman''), certain concepts concerning ''jiva'' are seen to contradict the notion of anatta.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803110450281 |title=ucchedavāda |publisher=Oxfordindex.oup.com |author=Damien Keown |date=2004-01-01 |accessdate=2013-12-04}}</ref><ref name="SN 12.17 PTS">SN 12.17 (PTS)</ref> Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul or ''jiva'' distinct from the body, raises the question of the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha did not teach. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also did not teach.{{cn|date=December 2014}}

===Modern Views on ''Anatta''===


====Peter Harvey====
===Developing the self===
{{Main|Buddhist Paths to liberation}}
{{Main|Buddhist Paths to liberation}}



Revision as of 04:44, 19 January 2015

In Buddhism, the term anattā (Pāli) or anātman (Sanskrit: अनात्मन्) refers to the perception of "not-self", recommended as one of the seven beneficial perceptions,[1] which along with the perception of dukkha, and anicca, is also formally classified among the three marks of existence.

Anatta in the Nikayas

The ancient Indian word for self or essence is attā (Pāli) or ātman (Sanskrit), and is often thought to be an eternal substance that persists despite death. Hence the term anatta is often interpreted as referring to the denial of a self or essence. Anatta is used in the early Buddhist texts, as a strategy to view the perception of self as conditioned processes (or even an action), instead of seeing it as an entity or an essence.

Taken together with the perceptions of anicca (impermanence) and dukkha (imperfection), anatta (not self) perception is the last of the three marks of existence, which when grasped strategically, leads to dispassion (nibbida). Dispassion then causes the mind to naturally tend to the deathless, and this is called release (vimutti).[2]

Karma and Anatta

Skillfull action

Because most philosophers focus on asserting or rejecting a self,[3] when people approach Buddhism, they assume it is answering the same questions. Thus they approach the Dhamma with the assumption that anatta is the basic framework, and wonder how karma could ever fit into such a framework.[4] But this brings assumptions that have no bearing on the Buddha's way of teaching. The Buddha's central teaching framework was karma. Anatta is just one of the strategies that fitted into this framework.[2][5]

The Buddha simply pointed out when the act of conceiving a self is skillful, and when it would be unskillful, and when the act of conceiving "not-self" is skillful, and when it is unskillful.[2] For example, the question "What, when I do it, would lead to my long-term benefit, and what would lead to my long-term harm?" involves skillful perceptions of self and is therefore a very skillful question, especially since it is framed in terms of karma. But views such as "there is a self", "there is no self, "because there is a self, one is reborn", or "despite there being no self, one is reborn", are all unskillful views.

Moral responsibility

The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility: the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which he calls "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda".[6] Instead, the Buddha repeatedly asserted that there are skillful and unskillful actions,[7] and that the distinction between them is universal. In the Buddha's framework of karma, the perception of self is only skillful to the extent that it brings about right view regarding actions, and motivates one to choose skillful actions.

Views on self

Existence and Non-existence

When asked about the existence of a self, the Buddha often refused to answer. Instead, he pointed out the drawbacks of thinking in terms of existence and non-existence.,[8] and recommended that one view phenomena as arising and passing away, based on impermanent conditions. This means that instead of the question "Is there a self?", it is recommended to ask "How does the perception of self originate?".[8]

Identity-view

Identity-view is defined as one of the fetters to be abandoned, and a requirement for stream entry. By analyzing the characteristic of not-self as pervading all conditioned phenomena, and removing notions of "self" and "I-making", one is able to attain liberation. The Nikayas describe various views of self to be abandoned, such as "this is mine, this I am, this is my self", "I will be", "I will be this", "I will be otherwise" etc. A few of the suttas[9][10] even see belief in no self as tied up with the belief in a self. Views of "denial", in the form "I am not this", or "I will not be that", are thus rooted in the same 'I am' attitude; even the view "I do not exist" arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.[11]

When demanded that the Buddha address the question of "who", as in "who feels"[12] or "who is reborn",[13] he often responded with a description of dependent origination, stating that the question of "who" brings with it assumptions that are incorrect.

Wrong self-views

There are three ways in which self views could be conceived and all three are said to be wrong views.[citation needed] A wrong view is not wrong because it is factually incorrect, but because it leads to dukkha (suffering).[citation needed]

  1. The first is the view that "this is the self," which refers to identity view with regard to something, or passing blind judgement on the intrinsic quality of oneself.
  2. The second is the view that "the self is contained in something else," which refers to identity view as contained in something else.
  3. The third is the view that "the self possesses something else," which refers to the self possessing an entity such as a body.

All these views types of identity view fetter one to samsāra, and it is for this reason that they are wrong views.

Eternalism and annihilationism

While the concept of jiva in Hinduism and Jainism is distinct from the Buddhist concept of a self (atta, ātman), certain concepts concerning jiva are seen to contradict the notion of anatta.[14][15] Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul or jiva distinct from the body, raises the question of the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha did not teach. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also did not teach.[citation needed]

Developing the self

According to Peter Harvey, while the suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self, they see an enlightened being as one whose changing, empirical self is highly developed.[16] One with "great self" has a mind which is not at the mercy of outside stimuli or its own moods, but is imbued with self-control, and self-contained.[17] The mind of such a one is without boundaries, not limited by attachment or "I-identification."[18] One can transform one's self from an "insignificant self" into a "great self" through practices such as loving-kindness and mindfulness.[19] The suttas portray one disciple who has developed his mind through loving-kindness saying: "Formerly this mind of mine was limited, but now my mind is immeasurable."[19]

Anatta in Mahāyāna

There are many different views of Anatta (Chinese: 無我 wú-wǒ; Japanese: 無我 muga) within various Mahayana schools.

Madhyamaka

While commenting on Āryadeva, Candrakīrti defines anatta as follows:

Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.

— Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7[20]

Buddhapālita adds, while commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

— Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2[20]

Tathagatagarbha Sutras

The Tathagatagarbha Sutras declare the existence of "atman," which in these scriptures is equated with buddha-nature.[citation needed] The Mahaparinirvana Sutra, a long and highly composite Mahayana scripture,[21] refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics.[22] From this, it continues:

The Buddha-nature is in fact not the self. For the sake of [guiding] sentient beings, I describe it as the self.[23]

The Ratnagotravibhaga, a related text, points out that the teaching of the tathagatagarbha is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "affection for one's self" - one of the five defects caused by non-Buddhist teaching. Youru Wang notes similar language in the Lankavatara Sutra, then writes:

Noticing this context is important. It will help us to avoid jumping to the conclusion that tathagatagarbha thought is simply another case of metaphysical imagination.[23]

According to some scholars, the "tathagatagarbha"/Buddha nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self (atman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of sunyata (emptiness) and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices.[24] Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references.[25][note 1]

Relation to Vedic and Hindu philosophy

The pre-Buddhist Upanishads of Hinduism link the Self to the feeling "I am."[30] The Chandogya Upanishad for example does, and it sees Self as underlying the whole world, being "below," "above," and in the four directions. In contrast, the Buddhist Arahant says:

Above, below, everywhere set free, not considering 'this I am.'[30]

While the pre-Buddhist Upanishads link the Self to the attitude "I am," others like the post-Buddhist Maitri Upanishad hold that only the defiled individual self, rather than the universal self, thinks "this is I" or "this is mine". According to Peter Harvey:

This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations.[30]

The Upanishadic "Self" shares certain characteristics with nirvana; both are permanent, beyond suffering, and unconditioned. However, early Buddhism shunned any attempt to see the spiritual goal in terms of "Self" because in this framework, the craving for a permanent self is the very thing which keeps a person in the round of uncontrollable rebirth, preventing him or her from attaining nibbana.[30] Harvey continues:

Both in the Upanishads and in common usage, self/Self is linked to the sense of "I am" [...] If the later Upanishads came to see ultimate reality as beyond the sense of "I am", Buddhism would then say: why call it 'Self', then?[30]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Michael Zimmermann, a specialist on the Tathagatagarbha Sutra,[26] sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in that early buddha-nature scripture and insists that the compilers of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra 'do not hesitate to attribute an obviously substantialist notion to the buddha-nature of living beings'.[27] Zimmermann also avers that 'the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra'.[28] He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata), saying: 'Throughout the whole Tathagatagarbha Sutra the term sunyata does not even appear once, nor does the general drift of the TGS somehow imply the notion of sunyata as its hidden foundation. On the contrary, the sutra uses very positive and substantialist terms to describe the nature of living beings.'.[29]

References

  1. ^ "Sañña Sutta: Perceptions" (AN 7.46), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an07/an07.046.than.html
  2. ^ a b c "Selves & Not-self: The Buddhist Teaching on Anatta", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selvesnotself.html
  3. ^ Many Indian philosophers before, during, and after the Buddha propounded various theories of self. Even the philosophy of Romanticsm involved the assumption that the self is one with the universe, which is a form of self-view.
  4. ^ For example: "If there is no self, then who or what is reborn?"
  5. ^ Thai forest monks in the lineage of Ajaan Mun Bhuridatto, including well known monks like Thanissaro Bhikku, and Ajahn Chah.
  6. ^ David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.
  7. ^ "Kusala Sutta: Skillful" (AN 2.19), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 4 August 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an02/an02.019.than.html
  8. ^ a b "Kaccayanagotta Sutta: To Kaccayana Gotta (on Right View)" (SN 12.15), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html
  9. ^ MN 2 (PTS)
  10. ^ SN 22.81 (PTS)
  11. ^ Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, pages 39,40.
  12. ^ SN 12.12 (PTS)
  13. ^ SN 12.35 (PTS)
  14. ^ Damien Keown (2004-01-01). "ucchedavāda". Oxfordindex.oup.com. Retrieved 2013-12-04.
  15. ^ SN 12.17 (PTS)
  16. ^ Peter Harvey, "The Selfless Mind." Curzon Press, 1995, page 54.
  17. ^ Peter Harvey, "The Selfless Mind." Curzon Press, 1995, page 55.
  18. ^ Peter Harvey, "The Selfless Mind." Curzon Press, 1995, page 63.
  19. ^ a b Peter Harvey, "The Selfless Mind." Curzon Press, 1995, page 57.
  20. ^ a b Translations from "The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment", Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
  21. ^ Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 98, see also page 99.
  22. ^ Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 100. "... it refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."
  23. ^ a b Youru Wang, Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism: The Other Way of Speaking. Routledge, 2003, page 58.
  24. ^ Heng-Ching Shih,The Significance Of 'Tathagatagarbha' -- A Positive Expression Of 'Sunyata'
  25. ^ Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99-100
  26. ^ ^ http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/Michael-Zimmermann.23.0.html?&L=1
  27. ^ Zimmermann, Michael (2002), A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64
  28. ^ Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 64
  29. ^ Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 81
  30. ^ a b c d e Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press, 1995, page 34.

Bibliography

  • Anatta: Non-Self Audio discussion of Anatta from Buddhist Society of Western Australia.
  • Nirvana Sutra English translation of the Nirvana Sutra by Kosho Yamamoto.