Russia–Syria relations: Difference between revisions
30 September 2015 air intervention |
Corriebertus (talk | contribs) →Military cooperation: updates. |
||
| Line 21: | Line 21: | ||
==Military cooperation== |
==Military cooperation== |
||
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev 21 August 2008-1.jpg|thumb|Bashar Al Assad with [[President of Russia|Russian President]] [[Dmitry Medvedev]] whilst on a visit to [[Sochi]] in August 2008.]] |
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev 21 August 2008-1.jpg|thumb|Bashar Al Assad with [[President of Russia|Russian President]] [[Dmitry Medvedev]] whilst on a visit to [[Sochi]] in August 2008.]] |
||
===Russian naval base Tartus=== |
|||
| ⚫ | |||
{{main|Russian naval facility in Tartus}} |
|||
| ⚫ | |||
The Syrian port city of [[Tartus]] hosts |
|||
Russia's only naval facility in the [[Mediterranean]] region and only remaining military facility outside the former USSR: the [[Russian naval facility in Tartus]]. |
|||
The base was established during the [[Cold War]] to support the [[Soviet Union|Soviet Navy's]] fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, under a 1971 agreement with Syria. |
|||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | Since Russia forgave Syria of three-fourths, or $9.8 billion, of its $13.4 billion [[Soviet Union|Soviet-era]] debt and became its main arms supplier, Russia and Syria have conducted talks about allowing Russia to develop and enlarge its naval base, so that Russia can strengthen its naval presence in the Mediterranean.<ref name=Weitz>{{cite book|last=Weitz|first=Richard|title=Global security watch--Russia : a reference handbook|year=2010|publisher=Praeger Security International|location=Santa Barbara, Calif.|isbn=978-0-313-35434-2|pages=30|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VcdZ9s2IAwMC&pg=PA30&dq=russian+navy+syria+tartous&hl=en&ei=dbBXTtDIL4jZsgaKwMTBCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=tartus&f=false}}</ref> Amid Russia's deteriorating relations with the West, because of the [[2008 South Ossetia War]] and plans to deploy a [[Poland-Russia relations#Deployment of US missile defense shield in Poland|US missile defense shield in Poland]], [[Bashar al-Assad|President Assad]] agreed to the port’s conversion into a permanent Middle East base for Russia’s nuclear-armed warships.<ref>{{cite news |first= |last= |authorlink= |coauthors= |title= Big Russian flotilla led by Admiral Kuznetsov carrier heads for Syrian port |url= http://www.debka.com/headline.php?hid=5526 |work=[[DEBKAfile]] |publisher=|date= August 21, 2008 |accessdate=August 22, 2008 }} {{dead link|date=September 2010}}</ref> |
||
Syria hosted Russia's "[[Center C]]" [[signals intelligence]] base near the Syrian-Israeli-Jordanian border until 2014 and is suspected of hosting at least two other Russian intelligence bases.<ref>http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11148857/Russian-spy-base-in-Syria-used-to-monitor-rebels-and-Israel-seized.html</ref> |
|||
Since 2009, Russia has been renovating the Tartus naval base and dredging the port to allow access for its larger naval vessels.<ref name=INSS>{{cite web|title=INSS: Syria Report|url=http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1287493352.pdf|publisher=Institute for National Security Studies|accessdate=3 September 2011}}</ref> |
|||
In 2012, a commentator called the use of the deep-water port at Tartus Russia’s greatest strategic and geopolitical interest in Syria,<ref name = "back down">{{cite web|last=Sayginer|first=Ozge|date=20 June 2012|title=Why Russia will never back down? Reasons behind supporting the Assad regime|url=http://www.europeanstrategist.eu/2012/06/why-russia-will-never-back-down-reasons-behind-supporting-the-assad-regime/|work=The European Strategist|accessdate=13 October 2015}}</ref> and some critics saw the position of the naval facility as a chief motivating factor for Russia to speak out in favor of the Assad government.{{Clarify|reason=Which “critics” say the position of Tartus is chief motivating factor for speaking out in favor of Assad? |date=October 2015}}<ref name='Economist'>{{cite journal | title = The Long Road to Damascus | journal = The Economist | date = 11 February 2012 | volume = 402 | issue = 8771 | pages = 25–28}}</ref><ref name='2012 CRS Report'>{{citation | contribution = Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime | title = CRS Report for Congress | editor-first = Jeremy M. | editor-last = Sharp | editor2= Christopher M. Blanchard | publisher = Congressional Research Service | place = Washington, DC | date=26 March 2012 }}</ref> |
|||
| ⚫ | On 30 September 2015, Russia started a [[Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War|military intervention in the Syrian Civil War]], consisting of air strikes against militant groups opposed to the Syrian government.<ref name=csm-20151014>{{cite news |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1014/Why-isn-t-Russia-singling-out-ISIS-in-Syria-Because-it-never-said-it-would |title=Why isn't Russia singling out ISIS in Syria? Because it never said it would |author=Fred Weir |newspaper=Christian Science Monitor |date=14 October 2015 |accessdate=17 October 2015}}</ref> |
||
In June 2013, the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister, [[Mikhail Bogdanov]], stated that the Russian naval base at Tartus had been evacuated. Bogdanov stated, that "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".<ref name="rt.com">"[http://rt.com/politics/navy-diplomat-syria-base-251/ All personnel withdrawn from Russian navy base in Syria – diplomat]". RT, 26 June 2013</ref><ref name="washingtonpost.com">"[http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-reports-pullout-from-small-base-in-syria/2013/06/26/4602b63e-de55-11e2-b797-cbd4cb13f9c6_story.html Russia reports pullout from small base in Syria]". ''The Washington Post''. 26 June 2013</ref> |
|||
But on 1 October 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry said that the Russian air fleet in Syria included over 50 warplanes and helicopters at their depot in Tartus.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite web|url=http://www.rt.com/news/317179-russian-airforce-syria-aircraft/|title=Russian Air Force in Syria deploying over 50 planes & choppers – Defense Ministry|work=RT English|accessdate=18 October 2015}}</ref> |
|||
===Russian air base Palmyra=== |
|||
Russia had in 2013 — and presumably still has today — an airbase in [[Tadmur|Palmyra (Tadmur)]].<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/syria/2013/01/25/Syria-Russia-evacuates-nationals-remains-close-Assad_8136864.html|title=Syria: Russia evacuates nationals, remains close to Assad|date=25 January 2013|publisher=ANSAmed|accessdate=27 January 2013|location=Beirut}}</ref> |
|||
===Russian weapon sales=== |
|||
| ⚫ | In 2008, Syria agreed to purchase modern weapons including modern anti-tank and anti-air missile systems from Russia: [[Mikoyan MiG-29M|MiG-29SMT]] fighters, [[Pantsir-S1|Pantsir S1E air-defense systems]], [[9K720 Iskander|Iskander tactical missile systems]], [[Yakovlev Yak-130|Yak-130]] aircraft, and two [[Amur class|Amur-1650]] submarines. Russia's foreign minister said his country's sale of weapons to Syria would not upset the balance of power in the Middle East. The sales he stated are "in line with the international law" and "in the interests of strengthening stability and maintaining security" in regions close to Russian borders, [[Sergei Lavrov]] told reporters in 2008.<ref>[http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/09/29/Russia_defends_arms_sales_to_Syria/UPI-28611222726785/ ‘Russia defends arms sales to Syria’]. UPI.com, 29 September 2008.</ref> [[Dmitri Trenin]] reported in the ''New York Times'' that from 2000 to 2010 Russia sold around $1.5 billion worth of arms to Syria, making Damascus Moscow’s seventh-largest client.<ref name=Trenin>{{cite news|last=Trenins|first=Dmitri|title=Why Russia Supports Assad|url=http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/opinion/why-russia-supports-assad.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss|accessdate=9 February 2012|newspaper=[[New York Times]] |date=9 February 2012}}</ref> |
||
In 2011 and 2012, Syria's [[Syrian Armed Forces#Modernization|arms contracts with Russia]] amounted to $687 million.<ref name=Amos2/><ref name=SIPRI>{{cite web|title=SIPRI Arms Transfers Database|url=http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|publisher=Stockholm International Peace Research Institute|accessdate=17 November 2013}}</ref> |
|||
===Secret Russian spy bases=== |
|||
{{main|Center S}} |
|||
The journal '' [[Jane's Defence Weekly]]'' in 2006 assumed two secret, joint, Russian–Syrian [[signals intelligence]] ‘spy’ posts to exist within Syria.<ref name=teleg.8Oct14/> |
|||
The biggest Russian electronic ‘eavesdropping post’ outside Russian territory was in 2012 established in [[Latakia]].<ref name=guar.23Dec12>{{cite news|title=Russian military presence in Syria poses challenge to US-led intervention|url=http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/23/syria-crisis-russian-military-presence|accessdate=15 October 2015|newspaper=The Guardian|date=23 December 2012|author=Julan Borger}}</ref> |
|||
Another signals intelligence base, [[Center S|"Center S" in Latin script ("Центр С" in Cyrillic script)]], jointly operated by the Russian [[OSNAZ]] [[GRU]] radio electronic intelligence agency and a Syrian intelligence agency, situated near [[Al-Harra, Syria|Al-Harra]] in Syria close to the Israeli-occupied [[Golan Heights]], was on 5 October 2014 captured by [[Free Syrian Army]] rebels during the [[Daraa offensive (October 2014)]].<ref name=spioenkop>{{cite web | url=http://spioenkop.blogspot.nl/2014/10/captured-russian-spy-facility-reveals.html | title=Captured Russian spy facility reveals the extent of Russian aid to the Assad regime | date=6 October 2014|work=spioenkop | accessdate=15 October 2015}}</ref><ref name=teleg.8Oct14>[http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11148857/Russian-spy-base-in-Syria-used-to-monitor-rebels-and-Israel-seized.html ‘Russian spy base in Syria used to monitor rebels and Israel seized’]. date=8 October 2014|work=Telegraph.co.uk|accessdate=14 October 2015}}</ref> |
|||
===Syria’s air defence with Russian gear=== |
|||
After the 2007 Israeli [[Operation Orchard]] airstrikes on an alleged nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in [[Deir ez-Zor Governorate]], and again after the March 2011 [[Syrian Civil War|Syrian protests]], Syria’s air defences have been bolstered with Russian upgrades—which the Russians have repeatedly denied. According to Western experts, the Russians delivered [[Buk missile system#9K317 Buk-M2|Buk-M2]] and [[Pantsir-S1]] (also known as SA-22) mobile missile launch and radar systems. While the Syrians were not capable of using such equipment to its full capacity, the Russians also helped man the crews and train the crews. As of late 2012, Syria’s air-defence command force comprised thousands of anti-aircraft guns, 130 anti-aircraft missile batteries, and an estimated 50,000 troops, and was qualified by '' [[the Guardian]]'' as “robust”.<ref name=guar.23Dec12/> |
|||
===2015 Russian military intervention=== |
|||
| ⚫ | |||
| ⚫ | On 30 September 2015, Russia started a [[Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War|military intervention in the Syrian Civil War]], consisting of air strikes against militant groups opposed to the Syrian government.<ref name=csm-20151014>{{cite news |url=http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1014/Why-isn-t-Russia-singling-out-ISIS-in-Syria-Because-it-never-said-it-would |title=Why isn't Russia singling out ISIS in Syria? Because it never said it would |author=Fred Weir |newspaper=Christian Science Monitor |date=14 October 2015 |accessdate=17 October 2015}}</ref> |
||
==Economic relations== |
==Economic relations== |
||
| Line 44: | Line 72: | ||
==References== |
==References== |
||
{{Reflist |
{{Reflist}} |
||
==Further reading== |
==Further reading== |
||
Revision as of 12:31, 22 October 2015
 | |
 Russia |
 Syria |
|---|---|
Russia–Syria relations (Russian: Российско-сирийские отношения) refers to the bilateral relationship between the two countries, Russia and Syria. Russia has an embassy in Damascus and had a consulate in Aleppo, since closed down. Syria has an embassy in Moscow. Russia enjoys a historically strong, stable, and friendly relationship with Syria, as it did until the Arab Spring, with most of the Arab countries.[1] In addition, Russia's only Mediterranean naval base for its Black Sea Fleet is located in the Syrian port of Tartus.[2]
Early in 2012, Russia took a strong stand in support of Syria's government and against international action—promoted by Western and Arab countries against Syria. As one of five veto-wielding members of UN Security Council, Russia promised to veto any sanctions against the Syrian government put before the Security Council and continued supplying large amounts of arms that Syria had earlier contracted to buy.[3]
Russian – Syrian relations since the independence
Syria gained full independence from France on 17 April 1946, but could not attain stability for a long period after the end of World War II. Political life in Syria, relatively calm during the years 1945-1949, entered a stage of total turmoil and disorder beginning in 1949. Three coups d'état occurred during 1949-1953, ushering in military dictatorships twice in the process. Finally, the Ba'ath Party came to the fore in Syrian politics following the military coup d’état of February 25, 1954. With the ascendancy of the Ba'ath Party, the USSR became an important ally for Syria.
Relations between Syria and the USSR, which had been taking an interest in the Middle East, were initiated by a secret agreement signed on February 10, 1946, just before the declaration of independence of Syria. That agreement prescribed diplomatic and political support from the USSR in the international arena and Soviet military help for the foundation of the national army. A non-aggression pact signed on April 10, 1950 further cemented Soviet–Syrian relations. This rapprochement between the two countries emerged naturally from the international conjuncture of that era. Looking at the Cold War period, we see that each conflict and war that broke out in the Middle East acted as a factor leading Syria to form closer ties with the USSR.
The first event which enhanced rapprochement between USSR and Syria was the Suez Crisis. The prestige of Soviets increased in the Middle East thanks to their response to the crisis breaking out in late 1956. Soviet aid to Syria accelerated amidst a general conflict of interests in the Middle East involving Eastern and Western governments. Cooperation between the USSR and Syria included military and economic strategic agreements.
The Baghdad Pact (see Central Treaty Organization), with its ultimately unsuccessful formation of CENTO, was another development that brought the USSR and Syria closer diplomatically. Syrians perceived this agreement as a pact against themselves. Indeed, among the consequences of the Baghdad Pact were not only a deepening of Syrian relations with the USSR but also a separation of Middle Eastern countries into allied satellites of the Eastern and Western blocs.
Another development in Soviet-Syrian relations took place with the accession to power of Hafez Assad in Syria in 1970.[4]
7 Soviet sailors were wounded when a Soviet naval ship was assaulted with rockets by 2 Syrian helicopters in Tartus 1989, the attack was ruled as an accident.[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]
Military cooperation
Russian naval base Tartus
The Syrian port city of Tartus hosts Russia's only naval facility in the Mediterranean region and only remaining military facility outside the former USSR: the Russian naval facility in Tartus.
The base was established during the Cold War to support the Soviet Navy's fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, under a 1971 agreement with Syria.
Since Russia forgave Syria of three-fourths, or $9.8 billion, of its $13.4 billion Soviet-era debt and became its main arms supplier, Russia and Syria have conducted talks about allowing Russia to develop and enlarge its naval base, so that Russia can strengthen its naval presence in the Mediterranean.[17] Amid Russia's deteriorating relations with the West, because of the 2008 South Ossetia War and plans to deploy a US missile defense shield in Poland, President Assad agreed to the port’s conversion into a permanent Middle East base for Russia’s nuclear-armed warships.[18] Since 2009, Russia has been renovating the Tartus naval base and dredging the port to allow access for its larger naval vessels.[19]
In 2012, a commentator called the use of the deep-water port at Tartus Russia’s greatest strategic and geopolitical interest in Syria,[20] and some critics saw the position of the naval facility as a chief motivating factor for Russia to speak out in favor of the Assad government.[clarification needed][21][22]
In June 2013, the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, stated that the Russian naval base at Tartus had been evacuated. Bogdanov stated, that "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".[23][24] But on 1 October 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry said that the Russian air fleet in Syria included over 50 warplanes and helicopters at their depot in Tartus.[25]
Russian air base Palmyra
Russia had in 2013 — and presumably still has today — an airbase in Palmyra (Tadmur).[26]
Russian weapon sales
In 2008, Syria agreed to purchase modern weapons including modern anti-tank and anti-air missile systems from Russia: MiG-29SMT fighters, Pantsir S1E air-defense systems, Iskander tactical missile systems, Yak-130 aircraft, and two Amur-1650 submarines. Russia's foreign minister said his country's sale of weapons to Syria would not upset the balance of power in the Middle East. The sales he stated are "in line with the international law" and "in the interests of strengthening stability and maintaining security" in regions close to Russian borders, Sergei Lavrov told reporters in 2008.[27] Dmitri Trenin reported in the New York Times that from 2000 to 2010 Russia sold around $1.5 billion worth of arms to Syria, making Damascus Moscow’s seventh-largest client.[28]
In 2011 and 2012, Syria's arms contracts with Russia amounted to $687 million.[29][30]
Secret Russian spy bases
The journal Jane's Defence Weekly in 2006 assumed two secret, joint, Russian–Syrian signals intelligence ‘spy’ posts to exist within Syria.[31] The biggest Russian electronic ‘eavesdropping post’ outside Russian territory was in 2012 established in Latakia.[32]
Another signals intelligence base, "Center S" in Latin script ("Центр С" in Cyrillic script), jointly operated by the Russian OSNAZ GRU radio electronic intelligence agency and a Syrian intelligence agency, situated near Al-Harra in Syria close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, was on 5 October 2014 captured by Free Syrian Army rebels during the Daraa offensive (October 2014).[33][31]
Syria’s air defence with Russian gear
After the 2007 Israeli Operation Orchard airstrikes on an alleged nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in Deir ez-Zor Governorate, and again after the March 2011 Syrian protests, Syria’s air defences have been bolstered with Russian upgrades—which the Russians have repeatedly denied. According to Western experts, the Russians delivered Buk-M2 and Pantsir-S1 (also known as SA-22) mobile missile launch and radar systems. While the Syrians were not capable of using such equipment to its full capacity, the Russians also helped man the crews and train the crews. As of late 2012, Syria’s air-defence command force comprised thousands of anti-aircraft guns, 130 anti-aircraft missile batteries, and an estimated 50,000 troops, and was qualified by the Guardian as “robust”.[32]
2015 Russian military intervention
On 30 September 2015, Russia started a military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, consisting of air strikes against militant groups opposed to the Syrian government.[34]
Economic relations
Russia has significant trade relations with Syria. Its exports to Syria were worth $1.1 billion in 2010 and its investments in the country were valued at $19.4 billion in 2009 according to The Moscow Times.[35][36] Besides lucrative arms contracts worth at least $4 billion, Russian firms have a substantial presence in Syria's infrastructure, energy and tourism industries.[29] Stroitransgaz, a natural gas facility construction company, has the largest Russian operation in Syria. In 2010, it was involved in projects worth $1.1 billion and had a staff of 80 Russians working in Syria. Stroitransgaz is building a natural gas processing plant 200 kilometers east of Homs in the Al-Raqqa region and is involved in technical support for the construction of the Arab Gas Pipeline. Tatneft is the most significant Russian energy firm in Syria. The company began in 2010 through a joint venture with the Syrian national oil company to pump Syrian oil and it planned to spend $12 million on exploratory wells near the Iraqi border.[35] Other firms with large business interests in Syria include steel pipe manufacturer TMK, gas producer ITERA, and national carrier Aeroflot.[29]
Political relations
Russia was one of three countries to vote against a formal UN Security Council condemnation of the Bashar al-Assad government for alleged attacks on civilians in the city of Homs in February 2012. It also opposed any sanctions or intervention against the government.[28] Russia's association with the ruling Assad family goes back four decades.[28] Recently though, Russian politicians have begun to acknowledge Bashar's potential downfall, saying "An opposition victory can't be excluded, unfortunately, but it's necessary to look at the facts: There is a trend for the government to progressively lose control over an increasing part of the territory," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Moscow's Middle East envoy, said during hearings at a Kremlin advisory body.
See also
- Embassy of Russia in Damascus
- Embassy of Syria in Moscow
- Russia's role in the Syrian conflict
- China–Syria relations
References
- ^ Russia clings on to last outpost in West Asia| Pionner| 3 February 2012
- ^ contribution to ‘What Should the United States Do About Syria?: A TNR Symposium.’| Daniel W. Drezner| tnr.com| 9 February 2012
- ^ Why Russia is willing to sell arms to Syria By Fred Weir| csmonitor.com| 19 January 2012
- ^ Historical Background and the Present State of the Russian-Syrian Relations http://www.erjournal.ru/journals_n/1354741741.pdf
- ^ http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/06/russia-repeating-cold-war-mistakes-syria-crisis-1957-nasser-2/
- ^ The Daily Review. April 1989. p. 80.
- ^ Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual. Academic International Press. 1989. p. 57.
- ^ Asian Bulletin. APACL Publications. 1989. p. 68.
- ^ Asian Bulletin. APACL Publications. 1989. p. 68.
- ^ The Workbook: Access to Information. Southwest Research and Information Center. 1991. p. 31.
- ^ Report on the USSR. RFE/RL, Incorporated. April 1989. p. 41.
- ^ Israel & Palestine Political Report. Magelan S.A.R.L. 1989. p. 15.
- ^ Israel and Palestine Political Report. Magelan S.A.R.L. 1989. p. 15.
- ^ Joshua Handler; Amy Wickenheiser; William M. Arkin (1990). Naval Safety 1989: The Year of the Accident. Greenpeace. p. 19.
- ^ The Workbook. Southwest Research and Information Center. 1990. p. 19.
- ^ The Air Force Law Review. Air Force Judge Advocate General's School. 1990. p. 201.
- ^ Weitz, Richard (2010). Global security watch--Russia : a reference handbook. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger Security International. p. 30. ISBN 978-0-313-35434-2.
- ^ "Big Russian flotilla led by Admiral Kuznetsov carrier heads for Syrian port". DEBKAfile. August 21, 2008. Retrieved August 22, 2008.
{{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter:|coauthors=(help) [dead link] - ^ "INSS: Syria Report" (PDF). Institute for National Security Studies. Retrieved 3 September 2011.
- ^ Sayginer, Ozge (20 June 2012). "Why Russia will never back down? Reasons behind supporting the Assad regime". The European Strategist. Retrieved 13 October 2015.
- ^ "The Long Road to Damascus". The Economist. 402 (8771): 25–28. 11 February 2012.
- ^ Sharp, Jeremy M.; Christopher M. Blanchard, eds. (26 March 2012), "Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime", CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service
- ^ "All personnel withdrawn from Russian navy base in Syria – diplomat". RT, 26 June 2013
- ^ "Russia reports pullout from small base in Syria". The Washington Post. 26 June 2013
- ^ "Russian Air Force in Syria deploying over 50 planes & choppers – Defense Ministry". RT English. Retrieved 18 October 2015.
- ^ "Syria: Russia evacuates nationals, remains close to Assad". Beirut: ANSAmed. 25 January 2013. Retrieved 27 January 2013.
- ^ ‘Russia defends arms sales to Syria’. UPI.com, 29 September 2008.
- ^ a b c Trenins, Dmitri (9 February 2012). "Why Russia Supports Assad". New York Times. Retrieved 9 February 2012.
- ^ a b c Amos, Howard (26 August 2011). "News Analysis: Russia Damages Image in Arab Spring". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 17 September 2011.
- ^ "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database". Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 17 November 2013.
- ^ a b ‘Russian spy base in Syria used to monitor rebels and Israel seized’. date=8 October 2014|work=Telegraph.co.uk|accessdate=14 October 2015}}
- ^ a b Julan Borger (23 December 2012). "Russian military presence in Syria poses challenge to US-led intervention". The Guardian. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
- ^ "Captured Russian spy facility reveals the extent of Russian aid to the Assad regime". spioenkop. 6 October 2014. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
- ^ Fred Weir (14 October 2015). "Why isn't Russia singling out ISIS in Syria? Because it never said it would". Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 17 October 2015.
- ^ a b Amos, Howard (2 September 2011). "Billions of Dollars of Russian Business Suffers Along With Syria". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 17 September 2011.
- ^ "Syria: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World" (PDF). European Commission. Retrieved 18 September 2011.
Further reading
- Allison, Roy (2013). "Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis". International Affairs. 89 (4): 795–823. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12046.
External links
- Template:Ru icon Documents on the Russia–Syria relationship at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Diplomatic missions
| Africa |  | |
|---|---|---|
| Americas | ||
| Asia | ||
| Europe | ||
| Disputes | ||
| Diplomatic missions | ||
| Multilateral | ||
