Russo-Georgian War

2008 South Ossetia war
Part of Georgian–Ossetian conflict and Georgian–Abkhazian conflict
File:2008 South Ossetia war.svg Location of Georgia (including Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and the Russian part of North Caucasus
Date 7 August 2008 – 16 August Location Georgian Territory Result Russian/South Ossetian/Abkhazian victory Partial recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent republics. Territorial changes Georgia loses control over parts of Abkhazia and S. Ossetia it previously held.
Belligerents
Russian Federation South Ossetia Abkhazia	Georgia
Commanders and leaders
Dmitry Medvedev (commander-in-chief) Anatoly Khrulyov (58th Army) Vyacheslav Borisov (76th Airborne) Marat Kulakhmetov (peacekepers) Vasiliy Lunev Anatoliy Zaitsev	Mikheil Saakashvili (commander-in-chief) Davit Kezerashvili Mamuka Kurashvili (WIA)
Strength
Est. at least 15,000 regulars in Georgia (as of 13/08/08), not including support and rear troops (in Russia and on the sea) 3,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists; unknown number of volunteers unknown number of volunteers, potential of 45,000 according to the At least 23,000 total	Estimate: 12,000 troops including 75 tanks and armoured personnel carriers Total military personnel is 37,000 as of 2007 Reserves number up to 250,000. Unknown number of Georgian Police deployed in the conflict zone
Casualties and losses
South Ossetia: 300 killed, 41 captured (Georgian estimate) Confirmed by Russia: 48 killed, 157 wounded and 6 captured Confirmed by Abkhazia: 1 killed, 2 wounded	Confirmed by Georgia: 144 soldiers killed, 25 missing, 42 captured and 1,964 wounded; 14 policemen killed and 22 missing Independent Georgian estimate: 400 Killed Russian intelligence estimate: 3,144 Killed
Civilian casualties: Georgia: Officials initially claimed at least 228 Georgian civilians killed, but later adjusted that number to 69; authorities in Georgia initially classified 872 civilians as missing; One foreign civilian killed and 3 wounded. South Ossetia: Russia and South Ossetian officials initially claimed 1,492 South Ossetian civilians killed. These numbers were disputed by Human Rights Watch and Memorial. The Russian Procurator's office says it's investigating 365 deaths. Human Rights Watch believes Russian and South Ossetian figure of 300-400 civilians is a "useful starting point,", and one HRW investigator estimates the total civilian dead in South Ossetia as less than 100. Letter of Rachel Denber (HRW) to Business Week</ref> Refugees:Georgia: At least 158,000 civilians displaced (including 56,000 from Gori, Georgia and 15,000 Georgians from South Ossetia per UNHCR). Estimate by Georgian Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs: at least 230,000. South Ossetia: Displaced from South Ossetia to Russia: Russian estimate, 30,000; HRW estimate, 24,000.

The 2008 South Ossetia War (The 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict) consisted of an armed conflict between Georgia on the one side, and Russia and the separatist self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other. It occurred in August 2008 and involved land, air and sea warfare.

A civil war fought after the breakup of the Soviet Union left parts of South Ossetia under the control of an unrecognised separatist government backed by Russia. Other parts remained under the control of Georgia. Hostilities escalated during June and July 2008. On the evening of August 7, 2008, Georgia launched a ground- and air-based military attack on South Ossetia's capital, Tskhinvali. Russia responded by sending troops into South Ossetia and launching bombing raids farther into Georgia. The events during 7 August remain a matter of debates and controversy . On August 8, Russian naval forces blocked Georgia's coast and landed ground forces and paratroopers on Georgian coast. Russian and Abkhazian forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge, held by Georgia, and invaded western parts of Georgia's interior. After five days of heavy fighting, Georgian forces were ejected from South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian troops invaded Georgia proper, occupying the cities of Poti and Gori among others.

Following mediation by EU chairman, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement on August 12, signed by Georgia and Russia on 15 August in Tbilisi and on August 16 in Moscow. On August 12, president Medvedev had already ordered a halt to Russian military operations in Georgia but fighting did not stop immediately. After the signing of the ceasefire Russia pulled most of its troops out of Georgia proper. However, Russia established "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia and check points in Georgia's interior (Poti, Senaki).

On August 26, 2008 Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. International monitoring personnel was deployed in Georgia on October 1. Following international agreements, Russia completed its withdrawal from Georgia on October 8. Russian troops remain stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including areas under Georgian control before the war, under bilateral agreements with respective governments.

A number of incidents have occurred in both the border conflict zones since the war ended.

Naming

Commentators have applied various names to the 2008 South Ossetia war. Some of the names include:

• August War
• Five-Day War
• Georgia-Russia conflict
• Russian-Georgian War, Russia-Georgia War or Russo-Georgian War

Background

Main article: Background of the 2008 South Ossetia war

See also: Georgian-Ossetian conflict; South Ossetian independence referendum, 2006; and 2008 Georgia-Russia crisis

Ethnic map of the Caucasus from 1995: Ossetians live in North and South Ossetia, as well as in central Georgia.

The Ossetians, an Iranic-speaking people, look to the Don River area for their ethnic origins. In the 13th century, they were pushed southwards and settled along the border with Georgia during the Mongol invasions. Ossetians and Georgians have had a long and complex history with periods of peaceful coexistence interspersed with violence from both sides.

In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Georgia stayed Menshevik controlled, while the Bolsheviks took control of Russia. In June 1920, a Russian-sponsored Ossetian force attacked the Georgian Army and People' Guard.

"The Georgians reacted with vigour and defeated the insurgents and their supporters in a series of hard-fought battles. Five thousand people perished in the fighting and 20,000 Ossetes fled into Soviet Russia. The Georgian People's Guard displayed a frenzy of chauvinistic zeal during the mopping-up operations, many villages being burnt to the ground and large areas of fertile land ravaged and depopulated."

Eight months later, the Red Army successfully invaded Georgia and in 1922 the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was created.

In 1990, as the USSR neared collapse, the longtime anti-Soviet dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia was emerging as Georgia's first independent leader. In basing his campaign for the presidency on a nationalist platform, dubbed Georgia for Georgians, he projected ethnic Georgians, who at the time constituted 70% of the population, as the country's true patriots, to the debasement of South Ossetians as newcomers.

Amidst rising ethnic tensions, a military conflict broke out in January 1991 when Georgia sent in troops to crush a separatist movement. Estimates of deaths in this fighting exceed 2,000 people. During the war several atrocities occurred on both sides, including atrocities committed by Georgian troops in Tskhinvali. Approximately 100.000 Ossetians fled Georgia and South Ossetia, while 23.000 Georgians left South Ossetia. The war resulted in South Ossetia, which had a Georgian ethnic minority of around one fifth of the total population (70,000), breaking away from Georgia and gaining de facto independence. After a cease-fire in 1992, Tskhinvali was isolated from the Georgian territory around it and Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia under the JCC's mandate of demilitarization. The 1992 ceasefire also defined both a zone of conflict around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South Ossetian territories.

In late 1994, Georgia's Supreme Council ordered the disbanding of the South-Ossetian autonomous region (oblast). The government in Tbilisi established Georgian as the country's principal language, whereas the Ossetians' first two languages were Russian and Ossetian.

The conflict remained frozen until 2003 when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in the Rose Revolution which ousted president Eduard Shevardnadze. In the years that followed, Saakashvili's government pushed a program to strengthen failing state institutions, including security and military. In 2007, Georgia spend 6% of GDP on its military and had the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. Restoring South Ossetia and Abkhazia (a region with a similar movement) to Georgian control has been a goal of Saakashvili since he came to power.

In the 2006 South Ossetian independence referendum, 99% of those voting supported full independence, although ethnic Georgians living in the region did not participate. Georgia accused Russia of the annexation of its internationally recognised territory and installing a puppet government led by Eduard Kokoity and several officials who previously served in the Russian FSB and Army.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that he would "protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they are". The proportion of Russians living in South Ossetia has always been low (in 1989, Ossetians accounted for around 60 percent, Georgians 20 percent, Armenians 10 percent and Russians 5 percent of the population), but about 7/8 of South Ossetians have been issued with Russian passports. Reuters describes the government as "dependent on Russia, [supplier of] two thirds of [its] annual budget", and reports that "Russia's state-controlled gas giant Gazprom is building new gas pipelines and infrastructure" worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply its cities with energy. In mid-April, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Prime Minister Putin had given instructions to the federal government whereby Moscow would pursue economic, diplomatic, and administrative relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as with the subjects of Russia.

Georgia has a close relationship with the United States, which has helped to train and arm the Georgian military. While Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves on its own, it is an important transit route that supplies the West. The pipeline has been a key factor for the United States' support for Georgia, allowing the West to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil while bypassing Russia and Iran.

Prelude to war

See also: Timeline of the 2008 South Ossetia war and First clashes in South Ossetia

In April 2008, Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a Georgian spy plane flying over Abkhazia. Russia denied involvement. Also Georgian interior ministry officials showed the BBC video footage of Russian troops deploying heavy military hardware in the breakaway region of Abkhazia and said that "it proved the Russians were a fighting force, not just peacekeepers." Russia denied the accusations.

At 8:05 a.m. on 1 August two roadside bombs hit a Georgian police vehicle on a detour road connecting Georgian-populated villages near the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. The five policemen were wounded (six according to the secondary sources ). Late in the evening, intense fighting began between Georgian troops and the forces of South Ossetia. Georgia claimed that South Ossetian separatists had shelled Georgian villages in violation of a ceasefire. South Ossetia denied provoking the conflict. A South Ossetian militiaman was killed by sniper located in a Georgian police post. The Russian peacekeeping command reported that snipers killed at least three people in Tskhinvali around 9 p.m. The command also reported that Tskhinvali came under mortar fire from the Georgian villages of Ergneti and Zemo Nikozi. At 11 p.m. on 1 August South Ossetian side (information from the republican hospital in Tskhinvali) said that six people killed (Roin Doguzov, 22 years old; Garick Bestaev, 38 years old; Anatoliy Kabisov, 45 years old; Vyacheslav Dudaev, 38 years old, Dudick Guchmazov, 40 years old, and Djioev) and seven injured.

On 2 August the South Ossetian side said that shelling and shooting resumed overnight. Mamuka Kurashvili, a Georgian Defense Ministry official in charge of overseeing peacekeeping operations, said that the Georgian side had opened fire in response to shelling of Georgian villages. Six civilians and one Georgian policeman were injured as a result of shelling of the Georgian villages of Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli and Ergneti, the Georgian Interior Ministry said. The South Ossetian side said that another two people, including a Russian soldier from the Russian North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion, were killed in fighting on August 2, bringing the toll to six people killed and about 15 injured as a result of intense shooting by the Georgian side directed towards Tskhinvali and nearby Ossetian villages late on August 1 and overnight on August 2.
The Russian military exercise Caucasus Frontier 2008, held almost concurrently with the joint US-Georgian Immediate Response 2008 exercise, ended on 2 August, after roughly one month of operations.

On 5 August, Russian ambassador-at-large Yuri Popov warned that Russia would intervene in the event of military conflict. Dmitry Medoyev declared from Moscow that volunteers were already arriving, primarily "from North Ossetia", in the Republic of South Ossetia to offer help in the event of Georgian aggression.

On 6 August South Ossetia and Georgia failed to agree on the format of talks. South Ossetian side had proposed holding a JCC session with the participation of Georgian, South Ossetian, Russian and Russia’s North Ossetian negotiators in Tskhinvali on 9 August. Tbilisi has consistently refused to participate in the quadripartite JCC talks.
According to the eyewitness account of a Nezavisimaya gazeta correspondent sporadic heavy shelling of Tskhinvali by Georgian military started on August 6. The weapons used by Georgians, the eyewitness claims, were mortars, artillery and sniper rifles. South Ossetian military officials speculated that the Georgian army was preparing for a full-scale attack on the city. Russian correspondents report that the city was under artillery and mortar fire that continued all night long.

Active stage of the war

Events of August 7

See also: 2008 South Ossetia War § Discussion about responsibility for war and starting it

Georgian officials claim that on August 7 at around 2 p.m. Ossetian artillery fire that had begun the night before resumed, targeting Georgian positions in the village of Avnevi in South Ossetia and continuing for several hours. Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze reported the killing of two Georgian peacekeepers. At 3 p.m., OSCE monitors on patrol saw large numbers of Georgian artillery and Grad rocket launchers massing on roads north of Gori, just south of the South Ossetian border. At about 7 p.m., President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered a unilateral ceasefire after Georgian troops had occupied several important heights around Tshkinvali. According to the Georgian military, fighting intensified despite the declared ceasefire. South Ossetia denies any such night bombardment of Georgian forces or villages. An OSCE monitoring group in Tskhinvali also did not record outgoing artillery fire from the South Ossetian side before the start of Georgian bombardment, and NATO officials attest to minor skirmishes but nothing that amounted to a provocation, according to Der Spiegel. The Russian and Ossetian governments claim that Saakashvili's ceasefire was as an attempt to buy time while Georgian forces positioned themselves for a major attack. During a news broadcast that began at 11 p.m., Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgian villages were being shelled, and vowed to restore Tbilisi's control by force over what he called the "criminal regime" in South Ossetia to "reinforce order". At 11:30 p.m. on August 7, Georgian forces began a major artillery assault on Tskhinvali. At 11:45 OSCE monitors report shells falling on Tskhinvali every 15–20 seconds. The Georgians used 27 rocket launchers, including 152-millimeter guns as well as cluster bombs. Three brigades began the nighttime assault. Georgia claims that it was responding to Russian troop movements, this claim has not gained support from Georgia's western allies. According to Georgian intelligence and several Russian sources, parts of 58th Russian Army moved to South Ossetian territory through the Roki Tunnel before the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. NATO experts did not question the Georgian claim that the Russians had provoked them by sending their troops through the Roki Tunnel. But their evaluation of the facts was dominated by skepticism that these were the true reasons for Saakashvili's actions. According to an article published in the New York Times on November 6, no conclusive evidence has been as yet presented by Georgia or its Western allies that Russia was invading the country before the Georgian attack or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary.

The Battle of Tskhinvali

Main article: Battle of Tskhinvali

Tskhinvali after the battle

Early in the morning of August 8, Georgia launched a military offensive, codenamed Operation Clear Field, to surround and capture Tskhinvali. At 12:15 a.m., General Marat M. Kulakhmetov, commander of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, reported to the OSCE monitors that his troops had come under fire and that they had casualties. According to a Russian military official, over 10 Russian Peacekeeping force servicemen stationed in Tskhinvali were killed during the attack. The heavy shelling, which included Georgian rockets being fired into South Ossetia left parts of the capital city in ruins, which Russian government sources claimed amounted to genocide. The news of the shelling was extensively covered by Russian media prior to the military reaction that followed, as Russia claimed to have responded in defense of South Ossetians against what they called "a genocide by Georgian forces." Russia claimed civilian casualties may amount up to 2,000 dead in Tskhinvali following the Georgian shelling. The extent of civilian casualties was later disputed in a number of sources, with Human Rights Watch report speaking of only 44 dead in Tskhinvali's city hospital, leveled with the BM-21 "Grad" multiple missile systems during the shelling of the city. The Tskhinvali hospital, HRW reports, was under constant shelling for 18 hours.

South Ossetian militias and Russian soldiers offered resistance to the advancing Georgian troops. In the morning, Georgia announced that it had surrounded Tskhinvali and captured eight South Ossetian villages. At 17:35, in a televised address, Mikheil Saakashvili announces that "Georgia controls Tskhinvali and most South Ossetian villages and regions.". However, at 21:22 the South Ossetian government said it is fully in control of Tskhinvali, but that Georgia is making attempts "to retake the city." According to a report in Der Spiegel, the attacking Georgian troops became bogged down and failed to advance further than Tskhinvali. According to an article in the Washington Post, 1,500 Georgian ground troops had entered the centre of Tskhinvali by 10 a.m. on August 8, but were pushed back three hours later by Russian artillery and air attacks. The BBC has discovered evidence that Georgia may have committed war crimes during its attack and occupation of Tskhinvali, including possible deliberate targeting of civilians. The Human Rights Watch found some evidence of firing being directed into basements, locations which civilians frequently choose as a place of shelter.

According to Georgia, Russian military aircraft violated Georgian airspace around 10 a.m. on 8 August. Starting around 2 a.m., international press agencies began running reports of Russian tanks in the Roki tunnel. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit, the First Battalion of the 135th Regiment, was ordered at around dawn of August 8 to move through the Roki Tunnel and reinforce the Russian forces in Tshkinvali. According to him, the unit passed through the tunnel at 2:30 p.m. It reached Tshkinvali at the evening, meeting heavy resistance from Georgian troops. Georgia disputes the account, saying that it was in heavy combat with Russian forces near the tunnel long before dawn of 8 August.

During the evening of August 8, vicious fighting took place in the area of Tskhinvali and in South Ossetia. The fighting in South Ossetian towns and villages was done by the local militia and volunteers, while Russian troops concentrated on engaging larger Georgian army groups. Russia also undertook action to suppress the Georgian artillery and the Russian Air Force launched strikes on Georgia's logistical infrastructure. According to some reports, Russian special units prevented Georgian saboteurs from blowing up the Roki Tunnel, which could have hindered the sending of reinforcements to South Ossetia.

On the early afternoon of August 9 the Russian military stated that Georgian forces had been driven out of Tskhinvali and that the city had been "fully liberated."

Burned Georgian tank in Tskhinvali

After being driven out or pulled back from Tskhinvali, the Georgian units regrouped with armoured reinforcements from Gori. On the later half of August 9, the regrouped Georgian forces reportedly launched a new offensive against Russian and South Ossetian defenders of Tskhinvali, using heavy tube and rocket artillery, while heavy fighting was reportedly underway on the city outskirts with Georgian forces, breaking through the defense and the rebel sources reporting three enemy tanks destroyed. Just before midnight a five-hour artillery onslaught on the city ended, but the fighting with the Georgian infantry in the south of Tskhinvali continued. The South Ossetian forces supposedly complained, that Georgia had not yet provided a peace corridor to evacuate the civilians, who were caught up in crossfire.

By August 10, the joint Russian and South Ossetian forces regained control over the city as the Georgian military withdrew. However, according to the Russians, some Georgian snipers and mobile infantry groups still remained in Tskhinvali. According to the Georgian Defence Minister, the Georgian military tried to push into Tskhinvali three times in total. During the last one, they got a very heavy counter attack which Georgian officials described as "something like hell." In total, the fighting in the Tskhinval area lasted for three days and nights, by the end of which Georgian artillery was either destroyed or had left its positions, from which it could shell the city and Georgian ground troops pulled out of the city.

Bombing and occupation of Gori

See also: Occupation of Gori

Pictures on display outside the Georgian parliament showing the destruction after Russian bombings in Gori

Gori is a major Georgian city close to the border with the de facto independent republic of South Ossetia, about 25 km from Tskhinvali. It was the staging area for the Georgian army during the fighting for the capital of South Ossetia and was bombed several times by the Russian Air Force.

Around 6 a.m. on 9 August, Reuters reported that two Russian fighters had bombed a Georgian artillery position near Gori. A later attack hit the central district of the city, killing one Dutch journalist. An air-to-ground missile also hit the Gori hospital. Human Rights Watch (HRW), an international rights group, accused Russia of deploying controversial and indiscriminately deadly cluster bombs on civilian areas of Georgia. According to HRW at least eight civilians were killed and dozens injured when a Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in the centre of Gori on August 12. According to the Russian military, three bombs hit an armament depot and the façade of one of the adjacent 5-storey apartment buildings suffered as a result exploding ammunition from the depot. The Georgian government reported that 60 civilians were killed when at least one bomb hit an apartment in Gori.

On the evening of August 10, large numbers of the civilian population began to flee the city. By the next day 56,000 people fled the district. The next day, at 5 p.m., the Georgian army started to abandon the city in disarray, without firing a shot, following their defeat at Tskhinvali. A Times reporter described the Georgian withdrawal as "sudden and dramatic", saying that the Gori residents watched in horror as their army abandoned their positions. Around August 13 Russian ground forces entered Gori. On August 14, the Russian Ministry of Defence official Vyacheslav Borisov claimed that the city of Gori was controlled jointly by Georgian Police and Russian troops. He further said that Russian troops would start leaving Gori in two days. Russian troops said they were removing military hardware and ammunition from an arms depot outside Gori. Russian troops were also seen on the road from Gori to Tbilisi, but they turned off to the north, about an hour from Tbilisi, and encamped. Georgian troops occupied the road six miles (about 10 km) closer to Tbilisi.

The Russian forces denied access to some humanitarian aid missions seeking to assist civilians. The United Nations, which has described the humanitarian situation in Gori as "desperate," was able to deliver only limited food supplies to the city. On August 15, Russian troops allowed a number of humanitarian supplies into the city but continued their blockade of the strategically located city. In the August 17 report, HRW said the organization's researchers interviewed ethnic Georgians from the city of Gori and surrounding villages who described how armed South Ossetian militias attacked their cars and kidnapped civilians as people tried to flee in response to militia attacks on their homes following the Russian advance into the area. In phone interviews, people remaining in Gori region villages told HRW that they had witnessed looting and arson attacks by South Ossetian militias in their villages, but were afraid to leave after learning about militia attacks on those who fled. The Russian human rights group Memorial called these attacks "pogroms".

The occupation lasted until August 22.

Abkhazian front

See also: Battle of the Kodori Valley

According Russian Ministry of Defense an action in the Black Sea off Abkhazia on August 9 resulted in a Georgian naval unit being sunk by the Russian Navy. The Russians claimed that Georgian ships had violated the security zone of the Black Sea Fleet and therefore the action was in accordance with international law. Following the action, the remaining Georgian ships withdrew to a nearby harbor. On August 10 Abkhazia declared a full military mobilization to drive out the 1,000 Georgian troops from their remaining stronghold in the Kodori Valley. The next day, Russian paratroopers deployed in Abkhazia carried out raids deep inside Georgian territory to destroy military bases from where Georgia could send reinforcements to its troops sealed off in South Ossetia. Russian forces reached the military base near the town of Senaki outside Abkhazia on the 11th, leaving the base there destroyed. Russian troops also drove through the port of Poti, and took up positions around it. On August 12, the Abkhazian authorities announced the beginning of military operations against Georgian troops in the Kodori Gorge area. On the same day, Georgia said it was withdrawing its troops from the Kodori Gorge "as a gesture of goodwill". On August 13, all of the remaining Georgian forces, including at least 1,500 civilians in the Kodori Valley, had retreated from Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Occupation of Poti

Main article: Occupation of Poti

On August 14, Russian troops entered Poti and sunk several Georgian naval vessels moored in the harbor, as well as removing or destroying military equipment. They also controlled the highway linking Poti to Tbilisi. Four days later, Russian forces in Poti took prisoner 22 Georgian troops who had approached the city. They were taken to a Georgian military base occupied by Russian troops at Senaki.

Six-point peace plan

Territories controlled by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh

On August 10, most international observers began calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict. The European Union and the United States expressed a willingness to send a joint delegation to try and negotiate a ceasefire. Russia, however, ruled out peace talks with Georgia until the latter withdrew from South Ossetia and signed a legally binding pact renouncing the use of force against South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On August 12, Russian President Medvedev said that he had ordered an end to military operations in Georgia, saying that "the operation has achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians has been restored. The aggressor was punished, suffering huge losses." Later on the same day, he met the President-in-Office of the European Union, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and approved a six-point peace plan. Late that night Georgian President Saakashvili agreed to the text. Sarkozy's plan originally had just the first four points. Russia added the fifth and sixth points. Georgia asked for the additions in parentheses, but Russia rejected them, and Sarkozy convinced Georgia to agree to the unchanged text. On August 14, South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity and Abkhazia President Sergei Bagapsh signed the peace plan as well.

1. No recourse to the use of force.
2. Definitive cessation of hostilities.
3. Free access to humanitarian aid (addition rejected: and to allow the return of refugees).
4. The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions.
5. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures. (addition rejected: six months)
6. An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security will take place. (addition rejected: based on the decisions of the UN and the OSCE).

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has 200 personnel in the area, of which nine are military observers. OSCE is preparing to send 100 more observers to monitor the ceasefire, of which 20 are to be deployed immediately. On 18 August, Russia also initially opposed the deployment of 100 new observers into the region, but later accepted them.

After the cease fire had been signed, hostilities did not immediately stop. A reporter for the UK The Guardian was quoted on the 13th of August saying "the idea there is a ceasefire is ridiculous" while Russian troops and irregulars advanced. On August 14, efforts to institute joint patrols of Georgian and Russian police in Gori broke down due to apparent discord among personnel. Reuters stated on August 15, that Russian forces had pushed to 34 miles (55 km) from Tbilisi, the closest during the war; they stopped in Igoeti 41°59′22″N 44°25′04″E, an important crossroads. According to the report, 17 APCs and 200 soldiers, including snipers, participated in the advance; the convoy included a military ambulance, and initially three helicopters provided covering fire. That day, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also traveled to Tbilisi, where Saakashvili signed the 6-point peace plan in her presence. Russian and Georgian forces exchanged prisoners of war on August 19. Georgia said it handed over 5 Russian servicemen, in exchange for 15 Georgians, including two civilians.

Russian withdrawal

Despite numerous calls for a quick withdrawal from Georgia by western leaders, Russian troops occupied some parts of Georgia proper for about two months. In late August, some troops were withdrawn, however Russian troops and checkpoints remained near Gori and Poti, as well as in so called "buffer zones" around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Withdrawal from the buffer zones around South Ossetia and Abkhazia was completed when control was handed over to EU observer mission on 9 October. On 9th September, 2008, Russia officially announced that its troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia would thenceforth be considered foreign troops stationed in "independent states" under bilateral agreements. Russia maintains 3,700 soldiers in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and is planning to open military bases in Java, Tskhinvali, and Gudauta in 2010. Russia is planning to spend $400 million on the bases.

A number of incidents have occurred in both the border conflict zones since the war ended.

Post-conflict incidents

Main article: Georgian–Ossetian conflict § After the 2008 war

Following the end of the war there were still several clashes in the coming months. During September, October and November, 31 people were killed in continuing cross-border fighting. The dead included:
Russia: seven soldiers;
Georgia: eight policemen, two soldiers and two civilians;
South Ossetia: seven civilians;
Abkhazia: four civilians and one border guard.

The worst incident was on October 3, when a car-bomb exploded in Tskhinvali, near the Russian peacekeeping headquarters, killing 13 people and wounding another eight. The Russians and South Ossetians accused the Georgian Security Ministry of being behind the attack, the Georgians denied it and further accused the Russians of orchestrating the attack so they would have enough of a reason to maintain their military presence in Georgia. Among the dead was also the Russian chief of staff of peacekeeping operations. Also, one of the Georgian civilians that were killed was the mayor of the Georgian town of Muzhava, Gia Mebonia.
In addition on August 29, two soldiers serving with the Russian North Ossetian peacekeeping battalion were arrested by Georgian police in the border zone for "illegaly detention" of 4 journalists and three other people, including a 13-year-old boy. They were sentenced to pre-trial custody for two months by a court in Mtskheta, a town close to Tbilisi, on August 30, creating a diplomatic row between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Humanitarian impact

See also: Humanitarian impact of the 2008 South Ossetia war

See also: Humanitarian response to the 2008 South Ossetia war

According to an 18 August report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), at the start of the military conflict on 7 August 2008, Georgian military used indiscriminate and disproportionate force resulting in civilian deaths in South Ossetia. The Russian military has since used indiscriminate force in attacks in South Ossetia and in the Gori district, and has apparently targeted convoys of civilians attempting to flee the conflict zones. HRW said that ongoing looting, arson attacks, and abductions by Russian soldiers and South Ossetian militia are terrorizing the Georgian civilian population, forcing them to flee their homes and preventing displaced people from returning home.

The organisation called the conflict a disaster for civilians, and said an international security mission should be deployed to help protect civilians and create a safe environment for the displaced to return home. HRW also called for international organisations to send fact-finding missions to establish the facts, report on human rights, and urge the authorities to account for any crimes.

In November 2008, Amnesty International released a 69 page report citing both Georgia and Russia of serious international law violations on the conduct of war.

Infrastructure damage

1993 map showing the defense industries of Georgia at the time: Tbilaviamsheni, an aircraft assembly plant in Tbilisi which was bombed during the war, and component plants in other cities.

Georgia claimed Russia had bombed airfields and civil and economic infrastructure, including the Black Sea port of Poti. Between eight and eleven Russian jets reportedly hit container tanks and a shipbuilding plant at the port.

UN UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) provided imagery that witnesses a total of 6 Georgian naval vessels either 'partially or completely submerged' in Poti. 'No other damage to physical infrastructure or vessel-related oil spills' were detected.

Reuters reported that Georgian interior ministry officials claimed an attack on the civilian Tbilisi International Airport, though Russia rejected attack had place. Later, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili denied that the attack had taken place, stating, "There was no attack on the airport in Tbilisi. It was a factory that produces combat airplanes (Tbliaviamsheni, Tbilisi military avionics plant)."

According to Russian sources on 15 August and 17, about 20% of the Tskhinvali's buildings have suffered various damage, including 10% of "beyond repair". On 12 August local authorities had claimed that approximately 70% of Tskhinvali's buildings, both municipal and private, have suffered serious damage.

United Nations' UNOSAT files state 1030 buildings were affected in the area around Tskhinvali, with 783 of them destroyed and 243 severely damaged, as of august 19th. A clear majority of damaged buildings are situated in the villages north of Tskhinvali (between Tamarasheni and Kekhvi). "Observed heavy concentration of damages", agency states, is located "within clearly defined residential areas". The report does not specify whether the buildings were damaged by fighting or destroyed afterwards, but Human Rights Watch claimed that they "confirm the widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages inside South Ossetia".

Retreating Georgian forces have reportedly mined civilian infrastructure in South Ossetia, including some private house basements civilians used to hide during the Georgian offensive.

26 August through 29 August — The United Nations' UNOSAT program published a series of satellite images which showed the extent of the Georgian bombardment of the civilian targets with a disclaimer that this is an initial damage assessment and has not yet been independently validated on the ground. Later, Human Rights Watch (HRW) used the images to support the claim that widespread torching of ethnic Georgian villages had occurred inside South Ossetia.

Reconstruction

On the sidelines of an International High Level Conference in Belgium on "The Future of Parliamentary Involvement in Global Health and Development," a donors' conference for Georgia on October 21 produced billions of dollars in aid for the country. The United States pledged $1 billion to support economic recovery. This came in addition to nonmilitary aid of nearly $40 million in emergency humanitarian assistance delivered by USAID and the U.S. Defense Department during the crisis. The European Commission added another "up to" €500 million. While others did not disclose their actual pledges, diplomats said Germany had pledged €33.7 million to add to their pre-war offer of €35 million. Sweden also ranked high on the list of most generous donors with €40 million while France pledged €7 million. Japan pledged $200 million in recovery aid over three years, primarily for rebuilding roads and rail systems, but they also joined delegates to urge Georgia to continue progress on democratic and economic reforms. The IMF offered a $750 million loan package, while the EU’s European Investment Bank has offered €200 million in loans to rebuild infrastructure damaged or destroyed.

Additionally, the Brussels conference raised more than a sum total of $4 billion in loans and grants for the Tbilisi government by 67 states, international financial institutions and private-sector donors. The amount, which would be paid over a three year period, far exceeded the $3.2 billion the World Bank had estimated Georgia would need to rebuild its infrastructure. Of the total, $2 billion would be on grants, with the remaining in low-interest loans covering the 2008-10 period. Most of the money would be put into the public sector, while some $850 million dollars would be invested directly in private companies.

Outgoing Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze said, "We are deeply moved and humbled by the demonstration of solidarity and support that we have received," additionally noting the pledges were made despite the ongoing effects of a global financial crisis. He then added that "Every single, euro, dollar and pound will make Georgia stronger, more prosperous, freer, more democratic and more genuinely and thoroughly European. (It) will alleviate, to a significant degree, the human suffering that has resulted in the aftermath of the Aug. 7 conflict." Joint summit host, EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, said of the occasion and its outcome that "This is a day of joy." This came after growth projections for Georgia's economy were cut from 9 percent to 3.5 percent with the resulting 127,000 new internally displaced people in and around the new separatist enclaves.

Discussion about responsibility for the war and starting it

The combatants' positions

Georgia's position is that the country acted in self-defence. Around 11:30 p.m. on 7 August the Georgian government claims to have received intelligence information that 150 Russian army vehicles had entered Georgian territory through the Roki Tunnel. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Mikheil Saakashvili said "we wanted to stop the Russian troops before they could reach Georgian villages. When our tanks moved toward Tskhinvali, the Russians bombed the city. They were the ones -- not us -- who reduced Tskhinvali to rubble."

Russia says it acted to defend Russian citizens in South Ossetia, and its own peacekeepers stationed there. The Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia suffered casualties during the initial Georgian artillery barrage on Tskhinvali and were besieged by Georgian troops for two days until a Russian unit broke through to their camp and started evacuating the wounded at 5 a.m. on 9 August. According to a senior Russian official, the first Russian combat unit was ordered to move through the Roki Tunnel at around dawn of 8 August. Defending Russia's decision to launch attacks on Georgia proper, Sergey Lavrov has said that Russia had no choice but to target the military infrastructure being used to sustain the Georgian offensive.

Georgian intelligence and journalistic evaluation

Georgia has released intercepted telephone calls purporting to show that part of a Russian armoured regiment crossed into the separatist enclave of South Ossetia nearly a full day before Georgia’s attack on the capital, Tskhinvali, late on Aug. 7; Russian military played down the significance of the intercepted conversations, saying the troop movements to the enclave before the war erupted were part of the normal rotation and replenishment of longstanding peacekeeping forces there. In a 16 September article, the New York Times described that "at a minimum, the intercepted calls, which senior American officials have reviewed and described as credible if not conclusive, suggest there were Russian military movements earlier than had previously been acknowledged, whether routine or hostile, into Georgian territory as tensions accelerated toward war."

In a later article published on 6 November, the New York Times said that "neither Georgia nor its Western allies have as yet provided conclusive evidence that Russia was invading the country or that the situation for Georgians in the Ossetian zone was so dire that a large-scale military attack was necessary" and that the phone intercepts published by Georgia did not show the Russian column’s size, composition or mission, and that "there has not been evidence that it was engaged with Georgian forces until many hours after the Georgian bombardment."

OSCE monitors

A former senior OSCE official, Ryan Grist, who was in charge of unarmed monitors in South Ossetia, told the BBC that he had been warning of Georgia's military activity before its move into the South Ossetia region, saying there was a "severe escalation" and that this "would give the Russian Federation any excuse it needed in terms of trying to support its own troops". According to Mr. Grist, Georgia launched the first military strikes against Tskhinvali. He has said: "It was clear to me that the [Georgian] attack was completely indiscriminate and disproportionate to any, if indeed there had been any, provocation,” he said. “The attack was clearly, in my mind, an indiscriminate attack on the town, as a town.”

Stephen Young, who was another senior OSCE official in Georgia at the time, has given a similar account. According to him, there had been little or no shelling of Georgian villages on the night Saakashvili’s troops began their onslaught on Tskhinvali, adding that if there had been shelling of Georgian villages that evening as Georgia has claimed, the OSCE monitors at the scene would have heard it. According to him, the monitors only heard occasional small arms fire.

The O.S.C.E. itself, while refusing to discuss its internal findings, stood by the accuracy of its work but urged caution in interpreting it too broadly. “We are confident that all O.S.C.E. observations are expert, accurate and unbiased,” Martha Freeman, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail message. “However, monitoring activities in certain areas at certain times cannot be taken in isolation to provide a comprehensive account.”

On December 2008 Ryan Grist's objectivity was being questioned by Georgia and some Western diplomats in Tbilisi . In an interview with The Wall Street Journal, he acknowledged for the first time that once war broke out he went AWOL across Russian lines on his own freelance fact-finding mission, which ultimately cost him his OSCE job. Grist remains scathing about Georgian actions before and during the war. But he now says some of his comments have been overinterpreted. "I have never said there was no provocation by the South Ossetians." Official OSCE reporting said a unilateral cease-fire Georgia declared on Aug. 7 was broken around 10 p.m., nearly two hours before the Georgian artillery assault on Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital. "What I have said is that the response from the Georgian authorities was absolutely disproportionate," said Mr. Grist. "To react with indiscriminate shelling - there just had to be a Russian response." Western diplomats in Tbilisi say they are confused by the narrow debate over who started the fight. They say it ignores equally important evidence, including Russia's actions during the lead-up to war. Ambassador Terhi Hakala of Finland, head of the OSCE mission to Georgia called what three monitors heard just from villages nearest them on Aug. 7 "a bit irrelevant." She added, "We're very limited in what we can monitor." Hakala also said Mr. Grist didn't give any warnings that were ignored. In the days before the war, Russian-backed South Ossetians were evacuating civilians and unusually had denied OSCE monitors access to several Ossetian villages. "It looks like all sides (including Russians) are waiting for the other side to make a fatal mistake in order to retaliate," said an August 5 report by a European Union diplomat. Georgian secret service believes Mr Grist is a Russian spy

Other statements

Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, observer of Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta and regular contributor to U.S. based think-tank Jamestown Foundation speculated in a Novaya Gazeta article that "Russia's invasion of Georgia had been planned in advance, with the final political decision to complete the preparations and start war in August apparently having been made back in April."

Andrei Illarionov, V. Putin's ex-advisor in economics topics, argues that Russia was the country to prepare and start the war. However, his speech wasn't shown by Russian television. Referring to a major ground exercise Russia held in July, just north of Georgia’s border, Dale Herspring (an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University) described Russia's intervention as being "exactly what they executed in Georgia just a few weeks later... a complete dress rehearsal".

On 8 September 2008, Dana Rohrabacher (a senior Republican member of the United States House of Representatives) Foreign Affairs Committee, argued at a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee meeting, according to The Daily Telegraph, that "the Georgians had initiated the recent military confrontation in the on-going Russian-South Ossetian conflict", citing unidentified U.S. intelligence sources. Further, Telegraph reported that "Mr. Rohrabacher insisted that Georgia was to blame", citing him: "The Georgians broke the truce, not the Russians, and no amount of talk of provocation and all this other stuff can alter that fact." Telegraph stated: ""His comments got little attention in the United States but have been played prominently on state-run Russian television bulletins and other media."

In September 2008, Irakli Okruashvili, Georgian defence minister from 2004 to 2006, reported in an interview to Reuters that in 2004–2006 he and Saakashvili worked together on military plans to invade South Ossetia and Abkhazia, adding "Abkhazia was our strategic priority, but we drew up military plans in 2005 for taking both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well". A US Defense official said that there was no obvious buildup of Russian forces along the border that signaled an intention to invade. "Once it did happen they were able to get the forces quickly and it was just a matter of taking the roads in. So it's not as though they were building up forces on the border, waiting," the official said.

Speaking at an event organised by the German Marshall Fund in Washington, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "acknowledged that Georgia had fired the first shots in the breakaway region of South Ossetia". This view was echoed by five former American Secretaries of State at a forum on presidential policy.

According to the Moscow Times, on August 7, state-owned Rossia television showed Sergei Bagapsh, the leader of Abkhazia, speaking at a meeting of the Abkhaz National Security Council. He is reported to have said: "I have spoken to the president of South Ossetia. It has more or less stabilized now. A battalion from the North Caucasus District has entered the area."

Erosi Kitsmarishvili, Georgia's former ambassador to Russia, has given a testimony to a parliamentary commission in which he said that Georgian authorities were responsible for starting the conflict. According to Kitsmarishvili, Georgian officials told him in April, 2008 that they planned to start a war in Abkhazia and that they had received a green light from the United States government to do so. He said that the Georgian government later decided to start the war in South Ossetia and continue into Abkhazia. According to him, "Russia was ready for the war, but the Georgian leadership started the military action first."

Badri Bitsadze, former head of Georgia's Border Police, has accused the Georgian leadership of starting the war. According to him, the Georgian leadership decided to launch the war in South Ossetia "because Saakashvili was sure he would have won it." He also said that "there was no green light from any foreign country" to start the war.

Reactions to the conflict

International reaction

Main article: International reaction to the 2008 South Ossetia war

See also: Protests regarding 2008 South Ossetia war and Controversy over Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence

In response to the war, Russia faced strong criticism from the US, the United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden and the Baltic states with Carl Bildt, foreign minister of Sweden and Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, being quoted, Russia's claims it was defending Russian citizens in South Ossetia "recalled Hitler’s justifications of Nazi invasions" and President George W. Bush warning Russia: "Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century." In contrast, Italy was more supportive of Russia, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini stating "We cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin's position". France and Germany took an intermediate position, refraining from naming a culprit while calling for an end of hostilities.

Also in response to the war, Viktor Yushchenko, the president of Ukraine, said he intended to negotiate increasing the rent on the Russian naval base at Sevastopol in the Crimea. On the other hand, the Abkhazian government said it would invite Russia to establish a naval base in the port of Sukhumi. According to Russia, any re-negotiation of the use of the Ukraine naval base would break a 1997 agreement, under which Russia leases the base for $98 million a year until 2017. A controversy arose over how Ukraine should respond to the Ossetia war, which contributed to the 2008 Ukrainian political crisis.

Although many Western leaders initially showed solidarity to Georgia, the findings of possible war crimes committed by Georgia in South Ossetia have been raising concerns among Georgia's supporters in the West. British Foreign Minister David Miliband, after being informed of the findings by the Human Rights Watch organization and the BBC, apparently hardened his language towards Georgia, calling its actions "reckless". But he also added that "the Russian response was reckless and wrong".

In November 2008, Amnesty International released a 69 page report citing both Georgia and Russia of serious international law violations on the conduct of war.

Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Main article: International recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence

On 25 August 2008, the Federal Assembly of Russia unanimously voted to urge President Medvedev to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. On 26 August 2008, Medvedev agreed, signing a decree officially recognising the two entities, and in a televised address to the Russian people expressed his opinion that recognising the independence of the two republics "represents the only possibility to save human lives." Georgia rejected this move outright as an annexation of its territory. Nicaragua recognised the republics on 5 September 2008.

The unilateral recognition by Russia was met by condemnation from NATO, the OSCE Chairman, the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, Foreign Ministers of the G7, and the government of Ukraine due to alleged violation of Georgia's territorial integrity, and United Nations Security Council resolutions. Russian policy of recognition was supported by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation although no members of the SCO have followed suit with recognition of the two republics.

Judicial reaction

On 12 August 2008 Georgia instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice against Russia for violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The case (Georgia v. Russian Federation) was accepted by the court on 15 August. The first public hearings has started at the Peace Palace in The Hague, seat of the Court on 8 September 2008. The delegation of Georgia was headed by Tina Burjaliani, First Deputy-Minister of Justice, and Maia Panjikidze, Ambassador of Georgia to the Netherlands. The delegation of Russia was headed by Roman Kolodkin, Director of Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Kirill Gevorgian, Ambassador of Russia to the Netherlands.

South Ossetians have brought over 300 lawsuits to the International Criminal Court in The Hague seeking to bring Georgian authorities to justice for genocide. Russian prosecutors are also gathering evidence to support the allegations of genocide committed by Georgians against the South Ossetians but have not given a detailed statement on the legal grounds for the accusation.

Cyberattacks

During the war, Georgian and Russian websites were attacked by hackers and distributed denial of service attacks (some coordinated via a website which provided a list of Georgian websites), including several Georgian governmental pages that became briefly unreachable. In response Estonia sent two specialists in information security from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Estonia to Georgia, and Georgia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website was hosted on an Estonian server. The Office of the President of Poland provided the website for dissemination of information and helped to get access to the Internet for Georgia's government after breakdowns of local servers caused by cyberattacks.

Censorship of the media

Russian cable TV stations and websites with addresses ending in .ru have been inaccessible in Georgia since the outbreak of the fighting on 8 August, as reported by Reporters Without Borders on 10 September 2008. The Georgian authorities cut all access to Russian TV station broadcasts. Temur Yakobashvili, the minister for reintegration, publicly claimed responsibility the blocking. Georgia’s leading ISP, Caucasus Online, was filtering the Russian domain name “.ru” thereby blocking access to the main Russian-language news websites .

NATO ships in the Black Sea

NATO increased its naval presence in the Black Sea substantially compared to the situation before the war. Some NATO vessels docked in Georgian ports, delivering baby food, care supplies, bottled water and milk according to the US navy. Additionally, NATO stressed that its presence in the Black Sea area is not related to the current tensions, that the vessels are conducting routine port visits and naval exercises with Romania and Bulgaria. President Dmitry Medvedev alleged delivery of military goods instead. In August 2008 Russian General Anatoly Nogovitsyn stated that NATO has exhausted the number of forces it is allowed to have in the Black Sea, under the 1936 Montreux convention. He also warned Western nations against sending more ships.

According to political analyst Vladimir Socor, the United States has maintained an uninterrupted naval presence in the Black Sea since the war. That presence is constrained, however, by the Montreux Convention's limitations on naval tonnage passing through the Turkish Straits and duration of naval visits in the Black Sea. The United States has therefore rotated its ships in the Black Sea at intervals consistent with that convention.

Combatants

See also: Military of Georgia, Military of Russia, Military of South Ossetia, and Military of Abkhazia

Military equipment and analysis

Georgia

As of 8 August 2008, Georgia had 82 T-72 Main Battle Tanks, 139 Armoured Personnel Carriers (BMP and BTR variants), 7 Combat aircraft (Su-25 ground attack) and 95 Heavy artillery pieces (including Grad BM-21 122mm multiple rocket launchers), according to Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments. Georgia had recently also been acquiring some western-made weaponry, including the UH-1 Iroquois helicopters and M4 Carbine rifles from the United States, 152mm SpGH DANA self-propelled guns and RM-70 Multiple rocket launchers from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Turkish Otokar Cobra armoured vehicles, and German Heckler & Koch G36 and Israeli IMI Tavor TAR-21 rifles. According to a US military trainer, the Americans had trained Georgian soldiers with M-4 rifles, but when the fighting started, the Georgians went back to Soviet AK-47s, the only weapon they trusted. They had serious firing problems because they seemed unable to fire in single shot. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, "the Georgian armed forces have GRADLAR 160 multiple launch rocket systems and MK4 LAR 160 type (with M85 bomblets) rockets with a range of 45 kilometers". Ukraine had supplied Georgia with weapons, reportedly including Tor and Buk AA missile systems, Armoured Personnel Carriers and small arms. Israeli companies supplied UAVs, night-vision equipment, anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition and electronic systems as well as advanced tactical training.

The Gulf Times noted that Georgian air-defence systems were outdated and inefficient. In contrast to that, U.S analysts mention that the air defense was "one of the few effective elements of the country's military" and credit the SA-11 Buk-1M with shooting down a Tupolev-22M and contributing to the losses of the 3 Su-25s. A view mirrored by Russia's deputy chief of General Staff, Col. Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn who said the Tor and Buk missile systems were responsible for the downings of 4 Russian aircraft in the war. SPYDER air-defense systems were also spotted.

According to HRW, the Israeli-made M85 cluster bombs used by the Georgian military had a high rate of submunitions that failed to explode on impact as designed.

In the aftermath of war Reuters cited some Stratfor analysts that believed that "Russia has largely destroyed Georgia's war-fighting capability" . An article in The New York Times claimed that during its retreat from South Ossetia the Georgian army left behind much of its military equipment.

Georgia has said that its principal vulnerabilities, which proved decisive, were its comparative weakness to Russian air power and its inability to communicate effectively in combat. According to Batu Kutelia, Georgia's first deputy defense minister, in the future Georgia will need a very sophisticated, multi-layered air-defense system to defend all its airspace. However, Western military officers who have experience working with Georgian military forces suggest that Georgia's military shortfalls were serious and too difficult to change merely by upgrading equipment. According to an article published in the New York Times on 3 September, "Georgia's Army fled ahead of the Russian Army's advance, turning its back and leaving Georgian civilians in an enemy's path. Its planes did not fly after the first few hours of contact. Its navy was sunk in the harbor, and its patrol boats were hauled away by Russian trucks on trailers... Georgia's logistical preparations were poor and that its units interfered with each other in the field." It has also been pointed out, that neither Saakashvili, nor his Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili had any military experience, but they still commanded troops in battle.

Russia

The New York Times reported that Russia’s military went into battle with aging equipment, including scores of tanks designed in the 1960s, and armoured vehicles that broke down in large numbers along Georgia’s roads. In contrast, the Washington Times writes that the war showed "how supposedly obsolete weapons can still play a potent and even decisive role in modern war" and added that Russia didn't rely exclusively on old T-72s; state-of-the-art T-90 main battle tanks were also identified in action. According a "military source in Moscow", who was interviewed by Reuters, Russian troops using similar weapons to the Georgians "surpassed them in every possible way".

According to U.S. analysts Russia's forces in the conflict included 150 T-62 and T-72 tanks and 100 pieces of artillery. At least some T-80 and modern T-90 main battle tanks were sighted in the war. Old T-72s had been upgraded with reactive armour. Su-25, Su-27 and Su-24 strike aircraft were used to establish air superiority. Russia reportedly fired 15 OTR-21 Tochka short-range ballistic missiles in the conflict during 8 August–11. During bombings, Russia used RBK air-dropped cluster bombs with AO-2.5 RTM submunitions.

An editorial in RIA Novosti claimed that forces deployed by the Russian army lacked unmanned combat aerial vehicles, which hurt their intelligence efforts and forced Russia to send a Tupolev Tu-22M3 long-range bomber on a reconnaissance mission. The same editorial stated that Russian Su-25 fighter jets still lacked radar sights, computers for calculating ground-target coordinates and long-range air-to-surface missiles that could be launched outside enemy air-defense areas.. According to Jane's Information Group, Russia also used BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry vehicles, BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers and MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicles. According to Russian General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the General Staff, no new arms were tested during the war.

A Reuters analyst described Russia's army in light of the conflict as "strong but flawed." According to him, the war showed that Russia's armed forces have emerged from years of neglect as a formidable fighting force, but revealed important deficiencies. The weaknesses, especially in missiles and air capability, leave Russia still lagging behind the image of a world-class military power it projects to the rest of the world. In contrast to the weak conscript soldiers used in Chechnya, Russia's force in Georgia was made up entirely of professional soldiers, according to commanders. Reuters reporters on the ground in Georgia saw disciplined, well-equipped troops. Ruslan Pukhov, director of Russia's Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technology, has pointed out that "the victory over the Georgian army ... should become for Russia not a cause for euphoria and excessive joy, but serve to speed up military transformations in Russia"

Georgian order of battle

The Georgian army consisted of 4 regular infantry brigades, plus a fifth brigade in the process of formation. One artillery brigade was stationed at Gori and Khoni and a tank battalion also stationed at Gori. In South Ossetia, Georgia reportedly committed several infantry battalions (likely part of the 4th infantry brigade) supported by T-72 tanks and artillery.

The 1st infantry brigade, being the only one trained to a NATO level, served in Iraq at the start of the war. 2–3 days into the war, it was airlifted to Georgia by the U.S. Air Force, too late to take part in the Battle of Tskhinvali. The Georgian Air Force has also been engaged in the conflict. According to their American trainers, the Georgian soldiers don´t lack "warrior spirit", but weren´t ready for combat.

Military instructors and alleged use of foreign mercenaries

At the outbreak of the war 127 U.S. military trainers including 35 civilian contractors were present in Georgia. Additionally, 1,650 personnel, including troops from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine, had participated in the military exercise "Immediate Response 2008" which ended only days earlier. Several of these soldiers were still in the country. EUCOM stated that neither participated in the conflict. According to South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity, quoted by pravda.ru, "many mercenaries from Ukraine and the Baltic states" participated in the fighting on the Georgian side. The Konovalyuk Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament released a disputed list of Ukrainian military specialists, thought to had been present in Georgia during the onset of the war. Aleksandr Bastrykin, head of the Russian Prosecutor-General's investigative committee, reiterated these claims: "It was a fairly small number of people. They mainly fulfilled support roles" - specifically mentioning a female sniper from Latvia, a reappearance of the mythical so-called "White Tights", female Baltic snipers supposedly active during the Chechen Wars. The allegations were neither substantiated, nor responded by Baltic states.

Russian-South-Ossetian and Russian-Abkhazian order of battle

The Russian order of battle involved significant elements of the Russian 58th Army. According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 58th Army is one of Russia’s premiere combat formations and boasts more than twice the number of troops, five times the number of tanks, ten times the number of armoured personnel carriers and twelve times the number of combat aircraft as the entire Georgian Armed Forces

South Ossetian Sector

• 600 peacekeepers from 135th Motorised Rifle Regiment of 58th Army
• Two battalions of 135th Motorised Rifle Regiment
• Units of Airborne Troops (VDV)
  • Units of 76th Airborne Division (Pskov)
  • Units of 98th Guards Airborne Division (Ivanovo)
• Units of GRU (direct or operational subordination)
  • Spetsnaz of 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV (Moscow)
  • One company of Special Battalion Vostok of 42nd Motor Rifle Division (Chechnya)
  • One company of Special Battalion Zapad of 42nd Motor Rifle Division (Chechnya)
• Army of South Ossetia

Abkhazian Sector

• Units of 131st Separate Motor-Rifle Brigade (formerly used for peacekeeping)
• Unnamed units of VDV
• Army (land and air forces) of Abkhazia
• Naval Task Force consisting of following units from the Black Sea Fleet
  • Slava Class Cruiser RFS Moskva
  • Kashin Class (Upgraded) Destroyer Smetlivy (Russian: Сметливый)
  • Alligator Class Landing Ships Saratov.
  • Ropucha-I Class Landing Ships Caesar Kunikov and Yamal.
  • Grisha-V Anti-Submarine Corvettes Kasimov, Povorino and Suzdalets.
  • Nanuchka-III Class Corvette Mirazh.
  • Bora Class Missile Boat Samum
  • Moma Class Surveillance ship Ekvator.
  • Natya Class Minesweepers Zhukov and Turbinist.
  • Small Landing Ship Koida
  • Sorum Class Fleet Tug MB-31.

Air support

• Fighter, attack, bomber and reconnaissance aircrafts of 4th Air Army (acting over South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia proper)
• Unnamed transport aviation units used for air-lift of units of 76th and 98th Airborne Divisions, Spetsnaz of 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment to South Ossetia and unnamed units of VDV to Abkhazia

See also

• Georgian–Abkhazian conflict
• Ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia
• Georgia Train and Equip Program
• Immediate Response 2008
• Caucasus Frontier 2008
• 2008 Georgia-Russia crisis
• Disinformation campaign during the 2008 South Ossetian war
• Borjomi wildfire
• Financial market reaction to 2008 South Ossetia war

External links

Documentary

• Template:En icon WAR 08/08/08

Abkhazia

• Template:Ab icon Template:En icon Template:Ru icon Template:Tr icon Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia

Georgia

• Template:En icon Template:Ka icon Template:Ru icon Georgia Update - service of the Government of Georgia offering updates on recent developments

Russia

• Template:En icon On the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia @ President of Russia
• Template:Ru icon On the situation around South Ossetia @ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

South Ossetia

• Template:En icon Template:Ru icon State Committee of Information and Press of the Republic of South Ossetia

International

• Template:En icon United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
• Template:En icon OSCE Mission to Georgia

Media

• Template:En icon War in Georgia. International Crisis Group’s multimedia presentation