Bolivia

For the film of the same name, see Bolivia (film).

Republic of Bolivia República de Bolivia Bolivia
Flag Coat of arms of Bolivia Coat of arms
Motto: "¡La unión es la fuerza!"  (Spanish) "Unity is strength!"
Anthem: Bolivianos, el hado propicio
Capital	Sucre (constitutional, judicial) 19°2′S 16°15′W La Paz (administrative) 16°29′S 68°8′W
Largest city	Santa Cruz de la Sierra 17°48′S 63°10′W
Official languages	Spanish, Quechua, Aymara
Government	Republic
• President	Evo Morales
Independence
• from Spain	August 6 1825
• Water (%)	1.29
Population
• Census	8,857,870
GDP (PPP)	1200 estimate
• Total	$25.684 billion (101st)
• Per capita	$2,817 (125th)
Gini (2002)	60.1 very high
HDI (2004)	0.692  (115th)
Currency	Boliviano (BOB)
Time zone	UTC-4
Calling code	591
ISO 3166 code	BO
Internet TLD	.bo

Bolivia (IPA: /boʊ.lɪv.i.ə/), officially the Republic of Bolivia (Spanish: República de Bolivia, IPA [re'puβlika ðe bo'liβi̯a], Quechua: Bulibya, Aymara: Wuliwya), named after Simón Bolívar, is a landlocked country in central South America. It is bordered by Brazil on the north and east, Paraguay and Argentina on the south, and Chile and Peru on the west.

History

Main article: History of Bolivia

Colonial period

The territory now known as Bolivia was called "Upper Peru" or "Charcas" and was under the authority of the Viceroy of Lima. Local government came from the Audiencia de Charcas located in Chuquisaca (La Plata — modern Sucre). Bolivian silver mines produced much of the Spanish empire's wealth. A steady stream of enslaved natives served as labor force. As Spanish royal authority weakened during the Napoleonic wars, sentiment against colonial rule grew.

The Republic and economic instability (1809)

Independence was proclaimed in 1809, but sixteen years of struggle followed before the establishment of the republic, named for Simón Bolívar, on August 6, 1825 (see Bolivian War of Independence).

In 1836, Bolivia, under the rule of Marshal Andres de Santa Cruz, invaded Peru to reinstall the deposed president, General Luis Orbegoso. Peru and Bolivia formed the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, with de Santa Cruz as the Supreme Protector. Following tensions between the Confederation and Chile, war was declared by Chile on December 28, 1836. Argentina, Chile's ally, declared war on the Confederation on May 9, 1837. The Peruvian-Bolivian forces achieved several major victories: the defeat of the Argentinian expedition and the defeat of the first Chilean expedition on the fields of Paucarpata near the city of Arequipa.

File:Bolivar Watercolor SMD.jpg

Simon Bolivar

On the same field the Paucarpata Treaty was signed with the unconditional surrender of the Chilean and Peruvian rebel army. The treaty assured the Chilean withdrawal from Peru-Bolivia, the return of captured Confederate ships, normalized economic relations, and the payment of Peruvian debt to Chile by the Confederation. Public outrage over the treaty forced the government to reject it. The Chileans organized a second expeditionary force, and attacked the Peru-Bolivian confederation, defeating the Confederation on the fields of Yungay using the same arms and equipment Santa Cruz had allowed them to retain. After this defeat, Santa Cruz fled Ecuador, and the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation was dissolved.

Following the independence of Peru, General Gamarra, the Peruvian president, invaded Bolivia in an attempt to reunify the two countries, under the Peruvian flag. The Peruvian army was decisively defeated at the Battle of Ingaví on November 20, 1841, where General Gamarra himself was killed. The Bolivian army under General José Ballivián then mounted a counter-offensive managing to capture the Peruvian port of Arica. Later, both sides signed a peace in 1842 putting a final end to the war.

Due to a period of political and economic instability in the early to middle nineteenth century, Bolivia's weakness was demonstrated during the War of the Pacific (1879–83), during which it lost its access to the sea, and the adjoining rich nitrate fields, together with the port of Antofagasta, to Chile. Since independence, Bolivia has lost over half of its territory to neighboring countries due to wars. Bolivia also lost the state of Acre (known for its production of rubber) when Brazil persuaded the state of Acre to secede from Bolivia in 1903 (see the Treaty of Petrópolis).

An increase in the world price of silver brought Bolivia a measure of relative prosperity and political stability in the late 1800s. During the early part of the twentieth century, tin replaced silver as the country's most important source of wealth. A succession of governments controlled by the economic and social elite followed laissez-faire capitalist policies through the first thirty years of the twentieth century.

Living conditions of the native people, who constituted most of the population, remained deplorable. Forced to work under primitive conditions in the mines and in nearly feudal status on large estates, they were denied access to education, economic opportunity, or political participation. Bolivia's defeat by Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932–35) marked a turning-point.

Rise of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (1951)

The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) emerged as a broadly based party. Denied their victory in the 1951 presidential elections, the MNR led the successful 1952 revolution. Under President Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR , having strong popular pressure, introduced universal suffrage into his political platform, and carried out a sweeping land-reform promoting rural education and nationalization of the country's largest tin-mines.

Twelve years of tumultuous rule left the MNR divided. In 1964, a military junta overthrew President Paz Estenssoro at the outset of his third term. The 1969 death of President René Barrientos Ortuño, a former member of the junta elected President in 1966, led to a succession of weak governments. Alarmed by public disorder and the rising Popular Assembly, the military, the MNR, and others installed Colonel (later General) Hugo Banzer Suárez as President in 1971. Banzer ruled with MNR support from 1971 to 1974. Then, impatient with schisms in the coalition, he replaced civilians with members of the armed forces and suspended political activities. The economy grew impressively during most of Banzer's presidency, but human rights violations and eventual fiscal crises undercut his support. He was forced to call elections in 1978, and Bolivia again entered a period of political turmoil.

Military governments: García Meza and Siles Zuazo (1978)

Elections in 1979 and 1981 were inconclusive and marked by fraud. There were coups, counter-coups, and caretaker governments. In 1980, General Luis García Meza Tejada carried out a ruthless and violent coup that did not have popular support. He pacified the people by promising to remain in power only for one year. (At the end of the year, he staged a televised rally to claim popular support and announced, "Bueno, me quedo," or, "All right; I'll stay [in office]." He was deposed shortly thereafter.) His government was notorious for human-rights-abuses, narcotics-trafficking, and economic mismanagement; during his presidency, the inflation that would later cripple the Bolivian economy could already be felt. Later convicted in absentia for various crimes, including murder, García Meza was extradited from Brazil and began serving a thirty-year sentence in 1995.

After a military rebellion forced out García Meza in 1981, three other military governments in fourteen months struggled with Bolivia's growing problems. Unrest forced the military to convoke the Congress elected in 1980 and allow it to choose a new chief executive. In October 1982, twenty-two years after the end of his first term of office (1956-60), Hernán Siles Zuazo again became President.

Sánchez de Lozada and Banzer: Liberalizing the economy (1993-2001)

Sánchez de Lozada pursued an aggressive economic and social reform agenda. The most dramatic change undertaken by the Sánchez de Lozada government was the "capitalization" program, under which investors, typically foreign, acquired 50% ownership and management control of public enterprises, such as the state oil corporation, telecommunications system, airlines, railroads, and electric utilities in return for agreed upon capital investments. The reforms and economic restructuring were strongly opposed by certain segments of society, which instigated frequent and sometimes violent protests, particularly in La Paz and the Chapare coca-growing region, from 1994 through 1996. The Sánchez de Lozada government pursued a policy of offering monetary compensation for voluntary eradication of illegal coca by its growers in the Chapare region. The policy produced little net reduction in coca, and in the mid-1990s Bolivia accounted for about one-third of the world's coca that was being processed into cocaine.

During this time, the umbrella labor-organization of Bolivia, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), became increasingly unable to effectively challenge government policy. A teachers' strike in 1995 was defeated because the COB could not marshall the support of many of its members, including construction- and factory-workers. The state also used selective martial law to keep the disruptions caused by the teachers to a minimum. The teachers were led by Trotskyites, and were considered to be the most militant union in the COB. Their downfall was a major blow to the COB, which also became mired in internal corruption and infighting in 1996.

In the 1997 elections, General Hugo Banzer, leader of the ADN party and former dictator (1971-1978), won 22% of the vote, while the MNR candidate won 18%. General Banzer formed a coalition of the ADN, MIR, UCS, and CONDEPA parties, which held a majority of seats in the Bolivian Congress. The Congress elected him as president, and he was inaugurated on August 6, 1997. During the election-campaign, General Banzer had promised to suspend the privatization of the state-owned oil-company, YPFB. Considering the weak position that Bolivia was in vis-à-vis international corporations, however, this seemed unlikely.

The Banzer government basically continued the free-market and privatization-policies of its predecessor, and the relatively robust economic growth of the mid-1990s continued until about the third year of its term in office. After that, regional, global and domestic factors contributed to a decline in economic growth. Financial crises in Argentina and Brazil, lower world prices for export-commodities, and reduced employment in the coca-sector depressed the Bolivian economy. The public also perceived a significant amount of public-sector corruption. These factors contributed to increasing social protests during the second half of Banzer's term.

At the outset of his government, President Banzer launched a policy of using special police-units to physically eradicate the illegal coca of the Chapare region. The policy produced a sudden and dramatic four-year decline in Bolivia's illegal coca-crop, to the point that Bolivia became a relatively small supplier of coca for cocaine. Those left unemployed by coca-eradication streamed into the cities, especially El Alto, the slum-neighborhood of La Paz. The MIR of Jaime Paz Zamora remained a coalition-partner throughout the Banzer government, supporting this policy (called the Dignity Plan).

On August 6 2001, Banzer resigned from office after being diagnosed with cancer. He died less than a year later. Banzer's U.S.-educated Vice President, Jorge Fernando Quiroga Ramírez, completed the final year of his term.

2002 elections

Quiroga was constitutionally prohibited from running for national office in 2002.

In the June 2002 national elections, former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) placed first with 22.5% of the vote, followed by coca-advocate and native peasant-leader Evo Morales (Movement Toward Socialism, MAS) with 20.9%. Morales edged out populist candidate Manfred Reyes Villa of the New Republican Force (NFR) by just 700 votes nationwide, earning a spot in the congressional run-off against Sánchez de Lozada on August 4, 2002.

A July agreement between the MNR and the fourth-place MIR, which had again been led in the election by former president Paz Zamora, virtually ensured the election of Sánchez de Lozada in the congressional run-off, and on August 6 he was sworn in for the second time. The MNR platform featured three overarching objectives: economic reactivation (and job creation), anti-corruption, and social inclusion.

Contemporary social crisis and the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources (2000-2005)

Main article: Bolivian Gas War

Indigenous president

Central La Paz

The 2005 Bolivian presidential election was held on December 18, 2005. The two main candidates were Juan Evo Morales Ayma of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) Party, and Jorge Quiroga, leader of the Democratic and Social Power (PODEMOS) Party and former head of the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) Party.

Morales won the election with 53.740% of the votes, an absolute majority unusual in Bolivian elections. He was sworn in on January 22 2006 for a five-year term. Prior to his official inauguration in La Paz, he was inaugurated in an Aymara ritual at the archeological site of Tiwanaku before a crowd of thousands of Aymara people and representatives of leftist movements from across Latin America. Though highly symbolic, this ritual was not historically based and primarily represented native Aymaras — not the main Quechua-speaking population. Since the Spanish conquest in the early 1500s, this region of South America, with a majority native population, has been ruled mostly by descendants of European immigrants, with only a few mestizo (mixed European and indigenous) rulers. Morales, himself an Aymara, has stated that the five hundred years of colonialism are now over and that the era of autonomy has begun.

His recent presidential election victory has also brought new attention to the U.S. drug-war in South America and its heavy emphasis on coca-crop-eradication. The US-supported "Plan Dignidad" (dignity-plan), which seeks to reduce cocaine-production to zero, is seen by many Bolivians as an attack on their livelihoods and way of life. Morales, himself a leader among coca-growers, has said his government will try to interdict drugs, but he wants to preserve the legal market for coca-leaves and promote export of legal coca-products.

On May 1 2006, Morales announced his intent to re-nationalize Bolivian hydrocarbon assets. While stating that the nationalization-initiative would not be an expropriation, Morales sent Bolivian troops to occupy fifty-six gas-installations simultaneously. Troops were also sent to the two Petrobras-owned refineries in Bolivia, which provide over 90% of Bolivia's refining-capacity. A deadline of 180 days was announced, by which all foreign energy-firms were required to sign new contracts giving Bolivia majority ownership and as much as 82% of revenues (the latter for the largest natural-gas-fields). That deadline has since passed, and all such firms have signed contracts. Reports from the Bolivian government and the companies involved are contradictory as to plans for future investment. By far the biggest customer for Bolivian hydrocarbons has been Brazil, which imports two-thirds of Bolivia's natural gas via pipelines operated by the huge semi-private Petrobras (PBR). Since gas can only be exported from landlocked Bolivia via PBR's large (and expensive) pipelines, the supplier and customer are strongly linked. How the nationalization will unfold is quite uncertain, as PBR has announced plans to produce sufficient natural gas by 2011 to replace that now supplied by Bolivia. Bolivia's position is strengthened both by the knowledge that hydrocarbon-reserves are more highly valued now than at the times of previous nationalizations, and by the pledged support of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

Fulfilling a campaign promise, Morales opened on August 6, 2006 an assembly to begin writing a new constitution aimed at giving more power to the indigenous majority. Problems immediately arose when, unable to garner the two-thirds votes needed to include controversial provisions in the constitutional draft, Morales' party announced unilaterally that only a simple majority (50%+1) would be needed, ensuring control of the constitution. Violent protests arose in December 2006 across the country, mostly in the eastern third of the country, where much of the hydrocarbon wealth is located. Many in this region threaten to secede from the nation if Morales does not include them in the constitutional process.

In January 2007 a clash between middle class city dwellers and poorer rural campesinos left 2 dead and over 130 injured in the central city of Cochabamba. The campesinos had paralyzed the city by blockading the highways, bridges, and main roads, and days earlier had set fire to the departmental seat of government, trying to force the resignation of the democratically elected Prefect of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa. The city dwellers clashed with the campesinos, breaking the blockade and routing the protestors, while the police did little to interfere on either side. Further attempts by the campesinos to reinstate the blockade and threaten the government were unsuccessful, but the underlying tensions have not been resolved.

Politics

Cochabamba

Main article: Politics of Bolivia

The 1967 constitution, amended in 1994, provides for balanced executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The traditionally strong executive, however, tends to overshadow the Congress, whose role is generally limited to debating and approving legislation initiated by the executive. The judiciary, consisting of the Supreme Court and departmental and lower courts, has long been riddled with corruption and inefficiency. Through revisions to the constitution in 1994, and subsequent laws, the government has initiated potentially far-reaching reforms in the judicial system and processes.

Bolivia's nine departments received greater autonomy under the Administrative Decentralization law of 1995. Departmental autonomy further increased with the first popular elections for departmental governors (prefectos) on 18 December 2005, after long protests by pro-autonomy-leader department of Santa Cruz. Bolivian cities and towns are governed by directly elected mayors and councils. Municipal elections were held on 5 December 2004, with councils elected to five-year terms. The Popular Participation Law of April 1994, which distributes a significant portion of national revenues to municipalities for discretionary use, has enabled previously neglected communities to make striking improvements in their facilities and services.

The president is elected to a five-year term by popular vote. Elected president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada resigned in October 2003, and was substituted by vice-president Carlos Mesa. Mesa was in turn replaced by chief justice of the Supreme Court Eduardo Rodríguez in June 2005. Six months later, on December 18, 2005, the Socialist native leader, Evo Morales, was elected president.

Legislative branch

The Congreso Nacional (National Congress) has two chambers. The Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) has 130 members elected to five-year terms, seventy from single-member districts (circunscripciones) and sixty by proportional representation. The Cámara de Senadores (Chamber of Senators) has twenty-seven members (three per department), elected to five-year terms.

According to Guinness World Records, Bolivia's total of 192 coups d'etat during its history is greater than any other country.

Military

The Bolivian military is comprised of three branches, an Army, Navy and Air Force. The legal age for voluntary admissions is 18; however, when the numbers are small the government recruits anyone as young as 14. It is estimated that 20% of the Bolivian army is between the ages 14 and 16 while another 20% is from 16 to 18. The tour of duty is generally 12 months. The Bolivian government annually spends $130 million on defence.

Departments and provinces

Map of the departments of Bolivia

Main articles: Departments of Bolivia and Provinces of Bolivia

Bolivia is divided into nine departments (departamentos); capitals in parentheses:

• Beni (Trinidad)
• Chuquisaca (Sucre)
• Cochabamba (Cochabamba)
• La Paz (La Paz)
• Oruro (Oruro)
• Pando (Cobija)
• Potosí (Potosí)
• Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz de la Sierra)
• Tarija (Tarija)

Additionally, the departments are further divided into 100 provinces (provincias), and the provinces are each divided into various numbers of cantons (cantones), and municipalities (municipalidades), which handle local affairs.

Geography

Map of Bolivia from the CIA World Factbook.

Main article: Geography of Bolivia

At 424,135 mi² (1,098,580 km² [1]), Bolivia is the world's 28th-largest country (after Ethiopia). It is comparable in size to Mauritania, and has 1.5 times the area of the US state of Texas.

Colours of Altiplano Boliviano

Bolivia has been a landlocked nation since 1879 when it lost its coastal department of Litoral to Chile in the War of the Pacific. However, it does have access to the Atlantic via the Paraguay river.

An enormous diversity of ecological zones are represented within Bolivia's territory. The western highlands of the country are situated in the Andes mountains and include the Bolivian Altiplano. The eastern lowlands include large sections of Amazonian rainforests and Chaco. The highest peak is Nevado Sajama at 6,542 metres (21,463 ft) located in the department of Oruro. Lake Titicaca is located on the border between Bolivia and Peru. The Salar de Uyuni, the world's largest salt flat, lies in the southwest corner of the country, in the department of Potosí.

Major cities are La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Cochabamba.

Economy

Main article: Economy of Bolivia

Bolivia is the poorest country in South America. This has been attributed to high levels of corruption and the imperialist role of foreign powers in the country since the colonization. The country is rich in natural resources, and has been called a "donkey sitting on a gold-mine" because of this. Apart from famous mines, which were known by the Incas and later exploited by the Spaniards, Bolivia owns the second largest natural gas field in South America after Venezuela. Furthermore, El Mutún in the Santa Cruz department represents 70% of the world's iron and magnesium.

Bolivia's 2002 gross domestic product (GDP) totaled USD $7.9 billion. Economic growth is about 2.5% a year, and inflation was expected to be between 3% and 4% in 2002 (it was under 2% in 2001).

Bolivia’s current lackluster economic situation can be linked to several factors from the past two decades. The first major blow to the Bolivian economy came with a dramatic fall in silver-prices during the early 1980s, which impacted one of Bolivia’s main sources of income and one of its major mining-industries. The second major economic blow came at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s as economic aid was withdrawn by western countries who had previously tried to keep a market-liberal regime in power through financial support. The third economic blow came from the U.S.-sponsored eradication of the Bolivian coca-crop, which, at its peak, figured in 80% of the world's cocaine-production. Along with the reduction in the coca-crop came a huge loss of income to the Bolivian economy, particularly to members of the peasant-class.

Since 1985, the government of Bolivia has implemented a far-reaching program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform aimed at maintaining price-stability, creating conditions for sustained growth, and alleviating scarcity. A major reform of the customs-service in recent years has significantly improved transparency in this area. The most important structural changes in the Bolivian economy have involved the capitalization of numerous public-sector enterprises. (Capitalization in the Bolivian context is a form of privatization where investors acquire a 50% share and management-control of public enterprises by agreeing to invest directly into the enterprise over several years rather than paying cash to the government).

Parallel legislative reforms have locked into place market-liberal policies, especially in the hydrocarbon- and telecommunication-sectors, that have encouraged private investment. Foreign investors are accorded national treatment, and foreign ownership of companies enjoys virtually no restrictions in Bolivia. While the capitalization-program was successful in vastly boosting foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bolivia ($1.7 billion in stock during 1996-2002), FDI flows have subsided in recent years as investors complete their capitalization-contract-obligations.

In 1996, three units of the Bolivian state oil-corporation (YPFB) involved in the exploration, production, and transportation of hydrocarbons were capitalized, facilitating the construction of a gas-pipeline to Brazil. The government has a long-term sales-agreement to sell natural gas to Brazil through 2019. The Brazil pipeline carried about 12 million cubic metres (424 million cu. ft) per day in 2002. Bolivia has the second-largest natural-gas-reserves in South America, and its current domestic use and exports to Brazil account for just a small portion of its potential production. The government expects to hold a binding referendum in 2004 on plans to export natural gas. Widespread opposition to exporting gas through Chile touched off protests that led to the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada in October 2003.

In April 2000, Bechtel signed a contract with Hugo Banzer, the former president of Bolivia, to privatize the water-supply in Bolivia's third-largest city, Cochabamba. The contract was officially awarded to a Bechtel subsidiary named Aguas del Tunari, which had been formed specifically for that purpose. Shortly thereafter, the company tripled the water-rates in that city, an action which resulted in protests and rioting among those who could no longer afford clean water. Martial law was declared, and Bolivian police killed at least six people and injured over 170 protesters. Amidst Bolivia's nationwide economic collapse and growing national unrest over the state of the economy, the Bolivian government was forced to withdraw the water-contract. In November 2001, Bechtel and its principal co-investor, Abengoa of Spain, filed suit before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes at the World Bank. They sued the Bolivian government for $50 million ($25 million in damages and $25 million in lost profits). The legal battle attracted attention and pressure from many anti-neoliberal globalization and anti-capitalist groups. Admist protest and pressure, an agreement was signed in Bolivia on January 19th, 2006. Bechtel and Abengoa of Spain agreed to abandon their lawsuit against the country in return for a token payment of 2 Bolivianos (about 30 American cents).

Bolivian exports were $1.3 billion in 2002, from a low of $652 million in 1991. imports were $1.7 billion in 2002. Bolivian tariffs are a uniformly low 10%, with capital equipment charged only 5%. Bolivia's trade-deficit was $460 million in 2002.

Salt mounds in Salar de Uyuni

Bolivia's trade with neighboring countries is growing, in part because of several regional preferential trade-agreements it has negotiated. Bolivia is a member of the Andean Community and enjoys nominally free trade with other member countries (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela.) Bolivia began to implement an association-agreement with Mercosur (Southern Cone Common Market) in March 1997. The agreement provides for the gradual creation of a free-trade-area covering at least 80% of the trade between the parties over a 10-year period, though economic crises in the region have derailed progress at integration. The U.S. Andean Trade Preference and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) allows numerous Bolivian products to enter the United States free of duty on a unilateral basis, including alpaca- and llama-products and, subject to a quota, cotton textiles.

The United States remains Bolivia's largest trading-partner. In 2002, the United States exported $283 million of merchandise to Bolivia and imported $162 million. Bolivia's major exports to the United States are tin, gold, jewelry, and wood-products. Its major imports from the United States are computers, vehicles, wheat, and machinery. A Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and Bolivia came into effect in 2001.

Agriculture accounts for roughly 15% of Bolivia's GDP. The amount of land cultivated by modern farming-techniques is increasing rapidly in the Santa Cruz area, where weather allows for two crops a year. Soybeans are the major cash crop, sold into the Andean Community market. The extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons accounts for another 10% of GDP and manufacturing for less than 17%.

Bolivia's government remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance to finance development-projects. At the end of 2002, the government owed $4.5 billion to its foreign creditors, with $1.6 billion of this amount owed to other governments and most of the balance owed to multilateral development-banks. Most payments to other governments have been rescheduled on several occasions since 1987 through the Paris Club mechanism. External creditors have been willing to do this because the Bolivian government has generally achieved the monetary and fiscal targets set by IMF programs since 1987, though economic crises in recent years have undercut Bolivia's normally good record. The rescheduling of agreements granted by the Paris Club has allowed the individual creditor-countries to apply very soft terms to the rescheduled debt. As a result, some countries have forgiven substantial amounts of Bolivia's bilateral debt. The U.S. government reached an agreement at the Paris Club meeting in December 1995 that reduced by 67% Bolivia's existing debt-stock. The Bolivian government continues to pay its debts to the multilateral development banks on time. Bolivia is a beneficiary of the Heavily debted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC debt-relief-programs, which by agreement restricts Bolivia's access to new soft loans. Bolivia was one of three countries in the Western Hemisphere selected for eligibility for the Millennium Challenge Account and is participating as an observer in FTA negotiations.

In 2004, the government gave great importance to the development of port-facilities at Puerto Busch on the Paraguay River. Farther north in Puerto Suárez and Puerto Aguirre, which are connected to the Paraguay via the Tamengo Canal, which passes through Brazil, mid-size container-ships traverse. As of 2004 about half of Bolivia's exports leave via the Paraguay River. When Puerto Busch is finished, larger ocean-going ships will be able to dock in Bolivia. This will greatly increase Bolivia's competitiveness, in that they will have a reduced need for foreign ports, such as those in Peru and Chile, which adds to the price of exports and imports. Tobacco is produced by Bolivian farmers – in 1992, over 1,000 million tons – but even more is imported to satisfy domestic demand.

Demographics

Cristo de la Concordia in Cochabamba.

Main article: Demographics of Bolivia

Bolivia's ethnic distribution is estimated to be 30% Quechua-speaking and 25% Aymara-speaking Amerindians. The largest of the approximately three-dozen native groups are the Quechuas (2.5 million), Aymaras (2 million), then Chiquitano (180,000), and Guaraní (125,000). So the full Amerindian population is at 56% and the remaining 30% is Mestizo (mixed Amerindian and European) and around 15% are Whites.

The white population consists mostly of criollos, which in turn consist of families of relatively unmixed Spanish ancestry, descended from the early Spanish colonists. These have formed much of the aristocracy since independence. Other smaller groups within the white population are Germans who founded the national airline Lloyd Aereo Boliviano, as well as Italian, American, Basque, Croatian, Russian, Polish and other minorities, many of whose members descend from families that have lived in Bolivia for several generations.

Also noteworthy is the Afro-Bolivian community that numbers more than 0.5% of the population, descended from African slaves that were transported to work in Brazil and then migrated westward into Bolivia. They are mostly concentrated in the Yungas region (Nor Yungas and Sud Yungas provinces) in the department of La Paz, some three hours from La Paz city. There are also Japanese who are concentrated mostly in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and Middle Easterners who became prosperous in commerce.

Bolivia is one of the least developed countries in South America. Almost two-thirds of its people, many of whom are subsistence farmers, live in poverty. Population-density ranges from less than one person per square kilometer in the southeastern plains to about ten per square kilometer (twenty-five per sq. mi) in the central highlands. As of 2006, the population is increasing about 1.45% per year.

The great majority of Bolivians are Roman Catholic (the official religion), although Protestant denominations are expanding strongly. Islam practiced by the descendants of Middle Easterners is almost nonexistent. There is also a small Jewish community that is almost all Ashkenazi in origin. More than 1% of Bolivians practice the Bahá'í Faith (giving Bolivia one of the largest percentages of Bahá'ís in the world). There are colonies of Mennonites in the department of Santa Cruz. Many Native communities interweave pre-Columbian and Christian symbols in their worship. About 80% of the people speak Spanish as their first language, although the Aymara and Quechua languages are also common. Approximately 90% of the children attend primary-school but often for a year or less. The literacy-rate is low in many rural areas, but, according to the CIA, the literacy-rate is 87% nationwide, a rate similar to Brazil's, but below the South American average. The cultural development of what is present-day Bolivia is divided into three distinct periods: pre-Columbian, colonial, and republican. Important archaeological ruins, gold and silver ornaments, stone monuments, ceramics, and weavings remain from several important pre-Columbian cultures. Major ruins include Tiwanaku, Samaipata, Incallajta, and Iskanawaya. The country abounds in other sites that are difficult to reach and have seen little archaeological exploration.

The Spanish brought their own tradition of religious art which, in the hands of local native and mestizo builders and artisans, developed into a rich and distinctive style of architecture, painting, and sculpture known as "Mestizo Baroque". The colonial period produced not only the paintings of Pérez de Holguín, Flores, Bitti, and others but also the works of skilled but unknown stonecutters, woodcarvers, goldsmiths, and silversmiths. An important body of native baroque religious music of the colonial period was recovered in recent years and has been performed internationally to wide acclaim since 1994.

Bolivian artists of stature in the twentieth century include Guzmán de Rojas, Arturo Borda, María Luisa Pacheco, and Marina Núñez del Prado.

Bolivia has a rich folklore. Its regional folk music is distinctive and varied. The "devil dances" at the annual carnival of Oruro are one of the great folkloric events of South America, as is the lesser known carnival at Tarabuco.

Culture

Main article: Culture of Bolivia

See also: Music of Bolivia and Public holidays in Bolivia

Bolivian culture has been heavily influenced by the Quechua, the Aymara, as well as by the popular cultures of Latin America as a whole.

The best known of the various festivals found in the country is the "Carnaval de Oruro", which was among the first 19 "Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity," as proclaimed by the UNESCO in May of 2001.

Entertainment includes football (soccer), which is the national sport, as well as table football, which is played on street-corners by both children and adults.

Zoos are a popular attraction, with a diverse population of interesting creatures, but with lack of proper funding.

Although it is difficult to describe a single "culture" of Bolivia, the effects of modernity and capitalism have led to increased urbanization and thus changes in culture. However, this does not mean that that many of the distinct characteristics of indigenous lifeways in Bolivia have been lost. Even in urban areas, many people are bilingual and speak one or two indigenous languages (such as Aymara or Quechua) in addition to Spanish. At he same time, many Bolivians share in a cultural system that is being increasingly defined by participation in wage labor that is dependent on international economic conditions.

Gill (1990, 2000) suggests that urbanization in Bolivia is directly related to economic reforms of the 1950s. In 1954, the nation of Bolivia sought agrarian reforms that put much of the land in the hands of the poorer populations (Morales 1992: 79). In addition, the government nationalized the tin mines and pursued development projects of building roads and making education more available. Bolivia also took loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States (Morales 1992: 79). In 1956, however, the United States forced Bolivia to rethink its economic policy by denying Bolivia funds for development (Morales 1992: 84). This led to a cut in social programs, and much of the money from the mines went to pay off the IMF loans (Morales 1992). The situation worsened in the 1980s. The agrarian reforms left out the possibility of subsistence agriculture, and by the 1988 most of the land in the agrarian reforms was being used for capitalist agribusiness (Morales 1992). Thus, rural peasants were denied any benefits from these reforms (Morales 1992: 113). Instead of helping the poorest populations, these reforms instead lead to a rural middle class (Morales 1992: 116). Very few social programs existed to help these populations because the money from the mines went to pay off loans. Then, during the 1980s, the tin market collapsed and the mines were privatized, so that mine owners were able to lay off thousands of workers (Gill 1990; Morales 1992: 121). In addition, the government destroyed the labor unions (Gill 2000: 13; Morales 1992: 97). By this time, the government was almost completely broke, as most of its funds went to pay off their staggering international loans. In 1985, the IMF forced the government into an economic reform that included privatization and the destruction of the public sector (Gill 2000: 13). Today (that is, before Evo Morales), the state is more concerned with managing its loans and promoting foreign investment, than it is with solving the mass unemployment problem (Gill 200: 7). Such conditions led many to migrate to the city, and now 60% of Bolivians (and 80% of Latin Americans in general) live in cities (Gill 2000; Gill 1990). Most of the migrants are miners and those displaced by agribusiness. According to Gill "The enormous social and cultural diversity of major metropolitan areas — itself the result of shifting forms of class formation ― provides an opportunity to examine new and old processes of differentiation among people who are being incorporated into draconian forms of national and international regulation" (2000: 4-5).

The effects of urbanization have had many cultural implications. One of these has been changes in religious demographics. Although many Bolivians tend to be Catholic, and often mix indigenous religious practices with Catholic traditions, many Bolivians are converting to various forms of Evangelical Christianity. In the case of Bolivia, this includes Pentecostalism, Methodism, 7th day Adventist and Baptist churches. These changes can be seen both in urban areas such as La Paz and Santa Cruz as well as in smaller towns. This phenomena can be seen around Latin America as well as in other parts of the world that are affected by processes of capitalism. The reasons for these changes vary.For instance, Kray (2002) points out that Pentecostal rituals often foster a sense of individualism – while still creating a viable religious community – that is often necessary for actors to operate in a capitalist economy. Brusco (1995) and Gill (1990) have demonstrated that conversion to evangelicalism can help reorient values to the domestic sphere that has been injured do to men’s reliance on wage labor. Burdick demonstrated that Pentecostalism often transforms local social categories of race and economic status.

Such changes have had cultural and political implications. Stoll points out that in Guatemala City in the 1960s, Protestants tended to avoid becoming involved in political groups (1990: 115). Burdick also suggests that Pentecostals in Rio de Janeiro tend to avoid politics as part of avoiding involvement with the inherently corrupted world (1993: 207). This break with politics has led to the appearance that Pentecostalism often supports the status quo (Stoll 1990: 316). When Pentecostalism has been involved with politics, it has often been associated with conservative politics and politicians that have tended to support neo-liberal agendas (Burdick 1993: 217). This has been the case, for instance, in Pentecostalism’s support of dictators such as Pinochet in Chile (Stoll 1990: 111) and Rios Montt in Guatemala. Martin points out that Protestants have often preferred that if violence is to ensue, it is better that it “come form the powers that be, and even if it creates a desert they are still inclined to call it peace” 1990: 267). This view may indeed go back to Martin Luther, who viewed all governments and economic orders as ordained by God. Corten argues that that the “most oppressive regimes have used the ‘obedience’ of piety [among Pentecostals] in order to strengthen their power” (Corten 1999: 153). In the end, Corten concludes, the sort of piety that Pentecostalism promotes is not compatible with a representational democracy (1999: 152). Many of the same observations may be made in terms of Evangelicalism’s relationship with economics. Ambivalence to politics — and thus to the way in which political processes affect economic realities — may, as Robert Maple Anderson suggests, make Pentecostals the perfect, submissive, proletariat (Stoll 1990: 116). Lalive d’ Epinay argued that Pentecostalism merely reproduces the hacienda-tributary system that was put in place by the Spanish, insofar as church members are encouraged to put their money into the church in exchange for social-economic stability (Stoll 1990: 318; also see Martin 1990: 229). Although it has been widely noted that Pentecostalism – like Protestantism in general – often leads to economic prosperity (Martin 1990; Stoll 1990), it is questionable whether or not Pentecostals ever effect any real change to the capitalist system in general. Martin points out that Pentecostalism may be conducive to an individuality that that is “well disposed to a capitalistic form of development” (1990: 231).

However, there is also data that problematizes these generalizations about politics, economics, and Evangelicalism. One of these areas concerns the one to one relationship with Pentecostalism and economic prosperity. Much like Max Weber has argued, it is difficult to say whether or not Pentecostalism actually causes economic prosperity. Thus, Martin argues that it is most fruitful to discuss the possible outcomes of the relationship between Protestantism and capitalism:

What we do need to probe are the complicated feedbacks whereby people perceive the possibility of change and so grasp and are grasped by religious ideas which can accelerate and/or help them cope with it. … It is clear that capitalism in the past could occur without Protestantism and vice versa. … Then, and again now, there is no necessary connection. The posited linkages and plausible likelihoods have to be couched in terms of frequent concurrence and mutual reinforcements. Evangelical religion and economic advancement often do go together, and when they do so appear to mutually support and reinforce one another (Martin 1990: 206, italics in original).

For those are already economically mobile, Evangelicalism does seem to act as a sort of stepping stone. In addition, as Max Weber suggested, economic prosperity is often related to the fact that Pentecostal churches tend to reinforce spending practices that are focused on the home, and abhor spending money on worldly pleasures such as alcohol (Brusco 1995, Burdick 1993; Martin 1990; Stoll 1990; Robbins 2004). In some cases, this does result in the reinvestment of capital, as Weber predicted, although this is not always the case. Many Pentecostals may just reinvest their money in the church (Stoll 1990). This is reinforced by the observation that in many instances, people leave the church once that reach a certain level of economic prosperity (Stoll 1990: 114). Thus, although Pentecostalism is indeed related to economic prosperity, it does not seem that one causes the other.

Indeed, there is evidence in La Paz that Evangelicalism is related to economic prosperity, although this link, as suggested above, does not imply that Evangelicalism causes such prosperity. This religious trend is associated with both the lower classes and the middle class, although many of the richest Bolivians are not Evangelical.

Such changes in the religious profile of many Bolivians does not mean that people have completely abandoned older, more traditional practices. Many traditional festivals are still extremely popular Bolivia. These include the Gran Poder in La Paz and the Carnival of Oruro. Such festivals are extremely popular, although many Evangelicals tend not to participate in such events. This is due partly to the fact that these festivals are heavily associated with Catholicism and often involve the consumption of alcohol, a practice not preferred by Evangelical Christians. At the same time, many Evangelicals still speak Aymara or Quechua and dress in indigenous fashions. Culture in this sense has much to do with self identification and less to do with adherence to a specific set of practices. Yet some cultural practices in Bolivia are often divided along religious lines.

There are also other widespread cultural practices in Bolivia that are worth mentioning. Although cultural practices differ along religious, political, and economic lines, many Bolivians (the upper class excluded) tend to spend much of their time at work. Thus, people tend to consume food away from their home. For this reason, public meal preparation in small restaurants for affordable prices is extremely important. Often, vendors will eat lunch at heir work places, provided by other vendors who bring food to their customers. Lunch tends to be the largest meal in Bolivia, and includes soup and a main dish of beef, chicken or fish, along with rice, lettuce, and tomatoes. In the evening, restaurants provide smaller meals of chicken, beef or sausages. However, many vendors, because they work 12 to 16 hours a day, will often take dinner in their work places.

Most Bolivians do not own automobiles, so public transportation in Bolivia is extremely important. This is often arranged by private workers who own vans or taxis.

Notes and references

• Brusco, Elizabeth 1995 Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia. Austin: University of Texas Press.

• Batalla, Guiellermo Bonfil 1996 México Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization. Austin: University of Texas Press.

• Burdick, John 1993 Looking for God in Brazil: The Progressive Catholic Church in Urban Brazil’s Religious Arena. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Corten, André 1999 Pentecostalism in Brazil: Emotion of the Poor and Theological Romanticism. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
• Gill, Lesley 1990 “Like a Veil to Cover Them”: Women and the Pentecostal Movement in La Paz. American Ethnologist 17(4): 708-721.

• Gill, Lesley 2000 Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State. New York: Columbia University Press.
• Kray, Christine A.2002 The Pentecostal Re-Formation of Self: Opting for Orthodoxy in Yucatan. Ethos. 29(4):395-429.

• Martin, David.1990 Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford: Blackwell.

• Morales, Waltraud Queiser 1992 Bolivia: Land of Struggle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

• Stoll, David 1990 Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. Berkely: University of California Press.

• Weber, Max 1930 [1984] The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Preston. London:Counterpoint.

External links

Government

• Agencia Para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad de la Informacion en Bolivia Agency for the Development of the Society of Information in Bolivia. Official web portal of the Bolivian Government.
• Presidencia de la Republica de Bolivia Office of the President of the Republic of Bolivia.
• Vicepresidencia de la Republica de Bolivia, Presidencia del Congreso Nacional Web portal of the Office of the Vice-President of the Republic of Bolivia, President of the Senate and President of the Commission of Congress.
• Poder Judicial de la Republica de Bolivia Web portal of the Bolivian Judicial Branch, which includes the Supreme Court of Bolivia, Constitutional Court, Agrarian Tribunal, Superior Courts and Judicial Council.
• Congreso Nacional de la Republica de Bolivia Web portal of the Bolivian National Congress, which includes the Presidency of the National Congress, the National Senate and the House of Representatives.
• Corte Nacional Electoral Web portal of the National Electoral Court of Bolivia. Electoral Organism of Bolivia.
• Asamblea Constituyente de la Republica de Bolivia Web portal of the Constituent Assembly of Bolivia.
• Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Web portal of the Statistics National Institute of Bolivia.

General information

• Public Opinion in Bolivia
• Election Tracker-Bolivia
• Bolivia-Online.net Information about Bolivia
• Encyclopaedia Britannica - Bolivia's Country Page
• Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Bolivia
• Bolivia Information Forum - news and background information

Media

• Agencia Boliviana de Información (ABI)
• Energy Press
• El Diario - La Paz
• La Razón - La Paz
• La Prensa - La Paz
• La Jornada - La Paz
• El Deber - Santa Cruz
• El Mundo - Santa Cruz
• El Nuevo Día - Santa Cruz
• Los Tiempos - Cochabamba
• Opinión - Cochabamba
• La Patria - Oruro
• Correo Del Sur - Sucre
• El País - Tarija
• Nuevo Sur - Tarija
• El Potosí - Potosí
• La Palabra del Beni - Beni

Military

• Ministerio de Defensa de Bolivia Ministry of Defense.
• Ejercito piooop

Native culture

• Lots of photos of Natives fiestas, clothing, daily life etc in the different provinces
• 'Coca is a way of life' (The Guardian's article)

Health

• Virtual Library of Public Health