Franz von Papen

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Franz von Papen
Bundesarchiv Bild 183-S00017, Franz von Papen crop.jpg
Von Papen in 1936
Chancellor of Germany
In office
1 June 1932 – 17 November 1932
President Paul von Hindenburg
Preceded by Heinrich Brüning
Succeeded by Kurt von Schleicher
Vice-Chancellor of Germany
In office
30 January 1933 – 7 August 1934
Chancellor Adolf Hitler
Preceded by Hermann R. Dietrich
Succeeded by Hermann Göring (1941)
Reich Commissioner of Prussia
In office
20 July 1932 – 3 December 1932
Preceded by Otto Braun (as Minister President)
Succeeded by Kurt von Schleicher
Minister President of Prussia
In office
30 January 1933 – 10 April 1933
Preceded by Kurt von Schleicher (as Reich Commissioner)
Succeeded by Hermann Göring
Personal details
Born Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen zu Köningen
(1879-10-29)29 October 1879
Werl, Germany
Died 2 May 1969(1969-05-02) (aged 89)
Obersasbach, West Germany
Resting place Wallerfangen, Germany
Political party Zentrum (1918–1932)
Independent (1918–1945)
Spouse(s) Martha von Boch-Galhau
Children Friedrich
Antoinette
Isabella
Margaret
Stephanie
Occupation Officer, diplomat, politician
Religion Roman Catholicism
Military service
Allegiance  German Empire
Battles/wars World War I

Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen zu Köningen (German: [ˈfʁants fɔn ˈpaːpən]; 29 October 1879 – 2 May 1969) was a German nobleman, General Staff officer and politician. He served as Chancellor of Germany in 1932 and as Vice-Chancellor under Adolf Hitler in 1933–34. He belonged to the group of close advisers to President Paul von Hindenburg in the late Weimar Republic. It was largely Papen, believing that Hitler could be controlled once he was in the government, who persuaded Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor in a cabinet not under Nazi Party domination. However, Papen and his allies were quickly marginalized by Hitler and he left the government after the Night of the Long Knives, during which some of his confidantes were killed by the Nazis.

Background[edit]

Born into a wealthy and noble Roman Catholic family[1] in Werl, Westphalia, the son of Friedrich von Papen zu Köningen (1839–1906) and his wife Anna Laura von Steffens (1852–1939), Papen was trained as an army officer. An excellent horseman and man of much charm, Papen cut a dashing figure and during this time, made the fateful friendship with Kurt von Schleicher who become one of his best friends.[2] He served for a period as a military attendant in the Kaiser's Palace, before joining the German General Staff in March 1913. He entered the diplomatic service in December 1913 as a military attaché to the German ambassador in the United States. In early 1914 he travelled to Mexico (to which he was also accredited) and observed the Mexican Revolution, returning to Washington, D.C. in August of that year on the outbreak of the First World War. He had married Martha von Boch-Galhau (1880–1961) on 3 May 1905. Papen's wife was the daughter of a wealthy Saarland industrialist whose dowry made him a very rich man.[3] Fluent in both French and English, Papen traveled widely all over Europe, the Middle East and North America.[4]

Von Papen as the German Military Attaché in Washington, D.C. (1914)

World War I[edit]

During the autumn of 1914, while attached to the German Embassy in Washington D.C., Papen's "natural proclivities for intrigue got him involved in espionage activities."[5] As a result, some sixteen months into the European War he was expelled from the United States for complicity in the planning of acts of sabotage, such as the Vanceboro international bridge bombing to destroy US rail lines.[6] On 28 December 1915, he was declared persona non grata after his exposure and was recalled to Germany.[7] Setting out on the journey, his luggage was confiscated, and 126 cheque stubs were found showing payments to his agents. Papen went on to report on American attitudes, both to General Erich von Falkenhayn and to Wilhelm II, the German Emperor. In April 1916, a United States federal grand jury issued an indictment against Papen for a plot to blow up Canada's Welland Canal, which connects Lake Ontario to Lake Erie, but Papen was by then safely home; he remained under indictment until he became Chancellor of Germany, at which time the charges were dropped.[7] As a Roman Catholic, Papen belonged to the Zentrum, the right of the center party that almost all German Catholics supported, but during the course of the war, the nationalist conservative Papen become estranged from his party.[8] Papen disapproved of Matthias Erzberger, whose efforts to pull the Zentrum to the left he was opposed to and regarded the Reichstag Peace Resolution of 19 July 1917 as almost treason.[9]

Later in the World War, Papen returned to the army on active service, first on the Western Front, from 1917 as an officer on the General Staff in the Middle East, and then as an officer attached to the Ottoman army in Palestine. During his time in the Ottoman Empire, Papen made another fateful friendship when he befriended Joachim von Ribbentrop. Papen also served as an intermediary between the Irish Volunteers and the German government regarding the purchase and delivery of arms to be used against the British during the Easter Rising of 1916, as well as serving as an intermediary with the Indian nationalists in the Hindu German Conspiracy. Promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, he returned to Germany and left the army soon after the armistice which halted the fighting in November 1918.

Inter-war years[edit]

The dilettante[edit]

Papen entered politics and joined the Centre Party better known as the Zentrum, in which the monarchist Papen formed part of the conservative wing. Papen belonged to a wing of the Zentrum that was opposed to his party's role as part of the Weimar Coalition, making him very much an outsider in his party.[10] Papen's politics were much closer to the German National People's Party than to the Zentrum, and he seems to have belonged to the Zentrum only on the account of his Roman Catholicism.[11] Papen stayed in the Zentrum mostly because he hoped to move his party towards the right, and he often advocated that the Zentrum leave the Weimar Coalition to join a coalition with the German National People's Party.[12] Papen's beliefs were based on a type of Catholic conservatism that believed that sovereignty rested only with God and those He had appointed as His earthly representatives such as the Catholic Church and the aristocracy, which led Papen to a complete rejection of democracy as he felt that sovereignty could not rest with the people.[13] Papen viewed the November Revolution of 1918 as a disaster that had brought "western subjectivism" to Germany, tearing apart the natural order of things and Germany could not recover from this disaster until the democratic system was destroyed.[14] Like many other Catholic noblemen in the interwar period, Papen had a profound sense of victimization, seeing himself as the victim of a monumental conspiracy.[15] For Papen, European history from the time of the Enlightenment onward was a continuous tale of woe and decline as the "false doctrines" of rationalism, liberalism, republicanism, democracy and secularism had gained ascendancy at the expense of the "true" Catholic and aristocratic values.[16] For Papen like many Catholic noblemen, the authors of these disastrous developments were the Freemasons and the Jews.[17] For Papen, the present was culmination of all he hated as he saw various developments like Marxism, women's rights, individualism, "economic egoism", democracy and the "de-Christianization" of German culture as part and parcel of the same conspiracy that had allegedly began in 18th century France.[18]

Papen was a member of the landtag of Prussia from 1921 to 1928 and from 1930 to 1932, representing a rural, Catholic constituency in Westphalia.[19] Papen rarely attended the sessions of the landtag and never spoke once at the meetings of the landtag during his all years as a landtag deputy.[20] Papen tried to have his name entered into the Zentrum party list for the Reichstag elections of May 1924, but was blocked by the Zentrum' leadership who made it clear that they did not want him in the Reichstag, viewing him as a trouble-maker.[21] In February 1925, when the Wilhelm Marx of the Zentrum tried to form a coalition government with the SPD in Prussia, Papen was one of the six Zentrum deputies in the landtag who voted with the German National People's Party and the German People's Party against the SPD-Zentrum government.[22] Papen was almost expelled from the Zenturm for breaking with party discipline in the landtag.[23] In the 1925 presidential elections, Papen surprised his party by supporting the right-wing candidate Paul von Hindenburg over the Centre Party's Wilhelm Marx. In a 1925 essay, Papen explained his view of Germany:

"The retreat from the universal valid Christian state system since the height of the Middle Ages, the mooring of the present in the principles of a most corrosive subjectivism, the disrespect for divine authority, and the usurpation of the highest state power by the 'sovereign people'-that is the present situation, which one can hardly better describe in one word: parties!"[24]

In the 1925 election, Papen attacked Marx in a press statement as not a proper Catholic for his willingness to work with the Social Democrats.[25] Papen argued that no real Catholic would work with the SPD, whom Papen denounced as a den of "atheistic socialism" and "left-liberal rationalism".[26] In a 1927 article in a Catholic magazine, Papen denounced the Zenturm for accepting the Weimar Republic as he maintained that the constitution of 1919 was based on the "fallacy" that sovereignty rested with the people whereas Papen maintained sovereignty rested only with God and those whom God had entrusted with power.[27] In May 1927 in a speech before a group of Catholic noblemen in Silesia, Papen repeated his Catholic conservative critique of the Weimar Republic as a monstrosity based on the "error" of popular sovereignty and suggested that the remedy was an union of all the German right, saying that in this struggle conservative Catholics would have to work with conservative Protestants against their common "liberal-democratic" foes.[28] In July 1927, in another speech before Catholic aristocrats, this time in Saxony, Papen called for all conservative Catholics to take part in politics, saying that only "the greater participation of the conservatives in the construction of the state" would prevent the triumph of the "liberal-left forces", as he argued that only "the formulation and restoration of a truly conservative weltanschauung on the basis of the teaching of our Holy Church and its revelations in private as well as economic life" could save Germany from the Weimar Republic.[29]

Papen was a member of the highly exclusive Deutscher Herrenklub (German Gentlemen's Club) of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. Papen, a man completely unknown to the general public was well known in elite circles in Berlin for his sense of style which together with his colorful and much embellished recounting of his adventures in Mexico, the United States, Canada, Flanders, France and the Ottoman Empire in the World War and his capacity to tell a seemingly endless number of jokes all combined to make a much sought after dinner guest among the elite.[30] Most people knew that the more fanciful exploits Papen described were exaggerations, if not fabrications, but Papen was such an entertaining raconteur who excelled at light conversation that few cared. At the Deutscher Herrenklub, Papen would spent hours drinking and talking with his best friend General Kurt von Schleicher who enjoyed his company.[31] Schleicher and his friends liked to call Papen Fränzchen, a somewhat disparaging diminutive of his name Franz, but the French ambassador André François-Poncet who also a member of the Herrenklub noted:"Papen sometimes served as the butt of their jokes; they enjoyed making fun of and teasing him, without him taking the least offense".[32] In March 1930, Papen welcomed the coming of presidential government, saying this was the most hopeful sign he yet seen in politics.[33] However as the presidential government of Heinrich Brüning depended upon the Social Democrats in the Reichstag to "tolerate" it by not voting to cancel laws passed under Article 48, Papen grew more critical.[34] In a speech before a group of farmers in October 1931, Papen called for Brüning to disallow the SPD and base his presidential government on "tolerance" from the NSDAP instead.[35] Papen demanded that Brüning transform the "concealed dictatorship" of a presidential government into a dictatorship that would unite all of the German right under its banner.[36] In the 1932 presidential elections, Papen voted for Hindenburg under the grounds he was the best man to unite the right while in the landtag Papen voted for the Nazi Hans Kerrl who was running to be the speaker of the landtag.[37] In a letter to the editor of the conservative journal Der Ring in April 1932, Papen once again repeated his favorite thesis that the Zentrum would best serve Germany by joining a "genuinely conservative state bloc" that he claimed was emerging in Germany.[38]

Chancellorship[edit]

On 28 April 1932, General Kurt von Schleicher met secretly with Adolf Hitler to tell him that the Reichswehr was opposed to the ban imposed on the SA and the SS by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning on 13 April 1932 and he would have it lifted as soon as possible.[39] On 7 May 1932, Schleicher at another secret meeting with Hitler told him that he was working to bring down Brüning and replace him with a new right-wing "presidential government", which Schleicher asked Hitler to support.[40] On 8 May 1932, Hitler and Schleicher reached a "gentleman's agreement" where Schleicher would bring down Brüning, install a new presidential government, lift the ban on the SA and the SS, and would dissolve the Reichstag for elections in the summer of 1932.[41] In exchange, after the elections, Hitler promised to support the new government, whose head Schleicher had not yet selected, and whose purpose Schleicher assured Hitler was the destruction of democracy.[42] After some searching, Schleicher decided his old friend Papen would be the chancellor in the new government he was creating.[43] Papen was not Schleicher's first choice, and it was only after Kuno von Westarp, Alfred Hugenberg, and Carl Friedrich Goerdeler all turned out to be unsuitable for various reasons that Schleicher chose Papen.[44]

On 1 June 1932 Papen moved from relative obscurity to supreme importance when president Paul von Hindenburg appointed him Chancellor, even though this meant replacing his own party's Heinrich Brüning. Papen owed his appointment to the Chancellorship to General Kurt von Schleicher, an old friend from the pre-war General Staff and influential advisor of President Hindenburg. It was Schleicher, not Papen, who selected the new cabinet, in which he also became Defence Minister.[45] The extent that Schleicher was responsible for the Papen government could be seen in that Schleicher had selected the entire cabinet himself before he even had approached Papen with the offer to be chancellor: after Papen had accepted the offer to serve as chancellor, Schleicher simply presented Papen with his list, and told him that this was to be his cabinet.[46] The day before, Papen had promised party chairman Ludwig Kaas he would not accept any appointment. After he broke his pledge, Kaas branded him the "Ephialtes of the Centre Party"; Papen forestalled being expelled from the party by leaving it on 3 June 1932.

Chancellor Papen (left) with his eventual successor, Minister of Defence Kurt von Schleicher

The French ambassador in Berlin, André François-Poncet, wrote at the time that Papen's selection by Hindenburg as chancellor was "met with incredulity". "Papen," the ambassador continued, "enjoyed the peculiarity of being taken seriously by neither his friends nor his enemies. He was reputed to be superficial, blundering, untrue, ambitious, vain, crafty and an intriguer." [47] François-Poncet who knew Papen well thanks to their shared membership in the prestigious Herrenclub (Gentleman's Club) of Berlin noted that Papen's "face bears the mark of frivolity of which he has never been able to rid himself. As for the rest, he is not regarded as a personality of the first rank...One quality he clearly does possesses: check, audacity, an amiable audacity of which he seems unaware. He is one of those persons who shouldn't be dared to undertake a dangerous enterprise because they accept all dares, take all bets. If he succeeds, he bursts with pleasure; if he fails, he exits with a pirouette".[48]

The cabinet which Papen formed was known as the "cabinet of barons" or as the "cabinet of monocles"[49] and was widely regarded with ridicule by Germans. Papen had virtually no support in the Reichstag; the only parties committed to supporting him was the far-right/national conservative German National People's Party (DNVP) and German People's Party. The first act of the Papen government was to dissolve the Reichstag in accordance with the "gentlemen's agreement" Schleicher had reached with Hitler on 4 June 1932.[50] As the Nazis had done very well in Länder elections that spring in Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin winning nearly 50% of the vote in both elections, it was reasonably expected by all concerned that the dissolution of the Reichstag only two years into its four-year term would only benefit the National Socialists.[51] As a presidential government, Papen ruled by Article 48, having his emergency degrees signed into law by President Hindenburg and did not seek to govern via the Reichstag.[52] However, the Reichstag could by majority vote cancel any law passed by Article 48 within sixty days of it being signed into law and could pass a vote of no-confidence in the government, which meant that Papen like Brüning before him needed a friendly majority in the Reichstag.[53] As Papen made no secret of his rabid hostility to the Social Democrats and the Zentrum hated him for his role in bringing down Brüning, it was unlikely that the Reichstag elected in 1930 would "tolerate" his government the same way it had the Brüning government.[54] Papen called a national election for July 1932, in the hope of that the Nazis would win the largest number of seats in the Reichstag, which was allow him the majority he needed to create a dictatorship.[55] On 15 June 1932, the new government lifted the ban on the SA and the SS, who were secretly encouraged to indulge in as much violence as possible as Schleicher wanted mayhem on the streets to justify the new authoritarian regime he was creating.[56] On 9 July 1932, Papen represented Germany at the Lausanne conference where reparations were cancelled, which Papen followed up by "repudiating" Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles (President Hindenburg had repudiated Article 231 in 1927, a speech that Papen appeared not to be aware of).[57] Germany had ceased paying reparations in June 1931 under the Hoover moratorium, and most of the groundwork for the Lausanne conference had been done by Brüning, but Papen took all the credit for the Lausanne conference, announcing in a speech that it was his "statesmanship" that had freed Germany from paying reparations to France and repudiated the "war guilt lie" of Article 231.[58] In exchange for cancelling reparations, Germany was supposed to make a one-time payment of 3 million Reichmarks to France, a commitment that Papen repudiated immediately upon his return to Berlin.[59][60] The British historian Anthony Nicolls noted Papen's diplomatic successes did not make Papen popular with the German people at all, which disapproves the thesis that it was inflexibility on the part of the Allies in revising Versailles in Germany's favor that caused the rise of the Nazis.[61]

Papen was authoritarian by inclination. Richard J. Evans described his philosophy as "utopian conservatism" due to his long-term goal of restoring a modern version of the Ancien Régime. He imposed increasingly stringent censorship on the press and repealed his predecessor's ban on the Sturmabteilung (SA) as a way to appease the Nazis, whom he hoped to lure into supporting his government.[62] Papen's economic policies, which were all passed by Article 48, were to sharply cut the payments offered by the unemployment insurance fund, subject all jobless Germans seeking unemployment insurance to a very strict means test, had wages drastically lowered (including those reached by collective bargaining) while bringing in very generous tax cuts to corporations and the rich.[63] Papen argued that lowering taxes on the well off and corporations would encourage them to spend and create jobs; that lowering wages would encourage businesses to hire and reducing unemployment insurance would force the jobless (whom Papen often implied were just lazy people who didn't want to work) to find work; and thus alleviate the effects of the Great Depression.[64] As 1932 was the worst year of the Great Depression with joblessness at an all time high, Papen's economic policies of favoring the rich while punishing the poor enraged ordinary Germans, making him into Germany's most hated man.[65] Papen reveled in his unpopularity and took a great deal of pleasure in taunting and baiting his critics as he enjoyed provoking people.[66]

The street violence in Germany had largely ceased in the period 11 April-15 June 1932 when the SA and SS had been banned, and it was only after Papen lifted the ban that street violence returned with a vengeance.[67] Papen took no responsibility for lifting the ban and blamed the Social Democratic Prussian minister-president Otto Braun for the violence, claiming with no real proof that Braun had ordered the Prussian police to support the Communists against the Nazis.[68] On 20 July 1932, Papen launched a coup against the centre-left coalition government of Prussia, which was dominated by the Social Democrats (the so-called Preußenschlag). The use of the police apparatus in the Prussian "coup" on 20 July 1932 is described by historians Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle as "the decisive breach on the path towards the Third Reich."[69] Riots resulted on the streets of Berlin, as a total of 461 battles between Communists and the SA took place, leading to 82 deaths on both sides. Berlin was put on military shutdown and Papen sent men to arrest the Prussian authorities, whom he accused with no evidence of being in league with the Communists. Hereafter, Papen declared himself commissioner of Prussia by way of an emergency decree which he elicited from Hindenburg, further weakening the democracy of the Weimar Republic.[70] In foreign affairs, Papen's principle interest was achieving gleichberechtigung ("equality of status") as doing away with the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was known at the World Disarmament Conference, demanding that either Germany be allowed to rearm or the other powers disarm down to the same levels at Versailles had imposed on the Reich (the latter was not a serious demand).[71] On 23 July 1932, Papen had Germany walk out of the World Disarmament Conference following objections from the French delegation that allowing Germany gleichberechtigung would cause another world war, and Papen announced that the Reich would not return to the conference until the other powers agreed to consider his demand for gleichberechtigung.[72]

In the Reichstag election of 31 July 1932, the Nazis gained 123 seats, becoming the largest party. Papen expected the Nazis to honor the "gentleman's agreement" by supporting his government and offered Hitler the position of Vice-Chancellor.[73] Hitler however reneged on the "gentleman's agreement" he reached with Schleicher by demanding the Chancellorship for himself.[74] The historian Mary Fulbrook writes that by gaining the largest number of seats in the Reichstag in the elections of 31 July 1932 the Nazis formed "an anti-parliamentary majority not prepared to tolerate the government of von Papen."[75] On 8 August 1932 Papen, who liked to take a tough law-and-order stance, brought in via Article 48 a new law which drastically streamlined the judicial process in death penalty cases while limiting with the right of appeal so that the courts could hand down as many death sentences as possible and many could be executed as possible.[76] A few hours later in the town of Potempa, five SA men broke into the house of a Communist miner Konrad Pietrzuch and proceeded to torture, castrate and murder Pietrzuch in front of his mother, launching the cause célèbre of the Potempa case.[77] On 11 August 1932, the public holiday of Constitution Day in Germany to celebrate the adoption of the Weimar Constitution in 1919, Papen together with his Interior Minister Baron Wilhelm von Gayl called a press conference, apparently with no sense of the irony involved, to announce their plans for a new constitution which would turn Germany into a dictatorship.[78] On 22 August 1932 Papen's new law of 8 August (which proscribed the death penalty in all cases of politically motivated murder) was put to the test with "Potempa five" were promptly convicted and sentenced to death, becoming in the process Nazi heroes as Hitler sent them a telegram praising them as great German heroes.[79] Alfred Rosenberg in an editorial in the Völkischer Beobachter declared that killing an ethnic Pole like Pietrzuch was no crime as National Socialists like himself rejected the principle that the life of a Pole was equal to the life of a German as National Socialism was based on the belief in the inequality of humanity.[80] The Potempa case generated enormous media attention, and Hitler made it clear that he would not support Papen's government if the "Potempa five" were executed. On 2 September 1932, Papen in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for Prussia reduced the sentences of the five SA men down to life imprisonment, supposedly because the "Potempa five" were not aware of his law at the time they castrated and murdered Pietrzuch, but in reality because he was hoping for Nazi support of his government.[81] The British historian Sir Ian Kershaw noted that the way in which the National Socialists from Hitler on down praised the "Potempa five" as heroes for torturing, castrating and murdering a man, all because he was a Communist and an ethnic Pole and demanded freedom for the "Potempa five" under the grounds that no German should be punished for killing an ethnic Polish Communist should have been fair warning to Papen and his fellow conservatives about what to expect if Hitler ever became Chancellor.[82]

When the new Reichstag first assembled, Papen hoped to use the opportunity to drop all pretense of democracy. He obtained in advance from Hindenburg a decree to dissolve it, then secured another decree to suspend elections for the time being.[83] He did not take the dissolution decree with him to the first session, having received a promise that there would be an immediate objection to an expected Communist motion of no confidence. However, when no one objected, Papen ordered one of his messengers to fetch the dissolution decree. He demanded the floor in order to read it, but the newly elected Reichstag president, Hermann Göring, pretended not to see him; the Nazis had decided to support the Communist motion.[84] The no-confidence vote passed by an overwhelming 512–42 margin. Realizing that he did not have nearly enough support to go through with his plan to subvert the republic from within, Papen was forced to call another election.[83] Through Schleicher approved of Papen's politics, a certain tension had emerged partly because Papen had proved himself far more aggressive and assertive than Schleicher had expected as the goofy Fränzchen had become a man who saw himself as one of history's Great Men and partly because Schleicher disapproved of Papen's style of provoking ordinary people with the general telling the chancellor that insulting people was not the best way to make them like you.[85] Schleicher wanted the "New State" to enjoy popular legitimacy, and was increasing convinced that Papen's massive unpopularity would denude the "New State" of any legitimacy.[86]

Chancellor Franz von Papen making an address on American radio in 1932

Bringing Hitler to Power[edit]

In the November 1932 election the Nazis lost seats, but Papen was still unable to get a Reichstag that would not pass a vote of no-confidence like the one that brought his first government. Papen then decided to try to negotiate with Hitler, but Hitler's reply contained so many conditions that Papen gave up all hope of reaching agreement. Soon afterward, under pressure from Schleicher, Papen resigned on 17 November. In November 1932, Paul Dinichert, the Swiss ambassador to Germany reported: "I left Herr von Papen with the impression of having spoken to a really glib man who cannot be blamed if one gets bored in his presence. Whatever this should be the principle trait of the man who governs Germany today is to be sure, another matter".[87] Konrad Adenauer who knew Papen well often said: "I always gave him the benefit of mitigating circumstances given his enormous limitations".[88]

Papen held out hope of being reappointed by Hindenburg, fully expecting that the aging president would find Hitler's demands unacceptable. Indeed, when Schleicher suggested on 1 December that he might be able to get support from the Nazis, Hindenburg blanched and told Papen to try to form another government. However, at a cabinet meeting the next day, Papen was informed that there was no way to maintain order against the Nazis and Communists. Realizing that Schleicher was deliberately trying to undercut him, Papen asked Hindenburg to fire Schleicher as defence minister. Instead, Hindenburg told Papen that he was appointing Schleicher as chancellor. Schleicher hoped to win the support of the Nazis by threatening to create a schism in the Nazi movement that would force Hitler to support him.[89]

Papen was deeply embittered by the way his former best friend Schleicher had brought him down and having acquired a taste for power was determined to be Chancellor again.[90] Papen contacted a friend, the Cologne banker Baron Kurt von Schröder who also happened to be a NSDAP member in late December 1932 to ask him to pass on a message to Hitler saying that Hindenburg's previously warm relations with Schleicher were cooling and that he wanted to meet Hitler to discuss a common strategy against Schleicher.[91] On 4 January 1933, Hitler and Papen met at what was supposed to be a secret meeting at Schröder's house in Cologne.[92] Hitler spent much of the meeting ranting about how he should had been named Chancellor in August 1932 after his party won the largest number of seats in the Reichstag with Papen telling the lie that he would tried to persuade Hindenburg to appoint Hitler Chancellor that August, but had been blocked by Schleicher (the opposite was the case).[93] For his part, Papen revealed a marked degree of hatred for Schleicher with Goebbels writing in his diary afterwards: "He [Papen] wants to bring about his [Schleicher] fall and get rid of him completely".[94] The principle problem that emerged at the Cologne meeting was the question of who was to be Chancellor as Papen insisted on having that office for himself while Hitler insisted equally vehemently on his "all or nothing" strategy of opposing every government not headed by himself, but the two agreed to keep talking.[95] Papen had strengthened Hitler's hand by revealing to him that Hindenburg had not given Schleicher a degree dissolving the Reichstag nor was likely to, which meant when the Reichstag met after its Christmas break on 31 January 1933, it would be possible to bring a vote of no confidence against Schleicher without worrying about new elections.[96] Before the meeting in Cologne, Papen and Hitler had been photographed going into Schröder's house and the next day 5 January 1933 the news of the Hitler-Papen summit was front-page news all over Germany.[97] On 9 January 1933, Papen met with Hindenburg to tell him that he believed that Hitler was now willing to support a presidential government headed by himself.[98] To continue the talks which started in Cologne, it was decided that henceforth that Papen and Hitler would meet at the house of Joachim von Ribbentrop in Berlin as Ribbentrop was a Nazi who was also an old friend of Papen's going back to their service together in the Ottoman Empire in 1917-18.[99]

The British ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold who met Papen in early January 1933 expressed "the wonder of an observer that the destines of this great country should had been, even for a short time, in the hands of such a lightweight", commenting that everything Papen had to say was superficial in the extreme and that Papen seemed incapable of critical thinking.[100] As it became increasingly obvious that Schleicher would be unsuccessful in his maneuvering to maintain his chancellorship that would not be defeated by a vote of no-confidence, Papen worked to undermine Schleicher. On 20 January 1933, Papen met with Otto Meissner, Hindenburg's chief of staff and Major Oskar von Hindenburg, Hindenburg's son who enjoyed much power by controlling access to his father to tell them he was considering abandoning his claim for the Chancellorship, and instead was considering the idea of a Hitler chancellorship with himself dominating the government.[101] Papen wanted to know if Meissner and the younger Hindenburg would support such an arrangement and if could they persuade the president to accept Hitler as Chancellor and Papen as Vice-Chancellor.[102] On the evening of 22 January 1933, during a meeting at Ribbentrop's house, Papen seeing that Hitler would not budge from his "all or nothing" stance, made the concession of abandoning his claim to the Chancellorship and promised to support Hitler as Chancellor in the proposed "Government of National Concentration".[103] Along with DNVP leader Alfred Hugenberg, Papen formed an agreement with Hitler under which the Nazi leader would become Chancellor of a coalition government with the Nationalists, with Papen serving as Vice-Chancellor and Minister President of Prussia.

On 23 January 1933 Schleicher admitted to Hindenburg that he had been unable to prevent a vote of no-confidence from the Reichstag when it was due convene on 31 January , and asked the president to declare a state of emergency. By this time, the Junker Hindenburg had become irritated by the Schleicher cabinet's policies affecting the Junkers, being enraged that Schleicher had dithered on the question of raising tariffs instead of raising tariffs as he wanted.[104] The Junkers favored a policy of protectionism to keep their estates in business, and Schleicher had been unable to make up his mind if he wanted a policy of free trade that would had pleased industrialists whom wanted access to foreign markets or a policy of protectionism which would had pleased the Junkers.[105] Simultaneously, Papen had been working behind the scenes and used his personal friendship with Hindenburg to assure the president that he, Papen, could control Hitler and could thus finally form a government that would not be defeated on a vote of no confidence from the Reichstag like his government had suffered in September 1932. On 29 January 1933, when the conservative Junker Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin told Papen that his plan to have Hitler as Chancellor while retaining power for himself was an absurd scheme that only end very badly for everybody, Papen replied: "What do you want? I have the confidence of Hindenburg! In two months we'll pushed Hitler so far into the corner that he'll squeal!".[106] Hindenburg refused to grant Schleicher the emergency powers he sought, and Schleicher resigned on 28 January. In the end, the President, who previously vowed never to allow Hitler (whom he derisively referred to as 'Bohemian corporal'), to become Chancellor, appointed Hitler to the post on 30 January 1933, with Papen as Vice-Chancellor.[107]

Von Papen with Hitler on 1 May 1933

At the formation of Hitler's cabinet on 30 January, only three Nazis had cabinet posts: Hitler, Göring, and Wilhelm Frick. The only Nazi besides Hitler to have an actual portfolio was Frick, who held the then-powerless interior ministry. The other eight posts were held by conservatives close to Papen. Additionally, as part of the deal that allowed Hitler to become Chancellor, Papen was granted the right to sit in on every meeting between Hitler and Hindenburg. Under the Weimar Constitution, the Chancellor was a fairly weak figure, serving as little more than a chairman. Moreover, Cabinet decisions were made by majority vote. With this in mind, Papen anticipated "boxing Hitler in," believing that his conservative friends' majority in the Cabinet and his closeness to Hindenburg would keep Hitler in check. Papen boasted to intimates that "Within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak." To the warning that he was placing himself in Hitler's hands, Papen replied, "You are mistaken. We've hired him." [108]

However, Hitler and his allies instead quickly marginalized Papen and the rest of the cabinet. For example, as part of the deal between Hitler and Papen, Göring had been appointed interior minister of Prussia, thus putting the largest police force in Germany under Nazi control. He frequently acted without consulting his nominal superior, Papen. Neither Papen nor his conservative allies waged a fight against the Reichstag Fire Decree in late February or the Enabling Act in March. Even the German Federal Constitutional Court, which had the authority to challenge the move, "accepted the validity of the Enabling Act".[109] After the Enabling Act was passed, the cabinet started to meet less and less as Hitler hated attending cabinet meetings, which thus neutralized Papen's attempt to "box" Hitler in by requiring the cabinet be the main organ of decision-making as the cabinet simply did not meet.

Papen bore a deep grudge against the Zentrum for opposing his Chancellorship in 1932 and endorsed Hitler's plan presented at a cabinet meeting on 7 March 1933 that the best way to destroy the Zentrum without alienating the majority of German Catholics who voted for the Zentrum was to sever the Catholic Church from the Zentrum.[110] This was the origin of the Reichskonkordat Papen was to negotiate with the Roman Catholic Church later in the spring of 1933.[111] Realizing belatedly that being a non-party politician had left him in a weak position regarding the NSDAP, Papen founded a new political party on 5 April 1933 called the League of German Catholics Cross and Eagle, which was intended as a conservative Catholic party that would hold the NSDAP in check while at the same time would work with the NSDAP.[112] In a letter to Hitler, Papen argued that his party was no threat to the regime as it would intended to enlist Catholic support for the "national revolution" (the NSDAP had trouble winning votes in Catholic areas), create a "common front" between all the factions of the right and end the "misunderstandings" between Roman Catholicism and National Socialism.[113] Both the Zentrum and the Bavarian People's Party declined to merge into Papen's new party while the rival Coalition of Catholic Germans which was sponsored by the NSDAP proved more effective at recruiting German Catholics.[114] On 8 April Papen traveled to the Vatican to offer a Reichskonkordat that defined the German state's relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. Papen was by all accounts euphoric at the Reichskonkordat he negotiated with Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli in Rome believing that this was a diplomatic success that restored his stature in Germany, guaranteed the rights of German Catholics in the Third Reich and required the disbandment of the Zentrum and the Bavarian People's Party, thereby achieving one of Papen's main political goals ever June 1932 when he had to resign rather than be expelled from the Zentrum.[115] During Papen's absence, the Nazified Landtag of Prussia elected Göring as prime minister on 10 April. In May 1933, Papen was forced to disband the League of German Catholics Cross and Eagle owing to lack of public interest with those Catholics wanting to support the regime joining the NSDAP and whose who were not declining to join Papen's party.[116] Still undaunted, Papen attended a conference held between 20-23 July 1933 called by Abbott Ildefons Herwegen, a Benedictine monk well known for pro-Nazi views, at the Maria Laach Abbey about best to reconcile National Socialism and Roman Catholicism.[117]

Conscious of his own increasing marginalisation as more ardent Nazis began to assume power in the government, Papen began covert talks with other conservative forces with the aim of convincing Hindenburg to restore the balance of power back to the conservatives by restricting Hitler's power.[118] Of special importance in these talks was the growing conflict between the German military and the paramilitary SA, led by Ernst Röhm and the fact that Hindenburg was clearly dying by May 1934 with the doctors telling Papen the president only had a few months left.[119] In early 1934 Röhm continued to demand that the storm troopers of the SA become the core of a new German army.[120] Many conservatives, including Hindenburg, felt uneasy with the storm troopers' demands, their lack of discipline and their revolutionary tendencies. Hindenburg's soon to be expected death put Papen in a weak position. Determined that Hitler should not assume the presidency when Hindenburg died, Papen in May 1934 together with Meissner and Oskar von Hindenburg drafted a "political will and last testament", which Hindenburg signed on 11 May 1934.[121] Hindenburg's will praised Hitler for creating the volksgemeinschaft (people's community), but blocked Hitler from becoming president and called for the restoration of the monarchy.[122] Perhaps the most crucial part of the Hindenburg's will, which was put in at Papen's request was the call to dismiss certain National Socialist ministers from the cabinet (through not Hitler) and to have the cabinet meet regularly, which would had achieved Papen's plan of January 1933 to have a broad coalition of the right, in which Hitler would play a leading, but not dominant role.[123]

Marburg Speech and downfall[edit]

Main article: Marburg speech

With the Army command recently having hinted at the need for Hitler to control the SA, Papen delivered an address at the University of Marburg on 17 June 1934 where he called for the restoration of some freedoms, demanded an end to the calls for a "second revolution" [124] and advocated the cessation of SA terror in the streets.

In the 'Marburg speech' Papen said that "The government [must be] mindful of the old maxim 'only weaklings suffer no criticism'" and that "No organization, no propaganda, however excellent, can alone maintain confidence in the long run." The speech was crafted by Papen's speech writer, Edgar Julius Jung, with the assistance of Papen's secretary Herbert von Bose and Catholic leader Erich Klausener. Jung's pen reflected Papen's misgivings, evidenced in one of the stronger warnings contained within the 'Marburg speech'; whereby Papen presciently exclaimed, "Germany must not turn into a train heading off into the blue yonder, with no one knowing when it will stop."[125]

The vice-chancellor's bold speech incensed Hitler, and its publication was suppressed by the Propaganda Ministry. Angered by this reaction and stating that he had spoken on behalf of Hindenburg, Papen told Hitler that he was resigning and would inform Hindenburg at once. Hitler knew that accepting the resignation of Hindenburg's long-time confidant, especially during a time of tumult, would anger the ailing president. He guessed right; not long afterward Hindenburg gave Hitler an ultimatum – unless he acted to end the state of tension in Germany, Hindenburg would throw him out of office and turn over control of the government to the army.

Night of the Long Knives[edit]

Two weeks after the Marburg speech, Hitler responded to the armed forces' demands to suppress the ambitions of Röhm and the SA by purging the SA leadership. The purge, known as the Night of the Long Knives, took place between 30 June and 2 July 1934. In the purge, Röhm and much of the SA leadership were murdered. General Kurt von Schleicher, the former Chancellor who had been scheming with some of Hitler's rivals within the party to separate them from their leader, was gunned down along with his wife. Also Gustav von Kahr, the conservative who had thwarted the Beer Hall Putsch more than ten years earlier, was killed and thrown into a swamp.

The architects of the purge: Hitler, Göring, Goebbels, and Hess. Only Himmler and Heydrich are missing.

Though Papen's bold speech against some of the excesses committed by the Nazis had angered Hitler, the latter was aware that he could not act directly against the Vice-Chancellor without offending Hindenburg. Instead, in the Night of the Long Knives, the Vice-Chancellery, Papen's office, was ransacked by the Schutzstaffel (SS); his associate Herbert von Bose was shot dead at his desk. Another associate, Erich Klausener, was also shot dead at his desk at the Ministry of Transport. Many more were arrested and imprisoned in concentration camps where Jung, amongst others, was shot a few days later. Papen himself was placed under house arrest at his villa with his telephone line cut, although some accounts indicate that this "protective custody" was ordered by Göring, who felt the ex-diplomat could be useful in the future. Other sources suggest that Papen had shared a place with Schleicher on an SS "death list", and that Göring had in fact saved him from the purge by ordering his confinement, possibly unwittingly after personal disputes. Understandably, Papen vehemently objected to being taken into custody, but he later came to the realization that Göring had indeed saved his life.[126]

Reportedly Papen arrived at the Chancellery, exhausted from days of house arrest without sleep, to find the Chancellor seated with other Nazi ministers around a round table, with no place for him but a hole in the middle. He insisted on a private audience with Hitler and announced his resignation, stating, "My service to the Fatherland is over!" The following day, Papen's resignation as Vice-Chancellor was formally accepted and publicised, with no successor appointed. With Hindenburg's death weeks later, the last conservative obstacle to complete Nazi rule was gone.[127]

Ambassador to Austria[edit]

Despite the events of the Night of the Long Knives, Franz von Papen still had a role to play in the regime. Since Hitler wanted Papen out of Berlin, he offered him the assignment of German ambassador to Vienna, where Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss had just been murdered in a failed Nazi coup, which was brutally suppressed. Gerhard Weinberg asserts that Papen went to work at this point using "subversive tactics" in Vienna similar to those he employed against the United States during the First World War.[128]

In Hitler's words and from what Papen later remarked, his duty was to restore "normal and friendly relations" between Germany and Austria.[129] Papen also contributed to achieving Hitler's goal of undermining Austrian sovereignty and bringing about the Nazis' long-dreamed-of Anschluss (annexation by Germany). Winston Churchill reported in his book The Gathering Storm (1948) that Hitler appointed Papen for "the undermining or winning over of leading personalities in Austrian politics". Churchill also quoted the United States ambassador in Vienna as saying of Papen that "in the boldest and most cynical manner... Papen proceeded to tell me that... he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with Austrians like Cardinal Innitzer."[130]

Ironically, one of the plots called for Papen's murder by Austrian Nazi sympathisers as a pretext for a retaliatory invasion by Germany.[131]

Throughout negotiations for the Anschluss with Austria, Papen (with knowledge that both Catholic Rome and Mussolini were uneasy about the affair) urged Hitler to proceed cautiously so as not to disturb their relationship with the Italians.[132]

Though Papen was dismissed from his mission in Austria on 4 February 1938, Hitler drafted him to arrange a meeting between the German dictator and Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden.[133] The ultimatum that Hitler presented to Schuschnigg, at the meeting on 12 February 1938, led to the Austrian government's capitulation to German threats and pressure, and paved the way for the Anschluss. On 13 March 1938, Hitler signed the "Law concerning the Reunion (sic) of Austria with the German Reich" making the Anschluss official. In the moments immediately following the union of Germany and Austria, Hitler sat motionless as tears of joy streamed down his face.[134] Papen was not there to experience this moment, perhaps fortunately for him since this alleged "aggression" against Austria was later recalled during the Nuremberg Trials.

Second World War[edit]

Papen later served the German government as Ambassador to Turkey from 1939 to 1944. There, he survived a Soviet assassination attempt on 24 February 1942 by agents from the NKVD[135]—a bomb exploded prematurely, killing the bomber and no-one else, although Papen was slightly injured.

After Pope Pius XI died in February 1939, his successor Pope Pius XII did not renew Papen's honorary title of Papal chamberlain. As nuncio, the future Pope John XXIII, Angelo Roncalli, was acquainted with Papen in Greece and Turkey during World War II. The German government considered appointing Papen ambassador to the Holy See, but Pope Pius XII, after consulting Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Berlin, rejected this proposal.

In August 1944, Papen had his last meeting with Hitler after arriving back in Germany from Turkey. Here, Hitler awarded Papen the Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross.[136]

Benzenhofen, near Ravensburg

Post-war years[edit]

Papen was captured along with his son Franz Jr. at his own home by First Lieutenant Thomas McKinley[137] and members of the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment, in April 1945. McKinley rushed into the lodge to find Franz von Papen having dinner with his family. McKinley pulled out a photograph and identified Papen. McKinley then told Papen that he was his prisoner; Papen stated in reply, "I don't know what the Americans would want with an old man of 65 like me!" Nonetheless, McKinley sat down and ate dinner with Papen before taking him captive. Papen was heard to remark (in English), "I wish this terrible war were over." Sergeant Fredericks responded, "So do 11 million other guys!" Also present during the capture was a small band from the 550th Airborne glider Infantry.[138]

Papen was one of the defendants at the main Nuremberg War Crimes Trial. The proceedings against Franz von Papen about his participation in the crimes of Nazi aggression, particularly those concerning his actions during the Austrian Anschluss were unconvincing. The investigating Tribunal found no solid evidence to support claims that Papen supported the occupation of Austria.[139] The court acquitted him, stating that while he had committed a number of "political immoralities," these actions were not punishable under the "conspiracy to commit crimes against peace" written in Papen's indictment. He was subsequently sentenced to eight years hard labour by a West German denazification court, but was released on appeal in 1949.[140]

Papen tried unsuccessfully to restart his political career in the 1950s; he lived at the Castle of Benzenhofen in Upper Swabia.

Pope John XXIII restored his title of Papal Chamberlain on 24 July 1959. Papen was also a Knight of Malta, and was awarded the Grand Cross of the Pontifical Order of Pius IX.

Papen published a number of books and memoirs, in which he defended his policies and dealt with the years 1930 to 1933 as well as early western Cold War politics. Papen praised the Schuman Plan as "wise and statesmanlike" and believed in the economic and military unification and integration of Western Europe.[141]

Franz von Papen died in Obersasbach, West Germany, on 2 May 1969 at the age of 89.[142]

Von Papen's grave in Wallerfangen, Saarland

Publications[edit]

  • Appell an das deutsche Gewissen. Reden zur nationalen Revolution, Stalling, Oldenburg, 1933
  • Franz von Papen Memoirs, Translated by Brian Connell, Andre Deutsch, London, 1952
  • Der Wahrheit eine Gasse, Paul List Verlag, München 1952
  • Europa, was nun? Betrachtungen zur Politik der Westmächte, Göttinger Verlags-Anstalt, Göttingen 1954
  • Vom Scheitern einer Demokratie. 1930 – 1933, Hase und Koehler, Mainz 1968

In popular culture[edit]

Franz von Papen has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theatrical productions;[143]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Notes

  1. ^ "Reich Chancellor Brüning's resignation" from the site Biografie Willy Brandt. Archived 27 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
  2. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 39.
  3. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 39.
  4. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 39.
  5. ^ Klaus Fischer, Nazi Germany: A New History, pg. 241
  6. ^ Shirer, William 1960, p 164.
  7. ^ a b Current Biography 1941, pp. 651–653.
  8. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 194.
  9. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 194.
  10. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 39.
  11. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 39.
  12. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 197.
  13. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 196.
  14. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 196.
  15. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 200.
  16. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 200.
  17. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 pages 200-201.
  18. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 201.
  19. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 40.
  20. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 8.
  21. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 pages 194-195.
  22. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 197.
  23. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 197.
  24. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 196.
  25. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 198.
  26. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 198.
  27. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 199.
  28. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 pages 201-202.
  29. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 203.
  30. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 41.
  31. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 41.
  32. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 41.
  33. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 205.
  34. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 205.
  35. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 206.
  36. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 206.
  37. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 206.
  38. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz Von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic" pages 191-217 from Central European History Vol. 38, No. 2, 2005 page 206.
  39. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: Norton, 1998 page 366
  40. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: Norton, 1998 page 366
  41. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan 1967 page 242
  42. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan 1967 page 242
  43. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 243-244
  44. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 243-244
  45. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris New York: Norton, 1998 page 367.
  46. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris New York: Norton, 1998 page 367.
  47. ^ François-Poncet made this observation in his book, The Fateful Years: Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin, 1931–1938, also quoted in William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.
  48. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 40.
  49. ^ "Time Magazine, Feb. 6, 1933". Time.com. 6 February 1933. Retrieved 2010-04-28. 
  50. ^ Cite error: The named reference autogenerated250 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  51. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris, New York: Norton, 1998 page 368.
  52. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 8.
  53. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 8.
  54. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 8.
  55. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 8.
  56. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 251.
  57. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 250.
  58. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 250.
  59. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 250.
  60. ^ Nicolls, Anthony Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London: Macmillan 2000 page 156.
  61. ^ Nicolls, Anthony Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London: Macmillan 2000 page 157.
  62. ^ Evans 2003, p. 284.
  63. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 pages 17-18.
  64. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 18.
  65. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 18.
  66. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 pages 18-19.
  67. ^ Nicolls, Anthony Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London: Macmillan 2000 page 161.
  68. ^ Nicolls, Anthony Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, London: Macmillan 2000 page 161.
  69. ^ Carsten Dams and Michael Stolle, The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 3.
  70. ^ Hagen Schulze, Germany: A New History, pgs. 241–243
  71. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 250.
  72. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 page 250.
  73. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 12.
  74. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 12.
  75. ^ Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany, pg. 176
  76. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 381.
  77. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 381.
  78. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 372.
  79. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 382.
  80. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 382.
  81. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 382.
  82. ^ Kershaw, Ian Hitler Hubris 1889-1936, New York: W.W. Norton, 1998 page 382.
  83. ^ a b Evans 2003, p. 297-298.
  84. ^ Shirer, p. 172.
  85. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 pages 18-19.
  86. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 19.
  87. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 40.
  88. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 40.
  89. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996, page 24
  90. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 41.
  91. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 pages 42-43.
  92. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 44.
  93. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 44.
  94. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 44.
  95. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 45.
  96. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 46.
  97. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 47.
  98. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 51.
  99. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 56.
  100. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 40.
  101. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 112.
  102. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 112.
  103. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 112.
  104. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 pages 98-99.
  105. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 95.
  106. ^ Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996 page 147.
  107. ^ Jackson Spielvogel, Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History, pgs. 67–69
  108. ^ Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889–1936: Hubris (1998) p.411
  109. ^ Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism, pg. 224
  110. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 292.
  111. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 293.
  112. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 pages 285-286.
  113. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 287.
  114. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 289.
  115. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 292.
  116. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 290.
  117. ^ Jones, Larry Eugene "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933–1934" pages 272-318 from The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 83, No. 2 June 2011 page 295.
  118. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 314-315.
  119. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 314.
  120. ^ Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS, pgs. 93–95
  121. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 314.
  122. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 314.
  123. ^ Wheeler-Bennett, John The Nemesis of Power The German Army in Politics 1918-1945, London: Macmillan, 1967 pages 314.
  124. ^ SA demands for a "socialist" revolution to complement the already fulfilled "nationalist" revolution inherent in the name of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP or Nazis). See http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,754321,00.html.
  125. ^ Wolfgang Benz, A Concise History of the Third Reich, pg. 53
  126. ^ Anthony Read, The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle, pgs. 369–370.
  127. ^ "GERMANY: Crux of Crisis". Time. 16 July 1934. 
  128. ^ Gerhard Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History, pg. 98.
  129. ^ Werner Ernst Braatz, Franz von Papen and the Movement of Anschluss with Austria, 1934–1938: An Episode in German Diplomacy, pg. 8.
  130. ^ Churchill, W. (1948). The Gathering Storm, p. 132.
  131. ^ Blandford (2001). SS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service, p. 135.
  132. ^ Gerhard Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II, pg. 493.
  133. ^ Klaus Hildebrand, The Third Reich, pg. 29.
  134. ^ Joachim Fest, Hitler, pg. 548.
  135. ^ Pavel Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1994), ISBN 0-316-77352-2
  136. ^ Franz von Papen, Memoirs, p. 532.
  137. ^ Hagerman, [compiled by Bart (1993). War stories : the men of the airborne (First ed.). Paducah, Ky.: Turner Pub. Co. p. 276. ISBN 1563110970. 
  138. ^ Hagerman, [compiled by Bart (1993). War stories : the men of the airborne (First ed.). Paducah, Ky.: Turner Pub. Co. p. 277. ISBN 1563110970. 
  139. ^ Patrycja Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression, p. 147.
  140. ^ Historian Richard Evans intimates that through the Anschluss, antisemitism throughout Germany intensified; namely since the Reich acquired upwards of 200,000 additional Austrian Jews, off-setting the number of Jews that had been forced to emigrate between March of 1933 to March of 1938. Evans goes on to say that "Without the Austrian example and the feelings of triumph and invulnerability it engendered in Nazi Party activists, it is impossible to understand the upsurge of violence that swept across Germany in the summer of 1938 and culminated in the pogrom of 9–10 November" (Reichskristallnacht). See: Richard Evans, The Third Reich in Power, (2006) pg. 661. Had it not been for von Papen's dismissal before the Anschluss, it is conceivable that he might have found himself in prison for much longer at the end of the Second World War, or worse, on the end of the hangman's noose at Nuremberg.
  141. ^ Franz von Papen, Memoirs, pgs. 586–587.
  142. ^ Robert S. Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany, p. 189.
  143. ^ "Franz von Papen (Character)". IMDb.com. Retrieved 20 May 2008. 

Bibliography

  • Benz, Wolfgang. A Concise History of the Third Reich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007.
  • Blandford, Edmund L. SS Intelligence: The Nazi Secret Service. Edison, NJ: Castle, 2001.
  • Braatz, Werner Ernst. Franz von Papen and the Movement of Anschluss with Austria, 1934–1938: An Episode in German Diplomacy. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953.
  • Bracher, Karl Dietrich Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik; eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie Villingen: Schwarzwald,Ring-Verlag, 1971.
  • Bracher, Karl Dietrich. The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of National Socialism. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
  • Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 – 8 May 1945. New York: William Morrow, 1946.
  • Dams, Carsten, and Michael Stolle. The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third Reich. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Evans, Richard J. (2003). The Coming of the Third Reich. New York City: Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0141009759. 
  • Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power. New York: Penguin, 2006.
  • Fest, Joachim C. Hitler. Orlando, FL.: Harcourt Inc., 2002.
  • Fischer, Klaus. Nazi Germany: A New History. New York: Continuum, 1995.
  • Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  • Grzebyk, Patrycja. Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression. New York: Routledge, 2013.
  • Hagerman, Bart. War Stories: The Men of the Airborne. Paducah, Ky.: Turner Pub. Co, 1993.
  • Hildebrand, Klaus. The Third Reich. London & New York: Routledge, 1986.
  • Höhne, Heinz. The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS. New York: Penguin Press, 2001.
  • Jones, Larry Eugene (2005), "Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic", Central European History, 38 (2): 191–217, doi:10.1163/156916105775563670 .
  • Kershaw, Ian Hitler: 1889–1936: Hubris New York: Norton, 1998.
  • Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. London: Andre Deutsch, 1952.
  • Read, Anthony. The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005.
  • Schulze, Hagen. Germany: A New History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
  • Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960.
  • Spielvogel, Jackson J. Hitler and Nazi Germany: A History. New York: Prentice Hall, 2004.
  • Sudoplatov, Pavel. Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994.
  • Turner, Henry Ashby Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996.
  • Weinberg, Gerhard L. Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History. New York & Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
  • Weinberg, Gerhard L. Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II. New York: Enigma Books, 2005.
  • Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John The Nemesis of Power: German Army in Politics, 1918 – 1945 New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publishing Company, 2005.
  • Wistrich, Robert S. Who's Who in Nazi Germany. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

Further reading

  • Fest, Joachim C. and Bullock, Michael (trans.) "Franz von Papen and the Conservative Collaboration" in The Face of the Third Reich New York: Penguin, 1979 (orig. published in German in 1963), pp. 229–246. ISBN 978-0201407143.

External links[edit]

Political offices
Preceded by
Heinrich Brüning
Chancellor of Germany
1932
Succeeded by
Kurt von Schleicher
Preceded by
Otto Braun (as prime minister)
Reichskomissar of Prussia
1932
Succeeded by
Kurt von Schleicher
Preceded by
Kurt von Schleicher (as Reichskomissar)
Prime Minister of Prussia
1933
Succeeded by
Hermann Göring
Preceded by
Hermann R. Dietrich
Vice-Chancellor of Germany
1933–34
Succeeded by
Hermann Göring (in 1941)