Algerian Civil War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Algerian Civil War
Arrêt du processus électoral de 1991 en Algérie.jpg
Military deployed in the streets of Algiers, after military coup against the islamists, who took up arms later.
Date 26 December 1991 – February 2002[1]
Location Algeria
Result Insurgency subsided after amnesty peace plan of 2000[2]
Belligerents
 Algeria Insurgents
Commanders and leaders
Algeria Ali Kafi
Algeria Liamine Zéroual
Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika
Abdelkader Chebouti
Madani Mezrag
Djamel Zitouni
Antar Zouabri
Strength
140,000 (1994)[3]
124,000 (in 2001)
2,000 (1992)
40,000 (1994)
10,000 (1996)[4]
300-1,000 (2005)[5]
Casualties and losses
44,000-150,000 total dead[6]

The Algerian Civil War was an armed conflict between the Algerian government and various Islamist rebel groups which began in 1991. Total casualties have yet to be accurately counted but it is estimated to have cost somewhere between 44,000 and 150,000 lives, in a population of about 25,010,000 in 1990 and 31,193,917 in 2000.[7][8]

More than 70 journalists were assassinated, either by security forces or by Islamists.[9] The conflict effectively ended with a government victory, following the surrender of the Islamic Salvation Army and the 2002 defeat of the Armed Islamic Group.

The conflict began in December 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party gained popularity amongst the Algerian people and the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, fearing the former's victory, cancelled elections after the first round. At this time the country's military effectively took control of the government, and president Chadli Bendjedid was forced from office. After the FIS was banned and thousands of its members arrested, Islamist guerrillas rapidly emerged and began an armed campaign against the government and its supporters.

They formed themselves into several armed groups, principally the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA), based in the mountains, and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), based in the towns. The guerrillas initially targeted the army and police, but some groups soon started attacking civilians. In 1994, as negotiations between the government and the FIS's imprisoned leadership reached their height, the GIA declared war on the FIS and its supporters, while the MIA and various smaller groups regrouped, becoming the FIS-loyalist Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).

Soon after, the talks collapsed, and new elections, the first since the 1992 coup d'état, were held—won by the army's candidate, General Liamine Zéroual (himself a former active participant, as were a significant number of other military officials, in president Bendjedid's FLN government). Conflict between the GIA and AIS intensified. Over the next few years, the GIA began a series of massacres targeting entire neighborhoods or villages; some evidence also suggests the involvement of government forces. These massacres peaked in 1997 around the parliamentary elections, which were won by a newly created pro-Army party, the National Rally for Democracy (RND).

The AIS, under attack from both sides, opted for a unilateral ceasefire with the government in 1997, while the GIA was torn apart by splits as various subdivisions objected to its new massacre policy. In 1999, following the election of a new president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a new law gave amnesty to most guerrillas, motivating large numbers to "repent" (as it was termed) and return to normal life. The violence declined substantially, with effective victory for the government. The remnants of the GIA proper were hunted down over the next two years, and had practically disappeared by 2002.

A splinter group of the GIA that formed on the fringes of Kabylie in 1998, called the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), rejected the amnesty. It dissociated itself from the previous indiscriminate killing of civilians and reverted to the classic MIA-AIS tactics of targeting combatant forces.[10] In October 2003, they announced their support for Al-Qaeda[11][12] and in 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a "blessed union" between the two groups. In 2007, the group changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and continues to be active.

Elections cancelled: a guerrilla war begins[edit]

  FIS majority
  50% FIS
  non-FIS majority
  Undecided
  No data available
In the above provincial seat allocation results of the 1991 elections, the FIS attained majorities in most of Algeria's populated areas.

The conflict began in December 1991, when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party gained popularity amongst the Algerian people prior to the 1991 Algerian elections and was on the verge of being elected to government. The army saw this outcome as unacceptable. The FIS had made open threats against the ruling pouvoir, condemning them as unpatriotic and pro-French, as well as financially corrupt. Additionally, FIS leadership was at best divided on the desirability of democracy, and some expressed fears that a FIS government would be, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian put it, "one man, one vote, one time."

On January 11, 1992 the army cancelled the electoral process, forcing President Chadli Bendjedid to resign and bringing in the exiled independence fighter Mohammed Boudiaf to serve as a new president. However, on 29 June 1992 he was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, a Lieutenant L. Boumaarafi. The assassin was sentenced to death in a closed trial in 1995. The sentence was not carried out. So many FIS members were arrested—5,000 by the army's account, 30,000 according to FIS, and including Abdelkader Hachani—that the jails had insufficient space to hold them in; camps were set up for them in the Sahara desert, and bearded men feared to leave their houses lest they be arrested as FIS sympathizers.

A state of emergency was declared, and many ordinary constitutional rights were suspended. Any protests that occurred were suppressed, and human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, reported frequent government use of torture and holding of suspects without charge or trial. The government officially dissolved the FIS on March 4.

Of the few FIS activists that remained free, many took this as a declaration of war. Throughout much of the country, remaining FIS activists, along with some Islamists too radical for FIS, took to the hills with whatever weapons were available and became guerrilla fighters. Their first attacks on the security forces (not counting the Guemmar incident) began barely a week after the coup, and soldiers and policemen rapidly became targets.

As in previous wars, the guerrillas were almost exclusively based in the mountains of northern Algeria, where the forest and scrub cover were well-suited to guerrilla warfare, and in certain areas of the cities; the very sparsely populated but oil-rich Sahara would remain mostly peaceful for almost the entire duration of the conflict. This meant that the government's principal source of foreign exchange—oil exports—was largely unaffected.

The tense situation was compounded by the economy, which collapsed even further that year, as almost all of the longstanding subsidies on food were eliminated. The hopes many placed in the seemingly untainted figure of Boudiaf were soon dashed when he fell to a bullet from one of his own security guards in late June. Soon afterwards, Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj were sentenced to 12 years in prison.

By August 26 it had become apparent that some guerrillas were beginning to target civilians as well as government figures: the bombing of the Algiers airport claimed 9 lives and injured 128 people. The FIS condemned the bombing along with the other major parties, but the FIS's influence over the guerrillas turned out to be limited.

The initial fighting appears to have been led by the small extremist group Takfir wal Hijra and associated ex-Afghan fighters. However, the first major armed movement to emerge, starting almost immediately after the coup, was the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA). It was led by the ex-soldier Abdelkader Chebouti, a longstanding Islamist who had kept his distance from the FIS during the electoral process. In February 1992, ex-soldier, ex-Afghan fighter, and former FIS head of security Said Mekhloufi founded the Movement for an Islamic State (MEI). The various groups arranged several meetings to attempt to unite their forces, accepting the overall leadership of Chebouti in theory. At the last of these, at Tamesguida on September 1, Chebouti expressed his concern about the movement's lack of discipline, in particular worrying that the Algiers airport attack, which he had not approved, could alienate supporters. Takfir wal Hijra and the Afghans (led by Noureddine Seddiki) responded by agreeing to join the MIA. However, the meeting was broken up by an assault from the security forces, provoking suspicions which prevented any further meetings.

The FIS itself established an underground network, with clandestine newspapers and even an MIA-linked radio station, and began issuing official statements from abroad starting in late 1992. However, at this stage the opinions of the guerrilla movements on the FIS were mixed; while many supported FIS, a significant faction, led by the "Afghans", regarded party political activity as inherently un-Islamic, and therefore rejected FIS statements.

1993[edit]

In January 1993, Abdelhak Layada declared his group independent of Chebouti's. The new faction was called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA, from French Groupe Islamique Armé). It became particularly prominent around Algiers and its suburbs, in urban environments. It took a hardline position, opposed to both the government and the FIS, affirming that "political pluralism is equivalent to sedition"[13] and issuing death threats against several FIS and MIA leaders. It was far less selective than the MIA, which insisted on ideological training; as a result, it was regularly infiltrated by the security forces, resulting in a rapid leadership turnover as successive heads were killed.

In 1993, the divisions within the guerrilla movement became more distinct. The MIA and MEI, concentrated in the maquis, attempted to develop a military strategy against the state, typically targeting the security services and sabotaging or bombing state institutions. From its inception on, however, the GIA, concentrated in urban areas, called for and implemented the killing of anyone supporting the authorities, including government employees such as teachers and civil servants. It assassinated journalists and intellectuals (such as Tahar Djaout), saying that "The journalists who fight against Islamism through the pen will perish by the sword. ".[14]

It soon stepped up its attacks by targeting civilians who refused to live by their prohibitions, and later in 1993 began killing foreigners, declaring that "anyone who exceeds that period [a one-month deadline] will be responsible for his own sudden death. "[15] After a few conspicuous killings, virtually all foreigners left the country; indeed, (often illegal) Algerian emigration too rose substantially, as people sought a way out. At the same time, the number of visas granted to Algerians by other countries began to drop substantially.

Failed negotiations and guerrilla infighting[edit]

The violence continued throughout 1994, although the economy began to improve during this time; following negotiations with the IMF, the government succeeded in rescheduling debt repayments, providing it with a substantial financial windfall,[16] and further obtained some 40 billion francs from the international community to back its economic liberalization.[17] As it became obvious that the fighting would continue for some time, General Liamine Zéroual was named new president of the High Council of State; he was considered to belong to the dialoguiste (pro-negotiation) rather than éradicateur (eradicator) faction of the army.

Soon after taking office, he began negotiations with the imprisoned FIS leadership, releasing some prisoners by way of encouragement. The talks split the political spectrum; the largest political parties, especially the socialist FLN and Kabyle socialist FFS, continued to call for compromise, while other forces—most notably the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), but including smaller leftist and feminist groups such as the ultra-secularist RCD—sided with the "eradicators". A few shadowy pro-government paramilitaries, such as the Organisation of Young Free Algerians (OJAL), emerged and began attacking civilian Islamist supporters. On March 10, 1994, over 1000 (mainly Islamist) prisoners escaped Tazoult prison in what appeared to be a major coup for the guerrillas; later, conspiracy theorists would suggest that this had been staged to allow the security forces to infiltrate the GIA.

Meanwhile, under Cherif Gousmi (its leader since March), the GIA became the most high-profile guerrilla army in 1994. In May, the FIS suffered an apparent blow as several of its leaders that were not jailed, along with the MEI's Said Makhloufi, joined the GIA; since the GIA had been issuing death threats against them since November 1993, this came as a surprise to many observers, who interpreted it either as the result of intra-FIS competition or as an attempt to change the GIA's course from within.

On August 26, the GIA even declared a caliphate, or Islamic government, for Algeria, with Gousmi as "Commander of the Faithful". However, the very next day, Said Mekhloufi announced his withdrawal from the GIA, claiming that the GIA had deviated from Islam and that this caliphate was an effort by ex-FIS leader Mohammed Said to take over the GIA. The GIA continued attacks on its usual targets, notably assassinating artists, such as Cheb Hasni, and in late August added a new practice to its activities: threatening insufficiently Islamist schools with arson.

FIS-loyal guerrillas, threatened with marginalization, attempted to unite their forces. In July 1994, the MIA, together with the remainder of the MEI and a variety of smaller groups, united as the Islamic Salvation Army (a term that had previously sometimes been used as a general label for pro-FIS guerrillas), declaring their allegiance to FIS and thus strengthening FIS's hand in the negotiations. By the end of 1994, they controlled over half the guerrillas of the east and west, but barely 20% in the center, near the capital, which was where the GIA were mainly based. They issued communiqués condemning the GIA's indiscriminate targeting of women, journalists and other civilians "not involved in the repression", and attacked the GIA's school arson campaign.

At the end of October, the government announced the failure of its negotiations with the FIS. Instead, Zéroual embarked on a new plan: he scheduled presidential elections for 1995, while promoting "eradicationists" such as Lamari within the army and organizing "self-defense militias" in villages to fight the guerrillas. The end of 1994 saw a noticeable upsurge in violence. Over 1994, Algeria's isolation deepened; most foreign press agencies, such as Reuters, left the country this year, while the Moroccan border closed and the main foreign airlines cancelled all routes. The resulting gap in news coverage was further worsened by a government order in June banning Algerian media from reporting any terrorism-related news not covered in official press releases.[18]

A few FIS leaders, notably Rabah Kebir, had escaped into exile abroad. Upon the invitation of the Rome-based Community of Sant'Egidio, in November 1994, they began negotiations in Rome with other opposition parties, both Islamist and secular (FLN, FFS, FIS, MDA, PT, JMC). They came out with a mutual agreement on January 14, 1995: the Sant'Egidio platform. This presented a set of principles: respect for human rights and multi-party democracy, rejection of army rule and dictatorship, recognition of Islam, Arab and Berber ethnic identity as essential aspects of Algeria's national identity, demand for the release of FIS leaders, and an end to extrajudicial killing and torture on all sides.

To the surprise of many, even Ali Belhadj endorsed the agreement, which meant that the FIS had returned into the legal framework, alongside with the other opposition parties. However, a crucial signatory was missing: the government itself. As a result, the platform's effect was at best limited - though some argue that, in the words of Andrea Riccardi who brokered the negotiations for the Community of Sant'Egidio, “the platform made the Algerian military leave the cage of a solely military confrontation and forced them to react with a political act”, the 1995 presidential elections. The next few months saw the killing of some 100 Islamist prisoners in the Serkadji prison mutiny, and a major success for the security forces in battle at Ain Defla, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of guerrilla fighters.

Cherif Gousmi was eventually succeeded by Djamel Zitouni as GIA head. Zitouni extended the GIA's attacks on civilians to French soil, beginning with the hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 at the end of December 1994 and continuing with several bombings and attempted bombings throughout 1995. In Algeria itself, he continued likewise, with car bombs and assassinations of musicians, sportsmen, and unveiled women, as well as the usual victims. Even at this stage, the seemingly counterproductive nature of many of its attacks led to speculation (encouraged by FIS members abroad) that the group had been infiltrated by Algerian secret services. The region south of Algiers, in particular, came to be dominated by the GIA, who called it the "liberated zone". Later, it would come to be known as the "Triangle of Death".

Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased, and the GIA reiterated its death threats against FIS and AIS leaders, assassinating a co-founder of the FIS, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, in Paris. At this point, foreign sources estimated the total number of guerrillas to be about 27,000.

Politics resume, militias emerge[edit]

Following the breakdown of negotiations with the FIS, the government decided to hold presidential elections. On 16 November 1995, Liamine Zéroual was elected president with 60% of votes cast. The election, contested by many candidates, including the Islamists Mahfoud Nahnah (25%) and Noureddine Boukrouh.[19]

The results reflected various popular opinions, ranging from support for secularism and opposition to Islamism to a desire for an end to the violence, regardless of politics. Hopes grew that Algerian politics would finally be normalized. Zéroual followed this up by pushing through a new constitution in 1996, substantially strengthening the power of the president and adding a second house that would be partly elected and partly appointed by the president. In November 1996, the text was passed by a national referendum; while the official turnout rate was 80%, this vote was unmonitored, and the claimed high turnout was considered by most to be implausible.

The government's political moves were combined with a substantial increase in the pro-government militias' profile. "Self-defense militias", often called "Patriots" for short, consisting of trusted local citizens trained by the army and given government weapons, were founded in towns near areas where guerrillas were active, and were promoted on national TV. The program was received well in some parts of the country, but was less popular in others; it would be substantially increased over the next few years, particularly after the massacres of 1997.

The election results were a setback for the armed groups, who saw a significant increase in desertions immediately following the elections. The FIS' Rabah Kebir responded to the apparent shift in popular mood by adopting a more conciliatory tone towards the government, but was condemned by some parts of the party and of the AIS. The GIA was shaken by internal dissension; shortly after the election, its leadership killed the FIS leaders who had joined the GIA, accusing them of attempting a takeover. This purge accelerated the disintegration of the GIA: Mustapha Kartali, Ali Benhadjar and Hassan Hattab's factions all refused to recognize Zitouni's leadership starting around late 1995, although they would not formally break away until later. In December, the GIA killed the AIS leader for central Algeria, Azzedine Baa, and in January pledged to fight the AIS as an enemy; particularly in the west, full-scale battles between them became common.

Massacres and reconciliation[edit]

Massacres of over 50 people in the years 1997 and 1998

In July 1996 GIA leader, Djamel Zitouni was killed by one of the breakaway ex-GIA factions and was succeeded by Antar Zouabri, who would prove an even bloodier leader.

Parliamentary elections were held on 5 June 1997. They were dominated by the National Democratic Rally (RND), a new party created in early 1997 for Zéroual's supporters, which got 156 out of 380 seats, followed mainly by the MSP (as Hamas had been required to rename itself) and the FLN at over 60 seats each. Views on this election were mixed; most major opposition parties filed complaints, and the success of the extremely new RND raised eyebrows. The RND, FLN and MSP formed a coalition government, with the RND's Ahmed Ouyahia as prime minister. There were hints of a softening towards FIS: Abdelkader Hachani was released, and Abbassi Madani moved to house arrest.

Village massacres[edit]

At this point, however, a new and vital problem emerged. Starting around April (the Thalit massacre), Algeria was wracked by massacres of intense brutality and unprecedented size; previous massacres had occurred in the conflict, but always on a substantially smaller scale. Typically targeting entire villages or neighborhoods and disregarding the age and sex of victims, killing tens, and sometimes hundreds, of civilians at a time.

Algerian massacres in 1997
Massacres in which over 50 people were killed:
Thalit massacre 3–4 April
Haouch Khemisti massacre 21 April
Daïat Labguer (M'sila) Massacre 16 June
Si-Zerrouk massacre 27 July
Oued El-Had and Mezouara massacre 3 August
Souhane massacre 20–21 August
Beni-Ali massacre 26 August
Rais massacre 29 August
Beni-Messous massacre 5–6 September
Guelb El-Kebir massacre 19 September
Bentalha massacre 22 September
Sid El-Antri massacre 23–24 December
Wilaya of Relizane massacres 30 December
1998 →

These massacres continued through the end of 1998, changing the nature of the political situation considerably. The areas south and east of Algiers, which had voted strongly for FIS in 1991, were hit particularly hard; the Rais and Bentalha massacres in particular shocked worldwide observers. Pregnant women were sliced open, children were hacked to pieces or dashed against walls, men's limbs were hacked off one by one, and, as the attackers retreated, they would kidnap young women to keep as sex slaves. Although this quotation by Nesroullah Yous, a survivor of Bentalha, may be an exaggeration, it expresses the apparent mood of the attackers:

"We have the whole night to rape your women and children, drink your blood. Even if you escape today, we'll come back tomorrow to finish you off! We're here to send you to your God!"[20]

The GIA's responsibility for these massacres remains disputed; it claimed credit for both Rais and Bentalha (calling the killings an "offering to God" and the victims "impious" supporters of tyrants in a press release), and its policy of massacring civilians was cited by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat as one of the main reasons it split off from the GIA. At this stage, it had apparently adopted a takfirist ideology, believing that practically all Algerians not actively fighting the government were corrupt to the point of being kafirs, and could be killed righteously with impunity; an unconfirmed communiqué by Zouabri had stated that "except for those who are with us, all others are apostates and deserving of death. "[21] In some cases, it has been suggested that the GIA were motivated to commit a massacre by a village's joining the Patriot program, which they saw as evidence of disloyalty; in others, that rivalry with other groups (e. g., Mustapha Kartali's breakaway faction) played a part.

According to reports by Amnesty International[22] and Human Rights Watch[23] army barracks were stationed within a few hundred meters of the villages, yet did nothing to stop the killings. At about the same time, a number of people claiming to be defectors from the Algerian security services (such as Habib Souaidia), having fled to Western countries, alleged that the security services had themselves committed some of the massacres.[24] These and other details raised suspicions that the state was in some way collaborating with, or even controlling parts of, the GIA (particularly through infiltration by the secret services) - a theory popularised by Nesroullah Yous, and FIS itself.[25] This suggestion provoked furious reactions from some quarters in Algeria, and has been rejected by many academics,[26] though others regard it as plausible.[27]

In contrast, Algerians such as Zazi Sadou, have collected testimonies by survivors that their attackers were unmasked and were recognised as local radicals - in one case even an elected member of the FIS.[28] Robert D. Kaplan, writing in The Atlantic Monthly, dismissed insinuations of government involvement in the massacres; "To people who had been watching Algeria's evolution, the assumption that sinister complicities within the Algerian state were involved in the assassinations and massacres was libelous."[29] However, as Youcef Bouandel notes; "Regardless of the explanations one may have regarding the violence, the authorities credibility has been tarnished by its non-assistance to endangered civilian villagers being massacred in the vicinity of military barracks. "[30]

The AIS, which at this point was engaged in an all-out war with the GIA as well as the government, found itself in an untenable position. The GIA seemed a more immediately pressing enemy, and AIS members expressed fears that the massacres—which it had condemned more than once—would be blamed on them. On 21 September 1997, the AIS' head, Madani Mezrag, ordered a unilateral and unconditional ceasefire starting 1 October, in order to "unveil the enemy that hides behind these abominable massacres." The AIS thus largely took itself out of the political equation, reducing the fighting to a struggle between the government, the GIA, and the various splinter groups that were increasingly breaking away from the GIA. Ali Benhadjar's FIS-loyalist Islamic League for Da'wa and Jihad (LIDD), formed in February 1997, allied itself with the AIS and observed the same ceasefire. Over the next three years, the AIS would gradually negotiate an amnesty for its members.

GIA destroyed, GSPC continues[edit]

After receiving much international pressure to act, the EU sent two delegations, one of them led by Mário Soares, to visit Algeria and investigate the massacres in the first half of 1998; their reports condemned the Islamist armed groups. Towns soon became safer, although massacres continued in rural areas. The GIA's policy of massacring civilians had already caused a split among its commanders, with some rejecting the policy; on 14 September 1998, this disagreement was formalized with the formation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), based in the mountains west of Kabylie and led by Hassan Hattab.

On September 11, Zéroual surprised observers by announcing his resignation. New elections were arranged, and on April 15, 1999, the army-backed ex-independence-fighter Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected president with, according to the authorities, 74% of the votes. All the other candidates had withdrawn from the election shortly before, citing fraud concerns. Bouteflika continued negotiations with the AIS, and on June 5 the AIS agreed, in principle, to disband. Bouteflika followed up this success for the government by pardoning a number of Islamist prisoners convicted of minor offenses and pushing the Civil Harmony Act through parliament, a law allowing Islamist fighters not guilty of murder or rape to escape all prosecution if they turn themselves in.

This law was finally approved by referendum on 16 September 1999, and a number of fighters, including Mustapha Kartali, took advantage of it to give themselves up and resume normal life—sometimes angering those who had suffered at the hands of the guerrillas. FIS leadership expressed dissatisfaction with the results, feeling that the AIS had stopped fighting without solving any of the issues; but their main voice outside of prison, Abdelkader Hachani, was assassinated on November 22. Violence declined, though not stopping altogether, and a sense of normality started returning to Algeria.

The AIS fully disbanded after 11 January 2000, having negotiated a special amnesty with the government. The GIA, torn by splits and desertions and denounced by all sides even in the Islamist movement, was slowly destroyed by army operations over the next few years; by the time of Antar Zouabri's death in early 2002, it was effectively incapacitated. The government's efforts were given a boost in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks; United States sympathy for Algeria's government increased, and was expressed concretely through such actions as the freezing of GIA and GSPC assets and the supply of infrared goggles to the army.

With the GIA's decline, the GSPC was left as the most active rebel group, with about 300 fighters in 2003.[31] It continued a campaign of assassinations of police and army personnel in its area, and also managed to expand into the Sahara, where its southern division, led by Amari Saifi (nicknamed "Abderrezak el-Para", the "paratrooper"), kidnapped a number of German tourists in 2003, before being forced to flee to sparsely populated areas of Mali, and later Niger and Chad, where he was captured. By late 2003, the group's founder had been supplanted by the even more radical Nabil Sahraoui, who announced his open support for al-Qaeda, thus strengthening government ties between the U. S. and Algeria. He was reportedly killed shortly afterwards, and was succeeded by Abou Mossaab Abdelouadoud in 2004.[32]

2004 presidential election and the amnesty[edit]

The release of FIS leaders Madani and Belhadj in 2003 had no observable effect on the situation, illustrating a newfound governmental confidence which would be deepened by the 2004 presidential election, in which Bouteflika was reelected by 85% with support from two major parties and one faction of the third major party. The vote was seen as confirming strong popular support for Bouteflika's policy towards the guerrillas and the successful termination of large-scale violence.[citation needed]

In September 2005 a national referendum was held on an amnesty proposal by Bouteflika's government, similar to the 1999 law, to end legal proceedings against individuals who were no longer fighting, and to provide compensation to families of people killed by government forces. The controversial Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation was declared to have won with 97% support, and with 80% of participation.[33] The conditions of the campaign in Algeria were criticized in the French press, in particular in Le Monde and L'Humanité.

Lawyer Ali Merabet, for example, founder of Somoud, a NGO which represents the families of the disappeared, was opposed to the Charter which would “force the victims to grant forgiveness”. He remains doubtful that the time of the FIS has truly ended and notes that while people no longer support them, the project of the FIS - which he denies is Islamic - still exists and remains a threat.[34]

The proposal was implemented by Presidential decree in February 2006, and adopted on September 29, 2006. Particularly controversial was its provision of immunity against prosecution to surrendered ex-guerrillas (for all but the worst crimes) and Army personnel (for any action "safeguarding the nation".)[35] According to Algerian paper El Khabar, over 400 GSPC guerrillas surrendered under its terms.[36] Estimates of the rebels size in 2005 ranged from 300 to 1000.[5] The International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) has opposed the amnesty.[37]

The fighting has continued to die down but a state of emergency remained in place.[38] The state of emergency was lifted in February 2011 due to renewed protests amidst the ongoing Arab Spring.

Death toll[edit]

Bouteflika said in 1999 that 100,000 people had died by that time and in a speech on 25 February 2005, spoke of a round figure of 150,000 people killed in the war.[5] These figures, not broken down into government forces, insurgents and civilians, are commonly cited as the war's death toll. However this estimate may be too high. A 2008 study found about 26,000 people killed, through combat operations, massacres, bombings and assassinations, alongside 18,000 people, 'disappeared' and presumed killed in secret. This would give a total death toll of around 44,000 people.[8]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Boot, Max (2013). "Appendix". Invisible Armies. 
  2. ^ "A hostage crisis haunted by the ghosts of Algeria’s bloody past". Washington Post. 
  3. ^ Martinez 1998:162.
  4. ^ Martinez 1998:215.
  5. ^ a b c "Algeria puts strife toll at 150,000". Al Jazeera English. 23 February 2005. Retrieved 7 November 2013. 
  6. ^ Hagelstein, Roman (2007). "Where and When does Violence Pay Off? The Algerian Civil War". HICN (Households in Conflict Network): 24. Retrieved 11 April 2012. 
  7. ^ Algeria, Encyclopedia of the Nations
  8. ^ a b Explaining the Violence Pattern of the Algerian Civil War, Roman Hagelstein, Households in Conflict Network, pp. 9, 17
  9. ^ Entre menace, censure et liberté: La presse privé algérienne se bat pour survivre, March 31, 1998
  10. ^ Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity', Verso: London 2003, p. 269: "Hassan Hattab's GSPC which has condemned the GIA's indiscriminate attacks on civilians and, since going it alone, has tended to revert to the classic MIA-AIS strategy of confining its attacks to guerrilla forces."
  11. ^ Whitlock, Craig (5 October 2006). "Al-Qaeda's Far-Reaching New Partner". Washington Post: A01. 
  12. ^ Algerian group backs al-Qaeda. BBC News. 23 October 2003. Retrieved 7 November 2008. 
  13. ^ Abdelhak Layada, quoted in Jeune Afrique, 27 January 1994 (quoted in Willis 1996)
  14. ^ Sid Ahmed Mourad, quoted in Jeune Afrique, 27 January 1994 (quoted in Willis 1996)
  15. ^ Naughton, Philippe (20 November 1993). "Islamic militants' death threat drives foreigners from Algeria". London: The Times. (quoted in Willis 1996)
  16. ^ Martinez 1998:92–93, 179.
  17. ^ Martinez 1998:228–229.
  18. ^ Ministry of Interior and of Communications confidential communiqué, quoted in Benjamin Stora (2001). La guerre invisible. Paris: Presse de Science Po. ISBN 2-7246-0847-X. , p. 25.
  19. ^ (Roberts, Hugh. "Algeria's Contested Elections". Middle East Report 209. Retrieved 16 February 2009. 
  20. ^ Nesroullah Yous & Salima Mellah (2000). Qui a tué a Bentalha?. La Découverte, Paris. ISBN 2-7071-3332-9. 
  21. ^ El Watan, 21 January (quoted in Willis 1996)
  22. ^ "Algeria: A human rights crisis". Amnesty International. 5 September 1997. Retrieved 7 November 2013. 
  23. ^ html
  24. ^ "Police role in Algerian killings exposed", The Observer, 11 January 1998; "Algeria regime 'was behind Paris bombs'", Manchester Guardian Weekly, 16 November 1997; Habib Souaidia, La sale guerre, Paris: La Découverte, 2001.Quote:[dead link] "'When I enlisted into the Algerian army in 1989, I was miles away from thinking that I would be a witness to the tragedy that has struck my country. I have seen colleagues burn alive a 15-year-old child. I have seen soldiers disguising themselves as terrorists and massacring civilians. ")
  25. ^ "Anwar N. Haddam: An Islamist Vision for Algeria". Middle East Quarterly. September 1996. Retrieved 18 January 2013. 
  26. ^ Kalyvas, Stathis N. "Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres in Algeria" Rationality and Society 1999; 11: "Still, there is substantial evidence that many among the deadliest massacres have been perpetrated by Islamist guerrillas. The most important evidence comes from testimonies of survivors who were able to identify local Islamists among the attackers (see below). In fact, survivors who openly accuse the army for its failure to intervene also expressed no doubt about the identity of the killers, pointing to the Islamist guerrillas (e. g. Tuquoi 1997). Moreover, some of the troubling aspects of this story can be explained without reference to an army conspiracy. For example, in civil wars prisoners tend to be killed on the spot rather than taken prisoner (Laqueur 1998).11 Militiamen, the most likely to capture guerrillas, have openly stated that they took no prisoners (AI 1997b: 17). Journalists working in the field have found credible testimonies in support of the thesis that most massacres are organized by the rebels (Leclère 1997; Tuquoi 1997 among others). European foreign ministries believe that it is Islamist guerrillas who are responsible for the massacres (Observer 9 February 1998). Although, it is impossible to know the full truth at this point (see Charef 1998), the assumption that many massacres were committed by the Islamist guerrillas seems plausible and is widely adopted by area experts (Addi 1998: 44) and other authors (Smith 1998: 27). Likewise, the reluctance of the army to intervene and stop some of these massacres is also beyond doubt."
  27. ^ George Joffe, "Report: Ahmad Zaoui", 3 June 2003, p. 16: "Under Zouabri, the extremism and violence of the GIA became completely indiscriminate, leader to the horrific massacres of 1997 and 1998 – although, once again, great care must be exercised over these incidents as it is quite clear that the greatest beneficiary from them was the Algerian state. There is considerable indirect evidence of state involvement and some direct evidence as well, which is discussed below." See also Martinez 1998:217: "So might the GIA not be the hidden face of a military regime faced with the need to rearrange its economic resources?"
  28. ^ Shadow Report on Algeria p. 15. note 27: "Some fundamentalist leaders have attempted to distance themselves from these massacres and claimed that the State was behind them or that they were the work of the State-armed self-defense groups. Some human rights groups have echoed this claim to some extent. Inside Algeria, and particularly among survivors of the communities attacked, the view is sharply different. In many cases, survivors have identified their attackers as the assailants enter the villages unmasked and are often from the locality. In one case, a survivor identified a former elected FIS officials as one of the perpetrators of a massacre. Testimonies Collected by Zazi Sadou."
  29. ^ Roger Kaplan, "The Libel of Moral Equivalence" in The Atlantic Monthly, August 1998; p.18: "To people who had been watching Algeria's evolution, the assumption that sinister complicities within the Algerian state were involved in the assassinations and massacres was libelous. I thought of Khalida Messaoudi, a forty-year-old former teacher and political activist who went into hiding after being sentenced to die by those who shared the ideology of the killers who descended on Had T'Chekala. Among democratic, humanrights, and feminist organizations very few have expressed support for Messaoudi. In the United States only the American Federation of Teachers has recognized her struggle for human rights. She was condemned for being an impious, Zionist (she is a nonpracticing Muslim), loose, radical woman, and thousands of women in Algeria have been killed for much less. Sixteen-year-old girls, for instance, have been dragged out of classrooms and slaughtered in school yards like sheep because the killers decreed that nubile girls should not be in school. This was the context and the background and the reality. And now, when the world paid attention, it was to suggest the involvement of government death squads."
  30. ^ "Political Violence And The Prospect Of Peace In Algeria", in Perihelion, journal of the European Rim Policy And Investment Council, April 2003
  31. ^ Profile: Algeria's Salafist group. BBC News. 14 May 2003. Retrieved 7 November 2008. 
  32. ^ New chief for Algeria's Islamists, Arezki Himeur, BBC News, 7 September 2004.
  33. ^ Algérie: le "oui" au référendum remporte plus de 97 % des voix, Le Monde, 29 September 2005 (French)
  34. ^ En Algérie, dans la Mitidja, ni pardon ni oubli, Le Monde, 28 September 2005 (French)
  35. ^ Algeria: New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go Unpunished, International Center for Transitional Justice, Press Release, March 1, 2006
  36. ^ استفادة 408 شخص من قانون المصالحة وإرهابي يسلم نفسه, El Khabar, 25 September 2006
  37. ^ Projet de charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale: pas d’impunité au nom de la « réconciliation » !, International Federation of Human Rights, 22 September 2005 (French)
  38. ^ "Country profile: Algeria". BBC News. 20 September 2008. Archived from the original on 16 February 2009. Retrieved 16 February 2009. 

Bibliography[edit]

  • Luis Martinez (translated by Jonathan Derrick) (1998). The Algerian Civil War 1990–1998. London: Hurst & Co. ISBN 1-85065-517-0. 
  • Michael Willis (1996). The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History. New York: NYU Press. ISBN 0-8147-9328-2. 
  • William B. Quandt (1998). Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-7301-3. 
  • Marco Impagliazzo, Mario Giro (1997). Algeria in ostaggio. Milano: Guerini e Associati. 
  • M. Al-Ahnaf, B. Botiveau, F. Fregosi (1991). L'Algerie par ses islamistes. Paris: Karthala. ISBN 2-86537-318-5. 
  • Roger Kaplan, "The Libel of Moral Equivalence" The Atlantic Monthly Boston: August 1998. Vol. 282, Iss. 2; pg. 18, 6 pgs.
  • Habib Souaidia (2001). La sale guerre. Paris: folio actuel. 

External links[edit]