Jump to content

History of Tibet (1950–present): Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Content deleted Content added
No edit summary
Undid revision 876067259 by 152.254.221.93 (talk) not an improvement, removing sourced content with pure text
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Lead too short|date=April 2011}}
Tibet was a distinct nation and maintained its own government, religion, language, laws and customs. Over the centuries, some countries, including China, Britain, and Mongolia have sought to exert control over Tibet, with periodic and partial success.
{{History of Tibet}}


The '''history of Tibet from 1950 to the present''' started with the Chinese [[People's Liberation Army]] [[Invasion of Tibet (1950–1951)|Invading Tibet]] in 1950. Before then, [[Tibet]] had declared independence from China in 1913. In 1951, the Tibetans signed a seventeen-point agreement reaffirming China's sovereignty over Tibet and providing an autonomous administration led by Dalai Lama. In [[1959 Tibetan uprising|1959]] the [[14th Dalai Lama]] fled Tibet to northern India under cover where he established the [[Central Tibetan Administration]]. The [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] within China was officially established in 1965.<ref>{{cite news|url =https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-16689779|title=Tibet profile}}</ref>
International legal scholars agree that from 1911 until the Chinese invasion in 1949, Tibet was a fully independent state by modern standards. Since then, Tibetans have struggled to regain their freedom and keep their culture intact.


==1950–1955: Traditional systems==
History of Tibet Before the Chinese Invasion of 1949
{{Further|Incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China}}
Tibet has a history dating back over 2,000 years. A good starting point in analyzing the country’s status is the period referred to as Tibet’s “imperial age,” when the entire country was first united under one ruler. There is no serious dispute over the existence of Tibet as an independent state during this period. Even China’s own historical records and the treaties Tibet and China concluded during that period refer to Tibet as a strong state with whom China was forced to deal on a footing of equality.
{{POV section|date=July 2013}}
In 1949, seeing that the Communists were gaining control of China, the [[Kashag]] expelled all Chinese connected with the Chinese government, over the protests of both the Kuomintang and the Communists.<ref name="shakya7-8">Shakya 1999, pp. 7–8</ref> Both the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] (ROC) and the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC) have maintained [[China]]'s claim to sovereignty over Tibet. Many people{{who|date=June 2018}} felt that Tibet should not be part of China because they were constantly under attack in different ways rather often. Tibet had ''de facto'' been its own country before 1951.<ref name="Hessler">{{Cite news|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/02/tibet-through-chinese-eyes/306395/|title=Tibet Through Chinese Eyes|last=Hessler|first=Peter|work=The Atlantic|access-date=2017-04-26|language=en-US}}</ref>


The [[Communist Party of China|Chinese Communist]] government led by [[Mao Zedong]], which came to power in October, lost little time in asserting a new PRC presence in Tibet. The PRC has carried out different projects in Tibet but the people of Tibet seem to feel ignored politically and economically in the “[[Tibet Autonomous Region]]” and in the Tibetan portions of land in Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{Cite web|url=https://www.savetibet.org/issue-56-tibet-under-the-rule-of-the-chinese-communist-party/|title=Issue #56: Tibet under the Rule of the Chinese Communist Party {{!}} International Campaign for Tibet|website=www.savetibet.org|language=en-US|access-date=2017-04-26}}</ref> In June 1950, the [[UK]] Government in the [[House of Commons of the United Kingdom|House of Commons]] stated that His Majesty's Government "have always been prepared to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/jun/21/tibet-autonomy#S5CV0476P0_19500621_HOC_70|title=TIBET (AUTONOMY)|work=millbanksystems.com|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> On 7 October 1950,<ref name="Laird301">Laird 2006, p. 301</ref> The [[People's Liberation Army]] [[Invasion of Tibet (1950–1951)|invaded]] the Tibetan area of [[Chamdo]]. The large number of units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered, largely pacifistic Tibetan forces. By October 19, 1950, 5,000 Tibetan troops had surrendered under PRC Oppression.<ref name="Laird301" />
At what point in history, then, did Tibet cease to exist as a state to become an integral part of China? Tibet’s history is not unlike that of other states. At times, Tibet extended its influence over neighboring countries and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the influence of powerful foreign rulers – the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu emperors and the British rulers of India.


In 1951, representatives of Tibetan authority, with the Dalai Lama's authorization,<ref>Goldstein 2007, p96</ref> participated in negotiations with the PRC government in Beijing. This resulted in a ''[[Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet|Seventeen Point Agreement]]'' which established PRC's sovereignty over Tibet, and it thereby gave the PRC power to rule.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.cfr.org/tibet/seventeen-point-plan-peaceful-liberation-tibet/p16006|title=Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet|work=Council on Foreign Relations|access-date=2017-04-26|language=en}}</ref> The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later.<ref>Goldstein 1989, pp. 812–813</ref> According to the [[Central Tibetan Administration|Tibetan government-in-exile]], some members of the Tibetan Cabinet (Kashag), for example, Tibetan Prime Minister [[Lukhangwa]], never accepted the agreement.<ref>In 1952 Lukhangwa told PRC Representative Zhang Jingwu "It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been." ''My Land and My People'', Dalai Lama, New York, 1992, p.95</ref> But the National Assembly of Tibet, "while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates had to sign the 'agreement', asked the government to accept the 'agreement'...the Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance of the 'agreement'."<ref name="tibet.net">{{cite web|url=http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=183&rmenuid=11|title=Encouraged By Rising Support From Intellectuals in China: His Holiness the Dalai Lama|work=tibet.net|accessdate=26 September 2015|deadurl=yes|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110928101214/http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=183&rmenuid=11|archivedate=28 September 2011|df=}}</ref>
It should be noted, before examining the relevant history, that international law is a system of law created by states primarily for their own protection. As a result, international law protects the independence of states from attempts to destroy it and, therefore, the presumption is in favor of the continuation of statehood. This means that, whereas an independent state that has existed for centuries, such as Tibet, does not need to prove its continued independence when challenged, a foreign state claiming sovereign rights over it needs to prove those rights by showing at what precise moment and by what legal means they were acquired.
Tibetan exile sources generally consider it invalid, as having been reluctantly or unwillingly signed under duress.<ref name="Powers116 7">Powers 2004, pp. 116&ndash;7</ref> On the path that was leading him into exile in India, the [[14th Dalai Lama]] arrived March 26, 1959 at Lhuntse Dzong where he repudiated the "17-point Agreement" as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms"<ref name="tibet.net" /> and reaffirmed his government as the only legitimate representative of Tibet.<ref name="Michel Peissel">[[Michel Peissel]], "The Cavaliers of Kham, the secret war in Tibet" London: Heinemann 1972, and Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1973</ref><ref name="Tenzin Gyatso">[[Tenzin Gyatso|Dalai Lama]], ''[[Freedom in Exile]]'' Harper San Francisco, 1991</ref> According to the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Dalai Lama-ruled Tibetan area was supposed to be a highly autonomous area of China. From the beginning, it was obvious that incorporating Tibet into Communist PRC would bring two opposite social systems face-to-face.<ref name="goldstein2007-541">Goldstein 2007, p541</ref> In western Tibet, however, the Chinese Communists opted not to make social reform an immediate priority. On the contrary, from 1951 to 1959, traditional Tibetan society with its lords and manorial estates continued to function unchanged and were subsidized by the central government.<ref name="goldstein2007-541" /> Despite the presence of twenty thousand PLA troops in Central Tibet, the Dalai Lama's government was permitted to maintain important symbols from its ''de facto'' independence period.<ref name="goldstein2007-541" /> The first national census in all of the [[People's Republic of China]] was held in 1954, counting 2,770,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 1,270,000 in the Tibet Autonomous Region.<ref name="pop">[http://www.tibetology.ac.cn/article2/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2764 Population of Tibet 1950–1990] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071124053818/http://www.tibetology.ac.cn/article2/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=2764 |date=2007-11-24 }} {{Link language|zh}}<!--Chinese--></ref> The Chinese built [[highways]] that reached Lhasa, and then extended them to the [[India]]n, [[Nepal]]ese and [[Pakistan]]i borders.


Tibetan areas in [[Qinghai]], which were outside the authority of the Dalai Lama's government, did not enjoy this same autonomy and had land redistribution implemented in full. Most lands were taken away from noblemen and monasteries and re-distributed to serfs. The Tibetan region of Eastern Kham, previously [[Xikang]] province, was incorporated into the province of Sichuan. Western Kham was put under the Chamdo Military Committee. In these areas, [[land reform]] was implemented. This involved communist agitators designating "landlords"&mdash;sometimes arbitrarily chosen&mdash;for public humiliation in so-called "[[Struggle Session|struggle sessions]]",<ref>''thamzing'', {{Bo|w=‘thab-‘dzing|l={{IPA-bo|tʰʌ́msiŋ|}}}}</ref> torture, maiming, and even death.<ref>Craig (1992), pp. 76–78, 120–123.</ref><ref>Shakya (1999), pp. 245–249, 296, 322–323.</ref> It was only after 1959 that China brought the same practices to Central Tibet.<ref>Laird 2006, p. 318</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-04/17/content_7994146.htm |title=Unforgettable History—Old Tibet Serfdom System |accessdate=2008-04-29 |author=Guangming Daily |language=zh }}</ref>
China’s present claim to Tibet is based entirely on the influence that Mongol and Manchuk emperors exercised over Tibet in the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively.


==1956–1958: Trials and incremental reform==
As Genghis Khan’s Mongol Empire expanded toward Europe in the west and China in the east in the thirteenth century, the Tibetan leaders of the Sakya school of Tibetan Buddhism concluded an agreement with the Mongol rulers in order to avoid the otherwise inevitable conquest of Tibet. They promised political allegiance and religious blessings and teachings in exchange for patronage and protection. The religious relationship became so important that when Kublai Khan conquered China and established the Yuan dynasty, he invited the Sakya Lama to become the Imperial Preceptor and supreme pontiff of his empire.
By 1956 there was unrest in eastern Kham and Amdo, where land reform had been implemented in full. Rebellions erupted and eventually spread into western Kham and Ü-Tsang. In some parts of the country Chinese Communists tried to establish rural communes, as they were in the whole of China.{{Citation needed|date=July 2010}}


A rebellion against the Chinese occupation was led by noblemen and monasteries and broke out in [[Amdo]] and eastern [[Kham]] in June 1956. The insurrection, supported by the American [[CIA]],<ref>{{cite news|title=Revolt of the Monks: How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester; A Role for Dalai Lama's Brother|first=Peter|last=Wonacott|work=[[Wall Street Journal]]|date=2008-08-30|archiveurl=http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2008/08/revolt-of-monks.html|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122005956740185361?mod=googlenews_wsj|archivedate=2008-08-30}}</ref> eventually spread to Lhasa.
The relationship that developed and still exists today between the Mongols and Tibetans is a reflection of the close racial, cultural and especially religious affinity between the two Central Asian peoples. To claim that Tibet became a part of China because both countries were independently subjected to varying degrees of Mongol control, as the PRC does, is absurd. The Mongol Empire was a world empire; no evidence exists to indicate that the Mongols integrated the administration of China and Tibet or appended Tibet to China in any manner. It is like claiming that France should belong to England because both came under Roman domination, or that Burma became a part of India when the British Empire extended its authority over both territories.


The [[Tibetan resistance movement]] began with isolated resistance to PRC control in 1956. Initially there was considerable success and with CIA support and aid much of southern Tibet fell into Tibetan [[guerilla fighter]]s hands. During this campaign, tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed.<ref>Laird 2006, pp. 320–328</ref>
This relatively brief period of foreign domination over Tibet occurred 700 years ago. Tibet broke away from the Yuan emperor before China regained its independence from the Mongols with the establishment of the native Ming dynasty. Not until the eighteenth century did Tibet once again come under a degree of foreign influence.


For many, their religious beliefs were not even left untouched by the communist influence. Those who practice Buddhism, as well as the [[Dalai Lama|Dali Lama]], were not safe from harm at this time. It came to the point where the Chinese government had caused a suppression of religion and in the end felt threatened by the Dali Lama. What the Chinese government had thought to do was to kidnap and harm him. India ended up being the country that provided the safest land for the Tibetans and the Dali Lama who wanted to practice Buddhism in peace and be safe at the same time.
The Ming dynasty, which ruled China from I368 to I644, had few ties to and no authority over Tibet. On the other hand, the Manchus, who conquered China and established the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century, embraced Tibetan Buddhism as the Mongols had and developed close ties with the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama, who had by then become the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet, agreed to become the spiritual guide of the Manchu emperor. He accepted patronage and protection in exchange. This “priest-patron” relationship, which the Dalai Lama also maintained with numerous Mongol Khans and Tibetan nobles, was the only formal tie that existed between the Tibetans and Manchus during the Qing dynasty. It did not, in itself, affect Tibet`s independence.


In 1959, China's socialist land reforms and military crackdown on rebels in Kham and Amdo led to the [[1959 Tibetan uprising]]. In an operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days.<ref name="friendsoftibet.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.friendsoftibet.org/main/concerns.html|title=Why Concerned About Tibet? - Friends of Tibet (INDIA)|work=friendsoftibet.org|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> Resistance spread throughout Tibet. Fearing capture of the Dalai Lama, unarmed Tibetans surrounded his residence, at which point the Dalai Lama fled<ref>"Witness: Reporting on the Dalai Lama's escape to India." Peter Jackson. ''Reuters''. Feb 27, 2009.[https://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSTRE51Q4OB20090227]</ref> with the help of the [[CIA]] to India, because the people of Tibet wanted to take a stance and protect the man they all cherished, from the communist government .<ref>The CIA's secret war in Tibet, Seattle Times, January 26, 1997, Paul Salopek Ihttp://www.timbomb.net/buddha/archive/msg00087.html</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=Wk7R3FxC74cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=1959+uprising+in+Tibet&ots=qK5ypmNPDF&sig=wFEBNIsTewkR_DQeSGWBSQrQfoo#v=onepage&q=1959&f=false|title=Resistance and Reform in Tibet|last=Akiner|first=Shirin|date=1996-01-01|publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publishe|isbn=9788120813717|language=en}}</ref> India ended up being the country that provided the safest land for the Tibetans and the Dali Lama who wanted to practice Buddhism in peace and be safe at the same time. On 28 March,<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/world/asia/20tibet.html|title=Holiday for Tibet Is a Swipe at the Dalai Lama|last=Wong|first=Edward|date=20 January 2009|work=The New York Times|page=13|accessdate=28 March 2011}}</ref> the Chinese set the [[Panchen Lama]] (who was virtually their prisoner<ref>Shakya (1999), p. 193.</ref>) as a figurehead in Lhasa, claiming that he headed the legitimate Government of Tibet in the absence of the Dalai Lama, the traditional ruler of Tibet.<ref>Shakya (1999), p. 128.</ref>
On the political level, some powerful Manchu emperors succeeded in exerting a degree of influence over Tibet. Thus, between I720 and I792 the Manchu emperors Kangxi, Yong Zhen and Qianlong sent imperial troops into Tibet four times to protect the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people from foreign invasion or internal unrest. It was these expeditions that provided them with influence in Tibet. The emperor sent representatives to the Tibetan capital, Lhasa, some of whom successfully exercised their influence, in his name, over the Tibetan government, particularly with respect to the conduct of foreign relations. At the height of Manchu power, which lasted a few decades, the situation was not unlike that which can exist between a superpower and a neighboring satellite or protectorate. The subjection of a state to foreign influence and even intervention in foreign or domestic affairs, however significant this may be politically, does not in itself entail the legal extinction of that state. Consequently, although some Manchu emperors exerted considerable influence over Tibet, they did not thereby incorporate Tibet into their empire, much less China.


After this, resistance forces operated from [[Nepal]]. Operations continued from the semi-independent [[Mustang (kingdom)|Kingdom of Mustang]] with a force of 2000 rebels; many of them trained at [[Camp Hale]] near [[Leadville, Colorado]], United States<ref>''Air America'', Corgi Books. Tim Robbins. 1988.</ref> Guerrilla warfare continued in other parts of the country for several years.
Manchu influence did not last for very long. It was entirely ineffective by the time the British briefly invaded Tibet in I904, and ceased entirely with the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in I9II, and its replacement in China by a native republican government. Whatever ties existed between the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor were extinguished with the dissolution of the Manchu Empire.


In 1969, on the eve of [[Henry Kissinger|Kissinger's]] overtures to China, American support was withdrawn and the Nepalese government dismantled the operation.{{Citation needed|date=March 2017}}
1911 – 1950
From I911 to I950, Tibet successfully avoided undue foreign influence and behaved, in every respect, as a fully independent state. The I3th Dalai Lama emphasized his country’s independent status externally, in formal communications to foreign rulers, and internally, by issuing a proclamation reaffirming Tibet’s independence and by strengthening the country’s defenses. Tibet remained neutral during the Second World War, despite strong pressure from China and its allies, Britain and the U.S.A. The Tibetan government maintained independent international relations with all neighboring countries, most of whom had diplomatic representatives in Lhasa.


==1959–1976: Uprising and upheaval==
The attitude of most foreign governments with whom Tibet maintained relations implied their recognition of Tibet’s independent status. The British government bound itself not to recognize Chinese suzerainty or any other rights over Tibet unless China signed the draft Simla Convention of I9I4 with Britain and Tibet, which China never did. Nepal’s recognition was confirmed by the Nepalese government in I949, in documents presented to the United Nations in support of that governments application for membership.
===1959 uprising===


{{main|1959 Tibetan uprising}}
The turning point in Tibet’s history came in I949, when the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC first crossed into Tibet. After defeating the small Tibetan army, the Chinese government imposed the so-called “I7-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” on the Tibetan government in May I951. Because it was signed under duress, the agreement was void under international law. The presence of 40,000 troops in Tibet, the threat of an immediate occupation of Lhasa and the prospect of the total obliteration of the Tibetan state left Tibetans little choice.


Armed conflict between [[Chushi Gangdruk|Tibetan rebels]] and the [[People's Liberation Army|Chinese army]] (PLA) broke out in 1956 in the [[Kham]] and [[Amdo]] regions, which had been subjected to [[socialist]] reform. The [[guerrilla warfare]] later spread to other areas of Tibet.
It should be noted that numerous countries made statements in the course of UN General Assembly debates following the invasion of Tibet that reflected their recognition of Tibet’s independent status. Thus, for example, the delegate from the Philippines declared: “It is clear that on the eve of the invasion I950, Tibet was not under the rule of any foreign country.” The delegate from Thailand reminded the assembly that the majority of states “refute the contention that Tibet is part of China.” The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese “aggression” and “invasion” of Tibet.


In March 1959 a revolt erupted in [[Lhasa]], which had been under the effective control of the [[Communist Party of China]] since the [[Seventeen Point Agreement]] in 1951.<ref>[[Chen Jian (academic)|Chen Jian]], [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/jcws.2006.8.3.pdf The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union], Journal of Cold War Studies, [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/abstracts.htm Volume 8 Issue 3 Summer 2006], Cold War Studies at Harvard University.</ref> On 12 March, protesters appeared in the streets of Lhasa declaring Tibet's independence. Within days, Tibetan troops prepared to secure an evacuation route for the [[Dalai Lama]], who [[14th Dalai Lama#Exile to India|fled into exile]] during the uprising. Artillery shells landed near the Dalai Lama's [[Potala Palace|Palace]],<ref name="shakya-1999">Shakya, Tsering. ''The Dragon In The Land Of Snows'' (1999) Columbia University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-231-11814-9}} pp. 186-191</ref> prompting the full force of the Uprising. Combat lasted only about two days, with Tibetan rebel forces being badly outnumbered and poorly armed.<ref name="chushigangdruk.org">[http://www.chushigangdruk.org/history/history07.html Chushi Gangdruk] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080325152030/http://www.chushigangdruk.org/history/history07.html |date=2008-03-25 }}</ref>
In the course of Tibet’s 2,000-year history, the country came under a degree of foreign influence only for short periods of time in the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. Few independent countries today can claim as impressive a record. As the ambassador for Ireland at the UN remarked during the General Assembly debates on the question of Tibet,”[f]or thousands of years, or for a couple of thousand years at any rate, [Tibet] wa s as free and as fully in control of its own affairs as any nation in this Assembly, and a thousand times more free to look after its own affairs than many of the nations here.”


Reprisals for the [[1959 Tibetan uprising]] involved the killing of 87,000 Tibetans by the Chinese count, according to a Radio Lhasa broadcast of 1 October 1960, although Tibetan exiles claim that 430,000 died during the Uprising and the subsequent 15 years of [[guerrilla warfare]], which continued until the US withdrew support.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tibet.org/Why/occupation.html|title=Tibet Online - Why Tibet? - Major Allegations on the Chinese Occupation|work=tibet.org|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref>
From a legal standpoint, Tibet has to this day not lost its statehood. It is an independent state under illegal occupation. Neither China’s military invasion nor the continuing occupation has transferred the sovereignty of Tibet to China. As pointed out earlier, the Chinese government has never claimed to have acquired sovereignty over Tibet by conquest. Indeed, China recognizes that the use or threat of force (outside the exceptional circumstances provided for in the UN Charter), the imposition of an unequal treaty or the continued illegal occupation of a country can never grant an invader legal title to territory. Its claims are based solely on the alleged subjection of Tibet to a few of China’s strongest foreign rulers in the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. If other countries were to make such tenuous claims based on their imperial past, how seriously would they be taken? Are we not, in even considering the merits of China’s arguments, accepting the right of powerful modern rulers to invade foreign countries in order to recreate lost empires of their ancestors?


===Famine===
Michael C. van Walt is an international legal scholar and a board member of the International Campaign for Tibet. Reprinted from the Cultural Survival Quarterly. Vol.12 1988 Number 1


{{main|Great Chinese Famine|70,000 Character Petition}}


China suffered widespread [[famine]] between the years 1959 and 1961. The causes are disputed. Drought and poor weather played a part and the policies of the [[Great Leap Forward]] contributed to the famine, but the relative weights of each are in dispute. Estimates of deaths vary; according to official government statistics, there were 15 million deaths.<ref>Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short History, p.95</ref> Unofficial estimates by scholars have estimated the number of famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.<ref name="xiz">Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," ''Population and Development Review'' 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.</ref>
History Since the Chinese Invasion
Despite 40 years of Chinese occupation, the Tibetan people’s determination to preserve their heritage and regain their freedom is as strong as ever. The situation has led to confrontation inside Tibet and to large scale Chinese propaganda efforts internationally.
On May 1962, the [[Tenth Panchen Lama]] sent Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] a confidential report<ref name="Kurtenbach-1998">{{cite web|url=http://www.christusrex.org/www2/fcf/tibetans21198.html|title=1962 report by Tibetan leader tells of mass beatings, starvation|last1=Kurtenbach|first1=Elaine|date=February 11, 1998|website=|publisher=Associated Press|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20010721174109/http://www.christusrex.org/www2/fcf/tibetans21198.html|archivedate=2001-07-21|accessdate=2016-04-18}}</ref><ref name="Panchen">"[http://www.subliminal.org/tibet/testimony/1962-panchen.html Secret Report by the Panchen Lama Criticises China]"</ref> detailing the suffering of the Tibetan people, which became known as the [[70,000 Character Petition]]. "In many parts of Tibet people have [[starved to death]].. . . In some places, whole families have perished and the [[death rate]] is very high. This is very abnormal, horrible and grave...In the past Tibet lived in a dark barbaric feudalism but there was never such a shortage of food, especially after Buddhism had spread....In Tibet from 1959 to 1961, for two years almost all animal husbandry and farming stopped. The nomads have no grain to eat and the farmers have no meat, butter or salt," the report continued.<ref name="Panchen"/> It was the opinion of the Panchen Lama that these deaths were a result of [[Official Policy|official policies]], not of any [[natural disasters]], which was the situation understood in Beijing by Chairman Mao and the Central People's Government.<ref name="subliminal.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.subliminal.org/tibet/testimony/1962-panchen.html|title=Samsara: 1962 Panchen Lama Report|work=subliminal.org|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> The Panchen Lama also described the uniqueness of the famine that Tibet suffered from: "There was never such an event in the history of Tibet. People could not even imagine such horrible starvation in their dreams. In some areas if one person catches a cold, then it spreads to hundreds and large numbers simply die."<ref name="subliminal.org"/> The destruction of most{{quantify|date=May 2016}} of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.<ref name="Craig 1992, p. 125">Craig (1992), p. 125.</ref>


The [[70,000 Character Petition]] was criticized by [[Barry Sautman]] from [[Hong Kong University of Science and Technology]]. According to Sautman, the [[10th Panchen Lama]] is purported to have visited three counties before writing his report: the counties of [[Ping'an County|Ping’an]], [[Hualong Hui Autonomous County|Hualong]] and [[Xunhua Salar Autonomous County|Xunhua]], but his description of a [[famine]] concerns only Xunhua, his native region. All three counties are in [[Haidong Prefecture]], a part of [[Qinghai]] province whose population is 90% non-Tibetan and does not belong to “cultural Tibet”. Exiled Tibetan writer [[Jamyang Norbu]]<ref>{{cite web|last1=Jamyang|first1=Norbu|title=Running-dog Propagandists|url=http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=21945&t=1|website=Phayul|accessdate=10 May 2016}}</ref> accuses Sautman of downplaying PRC activities in Tibet and Xinjiang.
1949-51 The Chinese Invasion
China’s newly established communist government sent troops to invade Tibet in 1949-50. An agreement was imposed on the Tibetan government in May of 1951, acknowledging sovereignty over Tibet but recognizing the Tibetan government’s autonomy with respect to Tibet’s internal affairs. As the Chinese consolidated their control, they repeatedly violated the treaty and open resistance to their rule grew, leading to the National Uprising in 1959 and the flight into India of the Dalai Lama.


Sautman also stated that the claim that Tibet was the region most hit by China’s famine of 1959&ndash;1962 is based not on statistics gathered in Tibetan areas, but on anonymous refugee reports lacking in numerical specificity.<ref>Barry Sautman, "Demographic Annihilation" and Tibet, pp. 230–257, in Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer (eds), ''Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region'', M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p.</ref> Sautman's conclusions recently subjected to criticism.<ref>[http://savetibet.ru/img/2010/tibet-book-eng.pdf Kuzmin, S.L. ''Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation''. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 340–341]</ref>
The international community reacted with shock at the events in Tibet. The question of Tibet was discussed on numerous occasions by the U.N. General Assembly between 1959 and 1965. Three resolutions were passed by the General Assembly condemning China’s violations of human rights in Tibet and calling upon China to respect those rights, including Tibet’s right to self-determination.


=== ICJ Human rights report ===
After 1959: Destruction
====Background====
The destruction of Tibet’s culture and oppression of its people was brutal during the 20 years following the uprising. 1.2 million Tibetans, one-fifth of the country’s population, died as a result of China’s policies, according to an estimate by the Tibetan government in exile; many more languished in prisons and labor camps; and more than 6000 monasteries, temples and other cultural and historic buildings were destroyed and their contents pillaged. In 1980 Hu Yao Bang, General Secretary of the Communist Party, visited Tibet—the first senior official to do so since the invasion. Alarmed by the extent of the destruction he saw there, he called for a series of drastic reforms and for a policy of “recuperation.” His forced resignation in 1987 was said partially to result from his views on Tibet. In 1981, Alexander Solzhenytsin described the Chinese regime in Tibet as “more brutal and inhumane than any other communist regime in the world.” Relaxation of China’s policies in Tibet came very slowly after 1979 and remains severely limited.


Under the 1951 [[Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet|Seventeen Point Agreement]] the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic gave a number of undertakings, among them: promises to maintain the existing political system of Tibet, to maintain the status and functions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of religion and the monasteries and to refrain from compulsion in the matter of reforms in Tibet. The ICJ found that these and other undertakings had been violated by the Chinese People's Republic, and that the [[Tibet (1912–51)|Government of Tibet]] was entitled to repudiate the Agreement as it did on March 11, 1959.<ref name="tibetjustice.org"/>
Attempted Tibet-China Dialogue
Following the re-establishment of contacts with Beijing, two delegations were sent by the Dalai Lama to hold high-level exploratory talks with the Chinese government and party leaders in Beijing in 1982 and 1984. The talks were unsuccessful because the Chinese were, at that time, not prepared to discuss anything of substance except the return of the Dalai Lama from exile. The Dalai Lama has always insisted that his return is not the issue; instead, the question that needs to be addressed is the future of the six million Tibetans inside Tibet. It is the Dalai Lama’s opinion that his own return will depend entirely upon resolving the question of the status and rights of Tibet and its people.


====Occupation and genocide====
Alarming Chinese Influx
In recent years the situation in Tibet has once again deteriorated, leading in 1987 to open demonstrations against Chinese rule in Lhasa and other parts of the country. One of the principle factors leading to this deterioration has been the large influx of Chinese into Tibet, particularly into its major towns. The exact number of Chinese is difficult to assess, because the vast majority have moved without obtaining official residence permits to do so. Thus, Chinese statistics are entirely misleading, counting as they do only the small numbers of registered immigrants. In Tibet’s cities and fertile valleys, particularly in eastern Tibet, Chinese outnumber Tibetans by two and sometimes three to one. In certain rural areas, particularly in western Tibet, there are very few Chinese. Regardless of the figures, the overall impact of the influx is devastating because the Chinese not only control the political and military power in Tibet, but also the economic life and even cultural and religious life of the people.


In 1960 the CIA-funded [[Nongovernmental organization|nongovernmental]] [[International Commission of Jurists]] (ICJ) gave a report titled ''Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations''. The report was prepared by the ICJ's Legal Inquiry Committee, composed of eleven international lawyers from around the world. This report accused the Chinese of the crime of [[genocide]] in Tibet, after nine years of full occupation, six years before the devastation of the [[cultural revolution]] began.<ref name="tibetjustice.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/govngo/govngo2.html|title=Tibet Justice Center - Legal Materials on Tibet - Governmental and NGOs - ICJ Report on Tibet and China (excerpt) (1960) [p.346]|work=tibetjustice.org|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> The ICJ also documented accounts of massacres, tortures and killings, bombardment of monasteries, and extermination of whole nomad camps<ref name="friendsoftibet.org"/> Declassified Soviet archives provides data that Chinese communists, who received a great assistance in military equipment from the USSR, broadly used Soviet aircraft for bombing monasteries and other punitive operations in Tibet.<ref>[http://savetibet.ru/img/2010/tibet-book-eng.pdf Kuzmin, S.L. ''Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation''. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011]</ref>
The Chinese military as well as the civilian build up in Tibet has been a source of great concern to India, as it impacts directly on India’s security. Tibet acted for centuries as a vital buffer between China and India. It is only when Chinese troops faced Indian troops on the Indo-Tibetan border that tensions, and even war, developed between the world’s most populous powers. The more Tibet is converted into a Chinese province, populated by Chinese, the stronger China’s strategic position along the Himalayas will be. China’s growing military reach has now become a source of concern to many Asian nations as well as to India.


The ICJ examined evidence relating to human rights within the structure of the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]] as announced by the [[General Assembly of the United Nations]]. After taking into account the human, economic and [[social rights]], they found that the Chinese communist authorities had violated Article 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]] in Tibet.<ref name="tibetjustice.org"/>
Tibet has been suffering for decades under the illegal rule of the criminal, corrupt, filthy and genocidal chinese government which has been successfuly silencing officials at UN, EU and other governments around the globe by the use of bribery and large scale corruption schemes involving politicians and businessmen.


====Cultural suppression====
The Legal Status of Tibet
Recent events in Tibet have intensified the dispute over its legal status. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims that Tibet is an integral part of China. The Tibetan government-in-exile maintains that Tibet is an independent state under unlawful occupation.


The Tibetans were not allowed to participate in the [[Tibetan culture|cultural]] life of their own community, a culture which the Chinese have [[Tibetan culture under Chinese rule|set out to destroy]], according to the ICJ. The ICJ discovered that Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan "rebels" of rape, plunder and torture were found in cases of plunder to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of belief for this and other reasons.<ref name="tibetjustice.org"/>
The question is highly relevant for at least two reasons. First, if Tibet is under unlawful Chinese occupation, Beijing’s large-scale transfer of Chinese settlers into Tibet is a serious violation of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the transfer of civilian population into occupied territory. Second, if Tibet is under unlawful Chinese occupation, China’s illegal presence in the country is a legitimate object of international concern. If, on the other hand, Tibet is an integral part of China, then these questions fall, a China claims, within its own domestic jurisdiction. The issue of human rights, including the right of self-determination and the right of the Tibetan people to maintain their own identity and autonomy are, of course, legitimate objects of international concern regardless of Tibet’s legal status.


In spite of claims by the Chinese that most of the damage to Tibet's institutions occurred subsequently during the [[Cultural Revolution]] (1966–1976), it is well established that the destruction of most of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.<ref name="Craig 1992, p. 125"/> During the mid-1960s, the monastic estates were broken up and [[Education in Tibet|secular education introduced]]. During the Cultural Revolution, [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guards]], which included Tibetan members,<ref>Shakya (1999), p. 320.</ref> inflicted a campaign of organized vandalism against cultural sites in the entire PRC, including Buddhist sites in Tibet.<ref>Shakya (1999), pp. 314–347.</ref> According to at least one Chinese source, only a handful of the most important monasteries remained without major damage.<ref>Wang 2001, pp. 212–214</ref>
The PRC makes no claim to sovereign rights over Tibet as a result of its military subjugation and occupation of Tibet following the country’s invasion in 1949-1950. Thus, China does not allege that it has acquired sovereignty by means of conquest, annexation or prescription in this period. Instead, it bases its claim to Tibet solely on their theory that Tibet has been an integral part of China for centuries.


====Criticism of report====
The question of Tibet’s status is essentially a legal question, albeit one of immediate political relevance. The international status of a country must be determined by objective legal criteria rather than subjective political ones. Thus, whether a particular entity is a state in international law depends on whether it possesses the necessary criteria for statehood (territory, population, independent government, ability to conduct international relations), not whether governments of other states recognize its independent status. Recognition can provide evidence that foreign governments are willing to treat an entity as an independent state, but cannot create or extinguish a state.


According to various authors, the 1959 and 1960 ICJ reports date back to a time when that organization was funded by the CIA. [[A. Tom Grunfeld]] asserts that the United States took advantage of the Dalai Lama's leaving Tibet by prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China.<ref>A. Tom Grunfeld, Tibet and the United States, in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (eds), ''Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region'', M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p., pp. 319–349, p. 329: {{quote|The United States also took advantage of the Dalai Lama's having left Tibet by having the CIA revive its Cold War propaganda machine, creating supposedly popular organizations such as the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War human rights organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China}}.</ref> In his 1994 book ''The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights'',<ref>Howard B. Tolley Jr., ''The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights'', Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, XVII p. + 344 p.</ref> Howard B. Tolley Jr. explains how the ICJ was created and bankrolled by the CIA from 1952 to 1967 as an instrument of the Cold War without most ICJ officers and members knowing about it.<ref>Richard Pierre Claude, [https://www.jstor.org/pss/762438 review] of Howard B. Tolley Jr., ''The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Humam Rights'', in ''Human Rights Quarterly'', August 1994: {{quote|Based on the documentation and named respondents, the authors present the tale of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in secretly bankrolling the formation of the ICJ as an instrument of the cold war. (...) Tolley shows that the tainted source of funding was unknown to most ICJ officers and members}}.</ref> The connection between the CIA and the early ICJ is also mentioned by Dorothy Stein in her book ''People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children'', published in 1995. She accuses the Commission of growing out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was dissiminating [[anti-communist]] propaganda.<ref>Dorothy Stein, ''People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children'', Earthscan Publications, London, 1995, XI + 239 p., pp. 193–104, note 27: {{quote|The ICJ itself grew out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was disseminating anti-communist propaganda. It too has received funds from the CIA, which is not a notable rights organization, nor, which is more to the point, particularly noted for its interest in truth. The 1960 LIC report, ''Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic'' (ICJ, Geneva: 1990), shows strong signs of bias in accepting or rejecting the testimonies cited}}.</ref> This contrasts with the official overview of the [[International Commission of Jurists]], which is "dedicated to the primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that advance human rights" and the "impartial, objective and authoritative legal approach to the protection and promotion of human rights through the rule of law" while providing "legal expertise at both the international and national levels to ensure that developments in international law adhere to human rights principles and that international standards are implemented at the national level."<ref>http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview</ref>
In many cases, such as the present one, it is necessary to examine a country’s history in order to determine its status. Such a historical study should logically be based primarily on the country’s own historical sources, rather than on interpretations contained in official sources of a foreign state, especially one claiming rights over the country in question. This may seem self-evident to most. When studying the history of France we examine French rather than German or Russian source materials. I am making the point, however, precisely because China’s claim to sovereignty over Tibet is based almost exclusively on self-serving Chinese official histories. Chinese sources portrayed most countries with whom the emperor of China had relations, not only Tibet, as vassals of the emperor. When studying Tibet’s history, Tibetan sources should be given primary importance; foreign sources, including Chinese ones, should only be given secondary weight.


===Establishment of TAR===
{{main|Tibet Autonomous Region}}


In 1965, the area that had been under the control of the Dalai Lama's government from 1951 to 1959 (Ü-Tsang and western Kham) was renamed the [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] or TAR. Autonomy provided that [[List of Chairmen of the Tibet Autonomous Region|head of government]] would be an ethnic Tibetan; however, the TAR head is always subordinate to the First Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who was not a Tibetan.<ref>Dodin (2008), pp. 205.</ref> The role of ethnic Tibetans in the higher levels of the TAR Communist Party was very limited.<ref>Dodin (2008), pp. 195–196.</ref>
The Political System in Tibet Today
Tibet is strictly governed by the Chinese Communist Party, with the active support of the military. The Party rules through branch offices in each province, autonomous region and autonomous prefecture. Subordinate to the Party is the government, which carries out policies designed by the Party. China has established the full panoply of Party and government offices to administer Tibet as exists in China. In Lhasa alone, there are over 60 departments and committees almost all of which are directly connected to their national offices in Beijing. Thus, Tibet is “autonomous” in word only; in fact, the Tibet Autonomous Region has less autonomy than Chinese provinces. The top T.A.R. post, the Party Secretary, has never been held by a Tibetan.


===Cultural revolution===
China maintains an occupation army in Tibet of at least a quarter million strong. Military and police are often overwhelmingly present in Lhasa and elsewhere, though as of February 1992, security in Lhasa is dominated by undercover and plainclothes police. The military plays a greater role in the administration of Tibet than any Chinese province, and no Tibetan serves in the leadership of the military district governing Tibet.
{{main|Cultural revolution}}


The [[Cultural Revolution]] launched in 1966 was a [[Disaster|catastrophe]] for Tibet, as it was for the rest of the PRC. Large numbers of Tibetans died violent deaths due to it, and the number of intact monasteries in Tibet was reduced from thousands to less than ten. Tibetan resentment towards the Chinese deepened.<ref name="Powers141 2">Powers 2004, pp. 141–2</ref> Tibetans participated in the destruction, but it is not clear how many of them actually embraced the Communist ideology and how many participated out of fear of becoming targets themselves.<ref name="Powers185">Powers 2004, pg. 185</ref> Resistors against the Cultural Revolution included Thrinley Chodron, a nun from [[Nyêmo County|Nyemo]], who led an armed rebellion that spread through eighteen xians (counties) of the TAR, targeting Chinese Party officials and Tibetan collaborators, that was ultimately suppressed by the PLA. Citing Tibetan Buddhist symbols which the rebels invoked, Shakya calls this 1969 revolt "a millenarian uprising, an insurgency characterized by a passionate desire to be rid of the [[Oppression|oppressor]]."<ref name="shakyawang">{{cite web|url=http://www.friendsoftibet.org/databank/tibethistory/tibeth3.html|title=Blood in the Snows(Reply to Wang Lixiong)|accessdate=2009-03-02}}</ref>
Even though the Party still controls Tibet, its control is beginning to slip. There is a pervasive disillusionment with, and contempt for, the Communist Party and the government in Tibet which can even be found among Party members and government functionaries. Inefficiency and corruption have consumed some government operations to the extent that they barely function and are an enormous waste of government funds. During ICT’s one-month tour of eastern Tibet, it became apparent that the Party’s goals have been drastically reduced from its once grandiose plans of social, human and economic transformation to simply holding onto power, taking care of Chinese settlers and extracting Tibet’s natural resources.


=== Demographic repercussions ===
The Party now seems to have little left to offer Tibetans other than the repression which keeps Tibetans from mass rebellion. Nobody in Tibet is talking about how the Party can reform itself, for it has become something that most Tibetans must just tolerate and avoid. Some Tibetans use the Party for their own personal and professional advancement and try to improve conditions for Tibetans from within the system. The late Panchen Lama succeeded in wresting enough power from the system to improve conditions in a number of areas. The Panchen Lama was the only Tibetan who the Chinese feared, unlike current Tibetan leaders such as Ngawang Ngapo Jigme, Mao Rubai and Raidi who have little power. Recent reports from Lhasa indicate increasing alienation and disaffection among middle and lower level Tibetan bureaucrats and acorresponding loss of trust in them by their Chinese superiors.

Warren W. Smith, a broadcaster of [[Radio Free Asia]] (which was established by the US government), extrapolated a death figure of 400,000 from his calculation of census reports of Tibet which show 200,000 "missing" people.<ref>''Tibet, Tibet'' {{ISBN|1-4000-4100-7}}, pp. 278–82</ref><ref>Smith 1997, p. 600</ref> The [[Central Tibetan Administration]] claimed that the number that have died of starvation, violence, or other indirect causes since 1950 is approximately 1.2 million.<ref name="Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts">[http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/pubs/wp/tb96/Tibet%20Proving%20Truth.pdf 'Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts'] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070615161100/http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/pubs/wp/tb96/Tibet%20Proving%20Truth.pdf |date=2007-06-15 }}, ''The Department of Information and International Relations: Central Tibetan Administration'', 1996. p. 53</ref> According to [[Patrick French]], the former director of the London-based [[Free Tibet Campaign]] and a supporter of the Tibetan cause who was able to view the data and calculations, the estimate is not reliable because the Tibetans were not able to process the data well enough to produce a credible total. French says this total was based on refugee interviews, but prevented outsider access to the data. French, who did gain access, found no names, but "the insertion of seemingly random figures into each section, and constant, unchecked duplication."<ref name="barry">Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer, ''Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, And Society In A Disputed Region'' pp. 239</ref> Furthermore, he found that of the 1.1 million dead listed, only 23,364 were female (implying that 1.07 million of the total Tibetan male population of 1.25 million had died).<ref name="barry"/> [[Tibetologist]] [[Tom Grunfeld]] also finds that the figure is "without documentary evidence."<ref>Grunfeld 1996, p. 247.</ref> There were, however, many casualties, perhaps as many as 400,000.<ref>French 2003, pp. 278–82</ref> Smith, calculating from census reports of Tibet, shows 144,000 to 160,000 "missing" from Tibet".<ref>Smith 1997, p. 600–1 n. 8</ref> Courtois ''et al.'' forward a figure of 800,000 deaths and allege that as many as 10% of the Tibetan populace were interned, with few survivors.<ref name="Kewly, p. 255">Courtois 1997, p. 545–6, (cites Kewly, ''Tibet'' p. 255)</ref> Chinese demographers have estimated that 90,000 of the 300,000 "missing" Tibetans fled the region.<ref>Yan Hao, [http://www.case.edu/affil/tibet/booksAndPapers/tibetan.population.in.china.pdf 'Tibetan Population in China: Myths and Facts Re-examined'], ''Asian Ethnicity'', Volume 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.24</ref> The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denies this. Its official toll of deaths recorded for the whole of China for the years of the Great Leap Forward is 14 million, but scholars have estimated the number of the famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.<ref>Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," ''Population and Development Review'' 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.<br>For a summary of other estimates, please refer to this [http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm#Mao link]</ref>

The Government of Tibet in Exile quotes an issue of ''[[People's Daily]]'' published in 1959 to claim that the Tibetan population has dropped significantly since 1959, counting the population of the Tibet Autonomous region but Qinghai, Gansu, and other regions inhabited by Tibetans, as the "Tibetan population". Compared as a whole to the 2000 numbers, the population in these regions has decreased, it says.<ref>People's Daily, Beijing, 10 November 1959, in [http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white8.html Population transfer and control]</ref> These findings are in conflict with a 1954 Chinese census report that counted ethnic Tibetans.<ref>[http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20020404_16767.htm 1954 Chinese Census Report] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090805174810/http://www.stats.gov.cn/TJGB/RKPCGB/qgrkpcgb/t20020404_16767.htm |date=2009-08-05 }} {{Link language|zh}}<!--Chinese--></ref> This is because in all of these provinces, Tibetans were not the only traditional ethnic group. This is held to be so especially in Qinghai, which has a historical mixture of different groups of ethnics. In 1949, Han Chinese made up 48.3% of the population, the rest of the ethnic groups make up 51.7% of the 1.5 million total population.<ref>{{zh icon}} Qinghai Population [http://www.57qh.com/qinghai/Html/2006624155714-1.html]</ref> As of today, Han Chinese account for 54% of the total population of Qinghai, which is slightly higher than in 1949. Tibetans make up around 20% of the population of Qinghai.{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}} Detailed analysis of statistical data from Chinese and Tibetan emigrant sources revealed errors in estimates of Tibetan population by regions. Although it may contain errors, data from the Government of Tibet in Exile was found to be in better correspondence with the known facts than any other existing estimates. With respect to total population of the whole Tibet in 1953 and 1959, the Tibetan side appears to provide numbers that are too high, while the Chinese side provides numbers that are too low.<ref>[http://savetibet.ru/img/2010/tibet-book-eng.pdf Kuzmin, S.L. ''Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation''. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 334–340]</ref>

On June 20, 1959 in [[Mussoorie]] during a [[press conference]], the Dalai Lama stated:
''"The ultimate Chinese aim with regard to Tibet, as far as I can make out, seems to attempt the extermination of religion and culture and even the absorption of the Tibetan race...Besides the civilian and military personnel already in Tibet, five million Chinese settlers have arrived in eastern and north-eastern Tso, in addition to which four million Chinese settlers are planned to be sent to U and Sung provinces of Central Tibet. Many Tibetans have been deported, thereby resulting in the complete absorption of these Tibetans as a race, which is being undertaken by the Chinese." ''<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/govngo/govngo1.html|title=Tibet Justice Center - Legal Materials on Tibet - Governmental and NGOs - ICJ Report on the Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (excerpt) (1959) [p.342]|work=tibetjustice.org|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref>

==1976–1987: Rapprochement and internationalization==

Following Mao's death in 1976, [[Deng Xiaoping]] launched initiatives of rapprochement with the exiled Tibetan leaders, hoping to persuade them to come to live in China. [[Ren Rong]], who was Communist Party Secretary in Tibet, thought that Tibetans in Tibet were happy under Chinese Communist rule and that they shared the Chinese Communist views of the pre-Communist Tibetan rulers as oppressive despots. "By 1979 most of the estimated 600,000 monks and nuns were dead, disappeared, or imprisoned, and the majority of Tibet's 6,000 monasteries had been destroyed."<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/53173808|title=The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives|last=Ardley|first=Jane|publisher=RoutledgeCurzon|year=2002|isbn=9780700715725|location=London|pages=22|chapter="Tibet: Religion, Resistance and the State"|oclc=53173808|quote="The economy was totally devastated, and the Cultural Revolution had succeeded in almost completely destroying Tibet's cultural heritage. By 1979 most of the estimated 600,000 monks and nuns were dead, disappeared, or imprisoned, and the majority of Tibet's 6,000 monasteries had been destroyed."}}</ref> So, when delegations from the Tibetan government in exile visited Tibet in 1979-80, Chinese officials expected to impress the Tibetan exiles with the progress that had occurred since 1950 and with the contentment of the Tibetan populace. Ren even organized meetings in Lhasa to urge Tibetans to restrain their animosity towards the coming representatives of an old, oppressive regime. The Chinese, then, were astonished and embarrassed at the massive, tearful expressions of devotion which Tibetans made to the visiting Tibetan exiles. Thousands of Tibetans cried, prostrated, offered scarves to the visitors, and strove for a chance to touch the Dalai Lama's brother.<ref name="Goldstein613">Goldstein 1997, pp. 61–3</ref>

These events also prompted Party Secretary [[Hu Yaobang]] and Vice Premier [[Wan Li]] to visit Tibet, where they were dismayed by the conditions they found. Hu announced a reform program intended to improve economic standards for Tibetans and to foster some freedom for Tibetans to practice ethnic and cultural traditions. In some ways, this was a return from the hard line authoritarianism and assimilation policies of the 1960s to Mao's more ethnically accommodating policies of the 1950s, with the major difference that there would be no separate Tibetan government as there had been in the 1950s.<ref name="Goldstein636">Goldstein 1997, pp. 63–66</ref> Hu ordered a change in policy, calling for the revitalization of Tibetan culture, religion, and language, the building of more [[List of universities and colleges in Tibet|universities and colleges in Tibet]], and an increase in the number of ethnic Tibetans in the local government.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://cc.purdue.edu/~wtv/tibet/article/art4.html |title=Archived copy |accessdate=2006-10-21 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20061106021854/http://cc.purdue.edu/~wtv/tibet/article/art4.html |archivedate=2006-11-06 |df= }} ''Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question,''by Melvyn C. Goldstein</ref> Concurrent liberalizations in [[Chinese economic reform|economics]] and [[Hukou system|internal migration]] have also resulted in Tibet seeing more [[Han Chinese]] [[migrant workers]], though the actual number of this [[floating population]] remains disputed.

New meetings between Chinese officials and exiled leaders took place in 1981–1984, but no agreements could be reached.<ref name="Goldstein674">Goldstein 1997, pp. 67–74</ref>

In 1986–1987, the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala launched a new drive to win international support for their cause as a human rights issue. In response, the [[United States House of Representatives]] in June 1987 passed a resolution in support of Tibetan human rights.<ref name="Goldstein758">Goldstein 1997, pp. 75–78</ref> Between [[1987–1989 Tibetan unrest|September 1987 and March 1989]], four major demonstrations occurred in Lhasa against Chinese rule.<ref name="Goldstein7983">Goldstein 1997, pp. 79–83</ref> American Tibetologist [[Melvyn Goldstein]] considered the riots to be spontaneous mass expressions of Tibetan resentment, sparked in part by hope that the United States would soon provide support or pressure enabling Tibet to become independent.<ref name="Goldstein837">Goldstein 1997, pp. 83–87</ref> In 1987, the Panchen Lama delivered a speech estimating the number of prison deaths in Qinghai at approximately 5 percent of the total population in the area.<ref>Barnett, Robert, in: ''Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions'', edited by Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille. (2008), pp. 89–90. University of California Press. {{ISBN|978-0-520-24464-1}} (cloth); {{ISBN|978-0-520-24928-8}} (pbk).</ref> The United States passed a 1988–1989 Foreign Relations Act which expressed support for Tibetan human rights.<ref name="Goldstein758" /> The riots ironically discredited Hu's more liberal Tibetan policies and brought about a return to hard-line policies; Beijing even imposed martial law in Tibet in 1989. Emphasis on economic development brought increasing numbers of non-Tibetans to Lhasa, and the economy in Tibet became increasingly dominated by Han. Lhasa became a city where non-Tibetans equalled or outnumbered Tibetans.<ref name="Goldstein8799">Goldstein 1997, pp. 87–99</ref>

When the 10th Panchen Lama addressed the Tibet Autonomous Region Standing Committee Meeting of the National People’s Congress in 1987, he detailed mass imprisonment and killings of Tibetans in Amdo (Qinghai): "there were between three to four thousand villages and towns, each having between three to four thousand families with four to five thousand people. From each town and village, about 800 to 1,000 people were imprisoned. Out of this, at least 300 to 400 people of them died in prison...In Golok area, many people were killed and their dead bodies were rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should all celebrate since the rebels had been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns. They were all buried there"<ref name="acme">{{cite web|url=http://www.tibetwrites.org/?Acme-of-Obscenity |title=Acme of Obscenity |accessdate=2010-03-28 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20100704094653/http://www.tibetwrites.org/?Acme-of-Obscenity |archivedate=2010-07-04 |df= }}</ref>

==1988–present==
[[File:Police notice, Tibet, 1993.jpg|thumb|220px|"Police Attention: No distributing any unhealthy thoughts or objects." A trilingual (Tibetan–Chinese–English) sign above the entrance to a small cafe in [[Nyalam Town]], Tibet, 1993]]
[[Hu Jintao]] became the Party Chief of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1988. In 1989, the [[Choekyi Gyaltsen|10th Panchen Lama]] died. Many Tibetans believe that Hu was involved in his unexpected death.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2404129.stm|title=BBC NEWS - Asia-Pacific - Profile: Hu Jintao|work=bbc.co.uk|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> A few months later, according to [[Tang Daxian]], a dissident journalist, the police in Lhasa received orders from General [[Li Lianxiu]] to provoke an incident. Peaceful demonstrations lead to the death of 450 Tibetans that year.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE4DE1131F937A2575BC0A966958260|title=Chinese Said to Kill 450 Tibetans in 1989|first=|last=AP|date=|website=nytimes.com|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref> The fourth national census was conducted in 1990, finding 4,590,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 2,090,000 in the TAR. The Chinese government compares these numbers to the first national census to conclude that the Tibetan population has doubled since 1951.<ref name="pop"/>

In 1995, the Dalai Lama named 6 year old [[Gedhun Choekyi Nyima]] as the 11th Panchen Lama without the approval of the government of China, while the PRC named another child, [[Gyaincain Norbu]] in conflict with the Dalai Lama's choice. Gyaincain Norbu was raised in Tibet and Beijing and makes frequent public appearances in religion and politics. The PRC-selected Panchen Lama is rejected by exiled Tibetans who commonly refer to him as the "Panchen Zuma" (literally "fake Panchen Lama").<ref name="web.amnesty.org">http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170071996 'Tibet: 6-year old boy missing and over 50 detained in Panchen Lama dispute', ''Amnesty International'', 18 January 1996</ref> Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his family are missing: kidnapped, says Amnesty International, or living under a secret identity for protection and privacy, says Beijing.<ref name="web.amnesty.org"/>

===Economic development===
[[File:Rail attendant.jpg|thumb|250px|A rail attendant for the service from [[Xining]] to Lhasa]]
In 2000, the Chinese government launched its [[China Western Development|Western Development Strategy]] aimed at boosting the economies of its poorer western regions. The strategy has featured a strong bias for large-scale, capital-intensive projects such as the [[Qinghai-Tibet Railway]]. Such projects however, have roused fears of facilitating military mobilisation and Han migration.<ref name="sfgate.com">{{cite web|url=http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/02/24/MNG7FBG71U1.DTL|title=Train heads for Tibet, carrying fears of change / Migration, tourism likely to increase|work=SFGate|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> Robert Barnett reports that the economic stimulus was used by hardliners to stimulate Han migration to Tibet as a control mechanism, and that 66% of official posts in Tibet are held by Han.<ref name="leh">[http://www.columbia.edu/cu/weai/documents/LEHMN2b.pdf Robert Barnett's passages extracted from] [[Steve Lehman (photographer)|Steve Lehman]]<span>,</span> ''[http://info-buddhism.com/the_tibetans_robert_barnett.html The Tibetans: Struggle to Survive]'', Umbrage Editions, New York, 1998., [https://www.amazon.com/dp/1884167365]</ref> There is still an ethnic imbalance in appointments and promotions to the civil and judicial services in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with disproportionately few ethnic Tibetans appointed to these posts.<ref name="savetibet.org">{{cite web|url=http://www.savetibet.org/news/newsitem.php?id=674|title=Personnel Changes in Lhasa Reveal Preference for Chinese Over Tibetans, Says TIN Report|author=|date=|website=savetibet.org|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref>

The PRC government claims that its rule over Tibet has provided economic development to Tibetan people, and that the [[China Western Development|Western Development Strategy]] plan is a benevolent and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier east coast to help the western parts of China catch up in terms of prosperity and living standards. On the other hand, the government maintains that the Tibetan Government did almost nothing to improve the Tibetans' material standard of life during its rule from 1913–59, and that they opposed any reforms proposed by the Chinese government. According to the Chinese government, this is the reason for the tension that grew between some central government officials and the local Tibetan government in 1959.<ref name="Wang 194-7">Jiawei, Wang, "The Historical Status of China's Tibet", 2000, pp 194–7</ref> The claims of economic hardship under the Dalai Lama's government from 1913&ndash;59 are disputed by the [[10th Panchen Lama]] in the [[70,000 Character Petition]]; however, the Panchen Lama praised the 1980s [[reform and opening up]] under Deng Xiaoping.<ref name="Hilton19x">Hilton 2000, pp. 192–194</ref>

The government, in turn, rejects claims that the lives of Tibetans have deteriorated, and states that the lives of Tibetans have been improved immensely compared to self-rule before 1950.<ref>Peter Hessler, [http://www.csd99.k12.il.us/khector/tibet_analysis.htm 'Tibet Through Chinese Eyes'], ''The Atlantic Monthly'', Feb. 1999</ref> Despite China's claims that the lives of Tibetans have improved immensely, a 2004 book claimed some 3,000 Tibetans brave hardship and danger to flee into exile every year.<ref name="Powers143">Powers 2004, pg. 143</ref><!--what about post-2008 strife exile numbers?--> In addition, [[Human Rights Watch]] reports continued widespread abuses committed by Chinese security forces<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/24/statement-tibet-human-rights-council|title=Statement to the Human Rights Council on Tibet|work=Human Rights Watch|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref> and torture by Chinese police and security forced.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/01/10/beijings-broken-promises-human-rights-0|title=Beijing's Broken Promises on Human Rights|work=Human Rights Watch|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref><!-- The above paragraph feels off-topic and extremely POV. I suggest its contents be moved into a related human rights article or something of the sort. -->

The PRC claims that from 1951 to 2007, the Tibetan population in Lhasa-administered Tibet has increased from 1.2 million to almost 3 million. The [[gross domestic product|GDP]] of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) today is thirty times that of before 1950. Workers in Tibet have the second highest wages in China.<ref>[http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/783.html 'High wages in Tibet benefit the privileged'], Asian Labour News, 21 February 2005,</ref> The TAR has {{convert|22500|km}} of highways, as opposed to none in 1950. All secular education in the TAR was created after the revolution. The TAR now has 25 scientific research institutes as opposed to none in 1950. [[Infant mortality]] has dropped from 43% in 1950 to 0.661% in 2000.<ref name=autogenerated8>[http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20011108/3.htm 'Tibet's March Toward Modernization, section II The Rapid Social Development in Tibet'], Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, November 2001</ref> (The United Nations reports an infant mortality rate of 3.53% in 2000, fallen from 43.0% in 1951.<ref>{{cite web | title = Tibet: Basic Data | url = http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/tibet.htm | publisher = United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific | accessdate = 2008-04-22 | deadurl = yes | archiveurl = https://web.archive.org/web/20040220022652/http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/chinadata/tibet.htm | archivedate = 2004-02-20 | df = }}</ref>) [[Life expectancy]] has risen from 35.5 years in 1950 to 67 in 2000. It points to the collection and publishing of the traditional ''[[Epic of King Gesar]]'', which is the longest [[Epic poetry|epic poem]] in the world and had only been handed down orally before. (However, corresponding Tibetan texts exist from the 18th century, and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries a [[woodblock printing|woodblock edition]] of the story was compiled by a scholar-monk from [[Ling-tsang]] (a small kingdom north-east of sDe-dge) with inspiration from the prolific Tibetan philosopher [[Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso]]) It also highlights the allocation of 300 million [[Renminbi]] since the 1980s for the maintenance and protection of Tibetan monasteries.<ref name=autogenerated8 /> The [[Cultural Revolution]] and the cultural damage it wrought upon the entire PRC is generally condemned as a nationwide catastrophe, whose main instigators, in the PRC's view, the [[Gang of Four]], have been brought to justice. The [[China Western Development]] plan is viewed by the PRC as a massive, benevolent, and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier eastern coast to help the western parts of China, including Tibet, catch up in prosperity and living standards.{{Citation needed|date=November 2010}}

In 2008 the Chinese government "launched a 570-million-yuan (81.43 million U.S. dollars) project to preserve 22 historical and cultural heritage sites in Tibet, including the Zhaxi Lhunbo Lamasery as well as the Jokhang, Ramogia, Sanyai and Samgya-Goutog monasteries."<ref>[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/13/content_11368148.htm] [[Xinhua]] on-line news on Tibet</ref>

===Tibetan language===
According to Barry Sautman, 92–94% of ethnic Tibetans speak [[Tibetan languages|Tibetan]]. Among those who do not are small Tibetan minorities in areas such as [[Qinghai]]. Primary school instruction is conducted almost exclusively in Tibetan, but instruction is bilingual from secondary school onward.

[[Tibetologist]] [[Elliot Sperling]] has also noted that "within certain limits the PRC does make efforts to accommodate Tibetan cultural expression (and) the cultural activity taking place all over the Tibetan plateau cannot be ignored".<ref>[[Elliot Sperling]], Exile and Dissent: The Historical and Cultural Context, in TIBET SINCE 1950: SILENCE, PRISON, OR EXILE 31-36 (Melissa Harris & Sydney Jones eds., 2000), see [https://www.hrw.org/legacy/pubweb/sperlingcont.html The Historical and Cultural Context by Elliot Sperling]</ref> Currently, "cultural Tibet" boasts three Tibetan-language television channels, one for each of the three main dialects spoken in China's Tibetan areas. The Tibet Autonomous Region possesses a 24-hour Central Tibetan-language TV channel (launched in 1999).<ref>[http://specials.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/01china.htm China launches Tibetan channel for India, Nepal], ''PTI'', rediff NEWS, October 1, 2007: "China launched the first-ever 24-hour Tibetan language television channel on Monday to mark its 58th National Day (...). The channel only broadcast 11 hours a day when it was opened in 1999."</ref> For speakers of [[Amdo]] Tibetan, there is an Amdo Tibetan-language TV channel in Qinghai<ref>[http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/04/the-wishes-of-a-tibetan/ The wishes of a Tibetan], ''China Digital Times'', March 27, 2009: "At present, the two most popular television channels in the Tibetan areas are the Qinghai Tibetan language channel and the Tibet Tibetan language channel"</ref> and for speakers of [[Khams]] Tibetan a recently launched TV satellite channel in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.<ref>Zhang Mingyu, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/17/content_12814007.htm Cheer up for opening khampa Tibetan TV Channel], ''tibet.new.cn'', January 17, 2010.</ref>
In October 2010, Tibetan students protested after the Chinese government published rules supporting the use of Mandarin Chinese in lessons and textbooks by 2015, with the exception of Tibetan language and English classes.<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/22/tibetan-school-pupils-protest-language-china Tibetan student protests spread to Beijing], ''The Guardian'', 22 October 2010</ref>

==Human rights in Tibet==
{{Main|Human rights in Tibet}}

After the [[2008 Tibetan unrest|2008 unrest]], Tibetan-populated areas of China remained tightly sealed off from outside scrutiny, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the protests that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, overseas Tibetan organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Following the detentions were reports of torture and other ill-treatment in detention, some cases resulting in death.<ref name=amnesty09>Amnesty International, [http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/asia-pacific/china State of the World's Human Rights: China], 2009, accessed 16 March 2010</ref> Religious repression included locking down major monasteries and nunneries, and a propaganda campaign where local authorities renewed “Patriotic Education,” which required Tibetans to participate in criticism sessions of the Dalai Lama and sign written denunciations of him, according to Amnesty's 2009 China report. Tibetan members of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] were also targeted, including being made to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools where they would have received a religious education.<ref name=amnesty09/> According to former political prisoners Tibet is virtually a big prison.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/news/exile/3487-tibet-is-virtually-a-big-prison-former-political-prisoners|title=Tibet is virtually a big prison: Former political prisoners|work=thetibetpost.com|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref>

===2008 unrest===
{{main|2008 Tibetan unrest}}
[[2008 Tibetan unrest|Protests in March, 2008 developed into riots]] in which Tibetan mobs attacked Han and Hui people in [[Lhasa]]. The Chinese government reacted curtly, imposing curfews and pressuring journalists in Lhasa to leave the region.<ref name="HRW323">{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/07/06/china-s-forbidden-zones-0|title=China's Forbidden Zones|accessdate=2010-03-11|pages=32–33}}</ref> The international response was measured, with a number of leaders expressing concern. Some people protested in large European and North American cities and chanted slogans, with some supporting China's actions and some supporting the protesters in Tibet.

For a time after the 2008 unrest, Tibetan-populated areas of China remained off-limits to journalists, and major monasteries and nunneries were locked down, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the unrest that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, Tibetan exile organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party were told to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools.<ref name="amnesty09"/>

==Ethnic composition==
The issue of the proportion of the Han population in Tibet is a politically sensitive one and is disputed, involving the [[Government of Tibet in Exile]], the PRC, and the Tibetan independence movement.

The Government of Tibet in Exile has said that government policies are [[Sinicization of Tibet|sinicizing Tibet]] by encouraging the migration of non-ethnic Tibetans, especially [[Han Chinese|Han]] and [[Hui people|Hui]], so that they outnumber ethnic Tibetans in the Tibetan region.<ref name="tibet.com">{{cite web |url=http://www.tibet.com/HumanRights/poptrans.html |title=Archived copy |accessdate=2009-07-12 |deadurl=yes |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090712112116/http://www.tibet.com/HumanRights/poptrans.html |archivedate=2009-07-12 |df= }}</ref> Some non-Tibetans migrating to the area may end up assimilating into and adapting to the Tibetan culture of the area to a degree, given its significance in the local culture. But if they adapt a more distinct identity to the Tibetans, Tibetan culture would be more likely to become endangered, particularly if Tibetans are the minority. The PRC gives the number of Tibetans in the [[Tibet Autonomous Region]] as 2.4 million, as opposed to 190,000 non-Tibetans, and the number of Tibetans in all Tibetan autonomous entities combined (slightly smaller than the Greater Tibet claimed by exiled Tibetans) as 5.0 million, as opposed to 2.3 million non-Tibetans. In the TAR itself, much of the Han population is to be found in [[Lhasa]].<ref name="stats.gov.cn">[http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/html/B0209C.HTM National Bureau of Statistics of China] {{Link language|zh}}<!--Chinese--></ref>

This statistic is in dispute primarily based on the distinction between the area often referred to as "[[Greater Tibet]]", in which ethnic Tibetans are a minority in the overall population, and the [[Tibet Autonomous Region]], in which ethnic Tibetans are a majority. [[Qinghai]], which is claimed by Tibetan exile groups, is made up of many ranging cultures local to different regions within the Province. Tibetan culture is local to and alive in many villages and towns throughout Qinghai.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uod9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA89&lpg=PA89&dq=%22become+tibetan%22&source=bl&ots=aIOjidSi1X&sig=rYBHaADmJxCDE3qmpOmb2EA2WkI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiR19fr3vDWAhXDRiYKHUJ0CPsQ6AEIQjAI#v=onepage&q&f=false|title=Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila|first=Ashild|last=Kolas|date=12 September 2007|publisher=Routledge|accessdate=19 April 2018|via=Google Books}}</ref>

Some of Tibet's towns and villages are located in India and Nepal. The total population for Tibetans in India is given at 94,203, and 13,514 in Nepal. One example of this is the city of [[Leh]] in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a population of 27,513. The people of Leh are ethnic Tibetan, speaking Ladakhi, an East Tibetan language. Along with this, there are several Tibetan villages in northern Nepal. These regions are currently not claimed by Tibetan Exile Groups.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.betterplace.org/en/projects/44869-help-for-the-tibetan-village-briddhim-in-northern-nepal|title=Help for the Tibetan village Briddhim in Northern Nepal|author=|date=|website=betterplace.org|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://tibetdata.org/projects/population/|title=Tibetan Population - Inside and Outside Tibet|author=|date=|website=tibetdata.org|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20040616075334/http://www.censusindia.net/results/town.php?stad=A&state5=999|archivedate=2004-06-16|title= Census of India 2001: Data from the 2001 Census, including cities, villages and towns (Provisional)|accessdate=2008-11-01|publisher= Census Commission of India}}</ref>

<ref name="tibet.com"/> Referencing the population figures of [[Lhasa]], the [[Dalai Lama]] has recently accused China of "demographic aggression" while stating that the Tibetans had been reduced to a minority "in his homeland".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=18451&t=1|title=Dalai Lama accuses China of 'demographic aggression'|author=|date=|website=Phayul.com|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref> Exiled Tibetans have also expressed concern that the [[Qinghai-Tibet Railway]] ([[Xining]] to [[Lhasa]]) is intended to further facilitate the influx of Chinese migrants.<ref>{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5133220.stm | work=BBC News | title=Hu opens world's highest railway | date=2006-07-01 | accessdate=2010-05-25}}</ref> The PRC does not recognize [[Greater Tibet]] as claimed by the government of Tibet in Exile.<ref>In aninterview May 31, 2008, the Dalai Lama declared: « "Greater Tibet", now, this very word comes from the Chinese government side. We never state the greater Tibet » [http://www.tibet.net/en/flash/2008/0508/31C0508.html His Holiness the Dalai Lama discusses the recent unrest inside Tibet with the editors of the Financial Times (FT)] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091014115556/http://www.tibet.net/en/flash/2008/0508/31C0508.html |date=2009-10-14 }}.</ref> The PRC government claims that the ethnically Tibetan areas outside the TAR were not controlled by the Tibetan government before 1959 in the first place, having been administered instead by other surrounding provinces for centuries. It further alleges that the idea of "Greater Tibet" was originally engineered by foreign [[Imperialism|imperialists]] in order to divide China amongst themselves ([[Mongolia]] being a striking precedent, gaining independence with [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] backing and subsequently aligning itself with the [[Soviet Union]]).<ref>[http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-11/15/content_630888.htm Xinhua News report] {{Link language|zh}}<!--Chinese--></ref>

The Government of Tibet in Exile disputes most demographic statistics released by the PRC government since they do not include members of the [[People's Liberation Army]] garrisoned in Tibet, or the floating population of unregistered migrants, and states that China is attempting to assimilate Tibet and further diminishing any chances of Tibetan political independence.<ref name="tibet.com"/> CCP member [[Jampa Phuntsok]], chairman of the TAR, has said that the central government has no policy of migration into Tibet due to its harsh high-altitude conditions, that the 6% Han in the TAR is a very fluid group mainly doing business or working, and that there is no immigration problem. (This report includes both permanent and temporary residences in Tibet, but excludes Tibetans studying or working outside of the TAR).<ref>[http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-08-27/1644645902s.shtml SINA News report] {{Link language|zh}}<!--Chinese--></ref> By 2006, 3% of the permanent residences in Tibet were of Han ethnicity, according to National Bureau of Statistics of China.<ref name="stats.gov.cn"/> The TAR has the lowest population density among China's province-level administrative regions, mostly due to its mountainous and harsh geographical features. As of 2000, 92.8% of the population were ethnic Tibetans, while Han Chinese comprised 6.1% of the population. In Lhasa, the capital of TAR, Hans made up 17%, far less than what many activists have claimed. Population control policies like the [[one-child policy]] apply only to [[Han Chinese]], not to minorities such as Tibetans.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25059.htm|title=中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法|work=www.gov.cn|accessdate=26 September 2015}}</ref>

[[File:Cubical houses in Xiangcheng valley.JPG|thumb|right|Traditional Kham houses]]

Review of different sources revealed that under the Mao Zedong rule from 3% to 30% of Tibetans perished<ref>[http://savetibet.ru/img/2010/tibet-book-eng.pdf Kuzmin, S.L. ''Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation''. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011].</ref>

Barry Sautman accused pro-independence forces of wanting the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han and the Dalai Lama of consistently misrepresenting the present situation as one of a Han majority. The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has very few non-Tibetans.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.blackandwhitecat.org/2008/04/01/separatism-and-tibet|title=Protests in Tibet and Separatism: the Olympics and Beyond|author=|date=|website=blackandwhitecat.org|accessdate=19 April 2018}}</ref>

Sautman also stated:
::[The settlers] are not personally subsidized by the state; although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to prosper.

::Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because those who cannot find work leave.

In a Writenet paper written for the [[UNHCR]], Professor [[Colin Mackerras]] (using PRC censuses) expresses the view that claims such as that the Chinese are swamping Tibetans in their own country and that 1.2 million Tibetans have died due to Chinese occupation "should be treated with the deepest skepticism":<ref>[http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?docid=423ea9094 People’s Republic of China: Background paper on the situation of the Tibetan population], A Writenet Report by Professor Colin P. Mackerras, p. 19–20.</ref> {{Cquote|The figures show that since the early 1960s, the Tibetan population has been increasing, probably for the first time for centuries. What seems to follow from this is that the TGIE’s allegations of population reduction due to Chinese rule probably have some validity for the 1950s but are greatly exaggerated. However, since the 1960s, Chinese rule has had the effect of increasing the population of the Tibetans, not decreasing it, largely due to a modernization process that has improved the standard of living and lowered infant, maternity and other mortality rates.}}

===Statistics according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China===
{| class="wikitable" style="text-align:right"
!align="center" colspan="8"| Major ethnic groups in Greater Tibet by region, 2000 census.
|-
!
! Total
!colspan="2"| [[Tibetans]]
!colspan="2"| [[Han Chinese]]
!colspan="2"| others
|-
|align="left"| [[Tibet Autonomous Region]]:
| 2,616,329
| 2,427,168
| '''92.8%'''
| 158,570
| 6.1%
| 30,591
| 1.2%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Lhasa]] PLC
| 474,499
| 387,124
| '''81.6%'''
| 80,584
| 17.0%
| 6,791
| 1.4%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Qamdo Prefecture]]
| 586,152
| 563,831
| '''96.2%'''
| 19,673
| 3.4%
| 2,648
| 0.5%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Shannan Prefecture]]
| 318,106
| 305,709
| '''96.1%'''
| 10,968
| 3.4%
| 1,429
| 0.4%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Xigazê Prefecture]]
| 634,962
| 618,270
| '''97.4%'''
| 12,500
| 2.0%
| 4,192
| 0.7%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Nagqu Prefecture]]
| 366,710
| 357,673
| '''97.5%'''
| 7,510
| 2.0%
| 1,527
| 0.4%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Ngari Prefecture]]
| 77,253
| 73,111
| '''94.6%'''
| 3,543
| 4.6%
| 599
| 0.8%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Nyingchi Prefecture]]
| 158,647
| 121,450
| '''76.6%'''
| 23,792
| 15.0%
| 13,405
| 8.4%
|-
|align="left"|[[Qinghai]] Province:
| 4,822,963
| 1,086,592
| 22.5%
| 2,606,050
| '''54.0%'''
| 1,130,321
| 23.4%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Xining]] PLC
| 1,849,713
| 96,091
| 5.2%
| 1,375,013
| '''74.3%'''
| 378,609
| 20.5%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Haidong Prefecture]]
| 1,391,565
| 128,025
| 9.2%
| 783,893
| '''56.3%'''
| 479,647
| 34.5%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Haibei AP]]
| 258,922
| 62,520
| 24.1%
| 94,841
| 36.6%
| 101,561
| '''39.2%'''
|-
|align="left"| – [[Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Huangnan AP]]
| 214,642
| 142,360
| '''66.3%'''
| 16,194
| 7.5%
| 56,088
| 26.1%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Hainan AP]]
| 375,426
| 235,663
| '''62.8%'''
| 105,337
| 28.1%
| 34,426
| 9.2%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Golog AP]]
| 137,940
| 126,395
| '''91.6%'''
| 9,096
| 6.6%
| 2,449
| 1.8%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Gyêgu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Gyêgu AP]]
| 262,661
| 255,167
| '''97.1%'''
| 5,970
| 2.3%
| 1,524
| 0.6%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Haixi AP]]
| 332,094
| 40,371
| 12.2%
| 215,706
| '''65.0%'''
| 76,017
| 22.9%
|-
|align="left" colspan="8"| Tibetan areas in [[Sichuan]] province
|-
|align="left"| – [[Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture|Ngawa AP]]
| 847,468
| 455,238
| '''53.7%'''
| 209,270
| 24.7%
| 182,960
| 21.6%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Garzê AP]]
| 897,239
| 703,168
| '''78.4%'''
| 163,648
| 18.2%
| 30,423
| 3.4%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Muli Tibetan Autonomous County|Muli AC]]
| 124,462
| 60,679
| '''48.8%'''
| 27,199
| 21.9%
| 36,584
| 29.4%
|-
|align="left" colspan="8"| Tibetan areas in [[Yunnan]] province
|-
|align="left"| – [[Dêqên Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Dêqên AP]]
| 353,518
| 117,099
| 33.1%
| 57,928
| 16.4%
| 178,491
| '''50.5%'''
|-
|align="left" colspan="8"| Tibetan areas in [[Gansu]] province
|-
|align="left"| – [[Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture|Gannan AP]]
| 640,106
| 329,278
| '''51.4%'''
| 267,260
| 41.8%
| 43,568
| 6.8%
|-
|align="left"| – [[Tianzhu Tibetan Autonomous County|Tianzhu AC]]
| 221,347
| 66,125
| 29.9%
| 139,190
| '''62.9%'''
| 16,032
| 7.2%
|-
|align="left" colspan="8"| Total for Greater Tibet:
|-
|align="left"| With Xining and Haidong
|10,523,432
| 5,245,347
| '''49.8%'''
| 3,629,115
| 34.5%
| 1,648,970
| 15.7%
|-
|align="left"| Without Xining and Haidong
| 7,282,154
| 5,021,231
| '''69.0%'''
| 1,470,209
| 20.2%
| 790,714
| 10.9%
|}

This table<ref name = "ZH">Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司) and Department of Economic Development of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of China (国家民族事务委员会经济发展司), eds. ''Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China'' (《2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料》). 2 vols. Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House (民族出版社), 2003 ({{ISBN|7-105-05425-5}}).</ref> includes all Tibetan [[autonomous entities of China|autonomous entities]] in the People's Republic of China, plus Xining PLC and Haidong P. The latter two are included to complete the figures for [[Qinghai province]], and also because they are claimed as parts of [[Greater Tibet]] by the Government of Tibet in exile.

P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; AC = Autonomous county.

Excludes members of the [[People's Liberation Army]] in active service.

Han settlers in the cities have steadily increased since then. But a preliminary analysis of the 2005 mini-census shows only a modest increase in Han population in the TAR from 2000–2005 and little change in eastern Tibet.

==See also==

*[[Self-immolation protests by Tibetans in China]]
*[[Tibet (1912–1951)]]
*[[Tibet under Qing rule]]
*[[Tibetan diaspora]]
*[[Tibetan Resistance Since 1950]]
*[[Tibetan sovereignty debate]]
*[[Tibetan Buddhism]]

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist|2}}

=== Sources ===
* Ardley, Jane ''The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives'' (2002) London: RoutledgeCurzon {{ISBN|9780700715725}}
* Craig, Mary ''Tears of Blood: A Cry for Tibet'' (1992) INDUS an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers Calcutta Second impression 1993 {{ISBN|0-00-627500-1}}
* Goldstein, Melvyn C. ''A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State'' (1989) University of California Press {{ISBN|978-0-520-06140-8}}
* Goldstein, Melvyn C. ''The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama'' (1997) University of California Press {{ISBN|0-520-21951-1}}
* Goldstein, Melvyn C. ''A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955'' (2007) University of California Press {{ISBN|978-0-520-24941-7}}
* Harrer, Heinrich ''Seven Years in Tibet'' Rupert Hart-Davis, London (1953) {{OCLC|475276448}}
* Harrer, Heinrich ''Return to Tibet: Tibet After the Chinese Occupation'' (1998) Jeremy P. Tarcher/ Putnam, New York {{ISBN|0-87477-925-1}}
* Hilton, Elizabeth ''The Search for the Panchen Lama'' (2000) W. W. Norton & Company. {{ISBN|0-393-04969-8}}
* Kuzmin, Sergius ''Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation'' (2011) Library of Tibetan Works & Archives {{ISBN|978-93-80359-47-2}}
* [[Thomas Laird|Laird, Thomas]]. ''The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama'' (2006) Grove Press {{ISBN|0-8021-1827-5}}
* Powers, John ''History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China'' (2004) Oxford University Press {{ISBN|978-0-19-517426-7}}
* Shakya, Tsering ''The Dragon In The Land Of Snows'' (1999) Columbia University Press {{ISBN|0-231-11814-7}}
* Smith Jr., Warren W., ''Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-Tibetan Relations'' (1997) Westview press {{ISBN|978-0-8133-3280-2}}

{{Tibet topics}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Tibet Since 1950}}
[[Category:History of Tibet]]
[[Category:20th century in Tibet]]
[[Category:History of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Tibet Autonomous Region]]
[[Category:1950s in Tibet]]
[[Category:1980s in Tibet]]
[[Category:1990s in Tibet]]
[[Category:Contemporary history by country]]

Revision as of 23:36, 30 December 2018

The history of Tibet from 1950 to the present started with the Chinese People's Liberation Army Invading Tibet in 1950. Before then, Tibet had declared independence from China in 1913. In 1951, the Tibetans signed a seventeen-point agreement reaffirming China's sovereignty over Tibet and providing an autonomous administration led by Dalai Lama. In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama fled Tibet to northern India under cover where he established the Central Tibetan Administration. The Tibet Autonomous Region within China was officially established in 1965.[1]

1950–1955: Traditional systems

In 1949, seeing that the Communists were gaining control of China, the Kashag expelled all Chinese connected with the Chinese government, over the protests of both the Kuomintang and the Communists.[2] Both the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have maintained China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. Many people[who?] felt that Tibet should not be part of China because they were constantly under attack in different ways rather often. Tibet had de facto been its own country before 1951.[3]

The Chinese Communist government led by Mao Zedong, which came to power in October, lost little time in asserting a new PRC presence in Tibet. The PRC has carried out different projects in Tibet but the people of Tibet seem to feel ignored politically and economically in the “Tibet Autonomous Region” and in the Tibetan portions of land in Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan.[4] In June 1950, the UK Government in the House of Commons stated that His Majesty's Government "have always been prepared to recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous."[5] On 7 October 1950,[6] The People's Liberation Army invaded the Tibetan area of Chamdo. The large number of units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered, largely pacifistic Tibetan forces. By October 19, 1950, 5,000 Tibetan troops had surrendered under PRC Oppression.[6]

In 1951, representatives of Tibetan authority, with the Dalai Lama's authorization,[7] participated in negotiations with the PRC government in Beijing. This resulted in a Seventeen Point Agreement which established PRC's sovereignty over Tibet, and it thereby gave the PRC power to rule.[8] The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later.[9] According to the Tibetan government-in-exile, some members of the Tibetan Cabinet (Kashag), for example, Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa, never accepted the agreement.[10] But the National Assembly of Tibet, "while recognizing the extenuating circumstances under which the delegates had to sign the 'agreement', asked the government to accept the 'agreement'...the Kashag told Zhang Jingwu that it would radio its acceptance of the 'agreement'."[11] Tibetan exile sources generally consider it invalid, as having been reluctantly or unwillingly signed under duress.[12] On the path that was leading him into exile in India, the 14th Dalai Lama arrived March 26, 1959 at Lhuntse Dzong where he repudiated the "17-point Agreement" as having been "thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms"[11] and reaffirmed his government as the only legitimate representative of Tibet.[13][14] According to the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Dalai Lama-ruled Tibetan area was supposed to be a highly autonomous area of China. From the beginning, it was obvious that incorporating Tibet into Communist PRC would bring two opposite social systems face-to-face.[15] In western Tibet, however, the Chinese Communists opted not to make social reform an immediate priority. On the contrary, from 1951 to 1959, traditional Tibetan society with its lords and manorial estates continued to function unchanged and were subsidized by the central government.[15] Despite the presence of twenty thousand PLA troops in Central Tibet, the Dalai Lama's government was permitted to maintain important symbols from its de facto independence period.[15] The first national census in all of the People's Republic of China was held in 1954, counting 2,770,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 1,270,000 in the Tibet Autonomous Region.[16] The Chinese built highways that reached Lhasa, and then extended them to the Indian, Nepalese and Pakistani borders.

Tibetan areas in Qinghai, which were outside the authority of the Dalai Lama's government, did not enjoy this same autonomy and had land redistribution implemented in full. Most lands were taken away from noblemen and monasteries and re-distributed to serfs. The Tibetan region of Eastern Kham, previously Xikang province, was incorporated into the province of Sichuan. Western Kham was put under the Chamdo Military Committee. In these areas, land reform was implemented. This involved communist agitators designating "landlords"—sometimes arbitrarily chosen—for public humiliation in so-called "struggle sessions",[17] torture, maiming, and even death.[18][19] It was only after 1959 that China brought the same practices to Central Tibet.[20][21]

1956–1958: Trials and incremental reform

By 1956 there was unrest in eastern Kham and Amdo, where land reform had been implemented in full. Rebellions erupted and eventually spread into western Kham and Ü-Tsang. In some parts of the country Chinese Communists tried to establish rural communes, as they were in the whole of China.[citation needed]

A rebellion against the Chinese occupation was led by noblemen and monasteries and broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956. The insurrection, supported by the American CIA,[22] eventually spread to Lhasa.

The Tibetan resistance movement began with isolated resistance to PRC control in 1956. Initially there was considerable success and with CIA support and aid much of southern Tibet fell into Tibetan guerilla fighters hands. During this campaign, tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed.[23]

For many, their religious beliefs were not even left untouched by the communist influence. Those who practice Buddhism, as well as the Dali Lama, were not safe from harm at this time. It came to the point where the Chinese government had caused a suppression of religion and in the end felt threatened by the Dali Lama. What the Chinese government had thought to do was to kidnap and harm him. India ended up being the country that provided the safest land for the Tibetans and the Dali Lama who wanted to practice Buddhism in peace and be safe at the same time.

In 1959, China's socialist land reforms and military crackdown on rebels in Kham and Amdo led to the 1959 Tibetan uprising. In an operation launched in the wake of the National Uprising of 10 March 1959 in Lhasa, 10,000 to 15,000 Tibetans were killed within three days.[24] Resistance spread throughout Tibet. Fearing capture of the Dalai Lama, unarmed Tibetans surrounded his residence, at which point the Dalai Lama fled[25] with the help of the CIA to India, because the people of Tibet wanted to take a stance and protect the man they all cherished, from the communist government .[26][27] India ended up being the country that provided the safest land for the Tibetans and the Dali Lama who wanted to practice Buddhism in peace and be safe at the same time. On 28 March,[28] the Chinese set the Panchen Lama (who was virtually their prisoner[29]) as a figurehead in Lhasa, claiming that he headed the legitimate Government of Tibet in the absence of the Dalai Lama, the traditional ruler of Tibet.[30]

After this, resistance forces operated from Nepal. Operations continued from the semi-independent Kingdom of Mustang with a force of 2000 rebels; many of them trained at Camp Hale near Leadville, Colorado, United States[31] Guerrilla warfare continued in other parts of the country for several years.

In 1969, on the eve of Kissinger's overtures to China, American support was withdrawn and the Nepalese government dismantled the operation.[citation needed]

1959–1976: Uprising and upheaval

1959 uprising

Armed conflict between Tibetan rebels and the Chinese army (PLA) broke out in 1956 in the Kham and Amdo regions, which had been subjected to socialist reform. The guerrilla warfare later spread to other areas of Tibet.

In March 1959 a revolt erupted in Lhasa, which had been under the effective control of the Communist Party of China since the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1951.[32] On 12 March, protesters appeared in the streets of Lhasa declaring Tibet's independence. Within days, Tibetan troops prepared to secure an evacuation route for the Dalai Lama, who fled into exile during the uprising. Artillery shells landed near the Dalai Lama's Palace,[33] prompting the full force of the Uprising. Combat lasted only about two days, with Tibetan rebel forces being badly outnumbered and poorly armed.[34]

Reprisals for the 1959 Tibetan uprising involved the killing of 87,000 Tibetans by the Chinese count, according to a Radio Lhasa broadcast of 1 October 1960, although Tibetan exiles claim that 430,000 died during the Uprising and the subsequent 15 years of guerrilla warfare, which continued until the US withdrew support.[35]

Famine

China suffered widespread famine between the years 1959 and 1961. The causes are disputed. Drought and poor weather played a part and the policies of the Great Leap Forward contributed to the famine, but the relative weights of each are in dispute. Estimates of deaths vary; according to official government statistics, there were 15 million deaths.[36] Unofficial estimates by scholars have estimated the number of famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.[37]

On May 1962, the Tenth Panchen Lama sent Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai a confidential report[38][39] detailing the suffering of the Tibetan people, which became known as the 70,000 Character Petition. "In many parts of Tibet people have starved to death.. . . In some places, whole families have perished and the death rate is very high. This is very abnormal, horrible and grave...In the past Tibet lived in a dark barbaric feudalism but there was never such a shortage of food, especially after Buddhism had spread....In Tibet from 1959 to 1961, for two years almost all animal husbandry and farming stopped. The nomads have no grain to eat and the farmers have no meat, butter or salt," the report continued.[39] It was the opinion of the Panchen Lama that these deaths were a result of official policies, not of any natural disasters, which was the situation understood in Beijing by Chairman Mao and the Central People's Government.[40] The Panchen Lama also described the uniqueness of the famine that Tibet suffered from: "There was never such an event in the history of Tibet. People could not even imagine such horrible starvation in their dreams. In some areas if one person catches a cold, then it spreads to hundreds and large numbers simply die."[40] The destruction of most[quantify] of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.[41]

The 70,000 Character Petition was criticized by Barry Sautman from Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. According to Sautman, the 10th Panchen Lama is purported to have visited three counties before writing his report: the counties of Ping’an, Hualong and Xunhua, but his description of a famine concerns only Xunhua, his native region. All three counties are in Haidong Prefecture, a part of Qinghai province whose population is 90% non-Tibetan and does not belong to “cultural Tibet”. Exiled Tibetan writer Jamyang Norbu[42] accuses Sautman of downplaying PRC activities in Tibet and Xinjiang.

Sautman also stated that the claim that Tibet was the region most hit by China’s famine of 1959–1962 is based not on statistics gathered in Tibetan areas, but on anonymous refugee reports lacking in numerical specificity.[43] Sautman's conclusions recently subjected to criticism.[44]

ICJ Human rights report

Background

Under the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic gave a number of undertakings, among them: promises to maintain the existing political system of Tibet, to maintain the status and functions of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, to protect freedom of religion and the monasteries and to refrain from compulsion in the matter of reforms in Tibet. The ICJ found that these and other undertakings had been violated by the Chinese People's Republic, and that the Government of Tibet was entitled to repudiate the Agreement as it did on March 11, 1959.[45]

Occupation and genocide

In 1960 the CIA-funded nongovernmental International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) gave a report titled Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations. The report was prepared by the ICJ's Legal Inquiry Committee, composed of eleven international lawyers from around the world. This report accused the Chinese of the crime of genocide in Tibet, after nine years of full occupation, six years before the devastation of the cultural revolution began.[45] The ICJ also documented accounts of massacres, tortures and killings, bombardment of monasteries, and extermination of whole nomad camps[24] Declassified Soviet archives provides data that Chinese communists, who received a great assistance in military equipment from the USSR, broadly used Soviet aircraft for bombing monasteries and other punitive operations in Tibet.[46]

The ICJ examined evidence relating to human rights within the structure of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as announced by the General Assembly of the United Nations. After taking into account the human, economic and social rights, they found that the Chinese communist authorities had violated Article 3, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Tibet.[45]

Cultural suppression

The Tibetans were not allowed to participate in the cultural life of their own community, a culture which the Chinese have set out to destroy, according to the ICJ. The ICJ discovered that Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan "rebels" of rape, plunder and torture were found in cases of plunder to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of belief for this and other reasons.[45]

In spite of claims by the Chinese that most of the damage to Tibet's institutions occurred subsequently during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it is well established that the destruction of most of Tibet's more than 6,000 monasteries happened between 1959 and 1961.[41] During the mid-1960s, the monastic estates were broken up and secular education introduced. During the Cultural Revolution, Red Guards, which included Tibetan members,[47] inflicted a campaign of organized vandalism against cultural sites in the entire PRC, including Buddhist sites in Tibet.[48] According to at least one Chinese source, only a handful of the most important monasteries remained without major damage.[49]

Criticism of report

According to various authors, the 1959 and 1960 ICJ reports date back to a time when that organization was funded by the CIA. A. Tom Grunfeld asserts that the United States took advantage of the Dalai Lama's leaving Tibet by prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China.[50] In his 1994 book The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights,[51] Howard B. Tolley Jr. explains how the ICJ was created and bankrolled by the CIA from 1952 to 1967 as an instrument of the Cold War without most ICJ officers and members knowing about it.[52] The connection between the CIA and the early ICJ is also mentioned by Dorothy Stein in her book People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children, published in 1995. She accuses the Commission of growing out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was dissiminating anti-communist propaganda.[53] This contrasts with the official overview of the International Commission of Jurists, which is "dedicated to the primacy, coherence and implementation of international law and principles that advance human rights" and the "impartial, objective and authoritative legal approach to the protection and promotion of human rights through the rule of law" while providing "legal expertise at both the international and national levels to ensure that developments in international law adhere to human rights principles and that international standards are implemented at the national level."[54]

Establishment of TAR

In 1965, the area that had been under the control of the Dalai Lama's government from 1951 to 1959 (Ü-Tsang and western Kham) was renamed the Tibet Autonomous Region or TAR. Autonomy provided that head of government would be an ethnic Tibetan; however, the TAR head is always subordinate to the First Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who was not a Tibetan.[55] The role of ethnic Tibetans in the higher levels of the TAR Communist Party was very limited.[56]

Cultural revolution

The Cultural Revolution launched in 1966 was a catastrophe for Tibet, as it was for the rest of the PRC. Large numbers of Tibetans died violent deaths due to it, and the number of intact monasteries in Tibet was reduced from thousands to less than ten. Tibetan resentment towards the Chinese deepened.[57] Tibetans participated in the destruction, but it is not clear how many of them actually embraced the Communist ideology and how many participated out of fear of becoming targets themselves.[58] Resistors against the Cultural Revolution included Thrinley Chodron, a nun from Nyemo, who led an armed rebellion that spread through eighteen xians (counties) of the TAR, targeting Chinese Party officials and Tibetan collaborators, that was ultimately suppressed by the PLA. Citing Tibetan Buddhist symbols which the rebels invoked, Shakya calls this 1969 revolt "a millenarian uprising, an insurgency characterized by a passionate desire to be rid of the oppressor."[59]

Demographic repercussions

Warren W. Smith, a broadcaster of Radio Free Asia (which was established by the US government), extrapolated a death figure of 400,000 from his calculation of census reports of Tibet which show 200,000 "missing" people.[60][61] The Central Tibetan Administration claimed that the number that have died of starvation, violence, or other indirect causes since 1950 is approximately 1.2 million.[62] According to Patrick French, the former director of the London-based Free Tibet Campaign and a supporter of the Tibetan cause who was able to view the data and calculations, the estimate is not reliable because the Tibetans were not able to process the data well enough to produce a credible total. French says this total was based on refugee interviews, but prevented outsider access to the data. French, who did gain access, found no names, but "the insertion of seemingly random figures into each section, and constant, unchecked duplication."[63] Furthermore, he found that of the 1.1 million dead listed, only 23,364 were female (implying that 1.07 million of the total Tibetan male population of 1.25 million had died).[63] Tibetologist Tom Grunfeld also finds that the figure is "without documentary evidence."[64] There were, however, many casualties, perhaps as many as 400,000.[65] Smith, calculating from census reports of Tibet, shows 144,000 to 160,000 "missing" from Tibet".[66] Courtois et al. forward a figure of 800,000 deaths and allege that as many as 10% of the Tibetan populace were interned, with few survivors.[67] Chinese demographers have estimated that 90,000 of the 300,000 "missing" Tibetans fled the region.[68] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) denies this. Its official toll of deaths recorded for the whole of China for the years of the Great Leap Forward is 14 million, but scholars have estimated the number of the famine victims to be between 20 and 43 million.[69]

The Government of Tibet in Exile quotes an issue of People's Daily published in 1959 to claim that the Tibetan population has dropped significantly since 1959, counting the population of the Tibet Autonomous region but Qinghai, Gansu, and other regions inhabited by Tibetans, as the "Tibetan population". Compared as a whole to the 2000 numbers, the population in these regions has decreased, it says.[70] These findings are in conflict with a 1954 Chinese census report that counted ethnic Tibetans.[71] This is because in all of these provinces, Tibetans were not the only traditional ethnic group. This is held to be so especially in Qinghai, which has a historical mixture of different groups of ethnics. In 1949, Han Chinese made up 48.3% of the population, the rest of the ethnic groups make up 51.7% of the 1.5 million total population.[72] As of today, Han Chinese account for 54% of the total population of Qinghai, which is slightly higher than in 1949. Tibetans make up around 20% of the population of Qinghai.[citation needed] Detailed analysis of statistical data from Chinese and Tibetan emigrant sources revealed errors in estimates of Tibetan population by regions. Although it may contain errors, data from the Government of Tibet in Exile was found to be in better correspondence with the known facts than any other existing estimates. With respect to total population of the whole Tibet in 1953 and 1959, the Tibetan side appears to provide numbers that are too high, while the Chinese side provides numbers that are too low.[73]

On June 20, 1959 in Mussoorie during a press conference, the Dalai Lama stated: "The ultimate Chinese aim with regard to Tibet, as far as I can make out, seems to attempt the extermination of religion and culture and even the absorption of the Tibetan race...Besides the civilian and military personnel already in Tibet, five million Chinese settlers have arrived in eastern and north-eastern Tso, in addition to which four million Chinese settlers are planned to be sent to U and Sung provinces of Central Tibet. Many Tibetans have been deported, thereby resulting in the complete absorption of these Tibetans as a race, which is being undertaken by the Chinese." [74]

1976–1987: Rapprochement and internationalization

Following Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping launched initiatives of rapprochement with the exiled Tibetan leaders, hoping to persuade them to come to live in China. Ren Rong, who was Communist Party Secretary in Tibet, thought that Tibetans in Tibet were happy under Chinese Communist rule and that they shared the Chinese Communist views of the pre-Communist Tibetan rulers as oppressive despots. "By 1979 most of the estimated 600,000 monks and nuns were dead, disappeared, or imprisoned, and the majority of Tibet's 6,000 monasteries had been destroyed."[75] So, when delegations from the Tibetan government in exile visited Tibet in 1979-80, Chinese officials expected to impress the Tibetan exiles with the progress that had occurred since 1950 and with the contentment of the Tibetan populace. Ren even organized meetings in Lhasa to urge Tibetans to restrain their animosity towards the coming representatives of an old, oppressive regime. The Chinese, then, were astonished and embarrassed at the massive, tearful expressions of devotion which Tibetans made to the visiting Tibetan exiles. Thousands of Tibetans cried, prostrated, offered scarves to the visitors, and strove for a chance to touch the Dalai Lama's brother.[76]

These events also prompted Party Secretary Hu Yaobang and Vice Premier Wan Li to visit Tibet, where they were dismayed by the conditions they found. Hu announced a reform program intended to improve economic standards for Tibetans and to foster some freedom for Tibetans to practice ethnic and cultural traditions. In some ways, this was a return from the hard line authoritarianism and assimilation policies of the 1960s to Mao's more ethnically accommodating policies of the 1950s, with the major difference that there would be no separate Tibetan government as there had been in the 1950s.[77] Hu ordered a change in policy, calling for the revitalization of Tibetan culture, religion, and language, the building of more universities and colleges in Tibet, and an increase in the number of ethnic Tibetans in the local government.[78] Concurrent liberalizations in economics and internal migration have also resulted in Tibet seeing more Han Chinese migrant workers, though the actual number of this floating population remains disputed.

New meetings between Chinese officials and exiled leaders took place in 1981–1984, but no agreements could be reached.[79]

In 1986–1987, the Tibetan government in exile in Dharamshala launched a new drive to win international support for their cause as a human rights issue. In response, the United States House of Representatives in June 1987 passed a resolution in support of Tibetan human rights.[80] Between September 1987 and March 1989, four major demonstrations occurred in Lhasa against Chinese rule.[81] American Tibetologist Melvyn Goldstein considered the riots to be spontaneous mass expressions of Tibetan resentment, sparked in part by hope that the United States would soon provide support or pressure enabling Tibet to become independent.[82] In 1987, the Panchen Lama delivered a speech estimating the number of prison deaths in Qinghai at approximately 5 percent of the total population in the area.[83] The United States passed a 1988–1989 Foreign Relations Act which expressed support for Tibetan human rights.[80] The riots ironically discredited Hu's more liberal Tibetan policies and brought about a return to hard-line policies; Beijing even imposed martial law in Tibet in 1989. Emphasis on economic development brought increasing numbers of non-Tibetans to Lhasa, and the economy in Tibet became increasingly dominated by Han. Lhasa became a city where non-Tibetans equalled or outnumbered Tibetans.[84]

When the 10th Panchen Lama addressed the Tibet Autonomous Region Standing Committee Meeting of the National People’s Congress in 1987, he detailed mass imprisonment and killings of Tibetans in Amdo (Qinghai): "there were between three to four thousand villages and towns, each having between three to four thousand families with four to five thousand people. From each town and village, about 800 to 1,000 people were imprisoned. Out of this, at least 300 to 400 people of them died in prison...In Golok area, many people were killed and their dead bodies were rolled down the hill into a big ditch. The soldiers told the family members and relatives of the dead people that they should all celebrate since the rebels had been wiped out. They were even forced to dance on the dead bodies. Soon after, they were also massacred with machine guns. They were all buried there"[85]

1988–present

"Police Attention: No distributing any unhealthy thoughts or objects." A trilingual (Tibetan–Chinese–English) sign above the entrance to a small cafe in Nyalam Town, Tibet, 1993

Hu Jintao became the Party Chief of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1988. In 1989, the 10th Panchen Lama died. Many Tibetans believe that Hu was involved in his unexpected death.[86] A few months later, according to Tang Daxian, a dissident journalist, the police in Lhasa received orders from General Li Lianxiu to provoke an incident. Peaceful demonstrations lead to the death of 450 Tibetans that year.[87] The fourth national census was conducted in 1990, finding 4,590,000 ethnic Tibetans in China, including 2,090,000 in the TAR. The Chinese government compares these numbers to the first national census to conclude that the Tibetan population has doubled since 1951.[16]

In 1995, the Dalai Lama named 6 year old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama without the approval of the government of China, while the PRC named another child, Gyaincain Norbu in conflict with the Dalai Lama's choice. Gyaincain Norbu was raised in Tibet and Beijing and makes frequent public appearances in religion and politics. The PRC-selected Panchen Lama is rejected by exiled Tibetans who commonly refer to him as the "Panchen Zuma" (literally "fake Panchen Lama").[88] Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his family are missing: kidnapped, says Amnesty International, or living under a secret identity for protection and privacy, says Beijing.[88]

Economic development

A rail attendant for the service from Xining to Lhasa

In 2000, the Chinese government launched its Western Development Strategy aimed at boosting the economies of its poorer western regions. The strategy has featured a strong bias for large-scale, capital-intensive projects such as the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. Such projects however, have roused fears of facilitating military mobilisation and Han migration.[89] Robert Barnett reports that the economic stimulus was used by hardliners to stimulate Han migration to Tibet as a control mechanism, and that 66% of official posts in Tibet are held by Han.[90] There is still an ethnic imbalance in appointments and promotions to the civil and judicial services in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, with disproportionately few ethnic Tibetans appointed to these posts.[91]

The PRC government claims that its rule over Tibet has provided economic development to Tibetan people, and that the Western Development Strategy plan is a benevolent and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier east coast to help the western parts of China catch up in terms of prosperity and living standards. On the other hand, the government maintains that the Tibetan Government did almost nothing to improve the Tibetans' material standard of life during its rule from 1913–59, and that they opposed any reforms proposed by the Chinese government. According to the Chinese government, this is the reason for the tension that grew between some central government officials and the local Tibetan government in 1959.[92] The claims of economic hardship under the Dalai Lama's government from 1913–59 are disputed by the 10th Panchen Lama in the 70,000 Character Petition; however, the Panchen Lama praised the 1980s reform and opening up under Deng Xiaoping.[93]

The government, in turn, rejects claims that the lives of Tibetans have deteriorated, and states that the lives of Tibetans have been improved immensely compared to self-rule before 1950.[94] Despite China's claims that the lives of Tibetans have improved immensely, a 2004 book claimed some 3,000 Tibetans brave hardship and danger to flee into exile every year.[95] In addition, Human Rights Watch reports continued widespread abuses committed by Chinese security forces[96] and torture by Chinese police and security forced.[97]

The PRC claims that from 1951 to 2007, the Tibetan population in Lhasa-administered Tibet has increased from 1.2 million to almost 3 million. The GDP of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) today is thirty times that of before 1950. Workers in Tibet have the second highest wages in China.[98] The TAR has 22,500 kilometres (14,000 mi) of highways, as opposed to none in 1950. All secular education in the TAR was created after the revolution. The TAR now has 25 scientific research institutes as opposed to none in 1950. Infant mortality has dropped from 43% in 1950 to 0.661% in 2000.[99] (The United Nations reports an infant mortality rate of 3.53% in 2000, fallen from 43.0% in 1951.[100]) Life expectancy has risen from 35.5 years in 1950 to 67 in 2000. It points to the collection and publishing of the traditional Epic of King Gesar, which is the longest epic poem in the world and had only been handed down orally before. (However, corresponding Tibetan texts exist from the 18th century, and in the late 19th and early 20th centuries a woodblock edition of the story was compiled by a scholar-monk from Ling-tsang (a small kingdom north-east of sDe-dge) with inspiration from the prolific Tibetan philosopher Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso) It also highlights the allocation of 300 million Renminbi since the 1980s for the maintenance and protection of Tibetan monasteries.[99] The Cultural Revolution and the cultural damage it wrought upon the entire PRC is generally condemned as a nationwide catastrophe, whose main instigators, in the PRC's view, the Gang of Four, have been brought to justice. The China Western Development plan is viewed by the PRC as a massive, benevolent, and patriotic undertaking by the wealthier eastern coast to help the western parts of China, including Tibet, catch up in prosperity and living standards.[citation needed]

In 2008 the Chinese government "launched a 570-million-yuan (81.43 million U.S. dollars) project to preserve 22 historical and cultural heritage sites in Tibet, including the Zhaxi Lhunbo Lamasery as well as the Jokhang, Ramogia, Sanyai and Samgya-Goutog monasteries."[101]

Tibetan language

According to Barry Sautman, 92–94% of ethnic Tibetans speak Tibetan. Among those who do not are small Tibetan minorities in areas such as Qinghai. Primary school instruction is conducted almost exclusively in Tibetan, but instruction is bilingual from secondary school onward.

Tibetologist Elliot Sperling has also noted that "within certain limits the PRC does make efforts to accommodate Tibetan cultural expression (and) the cultural activity taking place all over the Tibetan plateau cannot be ignored".[102] Currently, "cultural Tibet" boasts three Tibetan-language television channels, one for each of the three main dialects spoken in China's Tibetan areas. The Tibet Autonomous Region possesses a 24-hour Central Tibetan-language TV channel (launched in 1999).[103] For speakers of Amdo Tibetan, there is an Amdo Tibetan-language TV channel in Qinghai[104] and for speakers of Khams Tibetan a recently launched TV satellite channel in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.[105] In October 2010, Tibetan students protested after the Chinese government published rules supporting the use of Mandarin Chinese in lessons and textbooks by 2015, with the exception of Tibetan language and English classes.[106]

Human rights in Tibet

After the 2008 unrest, Tibetan-populated areas of China remained tightly sealed off from outside scrutiny, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the protests that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, overseas Tibetan organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Following the detentions were reports of torture and other ill-treatment in detention, some cases resulting in death.[107] Religious repression included locking down major monasteries and nunneries, and a propaganda campaign where local authorities renewed “Patriotic Education,” which required Tibetans to participate in criticism sessions of the Dalai Lama and sign written denunciations of him, according to Amnesty's 2009 China report. Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party were also targeted, including being made to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools where they would have received a religious education.[107] According to former political prisoners Tibet is virtually a big prison.[108]

2008 unrest

Protests in March, 2008 developed into riots in which Tibetan mobs attacked Han and Hui people in Lhasa. The Chinese government reacted curtly, imposing curfews and pressuring journalists in Lhasa to leave the region.[109] The international response was measured, with a number of leaders expressing concern. Some people protested in large European and North American cities and chanted slogans, with some supporting China's actions and some supporting the protesters in Tibet.

For a time after the 2008 unrest, Tibetan-populated areas of China remained off-limits to journalists, and major monasteries and nunneries were locked down, according to Amnesty International. While Chinese authorities announced after the unrest that over 1,000 individuals detained had been released, Tibetan exile organizations claimed that at least several hundred remained in detention by the start of 2009. Tibetan members of the Chinese Communist Party were told to remove their children from Tibet exile community schools.[107]

Ethnic composition

The issue of the proportion of the Han population in Tibet is a politically sensitive one and is disputed, involving the Government of Tibet in Exile, the PRC, and the Tibetan independence movement.

The Government of Tibet in Exile has said that government policies are sinicizing Tibet by encouraging the migration of non-ethnic Tibetans, especially Han and Hui, so that they outnumber ethnic Tibetans in the Tibetan region.[110] Some non-Tibetans migrating to the area may end up assimilating into and adapting to the Tibetan culture of the area to a degree, given its significance in the local culture. But if they adapt a more distinct identity to the Tibetans, Tibetan culture would be more likely to become endangered, particularly if Tibetans are the minority. The PRC gives the number of Tibetans in the Tibet Autonomous Region as 2.4 million, as opposed to 190,000 non-Tibetans, and the number of Tibetans in all Tibetan autonomous entities combined (slightly smaller than the Greater Tibet claimed by exiled Tibetans) as 5.0 million, as opposed to 2.3 million non-Tibetans. In the TAR itself, much of the Han population is to be found in Lhasa.[111]

This statistic is in dispute primarily based on the distinction between the area often referred to as "Greater Tibet", in which ethnic Tibetans are a minority in the overall population, and the Tibet Autonomous Region, in which ethnic Tibetans are a majority. Qinghai, which is claimed by Tibetan exile groups, is made up of many ranging cultures local to different regions within the Province. Tibetan culture is local to and alive in many villages and towns throughout Qinghai.[112]

Some of Tibet's towns and villages are located in India and Nepal. The total population for Tibetans in India is given at 94,203, and 13,514 in Nepal. One example of this is the city of Leh in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, with a population of 27,513. The people of Leh are ethnic Tibetan, speaking Ladakhi, an East Tibetan language. Along with this, there are several Tibetan villages in northern Nepal. These regions are currently not claimed by Tibetan Exile Groups.[113][114][115]

[110] Referencing the population figures of Lhasa, the Dalai Lama has recently accused China of "demographic aggression" while stating that the Tibetans had been reduced to a minority "in his homeland".[116] Exiled Tibetans have also expressed concern that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (Xining to Lhasa) is intended to further facilitate the influx of Chinese migrants.[117] The PRC does not recognize Greater Tibet as claimed by the government of Tibet in Exile.[118] The PRC government claims that the ethnically Tibetan areas outside the TAR were not controlled by the Tibetan government before 1959 in the first place, having been administered instead by other surrounding provinces for centuries. It further alleges that the idea of "Greater Tibet" was originally engineered by foreign imperialists in order to divide China amongst themselves (Mongolia being a striking precedent, gaining independence with Soviet backing and subsequently aligning itself with the Soviet Union).[119]

The Government of Tibet in Exile disputes most demographic statistics released by the PRC government since they do not include members of the People's Liberation Army garrisoned in Tibet, or the floating population of unregistered migrants, and states that China is attempting to assimilate Tibet and further diminishing any chances of Tibetan political independence.[110] CCP member Jampa Phuntsok, chairman of the TAR, has said that the central government has no policy of migration into Tibet due to its harsh high-altitude conditions, that the 6% Han in the TAR is a very fluid group mainly doing business or working, and that there is no immigration problem. (This report includes both permanent and temporary residences in Tibet, but excludes Tibetans studying or working outside of the TAR).[120] By 2006, 3% of the permanent residences in Tibet were of Han ethnicity, according to National Bureau of Statistics of China.[111] The TAR has the lowest population density among China's province-level administrative regions, mostly due to its mountainous and harsh geographical features. As of 2000, 92.8% of the population were ethnic Tibetans, while Han Chinese comprised 6.1% of the population. In Lhasa, the capital of TAR, Hans made up 17%, far less than what many activists have claimed. Population control policies like the one-child policy apply only to Han Chinese, not to minorities such as Tibetans.[121]

Traditional Kham houses

Review of different sources revealed that under the Mao Zedong rule from 3% to 30% of Tibetans perished[122]

Barry Sautman accused pro-independence forces of wanting the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han and the Dalai Lama of consistently misrepresenting the present situation as one of a Han majority. The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has very few non-Tibetans.[123]

Sautman also stated:

[The settlers] are not personally subsidized by the state; although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to prosper.
Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because those who cannot find work leave.

In a Writenet paper written for the UNHCR, Professor Colin Mackerras (using PRC censuses) expresses the view that claims such as that the Chinese are swamping Tibetans in their own country and that 1.2 million Tibetans have died due to Chinese occupation "should be treated with the deepest skepticism":[124]

The figures show that since the early 1960s, the Tibetan population has been increasing, probably for the first time for centuries. What seems to follow from this is that the TGIE’s allegations of population reduction due to Chinese rule probably have some validity for the 1950s but are greatly exaggerated. However, since the 1960s, Chinese rule has had the effect of increasing the population of the Tibetans, not decreasing it, largely due to a modernization process that has improved the standard of living and lowered infant, maternity and other mortality rates.

Statistics according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China

Major ethnic groups in Greater Tibet by region, 2000 census.
Total Tibetans Han Chinese others
Tibet Autonomous Region: 2,616,329 2,427,168 92.8% 158,570 6.1% 30,591 1.2%
Lhasa PLC 474,499 387,124 81.6% 80,584 17.0% 6,791 1.4%
Qamdo Prefecture 586,152 563,831 96.2% 19,673 3.4% 2,648 0.5%
Shannan Prefecture 318,106 305,709 96.1% 10,968 3.4% 1,429 0.4%
Xigazê Prefecture 634,962 618,270 97.4% 12,500 2.0% 4,192 0.7%
Nagqu Prefecture 366,710 357,673 97.5% 7,510 2.0% 1,527 0.4%
Ngari Prefecture 77,253 73,111 94.6% 3,543 4.6% 599 0.8%
Nyingchi Prefecture 158,647 121,450 76.6% 23,792 15.0% 13,405 8.4%
Qinghai Province: 4,822,963 1,086,592 22.5% 2,606,050 54.0% 1,130,321 23.4%
Xining PLC 1,849,713 96,091 5.2% 1,375,013 74.3% 378,609 20.5%
Haidong Prefecture 1,391,565 128,025 9.2% 783,893 56.3% 479,647 34.5%
Haibei AP 258,922 62,520 24.1% 94,841 36.6% 101,561 39.2%
Huangnan AP 214,642 142,360 66.3% 16,194 7.5% 56,088 26.1%
Hainan AP 375,426 235,663 62.8% 105,337 28.1% 34,426 9.2%
Golog AP 137,940 126,395 91.6% 9,096 6.6% 2,449 1.8%
Gyêgu AP 262,661 255,167 97.1% 5,970 2.3% 1,524 0.6%
Haixi AP 332,094 40,371 12.2% 215,706 65.0% 76,017 22.9%
Tibetan areas in Sichuan province
Ngawa AP 847,468 455,238 53.7% 209,270 24.7% 182,960 21.6%
Garzê AP 897,239 703,168 78.4% 163,648 18.2% 30,423 3.4%
Muli AC 124,462 60,679 48.8% 27,199 21.9% 36,584 29.4%
Tibetan areas in Yunnan province
Dêqên AP 353,518 117,099 33.1% 57,928 16.4% 178,491 50.5%
Tibetan areas in Gansu province
Gannan AP 640,106 329,278 51.4% 267,260 41.8% 43,568 6.8%
Tianzhu AC 221,347 66,125 29.9% 139,190 62.9% 16,032 7.2%
Total for Greater Tibet:
With Xining and Haidong 10,523,432 5,245,347 49.8% 3,629,115 34.5% 1,648,970 15.7%
Without Xining and Haidong 7,282,154 5,021,231 69.0% 1,470,209 20.2% 790,714 10.9%

This table[125] includes all Tibetan autonomous entities in the People's Republic of China, plus Xining PLC and Haidong P. The latter two are included to complete the figures for Qinghai province, and also because they are claimed as parts of Greater Tibet by the Government of Tibet in exile.

P = Prefecture; AP = Autonomous prefecture; PLC = Prefecture-level city; AC = Autonomous county.

Excludes members of the People's Liberation Army in active service.

Han settlers in the cities have steadily increased since then. But a preliminary analysis of the 2005 mini-census shows only a modest increase in Han population in the TAR from 2000–2005 and little change in eastern Tibet.

See also

References

Citations

  1. ^ "Tibet profile".
  2. ^ Shakya 1999, pp. 7–8
  3. ^ Hessler, Peter. "Tibet Through Chinese Eyes". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2017-04-26.
  4. ^ "Issue #56: Tibet under the Rule of the Chinese Communist Party | International Campaign for Tibet". www.savetibet.org. Retrieved 2017-04-26.
  5. ^ "TIBET (AUTONOMY)". millbanksystems.com. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  6. ^ a b Laird 2006, p. 301
  7. ^ Goldstein 2007, p96
  8. ^ "Seventeen-Point Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2017-04-26.
  9. ^ Goldstein 1989, pp. 812–813
  10. ^ In 1952 Lukhangwa told PRC Representative Zhang Jingwu "It was absurd to refer to the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement. Our people did not accept the agreement and the Chinese themselves had repeatedly broken the terms of it. Their army was still in occupation of eastern Tibet; the area had not been returned to the government of Tibet, as it should have been." My Land and My People, Dalai Lama, New York, 1992, p.95
  11. ^ a b "Encouraged By Rising Support From Intellectuals in China: His Holiness the Dalai Lama". tibet.net. Archived from the original on 28 September 2011. Retrieved 26 September 2015. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  12. ^ Powers 2004, pp. 116–7
  13. ^ Michel Peissel, "The Cavaliers of Kham, the secret war in Tibet" London: Heinemann 1972, and Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1973
  14. ^ Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile Harper San Francisco, 1991
  15. ^ a b c Goldstein 2007, p541
  16. ^ a b Population of Tibet 1950–1990 Archived 2007-11-24 at the Wayback Machine Template:Link language
  17. ^ thamzing, Wylie: ‘thab-‘dzing, Lhasa dialect: [[Help:IPA/Tibetan|[[tʰʌ́msiŋ]]]]
  18. ^ Craig (1992), pp. 76–78, 120–123.
  19. ^ Shakya (1999), pp. 245–249, 296, 322–323.
  20. ^ Laird 2006, p. 318
  21. ^ Guangming Daily. "Unforgettable History—Old Tibet Serfdom System" (in Chinese). Retrieved 2008-04-29.
  22. ^ Wonacott, Peter (2008-08-30). "Revolt of the Monks: How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester; A Role for Dalai Lama's Brother". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 2008-08-30.
  23. ^ Laird 2006, pp. 320–328
  24. ^ a b "Why Concerned About Tibet? - Friends of Tibet (INDIA)". friendsoftibet.org. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  25. ^ "Witness: Reporting on the Dalai Lama's escape to India." Peter Jackson. Reuters. Feb 27, 2009.[1]
  26. ^ The CIA's secret war in Tibet, Seattle Times, January 26, 1997, Paul Salopek Ihttp://www.timbomb.net/buddha/archive/msg00087.html
  27. ^ Akiner, Shirin (1996-01-01). Resistance and Reform in Tibet. Motilal Banarsidass Publishe. ISBN 9788120813717.
  28. ^ Wong, Edward (20 January 2009). "Holiday for Tibet Is a Swipe at the Dalai Lama". The New York Times. p. 13. Retrieved 28 March 2011.
  29. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 193.
  30. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 128.
  31. ^ Air America, Corgi Books. Tim Robbins. 1988.
  32. ^ Chen Jian, The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union, Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 8 Issue 3 Summer 2006, Cold War Studies at Harvard University.
  33. ^ Shakya, Tsering. The Dragon In The Land Of Snows (1999) Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-11814-9 pp. 186-191
  34. ^ Chushi Gangdruk Archived 2008-03-25 at the Wayback Machine
  35. ^ "Tibet Online - Why Tibet? - Major Allegations on the Chinese Occupation". tibet.org. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  36. ^ Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short History, p.95
  37. ^ Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.
  38. ^ Kurtenbach, Elaine (February 11, 1998). "1962 report by Tibetan leader tells of mass beatings, starvation". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 2001-07-21. Retrieved 2016-04-18.
  39. ^ a b "Secret Report by the Panchen Lama Criticises China"
  40. ^ a b "Samsara: 1962 Panchen Lama Report". subliminal.org. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  41. ^ a b Craig (1992), p. 125.
  42. ^ Jamyang, Norbu. "Running-dog Propagandists". Phayul. Retrieved 10 May 2016.
  43. ^ Barry Sautman, "Demographic Annihilation" and Tibet, pp. 230–257, in Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region, M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p.
  44. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 340–341
  45. ^ a b c d "Tibet Justice Center - Legal Materials on Tibet - Governmental and NGOs - ICJ Report on Tibet and China (excerpt) (1960) [p.346]". tibetjustice.org. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  46. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011
  47. ^ Shakya (1999), p. 320.
  48. ^ Shakya (1999), pp. 314–347.
  49. ^ Wang 2001, pp. 212–214
  50. ^ A. Tom Grunfeld, Tibet and the United States, in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer (eds), Contemporary Tibet: politics, development, and society in a disputed region, M. E. Sharpe, 2006, 360 p., pp. 319–349, p. 329:

    The United States also took advantage of the Dalai Lama's having left Tibet by having the CIA revive its Cold War propaganda machine, creating supposedly popular organizations such as the American Emergency Committee for Tibetan Refugees, prodding its clandestinely funded Cold War human rights organizations such as the International Commission of Jurists to prepare propagandistic reports attacking China

    .
  51. ^ Howard B. Tolley Jr., The International Commission of Jurists, Global Advocates for Human Rights, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944, XVII p. + 344 p.
  52. ^ Richard Pierre Claude, review of Howard B. Tolley Jr., The International Commission of Jurists: Global Advocates for Humam Rights, in Human Rights Quarterly, August 1994:

    Based on the documentation and named respondents, the authors present the tale of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in secretly bankrolling the formation of the ICJ as an instrument of the cold war. (...) Tolley shows that the tainted source of funding was unknown to most ICJ officers and members

    .
  53. ^ Dorothy Stein, People Who Count. Population and Politics, Women and Children, Earthscan Publications, London, 1995, XI + 239 p., pp. 193–104, note 27:

    The ICJ itself grew out of a group created by American intelligence agents whose purpose was disseminating anti-communist propaganda. It too has received funds from the CIA, which is not a notable rights organization, nor, which is more to the point, particularly noted for its interest in truth. The 1960 LIC report, Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic (ICJ, Geneva: 1990), shows strong signs of bias in accepting or rejecting the testimonies cited

    .
  54. ^ http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview
  55. ^ Dodin (2008), pp. 205.
  56. ^ Dodin (2008), pp. 195–196.
  57. ^ Powers 2004, pp. 141–2
  58. ^ Powers 2004, pg. 185
  59. ^ "Blood in the Snows(Reply to Wang Lixiong)". Retrieved 2009-03-02.
  60. ^ Tibet, Tibet ISBN 1-4000-4100-7, pp. 278–82
  61. ^ Smith 1997, p. 600
  62. ^ 'Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts' Archived 2007-06-15 at the Wayback Machine, The Department of Information and International Relations: Central Tibetan Administration, 1996. p. 53
  63. ^ a b Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer, Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, And Society In A Disputed Region pp. 239
  64. ^ Grunfeld 1996, p. 247.
  65. ^ French 2003, pp. 278–82
  66. ^ Smith 1997, p. 600–1 n. 8
  67. ^ Courtois 1997, p. 545–6, (cites Kewly, Tibet p. 255)
  68. ^ Yan Hao, 'Tibetan Population in China: Myths and Facts Re-examined', Asian Ethnicity, Volume 1, No. 1, March 2000, p.24
  69. ^ Peng Xizhe (彭希哲), "Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review 13, no. 4 (1987), 639–70.
    For a summary of other estimates, please refer to this link
  70. ^ People's Daily, Beijing, 10 November 1959, in Population transfer and control
  71. ^ 1954 Chinese Census Report Archived 2009-08-05 at the Wayback Machine Template:Link language
  72. ^ Template:Zh icon Qinghai Population [2]
  73. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011, pp. 334–340
  74. ^ "Tibet Justice Center - Legal Materials on Tibet - Governmental and NGOs - ICJ Report on the Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (excerpt) (1959) [p.342]". tibetjustice.org. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  75. ^ Ardley, Jane (2002). ""Tibet: Religion, Resistance and the State"". The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p. 22. ISBN 9780700715725. OCLC 53173808. The economy was totally devastated, and the Cultural Revolution had succeeded in almost completely destroying Tibet's cultural heritage. By 1979 most of the estimated 600,000 monks and nuns were dead, disappeared, or imprisoned, and the majority of Tibet's 6,000 monasteries had been destroyed.
  76. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 61–3
  77. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 63–66
  78. ^ "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2006-11-06. Retrieved 2006-10-21. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) Tibet, China and the United States: Reflections on the Tibet Question,by Melvyn C. Goldstein
  79. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 67–74
  80. ^ a b Goldstein 1997, pp. 75–78
  81. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 79–83
  82. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 83–87
  83. ^ Barnett, Robert, in: Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions, edited by Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille. (2008), pp. 89–90. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-24464-1 (cloth); ISBN 978-0-520-24928-8 (pbk).
  84. ^ Goldstein 1997, pp. 87–99
  85. ^ "Acme of Obscenity". Archived from the original on 2010-07-04. Retrieved 2010-03-28. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  86. ^ "BBC NEWS - Asia-Pacific - Profile: Hu Jintao". bbc.co.uk. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  87. ^ AP. "Chinese Said to Kill 450 Tibetans in 1989". nytimes.com. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  88. ^ a b http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170071996 'Tibet: 6-year old boy missing and over 50 detained in Panchen Lama dispute', Amnesty International, 18 January 1996
  89. ^ "Train heads for Tibet, carrying fears of change / Migration, tourism likely to increase". SFGate. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  90. ^ Robert Barnett's passages extracted from Steve Lehman, The Tibetans: Struggle to Survive, Umbrage Editions, New York, 1998., [3]
  91. ^ "Personnel Changes in Lhasa Reveal Preference for Chinese Over Tibetans, Says TIN Report". savetibet.org. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  92. ^ Jiawei, Wang, "The Historical Status of China's Tibet", 2000, pp 194–7
  93. ^ Hilton 2000, pp. 192–194
  94. ^ Peter Hessler, 'Tibet Through Chinese Eyes', The Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1999
  95. ^ Powers 2004, pg. 143
  96. ^ "Statement to the Human Rights Council on Tibet". Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  97. ^ "Beijing's Broken Promises on Human Rights". Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  98. ^ 'High wages in Tibet benefit the privileged', Asian Labour News, 21 February 2005,
  99. ^ a b 'Tibet's March Toward Modernization, section II The Rapid Social Development in Tibet', Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, November 2001
  100. ^ "Tibet: Basic Data". United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. Archived from the original on 2004-02-20. Retrieved 2008-04-22. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)
  101. ^ [4] Xinhua on-line news on Tibet
  102. ^ Elliot Sperling, Exile and Dissent: The Historical and Cultural Context, in TIBET SINCE 1950: SILENCE, PRISON, OR EXILE 31-36 (Melissa Harris & Sydney Jones eds., 2000), see The Historical and Cultural Context by Elliot Sperling
  103. ^ China launches Tibetan channel for India, Nepal, PTI, rediff NEWS, October 1, 2007: "China launched the first-ever 24-hour Tibetan language television channel on Monday to mark its 58th National Day (...). The channel only broadcast 11 hours a day when it was opened in 1999."
  104. ^ The wishes of a Tibetan, China Digital Times, March 27, 2009: "At present, the two most popular television channels in the Tibetan areas are the Qinghai Tibetan language channel and the Tibet Tibetan language channel"
  105. ^ Zhang Mingyu, Cheer up for opening khampa Tibetan TV Channel, tibet.new.cn, January 17, 2010.
  106. ^ Tibetan student protests spread to Beijing, The Guardian, 22 October 2010
  107. ^ a b c Amnesty International, State of the World's Human Rights: China, 2009, accessed 16 March 2010
  108. ^ "Tibet is virtually a big prison: Former political prisoners". thetibetpost.com. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  109. ^ "China's Forbidden Zones". pp. 32–33. Retrieved 2010-03-11.
  110. ^ a b c "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2009-07-12. Retrieved 2009-07-12. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |deadurl= ignored (|url-status= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  111. ^ a b National Bureau of Statistics of China Template:Link language
  112. ^ Kolas, Ashild (12 September 2007). "Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila". Routledge. Retrieved 19 April 2018 – via Google Books.
  113. ^ "Help for the Tibetan village Briddhim in Northern Nepal". betterplace.org. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  114. ^ "Tibetan Population - Inside and Outside Tibet". tibetdata.org. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  115. ^ "Census of India 2001: Data from the 2001 Census, including cities, villages and towns (Provisional)". Census Commission of India. Archived from the original on 2004-06-16. Retrieved 2008-11-01.
  116. ^ "Dalai Lama accuses China of 'demographic aggression'". Phayul.com. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  117. ^ "Hu opens world's highest railway". BBC News. 2006-07-01. Retrieved 2010-05-25.
  118. ^ In aninterview May 31, 2008, the Dalai Lama declared: « "Greater Tibet", now, this very word comes from the Chinese government side. We never state the greater Tibet » His Holiness the Dalai Lama discusses the recent unrest inside Tibet with the editors of the Financial Times (FT) Archived 2009-10-14 at the Wayback Machine.
  119. ^ Xinhua News report Template:Link language
  120. ^ SINA News report Template:Link language
  121. ^ "中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法". www.gov.cn. Retrieved 26 September 2015.
  122. ^ Kuzmin, S.L. Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation. Dharamsala, LTWA, 2011.
  123. ^ "Protests in Tibet and Separatism: the Olympics and Beyond". blackandwhitecat.org. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
  124. ^ People’s Republic of China: Background paper on the situation of the Tibetan population, A Writenet Report by Professor Colin P. Mackerras, p. 19–20.
  125. ^ Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司) and Department of Economic Development of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission of China (国家民族事务委员会经济发展司), eds. Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (《2000年人口普查中国民族人口资料》). 2 vols. Beijing: Nationalities Publishing House (民族出版社), 2003 (ISBN 7-105-05425-5).

Sources

  • Ardley, Jane The Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives (2002) London: RoutledgeCurzon ISBN 9780700715725
  • Craig, Mary Tears of Blood: A Cry for Tibet (1992) INDUS an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers Calcutta Second impression 1993 ISBN 0-00-627500-1
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989) University of California Press ISBN 978-0-520-06140-8
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (1997) University of California Press ISBN 0-520-21951-1
  • Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955 (2007) University of California Press ISBN 978-0-520-24941-7
  • Harrer, Heinrich Seven Years in Tibet Rupert Hart-Davis, London (1953) OCLC 475276448
  • Harrer, Heinrich Return to Tibet: Tibet After the Chinese Occupation (1998) Jeremy P. Tarcher/ Putnam, New York ISBN 0-87477-925-1
  • Hilton, Elizabeth The Search for the Panchen Lama (2000) W. W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0-393-04969-8
  • Kuzmin, Sergius Hidden Tibet: History of Independence and Occupation (2011) Library of Tibetan Works & Archives ISBN 978-93-80359-47-2
  • Laird, Thomas. The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama (2006) Grove Press ISBN 0-8021-1827-5
  • Powers, John History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People's Republic of China (2004) Oxford University Press ISBN 978-0-19-517426-7
  • Shakya, Tsering The Dragon In The Land Of Snows (1999) Columbia University Press ISBN 0-231-11814-7
  • Smith Jr., Warren W., Tibetan Nation: A History Of Tibetan Nationalism And Sino-Tibetan Relations (1997) Westview press ISBN 978-0-8133-3280-2