Erwin Rommel: Difference between revisions
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Rommel was a highly decorated officer in [[World War I]] and was awarded the [[Pour le Mérite]] for his actions on the [[Italian Front (World War I)|Italian Front]]. In [[World War II]], he distinguished himself as the commander of the [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer Division]] during the [[Battle of France|1940 invasion of France]]. His leadership of German and Italian forces in the [[North African campaign]] established his reputation as one of the most able commanders of the war, and earned him the appellation of the Desert Fox. He later commanded the German forces opposing the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] cross-channel [[invasion of Normandy]]. |
Rommel was a highly decorated officer in [[World War I]] and was awarded the [[Pour le Mérite]] for his actions on the [[Italian Front (World War I)|Italian Front]]. In [[World War II]], he distinguished himself as the commander of the [[7th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|7th Panzer Division]] during the [[Battle of France|1940 invasion of France]]. His leadership of German and Italian forces in the [[North African campaign]] established his reputation as one of the most able commanders of the war, and earned him the appellation of the Desert Fox. He later commanded the German forces opposing the [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] cross-channel [[invasion of Normandy]]. |
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Rommel supported the [[Nazi seizure of power]] and [[Adolf Hitler]], and his attitude towards [[Nazi ideology]] and the level of knowledge and involvement in the regime's crimes remain a matter of debate among scholars.<ref name="»War er [ Rommel ] ein überzeugter Nationalsozialist, den man verachten muss, oder ein Held des Widerstandes gegen Hitler?«, stellt sich bei genauer Kenntnisnahme der Geschichte so gar nicht. Die Antwort ist nämlich ebenso einfach wie überraschend: Rommel war beides....Rommels »Herz gehörte dem Führer«. Umso schwerer wiegt, dass dieser Mann dennoch die Kraft und den Mut aufbrachte, sich immer dann gegen Hitler zu entscheiden, wenn dessen Befehle seinem Gewissen zuwiderliefen...Unfreiwillig und wohl auch ohne es jemals wirklich erkannt zu haben, wurde Rommel so zum Komplizen eines mörderischen Regimes. Das stellt seine Taten und Leistungen als Feldherr in den Schatten der Verbrechen aber es ist keine individuelle Schuld.">{{cite book|last1=Remy|first1=Maurice|title=Mythos Rommel|pages=28, 355, 361|year=2002}}</ref>{{sfn|Scheck|2010}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Butler|first1=Daniel Allen|title=Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel|isbn=9781612002989|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u4L3CQAAQBAJ&pg=PA487&lpg=PA487&dq=rommel+knowledge+butler&source=bl&ots=tqnS0uGOGb&sig=DhudP0fDne7x50QkgM4hk0RasoY&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q=uncle&f=false}}</ref>{{sfn|Beckett|2014|p=128, 152}}<ref name="this article">{{cite web|last1=Von Fleischhauer|first1=Jan|last2=Friedmann|first2=Jan|title=Die Kraft des Bösen|url=http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-89343538.html|website=[[Der Spiegel]]}}</ref> In 1944, Rommel was peripherally implicated in the [[20 July plot]] to assassinate Hitler. Due to Rommel's status as a national hero, Hitler desired to eliminate him quietly. He forced Rommel to commit suicide |
Rommel supported the [[Nazi seizure of power]] and [[Adolf Hitler]], and his attitude towards [[Nazi ideology]] and the level of knowledge and involvement in the regime's crimes remain a matter of debate among scholars.<ref name="»War er [ Rommel ] ein überzeugter Nationalsozialist, den man verachten muss, oder ein Held des Widerstandes gegen Hitler?«, stellt sich bei genauer Kenntnisnahme der Geschichte so gar nicht. Die Antwort ist nämlich ebenso einfach wie überraschend: Rommel war beides....Rommels »Herz gehörte dem Führer«. Umso schwerer wiegt, dass dieser Mann dennoch die Kraft und den Mut aufbrachte, sich immer dann gegen Hitler zu entscheiden, wenn dessen Befehle seinem Gewissen zuwiderliefen...Unfreiwillig und wohl auch ohne es jemals wirklich erkannt zu haben, wurde Rommel so zum Komplizen eines mörderischen Regimes. Das stellt seine Taten und Leistungen als Feldherr in den Schatten der Verbrechen aber es ist keine individuelle Schuld.">{{cite book|last1=Remy|first1=Maurice|title=Mythos Rommel|pages=28, 355, 361|year=2002}}</ref>{{sfn|Scheck|2010}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Butler|first1=Daniel Allen|title=Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel|isbn=9781612002989|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u4L3CQAAQBAJ&pg=PA487&lpg=PA487&dq=rommel+knowledge+butler&source=bl&ots=tqnS0uGOGb&sig=DhudP0fDne7x50QkgM4hk0RasoY&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q=uncle&f=false}}</ref>{{sfn|Beckett|2014|p=128, 152}}<ref name="this article">{{cite web|last1=Von Fleischhauer|first1=Jan|last2=Friedmann|first2=Jan|title=Die Kraft des Bösen|url=http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-89343538.html|website=[[Der Spiegel]]}}</ref> In 1944, Rommel was peripherally implicated in the [[20 July plot]] to assassinate Hitler. Due to Rommel's status as a national hero, Hitler desired to eliminate him quietly. He forced Rommel to commit suicide, in return for assurances that Rommel's family would not be persecuted following his death. He was given a state funeral, and it was announced that Rommel had succumbed to his injuries from the strafing of his staff car in Normandy. |
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Rommel became a larger than life figure in both Allied and [[Nazi propaganda]]; following the war, that image coalesced into the [[Rommel myth]], a view that he was an apolitical, brilliant commander and a victim of the [[Third Reich]] due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot. Rommel's reputation for conducting a clean war was used in the interest of the [[Wiederbewaffnung|West German rearmament]] and reconciliation between the former enemies – Britain and the United States on one side and the new [[Federal Republic of Germany]] on the other. The Western Allies, particularly the British, depicted him as the "good German" and "our friend Rommel". The 1950 biography ''[[Rommel: The Desert Fox]]'' and the 1953 publication of ''The Rommel Papers'' laid the foundation of the post-war myth, which proved resilient in the face of subsequent attempts to present Rommel in a proper historical context. |
Rommel became a larger than life figure in both Allied and [[Nazi propaganda]]; following the war, that image coalesced into the [[Rommel myth]], a view that he was an apolitical, brilliant commander and a victim of the [[Third Reich]] due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot. Rommel's reputation for conducting a clean war was used in the interest of the [[Wiederbewaffnung|West German rearmament]] and reconciliation between the former enemies – Britain and the United States on one side and the new [[Federal Republic of Germany]] on the other. The Western Allies, particularly the British, depicted him as the "good German" and "our friend Rommel". The 1950 biography ''[[Rommel: The Desert Fox]]'' and the 1953 publication of ''The Rommel Papers'' laid the foundation of the post-war myth, which proved resilient in the face of subsequent attempts to present Rommel in a proper historical context. |
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== Rommel's style as military commander == |
== Rommel's style as military commander == |
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Rommel's experiences on the Italian front of the First World War of successes gained against disorganised opponents shaped Rommel's subsequent style as a military commander. Rommel was a successful tactician in a rapidly developing, mobile battle. He learned that taking initiative and not letting the enemy forces to regroup often led to victory. Rommel directed his forces aggressively, often leading from the front. The success repeated itself against the second-rate French forces 1940 and the British in 1941. However, these tactics were less effective against adequately led, trained and supplied opponents, and proved insufficient in the latter years of the war.{{sfn|Porch|2004|pp=205–208}} |
Rommel's experiences on the Italian front of the First World War of successes gained against disorganised opponents shaped Rommel's subsequent style as a military commander. Rommel was a successful tactician in a rapidly developing, mobile battle. He learned that taking initiative and not letting the enemy forces to regroup often led to victory. Rommel directed his forces aggressively, often leading from the front. The success repeated itself against the second-rate French forces 1940 and the depleted British formations in 1941. However, these tactics were less effective against adequately led, trained and supplied opponents, and proved insufficient in the latter years of the war.{{sfn|Porch|2004|pp=205–208}} |
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=== Leadership === |
=== Leadership === |
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Revision as of 09:03, 30 May 2016
Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel (15 November 1891 – 14 October 1944), popularly known as the Desert Fox, was a German field marshal of World War II.
Rommel was a highly decorated officer in World War I and was awarded the Pour le Mérite for his actions on the Italian Front. In World War II, he distinguished himself as the commander of the 7th Panzer Division during the 1940 invasion of France. His leadership of German and Italian forces in the North African campaign established his reputation as one of the most able commanders of the war, and earned him the appellation of the Desert Fox. He later commanded the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion of Normandy.
Rommel supported the Nazi seizure of power and Adolf Hitler, and his attitude towards Nazi ideology and the level of knowledge and involvement in the regime's crimes remain a matter of debate among scholars.[1][2][3][4][5] In 1944, Rommel was peripherally implicated in the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler. Due to Rommel's status as a national hero, Hitler desired to eliminate him quietly. He forced Rommel to commit suicide, in return for assurances that Rommel's family would not be persecuted following his death. He was given a state funeral, and it was announced that Rommel had succumbed to his injuries from the strafing of his staff car in Normandy.
Rommel became a larger than life figure in both Allied and Nazi propaganda; following the war, that image coalesced into the Rommel myth, a view that he was an apolitical, brilliant commander and a victim of the Third Reich due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot. Rommel's reputation for conducting a clean war was used in the interest of the West German rearmament and reconciliation between the former enemies – Britain and the United States on one side and the new Federal Republic of Germany on the other. The Western Allies, particularly the British, depicted him as the "good German" and "our friend Rommel". The 1950 biography Rommel: The Desert Fox and the 1953 publication of The Rommel Papers laid the foundation of the post-war myth, which proved resilient in the face of subsequent attempts to present Rommel in a proper historical context.
Early life and career
Rommel was born on 15 November 1891 in Southern Germany at Heidenheim, 45 kilometres (28 mi) from Ulm, in the Kingdom of Württemberg, then part of the German Empire. He was the second of four children of Erwin Rommel Senior (1860–1913), a teacher and school administrator, and his wife Helene von Lutz, who headed the local government council. As a young man Rommel's father had been a lieutenant in the artillery. Rommel had one older sister and three younger brothers, one of whom died in infancy.[6][7]
At age 18 Rommel joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry Regiment as a Fähnrich (ensign), in 1910, studying at the Officer Cadet School in Danzig.[8] He graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912 and was assigned to the 124th Infantry in Weingarten.[9] He was posted to Ulm in March 1914 to the 46th Field Artillery Regiment, XIII (Royal Württemberg) Corps, as a battery commander. He returned to the 124th when war was declared.[10] While at Cadet School, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971). They married in November 1916 in Danzig.[11]
World War I
During World War I, Rommel fought in France as well as in the Romanian and Italian Campaigns. He successfully employed the tactics of infiltrating through enemy lines under cover of darkness or moving forward rapidly to a flanking position to arrive at their rear, to achieve the element of surprise.[12] His first combat experience was on 22 August 1914 as a platoon commander near Verdun, when – catching the French garrison unprepared – he and three men engaged them without waiting for the rest of the platoon to arrive.[13] The armies continued to skirmish in open engagements throughout September, as the static trench warfare typical of the First World War was still in the future.[14] For his actions in September 1914 and January 1915, Rommel was awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class.[15]
Rommel was promoted to Oberleutnant (first lieutenant) and transferred to the newly created Royal Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion of the Alpenkorps in September 1915, as a company commander.[16] In August 1917, his unit was involved in the battle for Mount Cosna, a heavily fortified objective on the border between Hungary and Romania, which they took after two weeks of difficult uphill fighting.[17]
The Mountain Battalion was next assigned to the Isonzo front, in a mountainous area in Italy. The offensive, known as the Battle of Caporetto, began on 24 October 1917.[18] Rommel's battalion, consisting of three rifle companies and a machine gun unit, was part of an attempt to take enemy positions on three mountains: Kolovrat, Matajur, and Stol.[19] In two and a half days, from October 25 to 27, Rommel and his 150 men captured 81 guns and 9,000 men (including 150 officers), at the loss of six dead and 30 wounded.[20] Rommel achieved this remarkable success by taking advantage of the terrain to outflank the Italian forces, attacking from unexpected directions or behind enemy lines, and taking the initiative to attack when he had orders to the contrary. In one instance, the Italian forces, taken by surprise and believing that their lines had collapsed, surrendered after a brief firefight.[21] Acting as advance guard in the capture of Longarone on 9 November, Rommel again decided to attack with a much smaller force. Convinced that they were surrounded by an entire German division, the 1st Italian Infantry Division – 10,000 men – surrendered to Rommel. For this and his actions at Matajur, he received the order of Pour le Mérite. In January 1918, Rommel was promoted to Hauptmann (captain) and assigned to a staff position with XLIV Army Corps, where he served for the remainder of the war.[22]
Between the wars
Rommel remained with the 124th Regiment until 1 October 1920, when he was named company commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment in Stuttgart, a post he held with the rank of captain for the next nine years.[23][20] His regiment was involved in quelling riots and civil disturbances that were occurring throughout Germany at this time.[24] Wherever possible, he avoided the use of force in these confrontations.[25] He was assigned as an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933, and was promoted to major in April 1932.[20][26] While at Dresden, he wrote a manual on infantry training, published in 1934, and his book Infanterie Greift An (Infantry Attacks), a description of his wartime experiences along with his analysis, published in 1937. It became a bestseller; Adolf Hitler was one of many people who owned a copy.[27] During this period he indulged his interest in engineering and mechanics by learning about the inner workings and maintenance of internal combustion engines and heavy machine guns.[28] He memorized logarithm tables in his spare time, and enjoyed skiing and other outdoor sports.[29]
Rommel was promoted to Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) in October 1933 given his next command, the 3rd Jäger Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, stationed at Goslar.[30] Here he first met Hitler, who inspected his troops on 30 September 1934.[31] In September 1935 Rommel was moved to the War Academy at Potsdam as an instructor, a post he held for the next three years.[32] Hearing of Rommel's reputation as an outstanding military instructor, in February 1937 Hitler assigned him as the War Ministry liaison officer to the Hitler Youth, in charge of military training. Here he clashed with Baldur von Schirach, the Hitler Youth leader, over the amount of military training that the boys should receive. Accounts differ: Rommel himself said that he wished to concentrate on basic education and minimize the military aspects, while Schirach's version was that Rommel wished to focus on nothing else.[33][34] According to the historian Alaric Searle, Rommel had proposed a plan (twice) that would have effectively subordinated Hitler Youth to the army, removing it from the NSDAP control. That went against Schirach's express wishes, who appealed directly to Hitler. Consequently, Rommel was quietly removed from the project in 1938.[35]
In 1938 Rommel, who had been promoted to Oberst (colonel) on 1 August 1937, was appointed commandant of the Theresian Military Academy War Academy at Wiener Neustadt.[36] In October 1938 Hitler specially requested that Rommel be seconded to command the Führerbegleitbrigade (his escort battalion) for his entry into Prague during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia.[37] This unit accompanied him whenever he traveled outside of Germany.[31] While Rommel developed an admiration for Hitler, he never joined the Nazi Party.[38][39]
World War II
Poland 1939
Rommel was promoted to Generalmajor on 23 August 1939 and assigned as commander of the Führerbegleitbrigade battalion, tasked with guarding Hitler and his field headquarters during the invasion of Poland, which began on 1 September.[40] Hitler took a personal interest in the campaign, often moving close to the front in the Führersonderzug (headquarters train).[41] Rommel attended Hitler's daily war briefings and accompanied him everywhere, making use of the opportunity to observe first-hand the use of tanks and other motorized units.[42] On 26 September Rommel returned to Berlin to set up a new headquarters for his unit in the Reich Chancellery.[43]
Rommel was pleased with his position of proximity to Hitler; on one occasion he reported having had a two-hour conversation with the dictator.[44] Rommel returned briefly to Warsaw on 5 October to organise the German victory parade. He described the devastated Warsaw in a letter to his wife, concluding with: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them."[44]
France 1940
Panzer commander
Following the campaign in Poland, Rommel began lobbying for command of one of Germany's panzer divisions, of which there were then only ten.[45] Rommel's successes in World War I were based on surprise and maneuver, two elements for which the new panzer units were ideally suited.[46] Rommel received a promotion to a general's rank from Hitler ahead of more senior officers, skipping a rank. Rommel was subsequently able, with an intervention from Hitler, to obtain the command he aspired to, despite having been earlier turned down by the army's personnel office, which had offered him command of a mountain division instead.[47]
Going against military protocol, this was noted by Rommel's fellow officers and added to Rommel's growing reputation as one of Hitler's favored commanders.[48] The 7th Panzer Division had recently been converted to a fully armoured division consisting of 218 tanks in three battalions, with two rifle regiments, a motorcycle battalion, an engineer battalion, and an anti-tank battalion.[49] Upon taking command on 10 February 1940, Rommel quickly set his unit to practicing the maneuvers they would need in the upcoming campaign.[50]
Invasion of France and Belgium
The invasion began on 10 May 1940. By the third day Rommel, along with three panzer divisions commanded by Generalleutnant Heinz Guderian, had reached the River Meuse, where they found the bridges had already been destroyed.[51] Rommel was active in the forward areas, directing the efforts to make a crossing, which were initially unsuccessful due to suppressive fire by the French on the other side of the river. Rommel brought up tanks and flak units to provide counter-fire and had nearby houses set on fire to create a smokescreen. He sent infantry across in rubber boats, appropriated the bridging tackle of the 5th Panzer Division, and went into the water himself, encouraging the sappers and helping lash together the pontoons.[52] By 16 May Rommel had reached his assigned objective at Avesnes, where the original plan called for him to stop and await further orders. But Rommel pressed on.[53]
Battle of Arras
On 20 May Rommel reached Arras.[54] General Hermann Hoth received orders that the town should be bypassed and its British garrison thus isolated. He ordered the 5th Panzer Division to move to the west and 7th Panzer Division to the east, flanked by the 3rd SS Panzer Division Totenkopf.[55] The following day the British launched a counterattack, meeting the SS Totenkopf with two infantry battalions supported by heavily armoured Matilda Mk I and Matilda II tanks in the Battle of Arras. The German 37 mm anti-tank gun proved ineffective against the heavily-armoured Matildas. The 25th Panzer Regiment and a battery of 88 mm (3 in) anti-aircraft guns were called in to support, and the British withdrew.[56]
On 24 May, Hitler issued a halt order. The reason for this decision is still a matter of debate. He may have overestimated the size of the British forces in the area, or he may have wished to reserve the bulk of the armour for the drive on Paris.[57][58] The halt order was lifted on 26 May.[58] 7th Panzer continued its advance, reaching Lille on 27 May. For the assault, Hoth placed the 5th Panzer Division under Rommel's command. The Siege of Lille continued until 31 May, when the French garrison of 40,000 men surrendered. 7th Panzer was given six days leave, during which Rommel was summoned to Berlin to meet with Hitler. He was the only divisional commander present at the planning session for Fall Rot (Case Red), the second phase of the conquest of France. By this time the evacuation of the BEF was complete; over 338,000 Allied troops had been evacuated across the Channel, though they had to leave behind all their heavy equipment and vehicles.[59]
Drive for the Channel
Rommel, resuming his advance on 5 June, drove for the River Seine to secure the bridges near Rouen. Advancing 100 kilometres (62 mi) in two days, the division reached Rouen to find the bridges destroyed. On 10 June, Rommel reached the coast near Dieppe, sending Hoth the laconic message "Am at coast".[60] On 17 June, 7th Panzer was ordered to advance on Cherbourg, where additional British evacuations were underway. The division advanced 240 kilometres (150 mi) in 24 hours, and after two days of shelling, the French garrison surrendered on 19 June.[61] The speed and surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point where both the enemy and the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH; German High Command) at times lost track of its whereabouts, earned the 7th Panzers the nickname Gespensterdivision (Ghost Division).[62]
After the armistice with the French was signed on 22 June, the division was placed in reserve, being sent first to the Somme and then to Bordeaux to re-equip and prepare for Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), the planned invasion of Britain.[63] This invasion was later cancelled as Germany was not able to acquire the air superiority deemed a necessity for a successful outcome.[64]
Execution of captured prisoners in France
There are reports that soldiers of the 7th Panzer Division engaged in executions of captured prisoners of war, with Rommel directly being involved in execution of French officer who refused to cooperate after being taken prisoner. Historian Raffael Scheck says there is no known evidence of Rommel ordering or condoning the massacre)[65][66][67][68][69][70]
During the fighting in France, Rommel's 7th Panzer division, alongside troops from 5th Panzer division, committed numerous atrocities against French troops including the murder of 50 surrendering officers and men at Quesnoy and the nearby Airaines[N 1][N 2][73][74] After the war a memorial was erected to the commanding French officer Charles N'Tchoréré executed by soldiers under Rommel's command. The division is also considered by Raffael Scheck to have been "likely" responsible for the execution of PoW's in Hangest-sur-Somme,[N 3] while Scheck believes they were too far away to have been involved in the massacres at Airaines and nearby villages. French historian Dominique Lormier states the number of victims by 7th Panzer Division in Airaines at 109 mostly French-African soldiers from Senegal.[76] Historian Daniel Butler agrees that it was possible the massacre at Le Quesnoy happened given the existence of Nazis like Hanke in Rommel's division, while stating that in comparison with other German units, few sources regarding such actions of the men of the 7th Panzer exist. Showalter claims that there was no massacre at Le Quesnoy.[66]
North Africa 1941–43
On 6 February 1941, Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), consisting of the 5th Light Division (later redesignated 21st Panzer Division) and of the 15th Panzer Division.[77] He was promoted to the rank of Generalleutnant three days later and flew to Tripoli on 12 February.[78] The DAK had been sent to Libya in Operation Sonnenblume, to support Italian troops that had been severely defeated by British Commonwealth forces in Operation Compass.[78] His efforts in the Western Desert Campaign earned Rommel the nickname the "Desert Fox" from British journalists.[79] Allied troops in Africa were commanded by General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Command.[80]
First Axis offensive
Rommel and his troops were technically subordinate to Italian commander-in-chief General Italo Gariboldi.[77] Disagreeing with the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)'s orders to assume a defensive posture along the front line at Sirte, Rommel resorted to subterfuge and insubordination to take the war to the British.[81] He took advantage of his connections with Hitler to obtain approval to launch a limited offensive on 24 March with 5th Light Division, supported by two Italian divisions.[82] This thrust was not anticipated by the British, who had Ultra intelligence showing that Rommel had orders to remain on the defense until at least May, when the 15th Panzers were due to arrive.[83]
The British Western Desert Force had meanwhile been weakened by the transfer in mid-February of three divisions to help defend Greece.[84] They fell back to Mersa El Brega and started constructing defensive works.[85] Rommel continued his attack against these positions to prevent the British from building up their fortifications. After a day of fierce fighting on 31 March, the Germans captured Mersa El Brega.[86] Splitting his force into three groups, Rommel resumed the advance on 3 April. Benghazi fell that night as the British pulled out of the city.[87][88] Gariboldi, who had ordered Rommel to stay in Mersa El Brega, was furious. Rommel was equally forceful in his response, telling Gariboldi: "One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip by for the sake of trifles."[89] At that point a signal arrived from General Franz Halder reminding Rommel that he was to halt in Mersa El Brega. Knowing Gariboldi could not speak German, Rommel told him the message gave him complete freedom of action. Gariboldi backed down.[90]
On 4 April Rommel was advised by his supply officers that fuel was running short, which could result in a delay of up to four days. The problem was ultimately Rommel's fault, as he had not advised his supply officers of his intentions, and no fuel dumps had been set up. Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to unload all their lorries and return to El Agheila to collect fuel and ammunition. Driving through the night, they were able to reduce the halt to a single day. Fuel supply was problematic throughout the campaign, as no petrol was available locally; it had to be brought from Europe via tanker and then carried by road to where it was needed.[91][92] Food and fresh water were also in short supply, and it was difficult to move tanks and other equipment off-road through the sand.[93] In spite of these problems, Cyrenaica was captured by 8 April, except for the port city of Tobruk, which was surrounded on the landward sides on 11 April.[94][95]
Siege of Tobruk
The siege of Tobruk was not technically a siege, as the defenders were still able to move supplies and reinforcements into the city via the port.[96] Rommel knew that by capturing the port he could greatly reduce the length of his supply lines and increase his overall port capacity, which was insufficient even for day-to-day operations and only half that needed for offensive operations.[97] The city, which had been heavily fortified by the Italians during their 30-year occupation, was garrisoned by the 18th Infantry Brigade of the Australian 7th Division, the Australian 9th Division, HQ 3rd Armoured Brigade, several thousand British infantrymen, and one regiment of Indian infantry, for a total of 36,000 men.[98] The commanding officer was Australian Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead.[99] Hoping to catch the defenders off-guard, Rommel launched a failed attack on 14 April.[100]
Rommel requested reinforcements, but the OKW, then completing preparations for Operation Barbarossa, refused.[101] General Friedrich Paulus, head of the Operations Branch of OKH, arrived on 25 April to review the situation.[102] He was present for a second failed attack on the city on 30 April. On 4 May Paulus ordered that no further attempts should be made to take Tobruk via a direct assault. This order was not open to interpretation, and Rommel had no choice but to comply.[103] Aware of this order from intelligence reports, Churchill urged Wavell to seize the initiative. While awaiting further reinforcements and a shipment of 300 tanks that were already on their way, Wavell launched a limited offensive code named Operation Brevity on 15 May. The British briefly seized Sollum, Fort Capuzzo, and the important Halfaya Pass, a bottleneck along the coast near the border between Libya and Egypt. Rommel soon forced them to withdraw.[104][105] On 15 June Wavell launched Operation Battleaxe. The attack was defeated in a four-day battle at Sollum and Halfaya Pass, resulting in the loss of 98 British tanks. The Germans lost 12 tanks, while capturing and putting into service over 20 British tanks.[106] The defeat resulted in Churchill replacing Wavell with General Claude Auchinleck as theatre commander.[107] Rommel appointed Heinrich Kirchheim as commander of 5th Light Division on 16 May, became displeased and replaced him with Johann von Ravenstein on 30 May 1941.[108][109]
In August, Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Panzer Group Africa, with Fritz Bayerlein as his chief of staff.[110] The Afrika Korps, comprising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division, now reinforced and redesignated 21st Panzer Division, was put under command of Generalleutnant Ludwig Crüwell. In addition to the Afrika Korps, Rommel's Panzer Group had the 90th Light Division and four Italian divisions, three infantry divisions investing Tobruk, and one holding Bardia. The two Italian armoured divisions, Ariete and Trieste, were still under Italian control. They formed the Italian XX Motorized Corps under the command of General Gastone Gambara.[111] Two months later Hitler decided he must have German officers in better control of the Mediterranean theatre, and appointed Field Marshal Albert Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South. Kesselring was ordered to get control of the air and sea between Africa and Italy.[111]
Operation Crusader
Following his success in Battleaxe, Rommel returned his attention to the capture of Tobruk. He made preparations for a new offensive, to be launched between 15 and 20 November.[112] Meanwhile, Auchinleck reorganised Allied forces and strengthened them to two corps, XXX and XIII, which formed the British Eighth Army, which was placed under the command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck had 770 tanks and double the number of Axis aircraft.[113] Rommel opposed him with the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions with a total of 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division, five Italian infantry divisions, and one Italian armoured division of 278 tanks.[114][115]
Auchinleck launched Operation Crusader, a major offensive to relieve Tobruk, on 18 November 1941. The XIII Corps on the right were assigned to attack Sidi Omar, Capuzzo, Sollum, and Bardia; the XXX Corps (which included most of the armour) were to move on the left southern flank to a position about 30 miles (48 km) south of Tobruk, with the expectation that Rommel would find this move so threatening that he would move his armour there in response. Once Rommel's tanks were written down, the British 70th Infantry Division would break out of Tobruk to link up with XXX Corps.[116][117] Rommel reluctantly decided on 20 November to call off his planned attack on Tobruk.[118]
Some elements of the 7th Armoured Division were stopped on the 19th by the Italian Ariete Armoured Division at Bir el Gobi, but they also managed to capture the airfields at Sidi Rezegh, 10 miles (16 km) from Tobruk.[119] Engaging the Allied tanks located there became Rommel's primary objective. Noting that the British armour was split into three discontiguous groups, he concentrated his Panzers so as to gain local superiority.[120] The expected breakout from Tobruk, which took place on 20 November, was stopped by the Italians. The airfield at Sidi Rezegh was retaken by 21st Panzer on 22 November. In four days of fighting, the Eighth Army lost 530 tanks and Rommel only 100.[121] The German forces near Halfaya Pass were cut off on 23 November.[121]
Wanting to exploit the British halt and their apparent disorganisation, on 24 November Rommel counterattacked near the Egyptian border in an operation that became known as the "dash to the wire". Unknown to Rommel, his troops passed within 6 kilometres (4 mi) of a major British supply dump. Cunningham asked Auchinleck for permission to withraw into Egypt, but Auchinleck refused, and soon replaced Cunningham as commander of Eighth Army with Major General Neil Ritchie.[122][123] The German counterattack stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance, and was criticised by the German High Command and some of Rommel's staff officers.[124]
While Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth forces east of Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there. Unable to reach Rommel for several days,[N 4] Rommel's Chief of Staff, Siegfried Westphal, ordered the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn to support the siege of Tobruk. On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with the defenders, and Rommel, having suffered losses that could not easily be replaced, had to concentrate on regrouping the divisions that had attacked into Egypt. By 7 December Rommel fell back to a defensive line at Gazala, just west of Tobruk, all the while under heavy attack from the Desert Air Force. The Bardia garrison surrendered on 2 January and Halfaya on 17 January 1942.[126] The Allies kept up the pressure, and Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the starting positions he had held in March, reaching El Agheila in December 1941.[127] The British had retaken almost all of Cyrenaica, but Rommel's retreat dramatically shortened his supply lines.[128]
Battle of Gazala and capture of Tobruk
On 5 January 1942 the Afrika Korps received 55 tanks and new supplies and Rommel started planning a counterattack. On 21 January, Rommel launched the attack.[129][130] Caught by surprise by the Afrika Korps, the Allies lost over 110 tanks and other heavy equipment. The Axis forces retook Benghazi on 29 January and Timimi on 3 February, with the Allies pulling back to a defensive line just before the Tobruk area south of the coastal town of Gazala. Rommel placed a thin screen of mobile forces before them, and held the main force of the Panzerarmee well back near Antela and Mersa Brega.[131] Between December 1941 and June 1942, Rommel had excellent information about the disposition and intentions of the Commonwealth forces. Bonner Fellers, the US diplomat in Egypt, was sending detailed reports to the US State Department using a compromised code.[132]
Following Kesselring's successes in creating local air superiority around the British naval and air bases at Malta in April 1942, an increased flow of supplies reached the Axis forces in Africa.[133] With his forces strengthened, Rommel contemplated a major offensive operation for the end of May. He knew the British were planning offensive operations as well, and he hoped to pre-empt them. While out on reconnaissance on 6 April, he was severely bruised in the abdomen when his vehicle was the target of artillery fire.[134] The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new Grant tanks. Unlike the British, the Axis forces had no armoured reserve; all operable equipment was put into immediate service. Rommel's Panzer Army Africa had a force of 320 German tanks; 50 of these were the light Panzer II model. In addition, 240 Italian tanks were in service, but these were also under-gunned and poorly armoured.[135]
Early in the afternoon of 26 May 1942, Rommel attacked first and the Battle of Gazala commenced. Italian infantry supplemented with small numbers of armoured forces assaulted the centre of the Gazala fortifications. To give the impression that this was the main assault, spare aircraft engines mounted on trucks were used to create huge clouds of dust. Ritchie was not convinced by this display, and left the 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades in position at the south end of the Commonwealth position.[136] Under the cover of darkness, the bulk of Rommel's motorized and armoured forces (15th and 21st Panzers, 90th Light Division, and the Italian Ariete and Trieste Divisions) drove south to skirt the left flank of the British, coming up behind them and attacking to the north the following morning.[137] Throughout the day a running armour battle occurred, where both sides took heavy losses. The Grant tanks proved to be impossible to knock out except at close range.[138]
Renewing the attack on the morning of 28 May, Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying separate units of the British armour. Repeated British counterattacks threatened to cut off and destroy the Afrika Korps. Running low on fuel, Rommel assumed a defensive posture, forming "the Cauldron". He made use of the extensive British minefields to shield his western flank. Meanwhile, Italian infantry cleared a path through the mines to provide supplies. On 30 May Rommel resumed the offensive, attacking westwards to link with elements of Italian X Corps, which had cleared a path through the Allied minefields to establish a supply line.[139] On 1 June, Rommel accepted the surrender of some 3,000 soldiers of the 150th Brigade.[140] On 6 June, 90th Light Division and the Trieste Division assaulted the Free French strongpoint in the Battle of Bir Hakeim, but the defenders continued to thwart the attack until finally evacuating on 10 June.[141] With his communications and the southern strongpoint of the British line thus secured, Rommel shifted his attack north again, relying on the British minefields of the Gazala lines to protect his left flank.[142] Threatened with being completely cut off, the British began a retreat eastward toward Egypt on 14 June, the so-called "Gazala Gallop."[143]
On 15 June Axis forces reached the coast, cutting off the escape for the Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions. With this task completed, Rommel struck for Tobruk while the enemy was still confused and disorganised.[144] Tobruk's defenders were at this point the 2nd South African Infantry Division, 4th Antiaircraft Brigade, 11th Indian Infantry, 32nd Army Tank, and 201st Guards Brigades, all under command of Generalmajor Hendrik Klopper. The assault on Tobruk began at dawn on 20 June, and Klopper surrendered at dawn the following day.[145] With Tobruk, Rommel achieved the capture of 32,000 defenders, the port, and huge quantities of supplies.[146] Only at the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British Commonwealth troops been captured at one time. On 22 June, Hitler promoted Rommel to Generalfeldmarschall for this victory.[147][N 5]
Following his success at Gazala and Tobruk, Rommel wanted to seize the moment and not allow 8th Army a chance to regroup.[149] He strongly argued that the Panzerarmee should advance into Egypt and drive on to Alexandria and the Suez Canal, as this would place almost all Mediterranean coastline in Axis hands, ease conditions on the Eastern Front, and potentially lead to the capture from the south of the oil fields in the Caucasus and Middle East.[150] However, Hitler viewed the North African campaign primarily as a way to assist his Italian allies, not as an objective in and of itself. He would not consider sending Rommel the reinforcements and supplies he needed to take and hold Egypt, as this would have required diverting men and supplies from his primary focus: the Eastern Front.[151]
Rommel's success at Tobruk worked against him, as Hitler no longer felt it was necessary to proceed with Operation Herkules, the proposed attack on Malta.[152] Auchinleck relieved Ritchie of command of the Eighth Army on 25 June, and temporarily took command himself.[153] Rommel knew that delay would only benefit the British, who continued to receive supplies at a faster rate than Rommel could hope to achieve. He pressed an attack on the heavily fortified town of Mersa Matruh, which Auchinleck had designated as the fall-back position, surrounding it on 28 June.[154] The 2nd New Zealand Division and 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division were almost caught, with 50th Division fleeing on the 27th and 2nd Division escaping after a short engagement during the pre-dawn hours of 28 June. The four divisions of X Corps were caught in the encirclement, and were ordered by Auchinleck to attempt a breakout. The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was nearly destroyed, losing 6,000 troops and 40 tanks.[155] The fortress fell on 29 June.[156] In addition to stockpiles of fuel and other supplies, the British abandoned hundreds of tanks and trucks. Those that were functional were put into service by the Panzerarmee.[157]
El Alamein
First Battle of El Alamein
Rommel continued his pursuit of the Eighth Army, which had fallen back to heavily prepared defensive positions at El Alamein. This region is a natural choke point, where the Qattara Depression creates a relatively short line to defend that could not be outflanked to the south because of the steep escarpment. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein began. Rommel had around 100 available tanks. The Allies were able to achieve local air superiority, with heavy bombers attacking the 15th and 21st Panzers, who had also been delayed by a sandstorm. The 90th Light Division veered off course and were pinned down by South African artillery fire. Rommel continued to attempt to advance for two more days, but repeated sorties by the RAF meant he could make no progress.[158] On 3 July, he wrote in his diary that his strength had "faded away".[159] Attacks by 21st Panzer on 13 and 14 July were repulsed, and an Australian attack on 16–17 July was held off with difficulty.[160] Throughout the first half of July, Auchinleck concentrated attacks on the Italian 60th Infantry Division Sabratha at Tel el Eisa. The ridge was captured by the 26th Australian Brigade on 16 July.[161] Both sides suffered similar losses throughout the month, but the Axis supply situation remained less favourable. Rommel realised that the tide was turning.[162] A break in the action took place at the end of July as both sides rested and regrouped.[163]
Preparing for a renewed drive, the British replaced Auchinleck with General Harold Alexander on 8 August. Bernard Montgomery was made the new commander of Eighth Army that same day. The Eighth Army had initially been assigned to General William Gott, but he was killed when his plane was shot down on 7 August.[164] Rommel knew that a British convoy carrying over 100,000 tons of supplies was due to arrive in September.[165] He decided to launch an attack at the end of August with the 15th and 21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian XX Motorized Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the El Alamein lines.[166] Expecting an attack sooner rather than later, Montgomery fortified the Alam el Halfa ridge with the 44th Division, and positioned the 7th Armoured Division about 15 miles (24 km) to the south.[167]
Battle of Alam El Halfa
The Battle of Alam el Halfa was launched on 30 August. The terrain left Rommel with no choice but to follow a similar tactic as he had at previous battles: the bulk of the forces attempted to sweep around from the south while secondary attacks were launched on the remainder of the front. It took much longer than anticipated to get through the minefields in the southern sector, and the tanks got bogged down in unexpected patches of quicksand (Montgomery had arranged for Rommel to acquire a falsified map of the terrain).[168][169] Under heavy fire from British artillery and aircraft, and in the face of well prepared positions that Rommel could not hope to outflank due to lack of fuel, the attack stalled. By 2 September, Rommel realized the battle was unwinnable, and decided to withdraw.[170]
Montgomery had made preparations to cut the Germans off in their retreat, but in the afternoon of 2 September he visited Corps commander Brian Horrocks and gave orders to allow the Germans to retire. This was to preserve his own strength intact for the main battle which was to come.[171] On the night of 3 September the 2nd New Zealand Division and 7th Armoured Division positioned to the north engaged in an assault, but they were repelled in a fierce rearguard action by the 90th Light Division. Montgomery called off further action to preserve his strength and allow for further desert training for his forces.[172] In the attack Rommel had suffered 2,940 casualties and lost 50 tanks, a similar number of guns, and 400 lorries, vital for supplies and movement. The British losses, except tank losses of 68, were much less, further adding to the numerical inferiority of Panzer Army Afrika. The Desert Air Force inflicted the highest proportions of damage to Rommel's forces. He now realized the war in Africa could not be won.[173] Physically exhausted and suffering from a liver infection and low blood pressure, Rommel flew home to Germany to recover his health.[174][175] General Georg Stumme was left in command in Rommel's absence.[165]
Second Battle of El Alamein
Improved decoding by British intelligence meant that the Allies had advance knowledge of virtually every Mediterranean convoy, and only 30 per cent of shipments were getting through.[176] In addition, Mussolini diverted supplies intended for the front to his garrison at Tripoli, and refused to release any additional troops to Rommel.[177] The increasing Allied air superiority and lack of fuel meant Rommel was forced to take a more defensive posture than he would have liked for the second Battle of El Alamein.[178] The German defences to the west of the town included a minefield 5 miles (8.0 km) deep with the main defensive line – itself several thousand yards deep – to its west.[179] This, Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any point until motorized and armoured units in reserve could move up and counterattack any Allied breaches.[180] The British offensive began on 23 October. Stumme, in command in Rommel's absence, died of an apparent heart attack while examining the front on 24 October, and Rommel was ordered to return from his medical leave, arriving on the 25th.[181] Montgomery's intention was to clear a narrow path through the minefield at the northern part of the defenses, at the area called Kidney Ridge, with a feint to the south. By the end of 25 October, 15th Panzers, the defenders in this sector, had only 31 serviceable tanks remaining of their initial force of 119.[182] Rommel brought north the 21st Panzer and Ariete Divisions on 26 October to bolster the sector. On the 28th, Montgomery shifted his focus to the coast, ordering his 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions to attempt to swing around and cut off Rommel's line of retreat. Meanwhile, Rommel concentrated his attack on the Allied salient at Kidney Ridge, inflicting heavy losses. However, Rommel had only 150 operational tanks remaining, and Montgomery had 800, many of them Shermans.[183]
Montgomery, seeing his armoured brigades losing tanks at an alarming rate, stopped major attacks until the early hours of 2 November, when he opened "Operation Supercharge" with a massive artillery barrage.[184] This was followed by penetration at the salient by two armoured and two infantry divisions.[185] Rommel's counterattack at 11:00 inflicted severe casualties on the Commonwealth troops, but by 20:00, with only 35 tanks remaining, he ordered his forces to disengage and begin to withdraw.[186] At midnight, he informed the OKW of his decision, and received a reply directly from Hitler the following afternoon: he ordered Rommel and his troops to hold their position to the last man. Rommel, who believed that the lives of his soldiers should never be squandered needlessly, was stunned.[187] While he (like all members of the Wehrmacht) had pledged an oath of absolute obedience to Hitler, he thought this order was pointless, even madness, and had to be disobeyed.[188] Rommel initially complied with the order, but after discussions with Kesselring and others, he issued orders for a retreat on 4 November.[189] The delay proved costly in terms of his ability to get his forces out of Egypt. He later said the decision to delay was what he most regretted from his time in Africa.[190] Meanwhile, the British 1st and 7th Armoured Division had broken through the German defences and were preparing to swing north and surround the Axis forces.[191] On the evening of the 4th, Rommel finally received word from Hitler authorizing the withdrawal.[192] By this time it was impossible for Rommel to save his non-motorized units.[193]
End of Africa campaign
Retreat across Africa
As Rommel attempted to withdraw his forces before the British could cut off his retreat, he fought a series of delaying actions. Heavy rains slowed movements and grounded the Desert Air Force, which aided the withdrawal. Those parts of Panzerarmee Africa that were motorized slipped away from El Alamein, but were under pressure from the pursuing Eighth Army. A series of short delaying actions were fought over the coastal highway, but no line could be held for any length of time, as Rommel lacked the armour and fuel to defend his open southern flank.[194] Rommel continued to retreat west, abandoning Halfaya Pass, Sollum, Mersa Brega and El Agheila.[195] The line Rommel was aiming for was 'Gabes gap' in Tunisia.[196] Luftwaffe Field Marshal Kesselring strongly criticized Rommel's decision to retreat all the way to Tunisia, as each airfield the Germans abandoned extended the range of the Allied bombers and fighters. Rommel defended his decision, pointing out that if he tried to assume a defensive position the Allies would destroy his forces and take the airfields anyway; the retreat saved the lives of his remaining men and shortened his supply lines. By now, Rommel's remaining forces fought in reduced strength combat groups, whereas the Allied forces had great numerical superiority and control of the air. Upon his arrival in Tunisia, Rommel noted with some bitterness the reinforcements, including the 10th Panzer Division, arriving in Tunisia following the Allied invasion of Morocco.[197][better source needed]
Tunisia
Having reached Tunisia, Rommel launched an attack against the U.S. II Corps which was threatening to cut his lines of supply north to Tunis. Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass in February—what proved to be his last battlefield victory of the war, as well as his first battle against the United States Army.[198]
Rommel immediately turned back against the British forces, occupying the Mareth Line (old French defences on the Libyan border). While Rommel was at Kasserine at the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe was appointed commander of Panzer Army Africa, renamed the Italo-German Panzer Army in recognition of the fact that it consisted of one German and three Italian corps. Though Messe replaced Rommel, he diplomatically deferred to him, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically the same command. On 23 February Armeegruppe Afrika was created with Rommel in command. It included the Italo-German Panzer Army under Messe (renamed 1st Italian Army) and the German 5th Panzer Army in the north of Tunisia under General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim.
The last Rommel offensive in North Africa was on 6 March 1943, when he attacked Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine.[199] The attack was made with 10th, 15th, and 21st Panzer Divisions. Alerted by Ultra intercepts, Montgomery deployed large numbers of anti-tank guns in the path of the offensive. After losing 52 tanks, Rommel called off the assault.[200] On 9 March he returned to Germany.[201] Command was handed over to General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. Rommel never returned to Africa.[202] The fighting there continued on for another two months, until 13 May 1943, when General Messe surrendered the Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies.
Italy 1943
On 23 July 1943 Rommel was moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E to counter a possible British invasion of the Greek coast. He arrived in Greece on 25 July but was recalled to Berlin the same date due to the overthrow of Mussolini. Rommel was to be posted to Italy as commander of the newly formed Army Group B. On 16 August 1943 Rommel's headquarters moved to Lake Garda in northern Italy and formally assumed command of the army group, which consisted of 44th Infantry Division, 26th Panzer Division and SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. When Italy announced armistice with the Allies on 8 September, his forces took part in Operation Achse, disarming the Italian forces.[203]
Hitler met with Rommel and Kesselring to discuss future operations in Italy on 30 September 1943. Rommel insisted on a defensive line north of Rome, while Kesselring was more optimistic and advocated holding a line south of Rome. Hitler preferred Kesselring's appreciation and therefore revoked his prior decision for a subsequent subordination of Kesselring's forces to Rommel's army group. On 19 October Hitler decided that Kesselring would be the overall commander of the forces in Italy, sidelining Rommel.[204]
Rommel had wrongly predicted that the collapse of the German line in Italy would be fast. Hitler in 1944 commented on Rommel's pessimism at that time: "In Italy too he predicted our collapse as being just around the corner. It still has not occurred. Events have proved him completely wrong, and thoroughly justified my decision to leave Field Marshal Kesselring there. My view is that without optimism you cannot be a military commander".[citation needed]
On 21 November Hitler gave Kesselring overall command of the Italian theater, moving Rommel and Army Group B to Normandy in France with responsibility for defending the French coast against the long anticipated Allied invasion.[205]
Atlantic Wall 1944
There was broad disagreement in the German High Command as to how best to meet the expected allied invasion of Northern France. The Commander-in-Chief West, Gerd von Rundstedt, believed there was no way to stop the invasion near the beaches due to the firepower possessed by the Allied navies, as had been experienced at Salerno.[206] He argued that the German armour should be held in reserve well inland near Paris where they could be used to counter-attack in force in a more traditional military doctrine. The allies could be allowed to extend themselves deep into France where a battle for control would be fought, allowing the Germans to envelop the allied forces in a pincer movement, cutting off their avenue of retreat. These ideas were supported by other officers, most notably Heinz Guderian and Panzer Group West commander Leo Geyr. They feared the piecemeal commitment of their armoured forces would cause them to become caught in a battle of attrition which they could not hope to win.[206]
The notion of holding the armour inland to use as a mobile reserve force from which they could mount a powerful counterattack applied the classic use of armoured formations as seen in France 1940. These tactics were still effective on the Eastern Front, where control of the air was important but did not dominate the action. Rommel's own experiences at the end of the North African campaign revealed to him that the Germans would not be allowed to preserve their armour from air attack for this type of massed assault.[206] Rommel believed their only opportunity would be to oppose the landings directly at the beaches, and to counterattack there before the invaders could become well established. Though there had been some defensive positions established and gun emplacements made, the Atlantic Wall was a token defensive line.[N 6] Rommel believed if the Wehrmacht would have any chance, beach defenses would have to be created and the forces available brought close enough to the allied invaders as to make airstrikes against them difficult.
Upon arriving in Northern France Rommel was dismayed by the lack of completed works and the slow building pace. He set out to improve the fortifications along the Atlantic Wall with great energy and skill.[208] He had millions of mines laid and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on the beaches and throughout the countryside, including in fields suitable for glider aircraft landings, the so-called Rommelspargel ("Rommel's asparagus").[209] In April 1944 Rommel promised Hitler that the preparations would be complete by 1 May, but by the time of the Allied invasion the preparations were far from finished. The quality of some of the troops manning them was poor and many bunkers lacked sufficient stocks of ammunition.[209]
Rundstedt expected the Allies to invade in the Pas-de-Calais because it was the shortest crossing point from Britain, its port facilities were essential to supplying a large invasion force, and the distance from Calais to Germany was relatively short.[210] Hitler and his various intelligence services largely agreed with this assessment.[citation needed]
Hitler vacillated between the two strategies. In late April, he ordered the I SS Panzer Corps placed near Paris, far enough inland to be useless to Rommel, but not far enough for Rundstedt. Rommel moved those armoured formations under his command as far forward as possible, ordering General Erich Marcks, commanding the 84th Corps defending the Normandy section, to move his reserves into the frontline. Although Rommel was the dominating personality in Normandy with Rundstedt willing to delegate most of the responsibilities to him (the central reserve was Rundstedt's idea but he did not oppose to some form of coastal defense, and gradually came under the influence of Rommel's thinking), Rommel's strategy of an armor-supported coastal defense line was opposed by some officers, most notably Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg[211][212][213][214][216] Hitler compromised and gave Rommel three divisions (the 2nd, the 21st and the 116th Panzer), let Rundstedt retain four and turned the other three to Army Group G, pleasing no one.[217]
The Allies staged elaborate deceptions for D-Day (see Operation Fortitude), giving the impression that the landings would be at Calais. Although Hitler himself expected a Normandy invasion for a while, Rommel and most Army commanders in France believed there would be two invasions, with the main invasion coming at the Pas-de-Calais. Rommel drove defensive preparations all along the coast of Northern France, particularly concentrating fortification building in the River Somme estuary. By D-Day on 6 June 1944 nearly all the German staff officers, including Hitler's staff, believed that Pas-de-Calais was going to be the main invasion site, and continued to believe so even after the landings in Normandy had occurred.[218]
The 5 June storm in the channel seemed to make a landing very unlikely, and a number of the senior officers were away from their units for training exercises and various other efforts. On 4 June the chief meteorologist of the 3 Air Fleet reported that weather in the channel was so poor there could be no landing attempted for two weeks. On 5 June Rommel left France and on 6 June he was at home celebrating his wife's birthday.[209] He was recalled and returned to his headquarters at 10:00 at night. Meanwhile, earlier in the day, Rundstedt had requested the reserves be transferred to his command. At 10:00 in the morning Keitel advised that Hitler declined to release the reserves but that Rundstedt could move the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend closer to the coast, with the Panzer-Lehr-Division placed on standby. Later in the day, Rundstedt received authorisation to move additional units in preparation for a counterattack, which Rundstedt decided to launch on 7 June. Upon arrival, Rommel concurred with the plan. By nightfall, Rundstedt, Rommel and Speidel continued to believe that the Normandy landing might have been a diversionary attack, as the Allied deception measures still pointed towards Calais. The 7 June counterattack did not take place as the 12th SS did not arrive on time due to the Allied air bombardments.[219] All this made the German command structure in France in disarray during the opening hours of the D-Day invasion.[220]
Facing relatively small-scale German counterattacks, the Allies secured five beachheads by nightfall of 6 June, landing 155,000 troops.[221] The Allies pushed ashore and expanded their beachhead despite strong German resistance. Rommel believed that if his armies pulled out of range of Allied naval fire, it would give them a chance to regroup and re-engage them later with a better chance of success. While he managed to convince Rundstedt, they still needed to win over Hitler. At a meeting with Hitler in Margival on 17 June, Rommel warned Hitler about the inevitable collapse in the German defences, but was rebuffed and told to focus on military operations.[222][223]
By mid-July the German position was crumbling. On 17 July 1944, Rommel was returning from visiting the headquarters of the I SS Panzer Corps. According to a widely accepted version of events, an RCAF Spitfire of 412 Squadron piloted by Charley Fox strafed his staff car near Sainte-Foy-de-Montgommery.[224] The car sped up and attempted to get off the main roadway, but a 20 mm round shattered the driver's left arm, causing the vehicle to come off the road and crash into some trees. Rommel was thrown from the car, suffering injuries to the left side of his face from glass shards and three fractures to his skull.[224][225] He was hospitalised with major head injuries.
Plot against Hitler
The role that Rommel played in the military's resistance against Hitler or the 20 July plot is difficult to ascertain, as people most directly involved did not survive and limited documentation on the conspirators' plans and preparations exists. Thus, Rommel's participation remains ambiguous and the perception of it largely has its source in the subsequent events (especially Rommel's forced suicide) and the post-war accounts by surviving participants.[226] Some authors report that Rommel vehemently opposed assassination and that he was in favor of negotiating with the Western Allies.[227] The strongest evidence that points to the possibility that Rommel came to support the assassination plan was General Eberbach's confession to his son (eavesdropped by British agencies) while in British captivity, which stated that Rommel explicitly said to him that Hitler and his close associates had to be killed because this would be the only way out for Germany.[228][229][230] This conversation happened about a month before Rommel had to commit suicide.
According to a post-war account by Karl Strölin, three of Rommel's friends—the Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart, Strölin (who had served with Rommel in the First World War), Alexander von Falkenhausen, and Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel—began efforts to bring Rommel into the anti-Hitler conspiracy in early 1944. According to Strölin, sometime in February, Rommel agreed to lend his support to the resistance.[231] On 15 April 1944 Rommel's new chief of staff, Hans Speidel, arrived in Normandy and reintroduced Rommel to Stülpnagel.[232] Speidel had previously been connected to Carl Goerdeler, the civilian leader of the resistance, but not to the plotters led by Claus von Stauffenberg, and only came to the attention of Stauffenberg due to his appointment to Rommel's headquarters. The conspirators felt they needed the support of a field marshal on active duty, and gave instructions to Speidel to bring Rommel into their circle.[233]
Speidel met with former foreign minister Konstantin von Neurath and Strölin on 27 May in Germany, ostensibly at Rommel's request, although the latter was not present. Neurath and Strölin suggested opening immediate surrender negotiations in the West, and, according to Speidel, Rommel agreed to further discussions and preparations.[223] Around the same timeframe, the plotters in Berlin were not aware that Rommel had allegedly decided to take part in the conspiracy. On 16 May, they informed Allen Dulles, through whom they hoped to negotiate with the Western Allies, that Rommel could not be counted on for support.[234]
Rommel opposed assassinating Hitler (at least initially. According to authors like Maurice Remy and Antony Beevor, he gradually changed his attitude).[235][236] After the war, his widow—among others—maintained that Rommel believed an assassination attempt would spark civil war in Germany and Austria, and Hitler would have become a martyr for a lasting cause.[237] Instead, Rommel reportly suggested that Hitler be arrested and brought to trial for his crimes; he did not attempt to implement this plan when Hitler visited Margival, France, on 17 June. The arrest plan would have been highly improbable, as Hitler's security was extremely tight. Rommel would have known this, having commanded Hitler's army protection detail in 1939.[238] On 15 July, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler giving him a "last chance" to end the hostilities with the Western Allies. Rommel urged Hitler to "draw the proper conclusions without delay." What Rommel didn't know was that the letter took two weeks to reach Hitler because of Kluge's precautions.[239]
After the failed bomb attack of 20 July, many conspirators were arrested and the dragnet expanded to thousands.[240] Consequently, it did not take long for Rommel to come under suspicion. Rommel's name was first mentioned when Stülpnagel blurted it out after his failed suicide attempt. Under torture, Hofacker named Rommel as one of the participants.[241] Additionally, Goerdeler had written down Rommel's name on a list as potential Reich President.[242][243][244][245] On September 27, Martin Bormann submitted to Hitler a memorandum, which claimed that "the late General Stülpnagel, Colonel von Hofacker, Kluge's nephew who has been executed, Lieutenant Colonel Rathgens, and several of living defendants have testified that Field Marshall Rommel was perfectly in the picture about the assassination plan and have promised to be at the disposal of the New Government.[246][247] Gestapo agents were sent to Rommel's house in Ulm and placed him under surveillance.[248]
Death
Two generals from Hitler's headquarters, Wilhelm Burgdorf and Ernst Maisel, visited Rommel at his home on 14 October 1944. Burgdorf informed him of the charges and offered him a choice: he could either face the People's Court—which would have been tantamount to a death sentence—or choose a quiet suicide. In the former case, his family would have suffered even before the all-but-certain conviction and execution, and his staff would have been arrested and executed as well. In the latter case, the government would claim that he died a hero and bury him with full military honours, and his family would receive full pension payments. Burgdorf had brought a cyanide capsule. As Rommel thought the matter over, an SS detachment surrounded his house.[249] Rommel concluded, he would not reach Berlin alive.[250] With that in mind, Rommel opted to commit suicide, and explained his decision to his wife and son.[250][251] Wearing his Afrika Korps jacket and carrying his field marshal's baton, Rommel went to Burgdorf's Opel, driven by SS Master Sergeant Heinrich Doose, and was driven out of the village. After stopping, Doose and Maisel walked away from the car, leaving Rommel with Burgdorf. Five minutes later Burgdorf gestured to the two men to return to the car, and Doose noticed that Rommel was slumped over, having taken the cyanide. Ten minutes later the group telephoned Rommel's wife to inform her of Rommel's death.[252][253][254]
The official story of Rommel's death, as reported to the public, stated that Rommel had died of a cerebral embolism—a complication of the skull fractures he'd suffered in the earlier strafing of his staff car.[255][256] To further strengthen the story, Hitler ordered an official day of mourning in commemoration. As previously promised, Rommel was given a state funeral. The fact that his state funeral was held in Ulm instead of Berlin had, according to his son, been stipulated by Rommel.[257] Hitler sent Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who was unaware that Rommel had died as a result of Hitler's orders, as his representative at Rommel's funeral.[258] Rommel had specified that no political paraphernalia be displayed on his corpse, but the Nazis made sure his coffin was festooned with swastikas. The truth behind Rommel's death became known to the Allies when intelligence officer Charles Marshall interviewed Rommel's widow, Lucia Rommel,[259] as well as from a letter by Rommel's son Manfred in April 1945.[260]
Rommel's grave is located in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm. For decades after the war on the anniversary of his death, veterans of the Africa campaign, including former opponents, would gather at Rommel's tomb in Herrlingen.[261]
In 2013, it was revealed that Friedrich Breiderhoff wrote a report for the Cologne police on 22 July 1960, describing the circumstances which forced him to falsify Rommel's death certificate in 1944.[262]
Rommel's style as military commander
Rommel's experiences on the Italian front of the First World War of successes gained against disorganised opponents shaped Rommel's subsequent style as a military commander. Rommel was a successful tactician in a rapidly developing, mobile battle. He learned that taking initiative and not letting the enemy forces to regroup often led to victory. Rommel directed his forces aggressively, often leading from the front. The success repeated itself against the second-rate French forces 1940 and the depleted British formations in 1941. However, these tactics were less effective against adequately led, trained and supplied opponents, and proved insufficient in the latter years of the war.[263]
Leadership
The assessment of Rommel's leadership is varied. The historian and journalist Basil Liddell Hart concludes that he was a strong leader who was worshipped by his troops and respected by his adversaries, and is deserving to be named as one of the "Great Captains of History".[264] On the other hand, the German biographer Wolf Heckmann was far less sympathetic, describing Rommel as "the most overrated commander of an army in world history".[265]
Rommel received both praise and criticism for his tactics during the French campaign. Many, such as General Georg Stumme, who had previously commanded 7th Panzer Division, were impressed with the speed and success of Rommel's drive.[267] Others, however, were reserved or critical; Kluge, the commanding officer, argued that Rommel's decisions were impulsive and that he claimed too much credit, by falsifying diagrams or not acknowledging contributions of other units, especially the Luftwaffe. Some pointed out that Rommel's division took the highest casualties in the campaign.[268]
Taking his opponent by surprise and creating uncertainty in the mind of the adversarial commander were key elements in Rommel's thinking on offensive warfare: he would take advantage of sand storms and the dark of night to conceal the movement of his forces.[269] In battle, Rommel was often directing fire or leading an assault in the hottest point of decision.[270][N 7] If not on the frontlines, he often piloted a reconnaissance aircraft over the battle lines to get a view of the situation.[272] When the British mounted a commando raid deep behind German lines in an effort to kill Rommel and his staff on the eve of their Crusader offensive, Rommel was indignant that the British would expect to find his headquarters 250 miles behind his front.[273] Friedrich von Mellenthin, who was a key aide on Rommel's staff during the Africa campaign, wrote that at times in North Africa his absence from a position of communication made command of the battles of the Afrika Korps difficult. According to Mellenthin, Rommel's counterattack during Operation Crusader is one such instance.[274]
Rommel spoke German with a pronounced southern German or Swabian accent. He was not a part of the Prussian aristocracy that dominated the German high command, and as such was looked upon somewhat suspiciously by the Wehrmacht's traditional power structure.[275][276] Rommel felt a commander should be physically more robust than the troops he led, and should always show them an example.[277][N 8] He expected his subordinate commanders to do the same. They had to live hard. He felt it the obligation of a commander to be willing to suffer whatever hardships the soldier in the line was facing, and he understood the effect of this on the morale of his men.[citation needed] According to Mellenthin's memoirs, James Mason's portrayed Rommel as "altogether too polite" in the film The Desert Fox.[278]
Rommel was among the few Axis commanders (the others being Isoroku Yamamoto and Reinhard Heydrich) who were targeted for assassination by Allied planners. Two attempts were made, the first being Operation Flipper in North Africa on the eve of Operation Crusader in 1941, and the second being Operation Gaff, undertaken shortly after the invasion of Normandy in 1944.[279]
Relations with Italian forces
Rommel's relationship with the Italian High Command in North Africa was generally poor. Rommel was sent to Africa to shore up a crumbling situation created under the direction of the Italian command, and though he was nominally subordinate to the Italians for much of the campaign, he was under no illusions as to why he was there. Further, he enjoyed direct access to Hitler, which allowed him a certain degree of autonomy from his Italian counterparts; since he was directing their troops in battle as well as his own, this was bound to cause hostility among Italian commanders. Conversely, as the Italian command had control over the supplies of the forces in Africa, they resupplied Italian units preferentially, which was a source of resentment for Rommel and his staff. Rommel's direct and abrasive manner did nothing to smooth these issues.[280][281][better source needed]
While certainly much less proficient than Rommel in their leadership, aggressiveness, tactical outlook and mobile warfare skills,[citation needed] Italian commanders were competent in logistics, strategy and artillery doctrine: their troops were ill-equipped but well-trained. As such, the Italian commanders were repeatedly at odds with Rommel over concerns with issues of supply.[282] Field Marshal Kesselring was assigned Supreme Commander Mediterranean, at least in part to alleviate command problems between Rommel and the Italians. This effort does not seem to have succeeded, Kesselring claiming Rommel ignored him as easily as he ignored the Italians.[283]
Very different, however, was the perception of Rommel by Italian common soldiers and NCOs, who, like the German field troops, had the deepest trust and respect for him.[284][clarification needed] Paolo Colacicchi, an officer in the Italian Tenth Army recalled that Rommel "became sort of a myth to the Italian soldiers" and that the Bersaglieri baptised him "Rommelito" [285](perhaps also a reference to both men's small stature: "Rommelito" means "little Rommel" while Romulus means "the little boy from Rome")
Views on the conduct of war
Some post-war authors describe him as having a reputation of being chivalrous, humane, and professional officer[286] and that he earned the respect of both his own troops and his enemies.[287][288][286] According to Young's biography and Luck's memoirs, during the desert campaign, interactions between German and British troops encountering each other between battles were sometimes openly friendly.[289][290] The same was not true in the Normandy Campaign, however, where both Allied and German troops murdered prisoners of war on occasion during June and July 1944.[291] In Normandy, Rommel withheld Hitler's Commando Order to execute captured commandos from Army Group B, with his units reporting that they were treating commandos as regular POWs. The same had most likely been done in North Africa.[292] When Rommel learned about the atrocities SS Division Leibstandarte committed in Italy in September 1943, he allegedly forbade his son to join the Waffen-SS.[293]
Historian Richard J. Evans has stated that German soldiers in Tunisia raped Jewish women, and the success of Rommel's forces in capturing or securing Allied, Italian and Vichy French territory in North Africa led to many Jews in these areas being killed by other German institutions as part of the Holocaust.[294] Similarly, several German historians argued that while Rommel did not have strong racial views, if he had succeeded in his goal of invading the Middle East during 1942 large numbers of Jews in Palestine would have been murdered by an SS unit which had been deployed to North Africa in July 1942 to operate behind the lines of the Afrika Korps.[295]
During fighting in France, Rommel has been reported by Claus Telp in Rommel: A Reappraisal[296] to have generally treated his prisoners with consideration, however, he once shot a French officer for refusing to obey an order to cooperate after being taken prisoner.[296][297] Rommel had described the conduct of the desert war as "War without Hate" in his papers. Historian Martin Kitchen states that the reputation of the Afrika Korps was preserved due to the circumstances that they fought in: the sparsely populated desert areas did not lend themselves to ethnic cleansing; the German forces never reached Egypt and Palestine that had large Jewish populations; and in the urban areas of Tunisia and Transpolitania, the Italian government constrained the German efforts to discriminate against or eliminate Jews who were Italian citizens.[298] Despite this, the North African Jews themselves believed that it was Rommel who prevented the "Final Solution" from being carried out against them when German might dominated North Africa from Egypt to Morocco.[299][300] Historian Michael Curtis wrote that in the three French North African colonies, 120,000 Jews lived in Algeria, 200,000 in Morocco and about 80,000 in Tunisia (when the Germans invaded Tunisia in 1942, this number remained the same).[301]
During Rommel's time in France, Hitler ordered him to deport the country's Jewish population; Rommel disobeyed.[302] Several times he wrote letters protesting against the treatment of the Jews. He also refused to comply with Hitler's order to execute Jewish POWs.[303] At his 17 June 1944 meeting with Hitler at Margival, he protested against the atrocity committed by the 2nd SS Panzer division Das Reich, which had massacred the citizens of the French town of Oradour-sur-Glane. Rommel asked to be allowed to punish the division.[N 9] French civilians and Italian prisoners of war held by the Germans were forced to work on building some of the defences Rommel ordered constructed.[305]
In Nazi and Allied propaganda
Rommel's victories in France were featured in the German press and in the February 1941 film Victory in the West, in which Rommel personally helped direct a segment reenacting the crossing of the Somme River.[306] Rommel's victories in 1941 were played up by the Nazi propaganda, even though his successes in North Africa were achieved in arguably one of Germany's least strategically important theaters of World War II.[307][N 10] In November 1941, Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels wrote about "the urgent need" to have Rommel "elevated to a kind of popular hero". Rommel, with his innate abilities as a military commander and love of the spotlight, was a perfect fit for the role Goebbels designed for him.[307]
Successes in North Africa
In North Africa, Rommel received help in cultivating his image from Alfred Ingemar Berndt, a senior official at the Reich Propaganda Ministry who had volunteered for military service.[311] Seconded by Goebbels, Berndt was assigned to Rommel's staff and became one of his closest aides. Bernd often acted as liaison between Rommel, the Propaganda Ministry and the Führer Headquarters. He directed Rommel's photo shoots and filed radio dispatches describing the battles.[312][313]
In the spring of 1941, Rommel's name began to appear in the British media. In the autumn of 1941 and early winter of 1941/1942, he was mentioned in the British press almost daily. Toward the end of the year, the Reich propaganda machine also used Rommel's successes in Africa as a diversion from the Wehrmacht's challenging situation in the Soviet Union with the stall of Operation Barbarossa.[314][315][N 11] The American press soon began to take notice of Rommel as well, following the country's entry into the war on 11 December 1941, writing that "The British (...) admire him because he beat them and were surprised to have beaten in turn such a capable general". To counteract any demoralizing effect such articles might have on the British troops, General Auchinleck distributed a directive to his commanders seeking to dispel the notion that Rommel was a "superman".[316][317]
The attention of the Western and especially the British press thrilled Goebbels, who wrote in his diary in early 1942: "Rommel continues to be the recognized darling of even the enemies' news agencies."[318] The Field Marshal was pleased by the media attention, both domestic and foreign, often discussing it in letters to his wife.[318][N 12] Hitler took note of the British propaganda as well, commenting in the summer of 1942 that Britain's leaders must have hoped "to be able to explain their defeat to their own nation more easily by focusing on Rommel."[319]
The Field Marshal was the German commander most frequently covered in the German media, and the only one to be given a press conference, which took place in October 1942.[313][320] The press conference was moderated by Goebbels and was attended by both domestic and foreign media. Rommel declared: "Today we (...) have the gates of Egypt in hand, and with the intent to act!" Keeping the focus on Rommel distracted the German public from Wehrmacht losses elsewhere as the tide of the war began to turn. He became a symbol that was used to reinforce the German public's faith in an ultimate Axis victory.[321]
Military reverses
In the wake of the successful British offensive in November 1942 and other military reverses, the Propaganda Ministry directed the media to emphasize Rommel's invincibility. The charade was maintained until the spring of 1943, even as the German situation in Africa became increasingly precarious. To ensure that the inevitable defeat in Africa would not be associated with Rommel's name, Goebbels had the Supreme High Command announce in May 1943 that Rommel was on a two-month leave for health reasons.[322][N 13] Instead, the campaign was presented, by Berndt, who resumed his role in the Propaganda Ministry, as a ruse to tie down the British Empire while Germany was turning Europe into an impenetrable fortress, with Rommel at the helm of this success. After the radio program ran in May 1943, Rommel sent Berndt a case of cigars as a sign of his gratitude.[322]
Although Rommel then entered a period without a significant command, he remained a household name in Germany, synonymous with the aura of invincibility.[324] Hitler then made Rommel part of his defensive strategy for Fortress Europe (Festung Europa) by sending him to the West to inspect fortifications along the Atlantic Wall. Goebbels supported the decision, noting in his diary that Rommel was "undoubtedly the suitable man" for the task. The propaganda minister expected the move to reassure the German public and at the same time to have a negative impact on the Allied forces' morale.[325]
In France, a Wehrmacht propaganda company frequently accompanied Rommel on his inspection trips to document his work for both domestic and foreign audiences.[208][326] In May 1944 the German newsreels reported on Rommel's speech at a Wehrmacht conference, where he stated his conviction that "every single German soldier will make his contribution against the Anglo-American spirit that it deserves for its criminal and bestial air war campaign against our homeland". The speech led to an upswing in morale and sustained confidence in Rommel.[327]
When Rommel was seriously wounded on 17 June 1944, the Propaganda Ministry undertook efforts to conceal the injury so as not to undermine domestic morale. Despite those, the news leaked to the British press. To counteract the rumors of a serious injury and even death, Rommel was required to appear at the 1 August press conference. On 3 August, the German press published an official report that Rommel had been injured in a car accident. Rommel noted in his diary his dismay at this twisting of the truth, belatedly realising how much the Reich propaganda was using him for its own ends.[327]
Rommel's views on propaganda
Rommel was interested in propaganda, beyond the promotion of his own image. In 1944, after visiting Rommel in France and reading his proposals on counteracting Allied propaganda, Alfred-Ingemar Berndt remarked: "He is also interested in this propaganda business and wants to develop it by all means. He has even thought and brought out practical suggestions for each program and subject."[328]
Rommel saw the propaganda and education values in his and his nation's deeds (He also did value justice itself: According to Admiral Ruge's diary, Rommel told Ruge: "Justice is the indispensable foundation of a nation. Unfortunately the higher-ups are not clean. The slaughterings are grave sins."[329]) The key to the successful creating of an image, according to Rommel, was leading by example: "It is sheer nonsense to say that maintenance of the men's morale is the job of the battalion commander alone. The higher the rank, the greater the effect of the example. The men tend to feel no kind of contact with a commander who, they know, is sitting somewhere in headquarters. What they want is what might be termed a physical contact with him. In moments of panic, fatigue, or disorganization, or when something out of the ordinary has to be demanded from them, the personal example of the commander works wonders, especially if he has had the wit to create some sort of legend around himself."[330] He urged the Axis authorities to treat occupied people like the Arabs with the utmost respect to prevent uprisings behind the front.[331]
The political scientist and historian Randall Hansen suggests that Rommel chose his whole command style for the purpose of spreading meritocracy and egalitarianism, as well as Nazi ideals he shared with Hitler due to their common non-aristocratic background.[332] Rommel's proposals were not always practical: in 1943, he surprised Hitler by proposing that a Jew should be made into a Gauleiter to prove to the world that Germany was innocent of accusations that Rommel had heard from the enemy's propaganda regarding the mistreatment of Jews. Hilter replied "Dear Rommel, you understand nothing about my thinking at all".[333][334][335][336]
Relationship with National Socialism
Rommel and Hitler had a close and genuine, if complicated, personal relationship. Rommel, as other Wehrmacht officers, welcomed Nazi rise to power.[337][47] Numerous historians state that Rommel was one of Hitler's favorite generals and that his close relationship with the dictator benefited both his inter-war and war-time career.[48][338][47] Robert Citino describes Rommel as "not apolitical" and writes that his owed his career to Hitler, to whom Rommel's attitude was "worshipful",[313] while Charles Messenger describes Rommel's "growing admiration" towards Hitler following the invasion of Poland.[313][339][N 14]
Kesselring described Rommel's own power over Hitler as "hypnotic".[341] In 1944, Rommel himself told Ruge and his wife that Hitler had a kind of irresistible magnetic aura ("magnetismus") and was always seemingly in an intoxicated condition.[342] Maurice Remy notes that the moment the fatal attraction truly materialized into a personal relationship was 1939, when Rommel proudly announced to his friend Kurt Hesse that he had "sort of forced Hitler to go with me (to the Hradschin Castle in Prague, without another bodyguard), under my personal protection... He had entrusted himself to me and would never forget me for my excellent advice."[343]
The close relationship between Rommel and Hitler continued following the Western campaign; after Rommel sent to him a specially prepared diary on the 7th Division, he received a letter of thanks from the dictator.[344][N 15] According to Maurice Remy, the relationship, which Remy calls "a dream marriage", only showed the first crack in 1942, [345]and later gradually turned into, in the words of German writer Ernst Jünger who were in contact with Rommel in Normandy, "liebehass" (a love-hate relationship).[346] Ruge's diary and Rommel's letter to his wife showed his mood to fluctuate wildly regarding Hitler: while he showed disgust towards the atrocities and disappointment towards the situation, he was overjoyed to welcome a visit from Hitler, only to return to depression the next day when faced with reality.[347] Hitler displayed the same emotions. Amid growing doubts and differences, he would remain eager to hear from Rommel's calls, once almost grabbed the telephone out of Linge's hand.[348] When forced to commit suicide, Rommel accepted, and then said that "Once I have loved the Führer, and I still do." [334][349] Remy and Der Spiegel remark that the statement was very much genuine.
Rommel was an ambitious man who took advantage of his proximity to Hitler and willingly accepted the propaganda campaigns designed for him by Goebbels.[337][N 16] On one hand, he wanted personal promotion and the realization of his ideals. On the other hand, being elevated by the traditional system that gave preferential treatment to aristocratic officers would be betrayal of his aspiration "to remain a man of the troops".[N 17] In 1918, Rommel refused an invitation to a prestigious officer training course, and with it, the chance to be promoted to General.[351] He was thus attracted by the Common Man theme which promised to level German society,[352] the glorification of the national community,[353] and the idea of a soldier of common background who served the Fatherland with talent and got rewarded by another common man who embodied the will of the German people.[352]
Messenger points out that Rommel had many reasons to be grateful to Hitler, including his interference to arrange for Rommel to receive command of an armoured division, his elevation to the status of a national hero, and continued interest and support from the dictator. Messenger argues that Rommel's attitude towards Hitler changed only after the Allied invasion of Normandy, when Rommel came to realise that the war could not be won,[339] while Maurice Remy suggests that Rommel never truly broke away from the relationship with Hitler, but praises him for "always had the courage to oppose him whenever his conscience required so."[345] The historian Peter Lieb states that it was not clear whether the threat of defeat was the only reason he wanted to switch sides.[353]
Rommel's political inclinations was a controversial matter even among the contemporary Nazi elites. Rommel himself, while showing support to some facets of the Nazi ideology[247] and enjoying the propaganda the Nazi machine built around him, was enraged by the Nazi media's effort to portray him as an early party member and son of a mason.[354][355] The Nazi elites were not comfortable with the idea of a national icon who did not wholeheartedly support the regime. Hitler and Goebbels, his main supporters, tended to defend him. When Rommel was being considered for appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Army in the summer of 1942, Goebbels wrote in his diary that Rommel "is ideologically sound, is not just sympathetic to the National Socialists. He is a National Socialist; he is a troop leader with a gift for improvisation, personally courageous and extraordinarily inventive. These are the kinds of soldiers we need."[338] Despite this, they gradually saw that his grasp of political realities and his views could be very different from theirs [335][356][N 18] Meanwhile, officials who did not like Rommel like Bormann and Schirach whispered to each other that he was not a Nazi at all.[358] Rommel's relationship to the Nazi elites, other than Hitler and Goebbels, was mostly hostile, although even powerful people like Bormann[359] and Himmler had to tread carefully around Rommel. Himmler, who played a decisive role in Rommel's death,[348] tried to blame Keitel and Jodl for the deed.[217] (while Hitler also played innocent by trying to erect a monument for the national hero, on 7 March 1945[360]) Franz Halder, after concocting several schemes to rein in Rommel through people like Paulus and Gauss to no avail (even willing to undermine German operations and strategy in the process for the sole purpose of embarrassing him[361]), concluded that Rommel was a madman with whom no one dared to cross swords because of "his brutal methods and his backing from the highest levels".[362][363] Rommel for his part was highly critical of Himmler, Halder, the High Command and particularly Goering who, according to Rommel, was at some points his "bitterest enemy".[N 19] Hitler realized that Rommel attracted the elites' negative emotions to himself, in the same way he generated optimism in the common people, and depending on the case, manipulated or exarcebated the situation in order to benefit himself,[365][366][N 20] although he originally had no intent of pushing Rommel to the point of destruction,[367] until Rommel's enemies worked together to bring him down.[368]
Maurice Remy concludes that, unwillingly and probably without ever realizing, Rommel was part of a murderous regime, although he never actually grasped the core of National Socialism.[369] Peter Lieb sees Rommel as a person who could not be put into a single drawer, although problematic by modern moral standards, and suggests people to personally decide for themselves whether Rommel should remain a role model or not. Historian Cornelia Hecht remarks "It is really hard to know who the man behind the myth was," noting that in numerous letters he wrote to his wife during their almost 30-year marriage, he commented little on political issues as well as his personal life as a husband and a father.[370]
Rommel myth
An assessment of Rommel's role in history has been hampered by views of Rommel that were arrived at for political reasons, creating the Rommel myth, an interpretation that the Field Marshal was an apolitical, brilliant commander and a victim of the Third Reich due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot against Adolf Hitler.[371] The seeds of the myth can be found first in Rommel's drive for success as a young officer in World War I, and then in his popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks, which was written in a style that diverged from the German military literature of the time and which became a bestseller.[372][307]
The myth then took shape during the opening years of World War II, as a component of Nazi propaganda to praise the Wehrmacht and instill optimism in the German public, with Rommel's willing participation. Starting in 1941, it was picked up and disseminated in the West by the British press as the Allies sought to explain their continued inability to defeat the Axis forces in North Africa.[373] The British military and political figures contributed to the heroic image of the man as Rommel resumed offensive operations in January 1942 against the British forces weakened by redeployments to the Far East. During parliamentary debate following the fall of Tobruk, Churchill described Rommel as a "extraordinary bold and clever opponent" and a "great field commander".[374][375]
Following the war, the Western Allies, and particularly the British, depicted Rommel as the "good German" and "our friend Rommel". His reputation for conducting a clean war was used in the interest of the West German rearmament and reconciliation between the former enemies—Britain and the United States on one side and the new Federal Republic of Germany on the other.[376] When Rommel's alleged involvement in the plot to kill Hitler became known after the war, his stature was enhanced in the eyes of his former adversaries. Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a patriotic German willing to stand up to Hitler. Churchill wrote about him in 1950: "[Rommel] (...) deserves our respect because, although a loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works, and took part in the conspiracy of 1944 to rescue Germany by displacing the maniac and tyrant."[377] The release of the 1951 film The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel increased his fame. In 1970, a Lütjens-class destroyer was named the Rommel in his honour.[378]
Foundational works
The German rearmament of the early 1950s was highly dependent on the moral rehabilitation that the Wehrmacht needed. The journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart, an early proponent of these two interconnected initiatives, provided the first widely available source on Rommel in his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, updated in 1951, portraying Rommel in a positive light and as someone who stood apart from the regime.[379]
The other foundational text was the influential and laudatory biography 1950 Rommel: The Desert Fox by Brigadier Desmond Young.[380][381][N 21] Young extensively interviewed Rommel's widow and collaborated with several individuals who had been close to Rommel, including Hans Speidel. The manner of Rommel's death had led to the assumption that he had not been a supporter of Nazism, to which Young subscribed.[376][382][N 22] The reception of The Desert Fox in Britain was enthusiastic, with the book going through eight editions in a year.[383] Young's biography was another step in the development of the Rommel myth – with Rommel emerging as an active, if not a leading, plotter. Speidel contributed as well, starting, from the early 1950s, to bring up Rommel's and his own role in the plot, boosting his [Speidel's] suitability for a future role in the new military force of the Federal Republic, the Bundeswehr, and then in NATO.[384]
Lastly, 1953 saw the publication of Rommel's writings of the war period as The Rommel Papers, edited by Liddell Hart.[385] The book contributed to the perception of Rommel as a brilliant commander; in an introduction, Liddell Hart drew comparisons between Rommel and Lawrence of Arabia, "two masters of desert warfare".[386] Meanwhile, Liddell Hart had a personal interest in the work: by having coaxed Rommel's widow to include material favorable to himself, he could present Rommel as his "pupil". The controversy was described by the political scientist John Mearsheimer, who concluded that, by "manipulating history", Liddell Hart was in a position to show that he was at the root of the dramatic German success in 1940.[387][388]
Elements of the myth
According to Connelly, Young and Liddell Hart laid the foundation for the Anglo-American myth, which consisted of three themes: Rommel's ambivalence towards Nazism; his military genius; and the emphasis of the chivalrous nature of the fighting in North Africa.[385] Their works lent support to the image of the "clean Wehrmacht" and were generally not questioned, since they came from British authors, rather than German revisionists.[389][N 23]
Historian Bruce Allen Watson offers his interpretation of the myth, encompassing the foundation laid down by the Nazi propaganda machine. According to Watson, the most dominant element is Rommel the Superior Soldier; the second being Rommel the Common Man; and the last one Rommel the Martyr.[390] The leading German news magazine Der Spiegel describes the myth as "Gentleman warrior, military genius".[295][N 24]
Contradictions and ambiguities
According to recent assessments of Rommel, he was much more complex than the firmly established post-war reputation as a military genius ambivalent towards the Nazi regime.[391] Works, such as the 2002 documentary and book of the same name, Mythos Rommel, by the author and cinematographer Maurice Philip Remy and the 2004 book Rommel: Das Ende einer Legende ("Rommel: The End of a Legend") by the historian Ralf Georg Reuth, started a reevaluation of Rommel's role in history.[381]
Caddick-Adams writes that Rommel was a "complicated man of many contradictions",[392] while Beckett notes that "Rommel's myth (...) has proved remarkably resilient" and that more work is needed to put him in proper historical context.[226] Zabecki concludes that "the blind hero worship (...) only distorts the real lessons to be learned from [his] career and battles",[48] and Watson notes that the legend has been a "distraction" that obscured the evolution of Rommel as a military commander and his changing attitudes towards the regime that he served.[393]
Reputation as military commander
Rommel had been extraordinarily well known in his lifetime, including by his adversaries. His tactical prowess and consistent decency in the treatment of allied prisoners earned him the respect of many opponents, including Claude Auchinleck, Archibald Wavell, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery.[394] The trend continued following the publication of Rommel: The Desert Fox. British military personnel described Rommel as a brilliant commander and a resistance fighter, the "good German" and "our friend Rommel", with one senior military figure comparing Rommel to legendary military leader Belisarius. The praise led Brian Horrocks, Montgomery's former deputy, to publish an article "The Rommel Myth Debunked" in April 1950 in which he argued that the 8th Army beat Rommel's Africa Corps "fair and square".[395]
Rommel's military reputation has been controversial. While nearly all military practitioners acknowledge Rommel's excellent tactical skills and personal bravery, some, such as U.S. Major General and military historian David T. Zabecki of the United States Naval Institute, considers Rommel's performance as an operational level commander to be highly overrated. He argues that other officers share this belief.[48][N 25] General Klaus Naumann, who served as Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr, agrees with the military historian Charles Messenger that Rommel had challenges at the operational level, and states that Rommel's violation of the unity of command principle, bypassing the chain of command in Africa, was unacceptable and contributed to the eventual operational and strategic failure in North Africa.[396][N 26]
Nevertheless, there is also a notable number of officers who admire his methods, like Norman Schwarzkopf who describes Rommel as a "genius at battles of movement",[397] and Ariel Sharon who deemed the German military model used by Rommel to be superior to the British model used by Montgomery.[398] His compatriot Moshe Dayan likewise considered Rommel a model and icon.[399] General Wesley Clark states that "Rommel's military reputation, though, has lived on, and still sets the standard for a style of daring, charismatic leadership to which most officers aspire."[400] During the recent desert wars, Rommel's military theories and experiences attracted great interest from policy makers and military instructors.[401]Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). Chinese military leader Sun Li-jen had the laudatory nickname "Rommel of the East".[402]
Certain contemporary military historians, such as Larry T. Addington, Niall Barr, Douglas Porch and Robert Citino, are skeptical of Rommel as an operational, let alone strategic, level commander. They point to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to the German High Command, his poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to the historian Ian Beckett, his "penchant for glory hunting".[403][313] Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the eventual demise of the Axis forces in North Africa,[313][N 27] while Addington focuses on the struggle over strategy, whereby Rommel's initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in North Africa.[404] Porch highlights Rommel's "offensive mentality", symptomatic of the Wehrmacht commanders as a whole in the belief that the tactical and operational victories would lead to strategic success. Compounding the problem was the Wehrmacht's institutional tendency to discount logistics, industrial output and their opponents' capacity to learn from past mistakes.[405]
The historian Geoffrey P. Megargee points out Rommel's playing the German and Italian command structures against each other to his advantage. Rommel used the confused structure (the OKW (Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht), the OKH (Supreme High Command of the Army) and the Italian Supreme Command) to disregard orders that he disagreed with or to appeal to whatever authority he felt would be most sympathetic to his requests.[406] Rommel often went directly to Hitler with his needs and concerns, taking advantage of the favoritism that the Führer displayed towards him and adding to the distrust that the German High Command already had of him.[407]
Some historians, such as Zabecki and Peter Lieb, take issue with Rommel's absence from Normandy on the day of the Allied invasion, 6 June 1944. He had left France on 5 June and was at home on the 6th celebrating his wife's birthday. (According to Rommel, he planned to proceed to see Hitler the next day to discuss the situation in Normandy).[408][409] Zabecki calls his decision to leave the theatre in view of an imminent invasion "an incredible lapse of command responsibility".[408]
Family life
While at Cadet School in 1911, Rommel met and became engaged to 17-year-old Lucia (Lucie) Maria Mollin (1894–1971).[11] While stationed in Weingarten in 1913, Rommel developed a relationship with Walburga Stemmer, which produced a daughter, Gertrude, born 8 December 1913.[410][411] Because of elitism in the officer corps, Stemmer's working-class background made her unsuitable as an officer's wife, and Rommel felt honour-bound to uphold his previous commitment to Mollin. With Lucie's cooperation, he accepted financial responsibility for the child.[412]
Rommel and Mollin were married in November 1916 in Danzig.[11] After the end of the First World War, the couple settled initially in Stuttgart, and Stemmer and her child lived with them. Gertrude was referred to as Rommel's niece, a fiction that went unquestioned due to the enormous number of women widowed during the war.[413] Walburga died suddenly in October 1928, and Gertrude remained a member of the household until Rommel's death in 1944.[414]
Rommel's marriage was a happy one, and he wrote his wife at least one letter every day while he was in the field.[11] Their son Manfred, born 24 December 1928, served as Oberbürgermeister of Stuttgart from 1974 to 1996.[415][416][417] He died on 7 November 2013, survived by a daughter, Catherine.[418]
Medals and decorations
- Württembergische Goldene Verdienstmedaille on 25 February 1915
- Military Merit Order Fourth Class with Swords (Bavaria)
- Military Merit Order Second Class (Bavaria)
- Friedrich Order with Swords First Class (Württemberg)
- Military Merit Order (Württemberg)[419]
- Military Merit Cross 3rd class (Austria-Hungary)
- Iron Cross
- Pour le Mérite on 18 December 1917[422]
- Wound Badge (1918) in Silver[423]
- Honour Cross of the World War 1914/1918 in 1934
- Sudetenland Medal
- Memel Medal
- Wehrmacht Long Service Award 4th to 1st class
- Clasp to the Iron Cross
- Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds
- Knight's Cross on 27 May 1940 as Generalmajor and commander of the 7. Panzer-Division[425][426][427]
- Oak Leaves (10th recipient) on 20 March 1941 as Generalleutnant and commander of the 7. Panzer-Division[428][429][N 28]
- Swords (6th recipient) on 20 January 1942 as General der Panzertruppe and commander of the Panzergruppe Afrika[425][430][431]
- Diamonds (6th recipient) on 11 March 1943 as Generalfeldmarschall and commander in chief of the Heeresgruppe Afrika[425][432][433]
- Wound Badge in Gold on 7 August 1944
- Panzer Badge in Silver
- Italian Gold Medal of Military Valour in February 1942[434]
- Knight of the Colonial Order of the Star of Italy in February 1942[434]
- Grand Officer of the Italian Military Order of Savoy Mid-1942
- Romanian Order of Michael the Brave 3rd and 2nd Class on 12 July 1944
- Mentioned twice on the Wehrmachtbericht (21 June 1942 and 10 September 1943)[435]
References
Explanatory notes
- ^ "Indeed, the soldiers of the 'Ghost Division' and its partner in crime, 5th Panzer Division, committed numerous atrocities against French colonial troops in 1940, murdering fifty surrendered non-commissioned officers and men at Airaines"[71]
- ^ "On 7 June, a number of soldiers of 53eme Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale were shot, probably by troops of the 5th Panzer Division, following their surrender after a spirited defense in the area of Airaines, near Le Quesnoy. Similar acts had also been perpetrated by soldiers of Rommel's 7th Panzer Division on 5 June against the defenders of Le Quesnoy. Rommel noted in his own account that "any enemy troops were either wiped out or forced to withdraw"; at the same time he also provided the disparaging (but possibly somewhat contradictory in light of his first note) observation that "many of the prisoners taken were hopelessly drunk."[72]
- ^ In Hangest-sur-Somme, some captured Tirailleurs and a French second lieutenant were shot by Germans in black uniforms, most likely members of Rommel's 7th Panzer Division[75]
- ^ 23 to 28 November according to Mellenthin.[125]
- ^ As recounted by Luck in his memoirs, Rommel commented to his wife that he wished Hitler had given him another division instead.[148]
- ^ Runstedt had confided to Rommel that it was for propaganda purposes only.[207]
- ^ As a typical example, in the final assault on the 150th Brigade in "the Cauldron", Rommel went in with the foremost platoon.[271]
- ^ According to Lewin, in 1933 when Rommel became commander of a Hanoverian Jaeger battalion, which was composed of soldiers with skiing expertise, its officers gave him the mandatory test on the snow slopes. No lift was present, and the men had to climb to ski down the hillside. They trudged to the top and descended, and honour was satisfied, but the 41-year-old commander led his officers up and down the slope twice more before he let them fall out.[277]
- ^ Rommel survived the protest. Hitler told him it was none of his business, and took no further action against him[304]
- ^ Niall Barr: "...came to fame in a theatre which held almost no strategic interest for Hitler whatsoever".[308] Martin Kitchen: "German historians have largely ignored the North African campaign, not only because it was peripheral...".[309]
- ^ Peter Caddick-Adams: "Rommel's advances over the winter 1941-42 became a very useful distraction away from Germany's failure before Moscow".[315]
- ^ Quote from one of Rommel's letters, January 1942: "The opinion of me in the world press has improved".[318]
- ^ Peter Lieb: "Hitler was well aware that it would be unwise (...) to link the downfall of Army Group Africa to the name of Rommel, the child of Joseph Goebbel's propaganda machinery".[323]
- ^ Robert Citino: "His career had been based solely on Hitler's favor, and we might reasonably describe his attitude toward the Führer as worshipful."[313] Peter Caddick-Adams: "As is now clear, Rommel had been very close to Hitler and the Third Reich..."[340]
- ^ Charles Messenger: "He [Rommel] did receive one present that pleased him. He had sent Hitler a meticulously prepared diary of his division's exploits and received a letter of thanks just before Christmas. 'You can be proud of your achievements', Hitler wrote."[344]
- ^ Klaus Naumann: "Rommel was used by the Nazi regime to create a myth. He tolerated this since he had a strong dose of personal ambition and vanity."[337]
- ^ Maurice Remy: "...Rommel wollte bleiben, was es war: ein Mann der Truppe."[350]
- ^ Kubetzky: "Politics-wise, he has nothing but fantastic conceptions." (Goebbels' diary, after the assassination)[357]
- ^ Erwin Rommel: "During the whole of this period my bitterest enemy was Goering. I think he wanted to get me sacked in order to realise his own plans in North Africa."[364]
- ^ Erwin Rommel: "I was not very happy at the prospect of having to go on playing whipping-boy for the Fuehrer s H.Q, the Commando Supremo and the Luftwaffe."[135]
- ^ Martin Kitchen: "Early biographies, such as that by Desmond Young, were positively adulatory."[309]
- ^ Patrick Major: "Young had relied extensively on interviews with the Field Marshal's surviving widow, son and former comrades so that the positive picture that emerged is perhaps hardly surprising. Yet the overall effect bordered on hagiography".[382]
- ^ Kitchen: "The North African campaign has usually been seen, as in the title of Rommel's account, as 'War without Hate', and thus as further proof that the German army was not involved in any sordid butchering, which was left to Himmler's SS. While it was perfectly true that the German troops in North Africa fought with great distinction and gallantry, (...) it was fortunate for their subsequent reputation that the SS murderers that followed in their wake did not have an opportunity to get to work."[298]
- ^ Spiegel Online: "Gentleman warrior, military genius. The legend of Erwin Rommel, the German Field Marshal who outfoxed the British in North Africa, lives on."[295]
- ^ According to David T. Zabecki, Rommel's insubordination also played a role, leading to a calamitous misuse of resources when Rommel went over the head of his superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, to appeal directly to Hitler to approve an assault on Egypt instead of occupying Malta, as Kesselring and OKW were planning.[48]
- ^ Klaus Naumann: "Rommel's way out in Africa—bypassing the chain of command by seeking direct access to Hitler—must never be taken as an example to be followed." Rommel did not follow this "battle-proven principle", which allowed him to achieve some tactical victories, but this contributed to eventual operational and strategic failure in North Africa. [396]
- ^ Robert Citino: "[Rommel's] disinterest in the dreary science of logistics, his love of action, his tendency to fly off to wherever the fighting was hottest—all of these qualities (...) are problems in a commander under modern conditions, and they all contributed materially to the disaster that ultimately befell him and his army in the desert."[313]
- ^ According to Scherzer as Generalmajor.[425]
Citations
- ^ Remy, Maurice (2002). Mythos Rommel. pp. 28, 355, 361.
- ^ Scheck 2010.
- ^ Butler, Daniel Allen. Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. ISBN 9781612002989.
- ^ Beckett 2014, p. 128, 152.
- ^ Von Fleischhauer, Jan; Friedmann, Jan. "Die Kraft des Bösen". Der Spiegel.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 8.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 10.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 43.
- ^ a b c d Fraser 1993, p. 19.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 4.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 25, 27–29.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 31.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 36, 43.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 43, 45.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 53–60.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 65–67.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 14.
- ^ a b c Hoffmann 2004, p. 15.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 71–77.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 78–81.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 99.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 100.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 86.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 98.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 133–134.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 100, 103.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 99.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 100.
- ^ a b Lewin 1998, p. 9.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 117.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 132.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 120–121.
- ^ Searle 2014, pp. 19–21.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 137.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 142.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 138.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 119.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 144.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 146.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 141.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 146, 149.
- ^ a b Searle 2014, p. 24.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 151.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 114.
- ^ a b c Watson 1999, p. 158.
- ^ a b c d e Zabecki 2016.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 156–157.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 151, 161.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 154–155.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 14.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 164.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 183.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 165–166.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 166.
- ^ a b Hoffmann 2004, p. 24.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 169–171.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 172, 174.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 204–206.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 191–192.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 177.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 26.
- ^ Scheck, Raffael. "Mythos Rommel".
- ^ a b Patton And Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century - Dennis Showalter - 1996 "In fact, the garrison of Le Quesnoy, most of them Senegalese, took heavy toll of the German infantry in house-to-house fighting. Unlike other occasions in 1940, when Germans and Africans met, there was no deliberate massacre of survivors."
- ^ Scheck, Raffael (2006). Hitler's African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers ... p. 28.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - ^ Rommel and His Art of War Front Cover John Pimlott Greenhill Books, 2003, p. 47
- ^ Les crimes nazis lors de la libération de la France (1944-1945) Dominique Lormier 2014
- ^ Rommel: In His Own Words - p. 48 John Pimlott - 1994 "The French officer bluntly refused to come along, and there was nothing for it but to shoot him after three times ordering him to get up"
- ^ Alexander 2012, p. 332.
- ^ Stone 2009, p. 109.
- ^ Les Combats d'Airaines et environs, juin 1940 André Laboulet impr. Lafosse,page 21, 1972
- ^ Le Point Afrique - Publié le 19/08/2014 Un héros sort de l'ombre : Charles N'Tchoréré, venu du Gabon, mort pour la France
- ^ Scheck 2006, p. 26.
- ^ Dominique Lormier: Les crimes nazis lors de la libération de la France (1944-1945)
- ^ a b Fraser 1993, p. 223.
- ^ a b Fraser 1993, p. 217.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 17.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 182.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 187–190.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 193.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 199.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 198.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 33.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 229.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 231.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 204–205.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 36.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 205.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 35.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 205–206.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 207, 214.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 236.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 220.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 221.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 258.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 221, 224.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 35.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 242.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 39.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 240–241.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 244.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 100.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 250.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 271.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 48.
- ^ Mitcham 2007, pp. 28, 175.
- ^ Mitcham 2008, p. 436.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 53.
- ^ a b Lewin 1998, p. 54.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 57.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 292–293.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 293.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 277.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 278–280.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 294.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 295.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 294–295.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 297.
- ^ a b Butler 2015, p. 298.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 287–289.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 300–301.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 288.
- ^ von Luck 1989, p. 58.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 291–293.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 304.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 131.
- ^ Lewin 1998, pp. 99–101, Quote from Rommel: I had maintained secrecy over the Panzer Group's forthcoming attack eastwards from Mersa el Brega and informed neither the Italian nor the German High Command. We knew from experience that Italian Headquarters cannot keep things to themselves and that everything they wireless to Rome gets round to British ears. However, I had arranged with the Quartermaster for the Panzer Group's order to be posted in every Cantoniera in Tripolitinia on 21 January....
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 308, 311.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 106.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 309–310.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 321.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 319.
- ^ a b Rommel 1982, p. 196.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 323–324.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 45.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 326.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 325–327.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 330.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 331.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 217.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 334.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 224.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 334–335.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 337.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 337.
- ^ von Luck 1989, p. 103.
- ^ Playfair 1960, p. 296.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 285–286, 345–347.
- ^ Shirer 1960, pp. 911–912.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 342.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 339, 343.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 343–344.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 343–344.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 239.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 338–339, 344.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 347–350.
- ^ Shirer 1960, p. 913.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 345.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 351.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 346.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 354.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 355, 370.
- ^ a b Douglas-Home 1973, p. 171.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, map, p.163.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, pp. 47–48.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 48.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 165.
- ^ Carver 1962, p. 67.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 160.
- ^ Carver 1962, p. 70.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 286.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 372.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 50.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 52.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 362.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 172.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 370.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 299.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 375–377.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 373.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 378–380.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 378.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 385.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 379–380.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 385–386.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 387–388.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 381–383.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 327.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 389.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 383.
- ^ Douglas-Home 1973, p. 179.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 190.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 11.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 192.
- ^ Rommel 1982, pp. 342–357.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 129.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 134.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 135.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 209.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 136.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 115–116.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 117.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 117.
- ^ a b c Willmott 1984, p. 69.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 213.
- ^ a b Lieb 2014, p. 120.
- ^ a b c Lieb 2014, p. 121.
- ^ Willmott 1984, p. 60.
- ^ Harrison, Gordon (1951). US Army in WW II: European Theater of Operations, Cross Channel Attack. p. 247. ISBN 9780794837396.
- ^ Williams, Andrew (2004). D-Day To Berlin. ISBN 9780340833971.
- ^ Brighton, Terry (2008). Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. p. 247. ISBN 9781400114979.
- ^ Keegan, John (1999). The Book of War: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing -On the Other Side of the Hill. ISBN 9780140296556.
- ^ von Schweppenburg 1964, p. 109.
- ^ "Whatever one may say of Rommel's tactical ability, he was a brave and tough soldier, and his constant appearance at the front line demanded respect. This made it possible for the more senior officers to accept his orders".[215]
- ^ a b Mitcham, Samuel (1997). The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rommel's Defense of Fortress Europe. p. 198. ISBN 0275954846.
- ^ Willmott 1984, p. 89.
- ^ Messenger 2009, p. 168–170.
- ^ Willmott 1984, p. 83.
- ^ Messenger 2009, p. 169.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 125.
- ^ a b Hart 2014, p. 146.
- ^ a b "Obituary: Flight Lieutenant Charley Fox". Telegraph. 4 November 2008. Retrieved 27 March 2010.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 65.
- ^ a b Beckett 2014, p. 6.
- ^ Naumann 2009, pp. 189−191.
- ^ Schröder, Stephen Schröder. Zwanzigste Juli 1944--Profile, Motive, Desiderate. p. 191. ISBN 9783825811716.
- ^ Prados, John. Normandy Crucible: The Decisive Battle that Shaped World War II in Europe. ISBN 9781101516614.
- ^ Hansen, Randall. Disobeying Hitler: German Resistance After Valkyrie. ISBN 9780199927920.
- ^ Shirer 1960, pp. 1031, 1177.
- ^ Hart 2014, pp. 142–150.
- ^ Hart 2014, pp. 139–142.
- ^ Hart 2014, pp. 145–146.
- ^ Remy 2002, pp. 241–355. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. ISBN 9781101148723.
- ^ Hart 2014, p. 140: Sourced to Speidel (1950) Invasion 1944: We Defended Normandy, pp. 68, 73.
- ^ Hart 2014, pp. 145–147.
- ^ Remy, Maurice (2002). Mythos Rommel. Econ UllsteinList Verlag GmbH. p. 301. ISBN 3-471-78572-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - ^ Hart 2014, pp. 152.
- ^ Hart 2014, pp. 141, 152.
- ^ Marshall, Charles F. Discovering the Rommel Murder. ISBN 9780811742788.
- ^ Hansen, Randall. Disobeying Hitler: German Resistance in the Last Year of WWII. ISBN 978-0571284528.
- ^ Misch, Rochus (2014). Hitler's Last Witness: The Memoirs of Hitler's Bodyguard. Frontline Books. ISBN 9781848327498.
- ^ Reuth 2005, p. 183.
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 293. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ a b Lasserre, Caroline Lasserre. "Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung". Retrieved 2016.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=(help) - ^ Reuth 2005, p. 198.
- ^ Evans 2009, p. 642.
- ^ a b Evans 2009, pp. 642–643.
- ^ Shirer 1960, p. 967–969.
- ^ Manfred Rommel, Nuremberg testimony
- ^ "Manfred Rommel, son of the Desert Fox, forged a great friendship with Monty's son which became a symbol of post-war reconciliation". The Daily Telegraph. 10 November 2013.
- ^ "'The Desert Fox' commits suicide". History. Retrieved 23 August 2014.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 505, Letter from Goering to Frau Rommel, 26 October 1944: "The fact that your husband, Field Marshal Rommel, has died a hero's death as a result of his wounds, after we had all hoped he would remain for the German people, has deeply touched me.".
- ^ Shirer 1960, p. 1078.
- ^ Manfred Rommel: Trotz allem heiter. Stuttgart 1998, 3rd edition, p. 69.
- ^ von Mellenthin 1956, p. 321.
- ^ Marshall p.
- ^ "Letter reveals Rommel's son account of his general father's last moments after being ordered to commit suicide by Hitler - Daily Mail Online". Mail Online. 30 December 2012.
- ^ Mausshardt, Philipp (20 October 1989). "Stramm am Grab". Die Zeit.
- ^ Hall, Allan (17 November 2013). "Doctor's notes tell of SS Rommel plot: Report reveals how physician was forced to put 'heart attack' on death certificate to cover up his forced suicide". Daily Mail. DMG Media. Retrieved 18 November 2013.
- ^ Porch 2004, pp. 205–208.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. xv, Said Liddell Hart in his intro to the Rommel Papers: "Until I delved into Rommel's papers I regarded him as a brilliant tactician and great fighting leader, but did not realize how deep a sense of strategy he had.".
- ^ Watson 1999, p. 118.
- ^ Jackson, Robert (2010), Tanky a další vojenská vozidla, Grada Publishing a.s., p. 75
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 16.
- ^ Porch 2004, p. 204.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 101.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 94.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 243.
- ^ Young 1950, p. 113.
- ^ Brighton 2008, p. 108. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBrighton2008 (help)
- ^ von Mellenthin 1956, p. 88.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 1.
- ^ Hoffmann 2004, p. 92.
- ^ a b Lewin 1998, p. 239.
- ^ von Mellenthin 1956, p. 45.
- ^ Moorhouse 2007, pp. 157–158.
- ^ "Diario storico del Comando Supremo", vol.5 to 9, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
- ^ "Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale", vol.2 and 3, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
- ^ Montanari, "Le operazioni in Africa Settentrionale", vol. 1 to 4, Italian Army General Staff Historical Office
- ^ Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, pp. 124–125
- ^ M.Montanari, Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale, Vol.IV, chapter III, pp. 119–197
- ^ Caddick-Adams, Peter (2012). Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. The Overlook Press. ISBN 9781590207253.
- ^ a b Tim Moreman (23 November 2010). Bernard Montgomery: Leadership, Strategy, Conflict. Osprey Publishing. p. 50. ISBN 978-1-84908-143-6.
- ^ Coggins 1980, p. 30.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 241–242.
- ^ Young 1950, pp. 127–128.
- ^ von Luck 1989, pp. 125–128.
- ^ Lieb 2013, pp. 26–27.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 130.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 129.
- ^ Evans 2009, pp. 150–151.
- ^ a b c Friedmann 2007.
- ^ a b Beckett, Ian. Rommel: A Reappraisal.
- ^ Sebag-Montefiore, Hugh. Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man.
- ^ a b Kitchen 2009, p. 10.
- ^ "Rommel's Son Honoured". No. Jun 16, 1987. New Straits Times.
- ^ "Jerusalem Medal to Stuttgart Mayor, Son of General Rommel". Jewish Telegraphic Agency. June 17, 1987. Retrieved 2016.
{{cite news}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=(help) - ^ Curtis, Michael (2003). Verdict on Vichy: Power and Prejudice in the Vichy France Regime. p. 117. ISBN 9781628724363.
- ^ Patton, Benjamin; Scruby, Jennifer (6 March 2012). Growing Up Patton: Reflections on Heroes, History, and Family Wisdom. Penguin. ISBN 9781101560013.
- ^ Perry, Marvin (22 February 2012). World War II in Europe: A Concise History. Cengage Learning. p. 165. ISBN 1285401794.
- ^ Lewin 1998, p. 225.
- ^ Beevor 2009, p. 37.
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 158–159.
- ^ a b c Caddick-Adams 2012, pp. 471–472. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Barr 2014, p. 60.
- ^ a b Kitchen 2009, p. 9.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, pp. 210–211. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Watson 1999, p. 159.
- ^ Reuth 2005, p. 124.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Citino 2012.
- ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 136–139.
- ^ a b Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 471. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 166–167.
- ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 141–143.
- ^ a b c Reuth 2005, p. 144.
- ^ Reuth 2005, p. 148.
- ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 144–146.
- ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 150–152.
- ^ a b Reuth 2005, pp. 154–158.
- ^ Lieb 2014, p. 113.
- ^ Lieb 2014, pp. 113–115, 117–118.
- ^ Lieb 2014, pp. 117–118.
- ^ Reuth 2005, p. 159.
- ^ a b Reuth 2005, pp. 159–161.
- ^ Fischer, Thomas. "Propaganda-Star Ein Mythos entsteht". Retrieved 2016.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=(help) - ^ Remy 2002, p. 247. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 241.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 138.
- ^ Hansen, Randall. Disobeying Hitler: German Resistance After Valkyrie. ISBN 9780199927920.
- ^ Wehler, Hans-Ulrich; Jan, Wiele. "Der Mann wusste, dass der Krieg verloren ist".
{{cite web}}:|access-date=requires|url=(help); Check date values in:|accessdate=(help); Missing or empty|url=(help) - ^ a b Von Fleischhauer, Jan; Friedmann, Jan. "Die Kraft des Bösen". Retrieved 2016.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=(help) - ^ a b By John Mosier, John (2006). Cross of Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, 1918-1945. p. 41. ISBN 9780805083217.
- ^ Knab, By Jakob (1995). Falsche Glorie: das Traditionsverständnis der Bundeswehr. ISBN 3861530899.
- ^ a b c Naumann 2009, p. 190.
- ^ a b Reuth 2005, p. 54.
- ^ a b Messenger 2009, pp. 185–186.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 472. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Bungay, Stephen. Alamein. ISBN 9781854109293.
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 282. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 41. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ a b Messenger 2009, p. 60.
- ^ a b Remy 2002, p. 355. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 253. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, pp. 281, 282. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ a b Linge, Heinz. "The Private Life of Adolf Hitler - Detroit Free Press from Detroit, Michigan, p. 12". No. November 17, 1955.
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 348. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, pp. 24–25. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 24. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ a b Watson 1999, p. 169.
- ^ a b Lasserre, Caroline. "www.kas.de/niedersachsen/de/publications/38303/". Retrieved 2016.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|accessdate=(help) - ^ Butler 2015, p. 240.
- ^ Seewald, Berthold. "http://www.welt.de/kultur/article2905248/Erwin-Rommel-Held-der-sauberen-Wehrmacht.html".
{{cite web}}: External link in|title= - ^ Kubetzky, Thomas (2010). "The mask of command": Bernard L. Montgomery, George S. Patton und Erwin Rommell. ISBN 9783643103499.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - ^ Kubetzky 2010, p. 250.
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 38. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Remy 2002, p. 336. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Barnett, Correlli (1989). Hitler's Generals. Grove Press. ISBN 0802139949.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 241, 281–283.
- ^ Reuth 2005, p. 186.
- ^ Watson 1999, p. 175.
- ^ Rommel 1982, p. 367.
- ^ Christian Frey, Tim Versteegen (2011). Nazi Underworld-Hitler's Desert Fox [Nazi Underworld-Hitler's Desert Fox] (documentary film). National Geographic Channel. Retrieved 2016.
"Bigwigs...despised Rommel...It was very much the way Hitler liked to keep it. He was the classic divide-and-rule dictator" (statement made by historian Guy Walters, in 42th min)
{{cite AV media}}: Check|archive-url=value (help); Check date values in:|access-date=(help) - ^ Butler 2015, p. 283.
- ^ Knopp, Guido (2011). Geheimnisse des "Dritten Reichs". C.Bertelsmann. ISBN 9783641065126.
- ^ Christian Frey, Tim Versteegen (2011). Nazi Underworld-Hitler's Desert Fox [Nazi Underworld-Hitler's Desert Fox] (documentary film). National Geographic Channel. Retrieved 2016.
"Rommel's former enemies put together a pact against Rommel. It started at the Ehrenhof and ended in Hitler's immediate surrounding with Bormann and Keitel" (statement made by historian Reuth, in 43th min)
{{cite AV media}}: Check|archive-url=value (help); Check date values in:|access-date=(help) - ^ Remy 2002, pp. 38, 361. sfn error: multiple targets (3×): CITEREFRemy2002 (help)
- ^ Sonnberger, Heike. "Ausstellung entzaubert "Wüstenfuchs" Rommel".
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, pp. 471–473. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Major 2008.
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 166−167.
- ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 141−143.
- ^ a b Searle 2014, p. 9.
- ^ Churchill 1950, p. 200.
- ^ Silverstone 2011.
- ^ Searle 2014, pp. 8, 27.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 478. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ a b Beckett 2014, pp. 1–2.
- ^ a b Major 2008, p. 522.
- ^ Major 2008, p. 521.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 474. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ a b Connelly 2014, pp. 163–163.
- ^ Major 2008, p. 526.
- ^ Mearsheimer 1988, pp. 199–200.
- ^ Luvaas 1990, pp. 12–13.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 483. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 157–161.
- ^ Beckett 2014, pp. 4–6.
- ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, pp. 485–486. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCaddick-Adams2012 (help)
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Terry Brighton. Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. New York: Crown, 2008. p. xvii
- ^ Major 2008, pp. 520–523.
- ^ a b Naumann 2009, pp. 189−190.
- ^ Blais, Jan David. Twentieth Century Limited: Book Two, Age of Reckoning.
- ^ Kimmerling, Baruch. Politicide: Ariel Sharon's War Against the Palestinians.
- ^ Balwant Sidhu Galib. Rear View Mirror.
- ^ Messenger, Charles. Rommel: Lessons from Yesterday for Today's Leaders. ISBN 9780230609082.
- ^ Leroux, Charles. "Rommel May Guide U.S. In Desert Warfare".
{{cite news}}: External link in|ref= - ^ 罗, 学蓬. 东方隆美尔: 解密蒋介石为何欲置孙立人于死地. ISBN 9787515305974.
- ^ Beckett 2014, pp. 4−6.
- ^ Addington 1967.
- ^ Porch 2004, p. 206.
- ^ Megargee 2000, p. 97.
- ^ Watson 1999, pp. 164−165.
- ^ a b Zabecki March 2016.
- ^ Lieb 2014.
- ^ Bierman & Smith 2002, p. 56.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 32.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 101.
- ^ Butler 2015, pp. 33, 104.
- ^ Fraser 1993, pp. 98–99.
- ^ Grill 2002.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 546.
- ^ Martin 2013.
- ^ Butler 2015, photos after p. 240.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 36.
- ^ Fraser 1993, p. 43.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 561.
- ^ Butler 2015, p. 134.
- ^ a b Fraser 1993, p. 172.
- ^ a b c d Scherzer 2007, p. 638.
- ^ Fellgiebel 2000, p. 363.
- ^ Von Seemen 1976, p. 286.
- ^ Fellgiebel 2000, p. 54.
- ^ Von Seemen 1976, p. 25.
- ^ Fellgiebel 2000, p. 39.
- ^ Von Seemen 1976, p. 14.
- ^ Fellgiebel 2000, p. 36.
- ^ Von Seemen 1976, p. 12.
- ^ a b Butler 2015, p. 315.
- ^ The Wehrmacht Reports 1939–1945 Volume 3, p. 819.
Bibliography
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{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Barr, Niall (2014). "Rommel in the Desert, 1941". In I. F. W. Beckett (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Beckett, Ian (2014). "Introduction". In I. F. W. Beckett (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Beevor, Antony (2009). D-Day : The Battle for Normandy. New York: Viking. ISBN 9780670021192.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Bierman, John; Smith, Colin (2002). The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II. ISBN 978-0-670-03040-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Brighton, Terry (2008). Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War. New York: Crown. ISBN 978-0-307-46154-4.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Butler, Daniel Allen (2015). Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel. Havertown, PA; Oxford: Casemate. ISBN 978-1-61200-297-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Caddick-Adams, Peter (2012). Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN 9781590207253.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Chambers, Madeline (2012). "The Devil's General? German film seeks to debunk Rommel myth". Reuters. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
- Carver, Michael (1962). El Alamein. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 978-1-84022-220-3.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Churchill, Winston (1949). Their Finest Hour. The Second World War. Vol. II. Boston; Toronto: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 396145.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Churchill, Winston (1950). The Grand Alliance. The Second World War. Vol. III. Boston; Toronto: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 396147.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Citino, Robert (2007). Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. University Press of Kansas.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Citino, Robert (2012). "Rommel's Afrika Korps". HistoryNet. Retrieved 3 March 2016.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link) - Coggins, Jack (1980). The Campaign for North Africa. New York: Doubleday & Company. ISBN 0-385-04351-1.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Connelly, Mark (2014). "Rommel as icon". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}:|editor=has generic name (help); Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Douglas-Home, Charles (1973). Rommel. The Great Commanders. New York: Saturday Review Press. ISBN 0-8415-0255-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Evans, Richard J. (2009). The Third Reich at War. Penguin. ISBN 978-0-14-101548-4.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|city=ignored (|location=suggested) (help) - Fellgiebel, Walther-Peer (2000). Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939–1945 — Die Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkrieges aller Wehrmachtteile (in German). Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas. ISBN 978-3-7909-0284-6.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Fraser, David (1993). Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. New York: HarperCollins. ISBN 978-0-06-018222-9.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Friedmann, Jan (23 May 2007). "World War II: New Research Taints Image of Desert Fox Rommel". Spiegel Online. Retrieved 4 March 2016.
{{cite news}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Gibson, Charles M., Commander, USN (2001). "Operational Leadership as Practiced by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel During the German Campaign in North Africa 1941–1942: Success of Failure?" (PDF). Naval War College. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - Green, Leslie C. (1993). The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-3540-1.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Grill, Markus (10 October 2002). "Was Macht Eigentlich...: Manfred Rommel". Stern (in German).
{{cite web}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Hart, Russel A. (2014). "Rommel and the 20th July Bomb Plot". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}:|editor=has generic name (help); Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Hoffmann, Karl (2004). Erwin Rommel, 1891-1944. Commanders in Focus. London: Brassey's. ISBN 1-85753-374-7.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Kitchen, Martin (2009). Rommel's Desert War: Waging World War II in North Africa, 1941–1943. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-50971-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Lewin, Ronald (1998) [1968]. Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Lieb, Peter (2013). "Ardenne Abbey Massacre". In Mikaberidze, Alexander (ed.). Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO. pp. 25–27. ISBN 1598849263.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Lieb, Peter (2014). "Rommel in Normandy". In I. F. W. Beckett (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - von Luck, Hans (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. New York: Dell Publishing of Random House. ISBN 0-440-20802-5.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Luvaas, Jay (1990). "Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
- Major, Patrick (2008). "'Our Friend Rommel': The Wehrmacht as 'Worthy Enemy' in Postwar British Popular Culture". German History. 26 (4). Oxford University Press: 520–535. doi:10.1093/gerhis/ghn049.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Martin, Douglas (9 November 2013). "Manfred Rommel, Son of German Field Marshal, Dies at 84". The New York Times.
{{cite web}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Mearsheimer, John (1988). Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801420894.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Megargee, Geoffrey P. (2000). Inside Hitler's High Command. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press. ISBN 0-7006-1015-4.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - von Mellenthin, Friedrich (1956). Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. London: Cassell. ISBN 978-0-345-32158-9.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Messenger, Charles (2009). Rommel: Leadership Lessons from the Desert Fox. Basingstoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-23060-908-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Mitcham, Samuel W. (2007). Rommel's Desert Commanders — The Men Who Served the Desert Fox, North Africa, 1941–42. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-3510-9.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Mitcham, Samuel W. (2008). The Rise of the Wehrmacht. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. ISBN 978-0-275-99641-3.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Moorhouse, Roger (2007). Killing Hitler: The Third Reich and the Plots Against the Führer. London: Random House. ISBN 978-1-844133-22-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Naumann, Klaus (2009). "Afterword". In Charles Messenger (ed.). Rommel: Leadership Lessons from the Desert Fox. Basingstoke, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-23060-908-2.
{{cite encyclopedia}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Playfair, Major-General I. S. O.; with Flynn, Captain F. C. RN; Molony, Brigadier C. J. C.; Gleave, Group Captain T. P. (2004) [1960 HMSO]. Butler, Sir James (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb (September 1941 to September 1942). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. III. Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-845740-67-X.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|lastauthoramp=ignored (|name-list-style=suggested) (help) - Porch, Douglas (2004). The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (1st ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. ISBN 978-0-374-20518-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Remy, Maurice Philip (2002). Mythos Rommel. Munich: Ullstein. ISBN 3548603858.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) Maurice Philip Remy - Reuth, Ralf Georg (2005). Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books. ISBN 978-1-904950-20-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Robinson, James R. (1997). "The Rommel Myth". Military Review Journal. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
- Rommel, Erwin (1982) [1953]. Liddell Hart, B. H. (ed.). The Rommel Papers. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 978-0-306-80157-0.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Scherzer, Veit (2007). Die Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939 von Heer, Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine, Waffen-SS, Volkssturm sowie mit Deutschland verbündeter Streitkräfte nach den Unterlagen des Bundesarchives (in German). Jena, Germany: Scherzers Miltaer-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-938845-17-2.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Scheck, Raffael (2010). "Mythos Rommel (Raffael Scheck)".
{{cite web}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Searle, Alaric (2014). "Rommel and the rise of the Nazis". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624.
{{cite encyclopedia}}:|editor=has generic name (help); Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Shirer, William L. (1960). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-671-62420-0.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Silverstone, Paul (2011). The Navy of the Nuclear Age, 1947–2007. Routledge. ISBN 9781135864651.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Speidel, Hans (1950). Invasion 1944: Rommel and the Normandy Campaign. Chicago: Henry Regnery.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Thompson, Julian (2011) [2008]. Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory. New York: Arcade. ISBN 978-1-61145-314-0.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Von Seemen, Gerhard (1976). Die Ritterkreuzträger 1939–1945 : die Ritterkreuzträger sämtlicher Wehrmachtteile, Brillanten-, Schwerter- und Eichenlaubträger in der Reihenfolge der Verleihung : Anhang mit Verleihungsbestimmungen und weiteren Angaben (in German). Friedberg, Germany: Podzun-Verlag. ISBN 978-3-7909-0051-4.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Watson, Bruce Allen (1999). Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 9780275959234.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Willmott, H.P. (1984). June, 1944. Poole: Blandford Press. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Young, Desmond (1950). Rommel: The Desert Fox. New York: Harper & Row. OCLC 48067797.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Die Wehrmachtberichte 1939–1945 Band 2, 1. Januar 1942 bis 31. Dezember 1943 (in German). München, Germany: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG. 1985. ISBN 978-3-423-05944-2.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Die Wehrmachtberichte 1939–1945 Band 3, 1. Januar 1944 bis 9. Mai 1945 (in German). München, Germany: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG. 1985. ISBN 978-3-423-05944-2.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|trans_title=ignored (|trans-title=suggested) (help) - Zabecki, David T. (2016). "Rethinking Rommel". Military History. 32 (5). Herndon, Va.: 24–29.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Zabecki, David T. [in German] (2016). "March 2016 Readers' Letters". HistoryNet. Retrieved 3 March 2016.
Further reading
- Almásy, László (2001). With Rommel's Army in Libya. Bloomington, IN: 1st Books Libr. ISBN 978-0-7596-1608-0.
- De Lannoy, Francois (2002). Afrikakorps, 1941–1943: The Libya Egypt Campaign. Bayeux: Heimdal. ISBN 978-2-84048-152-2.
- Forty, George (1998). The Armies of Rommel. London: Arms and Armour Press. ISBN 978-1-85409-379-0.
- Greene, Jack; Massignani, Alessandro (1994). Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 – November 1942. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books. ISBN 978-1-58097-018-1.
- Jentz, Thomas L. (1998). Tank Combat in North Africa: The Opening Rounds: Operations Sonnenblume, Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe February 1941 – June 1941. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History. ISBN 978-0-7643-0226-8.
- Kelly, Orr (2002). Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia. New York: J. Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-41429-2.
- Kriebel, Rainer; Gudmundsson, Bruce I (1999). Inside the Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941–1942. London: Greenhill. ISBN 978-1-85367-322-1.
- Latimer, Jon (2002). Alamein. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-01016-1.
- Latimer, Jon (2001). Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move. Oxford: Osprey Military. ISBN 978-1-84176-092-6.
- Liddell Hart, B.H. (1948). The German Generals Talk. New York: Morrow. ISBN 978-0-688-06012-1.
- Marshall, Charles F. (1994). The Rommel Murder: The Life and Death of the Desert Fox. Stackpole Marshall Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-2472-2.
- Mitcham, Samuel W. (2001) [1998]. Rommel's Greatest Victory. Novato, CA: Presidio. ISBN 978-0-89141-730-9.
- Rommel, Erwin (1934). Gefechts-Aufgaben für Zug und Kompanie : Ein Handb. f. d. Offizierunterricht (in German). Mittler & Sohn.
- Rommel, Erwin; Kidde, G. E. (2006) [1937]. Infantry Attacks. OCLC 22898178.
- Rommel, Erwin; Pimlott, John (2006) [2003]. Rommel and his Art of War. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 978-1-85367-543-0.
- Schraepler, Hans-Joachim; Schraepler, Hans-Albrecht (September 2009). At Rommel's Side: The Lost Letters of Hans-Joachim Schraepler. London: Frontline Books. ISBN 978-1-84832-538-8.
- Showalter, Dennis (2005). Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century. ISBN 978-0-425-20663-8.
- Windrow, Martin (1976). Rommel's Desert Army. Osprey. ISBN 978-0-85045-095-8.
External links
- Works by or about Erwin Rommel at the Internet Archive
- Neitzel, Sönke (2005), "Rommel, Eugen Johannes Erwin", Neue Deutsche Biographie (in German), vol. 22, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 23–24; (full text online)
- Template:Worldcat id
- "Defeating the Desert Fox": Video on YouTube, via the official channel of The National WWII Museum; session by Nigel Hamilton at the 2012 International Conference on World War II
- "Erwin Rommel 1891–1944". LeMO at Deutsches Historisches Museum (in German). Retrieved 13 May 2016.
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- Use dmy dates from October 2012
- Erwin Rommel
- 1891 births
- 1944 deaths
- Field marshals of Nazi Germany
- Forced suicides
- German Lutherans
- German military personnel of World War I
- German military personnel who committed suicide
- German military writers
- Grand Officers of the Military Order of Savoy
- Knights of the Military Merit Order (Württemberg)
- Military personnel of Württemberg
- Military personnel referenced in the Wehrmachtbericht
- People from Heidenheim
- People from the Kingdom of Württemberg
- Recipients of the clasp to the Iron Cross, 1st class
- Knights 1st class of the Friedrich Order
- Recipients of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds
- Recipients of the Military Merit Order (Bavaria), 2nd class
- Recipients of the Order of Michael the Brave, 2nd class
- Recipients of the Pour le Mérite (military class)
- Recipients of the Gold Medal of Military Valor
- Suicides by cyanide poisoning
- Suicides in Germany
- Members of the 20 July plot who committed suicide