|DF-21/CSS-5 Mod 1|
DF-21 and transporter erector launcher vehicle at the Beijing Military Museum.
|Place of origin||China|
|Used by||People's Liberation Army Rocket Force
Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force
|Weight||14,700 kilograms (32,400 lb)|
|Length||10.7 metres (35 ft)|
|Diameter||1.4 metres (4.6 ft)|
|Warhead||1, or 5-6 (improved variant) 200-300-500 kt|
|1,770 km (1,100 mi) (DF-21/DF-21A)
1,700 km (1,100 mi) (DF-21C)
1,500 km (930 mi; 810 nmi) (DF-21D ASBM)
|Inertial + terminal active radar guidance|
The Dong-Feng 21 (DF-21; NATO reporting name CSS-5 - Dong-Feng (simplified Chinese: 东风; traditional Chinese: 東風; literally: "East Wind")) is a two-stage, solid-fuel rocket, single-warhead medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) in the Dong Feng series developed by China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy. Development started in the late 1960s and was completed around 1985-86, but it was not deployed until 1991. It was developed from the submarine-launched JL-1 missile, and is China's first solid-fuel land-based missile. The U.S. Department of Defense in 2008 estimated that China had 60-80 missiles and 60 launchers; approximately 10-11 missiles can be built annually.
Originally developed as a strategic weapon, the DF-21's later variants were designed for both nuclear and conventional missions. As well as a nuclear warhead of around 300 kt, it is thought that high explosive and submunition warheads are available. The latest DF-21D was said to be the world's first anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21 has also been developed into a space-capable anti-satellite weapon/anti-missile weapon carrier.
Though the launcher itself is mobile to reduce vulnerability, an actual launch unit requires support vehicles that can cover a 300×300-meter area, making it hard to move quickly and easier to detect. Also, the launcher is not made to travel off-road and requires solid ground when firing to prevent backblast and debris damage due to the hard launch, restricting its firing locations to roads and pre-made launch pads.
DF-21/A/C (CSS-5 Mod-1/2/3)
The basic variant DF-21 had a range of 1,770+ km, and a payload of 600 kg (1,300 lb) consisting of a single 500 kt nuclear warhead, with an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of 300~400 m; this version did not enter operational service. The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy with an estimated CEP of 100~300 m.[dead link] This version is reported to have a similar 1,770+ km range, with a potential extended range of 2,150 km (1,340 mi).
Revealed in 2006, the DF-21C is a terminally guided version that has a maximum range believed to be about 1,700 km (1,100 mi) and accuracy estimated to be 50~10 m. The missile was the first dual-capable version, able to be armed with either a nuclear or conventional warhead. In 2010, the DF-21C was being deployed in central Western China.
DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod-4) Anti-ship ballistic missile
This is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has a maximum range exceeding 1,450 kilometres (900 mi; 780 nmi), according to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center did not believe it was deployed in 2009. The guidance system is thought to be still in an evolutionary process as more UAVs and satellites are added.
The US Department of Defense stated in 2010 that China has developed and reached initial operating capability (IOC) of a conventionally armed high hypersonic land-based anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. This is the first ASBM and weapon system capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers. The DF-21D is thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system. It may have been tested in 2005-6, and the launch of the Jianbing-5/YaoGan-1 and Jianbing-6/YaoGan-2 satellites offering targeting information from synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and visual imaging respectively. The upgrades enhance China's ability to prevent US carriers from operating in the Taiwan Strait. Some have also suggested China could develop a "MIRVd" DF-21D with multiple independent missiles.
United States Naval Institute in 2009 stated that such a warhead would be large enough to destroy an aircraft carrier in one hit and that there was "currently ... no defense against it" if it worked as theorized. The United States Navy has responded by switching its focus from a close blockade force of shallow water vessels to return to building deep water ballistic missile defense destroyers. The United States has also assigned most of its ballistic missile defense capable ships to the Pacific, extended the BMD program to all Aegis destroyers and increased procurement of SM-3 BMD missiles. The United States also has a large network optimized for tracking ballistic missile launches which may give carrier groups sufficient warning in order to move away from the target area while the missile is in flight. Kinetic defenses against the DF-21D would be difficult. The Navy's primary ballistic missile interceptor, the SM-3, would not be effective since it is designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase in space, so it would have to be launched almost immediately to hit before reentry or from an Aegis ship positioned under its flight path. The SM-2 Block 4 can intercept missiles reentering the atmosphere, but the warhead will be performing high-G maneuvers that may complicate interception.
Use of such missile has been said by some experts to potentially lead to nuclear exchange, regional arms races with India and Japan, and the end of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, to which the People's Republic of China is not a party.
China has recently launched a series of satellites to support its ASBM efforts:
- Yaogan-VII electro-optical satellite - 9 December 2009
- Yaogan-VIII synthetic aperture radar satellite - 14 December 2009
- Yaogan-IX Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation (3 satellites in formation) - 5 March 2010.
- Yaogan-XVI Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation - 25 November 2012
In late 2013, a Russian Military Analysis report of the DF-21D concluded that the only way to successfully counter it would be through electronic countermeasures. Conventional interceptions of high-speed objectives have worked in the past, with the Russian report citing the 2008 interception of a malfunctioning satellite by a U.S. cruiser, but in that situation the warship had extensive knowledge of its location and trajectory. Against an attack from the Mach 10 DF-21D without knowing the missile's launch point, the U.S. Navy's only way to evade it would be through electronic countermeasures.
The emergence of the DF-21D has some analysts claiming that the "carrier killer" missiles have rendered the American use of aircraft carriers obsolete, as they are too vulnerable in the face of the new weapon and not worth the expense. Military leaders in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, however, do not see it as a "game changer" to completely count carriers out. First, the missile may not be able to single-handedly destroy its target, as the warhead is believed to be enough to only inflict a "mission kill" to make a carrier unable to conduct flight operations. Secondly, there is the problem of finding its target. The DF-21D has a range estimated between 1,035 to 1,726 mi (899 to 1,500 nmi; 1,666 to 2,778 km), so a carrier battle group would need to be located through other means before launching. Over-the-horizon radars cannot pinpoint their exact locations, and would have to be used in conjunction with Chinese recon satellites; recon aircraft and submarines could also look for them, but they are vulnerable to the carrier's defenses. Finally, although the DF-21D has radar and optical sensors for tracking, it has not yet been tested against a ship target moving at-sea at up to 55 km/h (30 kn; 34 mph), let alone ones using clutter and countermeasures. The "kill chain" of the missile requires processing and constantly updating data of a carrier's location, preparing the launch, programming information, and then firing, a chain the U.S. military's AirSea Battle concept involves disrupting. Some U.S. analysts believe that the DF-21D doesn't fly any faster than Mach 5.
The DF-21D reentry vehicle appears to bear similarities to the American Pershing II missile's RV, which was withdrawn from service in 1988. The Pershing II's RV weighed 1,400 lb (640 kg) and was fitted with four control fins to perform a 25-G pull-up after reentering the atmosphere, traveling at Mach 8 and then gliding 30 nmi (35 mi; 56 km) to the target to pitch into a terminal dive. Army training manuals about the missile are available on the internet and public open-source literature extensively describes it; the DF-21 has a comparable range and payload. Though much is made of the DF-21D's damage infliction ability based solely on velocity and kinetic energy, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has calculated that the energy of an inert 500 kg (1,100 lb) RV impacting at Mach 6 had similar energy to the combined kinetic and explosive power of the American subsonic Harpoon anti-ship missile, which is one-quarter the energy of the Russian supersonic 12,800 lb (5,800 kg) Kh-22 missile traveling at Mach 4 with a 2,200 lb (1,000 kg) warhead.
The DF-26 is a development of the DF-21 with range increased to 3,000 km (1,900 mi) to 4,000 km (2,500 mi); its existence was confirmed in the mid-2010s but it had already been in service for several years.
Saudi Arabian purchase
In January 2014, Newsweek revealed that Saudi Arabia had secretly bought a number of DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles in 2007. They also said that the American CIA had allowed the deal to go through as long as the missiles were modified to not be able to carry nuclear warheads. Saudi Arabia had previously secretly acquired Chinese DF-3A ballistic missiles in 1988, which was later exposed by the United States. While the DF-3 has a longer range, it was designed to carry a nuclear payload, and so had poor accuracy (300 meters CEP) if used with a conventional warhead. It would only be useful against large area targets like cities and military bases. This made them useless during the Gulf War for retaliating against Iraqi Scud missile attacks, as they would cause mass civilian casualties and would not be as effective as the ongoing coalition air attacks. After the war, the Saudis and the CIA worked together to covertly allow the purchase of Chinese DF-21s. The DF-21 is solid-fueled instead of liquid-fueled like the DF-3, so it takes less time to prepare for launch. It is accurate to 30 meters CEP, allowing it to attack specific targets like compounds or palaces. The Saudis are not known to possess mobile launchers, but may use the same 12 launchers originally bought with the DF-3s. The number of DF-21 missiles that were bought is unknown. Newsweek speculates that details of the deal being made public is part of Saudi deterrence against Iran.
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